INTRODUCTION

Spurred primarily by regulators, financial institutions invested significant resources in risk management over the last decade. An actuarial statistical approach to estimate future losses based on past experiences was used to create an illusion of improved control. Unfortunately, markets are not actuarial tables. The magnitude of the error became apparent once the 2007 credit crisis unfolded. For example, Merrill Lynch’s one-day value at risk (VAR) at the end of 2007 was $154 million,¹ which was supposedly the maximum it could lose over a one-day period at the 99 percent confidence level. The undisclosed risk in the 1 percent beyond the confidence level was substantial, triggering its forced sale to Bank of America.² Other institutions with similar experiences include Citigroup, Wachovia, and Washington Mutual. These losses triggered massive shareholder value destruction resulting in dilutive recapitalizations, replacement of whole management teams, the failure of numerous institutions, and the adoption of the $700 billion TARP³ rescue program. Clearly, something is wrong with the current state of risk management, which requires a rethinking of the activity.

Institutions, both large and small, assumed more risk to maintain income growth to offset challenging industry conditions and declining core profitability. As it turns out, the golden age of banking was not that golden. Large institutions increased risk through structured products. Smaller institutions used real estate concentrations in construction and development loans. They further increased the exposures by leveraging their position. Risk was deemed under control based on the twin illusions of liquidity and risk distribution. In fact, rather than distribute risk, institutions concentrated risk on both sides of their balance sheet. Liquidity evaporated once their leveraged positions began losing value.

This chapter explores why this occurred and what can be done to avoid this in future. Risk management needs to move away from a technical, specialist control function with limited linkage to shareholder value creation. Instead, we need to move beyond risk measurement to risk management that integrates risk into strategic planning, capital management, and governance. Enterprise risk management (ERM) provides a framework to integrate these functions. ERM incorporates the compounding impact of isolated risk decisions. Firms and risk decisions must move from an internal egocentric focus to an external systems approach that incorporates the firm within a market context.

CURRENT SITUATION

The financial services industry suffers from over capacity and product commoditization, which has pressured margins. Institutions increased risk exposure to enhance nominal returns without increasing shareholder value as reflected in Exhibit 17.1.

Exhibit 17.1 illustrates that not all risk increases enhance shareholder value. Opportunities to achieve true and lasting alpha like returns, “D,” are difficult to find in the highly competitive financial services industry. Entry barriers are low and substitutes abound. Consequently, most risk increases involve systematic market, or beta risk, which shareholders can achieve on their own. Distinguishing between beta and alpha performance can be difficult.

This difficulty is especially true for new products with limited historical data. A strong and experienced governance system is needed to avoid paying alpha bonuses for beta returns. Movements along the curve represent changes in firm risk appetite. Changes in risk appetite have direct impact on capital requirements to maintain total risk levels.

Risk exposures can be increased on both sides of the balance sheets. Asset risk is increased by taking tail, downside, risk exposure inherent in many of the new products with option like payoffs. For example, Merrill Lynch’s one-day VAR increased by almost five times from 2001 through 2007.⁴

Although VAR has its problems as a precise risk indicator, as a trend indicator it is useful. On the liabilities side of the balance sheet, leverage levels increased dramatically. This was accomplished by the large-scale use of off-balance sheet vehicles at banks and by raising debt to capital level at broker dealers.⁵ In fact, the large-scale capital raised by institutions served as a proxy for the undercapitalized or excessive leverage. In Merrill Lynch’s case, that totaled almost $32 billion in the first half of 2008.⁶ The consolidation of off-balance sheet vehicles by banks that were triggered once liquidity evaporated added billions of risk assets to already strained balance sheets.

Flawed risk models contributed to the problem. Overconfidence in the models created an illusion of adequate control. Profits were rising and the risk models did not indicate any undue concern. The models, however, failed in several respects. First, they mischaracterized the nature of risk by assuming risk to be exogenous to the system. Risk, however, is endogenous to markets caused by participant interactions similar to poker. Consequently, market behavioral changes were ignored or not adequately modeled.

