7

Culture and Leadership in a Flat Country:
The Case of the Netherlands

Henk Thierry
Tilburg University, the Netherlands

Deanne N. den Hartog
University of Amsterdam

Paul L. Koopman
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Celeste P. M. Wilderom
University of Twente, the Netherlands

Summary

Dutch GLOBE data are presented in this chapter with an overview of the history of Holland and later the Netherlands. From the Middle Ages onward, Dutch cities had substantial local autonomy, which led their educated citizens and merchants to rule themselves to a large extent. This relative autonomy stimulated independent thought and judgment, a climate that helped Protestantism to gain much ground. Foreign trade facilitated the rise of a liberal culture. Later on, religious denomination became an important societal organization principle. After the Second World War industrial relations were characterized by an economic order that emphasized mixed capitalism (in which the government has a strong role), consultation among major parties, and a welfare state.

GLOBE data on societal and organizational culture show that collective economic interests, low power distance, gender egalitarianism, and group loyalty are still endorsed in the Netherlands, although values like performance and assertiveness are gaining ground. This reflects a process of cultural transition in which individualization and flexibility become increasingly dominant values. Dutch middle managers’ perceptions of outstanding leaders stress the importance of consensus building, support, and power sharing, but also of visionary, motivating, and decisive qualities.

This chapter ends with 10 “commandments” on what leaders from abroad should and shouldn't do in the Netherlands.

1.  OVERVIEW

When descending by aircraft toward Amsterdam airport (Schiphol), the traveler gets a characteristic view of The Netherlands, regardless of the direction of the approach. Green meadows are orderly intersected by rivers, canals, and lakes; growing cities and towns surround agricultural areas; roads and highways expose heavy traffic; and the country is clean and flat. In fact, a large part of the country is below sea level: The Dutch are well known for their technical expertise in building dikes and dams to protect vulnerable areas and in gaining land from the sea. Additionally, some parts of the country are slightly hilly, but that feature is not visible to the air passenger: It reveals itself only to the traveler with a slower pace of transport. All in all, the country looks very organized.

Having read KLM's in-flight magazine, the air passenger is informed that the Netherlands covers 13,433 square miles. It houses slightly more than 16 million inhabitants and it is consequently the country with approximately the highest population per square mile in the world. The Dutch language is spoken throughout the country, but there are remarkable differences between regions with regard to pronunciation. Even bordering villages or towns may sizably differ from one another in their vocabulary. Often, historical and cultural factors explain most of these differences, for example, the extent to which a community was exposed to French influences during the French Revolution, or the religion (Protestantism or Roman Catholicism) most inhabitants (used to) adhere to. Dutch is also spoken by the Flemish people in Belgium. Not only their pronunciation, but also their construction of sentences is different; some “Dutch” words originate in Belgium, and are only used in Flemish. When somebody from South Africa (speaking “Afrikaans” rooted in 17th-century Dutch) is interviewed on Dutch TV, subtitles are shown. In one of the 12 counties, Friesland, the “Fries” language is spoken besides Dutch, and the names of towns in that county are spelled in both Dutch and Fries. Major current minority languages are Turkish, Moroccan, Surinam, and Papiaments (originally from the Dutch Antilles). Larger cities, like Amsterdam and Rotterdam, are home to former inhabitants of more than 130 countries, resulting in many other languages being heard as well, making Dutch culture in these areas increasingly multicolored and pluriform in nature.

The Netherlands is also the home base for several large multinational enterprises in different sectors, including Philips, Shell, Unilever, AKZO/Nobel, DSM, CORUS (former Hoogovens), KLM, ING Bank, ABN/AMRO Bank, and Ahold. Yet, company (and political) leadership is not often a hot item in the country. Many people even find it difficult to mention an outstanding Dutch leader, not because good leaders are lacking, but much more because a leader tends not to be recognized as such. As a well-known saying goes “a leader should remain to be an ordinary person.” Dutch organizations emphasize training and educating the workforce, and keeping people “employable.” Many commercial and noncommercial training institutions are active on the Dutch market. Many companies make extensive use of the help of organizational consultancy agencies. The average productivity level (combining both labor and capital productivity) was comparatively high in the past two decades, but the level of growth is gradually decreasing. Also, a sizable part of the employable population is partly or fully disabled and cannot work. Only around 40% of the people aged between 55 and 65 years are still employed. The country was successful in reducing its unemployment rate to less than 5% (effective 1998 onward), primarily through increasing the amount of part-time jobs. However, the slowing down of the economy has recently caused many organizations to reduce their labor force.

Characteristic to the country is having an organized, businesslike climate rather than a powerful leader-oriented atmosphere. To a certain extent there is even an antihero attitude. Dutch prime ministers usually do not present themselves as stars, but tend to emphasize trustworthiness, thoroughness, and commonness (such as “shopping like the next-door neighbor”) in their behavior. Often, they stress the general interest (in terms of “being the prime minister of all inhabitants of the country”) rather than favoring the interests of the political party they adhere to. The relative inexperience with stardom in politics surfaced in 2002 as a charismatic opposition leader “Pim Fortuyn” challenged the dominant “purple” coalition (constituted by the Conservative and the Social Democratic parties). He was killed briefly before the parliamentary elections in that year (which evoked distress on a national level), and even after his death his party still got the largest turnout of votes that any new party ever gained in Dutch parliamentary history.

The air passenger, with whom this introductory overview started, made the ground successfully. Inside and outside the airport the country looks orderly and clean; the Dutch language provides the passenger with mysterious feelings as it sounds so unfamiliar, but luckily most people master the English language. The country looks flat, and the passenger wonders whether this impression holds beyond its literal, geographical meaning.

Let's expose our guest first to an essay about some historical features of Dutch societal culture, (Section 2). Next, the industrial relations system is described (Section 3), focusing especially on how it developed itself after the Second World War. Section 4 highlights current characteristics of societal culture, including the data assembled in the GLOBE study, whereas Section 5 describes results relevant to the culture of the organizations participating in the Dutch GLOBE study. Section 6 returns to the theme of leadership, and presents the Dutch GLOBE data on this theme. Section 7 deals with several specific manifestations of Dutch societal culture, some limitations of the current study, as well as some suggestions for future research. Section 8 addresses some current challenges for Dutch organizational leadership. Finally, in the concluding Section 9 the guest should have at least learned which behaviors leaders from abroad should engage in, and abstain from, when exposed to Dutch employees.

2.  DUTCH SOCIETAL CULTURE AND POLITICS: A BRIEF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The Dutch are not known as people who regularly commemorate figures of historical importance. Suppose you as a reader were to ask a Dutch citizen living in one of the cities, which of his or her past or current countrymen is considered to be a person of historical importance? Probably, the first reply would be in terms of another question: “What is meant by ‘historical’ importance?” Assuming that this problem would be solved satisfactorily, the second reply would probably also embody a question: “Why commemorate him or her?”

One of the “solid” ways to commemorate historical figures and to support the societal values they modeled would be to erect a statue for them. Such statues in the Netherlands are scarce, but there are several, such as the one for William, Prince of Orange, murdered in 1584 in Delft; Van Oldenbarnevelt, an influential legal consultant to the Counties of Holland, also murdered (1619); Michiel de Ruyter, a famous Navy Commander in the 17th century; William III, King of the Netherlands, 19th century; and Van Heutsz, Army General and colonial ruler in the Indies, 19th and 20th century. Perhaps because of her role during the Second World War, Queen Wilhelmina, grandmother of the current Queen Beatrix, received more than one statue. Interestingly, some influential philosophers are also “petrified,” including Erasmus (Rotterdam), Spinoza, and Comenius (the latter from Czech decent). Quite a few statues are found along the Dutch coast, such as the one showing a small boy keeping his thumb in the hole of a dike, thus preventing the inundation of a larger part of the country. Some other statues show an old woman, sadly stretching her arm to the vast waters. Such statues express the constant concern of the “low countries” with the North Sea: a fishing area for some, a graveyard for too many, and an unpredictable nibbler of the coastline, causing a continuous fight for land.

Yet, the “harvest” of statues commemorating historical figures is modest. This is not because there weren't Dutch persons of historical national or international importance: Time and again Dutch inhabitants gained prominence in whatever domain, and painted portraits of some of these people are found in museums and castles. Rather, in Dutch culture outstanding individuals are usually not identified as a hero: It runs counter to important values and habits that attribute unusual performance mainly, let alone exclusively, to individual characteristics. The root of this conception probably dates back many centuries. To gain more insight into such roots we briefly need to review the political and economic culture of “Holland,” from the early 14th century onward (cf.; Blonk, Romein, & Oerlemans, 1967, 1978; Braudel, 1979; Koeningsberger, 2001; D. Langedijk, 1948a, 1948b; Rijpma, 1952; Schama, 1987).

Citizens and Merchants

Although the terms “Holland” and “the Netherlands” are nowadays used interchangeably to identify the same nation-state, there is a vast historical difference. Holland refers to the western part of the country, roughly encompassing the current counties North-Holland (capital: Haarlem) and South-Holland (capital: The Hague). During previous centuries Holland sometimes went to war against neighboring counties, but more often cooperated with them (such as Friesland, Zeeland, and Utrecht), and established a small nation – state for quite a long period of time. Some counties that currently belong to the state of Belgium joined the cooperation with Holland for a while, but other counties opted for temporary liaisons with “enemy states” such as France or Spain. Holland got its fair share of wars, against or in cooperation with England, Prussia, France, and, for quite a period, Spain. During Napoleon's regime Holland and other counties were made part of France for several years. Shortly afterward, as King William I was inaugurated (1814), the Netherlands was established as a country, also encompassing current parts of Belgium (the so-called South – Netherlands) as a consequence of the ruling by the Viennese Congress (1815). Later Belgium received its independence in 1831.

