CHAPTER 2
Student Conceptions and Conceptual Learning in Science
Alice is a 14-year-old high school student, and in her science classes she has been taught quite a lot about the scientific concept of energy. Prior to these lessons Alice certainly used the word “energy” in her every day speech, whether in talking about “having no energy,” referring to the “high energy music” of her favorite band, or trying to reduce “energy consumption” to preserve the environment. During the lessons, Alice struggled to come to terms with some of the scientific ideas, which often seemed to go against common sense. Indeed, her teacher had warned that “this is always a difficult topic to get hold of.” Nevertheless, by the end of the teaching, Alice (who is a bright girl) was able to use the idea of energy in answering questions about batteries and bulbs, chemical reactions, and photosynthesis. However, she still struggled, for example, to see how the products of an exothermic chemical reaction could have the same mass as the reactants, even though “energy has been transferred to the surroundings,” and it didn't make sense to her that a soda can on her desk “has gravitational potential energy,” even though it “just sits there.”
It is clear that Alice has learned something about the concept of energy. How might we conceptualize what has happened to Alice in these particular lessons? What do we mean when we say that Alice has “learned something about energy“? What factors act to influence her learning? What happens to Alice's existing ideas about energy being consumed, in the face of her new learning? Why should she find some of the scientific energy ideas strange and difficult to understand?
There are many questions that might be posed about any such learning event. The aim of this chapter is to review the different approaches taken to characterizing science concept learning. We begin by providing a brief historical overview of trends in the way in which research on conceptual learning has developed over the last 40 years or so. We then introduce the key features that have guided our structuring of the review, before presenting the detailed review itself. Given the sheer volume of literature addressing student conceptions and conceptual learning in science, it is not possible to be comprehensive in coverage. Rather, we have cited studies which, in our judgment, best illustrate the key features guiding our review, including work, where possible, that has been influential in various parts of the English-speaking world.
Although there are significant and fundamental differences among some of the approaches taken to conceptualizing science learning, it is also the case that other differences arise simply because different aspects of the learning process are being addressed. Bearing this point in mind, we believe that some approaches offer potentially complementary perspectives. We return to this theme in the concluding section, where we discuss the ways in which these ideas about learning might be drawn upon to illuminate and inform science teaching and learning in classroom settings.
STARTING POINTS AND TRENDS IN CHARACTERIZING SCIENCE CONCEPT LEARNING
Perspectives on student concepts and conceptual learning in science have been heavily influenced by the seminal work of the Swiss genetic epistemologist Jean Piaget. This influence was particularly dominant during the 1960s and 1970s, as can be confirmed by looking through the citations of Piaget in papers published in the main science education journals of that period (see Erickson, 2000, p. 276). Piaget described an interactive learning process whereby an individual makes sense of the world through cognitive schemes, which are themselves modified as a result of the individual's actions on objects in the world. This model is summarized in the statement “L'intelligence organise le monde en s'organisant elle-même“1 (Piaget, 1937). Piaget emphasized the significance of the child's social environment for knowledge development, claiming that: “Society is the supreme unit, and the individual can only achieve his inventions and intellectual constructions insofar as he is the seat of collective interactions that are naturally dependent, in level and value, on society as a whole” (Piaget, 1971, p. 368). Nonetheless, in most of Piaget's writing—and writing addressing the significance of Piagetian theorizing for science education— knowledge is portrayed as schemata in the individual's head, with little prominence being given to wider social aspects. The proposed mechanism for changes in intellectual organization as a result of interactions with the world (termed adaptation) involves the processes of assimilation and accommodation (Piaget, 1952). Assimilation is the process by which an individual interprets particular sensory information and in so doing includes that information in his/her existing cognitive structure. Accommodation is the process by which cognitive structure adapts in order to make sense of specific information. Assimilation and accommodation cannot be dissociated: whenever an individual interacts with sensory information, both assimilation and accommodation take place.
Although Piaget was primarily interested in development as a result of maturation, rather than learning as a result of instruction (Piaget, 1964), his empirical work addressed the development of children's knowledge about various aspects of the natural world, including life (Piaget, 1929); time (Piaget, 1946); and mass, weight, and volume (Piaget, 1930). Drawing upon this body of empirical work, an account of conceptual change based upon the development of content-independent logical structures was proposed (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956). Characteristic stages in the development of logical thinking were set out, based upon students’ abilities to perform tasks involving skills such as conservation and seriation (the serial ordering of items). The concrete operational stage, for example, runs between approximately 2 and 12 years and is characterized by the development and coordination of conceptual schemes, including conservation, classification, and seriation. Children at the concrete operational stage are not capable of performing operations at a purely symbolic level, however; that competence is characteristic of the formal operational stage.
Piaget's work has influenced perspectives on student conceptions and conceptual learning in several ways. His account of how individuals come to know can be seen in much writing about students’ conceptions, conceptual change, and personal constructivism through references to assimilation and accommodation. Piaget's methods for probing an individual's understanding, which involve an interviewer asking children questions without attempting to “lead” their responses (Piaget, 1929), have also been drawn upon in research on students’ alternative conceptions. Furthermore, Piagetian stage theory has been drawn upon to inform science curriculum design and sequencing [e.g., Science Curriculum Improvement Study in the United States (Andersson, 1976) and Cognitive Acceleration through Science Education in Britain (Adey & Shayer, 1993)].
Various criticisms of the use of Piagetian theory in science education have been advanced. Carey (1985), Donaldson (1978), and Driver (1978) questioned the empirical basis on which claims for characteristic stages in logico-mathematical thinking were founded. Specific criticisms include the following: (a) tasks requiring identical logico-mathematical reasoning are made easier or more difficult by the degree of familiarity with the task's context (Donaldson); (b) tasks characteristic of a given stage can be performed by much younger children (Driver); and (c) the analysis used in Piagetian research is designed to validate existing theory rather than account for children's reasoning (Driver; Carey).
