2     Transnational Social Policy and
 Migration

Ernie Lightman

INTRODUCTION

Although transnational migrations have been occurring as long as there have been national borders to cross, only recently has the process become an area of interest for social work. Social work, as a profession, has long been linked with the processes and outcomes of immigration, ranging from work in early settlement houses to contemporary refugee claimants. As large numbers of migrants cross borders, perhaps thousands of miles away from their homes, arriving without obvious sources of support and facing discrimination in their daily lives, it has been the task of social work to help address their needs and concerns.

Many of these new arrivals were what we today would label as ‘transnational’ migrants, coming and going, perhaps through multiple countries, maintaining links of varying intensities with the places through which they transit as well as with their home countries—including in some cases an explicit intent to return, which may or may not be eventually actualised (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Vertovec 2009).

It is only relatively recently that social work has begun to draw distinctions between transnational migrants and the more classic one-way migration whereby people leave country A for country B, in search of economic advancement and/or greater personal freedom and security. Yet the complexities posed by the multiple and overlapping migration patterns and associated loyalties that face transnational migrants were not recognised in earlier times. Migrants—immigrants—were seen as a relatively homogenous category of clients for whom the country of receipt, the country where they likely first engaged with social work, was the primary or often the sole focus. Services were to be delivered to those in need (including immigrants) and, according to more recent practice, were to be provided in a culturally sensitive manner (Al-Ali and Koser 2002; Foner 1997).

In recent years, social workers have begun to recognise that for many, migration is not a simple one-way movement, and that linkages with other countries remain a matter of importance for many new migrants. Hence, we witness the arrival of ‘transnationalism’ as new terminology in the practice lexicon (Midgley 2001). Yet, the practice questions remain broadly unaltered: Care is to be provided, but whose responsibility is this? What is the role of the sending society? Of the receiving society? Of other places through which migrants may have passed and sojourned?

Most of the social work focus has lain with the direct provision of services, at the individual or micro level. This suggests a need for a further dimension to the study of transnational social work that would highlight transnational social policy. It is the purpose of this chapter to introduce transnational social policy as a formal component in the general discussions of transnationalism in social work. In so doing we limit our focus to the area of transmigration and do not consider other dimensions of transnational social policy.

Before proceeding to a formal definition of transnational social policy, it may be useful to consider a brief example, to illustrate the kinds of concerns that the concept will add to practice and understanding: Migrants, whether transnational or not, have always sent remittances to families that they left behind. From a classic social work perspective, this is a relevant concern in the receiving countries in that it adversely affects the ability of new arrivals to integrate, accumulate savings, and raise their standards of living. In the sending countries, families become dependent on these remittances, experiencing high vulnerability should there be any interruptions in the flow of currency. Each of these analyses is limited to the family level and each occurs independently of the other. From a transnational perspective, whereby the impacts on sending and receiving countries will be considered in tandem and from a policy perspective, entirely new questions arise. For example, the receipt of transnational cash flows in certain countries (such as the Philippines or Mexico) becomes an important component of national income, a large budget line for governments (Basok 2003; Goldring 2000; Guarnizo 2003; Smith 2000). Issues of concern may include the effect of these flows on the social and economic structures of the societies that rely on remittances; the gap between those who receive money from abroad and those who do not, resulting in new socio-economic classes of precariously affluent residents, dependent on relatives abroad; issues of taxation and redistribution of income and opportunities resulting from these flows; the ability of local governments to abdicate (or privatise) their roles in pursuing social justice, health, or education, and relying instead on private remittances from abroad; and the ability to cope should the flows be interrupted or reduced or inadequate to deal with unanticipated domestic crises. What happens in countries such as those in the Caribbean when their earlier role as purveyor of nannies and caregivers to Canada is superseded by new and more desirable workers from East Asia: what are the impacts on social stability, on gross domestic product and balance of payments, or on domestic unemployment levels?

