Keywords

background check; chain of command; invasion of privacy; investigation; jurisdiction; policy and procedure manual; strategy; trespassing; voyeur; workplace security

What happened?

While at a bachelor’s party, a small group of FantasyForest male employees were shown a videotape of FantasyForest female entertainers in various stages of undress while in their dressing room. Another employee had secretly videotaped the women as they changed for various acts. The mystery employee also filmed the restroom in the women’s dressing area. The matter was reported to the security department, who allowed the situation to continue for another two months while they identified the culprit and developed a strategy to catch him in the act.

Who was being sued, and why?

FantasyForest, Inc. (a major theme park) and various senior executives, including Robert Laughlin, vice president of security and safety, were named as defendants in a lawsuit alleging they carelessly and negligently responded to the complaint that someone was surreptitiously watching and recording female employees in the privacy of their dressing room and restroom. The plaintiffs further alleged the investigation was unprofessional, ineptly managed, and conducted with no sense of urgency or prioritization, which allowed extended and continued victimization of the young women.

Who was involved?

When did it happen?

The first taping was in the late spring. The bachelor party viewing was in late September. The matter was first reported to a stage production manager on October 1. One week later, it was reported to security and safety. Wayne Stevenson was caught in early December.

How did it happen?

The balcony of the apartment was the only smoke-free area and it too was packed with the groom’s fellow employees. It was a BYOB (bring-your-own-bottle) party and invitation was by word of mouth. It was assumed everyone was an employee of FantasyForest, but you couldn’t really tell because the word spread among various departments and not everyone was known. Wayne Stevenson and his friend, Barney Poole, showed up around 10:00 p.m. Wayne had a videotape in his coat pocket. Neither of them knew anyone’s name, but they recognized faces in the crowd. After locating the VCR and ensuring it worked, Wayne and Barney moved about the apartment and tried to shout above the crowd that a “dirty movie” was going to be shown in the dining room in five minutes. The announcement didn’t generate anywhere near the interest Wayne had imagined.

About a dozen men stood by, either holding a drink or with arms folded, when the videotape started. It was obviously an amateur production, candidly taken of a group of young women in various stages of undress, changing costumes. Ted Simpson emerged from the bathroom in time to see his fiancée, Marie Chatálet, walk across the screen. He immediately identified the group as the female entertainers at work, obviously in their dressing area. He was shocked. He was grateful Marie was not undressed. In looking at the small crowd, no one seemed overly concerned nor did anyone seem to recognize Marie. How can anyone get a camera in there? he thought to himself. He was privately outraged, but others were having a good time. “Hey, look at those boobs, Harry. Isn’t she the one who slapped you last month,” evoking laughter among the group. There wasn’t anything really explicitly obscene in the tape, but Ted thought it was probably illegal and certainly in bad taste.

When the tape was over and the crowd dispersed Ted approached Wayne and told him he could get in serious trouble showing a videotape like this. He also asked Wayne how he obtained the videotape. Wayne laughed and said he had his “ways.” Ted didn’t know Wayne’s name or department, but he did recognize him as an employee. He broke off the discussion by again warning Wayne he could be heading for trouble if he didn’t stop taking such videos. Barney stood by during this conversation.

Ted fretted over the videotape the rest of the weekend. On Monday he shared what happened with coworkers who weren’t at the party, asking what they would do. The consensus was it should be reported to the stage manager, Gus Lombardi, who was on vacation but due back in one week. To report it to someone else would violate the chain of command.

When Gus returned to work the next week, Ted told him about the event. Gus asked him who the man was who had the videotape and Ted said he didn’t know his name, nor did he know the name of the short, heavyset man who followed him around. He said he thought the two might be in the wardrobe area, but wasn’t sure. Ted said the only thing he did not want was to be identified as an informer against another employee.

Gus said he’d talk to his boss about how to handle this and would get back to him. Several days later Gus told his boss, and he was instructed to take the matter to the security and safety department. Gus had an appointment set up with the security manger that afternoon.

James O’Hare had Gus take a seat after they shook hands. Gus informed the security manager of his conversation with his subordinate. Gus asked if he knew the identity of the offender and videographer. He didn’t. “Where does this man work?”

“We don’t know,” said Gus.

“What’s he look like?”

“Gee, I have no idea. I wasn’t told.”

Of course the security manager asked for the name of the employee who had seen the videotape, but Gus told him he wanted to remain anonymous. “Look, Gus, I can’t proceed unless I have more information. You go tell your guy to come see me.”

Later that afternoon, Ted sat with O’Hare and told him what he saw and what was said between himself and the employee who had the camera that night at the party.

