Leadership and Culture in Russia:
The Case of Transitional Economy
Countries of the former communist bloc adjust to global factors and conditions of socioeconomic development in parallel to their revolutionary efforts to substitute the totalitarian system of the past with democracy and the free market. Although the level of success of such a transition varies among different countries, Russia with no doubt is overcoming the most substantial change in macro- and microeconomic systems, in political structure, and in cultural norms and behaviors in the society. This makes it important to understand the current developments in Russia within the global context, and at the same time explain the factors that determine cultural configuration and effective leadership in transitional economy.
In the late 1990s, when the major GLOBE data collection was conducted, one could see Russia among visible global players, still on top in military expenditure of 12.3% in gross domestic product (GDP), with the largest territory covering 11 time zones. Economic transition in 1990–1998 resulted in deep crisis with an annual decline of GDP amounting to 7%, in addition to an annual decline in gross domestic investment of 13.7%. According to 1998 data, Russia comprised 146.9 million people, with the country having low indicators of life expectancy of 67 years. The unemployment rate was high at 13.3% even with high indicators of female economic activity (80.8%).
In the early 2000s, after the deep economic crisis in the previous decade, there are strong indications of revitalization and purification of the economy. Obsolete industries shrink. New advanced industries emerge at an incredible pace. Legislation is under construction. There are visible signs of openness of Russia to the global business community, and indications for civilized business practices.
The critical mass of people who act as entrepreneurs and as real business leaders is growing. A shift in management paradigm and organizational techniques is visible everywhere—in traditional mining and machine-building industries fighting for survival, in new fast-growing telecommunication, construction, business services, and trade. The business community has begun to understand that cultural variables (at both organizational and national levels) and certain leadership styles and behaviors could be the sources of competitive advantage. Multinational corporations transfer leadership skills and management know-how to Russia. Local managers and entrepreneurs seek compatibility in organizational methods and language of business with their foreign partners.
The period when the main GLOBE research was conducted coincided with the time of radical change in all spheres of economic and social life, such as property, financial system, or labor legislation. Mikhail Gorbachev's words about “chaos in the minds” adequately described the “mental model” of many Russians at that time. This is why the historic overview of Russian business culture and leadership at large should be combined with the specific analysis of transitional effects on culture and leadership. This chapter is guided by these current changes, and describes the culture specific characteristics of Russia with special focus on business culture and leadership in a transitional economy. GLOBE methodology and techniques help to understand that in contemporary Russia: (a) Instead of Soviet universalism of the past we find a fragmented managerial corps and cultural clusters; (b) types and characteristics of business culture are marginal when compared to the other countries, and Russian management does not fit easily into internationally recognized practices; (c) the profile of an effective business leader in Russia absorbs historical features of a nation, heritage of totalitarian system, and peculiarities of society-in-transition, and (d) there is a visible shift in public attention to business leadership with the media playing an important role in re-creating this leadership profile.
The chapter develops an interpretation of empirical data collected through Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) Research Project. These data are based on the survey of 450 Russian managers in banking and finance, telecommunication, and food processing industries. Sampling from middle managers permitted GLOBE researchers to generalize the subculture of middle managers in the countries and the three industries studied, and increased the internal validity of the study by ensuring the homogeneity of the sample. But the design of the GLOBE project, in particular, through the combination of anthropological and psychological/behavioral traditions of culture assessment, broader range of variables not often considered in cross-cultural theories, and integrated theory of leadership, increased the generalizability of these findings beyond the culture of middle managers alone (den Hartog, House, Hanges, Ruiz-Quintanilla, & Dorfman, Lindell et al., 1999 House, Hanges, Javidan et al., 2004; House, Hanges, Ruiz-Quintanilla et al., 1999; House, Wright, & Aditya, 1997). The following chapter summarizes the main streams of research on the societal cultural and leadership profile in Russia; explores the history and logic of the development of Russian cultures; and focuses on GLOBE results and their interpretation by analyzing the data from prepilot study, focused interviews, GLOBE survey, and media analysis. The basic conclusions about the impact of culture on leadership in Russia are then finally summarized at the end.
1. RESEARCH ON THE CULTURAL PROFILE OF RUSSIAN BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT
There is an extensive historiography on the roots of business values and behaviors related to the pre-Revolutionary period within Russia, such as memoirs of traders (kuptsi), books by Russian historians (Karamzin, 1892; Klyuchevski, 1904; Soloviev, 1913), business records, documents, and papers on the industrial development of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. However, during the Soviet period the phenomenon of business values and behaviors received limited attention in the USSR. The state was the only employer legally capable of exploiting economic freedom. The Communist Party had monopolized responsibility for moral judgments and created standards by manufacturing economic “heroes,” such as politically loyal directors of state-owned enterprises or Party nomenklature leaders.
In the West, Sovietologists focused on entrepreneurship in Imperial Russia: the rise of Muskovy business activity in the 16th/17th centuries, cultural economic determinants of Russian business in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and the role of foreign businesses influencing Russian economy. They also gave insight relevant to business activity in the USSR such as the state's domination of the economy, the pseudo-entrepreneurial role of the Party, central planning as a determinant of Soviet economy, and the transfer of risk of entrepreneurship from the individual to the state (Berliner, 1976; Blackwell, 1994; Guroff & Carstensen, 1983; Owen, 1981).
In the post-Socialist period, a discussion started in Russia on the rebirth of entrepreneurship and on diversity of its cultural characteristics (Kuzmichev & Petrov, 1993; Shikhirev, 2000). Particular attention was paid to characteristics of Russian society influenced by: (a) traditional features of pre-Revolutionary Russia; (b) totalitarian heritage of the 20th century, and (c) the radical revolution in the economy and values in the 1990s transitional period.
Western academics gained access to Russian data and provided insights on, and international comparisons of, organizational practices and business ethics (de Vries, 2000; Fey & Beamish, 2001; Michailova, 2000; Puffer, 1992, 1994). These research activities were strengthened through interaction with Russian scholars (Ageev, Gratchev, & Hisrich, 1995; Anderson & Shikhirev, 1994; Hisrich & Gratchev, 1993, 1997; Puffer, McCarthy, & Naumov, 1997, 2000; Rogovsky, Bertocci, & Gratchev, 1997). Detailed case studies developed in the 1990s helped scholars to better understand the changing business practices in the Russian transitional economy.
Recent research initiatives successfully applied advanced Hofstede-type cross-cultural tools integrating the Russian data into the stream of comparative management studies (Gratchev, 2001; Naumov, 1996; Naumov & Puffer, 2000), and evaluated it in the context of Eastern European cluster, with its distinctive cultural practices (Bakacsi, Takacs, Karacsonyi, & Imrek, 2002).
2. GENESIS OF RUSSIAN BUSINESS CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP
Based on a literature overview, relating to the different periods of the nation's history, general features of business culture and leadership can be determined. They refer to aggregate characteristics of culture, the entrepreneurial potential of Russian people, their continuous fight against monopolism, and the search for effective principles of business management.
The Fundamental Characteristics
Russian culture is rich in contradictions, spiritual, and sustainable. With Russian contribution to the human civilization, it is seen as an important factor for global development. Being holistic and influential, Slavic-Orthodox culture is treated as one of few global cultures (Huntington, 1993). Historically developed characteristics of Russian culture are rooted in Slavic history, Orthodox religion, specific features of natural environmental, and unique social capital.
While Russia was growing through the centuries, its leaders were traditionally associated with the State, religion, or military. The first independent Slavonic state—Kievan Rus—was founded in 862 with the capital in Kiev. Later the center of gravity had shifted to the cities of Novgorod and Vladimir. Being subjugated by the Tatars, the Russian development was seriously stunned from the 13th through 15th centuries until in 1480 Muscovy (Moscow State) succeeded in uniting all the Russian states. After liberalization from the Tatars, Muskovy strengthened as the dominant principality, and Russian Tzars such as Ivan the Great (ruled in 1462–1505) and Boris Godunov (1598–1605) became respected historic figures. The Russian Orthodox Church was a great influence in society, and several spiritual leaders were deified and highly respected (such as St. Sergii of Radonezh).
Russian history was marked by repeated attempts to catch up with the West economically, politically, and culturally. At the same time the country's leaders pursued imperial ambitions to the south and east (Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia, and Far East). Peter the Great (1696–1725) started “Westernization” by autocratic and barbarian means, proclaiming Russia as empire in 1721, and constructing St. Petersburg as its new capital. He was also an admired military leader, leading Russia to victories in several wars. The imperial gains were later consolidated by Catherine the Great (1762–1796).