Comparable concerns arise in the host countries that receive the transnational migrants (Jackson, Crang, and Dwyer 2004; Reitz 2009): What are the impacts on collective well-being when large amounts of money are sent abroad in remittances, leaving the senders potentially dependent on the state? Whose responsibility is it to care for these ‘voluntarily poor’ immigrants? What is the effect on local wage rates and employment levels when transnational migrants willingly work for sub-market wages, because the levels are still far above anything available in their home countries and these wages are typically paid in cash, thereby removing the money from the tax system? The combined effect in some cases is to render these transnational migrants at greater risk of financial dependency on the state, while removing their incomes from scrutiny of the local tax regimes.

We might also note that the questions just posed lie at the heart of transnational social policy, and must be addressed whether the migrants are truly transnationals or not. That is, the process (which we explore in this chapter) is one of transnationalism regardless of whether or not all/most/some of the migrants themselves would be considered transnationals.

DEFINITIONS OF TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL POLICY

In approaching a definition of transnational social policy, it is important to not be limited by the classic (particularly American) approach of social work that views policy as the outcome or consequence of decisions made at the family level. Instead, we view policy as the broad context or framework which influences and within which micro-level family decisions are made.

There are two ways to approach a definition of transnational social policy: each builds on existing definitions of social policy, while adding in a new dimension to incorporate transnationalism.

Firstly, a simple straightforward definition would refer to those initiatives, programmes, and services intended to meet the needs of transnational migrants. The emphasis here on the meeting of needs is directly in line with the traditional concerns of direct practice in social work and follows from early, mostly U.S.-focused definitions of social policy as meeting the needs of vulnerable members of the community (Gil 1976). Such an approach views transnational migrants as simply a subset of the broader society.

A more sophisticated definition builds on the early work of Richard Titmuss (1974), as extended by Lightman (2003). This approach looks at the two words social and policy, interpreting the meaning of each. The word policy implies choice: we have policies over those issues where we have some control and therefore are in a position to make choices; we do not have policies—and therefore do not exercise choices—over those issues where we have no control. We have no policy over whether the sun will shine tomorrow because we have no control over this; but we do have policies—we exercise choices—over what we will do if the sun does shine. The word social refers to groups or collectives, as distinct from individuals. One individual, in isolation, does not constitute a group (or a society); two or more individuals interacting in some way comprise a social unit.

Thus, social policy (taking the two words together) refers to choices and decisions that affect groups of people, as distinct from decision-making that affects only individuals (Lightman 2003). By extension, transnational social policy can be viewed as those choices and decisions that affect transnational migrants and the processes of transnational migration. Note that this definition includes both the people involved as migrants and also the processes of migration that they experience: in this discussion we focus primarily on the processes themselves which would qualify as ‘transnational’ whether or not the migrants are transnationals.

The choices and decisions that influence social policy can take diverse forms: They can be made by any groups in society, including residents, governments, and/or the voluntary sector; they can be focused on and/or funded by any of the societies with which the migrants—transnational or not—come into contact; the choices and decisions can be formal (legislated) or informal (ground-level practices); they can be explicit or merely implied, in the latter case leaving much discretion to individual administrators at every level, to social workers, to police, etc.; the choices can be occasional or continuing, major or minor, ‘fair’ or ‘unfair.’

The rhetoric and the reality can be similar or widely divergent: For example, borders can be formally open, but migrants may experience harassment once they arrive; or borders may be formally closed to certain groups but in practice there is substantial movement across of excluded people and goods. As well, the formal right to work for migrants and the actual employment practices they experience may bear little relation to one another. Formal entitlement to or disqualification from benefits for migrants may be encoded and formalised, or may be dependent on the moods and practices of field-level officials; and even if rules are formalised there always remains a role for discretion and ground-level interpretation.

The second definition of transnational social policy is broader than the first, in that it does not begin with the needs of individuals and families and goes beyond the provision of services to transnational migrants; with its focus of choices and decisions as a transnational process, it readily incorporates alternative approaches to the meeting of needs and the implicit notion of limited resources. (To choose means that we opt for A at the expense of B, because we cannot do both). Thus this definition takes us to a higher level of analysis than that embedded in a simple meeting of needs, suggesting more aggregate questions of collective choices and priorities.