“Who else saw the videotape?” asked O’Hare.

“I really don’t know, maybe a dozen guys, all employees here I think,” replied Ted.

Ted described the culprit. Before the day was over, the story offered by Ted was typed into the form of a sworn affidavit. “We require this affidavit before we can proceed,” Ted was informed. He signed it.

The investigation was now official and underway. It was October 7.

Assessment of the security department and its investigation

The discovery process produced, among other documents, the “FantasyForest Security and Safety Policy and Procedure Manual.” The section on “Investigations” ranked among the most professional and comprehensive of all such manuals I’ve seen in the private sector. I was suspicious it was in part plagiarized from a public sector agency, not because of quality but because of content. For example, they claimed their crime laboratory could do microscopic comparisons of all kinds of evidence from striation markings to handwritten and typewriter imprints annalists, and could do moulage and plaster of Paris castings (make 3D imprints of footprints), as well as having latent fingerprint expertise. These activities are simply not found in security departments. Later this presentation of professionalism made sense when it was disclosed the director of security and safety was Robert Laughlin, a recently retired special agent in charge of the local FBI office. The security department, of course, did not have such technical expertise.

Laughlin had no real involvement in or understanding of the security industry, and it appeared he was brought aboard as window dressing and good public relations for FantasyForest. On what grounds could I possibly arrive at that conclusion? Of great significance was that Laughlin had no knowledge of any investigation into this invasion of privacy. How could the director not know of such an important investigation? He was never informed of nor was consulted with about this matter. He didn’t ask his security manager what was happening of interest or what was significant or a problem in the organization. Instead, he attended civic luncheons as a speaker and was involved in other community programs that generated goodwill for FantasyForest. He identified and associated with senior management and rarely was seen in the security offices. He delegated all operational activities to O’Hare. Anyone in management knows one can delegate authority and assignments, but one cannot delegate responsibility.

O’Hare was a retired policeman from a midsize city on the east coast. He had no managerial experience and very limited investigative experience. He started as a uniformed security officer at FantasyForest. He assigned the invasion of privacy case to Clifford Beckman, one of his “investigators.”

Beckman was a retired highway patrolman from the midwest. He, like most members of the department, came to the area for the climate and subsequently sought some interesting employment to supplement his retirement pay. He, too, started as a uniform patrolman at FantasyForest and was subsequently promoted to “investigator.” His only investigative experience was in auto accidents. That limited focus of investigations isn’t all bad; the investigative process is universal: it’s the search for who, what, how, where, when, and why. So, by following the process, he should be able to solve this case.

Beckman started at the most logical place, the Fort’s dressing room for the female entertainers. The room was on the second floor of a huge structure. The third floor was the elevator and electrical and mechanical equipment room. Was there some opening that would allow a person to view down into the dressing room from that area? No, he determined. The building was tiered, so one could walk around the third floor on the roof of the second floor and walk around the second floor on the roof of the first floor. In the wall of the second floor, Beckman found a 3-foot by 3-foot metal access door into the HVAC (heating and air conditioning) machinery area. The door had a faulty lock and he could enter. Inspection of the darkened interior required a flashlight, even though one could turn on a bare 40-watt light bulb hanging by the ducts. He could find no way to view the interior of the dressing room.

Immediately adjacent to the dressing room, with a common wall, was a communication center for all the radios used by employees throughout the large theme park. Because of the vital importance and sensitivity of this equipment room, it was protected with an intrusion alarm—that is, the door was protected with alarm contacts and every time that door was opened an alarm sounded at the security department dispatcher’s desk. Upon receipt of the alarm, a security officer would be sent to investigate.

Despite this protection, Beckman inspected the common wall and discovered numerous small holes had been intentionally drilled to see into the dressing room. There was evidence of footprints on various pieces of furniture and the long workbench against the wall indicating where some person or persons stood and with one eye could view the interior of the dressing room. He also found a location where a viewer could get to the top of this wall and look over and down into the restroom. Clearly these women were being watched with some regularity.

But Beckman was perplexed. He could find no opening or hole large enough to accommodate the lens of a video camera. There had to be another location from which one could watch and videotape.

A reinspection of the interior of the dressing room disclosed a standard, secured access panel from the room itself into a hollow space of sufficient size to allow a worker to access more of the HVAC air ducts. Once inside, there was another hanging bare 40-watt light bulb with a switch.