Through the centuries Russia absorbed the basic values of both the West and the East— reason and inspiration. It served as a bridge between Western and Eastern cultural traditions, with a certain psychological dependence on both. These characteristics attracted much attention from the 18th century to early 20th century. According to one of the best Russian historians of the 19th century, V. Kluchevski, the national character combined, among others, such qualities as the habit of patient struggle against misfortunes and hardships, the ability to concentrate efforts, and the ability to cooperate within large geographic space (Kluchevski, 1904). The other famous intellectual, P. Chaadaev, defined contradictive Russian national character by such features as brutality and inclination to violence, impersonal collectivism, messianic, internal freedom, kindness, humanism, gentleness, and the search for truth (Chaadaev, 1991).
But in the 20th century under Communism these Russian characteristics were enforced by the specific Soviet (totalitarian) traits, such as the perception of the environment as hostile and dangerous, society's supremacy over the individual's goals, and a relativistic view of the morality with acceptance of double standards in life. One feature should be underlined. As D. Mikheev explains, “Real courage and cowardice can be measured only in the face of obvious, not just perceived, dangers. In these circumstances, Russians are anything but cowards” (Mikheyev, 1987, pp. 521–522).
Entrepreneurial Potential and the Fight Against Monopolism
In Imperial Russia, in the Soviet Union, and in post-Socialist Russia, one can see a vast amount of entrepreneurial potential. In the medieval Russian cities of Kiev and Novgorod, not only did merchants and artisans have political power and substantial wealth, but almost everyone above the lowest level of peasantry was engaged in one type of enterprise or another. In Imperial Russia, there was a substantial supply of entrepreneurial energy from both within and outside the business enterprise.
Entrepreneurs in the time of Peter the Great were traders who had created Europe's strongest military-industrial complex for Imperial Russia. The economic liberalism of Catherine the Great, in the late 18th century, had attracted the highest-ranking Russian nobles to entrepreneurial activities. After defeating Napoleon in 1812–1815 Russia was recognized as the great power, despite lagging behind the West institutionally and economically. The autocratic state was based on the predominantly agrarian economy and a feudal serf system.
The Industrial Revolution (which started in Russia half a century later than it had started in England) brought to Russia the real spirit of private entrepreneurship. The economic reform of 1861 gave freedom to peasants and activated different social groups. Industrial policy led to the “railway fever,” and created favorable conditions for development of banking capital to be added to existing industrial capital. Talented Russian businessmen S. Morozov, L. Knopp, P. Ryabushinski, and others became founders of successful business empires in Russia and introduced many organizational innovations.
A vigorous level of entrepreneurial response existed even within the Soviet command system. There is a certain positive Russian entrepreneurial heritage, including courageous behaviors, great technical projects, and charitable traditions. However Russian history has been a continuous fight against monopolism. In contrast to the West:
[Russia] appears to have largely retained, even in periods of rapid industrial expansion, an autocratic or patrimonial system (single-centered) which has sharply limited the autonomy of economic units in the use and disposal of resources, and which has preserved for those in political control the right, if only de jure, to determine the pace and pattern of economic development. (Guroff & Carstensen, 1983, p. 347)
The feature of pre-Revolution and Soviet societies—noneconomic domination of a small group of elite aristocracy or Party nomenclature over economic development—directly influenced economic policy (imperial foreign and oppressive domestic economic policy and the creation of the military-industrial complex), ownership (the state as the owner and employer, restriction of other ownership forms), institutions (legislation hostile to business, bureaucratization, and the standardization of structures and decisions), and culture (state paternalism and lack of personal responsibility and initiative).
In the Soviet era, the overwhelming majority of resources were under the control of a small group of monopolistic or oligopolistic coalitions.1 The needs of the society were sacrificed for the sake of stability and the expansion of these coalitions. Their influence on political leadership secured decision making by the suppression of competition and by channeling public opinion. In general, their domination resulted in a 20 to 25-year delay in undertaking the required structural changes, causing Russia to lag behind international standards of quality of life.
In President Yeltsin's era (1991–2000), the question of the role of the state and large corporations in economic development became critical. Russia's economy was run by a small number of financial-industrial groups, arguably more powerful than the state. The oligarchs— leaders of industrial and financial empires, such as M. Khodorkovsky, V. Potanin, or R. Abramovich—displayed the new model for leadership in the Russian economy. The future of the country became largely dependent on the relationships between these major economic players and the government.
In the transitional economy under President Putin (2000–current), when the period of selling state property (“privatization stage”) and rapid accumulation of capital is over, the discussions about the future of Russian business focus on interaction between large corporations and small businesses, on the role of the government in supporting large businesses, and on corporate governance. At this stage the main task for business is to manage capital effectively.
Three main assumptions help to understand the process of re-creating the Russian corporation in the early 2000s. First, the leaders of the large industrial corporations are interested in effective business and organizational development. They seek new ways to move from conglomerates of financially loosely linked entities to diversified corporations—whether with related or unrelated businesses.2 This reflects the new stage in development of management mentality of the Russian business leaders, and the process of building the critical mass of people able and willing to manage their businesses effectively, in a “modern” civilized way. Second, many business leaders resist the current government actions to reprivatize the Russian economy. They consider that the government may not have a clear strategy to support the development of private business enterprises. Third, currently there is no visible stakeholders’ influence on corporate design and development. There is no indication of any constructive dialogue between business and its stakeholders (unions, in particular) in the nearest future. The Russian corporations are displaying a unique, yet not clear national identity.3
Leadership Diversity
The multifaceted kaleidoscope culture of the current transitional society is different from the homogenous Soviet culture. Business leaders and managers in Russia are motivated by one, or a combination of the following business philosophies: bureaucratic, based on active initiatives but under state-run bureaucratic supervision; pragmatic, based on maximum profitability on a technocratic basis; predatory, based on the search for success through tough suppression of rivals including Mafia connections, growth by any means, cheating on partners, and consumers and the state; and socially responsible, based on linking business to the promotion of national interests, the resolution of social problems, and universal human values and beliefs.
The current transitional economy makes the carriers of those business philosophies very diverse, with a variety of economic and political interests. In the literature, a number of similar typologies exist to differentiate these carriers. Although they often do not go far beyond informal observations, they help to better explain the diversity of the Russian management community.
One such typology identifies the Old Guard, the New Wave, and the International Corps by linking their roots to the stages of Russian business history (Ageev et al., 1995). The first group, the Old Guard, consists of those who proved their talents in the past as leaders of large-scale projects, such as technological innovations in the space or defense industries. They exploit their access to key decision-making points and information, and use bureaucratic connections and control over resources. These people keep the leading positions in the large industrial corporations, or in the internationally competitive sectors of the economy (such as oil-and-gas, space, aviation, and shipbuilding). The second group, the New Wave of managers, initiated by economic reform, follows a different road to economic independence. They are former shadow-economy entrepreneurs, Young Communist League functionaries, or military officers who successfully transformed into businessmen. A large proportion of this group comprises young people, hungry for success and business education. The other part of this group can be called Unwilling Entrepreneurs. They are forced to take initiatives due to fear of unemployment and are involved primarily in small-scale trade transactions. Finally, there is a growing influence of the International Corps—Russian managers of multinational companies and representatives of the Russian diaspora, who strengthen economic ties with Russian business.
A similar system of categorizing Russian business leaders is suggested by M. de Vries (de Vries, 2000, pp. 71–72). He identifies two groups separated by a substantial generation gap. The administrators and bureaucrats who used to supervise the Soviet economy in the past make up one such group. However this group is not homogeneous. One subgroup consists of the present business elite, well connected and retaining privileged positions. The other subgroup among the older generation is focused on self-preservation, making superficial adjustments to maintain their status, but often giving lip service to the new economy. In the second group, de Vries places young, enthusiastic, talented people who recognize the opportunities of the new open society. This group also includes former black-marketers turning to legitimized business and children of Party nomenclature.
These categories indicate that typical carriers of management philosophies depend on their past history and practices, that generation gaps differentiate certain groups of business people, and that there are different combinations of basic business philosophies in society.
3. GLOBE DATA COLLECTION
The main body of GLOBE quantitative data was generated in 1995–1998 with additional data collected from media analysis in 2001. In order to create the cultural and leadership profile of Russia, Country Co-Investigators (CCIs) analyzed information accumulated through a pilot study, focused group interviews, the GLOBE survey of managers in the telecommunication, food-processing, and banking industries, and media research.
Pilot Study
In the 1994 pilot study, Russian CCIs surveyed 127 managers and entrepreneurs using the simplified design with questions linked to the GLOBE societal culture dimensions. The respondents represented key areas of the Russian economy: state-owned enterprises (5%), joint-stock companies (28%), limited partnerships (35%), individual businessmen (26%), and joint-ventures (6%). They did their business in manufacturing (31%), extraction industries (2%), agribusiness (3%), trade (20%), construction (4%), business services (30%), and communications (10%). The results of the pilot survey provided preliminary ideas for a generic profile of Russian culture.