Around AD 1300 the cities of Holland got municipal rights. These rights allowed a city to govern itself and to determine its own jurisdiction. If a plan for action was very expensive, good custom held that citizens were consulted. Generally, merchants favored the high extent of the cities’ “local autonomy.” As merchants became more prosperous through effective trading, they asked the count for protection against gangs of robbers or foreign invasion. Perhaps because of this, but also because an increasing number of counties became involved (Holland and other counties including French Burgundy), a strong centralized government was installed at the time Jacoba van Beieren was countess (early 15th century). Each region got a stadtholder (the word probably being a combination of the Dutch stad [city] and the English holder), representing the authority of the count. The nobility, the clergy and the cities were consulted in the Regional Estates (Gewestelijke Staten). All counties together convened every now and then in the Estate General (Staten Generaal).¹ The Dutch Estate General is among the oldest democratic institutions in Europe, established in 1464 by representatives of the Regional Estates (Koeningsberger, 2001).

These developments strengthened the position of the citizens (and the farmers) at the expense of the power of the nobility and the clergy. Trade and commerce flourished. The position of merchants was an issue of debate, however, because some people held that the price of a product would be lower if it were to be established without the interference of a “third (merchant) party.” So the government took care that products were bought and sold for a fair price. This early form of capitalism was also practiced in the early 16th century in Northern Italy. Dutch trade focused on fishing (in particular herring), whereas freight was taken when the fishing season was over. Gradually, Dutch merchants started to trade independently (e.g., in grain). Also, wage laborers were attracted to the clothing industry (cloth was purchased in Calais from English merchants). As the art of printing was developed (Gutenberg, in Germany, 1450), citizens in the wealthy cities founded their own schools, and reduced the power the clergy traditionally enjoyed in this domain. Pupils were educated in bookkeeping and other applied subjects, which prepared them for a merchant career. Wealthier cities also raised their own mercenary armies, thus controlling the power the nobility usually possessed there. It is small wonder that the onset of the Renaissance met fertile soil in the cities in Holland with their relatively wealthy, educated, and independent citizens. These citizens were used to carry personal responsibility and to making their own judgment, as they were rather independent from the clergy and the nobility.

Yet, it is not so much the Renaissance but more so the onset of Protestantism that is most important to the further development of Holland. Early in the 16th century Luther attached his 95 “statements” to the Chapel of Wittenberg, Germany (1517). In Holland and adjacent counties, the assumptions and ideas of Calvin (“Calvinism”) became more influential, as these diffused from Switzerland to France and other European countries from 1550 onward. During that period, Roman Catholic Spanish kings ruled Holland: Karel V reigned for a rather long time, and was succeeded by his son Philips II. A nobleman, William, Prince of Orange, became the leader of the opposition in Holland. Lower nobility joined with this opposition, because they too had adopted the Calvinistic faith. Moreover, the Bartholomew night (1572) that had taken place in France in which many Protestants were killed, had brought quite a number of those Protestant survivors to Holland. Major issues for the opposition to contest were:

• The introduction of new (Roman Catholic) dioceses.
• A change in civil administration.
• The preence of the Spanish army.

A long period of strenuous fights followed, partly underground. Groups of Geuzen² battled repeatedly with the Spanish army. When a city joined the Orange opposition, it meant that its citizens would adopt Protestantism. Usually this implied that a new government was appointed from the lower classes, which did not tend to obey the nobility and the Catholic Church. William, Prince of Orange was excommunicated by the pope in 1580, and was murdered in 1584. His son Maurits became the new stadtholder. Battles with Spain continued every now and then until the peace treaty of Münster in 1648.

Let's briefly recap the key ideas from the preceding sections. The cities in Holland already enjoyed a large amount of autonomy by the end of the Middle Ages. They took care of their administration as well as of their jurisdiction. Trade prospered, accompanied by a concern to achieve fair prices. Wealthier cities founded their own schools and raised mercenary armies. The role of the Catholic Church and of noblemen was much weaker than in many other countries: the educated citizen was capable of judging for him or herself how to behave and what to think, and was not inclined to accept somebody else's authority. Protestantism, in particular the Calvinistic faith, was very much in line with most of these values: Each citizen should read the Bible him or herself, should make his or her own judgment, and can practice faith in the local parish where “Presbyters,”³ and not priests, should have influence.

It is this background against which the 17th century—the Dutch Golden Age—took off. The Republic of Holland had by and large prospered during the war against Spain. Merchants established trading societies with shares for each participant, thus sharing profits and losses with one another. In 1602, the East Indies Company was founded, followed by the West Indies Company in 1621. Their shares were traded at the stock exchange. New Amsterdam (the later New York) was established in 1625. Holland was the sole country with a permanent foothold in Japan (Decima). The Northern Company ruled the whale fishery around Scandinavia. Sea traders sailed the world seas.⁴ Sciences, arts, and literature were cultivated at a high level (e.g., Huijgens, Spinoza, Vondel, and Rembrandt van Rijn). The Republic ruled itself through the Estate bodies mentioned earlier: The county of Holland had the most power (interestingly, the clergy was not represented in the States of Holland; the nobility had one vote). It is a matter of debate whether the Estate General of the Republic or the stadtholder wielded most power; anyway, they repeatedly struggled about the delineation of the other party's and their own rights and responsibilities (cf. Koeningsberger, 2001; van Deursen, 2004). In the domain of religion, a strongly debated and divisive subject related to the extent to which the Bible should be understood “literally,” for example, as to whether personal salvation is predetermined by God.⁵ Yet, many pleas were made to be tolerant and “liberal” to people with other beliefs or opinions (among those the people without a particular faith or religion), and “equal rights” were advocated for the “common people,” the handicapped, and the poor. Such pleas were even more important as the seizure of the Edict of Nantes in France (1685) expelled many French Protestants. As many of these “Huegenots” were skilled craftsmen, the economies in the countries to which they fled profited sizably (e.g., parts of Germany and Holland).

In the 18th century, the Republic showed a tremendous amount of decay in many domains that had flourished during the Golden Age. Wealthy merchants showed off their possessions and lived off the interests and rents. Regents divided the best jobs and positions among themselves and their offspring. The army was corrupt, and a debate continued about the required size of army needed. Moreover, many foreign countries became strong economic competitors, outperforming the Republic in many ways. Yet, trade remained a strong sector. Humanism strengthened the dislike of authority. Rousseau's ideas about the people's sovereignty and Montesquieu's conception about the “trias politica”⁶ were attractive to many regents. Then France occupied the Republic in 1794–1795, shortly before Napoleon started to battle with many other European countries.

Holland lost its independence for quite a while. The country—called the Batavian Republic until 1806—had to pay heavy duties to France. Trade collapsed, civil administration changed drastically, and the country became engaged in a war against England. Yet, various innovative laws were enacted, such as those on taxes and basic education. Between 1806 and 1810, Napoleon's brother—Lodewijk Napoleon—was King of Holland. From 1810 onward, Holland became a part of France. But in 1814, King William I of Orange was inaugurated and a new Constitution was introduced: The country of the Netherlands was born, which also incorporated major parts of Belgium until 1831. Trade started to flourish again. This newfound unity did not, however, lead to a centralized power structure. Most important for the administrative structure of the country was the new Constitution of 1848, primarily designed by the Liberal politician Thorbecke, who was appointed prime minister shortly afterward. It marked the onset of the parliamentary aristocracy (cf. Blonk et al., 1978). The Constitution addressed, for instance, direct election of the Second Chamber (Parliament), the rights and responsibilities of both Chambers, the public (open) character of all governmental institutions, and the inviolability of the king. Counties and cities again acquired substantial autonomy in the administration of their own affairs. Besides the Liberal Party, there was a Conservative, a Protestant, and a Roman Catholic Party. In the second part of the 19th century, social and socioeconomic issues became main points of concern, for example, child labor, industrial nuisance, and the self-organization of workers in labor unions. Manufacturing industries were innovated, and transport by train and by boat was provided with a better infrastructure. Farm produce was not protected against cheaper foreign imports, because the government favored free world trade.

In the next two sections, some main trends and characteristics of the 20th century are highlighted. First, the foreign policy of the Netherlands continued with its neutrality in international conflicts. This kept the country largely outside World War I, but it didn't offer protection against German occupation in World War II, which left the country devastated in 1945. Second, the life and work of many were organized along denominational segregation lines. This applied primarily to the Protestant and to the Roman Catholic denominations: Many societal organizations and institutions belonged to a particular denomination, implying, for instance, that citizens selected retail shops, leisure-time pursuits, health care, their political party, cultural events, their union, and even their employer more or less according to their “religious” color. Such segregation was previously thought to have hindered societal development, as the principles of “sovereignty in one's own circle” (Protestant) and “subsidiarity” (Roman Catholic: What is better done down the hierarchical chain should not be handled at a higher level) would make citizens less open to developments in other societal domains. Nowadays, the perspective is taken that denominational segregation may not only have facilitated the “emancipation” of minority movements, but may also have contributed to balancing parties in conflict and integrating citizens into society. Denominational segregation has probably played a key role in the development of a large middle class, which helped to stabilize the country and led to continued modernization. After a period of desegregation in recent decades, some new denominational categories have surfaced in Dutch society, like the Islamic, Liberal, Christian (Roman Catholics and Protestants combined), and Socio-Democrat movements.

No Heros?

Why is it that the Dutch usually do not tend to recognize countrymen of particular “historical” importance as heroes, or even manifest an antihero attitude? Why is it that they frequently detest observing outspoken symbols of officialdom, resent prerogatives of leaders, and sometimes even question the acceptability of persons in more powerful positions? Furthermore, why did they tend to disregard high performers or discourage outstanding achievers (as is highlighted in the typically Dutch saying: “Being ordinary is sufficiently awkward.”)? There is, of course, not one, single, fully adequate answer to these questions. However, the historical perspective taken in the preceding section identified some core themes, which may jointly apply:

1.  From at least the Middle Ages onward, cities possessed or gained much power to settle their own affairs in various respects. They were most often not subject to a strong, single-person type of leadership structure: the count or the king usually resided abroad and left affairs to be handled by a remplacant, for example, a stadtholder. The more educated citizens were thus accustomed to a relatively large amount of autonomy and shared their power, to a certain extent, with others. Thus, these citizens were never very dependent on emperors, the clergy, and/or the nobility. In addition, Holland never had very distinct class differences although in later centuries, a large middle class developed.