Transnational social policy is thus a macro-level component of transnational social support. It influences or determines the forms of micro-level transnational social support through decisions at the legislative, administrative, and local programmatic level; and it also follows from or responds to prior legislative, administrative, and programmatic decisions about the nature and forms of transnational social support.

Perhaps the notion of social policy is inherently a transnational concept: The definition of social in social policy (earlier) refers to societies, communities, collectives, groups (Lightman 2003, following Titmuss 1974). It makes no explicit reference to the nation-state or to national boundaries which are prerequisite for transnationalism. Thus, the generic definition of social policy previously developed in the literature already incorporates or accommodates a transnational dimension; or, in other words, social policy, by its very definition, is not limited to the boundaries or structures of the nation-state (although it was always developed within a nation-state). Perhaps, then, our existing definitions are sufficient and we need not extend them further.

At the same time, the notion of a border appears crucial to any understanding of transnational social policy. Without a border, one cannot cross from country to country and hence, almost by definition, there can be no transnational migration. Crossing a border makes one a visitor, an immigrant, or an alien, depending on the particular circumstances, and regardless of whether the border was crossed legally or illegally, temporarily or permanently, with or without papers. Each of the three terms conveys a distinct status to those crossing and carries with it certain specific legal implications (Mahler 2001).

Consider, for example, a worker from Newfoundland who travels to Alberta in search of employment. This person maintains ongoing contact with home, returns frequently to visit, may send cash remittances on a regular basis, and, when laid off, may well return home permanently. This person fulfills all the criteria for a transnational migrant except that s/he does not cross a border. As a Canadian citizen, s/he has certain rights and privileges wherever s/he travels in the country. The unemployment insurance programme, for example, is national in scope (though benefit levels do vary regionally).

Compare this person to the worker from Latin America, who travels roughly the same distance, also to work in the tar sands of Alberta. S/he also maintains regular contact with home, undoubtedly sends cash remittances, and may (or may not) visit or return home when laid off. If this person is in Canada with proper papers, s/he has certain rights which may well be less than those that accrue to citizens or permanent residents; if this person comes without documentation, s/he has few rights at all and is vulnerable to ongoing exploitation.

The only difference between these two cases is that one stays within a formal national border, while the other crosses a border or two. While the latter is labelled a transnational migrant, the former might be called an intranational migrant (within a single nation-state). Though their employment situations may be identical, their need for social support, whether formal or informal, is likely to differ, and their inclusion in state social policies will also diverge. As a result, their reliance on social supports from the voluntary sector will also be different. Yet, in reality, the only factor distinguishing their situation is that one of them crosses a formal legal border while the other does not. One may be in need of transnational social support (which s/he may or may not receive) while the other will have access to more traditional mainstream social services (Bernhard, Landolt, and Goldring 2005; Vertovec 2009).

THE CONTEXT OF TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL POLICY

The academic literature on transnational social policy first becomes visible in the early 1990s. There is some earlier material that deals with the phenomenon, though it does not appear to use the label as such (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Vertovec 2009).

However, the practice of transnationalism is much older. Prior to World War I, there were no widespread guarded borders within either Europe or North America: people were relatively free to travel from place to place, from country to country. Typically they were seeking something such as a higher income or personal freedom, or they were fleeing from something, usually oppression of some sort. These voyagers usually maintained links with their original places and some returned regularly, particularly if the geographic distances were not great. Because the notion of the nation-state with clearly defined borders was relatively undeveloped at this time, so too the concept of transnationalism (which entails crossing clearly defined borders) was little understood or even recognised. Social supports to these transnational migrants were provided only through the voluntary sector—often cultural, ethnic, or faith communities—which were also not bound by national borders.