Next, model risk is heavily dependent on data frequency and availability. Thus, for new products with a limited history, the models were inadequate. Finally, even if you have the data, models are based on experience, not exposures. Just because something has not yet occurred, the exposure may still exist. This is particularly true when dealing with large-scale event risks or “Black Swans.” Risk models concentrated on the ordinary to the exclusion of infrequent extraordinary tail events by confusing history with science. This increased the incentives to take excessive remote risk based on overconfidence in the stability of observed patterns.⁷

Regulators compounded the problem by legitimizing the models. Basel II allowed institutions to rely on their own internal risk models to set capital levels without realizing the incentive for institutions to underestimate risk.⁸ Furthermore, regulators increasingly relied on agency ratings. The agencies were using the same flawed models as the firms whose products they rated.

Decisions must be based on possibilities, not just history. History is just one possible scenario. Thus, not all risks are visible in historical returns. This is the basis of the peso problem where the extra yield, supposedly alpha, is merely compensation for an unseen risk, which may occur regardless of whether it has occurred in the past.⁹

The September 2008 collapse of independent investment banks illustrates the use of increased risk to compensate for a declining business model. Independent investment banks were largely artificial creations resulting from the Glass-Steagall separation of commercial and investment banking activities. They enjoyed a profitable existence up to the 1976 elimination of fixed commissions on stock trades. They then began searching for alternative revenue sources. Many, like Salomon Brothers, moved into higher risk—higher return activities like proprietary trading. The 1998 effective repeal of Glass-Steagall allowed commercial banks to enter agent-based underwriting and advisory businesses. This repeal had a predictable negative impact on investment banks.

Investment banks, once again, began searching for higher margin activities. This was clearly stated in the 2005 Goldman Sachs annual report. The business model outlined, subsequently known as the “Goldman Model,” noted their traditional agency business had become a commodity. They now had to combine capital with advice. Goldman Sachs began moving into private equity, trading, and investing in structured products. Its initial success with this model caused considerable envy among its competitors who began copying the model.

The Goldman Model was essentially an asset-heavy hedge fund activity. It involved a variant of the carry trade or 5L strategy. The 5Ls are:

1. Long-term investments.
2. Large concentrated holdings.
3. Low-quality high-risk assets.
4. Leveraged positions.
5. (I)lliquid assets with liquidity funding mismatch.

The model worked in a bull market awash with liquidity and declining interest rates. The model also contained a potentially fatal flaw. The assets were funded short term, primarily in the overnight repo market. Thus, they used a toxic combination of high 30:1 leverage and short-term funding. Any change in the macroeconomic environment causing investors to change their risk appetite would cause liquidity challenges—just as in Long Term Capital Management (LTCM). Investment banking risk management failed in two key areas. First, they held insufficient capital to withstand the inevitable losses from holding higher risk assets. Second, they compounded the error by having inadequate liquidity to cover creditor concerns once portfolio losses began occurring.

Failure of the board to recognize and remedy the situation represents a governance breakdown. Frequently, directors were unaware of the risk implications of strategic initiatives, and confused short-term results with skill. For example, Merrill Lynch’s strategy to match Goldman Sachs and become the structured finance market-share leader required assuming billions of additional warehouse asset risk. Essentially, they were making a franchise bet. This involved a large increase in risk appetite without adequate consideration of negative scenarios or capital structure implications. Next, incentive arrangements produced counterproductive behavioral changes. Strong managers began exploiting weak governance. Incentives became short-term oriented and based on nominal income with insufficient risk adjustments. Risk manager concerns, if raised at all, were presumably ignored or overruled, especially because the models, ratings, and regulators indicated that risk was under control.¹⁰

Even within risk management, organizational impediments exist. Individual risk functions tend to operate as independent “silos” with little or no strategic connection.¹¹ Additionally, there is limited consideration of business models and market states when evaluating transaction risks. Literally, it is failing to see the forest because of the trees. Market state changes are caused when an unstable market undergoes a rapid regime change. Herding causes the formation of “super portfolios” of overlapping positions. Once these positions reach a critical stage, a random trigger causes the unwinding of positions. Correlations change, diversification breaks down, and catastrophic losses occur over formerly diverse asset classes.¹²

Strategic risk, the major risk facing all organizations, was ignored. Strategic risk is the possibility of an event that impacts an organization’s ability to achieve its business plan. The integration of risk into strategic planning, capital management, and performance measurement is needed.¹³ This would combine business and risk considerations into a single, whole-firm view of value creation. See Box 17.1.