2.  Merchants created a lot of wealth for the cities. This strengthened the opportunities for cities and their citizens to regulate their own affairs, for example, through founding their own schools or setting up an army of mercenaries. As merchants very often went abroad and foreign traders frequently visited the Republic of Holland, a liberal, tolerant climate developed, open to different views (and, sometimes, some variety in religion).

• This culture of self-determination, of decentralized administration and of relative wealth for the “cultured,” educated citizens was open to the Protestant faith, in particular as represented by Calvin. It is probably a bit too simple, as Weber (1947) tended to say, that Calvinism provided fertile ground for capitalism (also as many other, non-Protestant countries adopted capitalism). Rather, a certain embarrassment with the visible prosperity of many may have been more characteristic (Schama, 1987). Schama coined the term “moral ambiguity of prosperity” to refer to the problem of how to reconcile a luxurious lifestyle with the endorsement of the values of soberness and charity.

• Children were usually raised at home and not in a boarding school. Generally, women aspired to be housewives, including taking on the full-time care of their children. As for a boarding school, this would be typical of a more masculine environment (stressing values like disciplined behavior, obedience, courage, achievement, etc.), but such values were not dominant. Moreover, the people of Holland were not used to royal courts with pomp and circumstance.

3.  Taken together, these core themes may have cradled the “germs” of the shared perception, in Dutch society, that a “person of historical importance” should be looked upon in terms of the social network—the context—she or he is embedded in. Favorable situational conditions rather than outstanding individual qualities should be considered crucial to their accomplishments.

4.  The emphasis on decentralization and local autonomy got reestablished in the Constitution inspired by Thorbecke in the midst of the 19th century. This “tradition” was markedly changed immediately after World War II. The national government gained a very important role in rebuilding Dutch society and contributed to a “mixed economy” in which capitalism met government interference. The next section, on industrial relations, highlights some of these features. However, the last decade of the 20th century witnessed a gradual changeover. A retreating government, favoring a stronger role of market forces was seen, along with an emphasis on “intermediary societal institutions” (like the family and the local community) that should provide for the integration of citizens in a “multicultural” society. These ideas are to a large extent in line with the principles that governed Dutch society in previous centuries.

Translated to the dimensions of GLOBE research (cf. House et al., 2004), the preceding description suggests the following dimensions to be characteristic of the developments in Dutch society during the second part of the 20th century:

•  (Societal and organizational) culture: relatively higher scores on individualism, femininity, tolerance of uncertainty, power egalitarianism, and humane orientation, and a relatively lower score on the performance orientation can be expected. There is no particular expectation regarding future–present orientation.

•  Leadership: higher scores on attributes such as being humane, diplomatic, having integrity, and a collective orientation are expected along with lower scores on autocratic and status conscious behavior.

3.  DUTCH INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AFTER WORLD WAR II

The First Part of the 20th Century: Some Features

The kingdom of the Netherlands—with Queen Wilhelmina and the two chambers of Parliament—was not strongly affected by the First World War, because the nation had maintained its neutral foreign policy. During the 1929 Great Depression, many people suffered from unemployment, sudden loss of wealth and property, and a gloomy outlook for the future. For sure, the government provided some relief work projects. Vocational guidance was started (also initiated by some nongovernmental institutions and groups) to facilitate job openings for unemployed people through additional education, and to match abilities and skills of those who entered the labor market with the requirements of available jobs (e.g., Van Strien, 1988). However, the country did not have much industry. Of course, there were exceptions, like the ship-building sector, agriculture, textiles, and the Philips company. But many employers were traders rather than industrial entrepreneurs.

The country suffered severely from the German occupation during World War II (1940–1945). The Royal Family and the Dutch cabinet went abroad. During the last years of the war, representatives of different political parties secretly met to consider opportunities for joint political action when the war would end.

A new era began in May 1945 after the country was liberated: The government got a strong “centralized” position in rebuilding the country, in reshaping civilization, and in raising a strong industrial infrastructure, the latter with the help of the U.S. Marshall Funds. Mixed capitalism (in which governmental control and market forces are the main factors), a consultation economy⁷ (which means that major interest groups are frequently consulted about their views), and a substantial welfare state were to be the main characteristics of Dutch (socio-)economic policy for many years to come.

Industrial Relations

Dutch industrial relations after World War II were strongly influenced by the need to rebuild society. The government, the major political parties, the employers’ federations, and the unions worked together (initially harmoniously) to achieve rapid industrialization (cf. Industrial Democracy in Europe International Research Group, 1981). The government played a dominant role, first through its authority to control wages and prices: For more than 15 years wage and price increases were set (and usually controlled and maintained) at a national level. Second, the government enacted legislation in various domains, such as that concerning industrial democracy at the level of the enterprise. Yet, most decisions that were eventually taken at the national, sector, or individual organization level went through a discussion and preparation phase in councils and committees, which were composed of employer federations and union representatives. During the 1950s some of the major characteristics of Dutch Industrial Relations were (Industrial Democracy in Europe International Research Group, 1981):

Objectives in the Post–Second World War Period

These included rebuilding the national economy, achieving full employment, and strongly expanding social legislation to further the development of a welfare state. The latter led to a comparatively high level of social security coverage, for example, a base pension for all citizens of 65 years or over and allowances in the case of sickness, unemployment, disability, and so forth. The consensus on objectives caused discussions and bargaining to focus primarily on ways and means. The three parties maintained frequent and intensive communication, in particular in the Social and Economic Council (SER) and the Foundation of Labor. This foundation was established in 1945 by employer federations and unions, and was accepted by the government as an important advisory body on socioeconomic subjects. The SER took shape in 1950 and became the main institution for advising the government on social and economic problems.⁸ It is composed of 45 members: Employer federations and unions account for 15 members each respectively, and 15 independent experts are appointed by the government.

Major conflicts were rare during the 1950s and early 1960s; if one occurred, a solution was reached by consultation. In order to establish the level of wages for the next year, a government planning bureau performed econometric calculations and estimated the wage increase the national economy could afford (e.g.,Windmuller, 1968). Institutions and industrial firms were stimulated to adopt a system of job evaluation (cf. Thierry & De Jong, 1998) that would facilitate company-internal equity as well as conformity to market rates (external equity). Instead of free bargaining, government control (and consultation with parties concerned) prevailed.

At the level of the enterprise, two formats for workers’ participation prevailed. In 1950, the first Works Council Act was enacted. This Act describes the Works Council as a consultation body, primarily concerned with the general, common interests of the enterprise, having the managing director as its chairperson. The second format referred to the introduction of job consultation (werkoverleg; cf. Koopman & Wierdsma, 1998) at the shop-floor level in an increasing number of work organizations.

The early 1960s saw the onset of a drastic change in the industrial relations climate. The national economy did rather well. The standard of living had risen sizably. The labor market was very tight, in particular in areas of the country bordering (former West-)Germany: The economic boom in the rebuilt German industry allowed companies in that country to pay rather high wages, which attracted many Dutch workers. The former forces pressing for integration, like rebuilding the economy and providing for full employment, were burning out. Industrial relations became slightly more decentralized. Unions adopted a more independent attitude, were less concerned about economic growth, and focused more on workers’ interests. This was apparent not only in the field of wages and employment conditions, but also in the domain of participation and power relations within the company. Moreover, around 1966, employer federations and unions agreed to eliminate the traditional distinction between white- and blue-collar workers and, consequently, to “harmonize” the differences in employment conditions. The growing diversification in jobs (and job requirements) had blurred this distinction, though it was widely held that most employment differences⁹ did not keep up with the shared conceptions of social justice.

In France, a “cultural revolution” surfaced around 1968, primarily among students at universities (e.g., Paris and Nanterre). It reverberated rather strongly at Dutch universities: The student movement protested against what they perceived to be authoritarian attitudes and rigid, bureaucratic structures (Albeda, 1984). The new ideology called for “democratization” and a less unequal power distribution. The Dutch government reacted rather quickly and enacted a new law on the administration of the university—which ruled that students would be represented in committees and boards—an effect of which was that the aftermath of the “revolution” took much longer (until the mid-1990s) than in any other European country. But the new ideology also affected industrial relations. Unions placed more emphasis on activities at the shop-floor level, consequently at the expense of the role they played at the industry and national level. The notions about a more equal distribution of power geared to the widely shared idea that income differences should be less steep. Remarkably, unions bargained with many industries in order to expel pay for performance, and achieved success (cf. Koopman-Iwema & Thierry, 1981). Job evaluation was considered to be a more fair strategy. In the 1970s, the government enacted a law to further the use of job evaluation, extending its application not only to higher management and senior executives in work organizations, but also to the free professions (like lawyers, accountants, medical doctors, etc.) and self-employed people. It sought to achieve both nationwide control of incomes and a fairer income distribution.

These developments can be characterized as a change in industrial relations from a “harmony model” to a “coalition model” (Peper, 1973). A harmony model is known for its consensus on goals, a large degree of cooperation, a low level of conflict, and the use of consultation as the main mechanism for the resolution of a conflict. A coalition model features partial consensus, some cooperation in a few restricted domains, a moderate level of conflict, and the use of bargaining as the main vehicle to solve conflicts. Some evidence in support of this change during those years is (Industrial Democracy in Europe International Research Group, 1981):

The new Act on the Works Council (1971) stated in particular that the task of the council was consultation, and representation of employees’ interests. Research in the 1970s showed that a considerable number of works councils had potential influence on the company's decision-making process. However, this influence proved to be rather limited in practice (cf. Hövels & Nas, 1976; Industrial Democracy in Europe International Research Group, 1981). Decisions about appointments of senior executives, investments, and reorganization were hardly influenced by these councils (Andriessen & Coetsier, 1984; Koopman, 1992; Andriessen, 1998). Yet, most key informants at all levels of organizations believed that the works council had made a contribution to informing people better about what was going on in their organization. Also, they held that decisions were more easily accepted after having been discussed by the council (Industrial Democracy in Europe International Research Group, 1993).