The first major state role in providing social services emerged in the English-speaking world only after World War II. The Keynes-Beveridge welfare state, as it was known, was based on the macroeconomics of Keynes and the social policy of Beveridge. This model was inherently a project of the nation-state: Keynes's original mathematical models were limited to a closed economy, with neither exports nor imports, an approach that created difficulties as international trade became ever more prominent. For example, the exogenously induced inflation which most countries experienced after the dramatic rise in world oil prices in the 1970s could not be addressed through traditional Keynesian approaches of reducing aggregate demand. It was not until years after Keynes completed his work that other economists expanded the original models beyond the nation-state focus, and even today Keynesianism is limited in its ability to undertake international analyses (Lightman 2003).

Likewise, in most cases, the new post-war welfare states had a national focus. Typically this was reflected through eligibility criteria that limited entitlement to those meeting them. In some cases, formal citizenship was required (as with voting in national elections); in other cases, a minimum period of legal residence was necessary (as with Canada's non-contributory Old Age Security pensions); at times legal residence or presence was sufficient (as with school enrolment in some jurisdictions). Occasionally, and unusually, there were no further requirements for eligibility beyond physical presence in a jurisdiction. For many years after its introduction in 1949, Britain's National Health Service (NHS) was available on equal terms to all persons physically present in the country, including new arrivals, regardless of legal status. This approach was based on a philosophical value system that talked of community and rejected distinctions based on legal status. By the 1970s, however, a strong sense of abuse—people arriving in Britain solely to secure needed and typically expensive medical care without charge—led to more explicit residency requirements in the NHS (Glennerster 2000, 2003). To the extent these benefits were based on residence rather than citizenship, transnational migrants had little difficulty securing coverage, often on the same terms as native-born residents; but over time, formal legal status in the country has become more important, often leaving transnational migrants—particularly transients—without entitlements or benefits. This has placed greater onus on the voluntary sector to fill in the gaps resulting from state withdrawal as service provider.

More recently, the nation-state in Europe has given way to the European Union, but this evolution does not alter our analysis. The notion of ‘borders’ or ‘boundaries’ to identify those eligible for support remains the same, though the specific boundaries have expanded outward to encompass many or all the countries that comprise the EU (Ginsburg 2001).

Also in recent years, the forces of globalisation have threatened the traditional welfare state. Globalisation (in this context, using U.S. definitions) implies the reduction or elimination of national boundaries and their replacement by the impersonal rules of the economic market. National governments become subservient to international economic forces, limited in their ability to offset domestically the outcomes of international economic decision-making (Vertovec 2004; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003). This results in the consequent inability of the nation-state to introduce or maintain social welfare measures for either domestic or migrant, permanent or temporary populations for at least two reasons. Firstly, when national social priorities conflict with the law of contract, the latter typically takes precedence. For example, occupational health and safety regulations must often give way to contrary dictates in commercial contracts. Secondly, because globalisation renders capital highly mobile, investment flows to places where the return/profit is greatest: these will often be settings in which both taxes and wages are low, leaving no room for social welfare measures. High wage–high tax countries are at risk of being left on the sidelines as investment and jobs flow to the more compliant alternatives. At the same time, the reduced importance of borders resulting from globalisation has led to increased migration, including transnational migration, resulting in greater need for transnational social support (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Yet, for the reasons just indicated, governments have been unwilling or incapable of providing this.

The weakening of the forces of globalisation in recent years has been accompanied by the re-emergence of the nation-state (or, in some case, the theocratic state). Former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown referred to the processes of ‘de-globalisation’ in the context of the global financial melt-down of 2009 (‘Deglobalization a new threat to the world, Brown warns’ 2009). In principle, this should make migration more difficult and should be associated with reduced flows of people from country to country. In practice, however, this has not occurred. The xenophobia associated with the new nation-states has made minority and other vulnerable groups ever more desperate to leave; and the widening economic gaps between the rich and poor countries have likewise increased incentives to migration. If legal population flows are suppressed, the drive to migrate will manifest itself illegally, as in the boatloads of immigrants without papers that arrive on Canada's west coast from time to time. In Europe, the Roma populations can be evicted from France in the name of the new nationstate parochialism, but no one seriously believes the underlying migration of peoples from east to west in Europe will cease or even diminish substantially. Immigrants without papers, almost by definition, have reduced formal social protections—in practice, even if not in principle—and thus their social needs are likely to remain unaddressed by the state. Once again, even greater responsibilities will fall into the ever-shrinking laps of the voluntary sector. The meeting of social needs is dramatically shifting from the state to the private sector (which includes of course the entire voluntary sector) and transnational migrants are among those affected by these changes.