Although there has been a decline in the influence of Piagetian approaches since the 1970s, there remains a significant line of research on domain-general reasoning skills in science learning (e.g., Koslowski, 1996; Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn, Amsel, & O'Loughlin, 1988; Metz, 1997), as well as accounts of science learning that draw on Piaget's work (e.g., Adey & Shayer, 1993; Lawson, 1985; Shayer, 2003).
Perhaps the most significant break from the Piagetian account of conceptual learning in science can be traced back to the developmental psychology of David Ausubel (1968). Ausubel argued that the most significant influence on the learners’ conceptual development is their existing conceptual knowledge in the target domain. During the early 1970s, a small number of empirical studies were conducted that accounted for students’ science learning in terms of domain-specific factors, rather than explaining learning in terms of global logico-mathematical reasoning skills (e.g., Driver, 1973; McClosky, 1983; Viennot, 1979).
An empirical research program was subsequently developed (Novak, 1978), focusing upon the content of students’ domain-specific reasoning (or students’ alternative conceptions; Driver & Easley, 1978) about natural phenomena and involving researchers from around the world. Two particularly influential books in the development of research on pupils’ alternative conceptions were The Pupil as Scientist by Rosalind Driver (1983) and Learning in Science: The Implications of Children's Science, edited by Roger Osborne and Peter Freyberg (1985). The latter provides an account of the work carried out by a group of researchers in the Learning in Science Project (LISP) at Waikato University, New Zealand. The “alternative conceptions” or “misconceptions” (Gilbert & Watts, 1983) movement gained further strength from a series of major international conferences organized by Joe Novak at Cornell University (Novak, 1987), and the number of publications in this field of science education research increased into the thousands (see, for example Bell, 1981; Driver, Guesne, & Tiberghien, 1985; Gunstone, 1987; Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994). Helga Pfundt and Reinders Duit of the IPN in Kiel, Germany, developed a comprehensive bibliography, Students’ Alternative Frameworks and Science Education, which is now in its fifth edition (Pfundt & Duit, 2000). All of the evidence suggests that there are strong commonalities in the alternative conceptions of students from different cultures, and, furthermore, these ideas about the natural world have a profound influence on what is learned as a result of science teaching, and some ideas are extremely resistant to change (Driver, 1989).
During the 1970s and 1980s, accounts of the origins of students’ thinking about the natural world tended to be based upon a Piagetian view of the knower-known relationship, with knowledge portrayed in terms of entities in the individual's head, which developed through that individual's interactions with the material world. Such views of knowledge were later challenged (Matthews, 1992) on the grounds that they advanced an empiricist account of the generation of scientific knowledge, an argument that will be returned to later in the chapter. Furthermore, they failed to make any distinction between an individual's beliefs about the world and knowledge of the world that has been publicly warranted as reliable.
In recent years, the “discursive turn in psychology” (Harré & Gillett, 1994) has involved a shift in focus away from viewing meaning-making purely in terms of cognitive processes in the individual, toward an account of individuals as they function in social contexts. Central to this development has been the rediscovery of the work of Vygotsky and other Soviet psychologists of the sociocultural tradition.
Overall, we therefore see a trend in characterizing students’ science concept learning, which takes us from the individually oriented perspectives of Piaget toward those sociocultural perspectives that bring together the individual with the social. In the following section we introduce the framework that we have drawn upon to structure our account of this development.
STRUCTURING THE REVIEW
Given the range of approaches taken to conceptualizing science learning, we have found it helpful to identify two key features that we use as organizing dimensions in developing and presenting the review. The first dimension is taken from the influential paper by Anna Sfard (1998), in which she proposed two key metaphors for learning: the acquisition metaphor and the participation metaphor.
According to Sfard (1998), human learning has been conceived of since the dawn of civilization as an acquisition of something; in recent decades, “the idea of learning as gaining possession over some commodity has persisted in a wide spectrum of frameworks, from moderate to radical constructivism and then to interactionism and sociocultural theories” (p. 6). Gaining possession implies that something is stored or held somewhere. Sfard makes clear that it is concepts that are learned and then stored in the learner's head: “Since the time of Piaget and Vygotsky, the growth of knowledge in the process of learning has been analysed in terms of concept development. Concepts are to be understood as basic units of knowledge that can be accumulated, gradually refined, and combined to form ever richer cognitive structures” (p. 5).
By way of contrast, Sfard (1998) saw the participation metaphor as offering a fundamentally different perspective on learning, in which “the learner should be viewed as a person interested in participation in certain kinds of activities rather than in accumulating private possessions” (p. 6). According to this perspective, “learning a subject is now conceived of as a process of becoming a member of a certain community” (p. 6).
In developing this review, we start with approaches to conceptualizing science concept learning that belong to the acquisition perspective and then move on to those that relate to participation. From the outset, it is important to recognize that the acquisition-participation dimension is not a continuum. The two metaphors offer fundamentally different perspectives on learning, or, as Sfard (1998) stated, “the acquisition/participation division is ontological in nature and draws on two radically different approaches to the fundamental question, ‘What is this thing called learning?’” (p. 7). The majority of approaches to conceptualizing science learning that we review here relate to the acquisition perspective.
The second dimension to be addressed involves the distinction between individual and social perspectives on learning. This takes us from a starting point where the main focus is on the individual learner and moves toward approaches where increased account is taken of various social aspects of the learning process and of knowledge itself.
SCIENCE CONCEPT LEARNING AS ACQUISITION: COGNITIVE APPROACHES
Following the ideas set out in the previous section, we first consider those approaches that see science learning as involving a process of acquisition and focus on the individual in providing an account of that learning.