The Works Council Act was amended in 1979, and again in 1982. The 1979 amendment made works councils more independent of the employer in organizations that totaled 100 or more employees: The managing director was no longer the chairperson, and the works council got more discretionary power on some subject matters. In 1982, the works council was made obligatory for organizations that employed 35 or more employees. Job evaluation schemes were still very much in use, if not at an increasing rate. Yet, the objective changed: Rather than effecting distributive justice, the acceptance of its results by employees (and their representatives in the works council) was emphasized. Consequently, the order of job values (and of corresponding basic salaries) that was considered to be acceptable in one organization could be seen as unfair in a neighboring company. This was one of the early signs of the need for decentralization, deregulation, and “company-tailored” conditions, which would manifest itself more strongly in the years to come.

Also in 1982, the coalition of political parties represented in the Dutch cabinet of ministers changed: The Christian Democratic Party constituted a new government jointly with the Liberal Party, whereas the Social Democrats went into the opposition. The new government was less interested than its predecessors in regulating industrial relations and furthering industrial democracy. As in several other countries, the era of “no-nonsense policymaking” took off. The economy—which faced a severe recession in that period—was stimulated by cutting back government spending and decreasing state intervention in trade and industry (Industrial Democracy in Europe International Research Group, 1993). In practice, it proved to be hard to reduce the role of the government in the industrial relations domain. Cabinets in later years did not drastically alter the main line of policy set during the 1970s. Remarkably, the coalition of Liberal and Social Democratic parties that ruled the country at the end of the 20th century and the onset of the 21st century strongly favored a market economy, in which the role of the state is modest (more facilitating in nature), service organizations and state firms were privatized as much as possible, flexibility in employment conditions (and various other areas) was pursued (e.g., “employability”), and decentralization and deregulation were enacted. As stated earlier, these values seem to be reminiscent of some of the major themes in Dutch history until the early 20th century, implying that the post–World War II period with a strong centralized position of the government may have been an exception to the rule.

Interpreting Evidence

How should Dutch industrial relations in the last 15 years of the 20th century be characterized? Hofstede's data (1984) on national culture show that the Dutch, in the early 1980s, scored high on individualism, and low on power distance and masculinity. Average scores were reached on tolerance of uncertainty, and long-term orientation. The “leader” was seen as somebody who is modest, favoring consultation of employees, work autonomy, training, the use of skills, the support of his or her group, and the contribution of all toward the success of the organization. Interestingly, these observations are in support of the GLOBE dimensions suggested to be characteristic for the Dutch in the historical overview (Section 2, No Heros?).

As previously outlined, centralized control prevailed until the early 1980s: The government was active in enacting new legislation on employees’ participation in decision making. Pleas and initiatives to increase the opportunities for participation also came from companies, unions, and academics. However, one of the consequences of the economic recession in those times was a severe weakening of the position of the main unions in the Netherlands as an effect of both the loss of many members and diminishing bargaining power. Also, “competing” unions (e.g., for executives and managers) were gradually gaining power, sometimes at a sector level, but mostly at the organizational level. Democratization and participation lost their position on the public agenda. Nationwide agreements and initiatives regarding industrial relations subjects became scarce: Formerly held societal values were wearing out and getting fragmented or were replaced by norms and values of interest groups operating at all levels of the society. Yet, research evidence showed that the extent of participation in practice, both direct and representative, was not smaller in the 1980s than in the 1970s (cf. Pool, Drenth, Koopman, & Lammers, 1988).

In the 1990s, the industrial relations climate was becoming more of an intense issue at the sector and organization level. The use of job evaluation (advocated in an earlier decade with an eye on nationwide objectives and values) was recommended, because it allowed ordering jobs (and thus base salaries) in accordance with the particular, if not unique, “strategic” conditions of each company. Employer's federations merged, and attuned their activities much more to local companies, regional markets, and international conditions. Also, major trade unions were in a merging process. Collective labor agreements were more often set at the company level, containing “boundary conditions” the framework of which was to be elaborated within a firm or business unit: It is here that the role of the (local) works council was emphasized. Some firms, for example, in the commercial services branch, tended to do without the involvement of unions, favoring individual labor contracts. Indeed, an important question is whether the Dutch industrial relations system can be characterized as a consultation economy since the 1990s.

In terms of GLOBE research, this overview suggests that the following dimensions characterize the postwar period until the early 1990s:

The next three sections deal in particular with data from different sources—most of which were gathered in the context of the GLOBE study—on how societal culture, organizational culture, and outstanding leadership were perceived to be in the Netherlands during the second part of the 1990s.

4.  CONTEMPORARY SOCIETAL CULTURE

During the pilot phase the provisional GLOBE questionnaires were carefully translated into Dutch and back-translated into English. The final questionnaires were administered to 287 middle managers, randomly selected from three companies in the food sector, and three companies in the banking/insurance sector. All items appeared to be clear and provided no observable problems of interpretation. The six companies had cooperated on an earlier occasion in a project with a member of the CCI team. Within each sector the three companies differed greatly from one another in size, location, products and services, and the like. A total of 146 managers filled out the national culture questionnaire and 141 completed the questionnaire on organizational culture.

In the first column of Table 7.1, the mean scores of Dutch managers on current societal culture practices are shown. The second column lists the group category: The scores of all 61 countries sparticipating in GLOBE were assigned to so-called Bands (cf. Hanges, Dickson, & Sipe, 2004). Band A is the highest, Band C (or D) the lowest. The third and fourth columns contain the maximum, and respectively, minimum scores given to any country. Thus, the first row indicates that Dutch managers rate Performance Orientation in their societal culture as slightly above the midscale point (running from 1 “very low” to 7 “very high”) positioned in Band B.

TABLE 7.1
Societal Culture Scales (“As Is”)

	Mean	Band a	Maximum	Minimum
Performance Orientation	4.32	B	4.94	3.20
Future Orientation	4.61	A	5.07	2.80
Assertiveness	4.32	A	4.97	2.79
Institutional Collectivism	4.46	B	5.22	3.25
Gender Egalitarianism	3.50	B	4.33	2.50
Humane Orientation	3.86	C	5.23	3.18
Power Distance	4.11	C	5.80	3.59
In-Group Collectivism	3.70	C	6.36	3.18
Uncertainty Avoidance	4.70	B	5.37	2.85

^aBands A > B > C > D are determined by calculating the grand mean and standard deviations across all society “As Is” and “Should Be” scales respectively for the GLOBE sample of countries. These means and standard deviations are than used to calculate low, medium, and high bands of countries (GLOBE standard procedure, cf. Hanges, Dickson, & Sipe, 2004).

Table 7.1 reveals that Dutch managers consider societal cultural practices as higher on Uncertainty Avoidance, Future Orientation, and Institutional Collectivism, and lower on Humane Orientation, In-Group Collectivism, and Gender Egalitarianism. They understand Dutch society as being characterized by rules and orderliness, planning ahead, collective economic interests, and group loyalty, but not so concerned with sensitivity toward people—a society, moreover, in which individual accomplishments of children are favored, and moderately equal opportunities exists for female citizens. The comparative scores add to this picture that Dutch people are seen as relatively dominant and tough (Assertiveness), and not so strongly inclined to accept hierarchy (Power Distance). The emphasis on self-reliance and individual autonomy (Participant Observation Questionnaire [POQ], Items 9 and 10), collective economic interests, and consensual decision making is in accordance with a part of Dutch history (Section 2) and the industrial relations system described earlier. The data on Gender Egalitarianism are to some extent in contrast with Hofstede's study (1984), in which Dutch society was found to be feminine. Also, the results from the POQ (items 40, 60, and 88) indicate that occupations of women are predominantly of a lower status, like homemaking, child care, and serving others. National heroes, on the other hand, are predominantly male. Yet, the percentage of women among politicians at the highest two levels of government is increasing (currently around 25% to 30%).

It is interesting to compare these results with the middle managers scores on societal cultural values, which reflect what they feel the dimensions should look like. Table 7.2 contains these data.

According to Table 7.2 Dutch managers have higher scores on Performance Orientation, Humane Orientation, In-Group Collectivism, and Future Orientation, and lower scores on Uncertainty Avoidance and in particular Power Distance. Thus, they value in their society an emphasis on innovativeness and effective performance, a sensitive and tolerant concern for people, loyalty to family and organization, an eye on future events and longer term planning, a climate of experimentation and freedom, and a concern for sharing power. The comparative scores show in addition that Dutch managers stress the importance of feminine opportunities, but less so of dominance and toughness.

TABLE 7.2
Societal Culture Scales (“Should Be”)

	Mean	Band a	Maximum	Minimum
Performance Orientation	5.49	B	6.58	2.35
Future Orientation	5.07	B	6.20	2.95
Asertiveness	3.02	C	4.94	2.40
Institutional Collectivism	4.55	B	5.65	3.80
Gender Egalitarianism	4.99	A	5.17	3.18
Humane Orientation	5.20	B	6.09	3.39
Power Distance	2.45	D	4.35	2.04
In-Group Collectivism	5.17	B	6.52	4.06
Uncertainty Avoidance	3.24	D	5.61	3.16

^aBands A > B > C > D are determined by calculating the grand mean and standard deviations across all society “As Is” and “Should Be” scales respectively for the GLOBE sample of countries. These means and standard deviations are than used to calculate low, medium, and high bands of countries (GLOBE standard procedure, cf. Hanges, Dickson, & Sipe, 2004).

When cultural practices (Table 7.1) are confronted with cultural values (Table 7.2) it appears that values like sharing power, feminine values, family and organizational loyalty, experimentation and freedom, sensitivity to people, and achievement should be emphasized more than they are now.¹⁰ These results suggest that Dutch society is involved in a process of cultural transition, in which more classical values, such as collective economic interests, loyalty, being humane, sharing of power, and gender egalitarianism, are still endorsed, whereas values of individual achievement and autonomy are gaining prominence. Let's see whether the perspectives on organizational culture reflect a comparable dual emphasis.

5.  ORGANIZATION CULTURE

As previously mentioned, 141 managers completed the questionnaire on organizational culture. Table 7.3 contains the scores given based on practices in both the financial and food sectors.

Table 7.3 shows that the scores of managers in the financial sector are not very different from those of managers in the food sector. The largest difference occurs with regard to Gender Egalitarianism. Thus, organizational culture practices are characterized by higher scores on Future Orientation, In-group Collectivism, Assertiveness, Humane Orientation, and Performance Orientation, and a lower score on Power Distance. In other words, to some extent middle managers describe cultural practices within their organization to be in accordance with societal culture practices, as a comparison with Table 7.1 reveals. Yet, more emphasis is put on future events, longer term planning, and humane values, and less on power distance and uncertainty avoidance. Table 7.4 lists the middle managers’ scores on organization culture values.