THE PROCESSES AND OUTCOMES OF TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL POLICY

In general terms, transnational social policy is associated with transnational population flows (though the causality can be in either direction). There has always been both a ‘push’ and a ‘pull’ to the migration: The ‘pull’ is usually associated with the pursuit of a better life and economic opportunities, as in ‘the streets of New York are paved with gold.’ The ‘push’ is often associated with flight from oppression or persecution, as people run from wars, genocides, and economic crises; however, ‘push’ can also be a conscious developmental strategy, as in the Philippines, where people are trained to be exported as nannies and caregivers abroad. Transnational migration is distinguished from traditional migration in that it is not solely a one-way movement from A to B; rather it is associated with multiple dimensions of interaction among different countries as mobile individuals maintain and sever links of various sorts with the home country, and potentially several transit and receiving countries. The cause and nature of the population movements clearly influence the nature of the need for transnational social services, in both sending and receiving countries (Faist 2000; Wayland 2006).

•   The need for transnational social policies is based on four general considerations. How these manifest themselves and how they interact will determine whether there will be transnational linkages and what their strength and resilience will be. They refer both to context and individuals, thus operating at both the macro and the micro levels. The policies and practices, both formal and informal, in the sending or initial countries: Do they have programmes or initiatives in place to encourage or facilitate transnational linkages? Do they erect barriers? Are they indifferent? Some countries (such as Ireland or Iceland) actively promote transnational linkages, both through government missions abroad and through support of the voluntary sector. St Patrick's Day celebrations in many countries, the symbolism of the shamrock and the leprechaun, even Guinness beer, all promote a positive image abroad for the Irish nation-state while also helping migrants maintain their transnational linkages with the home country. Other countries such as North Korea make such links difficult to maintain and actively discourage the ‘to and fro’ flows of transnationalism.

•   The policies and practices, both formal and informal, in the receiving countries (noting there may be multiple transit and receiving countries as transnational migrants represent ongoing population movements): Do the receiving countries have programmes or initiatives in place to encourage or facilitate transnational linkages? Do they erect barriers? Are they indifferent? Some practices can evolve without a formal governmental role: Ong and Nonini (1997), for example, identified Chinese transnationalism across Southeast Asia as responsible for the spread of Confucian values in the development of social policy in that region (Ong and Nonini 1997).

•   The personal priorities and preferences of transnational migrants: Some individuals value these transnational links highly and work to maintain them, while others, often for personal reasons, have no particular interest in transnationalism.

•   The technical ease or difficulty for transnational migrants to maintain links with home countries: Although telecommunications and transportation have become dramatically cheaper in recent years, for a long time cost considerations made transnationalism harder to maintain in some places. Even today, it is still difficult to support such links to certain countries and regions.

Traditional social policy (Lightman 2003) is based on answers to a limited number of broad questions: with modification, these same questions help in understanding the processes of transnational social policy. Perhaps the most central of these questions asks whose responsibility it is to meet needs, both individual and collective. Is the role assigned to individuals (as in the traditional economic market) or to the collective/group/community/society? And if the latter is involved, does this entail action by government or by the voluntary/non-governmental sector (or both, in varying combinations)?

In focusing on transnational social policy, we add a new dimension to these questions: Given that there are at least two distinct societies—one sending and one receiving—and possibly many more, which of the multiple societies holds responsibility for the meeting of these needs for transnational migrants? Which government(s) and which voluntary agency/ies? And, given that there are multiple flows back and forth—commodities, money, communications, travel, and other linkages—how are the key questions to be answered for each of these factors individually?