Focus Group Interviews
Focus group interviews were designed along the GLOBE guidelines to provide a preliminary generic profile of leadership in Russia. Because the authors were aware of tremendous differences between various groups of managers/entrepreneurs, they targeted two groups. The first group of five managers/entrepreneurs represented those with experience in the Soviet economy and contemporary business organizations. They were mature people between the ages of 38 to 51 years, from the machine-building, construction, and publishing industries. The second group of three managers/entrepreneurs represented new businessmen aged between 22 and 36 years, who had started businesses only 1 to 3 years ago in such industries as telecommunications and wholesale trade. All respondents represented businesses in Moscow or in the Greater Moscow Region. This approach helped CCIs to understand leadership similarities shared by managers of Russia, and also uncover the differences in attitudes toward leadership, expressed by representatives of these two groups. The interviews, conducted in an informal atmosphere, were recorded and analyzed.
The Main GLOBE Study
When Russian CCIs were distributing GLOBE questionnaires and interacting with respondents, they faced a number of country-specific problems. First, not all the questions designed in the West were perfectly clear to those surveyed. In a few cases, the authors had to explain to those managers trained in the Soviet era basic conceptual management ideas in order to facilitate adequate response. Market-oriented human resource management was an example. Second, the culture of interviewing people had not been appreciated in the former Soviet era. Historically, people were suspicious about any unofficial attempts to learn about their views and assessments. Those interviewed were somewhat hesitant to give honest answers to some questions, especially those related to the profile of their organization and to personal data on employment and education. Third, motivation to contribute to GLOBE was low, with no visible quick benefits to respondents who complained about spending a lot of time on answering the questions. Fourth, in the turbulent economic environment of the 1990s it was hardly possible to access few organizations with deep and detailed research, and Russian CCIs had to look for creative solutions to accessing such a large number of managers from three industries. Industry-related data and statistics in a recently privatized economy were also not adequate. All these factors had added additional difficulties to the data collection. This explains why the CCIs could not effectively create the database for the organizational-level research.
The main GLOBE data were received from 450 managers in food processing, telecommunication, and banking/finance—150 managers in each industry. In order to access this large group, the authors targeted nationally recognized management training and development centers. In Moscow, respondents from banking and finance were accessed through a training and development center under the Ministry of Finance. The Academy of National Economy under the government of the Russian Federation helped with accessing managers in the food-processing industry. In St. Petersburg, the authors surveyed participants in management development programs at the Ministry of Communication's Training and Development Institute. The surveys were administered in two of the largest cities in Russia, but the trainees had come from different parts of the country—Far East, Siberia, the Urals, Southern and Northern Russia, and large cities of the Central Region.
Based on the data collected, the authors aggregated responses to demographic questions of the survey and designed the profile of the sample. The average age of respondents was 38.8 years, and the gender composition of the sample was 61.7% men and 38.3% women.
The questions related to citizenship and nationality in a transitional country that had just changed its name, anthem, and flag, and were often considered as ambiguous. Some people differentiated Russia and the USSR, whereas others did not: 96% had named the USSR and Russia as the place of birth, but Georgia and Ukraine (which were a part of the USSR in the past) were mentioned by only 2% of respondents accordingly. The average number of years that respondents had lived in Russia was 37.9. Out of the whole sample, three respondents had lived outside Russia for more than 1 year. Ethnic composition of the sample was very diverse: Russians 69%, Ukrainians 10%, Tatars 5%; other nationalities’ percentage was under 2%, such as Kalmyk, Khakas, Georgians, Mordva, Belarus, Karel, Buryat, and German. Previously, in the USSR, the Jews were formally considered a nationality, and so 4% of the respondents mentioned being a Jew in answer to the nationality question. With regard to faith, believers accounted for 25%, out of which 22% considered themselves as Christians (including those of the Russian Orthodox Church) and 3% as Buddhists. When asked about their families, all of them reported that their fathers and mothers were born in the USSR. However, out of the whole sample 10% indicated that the Ukrainian language was spoken in the family, 1% German and 1% Hebrew.
The average employment profile of managers consists of: number of years employed 16.8 years, management experience 7.4 years, and employment in their current organization 8.6 years. Members of professional organizations totaled 40%, whereas 15% were actively involved in trade and industry associations. Respondents working for multinational corporations amounted to 5%.
Managers surveyed as to function were employed in production and engineering (42%), administration (28%), sales and marketing (15%), human resource management (8%), research and development (5%); the remaining 2% were in planning and other functions. The average number of subordinates reporting to those managers surveyed was 15.4, with the average number of administrative layers between them and the CEO being 2.1, and layers below 2.9. The average number of people employed in the organizations was 1,378. The use of one language, by managers, in their work was 83%, with 15% representing the use of two languages and 2% using three.
Educational levels for respondents were very high—total number of years in education was 15.5. The university/college background revealed that 61% was technical and 39% in economics, planning, and finance. However, in the food industry and telecommunications the number of technical graduates was even higher. Respondents that had received some training in Western management concepts and techniques amounted to 12% overall.
4. CULTURE PROFILES FROM THE PILOT STUDY
The pilot study helped to sketch a rough picture of Russian societal culture as perceived by managers, which is explored later, in detail, through GLOBE questionnaires. When asked about future versus present orientation, fewer respondents (44%) preferred future orientation versus present (56%). It was considered as the “positive surprise” for the people in the economy under hyperinflation and with strong demand for short-term return on investments. Respondents that relied more on power and authority accounted for 62%, as opposed to 38% who relied on consensus and team building. Few respondents (17%) preferred impersonal versus personal approach (83%) in dealing with people. However, the majority of respondents mentioned they lacked skills in human resources management. Most of the respondents were willing to accept the idea of establishing order and following the rules (69%), rather than exploiting the benefits of uncertainty (31%); adding to this are the entrepreneurs who need stability in the rules of the game in order to do business effectively. Political shifts, poor legislation, and rapid changes in the laws were treated as strong limitations for business leadership. It was a surprise to Russian CCIs to see how many entrepreneurs/managers (64%) preferred the individualistic versus collectivist approach, if one takes into consideration past history and the indoctrination of collectivist-socialist ideology in the former USSR. Also when asked to assess assertiveness, 52% preferred assertive to nonassertive behavior.
Based on this survey, the authors had summarized respondents’ reactions to societal issues in a transitional economy as more present oriented, with modest assertive and individualistic behavior, but seeking more order and relying on personal approach in management.
5. GLOBE SCALES: SOCIETAL CULTURE RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
The main results are based on societal culture profiles generated from the main study's GLOBE questionnaires. Figure 22.1 summarizes quantitative findings that lead to the most important conclusions. Here we review the data along each GLOBE dimension and then discuss the content of these findings and interrelations among the main results. Table 22.1 contains quantitative data. We make important observations of these results: Some dimensions display agreement between perceptions of Russian societal culture “As Is” and “Should Be,” namely, Institutional Collectivism, In-Group Collectivism, Egalitarianism, and Assertiveness, whereas others display marked differences between perceptions of the Russian societal culture (“As Is”) and respective cultural values (“Should Be”), namely, Power Distance, Performance Orientation, Future Orientation, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Humane Orientation. We now examine the results in the order mentioned here.
Institutional Collectivism is the degree to which cultural norms and practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and collective action. On Institutional Collectivism “As Is” Russia scores 4.50, which equates to Rank 17 (out of 61 GLOBE countries) within Band B (i.e. second-highest group of countries on that dimension). The societal culture, as it is perceived by the respondents, reflects traditional collectivistic practices rooted in historic traditions and Socialist indoctrination. At the same time, the “Should Be” score (3.89) reflects the cultural values endorsed by the responding managers, which place Russia much lower, at the end of the spectrum (Rank 60, Band D). The marked difference between “As Is” and “Should Be” scores is in line with the notion of a decline of traditional collectivistic values, which we attribute to the aforementioned process of fragmentation of the Russian society.
In-Group Collectivism is the degree to which individuals are encouraged in a society to express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in groups, organizations, or families. In-Group Collectivism “As Is” is relatively high (5.63, Rank 17), which places Russia in the leading group of countries on this dimension (Band A). Although the “Should Be” scores are still high (5.79, Rank 20), Russia ranks slightly lower (Rank 20, Band B).
Figure 22.1. Societal culture scales for Russia (circles– “As Is”; triangles–“Should Be”).