Learning as Conceptual Change
Recognition that prior knowledge influences learning (Ausubel 1968), together with Piagetian ideas of accommodation and assimilation, and work from the philosophy of science (Kuhn, 1970; Lakatos, 1972) all underpinned a seminal paper by Posner, Strike, Hewson, and Gertzog (1982) on conceptual change in science learning. In the paper by Posner et al., the conditions needed for a major change in thinking within a scientific field (such as the shift from an Earth-centered to a Sun-centered model of the solar system) were considered analogous to the conditions needed to bring about accommodation or conceptual change in individual learners. Posner et al. identified four conditions that must be met before such an accommodation can occur. These conditions are that a learner must first be dissatisfied with existing ideas and then that the new ideas must be seen as intelligible, plausible, and fruitful. Empirical evidence from students’ learning about the special theory of relativity was then used to illustrate and exemplify this model of conceptual change learning. Though taking the view that learning is a rational activity, Posner et al. recognized that such accommodations might take considerable time, involving “much fumbling about, many false starts and mistakes, and frequent reversals of direction” (p. 223). The conditions of intelligibility, plausibility, and fruitfulness contribute to the status of an idea. During conceptual change the status of different ideas within a person's conceptual ecology (the range of ideas they hold) changes (Hewson, 1981; Hewson & Hennesey, 1992; Hewson & Lemberger, 2000). The implications of this model for teaching were outlined in the original paper and further discussed by Hewson, Beeth, and Thorley (1998). In addition, Scott, Asoko, and Driver (1992) outlined two broad approaches to conceptual change teaching. The first of these is based upon promoting cognitive conflict and follows from the model proposed by Posner et al., whereas in the second the learner's existing ideas are built upon and extended.
A significant point of confusion in this whole area of work concerns the different meanings that are attached to the term conceptual change. Sometimes conceptual change refers to the process of learning, and at other times it refers to the products. Furthermore, conceptual change sometimes refers to situations where one concept (seen as a unit of knowledge) is exchanged for another; sometimes where a concept is modified in some way, for example by differentiation into two; sometimes where the relationship between concepts changes; and sometimes where new concepts are added without loss of the original ideas. The interest in student misconceptions, or alternative conceptions, in the 1980s led to a focus on conceptual change as revolutionary, with new ideas replacing the original ones (through a process of exchange), rather than evolutionary and gradual, with the possibility of several views existing simultaneously (through a process of addition) and used in different contexts (see, for example, Sinatra, 2002).
What Changes During Conceptual Change?
Posner et al.’s (1982) model of conceptual change focused on the conditions under which radical accommodations occur. Alongside this, the focus of much work in developmental cognitive psychology has been on what changes, exploring the performance of learners at different ages and attempting to explain this in terms of the ways in which concepts are mentally represented and related and the cognitive processes by which they are acquired and change.
One of the early proponents of domain-specific approaches, Susan Carey, proposed two forms of knowledge restructuring in learning, one similar to that demonstrated in the shift from novice to expert and one analogous to that of theory change in science. In the first, “weak” restructuring, the relations between concepts are changed. In the second, “strong” restructuring, the concepts themselves change (Carey, 1985), and this is regarded as difficult to achieve. Considerable attention has been given to these latter situations where radical restructuring is needed, particularly in the context of learning physics concepts.
The idea that learning occurs as discrete concepts are formed and then linked into more complex conceptual structures has largely given way to a view that concepts are part of larger relational structures from the start. Vosniadou (1994), for example, argued that concepts are embedded into larger theoretical structures of two types, with the term theoretical being used to describe a relatively coherent explanatory structure. Framework theories, which develop from early infancy, consist of fundamental ontological and epistemological presuppositions. Specific theories are beliefs about the properties or behavior of objects, which arise from observation and/or are transmitted by the pervading culture. These specific theories are constrained by the assumptions of the underpinning framework theories. Specific and framework theories provide the basis for the generation of situation-specific mental models in response to the demands of a particular situation. Exploration of these mental models, for example in the context of the development of ideas about astronomical phenomena or force, provides insight into the underlying theoretical base. Conceptual change, according to this perspective, is thought to occur by enrichment or revision of a specific or a framework theory, a process that requires a gradual suspension of presuppositions and their revision or replacement with a different explanatory framework (Vosniadou & Ioannides, 1998). From this perspective, misconceptions are generated on the spot, during testing, from the deeply held framework theory, rather than being deeply held beliefs.
Following the seminal work of Keil (1979), ontological categorization is also seen as being of fundamental importance in the learning of science concepts. Chi (Chi, 1992; Chi, Slotta, & de Leeuw, 1994) argued that the meaning of a concept is determined by the ontological category to which it is assigned. Misconceptions thus arise when a concept is assigned to an inappropriate ontological category, for example, seeing the concept of “heat” as belonging to the category of “matter” instead of the category “process.” Chi and Roscoe (2002) distinguished between the reassignment of concepts within levels of an ontological category and change, which requires a shift from one category to another, which is much more difficult.
DiSessa and Sherin (1998) pointed out some difficulties with the “standard” model of conceptual change. They argued that the notion of “concept” needs to be replaced by more carefully defined theoretical constructs within a knowledge system, which allow us to understand how that system functions. Focusing on the cognitive processes by which we gain information from the world, they proposed entities such as “co-ordination classes” and “phenomenological primitives,” or p-prims. Co-ordination classes include cognitive strategies such as selecting and integrating information and are “systematically connected ways of getting information from the world” (p. 1171). Phenomenological primitives are described as abstractions from experience that need no explanation and form primitive schemata that constitute the basis of intuitive knowledge. For example, people usually expect that greater effort produces greater results and may apply this principle across a range of contexts. Intuitive “rules” such as these have also been identified by Stavy and co-workers (Stavy & Tirosh, 2000; Tirosh, Stavy, & Cohen, 1998). They believed that many of the alternative conceptions reported in the literature are, in fact, due to the use of rules such as more of A-more of B, which are relatively stable and resistant to change.