Again, the scores of managers in both sectors hardly differ from one another, as Table 7.4 shows.

TABLE 7.3
Organization Culture Practices (“As Is”) in the Financial and Food Sector

	Financial Sector	Food Sector
Performance Orientation	4.56	4.29
Assertiveness	4.63	4.38
Future Orientation	5.20	5.29
Gender Egalitarianism	3.71	3.01
Humane Orientation	4.77	4.57
Institutional Collectivism	4.33	4.63
Power Distance	3.14	3.07
In-Group Collectivism	4.90	4.92
Uncertainty Avoidance	3.85	3.91

TABLE 7.4
Organization Culture Values (“Should Be”) in the Food and Banking/Insurance Sector

	Financial Sector	Food Sector
Performance Orientation	5.99	5.76
Assertiveness	4.15	4.51
Future Orientation	5.65	5.70
Gender Egalitarianism	5.22	5.12
Humane Values	4.50	4.82
Institutional Collectivism	4.54	4.57
Power Distance	3.07	3.12
In-Group Collectivism	5.72	5.60
Uncertainty Avoidance	2.98	3.30

The results indicate that Performance Orientation, Future Orientation, and In-Group Collectivism get higher scores, whereas Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance get lower scores. In comparison with Table 7.3 on organization culture practices, it appears that values such as Performance Orientation, family and organization Collectivism, and Gender Egalitarianism receive higher scores, whereas Uncertainty Avoidance gets a lower score. Thus, middle managers prefer their organization's culture to be more focused upon innovation and effective performance, on planning for the future, on equal opportunities for women, and on loyalty to the family and their own organization. With a view on the relatively high scores on a humane as well as a collective orientation, the suggestion put forward at the end of the preceding section is supported: Dutch societal and organizational culture seems to be in a transitional phase. Classical values concerning loyalty, collective economic interests, being humane, sharing of power, and gender egalitarianism are still endorsed, whereas individual achievement and innovation are becoming more important. This transition occurs against the background of the changeover from the post–Second World War political and industrial relations climate—which was rather “collective” in nature—toward the contemporaneous more “individualized and flexible” climate (as described in Sections 2 and 3). An interesting question is which leadership attributes are considered to qualify outstanding leaders in this transitional phase. This is the subject of the next section.

6.  ON LEADERSHIP

In this section the results from some qualitative and quantitative data on leadership are discussed. First, the outcomes of Dutch media analysis are presented. Then the main themes from a series of interviews in a major Dutch daily newspaper with Dutch CEOs on decision making and leadership are summarized. Next, the responses given in individual as well as focus group interviews on characteristics of outstanding leadership are highlighted. Subsequent to this, data on GLOBE questionnaires relating to preferred attributes of outstanding leaders are analyzed. In conclusion, some data from another Dutch study on leadership characteristics are discussed.

Media Analysis

One of the qualitative sources for learning more about contemporary leadership values and required leader characteristics is provided by the analysis of media. Data for this analysis were collected in Week 32 (August 4–11) of 1996. It started with NRC/Handelsblad (a prominent national newspaper, with a liberal character). Then Het Financiële Dagblad (the Dutch equivalent of the Wall Street Journal) was added, as well as Intermediair (including its postings of management vacancies), Elsevier, HP/De Tijd, and Vrij Nederland (four weekly magazines with a wide distribution throughout the Netherlands). Finally, a monthly glossy management magazine was included called Quote. All these weekly and monthly magazines are especially popular among people in middle-managerial positions.

In these media we hardly found any articles on good leaders; moreover, in Dutch media very few leaders are associated with events in society or in organizations. Probably, this observation relates both to Dutch culture in general and to the prevailing Dutch media culture. Most journalists tend to be factual and fairly neutral in their reporting style with little speculation about possible managerial or leadership influences. Also, details about a leader's private life are not made public or at least only to a moderate extent (a similar reserve is taken by most media regarding the private life of the Queen and the Royal Family).

The media portray good Dutch leaders/managers as fulfilling a modest role; they tend to be trustworthy, down-to-earth, well-organized, hard-working, competent, and inconspicuous. At the same time, they are strong-willed, ambitious, inspirational, pragmatic, and demanding on their personnel and on suppliers. They feel they should take time to consult major parties before implementing plans; they tend to mediate well between various stakeholders and they attribute success to teamwork. Some consider many Dutch leaders to be intellectually mediocre and some such critics think they should say that in public. Often, leaders get more public criticism than praise in the Netherlands. Perhaps that explains, in part, why most leadership figures are slightly inconspicuous or nonflamboyant.

Table 7.5 lists leadership attributes that are specified in managerial job postings. Three frequency categories are distinguished: (a) all postings, (b) often listed, and (c) mentioned several times.

TABLE 7.5
Leadership Attributes Listed in Intermediair's Managerial Job Postings

Listed in All Postings	Often Listed
Leadership experience	Good communicator
Expertise (that fits the particular job)	Flexible
Mentioned Several Times
Consideration	Achievement orientation
Motivator	Self-confidence
Empathy	Independent, yet team player
Convincing	Commercial skills
Tactful/diplomatic	Hard-working
Coach	Entrepreneur
Trustworthy	Strong personality
Change/Innovation	Decision maker
Creative negotiator	Planning & Control
Innovator	Risk controller
International experience/interest	Planner
Experienced change manager	Organizing talent
Vision implementer	Eye for detail
Initiating capacity
Inspiring

Table 7.5 shows that “expertise” is emphasized as a major leadership attribute required. Managers need to have a particularly strong background in the contents of the jobs they will be managing. In addition, they should have gained some managerial experience, to show they are capable of leading others. Moreover, they need to be socially astute. Less frequently mentioned attributes relate to consideration, achievement orientation, change and innovation, and planning and control.

It should be kept in mind that the postings refer to a rather large variety of leadership positions and managerial jobs. Many of the requirements just mentioned change from time to time and are prone to (especially Anglo-Saxon managerial) fads and fashions. After all, Dutch people have a great interest in (popular English) managerial literature, which has, of course, an impact. Yet, this impact does not seem to pervade the media culture very strongly, as these requirements are rather general in nature. Let's see how Dutch CEOs are characterized by several journalists.

Interviews With Dutch CEOs

In the spring of 1994, NRC/Handelsblad, the daily newspaper, ran a series of feature articles titled “The Decision Makers.” This 15-part series consisted of 14 interviews with Dutch CEOs of diverse and rather large companies. The smallest organization, DTZ Zadelhoff, is a brokerage agency, at that time still led by the entrepreneur who had started the business in 1961. When the interview was held it consisted of 1,700 employees in nine different countries. With 96,000 employees at the time of the interview KPN, the Dutch telecommunications and postal giant (later privatized), is the largest independent employer on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. Other well-known companies whose CEOs participated in the series include Heineken (beer), KLM (Royal Dutch Airline), ING (banking), and Akzo-Nobel (chemicals).

The interviews highlight the opinion of Dutch business leaders on topics such as unemployment, government regulations, and competition from low-wage countries. It was also intended to give an impression of how these CEOs lead their own organization. The series concluded with one final article by journalists and business consultants that comprised of more general comments based on Dutch business leaders and outlined the demands faced by Dutch business leadership in the past and future decade.

In general, several points are noteworthy. First, it is remarkable that the articles do not give much personal information about CEOs. Some prior work experience is mentioned for all CEOs, their educational background and age for most, but further personal details, income, or family are hardly discussed. This seems consistent with Dutch tradition (as we also noted in the media analysis in the previous section), where even royalty and public figures are “entitled” to some privacy and in which leaders are not considered or treated as heroes (Section 2).

All CEOs interviewed are men. This still reflects the current situation in which only a very few women are found in the higher echelons of large corporations. Recent figures also show, for instance, that Dutch universities are among the lowest ranking in the world with regard to women holding a full professorship. Most of the interviewed CEOs commented on political issues in the interviews and several were actively involved in national politics and political decision making, mainly through their role in political parties or employers federations. All 14 have a university degree. However, they were educated in diverse fields such as economics and business, engineering, or law. Most started their career in another organization, earning their merits before taking over as CEO in their current organization. Two of the CEOs are entrepreneurs who started their own business and are still in charge.

Another striking aspect in the articles is the strong international focus of all CEOs and of the company strategies they represent. Asia and especially China are seen as offering many new and important business opportunities; the same goes (to a lesser extent) for Central or Eastern Europe. It is not surprising that Dutch business often has an international orientation; the Netherlands is a small country with a limited domestic market. The tradition of intensive trade with many other nations started many centuries ago (Section 2). Also, an international orientation seems to be a typical feature of the Netherlands, which is reflected, for instance, in the fact that most Dutch speak two or often even three languages to a certain degree (Dutch, and usually English and/or some German). The educational system emphasizes the importance of learning these different languages. Also indicative of this international focus is that newspapers and broadcasts present a lot of international news, especially regarding other countries in Europe, the United States, Asia, and the Middle East.

The interview with each CEO includes many company-specific situational elements. For instance, in companies that had recently experienced a crisis, restructuring, or turnaround in which many employees had to be made unemployed, this provided the background for the interview. In companies that recently merged or were taken over by others, this constituted the main setting.

CEOs often referred to the company in terms of a collectivity: “we at …” Other elements that were often mentioned regarding leadership and decision making were the necessity of support, consensus, and acceptance by lower level managers and employees. Remarks such as “consensus is an important prerequisite to realize goals” and “ideas need acceptance, otherwise they will not be realized” reflect this concern. This emphasis on a combination of autonomy and consensus is a feature strongly associated with the way in which the Dutch have been governed for many years. Hofstede (1984) has also described this Dutch emphasis on consensus (see Section 3 as well).