RISK STRATEGY FRAMEWORK

Value is created on the asset side of the balance sheet through investment decisions. The value of risk management is to ensure funding of the investment plan by maintaining capital market access under all conditions. This entails maintaining a total risk profile consistent with rating targets. Consequently, balancing asset portfolio risk with capital structure is required. Failure to do so can undermine an institution’s strategic position and independence.

Questionable strategic growth initiatives that were inappropriately funded underlie the problems at many financial institutions.¹⁴ Bankers believed that growth added value. Unfortunately, growth can destroy value when the returns are less than their cost of capital. This is illustrated here:

• Value = Cash flow + Investment (Return on Assets – Cost of Capital) T
• Cost of capital cost of capital (17.1)(17.2)
• Source: Adapted from Modigliani and Miller (1961).

Term (17.1) represents the value created by assets already in place, while term (17.2) is the value created by growth. T, the competitive advantage period, represents the number of years the firm enjoys the opportunity to invest in profitable projects. Growth can destroy value when an institution invests in projects earning less than their cost of capital. Value creation can also be impacted through poor risk management, which causes the disruption of a firm’s investment program due to inadequate capital and liquidity positions to absorb unexpected events.

Insufficient returns from growth initiatives can strain capital structures and dividends. Maintaining such growth, absent a dividend cut, requires either a dilutive equity issuance or increased leverage. Rather than potentially upsetting shareholders, many institutions chose to increase leverage levels as reflected in Exhibit 17.2.

Surprisingly, even with the leverage increases, returns on equity for many institutions stayed in the low to mid-20 percent range. This was largely due to compensation levels exceeding 50 percent of revenues and compressed spreads. The leverage strategy left little room for error if conditions deteriorated.

Risk management includes a capital structure decision process linking strategy and capital levels. Risk management needs to support the institution’s corporate strategy, which determines the risk universe faced by the bank organization as outlined in Exhibit 17.3. Firms can change the nature of risks retained by using risk management.

As Exhibit 17.3 highlights, the cash-flow volatility of current and future investments combined with the strategic investment plan drives the value of risk management. Low volatility, low-growth firms with limited investment needs have lower risk management needs than rapidly growing firms. Financial institutions have an additional demand for flexibility reflected in high investment-grade rating targets, that is, A and above. This is due to their liability sensitivity. Their customers are also creditors concerned with deposit and trading products. Thus, such ratings are necessary to maintain customers.

Traditional underwriting, mitigation, and transfer risk management techniques can be used to select those risks that the institution is competitively advantaged to own and eliminate the rest. For example, community banks have an informational advantage regarding local clients. Thus, they should retain such risk up to prudent concentration levels. Alternatively, market risks, like interest rate risk, should not be held unless the institution possesses special information or they are perceived to be mispriced. The retained risk should be covered by capital consistent with a ratings goal to ensure capital market access sufficient to fund the investment plan. Viewed in this light, risk management and capital can be seen as interchangeable with capital being the cost of retained risk. In fact, risk management is essentially tax-deductible synthetic equity. The key is to avoid a mismatch between the assets and liabilities and equity of the balance sheet. Too little capital relative to asset risk reduces flexibility, while excess capital depresses returns.

The overall institutional risk level is dependent on the board’s risk appetite—the level of risk the organization is willing to assume on both sides of their balance sheet in pursuit of its strategy. Risk appetite is a relative term among stakeholders. Usually aligned, there are instances when management and stakeholder appetites differ. Management’s risk appetite is best expressed as a continuum reflected in Exhibit 17.4 (adapted from Oliver Wyman 2007).

Obviously, no one consciously plans on accepting the risk of replacement, regulatory action, or failure. Rather, these situations result from the failure to consider adequately the probability of ruin in rare bad states. These strategies involve bets against randomness and an acceptance of peso risk. The 20-plus year financial bull market lulled management, directors, regulators, and shareholders into a false sense of security. They simply ignored these rare but possible negative states by assuming large risk positions relative to their capital.¹⁵ Risk strategies that are successful except for rare events are like having an airbag that works except when there is a crash.

Risk appetite decisions involve determining how much of the firm’s value is at risk should the worst case materialize, whether this is tolerable, and if not, how much additional capital is needed to self-insure. Exhibit 17.4 illustrates the apparent internal risk appetite continuum of many financial institutions as demonstrated by recent history. The skewed compensation systems that allowed managers to exit with huge payouts, and keep prior year bonuses, exacerbates this concern. It encourages managers to “roll the dice” in a “heads I win/tails you lose” situation. Senior management’s interests were misaligned by their compensation systems. Consequently, they acted in a predictable and rational manner at the expense of their shareholders.