All of the above utilize some form of mental model, or system that develops and changes as a result of cognitive processes. The view that evolutionary pressures have led to the development of innate dispositions to interpret the world in particular ways was discussed by Matthews (2000), who also suggested that some conceptual structures can be triggered, rather than learned in the usual sense of the word. He considered, for example, that some of the p-prims, proposed by DiSessa, have the character of triggered concepts. Drawing on connectionist theories, he suggested that certain neural networks are designed to respond quickly and thus reinforce an initial bias. Conceptual change might then be viewed as a “process by which additional cognitive structures are built that, once firmly established, can over-ride rather than merge with, the functioning of competing innate structures” (p. 528). Such innate structures might correspond or give rise to the “naïve physics” and “naïve psychology” proposed by Carey (1985) or DiSessa's naïve “sense of mechanism” (DiSessa & Sherin, 1998) and perhaps lie behind Vosniadou's (1994) framework theories and Stavy's intuitive rules (Stavy & Tirosh, 2000).
Beyond “Cold” Conceptual Change
Although Posner et al. (1982) noted that motivational and affective variables were not unimportant in the learning process, the model of conceptual change they proposed was based on a view of learning as a rational activity. Pintrich, Marx, and Boyle (1993), in their critique of “cold” conceptual change models, proposed that the conditions of dissatisfaction with existing conceptions and the intelligibility, plausibility, and fruitfulness of the new, although necessary, are not sufficient to support conceptual change. Cognitive, motivational, and classroom contextual factors must also be taken into account as the individual student in the classroom is subject to influences from the broader social setting.
Cognitive Approaches: Summary and Implications
The following fundamental insights about science concept learning are common to the majority of cognitive perspectives:
- Individuals’ beliefs about the natural world are constructed, rather than received.
- There are strong commonalities in how individuals appear to think about the natural world.
- A person's existing ideas about a given subject greatly influence his/her subsequent learning about that subject.
In addition, some have argued that there are more general aspects of reasoning, such as Piaget's logico-mathematical reasoning skills, or the skills described by Kuhn et al. (1988), which influence the learner's response to instruction.
These insights have significant implications for our understanding of how science concepts are taught and learned. The facts that scientific knowledge cannot be transferred during teaching, and that existing thinking influences learning outcomes, offer a starting point to explaining why some aspects of science are difficult to learn. Furthermore, the research into students’ thinking about aspects of the natural world has been drawn upon by science educators involved in the design and evaluation of teaching sequences (see, for example, Clement, 1993; Minstrell, 1992; Psillos & Méheut, 2004; Rowell & Dawson, 1985; Stavy & Berkowitz, 1980; Tiberghien, 2000; Viennot & Rainson, 1999) and in decisions about sequencing of ideas and age placement in the science curriculum (Driver, Leach, Scott, & Wood-Robinson, 1994). Science educators have also drawn upon research into more general aspects of students’ scientific reasoning in developing teaching materials focused on the general reasoning skills of students (e.g., Adey & Shayer, 1993).
If the above points constitute a shared ground among cognitive perspectives, where do the points of difference lie? One area for debate concerns the existence and relative importance of domain-general and domain-specific aspects of reasoning in accounting for conceptual learning and conceptual change in science. Thinking back to the case of Alice, some of her difficulties with learning about energy might be explained, from a domain-specific perspective, in terms of the ontology of her existing concepts (“How come the mass hasn't changed when energy has been transferred to the surroundings?“). Instruction might therefore be designed to make it plausible that energy is not a substance, and to allow Alice to compare the scientific account of energy explicitly with her prior thinking.
From a domain-general perspective, Alice's difficulties might be accounted for in terms of the prevalence of abstract entities in the scientific account of energy and Alice's capacity to operate with those abstract entities. We are not aware of research that accounts for the teaching and learning of specific conceptual content from a domain-general perspective. Rather, the instructional solution might involve teaching thinking skills, or possibly not addressing the more abstract aspects of the energy concept until Alice has developed the appropriate thinking skills.
Another area of debate is the relative coordination or fragmentation of the elements of conceptual thinking in science learners. Are Alice's ideas about energy coordinated and coherent, or fragmented and lacking in logical coherence? Depending on the answer to this question, the challenge for Alice's science teacher might involve presenting a scientific account of energy and contrasting it explicitly with students’ theories, or helping students to appreciate how a single, coherent theory can explain a wide range of phenomena.
In practice, however, there may be no simple, direct relationship between perspectives on learning and strategies for teaching (Millar, 1989), and Alice's teacher might well achieve similar success as a result of using several of the above strategies. It might therefore be the case that messages for practice lie at a more fundamental level, suggesting that teaching ought to provide opportunities to probe students’ developing understanding in a formative way, allowing subsequent teaching to be responsive to students’ learning. Insights about how to teach conceptual content in areas such as thermodynamics, chemical change, or plant nutrition will only arise through design research (Brown, 1992), where insights about domain-specific reasoning are drawn upon in the design of teaching materials, which are then tested and developed in a cyclical process (Lijnse, 1995). Such research does not in itself rest directly upon cognitive theory.
SCIENCE CONCEPT LEARNING AS ACQUISITION: SOCIOCULTURAL AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVES
At this point in the review we take a significant step in moving from approaches to characterizing science concept learning that focus on the individual, while recognizing the influence of the social context, to those that take the social context as an integral part of the learning process. In short, we move from cognitive to sociocultural and social constructivist approaches.