If an organization faces a crisis, leaders need to show optimism, vision, decisiveness, and credibility, need to care about the people they work with, and should emphasize team building. Examples of remarks made are:

Other remarks on the demands that a crisis places on management were: “A clear agreement on goals of the reorganization is very important, and so is making people responsible for goal attainment.” This was followed by the remark: “A second element is working as a team, gaining consensus.” Another translated quote: “In the team we listen well and keep talking until everyone agrees. That goes for the board of directors but also for the levels below that. Of course knots must be cut [hard decisions made]. That is my role. Everyone understands that at a certain point talk is over.”

According to the CEOs, visioning is part of the job. Many talk about their ideas for the future, new markets, a new strategy, as well as what they learned from the past. A more general remark reflecting the importance the CEOs put on vision is:

People skills, motivating, and social responsibility are also mentioned several times as important leadership skills.

In the concluding article, the journalists show that until recently the top echelon of Dutch business was recruited from a small “reservoir,” a sort of old boys network. Many companies were also still run by the family that had once started the corporation. However, in the 1980s the situation changed. The barriers of the “silent ruling class” in business were broken and the influence of families in their businesses diminished to make way for what one of the CEOs describes as “professional management.” The appealing entrepreneurs, the immensely committed heads of the family business, and the social reformers in top administrative positions were replaced with hard-working, analytical, and careful problem solvers. These new top managers had an almost mathematical method of leading, in which communicating with the outside world is hardly done except where company figures and acquisitions are concerned. However, according to the journalists the coming years will place new demands on leaders. These ever faster changing times call for more inspirational “stimulators” who are willing to take risks and have a vision that integrates the activities of the many business units the modern corporation is composed of. The writers summarize their impression with remarks such as “after the shepherds, technocrats and caretakers we now need pioneers to run large businesses in The Netherlands.”

We assume that the final conclusions of the journalists concerned are in accordance with the ideas expressed by the CEOs. Remarkable, then, is the agreement with the results of the media analysis (Section 6) regarding managerial job postings. It seems that in addition to traditional practices and values concerning consensus, acceptance, support, and work autonomy, an outstanding CEO is expected to be a decisive team player, tenacious and dreaming, motivate people, and pioneer the organization. In Section 3, several leadership dimensions were suggested as characteristic for the Dutch postwar period until the early 1990s. The preceding qualitative findings are only partly in agreement with these. Against the background of the transition in Dutch societal and organizational culture (Sections 4 and 5) these findings may suggest the beginning demise of a leadership pattern that seems to have been developed during the postwar period. This pattern combined two distinct, though interrelated, features:

Focus Interviews and Questionnaire Data

Individual interviews were held with five middle managers. Focus group interviews involved an additional 15 managers. Table 7.6 indicates which aspects are mentioned more and less frequently as characteristic of outstanding leadership by all 20 respondents.

TABLE 7.6
Characteristics of Outstanding Leadership Assembled by Interviews and Focus Groups

Mentioned Attributes of Outstanding Leadership	Frequency
Visionary	19
Creativity/innovative behavior	17
Inspiring	12
Risk taking/courage/nerve	11
Self-insight/knowing one's limitations	11
Open communication	10
Calm	9
Open to situation/environment	8
Creating group feeling	8
Attention to private life of follower	7
Long-term oriented	7
Trustworthy	7
Expressiveness/radiating	7

Almost all respondents say that an outstanding leader should have a clear vision of the direction in which the organization ought to go, including the way to achieve the objectives and goals set. The leader should moreover continuously adapt to the organization's internal and external changes, solving occurring problems creatively. In doing so the leader must be able to inspire followers, motivating them to work hard and to give 100% in their job. That also requires the courage to stick out one's neck, accompanied by a good self-insight and a sense of one's own limitations. Half the respondents refer to open communication, which includes the discussion of policy matters with followers, the clarification of difficult issues, the ability to listen, and honesty toward followers. In summary, the outstanding leader should be a visionary and a decent person who involves his or her followers incisively. Remarkably, an attribute like integrity was not mentioned at all: When asked, respondents indicated that all human beings should show integrity (and not only outstanding leaders). Also, achievement was hardly stressed. Slightly different from the results of the media analysis (Section 6), it appears that change/innovation is strongly emphasized, whereas achievement is not.

The same respondents also rated 10 leadership characteristics (derived from performance appraisal instruments) regarding their importance to outstanding leadership. Table 7.7 lists these characteristics and the mean scores.

Creativity and innovation are considered to be most vital to outstanding leadership, according to the results of Table 7.7. Interpersonal relationships is rated second (as is quality of output), getting a slightly more prominent place than open communications in Table 7.6. Reliability is among the less outspoken dimensions (as is trustworthy in Table 7.6). All in all, these outcomes support the main conclusions derived from the interviews with middle managers.

GLOBE Questionnaire Results

As indicated earlier, 287 middle managers from the food and the banking/insurance sector took the questionnaire on leadership attributes. Table 7.8 shows the results, also in comparison to the scores of all other countries. This table shows that Dutch managers consider characteristics such as integrity, inspirational, and visionary as crucial for success as a leader. On the contrary, attributes such as malevolent, self-centered, and autocratic get very low scores. In comparison with all other countries, the attributes team integrator, decisive, diplomatic, and humane orientation also characterize Dutch perceptions of outstanding leaders. Malevolent, Autocratic, and Face saving get comparatively low scores.

TABLE 7.7
Importance Ratings of Leadership Characteristics

Dimensions	Mean
Creativity and innovative behavior	3.0
Quality of output	3.3
Interpersonal relationships	3.3
Planning	5.1
Cooperative attitude	5.9
Cost control	6.0
Expertise	6.1
Reliability	6.3
Quantity of output	7.3
Work habits	8.7

Note. N = 20 managerial raters. 1 = most important.

Table 7.9 shows the results of an exploratory factor analysis¹¹ on the Dutch data. Jointly, these four factors explain 55% of the variance. The higher loadings on Factor I reveal that a generous, group-oriented, modest, and sincere style characterizes one pattern of leadership. A second pattern combines foresight, mission orientation, willfulness, enthusiasm, and a concern for excellence. Interestingly, the attribute face saving (which represents evasive, indirect behaviors) has a negative loading on this second factor. The third pattern is characterized by a nonparticipative, individualistic, domineering style. The fourth pattern reflects a formal, cautious, and orderly style of leadership. Some attributes have rather high loadings on more than one factor (like self-sacrifice and face saving); other attributes (e.g., status-conscious) have rather low loadings on all factors.

TABLE 7.8
Outstanding Leadership Attributes

Dimension	Mean	Band	Maximum
Integrity	6.52	A	6.79
Inspirational	6.38	A	6.63
Visionary	6.30	A	6.50
Team Integrator	6.01	A	6.43
Performance Orientation	5.95	B	6.64
Decisive	5.87	A	6.37
Diplomatic	5.43	A	6.05
Admin. Competent	5.43	C	6.42
Team Orientation	5.42	B	6.09
Humane Orient.	4.98	A	5.68
Self-Sacrifice	4.79	B	5.99
Modesty	4.71	B	5.79
Status-Conscious	3.93	C	5.93
Autonomous	3.53	B	4.65
Conflict Inducer	3.26	C	5.01
Procedural	3.22	C	4.89
Nonparticipative	2.41	B	3.68
Face Saving	2.23	D	4.53
Autocratic	2.08	D	4.16
Self-Centered	1.75	C	3.41
Malevolent	1.62	D	2.67

Note. N = 287.

TABLE 7.9
Four Leadership Factors: Attributes and Factor Loadings

In the typical Dutch polder model,¹² a group-oriented leadership style is important, in which consultation with other parties and integration of different opinions stands out. Therefore, a relatively low score on the orderly leadership style (which represents a focus on attributes as autocratic, self-centered, and nonparticipative) could be expected. Also, status consciousness is not very helpful to become an excellent manager in the Netherlands. Sharing visions and being a team player are more required. Observations in line with these results can also be found in the Unobtrusive Measurement Questionnaire (UMQ) and the Participant Observation Questionnaire (POQ); for example: Burial places are not separated according to the status of the deceased (Item 3). Pictures of living political leaders are not normally displayed in bars during nonelection times (Item 4), nor displayed on postage stamps (Item 16). Eating places in large companies are mostly not separated according to the status of the employees (Item 22). Also, individuals are generally expected to voice their personal opinions, even when in disagreement with the majority of the people with whom they interact.

A separate study done in the Netherlands (den Hartog, 1997; den Hartog, Koopman, & Van Muijen, 1998) asked a nationwide sample (N =2,161, at least 19 years of age, with work experience) on characteristics seen as important for Dutch top and middle managers. Results show that the most important characteristics for top managers in the Netherlands are: eye for innovation, long-term orientation, vision, convincing, trustworthy, communicative, confidence builder, and courage. Dominant, formal, but also modest behaviors are not considered as characteristics of successful top leaders. For good Dutch middle managers, important characteristics are: trustworthy, communicative, concern for subordinates’ interests, team builder, participative, and confidence builder. Again, dominant and formal behaviors have very low scores.

In other words, this confirms again that the Dutch culture appears to be a bit aversive against a large power distance and strong leaders. Formal leadership does not guarantee commitment. Leaders have to consult, and to convince in order to be trusted and followed. As was shown in Table 7.6, characteristics mentioned most in the interviews and the focus group interviews were: visionary, creativity/innovative behavior, and inspirational leadership. Dominant, formal, and authoritarian leadership is less accepted in the Netherlands, perhaps unless special situations, such as a crisis or a decline of operations, are faced. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that a trend in Dutch societal and organizational culture seems to be emerging in which increasing emphasis is placed on values like individualism and flexibility (Sections 4 and 5). Apparently, outstanding leaders with a strong group orientation and an emphasis on intellectual stimulation, orderly in nature but low on individualism, are considered to be able to cope with these upcoming changes.

7.  SPECIFIC MANIFESTATIONS OF DUTCH SOCIETAL CULTURE

One way to characterize the dominant current culture in Dutch society is its egalitarian nature. Leaders of companies and institutions ought to satisfy pretty high requirements in order to be qualified for their job, but should still behave as their next-door neighbor, without pretense, pomp, particular prerogatives, or a high income. Good leaders are expected not to behave distinctively, and their style of living should be kept a rather private issue, according to many citizens. Dutch people tend not to monitor individuals in high-power positions, excellent performers, or talented youngsters. Rather, their heart goes out to human beings in deprived conditions (abroad or at home), to mediocre or poor performers, to students at school staying behind: These people should get supportive aid within a climate of “equal opportunities for all.” Many citizens hold the strong belief that the creation of facilitating conditions results in better, more mature personal development of individuals. The enactment of rules and regulations at different societal levels helps to further these conditions as well as a climate that favors humane, social values.