Maintenance workers would have known of this, but the wall between the space and the dressing room was solid except for an electrical outlet that was mounted on the dressing room wall. The electrical wire to the outlet looked loose. Beckman, flashlight tucked under his arm, examined the wire and, to his surprise, the plate came loose. He could move the electrical plate (the same type everyone has in their home to either plug in an appliance or switch a light on or off) from its backside and view the interior of the room. From that vantage point he could also see the open door into the restroom. The plate was actually the cover plate of an air conditioning control knob. Beckman had found the location where the peeper/employee could videotape the women. Disturbances in the dust all around this switch area and the floor beneath it substantiated the discovery. This was a “Bingo!” He immediately radioed O’Hare informing him of his discovery. O’Hare wasted no time to drive to the Fort and joined Beckman in the dressing room.

They determined that the cover plate had to be completely removed from its normal position in the wall to allow for the lens of a camera. That meant the culprit would get into his position behind the wall between performances or before the first act of the day. While in there, he would push the plate into the room and it would dangle there held by the two electrical wires connected to the switch. If you were inside the dressing room and looked at that wall and noticed the switch, it would appear as though it had fallen from its normal position on the wall and needed to be pushed back in, or one might think it was being repaired. Who would imagine there was a man and a camera behind the wall peering through that hole?

It was then and there O’Hare made the decision to allow the condition to remain so as to catch the peeper in the act. In his view, the position of the switch plate was the key. All that had to be done was routinely check the switch plate. If it was hanging down it meant the culprit was in his position and had no way out except through the access door right in the dressing room. The peeper would be trapped! An order was issued to have the uniform patrolmen assigned to the Fort make hourly checks on the wall switch and report it to the main security office if it was hanging down.

So now security knew that someone was peeking into the room from two sides and from above. The where and how were known. The why was apparent. The challenge now was who and when. This was day two of the investigation.

The next step was to identify the voyeur.

Several days later, Ted, while walking toward the employee cafeteria in the underground maze of tunnels, ran into Wayne and stopped him. “Still shooting the women?” he asked.

“All the time,” responded Wayne, with a big smile. Simpson really had hoped to get Wayne’s full name off his employee badge. All he could read was “Wayne.”

“They’re gonna get you, one of these days.”

Wayne said, still smiling, “That’ll be the day!” and off he went southbound down the main tunnel.

Ted called O’Hare and told him of his encounter with Wayne. Based on this information Beckman went to human resources for a search of the computerized listing of 1,422 employees looking for the first name of Wayne. There were three. One, Wayne Stevenson, was in wardrobes and costumes, which was located in the southern part of this underground city that served as the “behind the scenes” of the theme park, housing all the offices, maintenance machine shops, generators, supplies, storage, and employee services. Only security was headquartered aboveground.

Stevenson was 22-years-old, lived with his parents, had been with FantasyForest for two years, and was rated as an average performer. His file also reflected a complaint made against him for rubbing a female employee’s breast while he was fitting her for a new costume. She was positive he did it intentionally, but when confronted with her complaint he insisted it was accidental. Wayne was warned he must be careful during fittings; any new similar complaints could lead to serious disciplinary action.

Beckman decided to have a criminal background check made through the sheriff’s department and spoke with the liaison deputy assigned to the park, Paul Cork. Cork checked law enforcement records and later that day advised Beckman that Wayne had been cited and fined for possession of an open alcoholic beverage container in an auto when he was 18-years-old and, two years later, was arrested for trespassing at night near a women’s dormitory. He pled guilty to this minor offense, was fined $100, and given eight hours of community service. When Wayne completed his application for employment at FantasyForest he answered “yes” to the question about criminal convictions and wrote “trespassing” on the form. That did not raise a red flag then, but now, in light of the current situation, that conduct and conviction was meaningful. “Trespassing at night” could indicate he was a peeping tom, a true voyeur.

Beckman and O’Hare discussed the status of the investigation. Beckman said he wanted to call Wayne in and confront him. O’Hare said no. “What if the kid denies it? You have no evidence. If he sits there and stares you down and doesn’t admit it, you have egg on your face and have to put him back to work. Then he’ll never do it again and the matter goes unsolved and the tapes he’s been making are still in circulation.”

Beckman responded, “If he sits there and denies it, then I’ll bring in Ted Simpson who witnessed the showing of the tape.”

“Yeah, but if the kid’s smart and still denies it, it’s one employee’s word against another, and you can’t take any action under those circumstances. We have no other person who was present at that party willing to come forward and verify Ted’s information. No, we must catch him in the act, and then we’d have grounds to search his home and recover all tapes, which are likely in his possession. Be patient; the next time he slips into that space we’ll have him.”