Vygotskian Perspective on Learning
A fundamental theoretical reference point for sociocultural and social constructivist perspectives on learning was provided by Lev Semenovich Vygotsky (Vygotsky, 1934/1987). Central to Vygotsky's views is the idea that learning involves a passage from social contexts to individual understanding (Vygotsky, 1978). Thus, we first meet new ideas (new to us, at least) in social situations where those ideas are rehearsed between people, drawing on a range of modes of communication, such as talk, gesture, writing, visual images, and action. Vygotsky referred to these interactions as existing on the social plane. The social plane may be constituted by a teacher working with a class of students in school; it may involve a parent explaining something to a child. As ideas are explored during the social event, each participant is able to reflect on and make individual sense of what is being communicated. The words, gestures, and images used in the social exchanges provide the very tools needed for individual thinking. Thus, there is a transition from social to individual planes, whereby the social tools for communication become internalized and provide the means for individual thinking. It is no coincidence that Vygotsky's seminal book is titled Thought and Language (Vygotsky, 1962).
The social origins of learning are thus a fundamental and integral part of Vygotsky's account, and it is the job of the teacher to make scientific knowledge available on the social plane of the classroom, supporting students as they try to make sense of it. Vygotsky brought the activities of teaching and learning together through his concept of the Zone of Proximal Development or ZPD (Vygotsky, 1978). The ZPD provides a measure of the difference between what the student can achieve working alone and what can be done with assistance. The key point here is that the student's learning is conceived of as being directly connected to, and dependent upon, the supporting activity of the teacher on the social plane.
As well as drawing attention to the social origins of learning, Vygotsky also emphasized the role of the individual in the learning process. The process of internalization, as envisaged by Vygotsky, does not involve the simple transfer of ways of talking and thinking from social to personal planes. There must always be a step of personal sense making. Leontiev (1981), one of Vygotsky's contemporaries, made the point in stating that “the process of internalisation is not the transferral of an external activity to a pre-existing ‘internal plane of consciousness.’ It is the process in which this plane is formed” (p. 57). That is, individual learners must make sense of the talk, which surrounds them on the social plane, relating that talk in a dialogic way to their existing ideas and ways of thinking.
In this respect Vygotskian theory shares common ground with the constructivist perspectives outlined earlier, which emphasize that learners cannot be passive recipients of knowledge. It is perhaps with this point in mind that those contemporary approaches to conceptualizing science learning, which draw on Vygotskian socio-cultural theory, are often referred to as social constructivist perspectives.
Social Constructivist Views of Learning Science
Vygotskian theory has been directly drawn upon by a number of researchers in their development of an account of science learning (see, for example, Driver et al., 1994; Hodson & Hodson, 1998; Howe, 1996; Leach & Scott, 2002, 2003; Mortimer & Scott, 2003; Scott, 1998; Wells, 1999).
Hodson and Hodson (1998), for example, outlined a social constructivist perspective on teaching and learning science, which was “based on the Vygotskian notion of enculturation” (p. 33). They argued that this perspective provides an alternative to personal constructivist accounts of learning (see also Osborne, 1996), which they claimed often imply “that students who construct their own understanding of the world are building scientific understanding” (p. 34; emphasis as in original). This point takes us back to the empiricist critique of constructivism outlined earlier. Thus Michael Matthews has argued that “constructivism is basically, and at best, a warmed up version of old-style empiricism” (Matthews, 1992, p. 5). One might question whether adherents to such an empiricist view of constructivism actually exist.
Central to the social constructivist response to charges of empiricism is the fundamental epistemological tenet that areas of knowledge such as science are developed within specific social communities. Thus, Driver et al. (1994) stated:
[I]f knowledge construction is seen solely as an individual process, then this is similar to what has traditionally been identified as discovery learning. If, however, learners are to be given access to the knowledge systems of science, the process of knowledge construction must go beyond personal empirical enquiry. Learners need to be given access not only to physical experiences but also to the concepts and models of conventional science. (p. 7)
The implications of this point are fundamental. The understandings of an individual, acquired, on the one hand, through the individual's interactions with the material world, and, on the other, through being introduced to the concepts and models of conventional science, are ontologically different. The concepts and models of conventional science embody practices, conventions, and modes of expression that are socially and institutionally agreed upon. Because scientific knowledge is the product of the scientific community, it cannot be learned through interactions with the material world alone. Such differences between empiricist interpretations of personal constructivism and social constructivist accounts of learning were discussed by Leach and Scott (2003).
Following the ideas set out in the preceding sections, social constructivist accounts of learning can be deemed to be “social” in nature on two counts: first, in the sense of specifying the social origins of learning, through the interactions of the social plane, and second in recognizing the social context of the scientific community for the development of scientific knowledge.
Learning Science as Learning the Social Language of Science
The view of scientific knowledge as a product of the scientific community maps onto Bakhtin's notion of social languages. For Bakhtin, a social language is “a discourse peculiar to a specific stratum of society (professional, age group etc.) within a given system at a given time” (Bakhtin, 1934/1981, p. 430). Thus science can be construed as the social language that has been developed within the scientific community. It is based on specific concepts such as energy, mass, and entropy; it involves the development of models that provide a simplified account of phenomena in the natural world; and it is characterized by key epistemological features such as the development of theories, which can be generally applied to a whole range of phenomena and situations. The social language of science is clearly different from that of geography or economics or literary criticism. Furthermore, the science that is taught in school focuses on particular concepts and models and is subject to social and political pressures, which are quite different from those of professional science (Tiberghien, 2000). From this point of view, learning science involves learning the social language of “school science” (Leach & Scott, 2002; Mortimer & Scott, 2003; see also Chapter 3, this volume).
James Wertsch (1991) suggested that the different social languages that we learn constitute the “tools” of a “mediational tool kit,” which can be called upon for talking and thinking as the context demands. Furthermore, Wertsch suggested that “children do not stop using perspectives grounded in everyday concepts and questions after they master these [scientific] forms of discourse” (1991, p. 118). Thus, everyday, or spontaneous (Vygotsky, 1934/1987), ways of talking and thinking constitute an “everyday social language.” Wertsch saw the learner developing disciplinary social languages alongside these everyday ways of talking and thinking. As such, this sociocultural perspective on learning clearly involves a process of conceptual addition (as introduced in the earlier section on cognitive science approaches) rather than replacement.