The risk appetite conflict between internal and external stakeholders is highlighted in Exhibit 17.5 (adapted from P. Laurin 2006).

Unresolved conflicts between internal and external risk appetite have underlined problems at many institutions. Management had undertaken new higher risk strategies with capital structures incapable of absorbing the inevitable losses in pursuit of maximizing their bonuses. Complicating matters is the pro-cyclical nature of risk appetite. As a bull market ages, income increases and vigilance declines. Institutions extrapolate, and assume short-term trends will continue. Eventually, absent strong governance, they move farther out on the risk curve by confusing a bull market with skill. This results in an overexposed position once the inevitable correction occurs.

Risk models contributed to increasing risk appetite. Individuals chose to maintain a given level of risk. Perceived risk declines trigger behavioral changes as we increase our risk exposure to return to our original risk level as if we had a risk thermostat. Institutions mistakenly believed risk management had reduced risk, and compensated by increasing their risk exposures.¹⁶ This leads to the paradoxical conclusion that risk mitigation does not reduce risk—rather it redistributes it.

Additionally, many financial firms held large amounts of risk in which they had limited competitive advantages. They had effectively shifted from an “originate to distribute” to an “originate to hold” business model. This market risk, beta, while increasing nominal income, failed to create shareholder value. Even worse, they failed to compensate for their increased risk exposure. The current situation represents an amplified system-wide version of the LTCM collapse, which can be seen as the blueprint for the current crisis. Both situations involved large, leveraged, and illiquid concentration bets in tail risk options like assets based on models that underestimated risk.¹⁷ The short put option exposure of LTCM was replaced by stealth-like structured finance products to exploit “blind spot” weaknesses in risk management systems. Structured finance products are the perfect moral hazard products to exploit the risk and compensation systems.¹⁸ The legitimacy of structured products was enhanced by the high, often AAA ratings awarded to such products, which provided the appearance of liquidity.¹⁹

It is important to distinguish liquidity from solvency. Liquidity concerns the composition of the balance sheet. Specifically, it focuses on having enough cash to withstand a run of bad events. Liquidity allows you to survive long enough to succeed. Solvency relates to the overall collateralization of liabilities with asset values.

In a market crisis state, the key concern is liquidity. Yet surprisingly, both the regulators in BIS II and the rating agencies had expressed little concern on this issue. Asset prices become volatile during a liquidity crisis. Again, this was highlighted in LTCM. Their trades eventually worked, but since they had insufficient liquidity, they were forced out before they could realize the gains. This is illustrated below in Exhibit 17.6.

The size of the bid/offer spread during the panic stage complicates the conversion of assets into cash without loss. The inability to convert long-term assets to cash to match short-term debt maturities, caused firms like Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns to fail even though they were arguably solvent.

There are two sources of liquidity. Traditionally, institutions held cash or cash-like liquidity buffers to cover asset price liquidity concerns. This is, however, expensive. Many institutions switched to liability-based liquidity. This was based on the ability to have debt access on reasonable terms. Investment banks typically used short-term, frequently overnight funding to support long-term asset positions because it was less expensive. Unfortunately, this availability is fragile and subject to potentially volatile market conditions.²⁰ The presumption of the ability to borrow is state-specific. It holds during normal periods, but is invalid during panic states when price declines generate more sellers than buyers, thus creating a liquidity black hole.²¹ Credit-based liquidity is illusory. The combination of leverage without liquidity is deadly regardless of the quality of a firm’s assets. Asset problems eventually impact a firm’s ability to access funding, which leads to a liquidity crisis.

GOVERNANCE

A key, but often neglected, component of risk management is governance. As Rene Stulz rightfully points out, risk managers are not solely responsible for the current credit crisis. At its core, risk management is an exposure measurement and accounting system. The decision to take major risks is the responsibility of top management and the board of directors.²²

Governance involves designing appropriate incentives and controls to ensure the alignment of potentially conflicting management and shareholder interests. This involves assigning decision rights, establishing performance metrics, and developing an appropriate rewards system. This is especially important to financial institutions that take opaque risk positions, which do not manifest themselves until later. Under these circumstances, high-powered incentive compensation arrangements coupled with information asymmetry create an incentive for management to game the system leading to Decisions at Risk (DAR)²³ in Exhibit 17.7. Bonuses tied to short-term performance and equity options misalign management and shareholder interests resulting in excessive risk taking.