Weeks passed and no security officer called headquarters to report the plate hanging loose. Neither O’Hare nor Beckman went out to talk with the various patrolmen to ensure they knew the importance of the check. Nor was anything done to seal the holes in the wall between the communication room and dressing room. Employees accessing that communication room were authorized to enter and could bypass the alarm, so the strategy in place to catch peepers ignored or overlooked that risk. The same was true with respect to the restroom ceiling that was still vulnerable to someone looking down. Everything was in a state of suspense pending the call from a patrolling officer, which never came.

The entertainers were oblivious to the entire matter, and simply assumed the dressing room provided to them was secure and assured them the privacy to which they were entitled.

In the meantime, Ted had another chance encounter with Wayne and, this time, Wayne indicated he had just obtained some spectacular shots of the women. Ted wasn’t sure if it was true or Wayne was just trying to get under his skin. O’Hare was again contacted, and this newest information was shared. Beckman was called in; he had been actively engaged in a mysterious disappearance of blank bank checks from the controller’s office, and the invasion of privacy case was on the backburner.

Ted’s report of his encounter and discussion with Wayne forced the investigators to again focus on the Fort. The discussion resulted in the decision to request funds for a camera that would pick up images in very low-light conditions, an infrared lamp that would help illuminate the interior space (a light that could not be seen by the suspect), and a new recorder with a monitor. The plan was to install this equipment and conduct an electronic 24-hour-a-day surveillance.

If Wayne entered he would be captured on videotape, even if the investigators weren’t there. Wayne could deny his activity all he wanted, but the evidence of the tape would prove otherwise. The request for the equipment was formally processed up the chain of command.

The first approval signature had to be Robert Laughlin’s. He signed it without asking the purpose of the equipment. With Laughlin’s approval, the purchase order went its rounds until all required signatures were obtained. The corporate purchasing agent called and, after a discussion with O’Hare, ordered it. Two weeks later the shipment arrived.

The next evening, after the entertainers had gone home, Beckman, assisted by another security investigator, entered the space and within four hours mounted the camera, installed the infrared light, and ran the camera’s coaxial cable over the dressing rooms ceiling and into the communications room. There they connected to the VCR and tested for the picture on the monitor. Beckman had his colleague crawl through the access door from inside the dressing room and make his way to the wall plate. Beckman, watching the monitor, could see his colleague, but couldn’t make out details; details weren’t necessary. The installation was successful, and the around-the-clock monitoring began at near midnight, Wednesday night. It was now the first week of December.

The next morning Beckman brought O’Hare to the Fort to show-off his installation. They entered the communications room (i.e., the same room in which holes in the wall were being used and one could climb up and peer into the restroom) and approached the monitor. Beckman was immediately startled to observe what he thought was his partner in between the walls and wondered why he was in that space. He used his radio and called his partner who answered promptly. “Is that you?” asked Beckman, clearly puzzled by what he was seeing and hearing. “I mean in the wall?”

“In the wall?” asked the younger investigator. Then it was shockingly apparent the dark silhouette of the man in the space was the culprit! “I can’t believe it,” whispered Beckman as they both stared at the monitor, “we’ve got him already!”

O’Hare nodded in agreement. On the other side of the wall they could hear the women chattering. All the women had arrived at work. Wayne had entered earlier to await their arrival.

Both O’Hare and Beckman wondered what he was doing. As the two investigators watched the monitor it became clear Wayne was masturbating as he watched through the switch plate opening. Then they could see him raise a camera to the opening. For the next 40 minutes Wayne would put the camera to the opening, then pull the camera away, as though filming only the best scenes then waiting for more good shots.

When the women left for their first performance, Beckman and O’Hare hurried out of the communications room and entered the dressing room. They opened the access door and called for Wayne to come out, telling him he was under arrest. Wayne crawled out and was taken into custody then transported to the security offices. The camera was, of course, immediately seized and the cassette was removed for evidence.

Once inside the security building, the trio went to O’Hare’s office where the interrogation was to be conducted. There were many questions that needed answering, including when the filming first began, how many times Wayne had been in that space filming since the bachelor’s party, what he did with the videotapes, how many videotapes he made, etc. But, before the questioning could get under way, Deputy Cork, who had only a fleeting understanding of what the security investigators were working on, overheard the voyeur was in custody in O’Hare’s office. Cork went to the office and opened the door. Beckman announced they had caught the employee in the wall space recording the entertainers. Cork asked if the camera had a microphone and if voices were recorded on the videotape. They all examined the camera on the desk and it indeed picked up sound. “In that case,” announced Cork, “this case falls within the sheriff’s department’s jurisdiction. Recording others without their knowledge is a federal violation, and I must take custody of the prisoner and the evidence.”