TABLE 22.1
GLOBE Societal Culture Scores for Russia
| “As Is” Scorea | Rankc (Band)b | “Should Be” Score | Rankc (Band)b | |
Institutional Collectivism |
4.50 | 17 (B) | 3.89 | 60 (D) |
In-Group Collectivism |
5.63 | 17 (A) | 5.79 | 20 (B) |
Gender Egalitarianism |
4.07 | 2 (A) | 4.18 | 49 (B) |
Assertiveness |
3.68 | 54 (B) | 2.83 | 59 (C) |
Power Distance |
5.52 | 14 (A) | 2.62 | 40 (C) |
Performance Orientation |
3.39 | 59 (C) | 5.54 | 55 (D) |
Future Orientation |
2.88 | 61 (D) | 5.48 | 34 (B) |
Uncertainty Avoidance |
2.88 | 61 (D) | 5.07 | 18 (A) |
| Humane Orientation | 3.94 | 37 (C) | a 5.59 | 18 (B) |
aCountry mean score on a 7-point Likert-type scale. bBand letters A–D indicating meaningful country bands for the scales A > B > C > D; the band widths are equal to 2*SD. cThe rank orders for Russia relative to the 61 GLOBE countries.
Russia is stereotyped as a collectivistic culture. However, the GLOBE data necessitate a closer inspection, because on both collectivism dimensions, the cultural values (“Should Be”) scores are lower than the respective “As Is” scores for culture perceptions. Historically, Russians lived on large open spaces and were forced by (a relatively hostile) nature to work together. An agrarian country for centuries, with low geographic mobility of peasants within the serf system, Russia was known for collective agricultural practices. The Russian Orthodox Church supported strong family ties and mutual support. The social framework did not permit a high level of individual freedom, and there were quite a few limitations to express individual competitiveness (winning was not always appreciated). In many cases, Russian collectivism was formal, prescribed by the social institutions.
Economic reforms of the second half of the 19th century and early 20th century started the process of destroying the collectivist traditions cultivated by the church and agrarian social system. However, the higher level of individual freedom (migration, developing labor market, access to education, democratic trends) after the Revolution was replaced with politicized artificial loyalty and obedience to the Communist Party, which controlled behavior and enforced people's conformity through total surveillance and purges. The Party also took responsibility for substituting family and natural group loyalty, with loyalty to the political system and to the State.
However, collectivist behavior was important in periods of high danger, such as the fight for national survival during the Second World War. In the early 1990s, when the struggle for survival in economic turmoil made mutual support important, some more reflections of collectivism became visible, especially among socially excluded groups. More contemporarily, indoctrination of Westernized behavior through media and the official doctrine of entrepreneurship are now pushing the country along the road of higher individualism and social fragmentation. That is why in current Russia striking contradictions between highly individualistic behavior and low social responsibility on the one side, with active networking for survival—often exploited by criminal structures—on the other side, are evident. From the trend toward less collectivistic cultural values on both dimensions, it is clear that Russia is inclined to transform itself into a more individualistic society.
Gender Egalitarianism is the extent to which an organization or society minimize gender role differences. The “As Is” (4.07) and “Should Be” (4.18) scores for Russia are quite similar, thus displaying relatively low concern of respondents with the difference between cultural values and practices in this case. In comparison to all 61 GLOBE countries, which show a clear trend from comparatively low perceived Gender Egalitarianism toward a much higher valued Gender Egalitarianism, in Russia, the current cultural practices are perceived as already highly Egalitarian (Rank 2, Band A), whereas the respective cultural value (“Should Be”) ranks considerably lower (Rank 49, Band B).
There are interesting historic interpretations of Gender Egalitarianism in Russia. In medieval times, the roles of Russian men and women were clearly defined and separated from each other. Men were responsible for activities outside the home (hunter, agrarian, spokesperson for the family), whereas women took care of internal home affairs. But with the increased influence of the state (and later, the communist system) on the social environment, the individual‘s control of this environment declined, and, as a result, the gender-defined social roles were changing. During the Soviet period, Joseph Stalin's repressions and the Second World War severely decreased the male population and enabled women to take over various traditional men's activities in such industries as textiles, education, and health care, turning them into women‘s professions. The state facilitated equal access of men and women to education and social benefits, and the Party controlled the “right” balance of men and women in the political and government bodies.
In the transitional 1990s, the country was backsliding from the Soviet era. The gap between men and women in employment structure somewhat increased: In 1990, 37 million men and 38 million women were involved in economic activity versus 39 million and 33 million respectively in 1995, prior to the GLOBE data collection. Compared with the upward trend in value orientation, expressed by respondents from other surveyed countries, Russian managers are not much concerned with strengthening Gender Egalitarianism. This seems to reflect the patrimonial system of traditional Russian society, only superficially moderated in the Soviet period (Izyumov & Razumnova, 2000). The Russian managers, unlike their peers in other countries, do not express willingness to increase or change the role of women in organizations, and in society as a whole.
Assertiveness is the degree to which individuals are encouraged within a society to be assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in social relationships. The “As Is” score is 3.68, placing Russian societal culture on a low position (Rank 54, Band B), and the “Should Be” score 2.83 is also low (Rank 59, Band C). In the medieval times, the roles were clearly divided by gender. Masculine type of culture was reflected by male-headed households, and publicly by the role of the tzar (with few historic exceptions, such as Catherine the Great). Western influences (French in particular) in the 18th and 19th centuries added some feminine characteristics to the noble strata of the society. Through active interaction with the French establishment, and acceptance of the French language by the aristocracy as its second (occasionally even the first) language, and the French literature and arts, higher respect for women and romanticism were transferred to the Emperor's court. In the decades of Communist rule, elements of feminine culture were indoctrinated by promoting official policy of caring for people (especially for children), education, and full employment.
The current transitional society demands more assertive behavior, with tough measures to survive and transform businesses, and society at large. However, the heritage of caring for other people and social assistance limits such assertive behavior for many managers. Also, interpersonal networks (family ties, nepotism, Mafia structures) and collective obligations often suggest forms that are different from open and direct assertive management.
Power Distance is the degree to which members of a society expect and agree that power should be unequally shared. For Russia, the gap between “As Is” and “Should Be” scores is substantial. Over and above the common trend among GLOBE countries toward lower Power Distance “Should Be,” Power Distance “As Is” in Russia ranks very high (5.52, Rank 14, Band A), whereas Power Distance “Should Be” ranks substantially lower (2.62, Rank 41, Band C).
Again, in the past, Russia has experienced serious changes in behaviors and values related to Power Distance. The pre-Revolutionary period formalized social status stratification, with the system of serfdom that had existed until the mid-19th century, the weak middle class, strong centralization of power in the hands of the state, and lack of democratic traditions. This trend continued in the Stalin era, with the Party hierarchy as the power stratification framework. That system suppressed people's independent behavior by all means of control. The tradition of respect for authority and privileges is still strong in contemporary Russian society. Current common belief in democratic reforms (as expressed by GLOBE respondents) may eliminate political power over economic behavior, and give society a higher level of economic freedom and competition. The opportunities for people today are increasingly linked to education, skills, and experience, rather than political connections. This, in turn, may modify the behavior of people toward more democratic management styles and social norms. But this option, to a great extent, depends on Russia's overall ability to balance democracy with establishing order in society.
Performance Orientation is the extent to which a society encourages or rewards group members for performance and excellence. In the Russian case, quite poor Performance Orientation is reported with the “As Is” score of 3.39 (Rank 59, Band C). Though Performance Orientation “Should Be” scores high (5.54) in comparison to the “As Is” score within Russia, in comparison to the 61 GLOBE countries, the Performance Orientation “Should Be” scores position Russia still at the lower end of the distribution (Rank 55, Band D). In the Soviet era, enterprise managers de-emphasized the need to exceed the planned indicators delegated from above. Managers and factory directors were not rewarded for high results that did not fit the state-designed economic plans, nor had they additional resources for unplanned initiatives. Legitimized achievements were not recognized by monetary means (there were official ceilings for salaries), but in this case managers were awarded symbolically or with higher status in nomenklatura hierarchy. In the other domains of human activity, the state rewarded those high achievements in science, sports, and the arts that were blessed by the Party and official propaganda. During mass privatization in the 1990s, many managers of large enterprises made their fortunes, not by improving enterprise performance, but by capitalizing on management buyout schemes. Successful performance results could be achieved by ignoring ethical standards and rules of morality, thus making Performance Orientation a contradictory weapon in competition. The small business (still underdeveloped), however, provides selected examples of high Performance Orientation with socially responsible managerial behavior (Hisrich, Gratchev, Bolshakov, Popov, & Ilyin, 1996).