More specifically, does the original initiating society have obligations towards those who migrate, either temporarily or permanently? For example, Canada's Old Age Security (OAS), a universal non-contributory taxable monthly payment to those 65 and older who meet certain residency (not citizenship) requirements is receivable worldwide, through direct bank transfer in some cases; on the other hand, the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), a means-tested supplement to low-income seniors, is payable only in Canada to current Canadian residents. From this we infer that Canada holds an obligation to those seniors who spend at least twenty years of their adult lives in the country but this does not extend to meet the low-income needs of those who choose to sojourn or reside abroad.

Does the receiving society/ies have any obligation to meet the needs of those arriving at its borders, whether temporarily or permanently? We noted earlier the example of Britain's National Health Service (NHS), originally available on equal terms to all those physically present in the country, regardless of legal status, but subsequently tightened in the face of significant system ‘abuse.’ More recently (Toronto Star 9 March 2009), the province of Quebec has identified a problem with ‘maternity tourism,’ whereby women, often from French-speaking countries, arrive in Quebec in the late stages of pregnancy, give birth (thereby securing citizenship for the child), and leave the country without paying the hospital and medical bills.

Because the welfare state is based on the concept of the nation-state, the integration of new residents, whether transnational migrants or new permanent residents, has always been problematic. There is a dichotomy, by which one either qualifies for social benefits, or one does not, and the criteria by which one becomes eligible vary from programme to programme, from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Often there is a waiting period: new residents to Ontario, for example, face a 90-day period before they become eligible for health care (Medicare) benefits. When parents are in Canada without documentation, the rights of their children to attend school are often murky; Old Age Security (OAS) requires twenty years’ residence in Canada (after age eighteen) in order to qualify for full payment, while the benefits are pro-rated for lesser periods of time. Both transnational, temporary migrants and permanent new immigrants would face these same barriers to accessing benefits (Stewart et al. 2006) assuming the former are in the country with correct papers; those without papers have few rights.

Over the years, a number of creative initiatives have been developed to meet the needs of immigrants without fundamentally challenging the nation-state focus of the welfare state. For example, many schools now pursue “Don't ask; don't tell” policies with respect to the schooling of children: they do not inquire into the residence status of parents and it is assumed parents will not volunteer this information. In this way, the children can get access to the full school system. In addition, there has been considerable growth in the number of NGOs that attempt to meet needs resulting from these gaps in coverage and, at the same time, advocate for changes in the regulatory frameworks. The goal, in most cases, is to work towards a system of social services in which eligibility is based on need rather than legal status or time in the country. While these initiatives do not specifically target transnational migrants—and in fact are often directed more towards refugee claimants, whether transnational or not—the effect is to extend service coverage to all those in need, regardless of status.

But transnationalism has added new dimensions to these debates over entitlement. At times, transnational migrants will claim to be permanent residents/immigrants (or will pretend) in order to claim benefits, e.g., for many years (and perhaps still today, though to a lesser extent), American residents close to the Canadian border would pretend to be transnationals, living in Canada enough days to qualify for health coverage. As a result, qualification requirements for health benefits have been tightened severely in recent years to close this expensive ‘loophole’ in the system. In other cases, people will not disclose absences abroad: continuing coverage under Medicare requires physical presence in Ontario for 186 days a year; the Guaranteed Income Supplement for low-income seniors is available only to those permanently resident in Canada. Once again formerly loose eligibility determination has been tightened in recent years.

The legal framework can facilitate or impede access to benefits for transnational migrants, by rigour of enforcement (as noted earlier) and through the actual content of the laws themselves: for example, the law can specify a formal finite length of time one can be in Canada under certain programmes, and when this time is up, the visitor must then either leave the country or remain without papers. The more the laws and their enforcement are framed to serve a gatekeeper function—to deny and exclude from entitlement—clearly the more difficult it becomes for transnationals to receive needed services. The legal framework can also facilitate or impede the maintenance of transnational linkages, which can at times serve as a substitute for the receipt of local services. The law can attempt to distinguish permanent immigrants from transnational migrants to provide benefits for the former but not the latter, but this is hard to do, as the two categories are not mutually exclusive: a claimant can simultaneously be a permanent immigrant (a legal status) and a transnational migrant (a behavioural condition).