One of the manifestations of egalitarianism is the dislike for authority within Dutch society. Obviously, a few officials with some authority are needed to get society moving, but the authority sources should not be too personalized. Dutch citizens favor a high degree of individual autonomy: They tend to follow only those rules (e.g., in traffic) that they consider to be worthwhile and “relevant” to their personal situation. The need for autonomy is apparent in the tendency not to accept “directives from above,” but to engage in discussion and deliberation in order to better negotiate personal and group interests. On a societal level this tendency is exemplified during the past two decades by the poldermodel, the Dutch term for “consensual” decision making between (socio) political parties with diverging interests. The poldermodel is built on the assumption that parties concerned are willing to form coalitions with one another, to make compromises, to give and to take, thus achieving their objectives and interests eventually better than through pushing these separate from each other. As a consequence, the poldermodel absorbs countervoices to some extent: It smoothes extreme points of view. But it has also enabled Dutch industry from the early 1980s onward to create an unprecedented increase in employment—for instance, through introducing flexible working conditions on a large scale, part-time jobs, and the like—jointly with very moderate annual wage and salary increases.

A particular characteristic of Dutch societal culture is the belief that Dutch culture is not so important. Many citizens in the Netherlands are not very well informed about the history of their country or major achievements (and failures) in earlier ages, let alone heroes of the past. They doubt moreover whether it is necessary to teach Dutch history extensively at school. Various new developments and trends have often been rapidly accepted and introduced, as the high average rate of Internet facilities at home and cellular phones shows. Some feel this reflects the traditional liberal climate in the country: open to innovations and imports from abroad, tolerant of different beliefs and habits of immigrants, and thus exemplifying the features of a modern, multicultured society. Others tend to interpret this development as “nihilistic,” betraying a loss of shared values and norms without the occurrence of a coherent set of new and different beliefs and ideals. Dutch people's self-image stresses their being open, friendly, and hardly discriminatory.

In earlier sections, the suggestion was made that Dutch culture is in a process of transition from a focus on classical values (like collective interests) toward more emphasis on modern values such as individualism, flexibility, and autonomy. Because many people do not esteem their culture in high terms, this process is probably creating quite some ambivalence.

8.  LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT STUDY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The GLOBE project is unique in its scope and the number of countries and researchers involved. Aiming to compare countries almost inevitably means that some of the uniqueness of different cultures is lost. Some features—sometimes those that are very central to specific cultures—are moreover hard to translate (a Dutch example is the word gezelligheid, a very common term describing a cozy, pleasant, rather “intimate” social climate within a group). To ensure that GLOBE also captures some of the culture-specific elements, qualitative research was done alongside the quantitative study. This combination of methods offers a rich data set that is explored in this volume. However, the emphasis in most publications from the GLOBE study is on the quantitative data gathered with questionnaires, with all the associated methodological advantages and drawbacks. We do not go into general methodological issues, but describe a few limitations of the GLOBE study (as a whole and the Dutch part) and provide some suggestions for future research.

GLOBE focuses on universals and culture-based differences in preferred leadership attributes by asking middle managers to rate whether showing certain leader characteristics and behaviors would help or hinder a person in being an outstanding leader. A possible bias in this study stems from the fact that when middle managers rate characteristics for effective leadership, they are likely to think of top management, as those are the leaders from the middle-management vantage point: “The perceptual processes that operate with respect to leaders are very likely to involve quite different considerations at upper versus lower hierarchical levels” (Lord & Maher, 1991, p. 97). As demands, tasks, and responsibilities at different hierarchical levels are quite diverse, it seems likely that preferred leader attributes also differ for the different levels. Thus, more research on perceptions of different types of leadership (including, e.g., political and military leadership) may also be of interest. Also, all respondents in the GLOBE study are currently employed within middle management in organizations from two industries. This leads to a restriction regarding variables such as age, gender, and education. A specific problem with the Dutch sample is that the managers were virtually all men. Although women are underrepresented in the samples from many countries, this is obviously extremely so for our sample. There may well be differences in the perceptions and preferences of women and men where culture and leadership are concerned.

To illustrate the possible biases resulting from the chosen sample, another study was done. The aforementioned study on perceptions of top and middle managers used a representative sample of the Dutch population older than 19 years of age. The study shows there are clear differences in preferred leadership attributes for leaders at top-management level and managers at lower levels in the hierarchy. It also explores whether there are greater gender differences. Some gender differences were indeed found; for example, women rated the importance of characteristics such as concern for subordinates’ interests, compassionate, and participative higher than men, and characteristics such as dominant and rational were scored higher by men than by women (den Hartog, 1997). Besides the gender diversity, the ethnic diversity of the workforce is also rapidly changing in the Netherlands. Future research, using different and diverse samples, can help create more insight into the expectations that different groups within our society have of their leaders. A related question is the extent to which perceptions of people from different ethnic backgrounds are influenced by both the norms and values of their former “home” country and the country they currently live in. Are their views typically “Dutch” or have such groups perhaps developed a unique hybrid culture, combining Dutch norms and values with those from their home country?

As stated, GLOBE focuses on leadership perceptions: What are characteristics that people associate with highly effective leaders? Future research should also take actual leader behavior into account. An interesting question is whether leaders need to match their behavior to cultural expectations to be effective. House, Wright, and Aditya (1997) advanced three propositions in this area. First, they propose that leader behaviors that are accepted, enacted, and effective within a collective are the behaviors that most clearly fit within the parameters of the cultural forces surrounding the leader. They also suggest that leader behavior that deviates slightly from dominant cultural values will encourage innovation and performance improvement, as such behaviors are nontraditional and unexpected. Finally, they hold that some leader behaviors may be universally accepted and considered effective, regardless of the specific cultural values of the collective. More research in this area is needed in order to shed more light.

The Dutch GLOBE data were gathered at one specific point in time. They present a snapshot of perceptions of leadership and culture in the Netherlands, seen through the eyes of a very specific group in organizations (middle managers). In addition to studying the perceptions of other groups, as suggested earlier, repeating data collection every few years might yield interesting information on how the perceptions of leadership and culture changes over time. Given the changing organizational landscape in the Netherlands (due to, e.g., technological developments, more flexibility and less hierarchy, and increased globalization), the demands placed on leaders of and within organizations may well change too.

9.  CURRENT CHALLENGES

The trend toward more individualism and flexibility confronts Dutch society with values and practices that are slightly at odds with the dominant societal and organizational culture outlined in previous sections. This trend is briefly discussed next under two headings: Flexibility and Action Organizations. Some potential implications for outstanding leadership values and practices are touched on.

Flexibility

This term has gained momentum in the past 20 years. The original meaning of flexibility is that the core of something remains unchanged, whereas the particular form or application of that something is tailored to specific, local conditions or requirements. Current usage is quite different: Flexibility has become some “container” concept, referring to many domains of what is commonly understood to be “organizational change.” At least seven areas of flexibility in organizations may be distinguished and are described in the following subsections.

Work Content. This area is often referred to as work structuring, job redesign, quality of work, and the like. It covers changes in the content of somebody's work as a result of job rotation, job enlargement, and job enrichment, but also as a consequence of moving toward a second or third career. It highlights the management of competences and of multiskills, intending to increase and support employability.

Workplace. This area literally bears upon the geographical location of somebody's place(s) of work. In addition to the fixed or stable location, we distinguish the mobile workplace (such as when technical maintenance is carried out at a client's home), the “flying brigade” (whose members are assigned to units with a temporary shortage of manpower), tele-work (where the employee or manager is working at home or at a particular shop, communicating electronically with his or her company), and the “flexible bureau” (in which employees plug in their PC at a spot that happens to be available in their organization).

Labor Relations. Both internal and external relations constitute this domain. Internally, it covers themes like the less hierarchical organization chart (with fewer layers than previously) and self-steering units (semiautonomous work teams). These examples reflect that the locus of power, in particular concerning knowledge, is moving downward in many organizations. Externally, we refer to what was said earlier regarding collective labor agreements: They tend to become decentralized (toward the firm level), deregulated (defining merely boundary conditions), or even “traded” for individual agreements. Increasingly, company-internal and external groups tend to negotiate about working conditions that are tailored to their own interests.

Work Time. Many changes are occurring in this area, for instance, an increase in the application rate (and the diversity) of shift work and irregular working schedules (Thierry & Jansen, 1998), of part-time arrangements, and of compressed schedules (working more hours per day and fewer days per week). There is also a slight increase in flexitime schedules (core and optional work hours), in permanent night and weekend shifts, in work hour budgets that specify the annual amount of hours (allowing much variation per day or week), and the like.

Labor Contract. This area borders the preceding one. For decades, contracts mirrored the tradition of having permanent employment (in most cases after a probation period). Increasingly, contracts are made that limit employment to a fixed period, for example, the min–max contract (in which merely the minimum and the maximum amount of hours per week or other time period are specified), and the zero hours contract (a worker may work no hours at all in one week, and work full-time with overtime the following week), and so forth. Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) figures show that “flexible” contracts apply to around 12% of the employed people in the Netherlands.

Work Conditions. Flexible pay usually concerns employee benefits, allowing employees and managers some choice on how to spend part of their income, such as in the cafeteria plan (M. C. Langedijk, 1998; Thierry, 2002). Yet, a more recent usage also includes gain sharing (making a relatively large proportion of base salary dependent on the organization's financial results), performance – related pay, and reducing social security provisions to a slightly smaller core package.

Personal Career. As an outcome of changes in the preceding areas, the working life of the individual executive, manager, and employee is increasingly showing a diversified pattern. Continued education and training are necessary to make up for the increasingly rapid obsolescence of acquired skills and abilities. Periods of work and care taking (e.g., parental leave) will alternate. Two or more careers per individual are going to be the rule rather than the exception.