Future Orientation is the degree to which individuals in organizations or society engage in future-oriented behaviors such as planning, investing in the future, and delaying gratification. This dimension is important to better understand the social side of the economy-intransition. It presents striking differences in the assessment of cultural practices versus cultural values by the respondents. The “As Is” score (2.88) is extremely low (Rank 61, Band D). As in the case of Performance Orientation, the Russian managers believe that economic stabilization is contingent on changes in value orientation—at least when “As Is” (2.88) and “Should Be” (5.48) Future Orientation scores are compared within Russia. In contrast, the Future Orientation “Should Be” score (5.48) positions Russia not at the lower end of the distribution, as was the case for Performance Orientation “Should Be,” but at a midrange level (Rank 34, Band B). After decades of strong beliefs in a better life under Communism and a national long-term planning system, in the 1990s Russia has transformed into a society with at least limited Future Orientation. The continuous government reshuffling, changes in legislation, and political instability added to this enormously. People and businesses in the mid-and late 1990s did not rely on savings, quickly transferring inflated rubles into hard currencies or spending money above all reasonable limits. The signs of economic stabilization in 2000–2006 are still coupled with mass suspicion of authorities and their promises about positive future changes. However, the managers we interviewed in focus groups expressed a strong belief in values related to stability in the economy and society, which enables them to think and act strategically. This leads to a more optimistic conclusion about the potential economic development of Russia and the predictability of its businesses, which seems to be reflected in the midrange (rather than low) positioning of Future Orientation “Should Be.”
Uncertainty Avoidance is the extent to which members of a society strive to avoid uncertainty by relying on social norms, rituals, and bureaucratic practices to alleviate the unpredictability of future events. With an “As Is” score of 2.88, Russia ranks lowest among all GLOBE countries (Rank 61, Band D) on Uncertainty Avoidance practices. This could be interpreted as “uncertainty acceptance” in the transitional economy. To a certain extent, this indicates the entrepreneurial and risk-oriented behavior of Russian managers. At the same time, managers‘ responses to the “Should Be” questions relating to Uncertainty Avoidance show a large gap between reality, on the one hand, and values and expectations on the other. The “Should Be” score of 5.07 (Rank 18, Band A) positions Russia among the countries with a clear value preference for Uncertainty Avoidance. That may indicate a still existing preference for a planning system among Russian managers, which they feel comfortable with, or an increased need for security and direction in times of transition where uncertainty is particularly high.
In the 1990s, most of the population lost a clear sense of direction in the new fragmented and uncertain environment. Realities of the past that provided security and supported tolerance of uncertainty (respect for age, tradition, rule orientation, social order) are no longer valid. In the current situation, managers quickly and creatively adjust to rapidly changing situations in the environment. This demands specific traits for quick reaction, multiscenario thinking, networking, and sharing risk. Many Russian managers and entrepreneurs work successfully in networks, relying not only on formal agreements, but on friendship and social interaction as well.
Humane Orientation is the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies encourage and reward individuals for being fair, friendly, generous, caring, and kind to others. The relations between the current behavior and the values of the Russian managers look encouraging for the prospects of the country. Whereas the “As Is” score of 3.94 positions Russia on Rank 37 (Band C), the “Should Be” score is high, 5.59 (Rank 18, Band B), and positions Russia among the countries with strong endorsement of humane-oriented values. Transitional Russia can be characterized by the absence of social norms and laws that protect the less fortunate. There is much unfairness and corruption in business, and ethical norms and morality are not highly respected in business or in society at large. Much of the current behavior in the economy is quite exploitative, and much wealth is concentrated in the hands of very few. Poverty and social exclusion in Russia today are widespread. Suspicion and mistrust are more a rule than an exception. At the organizational level, welfare and social benefits are often neglected. Humane Orientation “Should Be” is usually inversely related to the frequency and severity of aggressiveness and hostile actions (“As Is”) within cultures, which is evident in contemporary Russia, with its multiple ethnic and industrial conflicts.
To summarize, GLOBE indicators and rankings for Russia seem to reflect the realities of painful economic transformation and current “mental models” of “doing business” in Russia. Our research had positioned Russia as having an extreme “As Is” profile when compared to the other countries on the GLOBE dimensions: very low in Uncertainty Avoidance, Future Orientation, Performance Orientation, and Humane Orientation, and very high on Power Distance. An extremely low Uncertainty Avoidance score and rank could be considered favorable for entrepreneurship activities unless one links it to a very low Future Orientation. That can be interpreted as a lack of vision in management and entrepreneurship, as the primary focus is on survival and short-term business development. Low Performance Orientation makes it difficult to encourage managers to focus on continuous improvement and learning. Low ranking on Humane Orientation raises doubts about long-term investments in human resources. High Power Distance scores explain the tough bureaucratic measures in crisis management and in restructuring enterprises and industries.
An analysis of societal culture trends, evident in discrepancies between “As Is” and “Should Be” scores, makes further interpretations possible. In particular, the discrepancies found display deficits in, and preference for, humanistic, ethical, and democratic practices. No discrepancies were found, for example, for In-Group Collectivism, which is strongly linked to historical cultural roots of collectivism. Also for Gender Egalitarianism, no discrepancies between relatively high “As Is” and “Should Be” scores were found. However, when compared to the overall trend among the other GLOBE countries, a dramatic decline in Gender Egalitarian values is evident (“As Is” Rank 2 vs. “Should Be” Rank 49).
6. LEADERSHIP PROFILE IN FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEWS
In focused group interviews, participants talked about characteristics of leadership and leaders in Russia. They suggested that leaders should be defined differently in society on the one hand, and in the economy on the other.
According to the interviewees, the definition of leadership in general should be based on stereotypes of heroes, developed in history, as well as indoctrinated by official propaganda. Leaders were associated with national success, great achievements, and heroism, inspiring people with personal ability, creativity, courage, and risk taking. The effectiveness of leaders was judged by interviewees via results and success. More often, strong leaders were valued in the history of the state (Tzar Peter the Great; Dictator Joseph Stalin), in large-scale national projects (physicists I. Kurchatov and A. Sakharov in nuclear industry, engineer S. Korolev in space exploration). Both groups of respondents shared these views.
In the economy, however, leadership was viewed differently by representatives of Group 1 and Group 2, and without consensus. In the Soviet economy, the responsibility of factory manager was the implementation of the plan: meeting previously indicated targets. Extraordinary results in productivity, innovations that did not fit the “planning system” were the factors of unbalance and were not appreciated. The state used propaganda to create an image of those leaders who were productive, loyal to the Communist Party, and channeled officially recognized values.
Representatives of the first group defined leadership in the economy as the ability to represent and share technical skills and expertise. Few remarks were made about managers‘ professionalism and to deal with people effectively. The representatives of the first group thought that the most important job of the manager was to follow the already established norms and principles. The second group, consisting of younger aggressive entrepreneurs, with practically no experience in the old Soviet system, was more definite on leadership qualities such as creating new companies, new businesses, and in general, taking risk and inspiring others to follow them. The interviewed managers/entrepreneurs of this group showed themselves as not just administrators but also “creators of organizational culture.”
One interesting comment related to charitable traditions of Russian entrepreneurs. People from both groups appreciated the charitable activities of the pre-Revolutionary industrialists (S. Morozov & P. Ryabushinski) who donated resources to hospitals, theaters, and museums, and preserved Russian arts and culture.
In general, discussion with the Russian managers/entrepreneurs indicated their strong interest in leadership qualities, and consequently in leadership development. The issues of special interest were related to the nature of leaders: whether leaders are those with naturally developed features, or those who have leadership qualities, based on focused individual work, individual training. It became clear that most of those interviewed agree that one can develop these qualities.
Though displaying different interpretations of leadership, the interviewees had raised the following critical issues. First, leadership is the reality of every society. It is based on the freely released diverse human activity. At a certain historic moment it becomes the focus of special attention, when it can be purposefully accumulated and developed, thus making leadership one of management's strategic resources. Second, leadership is a practical, social phenomenon, which can be found in various social fabrics (individual, collective, culture, and politics). Leadership includes the ability to catalyze practical reaction to the factors of socioeconomic development. This is “the first social move” to one of the possible options (scenarios) of getting into the future. In other words, leadership creates something new, nonstandard—in the practical form (precedent) by involving others into its activity. Third, leadership also is an organizational phenomenon, and here respondents agreed with GLOBE's definition of leadership as “the ability of an individual to influence, motivate, and enable others to contribute toward the effectiveness and success of the organization of which they are members.” Fourth, leadership is also interdependent with society, and only those leaders who comply with the social capital of their nation are able to absorb and distribute the advanced international experience, without possible dangerous side effects. If a society is unable to generate mass motivation, it may create leaders who will move the society away from the road of ethical development. Social partnership, degree of corporate citizenship, and social responsibilities depend on the moral potential of leadership. At the same time, the discussants concluded that society is responsible for facilitating healthy leadership, for providing the appropriate level of freedom and reasonable tolerance to unexpected and unusual behaviors.