Learning as Conceptual Addition/Replacement
This formulation of learning in terms of conceptual addition and replacement is rather more complex than these simple labels might suggest. For example, can it be the case that, in conceptual addition, everyday knowledge is left intact as the learner develops a new point of view based on a particular social language, such as school science?
There is a certain ambiguity in Vygotsky's (1987) views on the possible outcome of the learning process. In some cases he seemed to suggest that scientific perspectives (Vygotsky actually uses the term scientific in referring to disciplinary knowledge, which includes the natural sciences) are likely to transform everyday views: “The formal discipline of studying scientific concepts is manifested in the complete restructuring of the child's spontaneous concepts. This is why the scientific concept is of such extraordinary importance for the history of the child's mental development” (p. 236).
Elsewhere, Vygotsky suggested that even with the emergence of scientific concepts, people continue to have access to everyday concepts, which they often employ:
A child who has mastered the higher forms of thinking, a child who has mastered concepts, does not part with the more elementary forms of thinking. In quantitative terms these more elementary forms continue to predominate in many domains for a long time. As we noted earlier, even adults often fail to think in concepts. The adult's thinking is often carried out on the level of complexes, sometimes sinks to even more primitive levels. (p. 160)
So, we have a picture of scientific knowledge transforming everyday thinking on the one hand and everyday or elementary thinking being left behind on the other. It might be the case that the outcome of this meeting of social languages (everyday and school science) depends on the context of learning. For example, it might be argued that coming to understand a fundamental scientific principle such as the “conservation of substance” is likely to transform the thinking of the individual. It is difficult to believe that the learner will consciously revert to being a nonconserver and talk about simple everyday events in such a way (being prepared to accept, for example, that salt actually does disappear on dissolving in water). On the other hand, as one learns about air pressure, it is unlikely that air pressure explanations will replace everyday talk in terms of “sucking.” Here it is likely that the individual will move between the two forms of explanation according to the perceived context of activity and application. Joan Solomon made a seminal contribution to the development of this perspective in science education with her work on “how children think in two domains” (see Solomon, 1983).
This general idea of a heterogeneity in ways of thinking (see Bachelard, 1940/ 1968; Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Tulviste, 1988/1991) has been developed in the context of science education in terms of a conceptual profile (Mortimer, 1995, 1998). The conceptual profile acknowledges the coexistence, for the individual, of different ways of conceptualizing physical phenomena in science. These different ways can range from approaches based on everyday knowledge (which might be informed by the immediate sense perception of the actual phenomenon) to sophisticated scientific ways (which might represent reality in purely symbolic models) and constitute different zones of an individual person's conceptual profile. As such, science learning can be characterized in terms of extending the zones of the individual learner's conceptual profile.
Alternative Conceptions and Everyday Social Language
The sociocultural view of learning offers an interesting perspective on the origins and status of alternative conceptions or misconceptions. From the sociocultural point of view, an alternative conception, such as the idea of a plant drawing its food from the soil, is representative of an everyday way of talking and thinking about plants. This is the way in which ordinary people talk about such things, and in this respect there is a very real sense in which the scientific point of view (based on the concept of photosynthesis) offers the alternative perspective. Viewed in this way, it is hardly surprising that the alternative conceptions or misconceptions identified by the science education community are “robust” and “difficult to change.” These are not the ephemeral outcomes of the solitary musings of children trying to make sense of the natural world around them, but the tools of an everyday language that continuously acts to socially define, and reinforce, our ways of talking and thinking.
Social Constructivist Approaches: Summary and Implications
The following insights about science concept learning are common to social constructivist perspectives:
- Learning scientific knowledge involves a passage from social to personal planes.
- The process of learning is consequent upon individual sense-making by the learner.
- Learning is mediated by various semiotic resources, the most important of which is language.
- Learning science involves learning the social language of the scientific community, which must be introduced to the learner by a teacher or some other knowledgeable figure.
What perspective do these distinctive aspects of the social constructivist perspective take us to that is different from the interests and outcomes of the cognitive viewpoint? The most obvious development has been the increased attention, during the late 1980s and 1990s, to the role of the teacher and the ways in which teachers guide the discourse of the classroom to support the introduction of scientific knowledge and scientific ways of explaining (Edwards & Mercer, 1987; Mortimer & Scott, 2003; Ogborn, Kress, Martins, & McGillicuddy, 1996; Scott, 1998; van Zee & Minstrell, 1997). Through this kind of work, we have a much better grasp of the ways in which teachers make scientific knowledge available on the social plane of the classroom.
Whereas these approaches to analyzing teacher talk have been fruitful, we are less aware of work, informed by social constructivist perspectives, that addresses the issue of designing science instruction (see, for example, Hodson & Hodson, 1998; Leach & Scott, 2002). It also seems to be the case that the step of individual sense making, or internalization, has been given less attention, both theoretically and empirically in social constructivist studies.
And what about Alice and her learning the concept of energy? According to these views, Alice is learning a new social language, a new way of talking and thinking about the world. If some of the scientific ideas “that energy is not used up” appear implausible, it is because they are in relation to everyday ways of thinking. The obvious way to address this point is for the teacher to make clear that what is on offer is a new and powerful way of thinking and talking about the natural world—the scientific point of view. Furthermore, learning a scientific account of energy must involve an authoritative introduction of ideas by the teacher. Thereafter, Alice and her fellow students need the opportunity to talk and think with those conceptual tools for themselves.
SCIENCE CONCEPT LEARNING AS PARTICIPATION
In this final section of the review we take the step from approaches to conceptualizing science concept learning that are based on acquisition to those that entail some form of participation.
Situated Cognition
The metaphor of learning as participation has largely arisen through a perspective on learning known as situated cognition (see, for example, Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Rogoff, 1990).