Both the initiating and the receiving societies can develop initiatives to protect the interests of transnational migrants, or they can decline to do so. The sending societies can permit people to carry benefits wherever they may choose to reside, as occurs, for example, with Canada's Old Age Security payments. They can more formally advocate with receiving societies to protect the interests and needs of migrants through the introduction of anti-discrimination legislation or practices: for example, those countries that send caregivers or labourers abroad will attempt (usually unsuccessfully) to protect their nationals against undue personal abuse or exploitation through unsafe working practices. In some cases, sending countries can fund or support agencies or NGOs in the receiving societies that include in their mandates the interests of transnational migrants.

The receiving societies, for their part, can introduce legal protections for transnational migrants through anti-discrimination legislation that is effectively enforced. They may also overlook extra-legal practices by transnational migrants that serve as a form of self-help to meet needs that are otherwise unaddressed. And they can also fund or support new or existing NGOs that (re)define their mandates to include services to transnational migrants.

In all these cases, voluntary agencies or NGOs can emerge to address the gaps in service provision for transnational migrants. These agencies may be partially funded by governments, either in the service-providing countries or elsewhere, or they may be totally independent of governments that choose to not intervene in the provision of services. Existing NGOs can expand their mandates to include transnationals, or new, special purpose NGOs can emerge, but in all cases their funding is likely to be tenuous, as will their ability to fulfill mandates (Cooley and Ron 2002; Jordan and Van Tuijl 2000).

To summarise this section, we can see that transnational migrants, particularly if they are present in substantial numbers, may alter the functions of the state in response to new and emerging needs that are not addressed elsewhere. The roles, functions, and expectations placed on the state may change dramatically. The state can respond by expanding its role, either directly or indirectly through supporting voluntary agencies/NGOs, thereby working towards the social inclusion of all those present in the society; or, alternatively, the state may choose to restrict its role to prevent meeting the needs of new transnational residents, thereby impeding social inclusion either actively (through new restrictive laws and regulations) or passively (by ignoring new problems). In this latter case even greater responsibility is placed on voluntary agencies/NGOs who will likely face increased demands for service from a shrinking fiscal base (Hirschman, Dewind, and Kasinitz 1999; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001).

The outcomes of transnational social policy, as might be expected, relate directly to, and follow from, the processes. Hence, the outcomes will vary, dependent on the same four considerations that influence the processes:

•   The conditions and attitudes in the receiving society/ies

•   The conditions and attitudes in the sending society/ies

•   The personal attitudes, preferences, and desires of the transnational migrants

•   The technical ease or difficulty to maintain transnational links

Transnational migrants can assume a range of statuses in any or all of the societies in which they sojourn: they can be marginalised and second-class, fully integrated, or anything in between. The most extreme marginal status suggests no real sense of inclusion or integration in any of the societies through which they may pass, along with only tenuous links to the initiating society/ies. “They don't belong here and they don't belong there.” This condition may result from a failure or inability of transnational social policy (both government and NGO) in any/all the affected societies to address the social and economic gaps that lead to exclusion; combined with this at the micro level, individuals may not make sufficient efforts to address their own needs (Heisler 2001).

At the other extreme, transnational migrants may be fully integrated into all of the societies with which they interact. They can move back and forth, with comfort and ease. “They belong both here and there.” This fluidity of movement may occur with or without the active intervention of the affected governments and NGOs (DeMars 2005; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997).

Finally, transnational migrants can be placed anywhere between these polar cases, or they can shift into and out of the polar cases. Where individuals and groups of transnational migrants will be found on a scale of integration/exclusion will vary with time, space, distance, context, and personal preferences and characteristics.

FINAL THOUGHTS

This chapter has attempted to combine the existing literatures on transnationalism and on social policy to present a first look at transnational social policy and migration. In doing this, we have extended the ideas of mainstream social policy through the inclusion of a new dimension of transnationalism. The outcomes are not the same, for the addition of a new variable to the equation inevitably alters the calculus and the results. Nevertheless, we have begun to explore transnational social policy through the formulation of new questions and approaches in ways that may be helpful to other researchers.