Management can exploit its information advantage to deceive the board of directors. Structured products have a high DAR because they involve complex accounting and valuation problems. This was the reason underlying Warren Buffett’s charge that they constituted “weapons of mass destruction.”²⁴ Furthermore, management may lack the capability to oversee and understand their risk positions. In these cases, senior management becomes a captive of middle managers whose incentives are to maximize their bonuses through increased risk taking. Arguably, this occurred at Bear Stearns where senior management did not understand its risk exposures.

Although we know how risk decisions should be made, less is known on how these decisions are actually made. Decision makers are subject to behavioral biases concerning how risk is perceived and managed. Behavioral finance examines how decision makers gather, interpret, and process information. These biases can corrupt the decision process, leading to suboptimal results.

Major behavioral biases include:

• Overconfidence: exaggerate skills and ignore the impact of change or external circumstances. It causes an underestimation of outcome variability; sometimes known as “confusing a bull market for skill.”
• Availability bias: subjective probability depends on recent experience. Consequently, infrequent extreme events like market or firm collapse are overlooked creating a false sense of security.²⁵
• Herding: individuals begin mimicking the decisions of others. Herding amplifies market cycles by overreliance on feedback loops.

No matter how good the data or how sophisticated the model, we can be fooled by randomness, confuse actions with outcomes, and fall prey to poor risk decisions.

This is especially important for certain types of difficult, rare decisions involving delayed feedback.²⁶ Major new investment programs are examples of this type of decision. This can lead to a tragedy of the commons (TOTC) situation when coupled with misaligned incentives. TOTC occurs when a finite resource is underpriced leading to its over-exploitation. Banks mispriced their capital by underestimating asset risk. This blinded them to the dangers of an increasing risk appetite.

Boards, suffering from DAR problems, became co-opted by management. They seldom questioned management unless forced by a market crisis. Symptoms of ineffective boards include:

• Large boards.
• Inexperienced directors.
• Retired CEOs predisposed to side with the CEO.
• Limited ownership: this curtails their commitment.

Boards need to understand the institution’s strategy, risk appetite, and the impact of business plan assumptions. Otherwise, they will fail to notice risk appetite changes, the risk implications of strategy changes, required capital levels, and the incentive impact of compensation schemes and franchise bets.²⁷ Unfortunately, attempts to improve board performance can face challenges. This is similar to regulatory capture when mechanisms created to protect individuals end up acting in the interests of the regulated firms.

Internal control breakdowns usually lead to declining performance and shareholder pressure and changes in corporate control. The usual form of these actions involves proxy battles and hostile takeovers. In regulated industries, like banking, regulations make such actions difficult. The regulators become a replacement for the external market for control. Regulators are, however, an inefficient replacement. They are not necessarily aligned with shareholders, and face the same DAR problems as the board of directors. Furthermore, they are subject to being co-opted. The answer is not necessarily more regulation, but allowing for increased market discipline, which can be achieved in two areas.

First, large active shareholders with board representation, such as private equity firms, can counterbalance management. Unfortunately, bank holding company rules complicate this effort.²⁸ An alternative is based on contingent capital provided by private insurers in meaningful amounts.²⁹ The insurer will have a monetary incentive to challenge management and ensure appropriate risk management oversight. Another quasi-market approach is the requirement of banks to issue subordinated debt. Subordinated debt would act as the “canary in the coal mine” to provide an early warning of bank solvency issues.³⁰ We can expect further developments in this area. Absent such solutions, banks will suffer an information uncertainty discount, which will raise their cost of capital.³¹ Thus, an institution’s ownership structure and composition should be an important risk management consideration.

NEW DIRECTIONS

We need to move beyond risk measurement to risk management that integrates risk into strategic planning, capital management and governance. Enterprise risk management provides a framework to integrate these functions.

Enterprise Risk Management (ERM): The First Step

Risk management is a strategy and a means to an end, and not an end in itself. The focus is on linking the control aspects of governance with strategy and performance in a holistic integrated fashion. Risk is viewed on a total firm portfolio basis linking both sides of the balance sheet. The firm, and consequently, risk management is more than the sum of the parts. The interactions among various units and risks, something ignored by silo-based risk management, is just as important as the units and risks themselves. ERM provides such a unifying mechanism. Its scope goes beyond traditional financial risks to include human resources, incentives, and governance matters as well.