7. GLOBE SCALES: LEADERSHIP RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
The scores of the overall profile of Russian leaders according to globally endorsed implicit leadership theory dimensions (Charismatic, Team Oriented, Participative, Humane, Self-Protective, Autonomous) are displayed in Figure 22.2. In Table 22.2, the scores for the 21 first-order leadership dimensions are described together with Russia's positioning relative to the 61 GLOBE countries (Ranks) and the country groupings (Bands) on each dimension.
Charismatic/Value-Based Orientation
Aggregate indicators for universal positive leader attributes summarized in Charismatic/Value-Based leadership dimensions are relatively low for Russia (5.66, Rank 47, Band D). The first-order dimensions for Charismatic/Value-Based leadership display Visionary (6.07) as the most important dimension in considering effective leadership in Russia. In the range for factors slightly contributing to effective leadership, we find the following first-order dimensions: Performance Oriented (5.92), Inspirational (5.93), Decisive (5.95), and Integrator (5.19). Self-Sacrifice (4.28) has no impact on outstanding leadership. Comparing these factors for Russia to the other countries, one can consider the Russian profile in Band A on the Decisive dimension, in Band B on Visionary, Performance Orientation, and Integrity, and in Band C on Self-Sacrificial.
Team Orientation
Second-order scales for Team Oriented leadership do not provide us with an optimistic assessment of Russia's leadership profile as well. The Team Orientation country score is 5.63 (Rank 46, Band C). The first-order scales provide us with the following data. Whereas Administrative Competence is the factor most contributing to effective leadership in Russia (6.01), the other global dimensions present, only somewhat contributing to this leadership are: Team-Oriented (5.68), Team Integrator (5.19), Diplomatic (5.35), and Malevolent (2.02, reverse score). In the all country benchmarking, Russia is among the countries with high indicators for Administratively Competent (Band A), whereas the critical factors such as Team Orientation and Malevolence place it only into Band C. On the other two dimensions Diplomatic and Team Integrator, Russia is placed in Band B.
Figure 22.2. Global culturally endorsed implicit leadership (CLT) scores for Russia (circles–maximum mean, squares–minimum mean within 62 countries).
Humane Orientation
The dimension that nearly universally contributes to effective leadership is Humane Orientation, and by Russian managers it is perceived to have only limited impact on outstanding leadership (4.08, Rank 60, Band D). The first-order dimensions related to the second-order Humane Orientation are Modesty (4.25), which in the Russian case slightly facilitates effective leadership, and Humane Orientation (3.91), which slightly inhibits people being perceived as outstanding leaders.
Participative Orientation
On Participative Orientation in leadership perception, Russia scores comparatively low (4.67, Rank 58, Band D) with the two reverse-scored first-order dimensions, Autocratic (3.86, Rank 1, Band A) and Nonparticipative (2.82, Rank 23, Band A), ranking very high and medium respectively.
TABLE 22.2
GLOBE First-Order Leadership Dimension Scores for Russia
Dimensions Subdimensions |
Country Score | GLOBE Rank (Band) |
| Charismatic/Value Based | 5.66 | 47 (D) |
Visionary |
6.07 | 35 (B) |
Inspirational |
5.93 | 42 (D) |
Self-Sacrificial |
4.28 | 58 (C) |
Integrity |
5.19 | 50 (B) |
Decisive |
5.95 | 26 (A) |
Performance Orientation |
5.92 | 45 (B) |
| Team Oriented | 5.63 | 46 (C) |
Collaborative Team Oriented |
5.68 | 52 (C) |
Team Integrator |
5.19 | 45 (B) |
Diplomatic |
5.01 | 43 (B) |
Malevolent (Recoded) |
2.02 | 14 (A) |
Administratively Competent |
6.01 | 19 (A) |
| Self-Protective | 3.69 | 17 (D) |
Self-Centered |
2.48 | 13 (B) |
Status Consciousness |
5.06 | 12 (B) |
Conflict Inducer |
4.43 | 14 (B) |
Face Saver |
3.40 | 13 (C) |
Procedural |
3.21 | 53 (D) |
| Participative | 4.67 | 58 (D) |
Autocratic (Recoded) |
3.86 | 1 (A) |
Nonparticipative (Recoded) |
2.82 | 23 (B) |
| Humane | 4.08 | 60 (D) |
Modesty |
4.25 | 60 (C) |
Humane |
3.91 | 57 (C) |
Autonomous |
4.63 | 1 (A) |
Autonomous
In relation to all GLOBE countries, Autonomous leadership seems to be strongly endorsed in Russian culture (4.63, Rank 1, Band A). It is based on such characteristics as individualism, independence, uniqueness, and being autonomous.
Self-Protective leadership perceptions (3.69, Rank 17, Band A) slightly inhibit outstanding leadership in Russia. This is based on a profile or some positive impact of the dimension Status-Conscious (5.06) and Conflict Inducer (4.43), counterset by negative impacts of the dimensions Self-Centered (2.48), Face Saver (3.4), and Procedural (3.21). Relative to the 61 GLOBE countries, Russia positions itself in Band B on such dimensions as Status-Conscious, Self-Centered, and Conflict Inducer, in Band C for Face Saver, and in Band D for Procedural. With a very low score on the Procedural dimension, it indicates that being procedural is likely to be a greater inhibitor of effective leadership in Russia than in most countries included in the GLOBE sample.
The Profile of Effective Leadership
In terms of GLOBE dimensions, Russia displays a clear picture of what makes effective leadership in a transitional economy. The most important within-country attributes are Visionary and Administrative Competency. They are followed by being Decisive, Performance Orientated, and Inspirational. Also Integrity, Team Integration, Collaborative, and Diplomatic are considered to contribute somewhat to outstanding leadership. At the same time such dimensions as Self-Sacrifice, Modesty and Humane Orientation, Status Consciousness, and Conflict Inducer do not make a difference; that is, if they are perceived, they do not subtract from being perceived as an outstanding leader for other reasons. These findings display the profile of an administratively competent manager, capable of making serious decisions and inspiring his or her followers to meet performance targets. Only to a certain extent is there positive reliance on diplomacy and collaborative moves. Humane Orientation and modesty in personal behavior seem neutral to perceptions of outstanding leadership, as is the case for face-saving behavior. However, that can mean that a positive perception of a leader (for other reasons) would not be negatively affected by a leader who shows either face-saving behavior and/or low humane orientation. Status does not seem important to the modern Russian business leader.
The GLOBE results suggest that universal positive leader attributes such as Charismatic/Value Based leadership and Team Oriented leadership are considered as contributors to outstanding leadership in Russia. However the level of such contribution is much lower than in most of the other countries. The other two dimensions that nearly universally contribute to leadership—Participative and Humane Orientation—have only limited impact in Russia. Universal negative leader attributes such as Self-Protective and Autonomous seem also less relevant to the implicit leadership theories endorsed in Russia. Summarizing these findings, one may consider Russia as marginal in finding the ways for effective leadership concepts and practices within the global framework.
The authors however are far from taking a morbid point of view that Russia will never catch up with the others, even in the attitude toward leaders. Young people are more individualistic and creative. Moreover, they are ready to express their own ideas and to defend their own principles. It's very unlikely that today's youngsters will blindly obey a leader, no matter who he or she is. The authors had some other positive discoveries, noticing the growing interest in Future Orientation and in moral values. While the country is going through transition in the market and in its democracy, it's very hard to work out an exact definition of the Russian country-specific leadership. The situation in the economy and social sphere is changing rapidly, and the psychology of the Russian businesspeople is not an exception.
TABLE 22.3
Media Sources for Analysis
Media Source |
1996 |
2001 |
Circulation |
Number of Pages |
Izvestiya |
X |
X |
556,284 (1996) |
6 (1996) |
234,500 (2001) |
12 (2001) |
|||
Argumenty I Fakty |
X |
X |
3,360 000 (1996) |
24 (1996) |
2,921 170 (2001) |
20 (2001) |
|||
Moskovsky Komsomoletz |
X |
868,523 |
8 |
|
Nezavisimaya Gazeta |
X |
48,000 |
16 |
|
Kommersant-Daily |
X |
400,000 |
12–18 |
|
Komsomolskaya Pravda |
X |
765,000 |
24 |
|
Trud |
X |
612,850 |
8 |
8. LEADERSHIP EXPRESSED IN MEDIA
Media analysis was carried out as part of the GLOBE project with a view to reveal public opinion toward leaders and leadership in Russia. The authors’ main task was to determine how the media portrays leaders and the phenomenon of leadership, and then to compare the results to the other GLOBE findings for Russia.