These preliminary thoughts have not addressed a number of important questions that may serve as a conclusion to this chapter.

Firstly it is crucial to appreciate that transnational social policy does not necessarily promote positive outcomes for recipients. The original definition of social policy, which refers to ‘choices’ and ‘options,’ is consciously silent on the content or outcomes of those choices. Thus, traditional social policy can serve for good (inclusion) or bad (exclusion). Modifying the definition to encompass a transnational dimension does nothing to alter this fundamental silence. While much of this chapter has focused on how transnational social policy can serve to meet the needs of transnational migrants, the same social policy can equally serve to deny entitlements and restrict eligibility. It is only through the introduction of an exogenous value system that transnational social policy acquires either a positive or a negative vector.

Secondly, this chapter has not addressed the central role played by economic class. Not all transnational migrants are the same, and their needs differ dramatically dependent on who they are, where they come from, and what their personal, private resource packages are. Much of the literature on transnationalism refers to poor and marginalised populations who cross borders to escape economic deprivation and/or persecution. We think, immediately, of those moving from eastern Europe and Turkey to western Europe, or from the Caribbean islands, Mexico, and Central America to the United States and Canada. In all these cases, upward economic mobility is a central (though not always exclusive) motivator for movement. These transnational migrants tend to live on the margins of the receiving societies, working at precarious employment, and subject to various forms of exclusion and discrimination. If they do not hold proper documentation, their situations are even more vulnerable. That these populations need social services and supportive social policies—whether traditional nationally bounded or transnational—is rather evident (Massey, Goldring, and Durand 1994; Rouse 1992).

However, there also exists the transnational movement of middle- and upper-class migrants, who have personal social capital and considerable resources (Granovetter 1973; Vertovec 2009; Wong 2004). There are many Americans living and working in Canada who may well identify as transnationals, but who clearly do not need targeted social services and supports. Often they bring their American values promoting individualism and primacy of the private market, a process that has a deleterious effect on the maintenance of Canada's own social policies and programmes. Many of these temporary migrants live on the upper margins of Canada's economic structure, receiving particular supports (such as foreign living allowances) from the United States while also benefiting from (and simultaneously criticising) Canada's own social systems such as public health care.

Class is important. And while we may properly focus on poor and vulnerable transnational migrants as those in greatest need of our collective attention, it is also important to remember that not all transnational migrants in all countries are in need of specific added supports and concerns. Those from wealthy countries and communities are well able to look after their own interests.

We may close with a final word on the meaning of transnational immigration to Canada. Canada's traditional ‘openness’ to immigration—including transnational migrants—is typically associated with little or no pressure to ‘become Canadian’ (whatever that phrase may mean). This is often juxtaposed to the United States notion of the ‘melting pot’ with its implied (or perhaps more explicit) pressure to ‘become American.’ The difference in approach of the two countries has been attributed to various causes: the greater sense of nationalism, parochialism, and perhaps even xenophobia in the U.S. today is undoubtedly evident, but even historically the U.S. has always been focused on nation-building to a greater extent than Canada. As well, Canada receives greater numbers of immigrants relative to total population, including in recent years, and so there will be closer and more ongoing links to home countries abroad (Bumsted 2001; Lipset 1992; Reitz and Somerville 2004). This encourages greater transnational interest and hence the need for transnational services and social policies.

The implication is that there will be greater interest in, and need for, transnational social policy in Canada than in the United States. Offsetting this of course is the greater number of immigrants to the U.S. who lack documentation and hence are more socially vulnerable and at risk of discrimination and deportation.

Some have challenged the very distinction between America's ‘melting pot’ and Canada's lesser pressure to induce social integration (Reitz and Breton 1994). This is not the place to explore that challenge, but the distinction between the two images of the societies does remain a powerful force in creating a Canadian identity, regardless of reality on the ground.

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