ERM is a consolidated top-down cross-functional total risk management exercise, which cuts across all business units and risk types. The focus is strategic, not transactional. It seeks to improve decision making through a portfolio view of interrelated risks across the firm. This is accomplished by imbedding a risk culture within business units so risk considerations become an input versus a consequence of these strategies. This ensures that an organization in control, rather than a control organization, develops. This is especially important in a rapidly evolving financial services market with institutions struggling with declining core operations, and searching for replacement business models.

Risk management does not operate in a vacuum. It is context-dependent, and must take the external environment into account. ERM can become too inward-looking and fail to consider the firm’s adaptability to changing unstable market conditions. A useful approach is referenced in Exhibit 17.8.

Industries are interactively complex. The relationships are nonlinear, meaning that small changes can have disproportionate impacts. Additionally, the system is tightly connected by feedback loops. Events spread quickly throughout the system in unpredictable ways. The current crisis represents a system failure and attempts to identify a single cause or assign blame are fruitless.

To ensure success, risk strategies must be flexible enough to change once environmental conditions change. Sophisticated systems that work in only one market state, that is, the current one, are of limited use in alternative states. Firms need enough resiliency to survive and adapt to unanticipated environmental changes.

Enterprise Resilience (ER): The Next Step?

Firms are part of a complex living market system. Crises within that system may be infrequent, but are inevitable. A firm’s ability to adapt to unforeseen events—its resilience—becomes a critical success factor. The system is too complex to predict when and where accidents will occur. The key is the flexibility to sense and respond to accidents. ER is a possible next step in the development of risk management as reflected in Exhibit 17.9.³²

ER involves a focus on what can happen regardless of probability, and across multiple market states. Then the firm needs to build a risk management structure to withstand whatever category market storm fits its risk tolerance. Although not optimal in all market states, ER ensures survival over multiple market states.

CONCLUSION

The structured finance credit crisis illustrates the shortcomings of current risk management. Risk management lagged financial innovation. Risk at best was measured, but not managed adequately. Instead, it evolved as a ritualistic prediction activity. Conventional risk management became overconfident, a regulatory fiction behind which excessive risk taking occurred.

Risk management must include the risk return tradeoff facing the entire firm. This includes strategic risk and capital structure issues. There is nothing necessarily wrong about high-risk strategies, provided the firm is compensated, understands the risk, can withstand an adverse event, and stakeholder interests are aligned.

The risk from declining banking business models increases concerns for misalignment. ERM and ER offer the opportunity to bridge this gap by combining business and risk considerations into a single, whole-firm view of value creation over multiple market states. Next, governance issues, which are partly the source of the current problems, or may just not be adequate to control other sources of risk, must be addressed. Governance concerns the assignment of decision rights to identifying, addressing, and resolving conflicting stakeholder claims. Additionally, reporting transparency that reflects the risk appetite and the risk profile is needed. The most important component of risk management is management, not measurement. If successful, these developments will transform risk management into a strategic value enabler.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

For 24 years before joining CapGen, Joe Rizzi was a member of the ABN AMRO Group or its U.S. affiliate, LaSalle Bank. He most recently served as Managing Director of LaSalle Bank Corporation’s Enterprise Risk Management unit for North America.

During his tenure with the ABN AMRO Group, Mr. Rizzi worked in several areas of the company. He began his career there with Secured Lending and Leasing and then joined the Corporate Banking group. From 1986 through 2000, he was a leading member of the Strategic Planning, Structured Finance or Leveraged Finance teams located in Chicago.

In 2001, he began his role as a group head in Amsterdam. Over the next five years, Mr. Rizzi alternated working at ABN AMRO in Amsterdam and New York City, focusing on Group Risk Management, Asset and Liability Management, as well as Country Management.

He is a widely published author and has lectured to various professional organizations in Europe and the United States. He taught regularly at the Amsterdam Institute of Finance and at the University of Notre Dame’s Mendoza School of Business.

Mr. Rizzi graduated summa cum laude from DePaul University, earned an MBA from the University of Chicago, and received a JD magna cum laude from the University of Notre Dame Law School.