For the media analysis two periods from November 26 to December 2, 1996 and from July 30 to August 6, 2001, were chosen. Within these periods there were neither significant political events, nor holidays that could somehow influence the content of the media publications. Thus, the information published in the studied newspapers was quite generic.
Russian newspapers are the second-largest source of information for the public, after television. In recent years, however, there was a certain decline in the reading audience as compared statistically to the 1980s. This is the result of growing social and political apathy in the late 1990s. It also reflects the fact that many people are concerned with their survival rather than with national events they can not control. Also, there is a widespread belief that the media is increasingly controlled by tycoons and by the Kremlin administration, and as a result, is less objective, serving populist interests of a narrow group. Five leading nationally distributed newspapers were selected for the analysis (see Table 22.3).
Izvestiya is a daily newspaper that provides in-depth analyses of national and international economy and politics, comments on events in sports and cultural life, and presents interviews with well-known politicians and businesspeople. Its readers are mostly middle-aged people with higher education, many of them civil servants. Argumenty I Fakty, a weekly newspaper with the largest circulation in Russia, offers its readers a wide range of information in practically all possible areas: from political news to UFOs. The newspaper is oriented on mass readership of all ages and occupations. Moreover, it is one of the few relatively independent newspapers, respected by representatives of different, sometimes even extremely opposite political groups. Moskovsky Komsomoletz, a popular daily newspaper, absorbs scandals, sensations, piquant details of the personal life of politicians, and compromising data about well-known people. However, this newspaper has a considerable influence on many people; it is popular and may form public opinion on an event or a person. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, with the smallest circulation of all those sampled, is considered one of the best informed and most reliable newspapers, targeting the intellectually elite segment of the market. Kommersant-Daily was among the first newspapers in democratic Russia to be differentiated as a business daily. Though it publishes news and opinions on politics, arts, and international affairs, business focus is still dominating in this newspaper. One can get the latest market trends, CEO's opinions, and stories of mergers and acquisitions, among others. Komsomolskaya Pravda, originally targeting a younger population, now is considered a well-informed and analytical newspaper with a broad customer base. Trud, the former trade union daily, currently is among the most popular newspapers for the general public, trying to distance itself from union-oriented papers and position itself as well-informed, enjoyable reading.
Altogether 217 articles and editorials were identified that could be referred to as dealing with issues leadership in various spheres of life: economics, politics, sports, culture, and daily events. Among all the articles selected for media analysis 162 articles (75%) focused on Russian leaders and 55 articles (25%) commented on leaders from foreign countries.
At the first stage the articles were sorted according to the spheres of the leaders’ activity: politics, business, sport, arts and show business, others.
The structures of the “foreign” and “Russian” sets were different (see Table 22.4). In the “foreign” set, the interest in political leaders was the highest with 22 articles (40% of the “foreign” sample); business leaders were mentioned in 16 articles (29%), in show business 7 articles (13%), and in sports also 7 articles (13%). In the “Russian” set, the highest interest was expressed in political leaders, consisting of more than half of the sample and totaling 82 articles (51% of the “Russian” set), business leaders were described in 25 articles (16%), in sports 10 articles (6%), arts and show business 30 articles (18%) and other areas 15 articles (9%). These findings present a moderate interest by the Russian media of leaders in business when compared to the other groups of leaders. Also political leadership, both international and domestic, is a visible priority for Russian newspapers.
The next step filtered the articles and assessed the kind of leadership issues they had discussed. At this stage, in the “Russian” set, the authors excluded interviews (as not impartial because one can hardly speak impartially about him or herself) and simply informative articles (as not allowing any idea of media attitude to the personality of leaders). Finally, out of 162 articles that had mentioned leaders in Russia, 130 (80%) remained for the linguistic analysis.
The words and word combinations (“typical phrases”) were sorted according to GLOBE media analysis guidelines and grouped by category of descriptions of leaders and leadership (Table 22.5). We identified the frequency with which these categories were mentioned. These frequencies displayed relative importance of different categories.
The most important trait of a leader expressed by media was image with a frequency of 25 (13% of all phrases and expressions). That was not a surprise as creating an image is one of the main tasks of media itself and is the means for the newspapers to communicate the effective and outstanding leadership. The next four characteristics were facilitate and action with frequencies of 22 and 21 respectively (11% each), knowledge with a frequency of 19 (10%), and energy with a frequency of 17 (9%). This result corresponds with the GLOBE leadership profile of a manager oriented on decision making with a capability to inspire the followers.
The communication trait was somewhat less visible with a frequency of 15 (8%) and corresponded with moderate team orientation in a leadership profile. Moderate frequencies of 7 and 6 (4% and 3%) were displayed for change and survive traits that might be important to the current transitional economy.
TABLE 22.4
The Composition of the Sets of Articles (1996/2001)
Not only those traits mentioned most frequently, but also those less frequent ones, were reviewed by the authors. Characteristics that should be important for Value-Based Charismatic leadership were not visible in the media analysis. Charisma, vision, and creativity were mentioned less than five times (under 2%) and role model of a leader only five times (3%). These results correspond with the marginal acceptance of such a Charismatic leadership in Russia as discussed in the previous section. It is worth mentioning that the weakness and fault items were both rare with each trait having a frequency of 3 (1.5%), which can bring us to the conclusion that in a non-Face Saving society, media designs more of a positive image of a leader than the reality actually is.
Based on linguistic analysis, we can construct the following typical media leadership profile. A Russian leader has a rich image linked to his or her success, competencies, and social and professional recognition. He or she displays the action-oriented and energetic behavior of a facilitator with entrepreneurial competencies. In particular, he or she is “full of unprecedented intervention,” “acts with no hesitations” as a “real fighter,” and “hard-working, restless, and enduring.” He or she is somewhat capable of controlling the situation, can facilitate change in the organization, and can survive in a turbulent environment. At the same time the media profile does not consider him or her to be a charismatic leader with clear systemic vision and cultural sensitivity.
9. CONCLUSIONS
The radical transformation in Russia in the 1990s and the first years of the 21st century has set the stage for transition toward a democratic civil society. In the economy, the market is substituting a previous monopolistic and ideology-dominated system. Combined with these two trends is the cultural change, when values, norms of behavior, and artifacts are reassessed, renewed, created, or removed.
Culture and leadership in contemporary Russia are rooted in three groups of factors: first, traditional and historically developed cultural features of Russian society; second, the influence of a totalitarian heritage of the twentieth century; and third, the radical revolution in culture and leadership in the 1990s transitional period. All three were considered as substantial for interpretation of the GLOBE findings and for comparing Russian profile to the other countries.
TABLE 22.5
Leadership Characteristics Displayed in Russian Media
GLOBE research positioned Russia very low in Uncertainty Avoidance, Future Orientation, Performance Orientation, and Humane Orientation, but very high on Power Distance. Whereas Institutional and In-group Collectivism, Egalitarianism, and Assertiveness dimensions displayed some agreement between the “As Is” and “Should Be” scores, dimensions such as Power Distance, Performance Orientation, Future Orientation, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Humane Orientation—primarily linked to the current economic and social transformation—showed the visible gap between the “As Is” and “Should Be” scores.
The profile of an effective business leader in Russia is based on administrative competence and the capability of serious decision making. He or she is able to motivate followers in order to meet performance targets, work in teams, and integrate efforts. However, there is no serious caring about humane motivation and modesty in personal behavior. Universal characteristics such as Charismatic/Value Based leadership and Team Oriented leadership are considered as contributors to outstanding leadership in Russia, however at a lower level when compared to most of the other countries. Participative and Humane Orientation have only limited impact in Russia. Attributes such as Self-Protective and Autonomous are also not very important.
Media analysis to a certain extent supports the findings based on the GLOBE survey. Media create the leadership profile that is focused on personal success and recognition. The Russian leader is action oriented and energetic, being capable of controlling the situation, facilitating change in the organization, and surviving in a transitional society. However, media analysis does not consider him or her as a charismatic leader and visionary.
This chapter has shed light on the state and current transformation of culture and leadership in Russia. The findings presented here seem to have quite important implications for both researchers and practitioners. The GLOBE project is one of the first attempts to collect a research-oriented Russian data set by using internationally recognized and reliable research methods, to provide cross-cultural comparisons among 61 nations.