The pioneering work in this field focused on the use of mathematics in the workplace and in day-to-day life. For example, Scribner (1984) analyzed the arithmetical practices of people as they worked in a dairy factory, and Lave (1988) focused on the use of arithmetic in everyday shopping. These studies and others (see Hennessy, 1993, for a comprehensive review) have identified forms of arithmetic that are radically different from those taught in school. The skilled users of these everyday forms of arithmetic vary their problem-solving approaches depending on the specific situation, and problems that appear to be structurally identical are solved with different strategies. In this sense, the strategies are seen to be directly linked to context and thereby situated in nature.
According to the situated cognition perspective, learning is seen as a process of enculturation, or participation in socially organized practices, through which specialized skills are developed by learners as they engage in an apprenticeship in thinking (Rogoff, 1990) or in legitimate peripheral participation (Lave & Wenger, 1991). According to Collins, Brown, and Newman (1989), the key components of the apprenticeship process include modeling, coaching, scaffolding, fading, and encouraging learners to reflect on their own problem-solving strategies. This apprenticeship leads to the learner becoming involved in the authentic practices of a “community of practice” (Lave and Wenger, 1991). Brown, Collins, and Duguid (1989) argued: “Unfortunately, students are too often asked to use the tools of a discipline without being able to adopt its culture. To learn to use tools as practitioners use them, a student, like an apprentice, must enter that community and its culture” (p. 33). Roth (1995a) suggested that authentic practices involve activities “which have a large degree of resemblance with the activities in which core members of a community actually engage” (p. 29).
In the context of education, situated cognition perspectives have received a lot of attention, particularly in North America and particularly in relation to mathematics education (see, for example, Cobb, Wood, & Yackel, 1991; Cobb & Yackel, 1996; Lampert, 1990). According to Cobb and Bowers (1999), “A situated perspective on the mathematics classroom sees individual students as participating in and contributing to the development of the mathematical practices established by the classroom community” (p. 5).
Situated perspectives on learning have also been drawn upon as part of a theoretical justification for “inquiry-based” approaches to science teaching and learning (see, for example, Metz, 1998; Roth, 1995b). Roth (1995a) suggested that “situated learning emphasizes learning through the engagement in authentic activities” (p. 29). He explained his use of the term “authentic” by suggesting that in classrooms focused on scientific activities, the students would (a) learn in contexts constituted in part by ill-defined problems; (b) experience uncertainties, ambiguities, and the social nature of scientific work and knowledge; (c) engage in learning (curriculum) that is predicated on, and driven by, their current knowledge state; (d) experience themselves as part of communities of inquiry in which knowledge, practices, resources, and discourse are shared; and (e) participate in classroom communities, in which they can draw on the expertise of more knowledgeable others (Roth, 1995a, p. 29; see also Wells, 1999).
Drawing explicitly upon these ideas, science instruction has been planned and implemented as the enculturation of students into practices such as field ecology (e.g., Roth & Bowen, 1995), environmental activism (e.g., Roth & Désautels, 2002), and basic scientific research (e.g., Ryder, Leach, & Driver, 1999). Although the practices described in these studies can be argued to be authentic in the sense that they refer to situations in which science is actually used, it is more difficult to argue that they are closely related to the everyday experience of most science learners. Furthermore, the authors’ analyses of teaching focus more upon students’ learning about various practices that involve science (the use of instrumentation and specific technical procedures, the construction of arguments, the social relationships of various communities) than upon the development of conceptual understanding by students.
Learning Science, Learning to Talk Science
Lemke (1990) offered a different perspective on learning science through participation in his book, Talking Science: Language, Learning and Values. This “social semiotic” approach has been highly influential in drawing attention to the fundamental importance of language in science learning. The basic thesis that Lemke proposed is that learning science involves learning to talk science: “it means learning to communicate in the language of science and act as a member of the community of people who do so” (p. 1). Lemke questioned the value of cognitive theories of concept use based on mental processes “which we know nothing about” and suggested that “we may as well cut out the ‘middleman’ of mental concepts, and simply analyse conceptual systems in terms of the thematic patterns of language use and other forms of meaningful human action” (p. 122). Consistent with this point of view, Lemke suggested that scientific reasoning is learned “by talking to other members of our community, we practice it by talking to others, and we use it in talking to them, in talking to ourselves, and in writing and other forms of more complex activity (e.g., problem-solving, experimenting)” (p. 122; see also Chapter 3, this volume, for more on language and science learning).
Multimodality: Extending Beyond Language
Although science classrooms are filled with the voices of teacher and students, it is clear that communication and learning in the classroom are achieved by more than just linguistic tools. Kress, Jewitt, Ogborn, and Tsatsarelis (2001) set out an approach to analyzing science teaching and learning, “in which the multiplicity of modes of communication that are active in the classroom are given equally serious attention” (p. 1). Through this “multimodal” approach, Kress et al. were able to demonstrate how the meaning of what is spoken or written does not reside purely in language, by focusing on the ways in which teacher and students use a variety of semiotic modes, “actional, visual and linguistic resources” (p. 33), to represent and communicate ideas. One of their examples offers a detailed and vivid illustration of how a teacher orchestrates a range of modes of communication to introduce the idea of blood circulation. The image that sticks in the mind is the teacher moving fluently between a diagram on the board, a model of the human body, and his own body, gesturing toward each as he develops the verbal scientific narrative (see also Scott & Jewitt, 2003).
This multimodal account of learning sits firmly in the participation camp. “We believe that ‘acquisition’ is an inappropriate metaphor to describe the processes of learning: it implies a stable system which is statically acquired by an individual” (Kress et al., 2001, p. 28). Rather, learning is presented as a process of transformation in which “students are involved in the active ‘remaking’ of teachers’ (and others’) signs” (p. 27). In other words, learning involves the students in making sense of (and thereby transforming) the multimodal events that are unfolding around them in the science classroom.