The security officers were stunned. Security made arrests regularly. Such offenses as thefts from vehicles in the parking lot, shoplifting from the various gift shops, pickpockets, use of stolen credit cards, or passing counterfeit currency were almost daily occurrences that ended in so-called “citizen arrests.” The sheriff’s liaison officer assisted, and only upon request. Cork’s intervention in this matter came as a shock.

Wayne was whisked away, along with the camera and videotape. Now Laughlin was notified of the events, but it was too late. Later, the sheriff reported Wayne confessed to the taping and that only one tape was recovered from his bedroom, claiming it was the only one he ever had. Wayne pled guilty to an illegal interception of communications charge, a misdemeanor, and received a light sentence that included psychological counseling and community service.

Following the arrest by security, the sheriff’s department interviewed each dancer and they were allowed to view the videotape that was recorded just before the arrest. The dancers were outraged with what they saw and learned, especially the news that Wayne had been suspected weeks before his capture and they were allowed to be victimized and exposed to this man for such an extended period of time. They also came to learn of the holes in the other wall and the vulnerability of the restroom. They sought legal advice. When Marie learned that her fiancée had seen her on a videotape in September and didn’t tell her or warn her, she broke off their relationship.

Once the lawsuit was filed the park modified its “FantasyForest Security and Safety Policy and Procedures Manual” to include a regularly scheduled survey and inspection of all restrooms and dressing areas on premises, to ensure there would be no repeated or similar problems. The walls and ceiling of the entertainer’s dressing room in the Fort were repaired.

My assessment of the security department’s strategy

My review of all the various documents, including the history of prior criminal events on the premises, disclosed numerous peeping tom incidents, including the catching of a maintenance man drilling holes through the wall between the communications room and dressing room just one year prior to this case. That employee was terminated, but no one bothered to cover or fill the holes. Other cases, including the detection of an employee who constructed a position in the ceiling over a public women’s restroom installed his own ventilation grill to watch through, clearly signaled that voyeurism was an ongoing threat to this kind of facility, and there was a need for a program of restroom inspections for breaches of privacy. But no effort had been undertaken, after either case, to prevent this activity.

In my deposition testimony I was critical of the strategy that relied on a uniform patrolman to monitor the wall plate. I pointed out that if they didn’t have the cameras, which could pick up images in the dark (contrary to the policy and procedures manual that indicated they had the whole range of investigatory equipment), that didn’t preclude them from using the alarm technology that was right at hand. The communications room door was wired into the alarm system. All they had to do was install common sensors on the inside of the access door by rerouting two wires and whenever that door was opened an alarm would signal to the alarm board in the security building. It was that simple.

“Well, Mr. Sennewald, what experience do you have in solving voyeur problems in the workplace?” asked the defense attorney.

“I’ve had my share when I was a security executive, and I successfully resolved them in a timely manner,” I replied.

“Can you cite for me an example?”

“Surely,” I replied, and I referred to my book titled The Process of Investigation: Concepts and Strategies for the Security Professional, in which I described a case where a store detective smelled fresh wood in a stockroom behind fitting rooms used by female customers in the swimwear department. The detective followed her nose, finding fresh sawdust on an upper shelf. Standing on the lower shelf she could see someone had recently drilled a hole into a fitting room. She contacted me. In a matter of hours I determined the best suspect was a new maintenance man who had been noticed staring at female employees. I devised a scenario for the next day in which the suspect would be summoned to the personnel manager’s office to replace a light bulb. While he would be on the ladder making that change, the manager of the swimwear department would enter the office and inform the personnel manager her swimsuit had just arrived, and ask her if she could come right down and try it on. The personnel manager said she would. As planned, the maintenance man overheard all this and almost broke his leg getting down and folding up his ladder. A few moments later he was caught with his eye to the hole. The case was resolved in a span of two days.

I did not fault the security investigators for “losing control of their case and their employee suspect.” They were foiled by an overzealous sheriff’s deputy. However, because of that improper intervention, no one will ever know if more videotapes are out there and in circulation. There is no peace of mind for the victims in this case.

I found no fault in O’Hare’s rejection of Beckman’s proposal to interview Wayne early on; that was good judgment.

I was critical of Laughlin for not having a hand in the management of his own department, for not being abreast of important problems in the facility, and for not being cognizant of how an important investigation was being handled, all of which contributed to the extraordinary delay in the case. I noted the delays subjected the women to weeks of unnecessary invasion of privacy. In my opinion, the lack of leadership, the absence of a sense of urgency, and the early investigative strategy fell below the security industry’s standard of care, and the investigation was unnecessarily delayed and negligently conducted.

The matter settled out of court.