As the current Russian economic situation is becoming more and more predictable, the GLOBE findings convey certain optimism. Russia's competitiveness at both national and corporate levels could be based on advantageous characteristics of Russian managers, mentioned in this study, such as the courage and ability to launch large-scale projects, decisiveness, the ability to make decisions and assume responsibility, and the ability to quickly react and operate in an unstable environment. Cultural transformation related to Future Orientation and healthy individualism also looks promising.
Certain current societal trends, however, lead the authors to more cautious predictions. In particular, in the 2000s there is a visible rapid increase in Power Distance. Russian President Putin and his administration redesign the relations between the government and oligarchs, and strengthen the vertical power structure. It is obvious that Russia is moving toward its traditional center-oriented model, where even the richest oligarch is nothing but a serf to the centralized state. Indications of the widening gap between the rich and the poor, numerous signs of status (VIP, exclusive arrangements for the elite) on the one hand, and visible social exclusion, on the other, are the facts of Russian life. This is also true about the widening gap between the wealthy regions (Moscow and St. Petersburg, rich oil-and-gas Tyumen) and the other parts of the country.
Considerations for Foreign Managers in Russia
This chapter described a number of characteristics that Russian managers believe their leaders should possess. Foreign managers, working in Russia, should be aware of these expectations and make sure that their own skills and abilities reflect a desirable leadership profile, as described in this chapter. We are certainly not suggesting, however, that foreign managers should get rid of their characteristics, highly valued in their own cultures, but not necessarily in Russia. The best expatriate managers should not try to “play a role,” but should rather enrich themselves through cultural learning. Such learning will help foreign managers to benefit from cultural synergies and to be successful in Russia. We therefore advise foreign managers to be open-minded and nonjudgmental when dealing with the Russian managers.
As we have tried to show in this chapter, present-day Russian business culture is rather unstable, and the business environment is still volatile. That's what any foreign manager should expect. However, foreign managers should not assume that Russian business culture does not exist at all, and that they are free to establish their own “rules of the game.” Russian business culture is increasingly becoming more predictable and transparent. This evolutionary process is influenced by both increased self-awareness about the business cultures of prerevolutionary and Soviet periods of Russian history, and emulation of the Western managerial principles, policies, and practices.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors acknowledge the contribution of GLOBE Research Assistants Mariya Bobina, Mariya Frolova, and Sergei Yurkov in data collection and in preparing this manuscript for publication.
REFERENCES
Ageev, A., Gratchev M., & Hisrich, R. (1995). Entrepreneurship in the Soviet Union and Post-Socialist Russia, Small Business Economics, 7(5), 365–376.
Anderson, D., & Shikhirev, P. (1994). Akuli I delfini. [Sharks and dolphins]. Moscow: Delo.
Bakacsi, G., Takacs, S., Karacsonyi, A., & Imrek, V. (2002). Eastern European cluster: Tradition and transition. Journal of World Business, 37, 69–80.
Berliner, J. (1976). The innovation decision in the Soviet industry. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Blackwell, W. (1994). The industrialization of Russia: A historical perspective. Arlington Heights, IL: H. Davidson.
Chaadaev, P. (1991). Philosophical works of Peter Chaadaev. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
de Vries, M. (2000). J Journey into the “Wild East”: Leadership style and organizational practices in Russia. Organizational Dynamics, 28(4), 67–81.
den Hartog, D., House, R., Hanges, P., Ruiz-Quintanilla, S., Dorfman, P., Lindell, M., et al. (1999). Culture specific and cross-culturally generalizable implicit leadership theories: Are attributes of charismatic/transormational leadership universally endorsed? Leadership Quarterly, 10(2), 219–256.
Fey, C., & Beamish, P. (2000). Joint venture conflict: The case of Russian international joint ventures. International Business Review, 9, 139–162.
Fey, C., & Bjorkman, I. (2001). The effect of human resource management practices on MNC subsidiary performance in Russia. Journal of International Business Studies, 32(1), 59–75.
Gratchev, M. (2001, October). Making the most of cultural differences. Harvard Business Review, 28–30.
Guroff, G., & Carstensen, F. (1983). Entrepreneurship in imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Hisrich, R., & Gratchev, M. (1993). The Russian entrepreneur. Journal of Business Venturing, 8(6), 487–498.
Hisrich, R., & Gratchev, M. (1997). Russian vs. American entrepreneurs: Where are the ethics? In P. Reynolds (Ed.), Frontiers of entrepreneurship research (pp. 256–257). Boston: Babson College.
Hisrich, R., Gratchev, M., Bolshakov, Z., Popov, D., & Ilyin, A. (1996). DOKA Corporation: The case of Russian high-tech company. In R. Hisrich (Ed.), Cases in international entrepreneurship (pp. 287–302). Chicago: Irwin.
House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., Gupta, V., & Globe Associates. (2004). Culture, leadership, and organizations: The GLOBE study of 62 societies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
House, R., Hanges, P., Ruiz-Quintanilla, S., Dorfman, P., Javidan, M., Dickson, M., et al. (1999). Cultural influences on leadership and organizations: Project GLOBE. In W. Mobley, M. Gessner, & V. Arnold (Eds.), Advances in global leadership (pp. 171–233). Stamford, CT: JAI.
House, R., Wright, N., & Aditya, R. (1997). Cross-cultural research on organizational leadership: A critical analysis and a proposed theory. In P. C. Early & M. Erez (Eds.), New perspectives on international industrial/organizational psychology. San Francisco: Lexington Press.
Huntington, S. (1993). The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22–49.
Izyumov, A., & Razumnova, I. (2000). Women entrepreneurs in Russia: Learning to survive the market. Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship, 5(1), 1–20.
Karamzin, N. (1892) Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskago [History of the Russian state]. St. Petersburg, Russia: Izd. Evg. Evdokimova.
Kluchevskii, V. (1904). Kurs Russkoi istorii [The course in Russian history] Moscow: Sinodalnaya Tipografiya.
Kluckhohn, F., & Strodtbeck, F. (1961). Variations in value orientation. New York: HarperCollins.
Kuzmichev, A., & Petrov, R. (1993) Russkie millionshiki [Russian millionaires]. Moscow: Vlados/Foros.
Michailova, S. (2000) Contrasts in culture: Russian and Western perspectives on organizational change. The Academy of Management Executive, 14(4), 99–112.
Mikheyev, D. (1987) The Soviet mentality. Political Psychology, 8(4), 491–523.
Naumov, A. (1996). Hofstedovo Izmerenie Rossii [Hofstede‘s dimension of Russia]. Menedzhment, 3, 70–103.
Naumov, A., & Puffer, S. (2000) Measuring Russian culture using Hofstede‘s dimensions. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 49(4), 709–718.
Owen, T. (1981). Capitalism and politics in Russia: A social history of Moscow merchants, 1855–1905. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Puffer, S. (Ed.). (1992). The Russian management revolution: Preparing managers for the market economy. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
Puffer, S. (1994). Understanding the bear: A portrait of Russian business leaders. Academy of Management Executive, 8(1), 41–54.
Puffer, S., McCarthy, D., & Naumov, A. (1997). Russian managers’ beliefs about work: Beyond the stereotypes. Journal of World Business, 32(3), 258–276.
Puffer, S., McCarthy, D., & Naumov, A. (2000). The Russian capitalist experiment: From state-owned organizations to entrepreneurships. Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar.
Rogovsky, N., Bertocci, C., & Gratchev, M. (1997). Social exclusion and business initiatives in the economies in transition: The case of Russia. Copenhagen: Danish National Institute of Social Research.
Shikhirev, P. (2000). Vvedenie v Rossiiskuyu Delovuyu Kul'turu [Introduction to Russian business culture]. Moscow: Novosti.
Soloviev, V. (1913). Sobranie sotchinenii [Collection of works]. St. Petersburg, Russia: Prosveshenie.
_____________
1This phenomenon existed not only in the military-industrial complex, but also in such industrial areas as construction, mining, trade, and power engineering. For example, in the mid-1980s in the USSR one could identify only two main retail networks, one airline company, one oil-extraction ministerial monopoly, and nine ministerial conglomerates in defense industries.
2In May 1998, representatives of large financial-industrial groups (FIG), questioned by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), ranked lack of finance and lack of competitive advantage among their most critical problems in business and organizational development. According to EBRD experts, however, the main FIG problems were structural weaknesses, poor corporate management, low cost-effectiveness, and the unclear role of the financial institution.
3The managing director of the International Monetary Fund, Michael Camdessus, in spring 1998 personally warned Russian President Yeltsin about the dangers of Asian-like “incestuous relationships between banking, government and corporate sectors” in Russia, comparing a growing oligarchy with the Asian system of chaebols, which are closed, family-controlled conglomerates with secret ties to banks and government officials (April 1998 press conference at the U.S.–Russia Business Council and at the National Press Club in Washington, DC).