This “flexibilization of work and private life” occurs in some sectors (as well as in some countries) much faster than in others. Yet, it will probably pervade industrialized countries to a greater extent in the years to come. Flexibility seems to be the visible, manifest outcropping of incisive, partly latent societal changes. These changes necessitate at least a partly different legitimation process of leadership decisions on both company strategy and policy implementation. Related to this is another factor: Markets are becoming more global, competition is increasingly on an international basis, and technological innovations occur more frequently, one of the consequences of which is the need for flexible organizational adaptation, involving one reorganization after another.

It is far from evident which outstanding leadership practices and attitudes are required to manage this flexible life. Probably, they differ according to different segments of an organization's workforce. Thus, it might be argued that a visionary, change-oriented, and consulting style would apply to the core, highly educated employees in organizations facing high levels of uncertainty. Transactional leader behavior would best suit the temporary managers and employees, who are hired from employment agencies. A more formal, orderly oriented style would qualify the approach to workers on a hire-and-fire basis. Career planning would be facilitated by a humane, collaborative style. This theme—the mix of outstanding leadership practices—is hopefully a major subject for comparative future research, in which one important question would be whether outstanding leadership should be conceived in terms of simultaneously needed, contradictory practices (e.g., visionary and transactional, change oriented and an emphasis on more formal control).

Action Organizations

In the mid-1990s, the Dutch—British multinational Shell Petroleum Company intended to dump the worn-out oil platform Brent Spar at the bottom of one of the deep seas. Greenpeace, very well known because of its stands and actions to protect the ecological environment, objected heavily. Greenpeace held, for instance, that the platform would severely pollute seawater, and that Shell greatly underrated the amount of oil and other substances left in Brent Spar. Shell management disputed Greenpeace's point of view, with among other things expert data, but Greenpeace maintained its stand, supported by much publicity in various countries. Gradually, members of Parliament started to pose critical questions; regular customers of Shell (i.e., at gas stations) changed to competing oil companies, and so forth. Eventually, Shell gave in and agreed to search for another solution for Brent Spar, while a joint Shell–Greenpeace committee of experts would reanalyze the debris within the former platform. This was widely acclaimed as a Greenpeace victory; incidentally, the joint committee reported later that data initially published by Shell were in fact correct.

Of course, this account does not “accuse” or “applaud” any of the parties mentioned. It serves as an illustration of what seems to become a major change in the (Dutch) industrial relations system and climate since the early 1990s: the onset of action organizations confronting larger enterprises with their points of view (cf. Tieleman, Van Luijk, Van Noort, & Van Riemsdijk, 1996). Current action organizations cover a great variety of themes, such as, human rights, the policy toward a particular developing country, social policy, child labor, anti-racism, baby nutrition, DNA manipulation, peace keeping, the aged, and so forth. Of course, action or interest groups are nothing new: Olson (1982) made the intriguing argument that the decline of large nations—such as the Roman or the British Empire—might have been brought about by the falling apart of the society in a multiplicity of action groups. What appears to be new is that more and more action organizations¹³ voice very particular concerns against larger companies— such as protesting against specific policy measures or putting pressure in favor of a stand or action—as a consequence of which they become involved in bargaining processes with companies. An action organization expresses a particular concern (e.g., genetically manipulated soy beans) as a theme of general interest (i.e., health risks for the population at large). It has a smaller or larger constituency whose members are usually well educated. The action organization embodies and expresses to some extent the countervoice (cf. Section 6).

Although action organizations deal primarily, until now, with larger companies, medium-size organizations may be affected as well in the near future. Traditionally, a large (multi-)national enterprise enters into agreements with the government and the unions of one or more countries (and, obviously, with banking corporations and perhaps transnational political authorities). This continues to be the case. But it doesn't suffice anymore: Agreed-upon plans for action (e.g., investments or a new plant) do not reach the operational phase; more bargaining is needed. Why? The national government occupies a more peripheral position than in the 1970s and 1980s, and has lost quite a bit of power and legitimizing authority. The same argument applies to many unions: They have moved from a natural countervailing power position toward the role of discussion partner (cf. Tieleman et al., 1996). Action organizations—sometimes called single-issue nongovernmental organizations—question indeed the credibility of the company in some particular subject matter, and require at least public recognition of their particular concerns. As a consequence, the company enters new territory: facing particular actions, being engaged in tense debates, negotiating for an agreement with one or more counterparties who are able to commit many resources. In other words, the company has to search for legitimation of its policy and activities from other, and more, sources than they were used to.

How should the company go about achieving this? Should they act quickly, and engage immediately into negotiations with action organizations’ representatives? Or is it better to avoid rapid action? Is one governance structure (e.g., the divisional form; cf. Mintzberg, 1983) more suited than another? Tieleman et al. (1996) suggest that a company should not focus its business plan exclusively on financial results: This implies, of course, a serious discussion with the shareholders about their concerns. Rather, major subject matters of action organizations could be made part of the company's business policy (cf. Ackerman, 1975). Shell's former CEO seems to have followed Ackerman's advice: He testified in 1996 that his company had been rather arrogant in reaction to environmental, and other, concerns of action organizations. Thus, Shell enacted early 1997 an ethical statute, outlining norms and lines of conduct applying to top managers in any country where Shell has economic interests. Many other organizations followed Shell's example.

Why has the government lost much of its power and legitimizing authority? Various perspectives may be taken here: One line of explanation holds that the increased role of the market economy, combined with the globalization and internationalization of doing business, has more or less caused the decrease in governmental authority. Self-steering work teams are the contemporaneous expression of the historical trend of Dutch educated citizens to rule themselves as much as possible. As a consequence, the government's primary role is being reduced to facilitate this. Another explanation stresses changes that reverberate at both the societal and the individual citizen level: The increasing individualization (and flexibilization) reflects that almost no values and norms are shared by the whole society, but rather by members of interest groups, clubs, committees, action organizations, and the like. Moral behavior, according to Tieleman et al., is democratized. Thus, there is hardly any moral authority left for the government. At the individual level, people are usually engaged in many different activities; yet, these activities are kept separate. The loyalty felt for one activity (e.g., being an employee of a construction firm) does not relate to the loyalty felt for another activity (e.g., being a member of an action organization fighting the construction firm's activities in a particular neighborhood). Moral behavior is thus individualized.¹⁴ Within this perspective, action organizations are filling a ‘moral gap’.

10.  IN CONCLUSION: 10 COMMANDMENTS

This chapter started with presenting the views of an air passenger descending into Amsterdam airport. One concern of the passenger proved to be whether the initial impression of a flat country would also apply to its culture, politics, leadership, and achievements. The journey through the preceding sections has shown how misleading first impressions might be. As a summary of the discoveries made during that journey, the passenger has some clear notions on what she or he, as a foreigner, should (not) do, were she or he planning as a next step in his or her career to manage and to provide leadership to Dutch employees and supervisors. Having learned quite a bit about Dutch history, she or he voices these notions in the form of 10 commandments.

As a leader from abroad; thou should:

As a leader from abroad; thou should not:

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¹Up to the present day, the Dutch Parliament (which is composed of two chambers) is called the “Estate General.” Each of the current 12 countries is ruled by the “County Estate” (whereas each city or town is headed by the City Council).

²The word geus probably stems from the French term des gueux, which means “beggar” or “vagrant,” a term perhaps used by an underling in the Spanish court to identify the “Protestants” from Holland. Interestingly, the English word for geus is Protestant. In Dutch, geus has the connotation of a courageous person.

³Senior, recognized church members, appointed or elected by the parish community.

⁴Even nowadays a strong characteristic of the Dutch economy is the transport sector for international trade.

⁵The so-called “predestination.”

⁶The “trias politica” holds that the legislative power, the judicial power, and the executive power should be independent from one another.

⁷Some favor the term consensus economy.

⁸The Social and Economic Council is an example of the so-called cooperate industrial organization (CIO; Publiekrechtelijke Bedrijfsorganisatie), which was implemented at the level of an (industrial) sector. Its aim is to let the relevant employer federations and unions concerned arrange the “infrastructure” of that sector. Like the SER, some of the CIOs are still in existence. Some people expect that the increasing socioeconomic interdependence among countries within the European Union (EU) will make the CIO obsolete.

⁹White-collar employees got a monthly salary, whereas blue-collar workers were paid a weekly wage. White collars usually got a flat salary, whereas blue-collar pay was often partly based on performance. Regulations on absenteeism, pension schemes, and so forth also differed sizably. This harmonization movement took off much later in other European countries (Thierry, 1998).

¹⁰All t values concerned are significant.

¹¹Principal components analysis with Varimax rotation was used. Note that the GLOBE scales were designed to measure organizational or societal level variability (Hanges, Dickson, & Sipe, 2004). The scales were not intended to meaningfully differentiate among individuals within a particular society. However, even though the scales were not constructed to provide such information, in some cases it is interesting to assess whether similar factors differentiate individuals within a society. Country-specific factor analysis is intended as an exploration of the themes captured by GLOBE in a new domain, that is, individual differences within a society. It should be noted, that because of the within-society restriction of the GLOBE scales true-score variability (which was based on between-society differences) the loadings of the GLOBE scale's items on within-society factors should be lower than between societies (cf. Hanges, Dickson, & Sipe, 2004). Furthermore, one should not interpret the within-society factor analyses as replications of the GLOBE factor structure. And the absence of a GLOBE factor within a society should not be automatically interpreted as the factor being irrelevant to the people in that country. Rather, a factor may fail to emerge within a society even when that theme is extremely critical because there was no variability in how the individuals from a single society rated the items (e.g., they all rated the items a 7). Factor analysis requires variability and so a factor could fail to emerge because it is extremely critical or completely irrelevant to the people within a society.

¹²The term poldermodel refers literally to pieces of land gained from the sea. Symbolically, it reflects a concern for consultation and joint decision making in the industrial relations area.

¹³The term action organization stems from Cor. J. Lammers (Organiseren van bovenaf en van onderop [Organization downwards and upwards], 1993, Utrecht: Het Spectrum.

¹⁴It is an interesting question whether individualized behavior can acquire a moral quality by definition.