In his more recent work, Lemke has developed the social semiotics perspective introduced in Talking Science, along similar multimodal lines, to investigate “how we make meaning using the cultural resources of systems of words, images, symbols and actions” (Lemke, 2003, “Languages and Concepts in Science” section). As part of this analysis, Lemke made the important point not only that it is the communicative activities of teacher and students in the classroom that are multimodal in character, but that science itself also involves the use of multiple semiotic systems: “Science does not speak of the world in the language of words alone, and in many cases it simply cannot do so. The natural language of science is a synergistic integration of words, diagrams, pictures, graphs, maps, equations, tables, charts, and other forms of visual and mathematical expression” (p. 3).
Science thus consists of: “the languages of visual representation, the languages of mathematical symbolism, and the languages of experimental operations” (p. 3). Following this perspective, Lemke argued that learning science must involve developing the ability “to use all of these languages in meaningful and appropriate ways, and, above all, to be able to functionally integrate them in the conduct of scientific activity” (p. 3).
Participative Approaches: Summary and Implications
The following insights about learning are common to the participative approaches outlined above:
- Learning is seen as a process of developing participation in the practices of a particular community.
- The learner takes on the role of apprentice, whereas the teacher is seen as an expert participant.
- That which is to be learned involves some aspect of practice or discourse.
Perhaps the biggest question to be raised in relation to the participative approaches concerns the issue of subject matter and the very aims of science education. For example, what does it mean to suggest that learning science should involve “participation in the practices of a scientific community“? What does it mean to suggest that students should “engage in the authentic practices of science“? To what extent is it possible to reconfigure the science classroom as a seat of authentic scientific practices? Is it reasonable to expect that the teacher can act as an expert practitioner within this scientific community of the classroom? What would be the aims of such an approach to science education? What would be learned?
Of course, we have already referred to examples of classroom practice where these kinds of questions have been addressed; it is clear that the kinds of investigative or inquiry-based activity suggested offer workable possibilities. But what about Alice and her quest to understand the scientific concept of energy? It stretches faith in participative methods to suggest that learning scientific concepts, the tools of science, might best be achieved through investigative methods. Here the social constructivist perspective seems to offer a more plausible and helpful way of framing possible instructional approaches.
WHAT CAN WE SAY ABOUT SCIENCE CONCEPT LEARNING IN CLASSROOM SETTINGS?
We began this chapter with a brief sketch of one student, Alice, and her learning of the scientific account of energy during science lessons in school. We return to that scenario, for a final time, to consider the ways in which the different approaches to viewing science concept learning might be drawn upon to illuminate such a teaching and learning event, addressing some of the questions listed in the introduction to the chapter. Our view is that, given the complexity of what goes on in classrooms as students learn science, it is unrealistic to expect that one “grand” theory might capture all of the activity. In this respect we follow the lead of Sfard (1998) and others (see, for example, Mayer, 2002) in drawing upon what might be regarded as complementary perspectives on learning.
As a starting point, we take the social constructivist perspective, which we believe constitutes a helpful framing or “orienting” (Green, Dixon, & Gomes, 2003) theory in bringing together the social context for learning with the individual student's response. Here the teacher occupies the pivotal role, between culture and students, in introducing the scientific social language. Given this overall framing, it is clear that learning scientific concepts is driven by teaching and that the students must engage in the act of personal sense-making during internalization.
Accepting the point of view that learning science involves learning the social language of “school science,” a legitimate question to ask is, why can learning some parts of science prove to be so difficult? Why is it, for example, that Alice struggled to come to terms with the school science account of “energy.” Why is it that the school science view often appears implausible to the learner, even if it is intelligible (Posner et al., 1982)? How can we develop and extend our orienting theoretical framework to address these questions?
One response relates to differences in social languages and is based on the idea that where there are significant differences between school science and everyday accounts of a particular phenomenon, greater “learning demands” (Leach & Scott, 2002) are created for the student. How might such learning demands be appraised? Three possible ways in which differences between everyday and school science perspectives might arise have been identified (Leach & Scott). These relate to differences in the conceptual tools used, differences in the epistemological underpinning of those conceptual tools, and differences in the ontology on which those conceptual tools are based.
For example, in relation to plant nutrition, students commonly draw upon everyday notions of food as something that is ingested, in contrast to scientific accounts, which describe the synthesis of complex organic molecules within plants, from simple, inorganic precursors. In the case of energy, the scientific concept is essentially a mathematical accounting device (which can be used to predict the limits of possible outcomes to physical events), whereas the everyday concept is likely to involve references to human activity and notions of energy as something that “makes things happen.”
Other differences relate to the epistemological underpinning of the conceptual tools used. Thus, the ways of generating explanations using scientific models and theories that are taken for granted in school science are not part of the everyday social language of many learners (Driver, Leach, Millar, & Scott, 1996; Leach, Driver, Scott, & Wood-Robinson, 1996; Vosniadou, 1994). Whereas in scientific social languages, great importance is attached to developing a small number of models and theories, which can be generally applied to as broad a range of phenomena as possible, the same is not true for everyday social languages. Thus, in science, energy is an absolutely central concept, simply because it offers a generalizable way of thinking about virtually any phenomenon. In everyday contexts, where there is not the same attention to generalizability; the term energy might be used with different meanings in different contexts.
Learning demands may also result from differences in the ontology of the conceptual tools used (Chi, 1992; Chi, Slotta, & de Leeuw, 1994; Leach et al., 1996; Vosniadou, 1994). Thus, entities that are taken for granted as having a real existence in the realm of school science may not be similarly referred to in the everyday language of students. For example, there is evidence that many lower secondary school students learning about matter cycling in ecosystems do not think about atmospheric gases as a potential source of matter for the chemical processes of ecological systems (Leach et al.). There is a learning issue here that relates to the students’ basic commitments about the nature of matter—initially they do not consider gases to be substantive. With regard to the energy example, in scientific social languages energy is regarded as an abstract mathematical device, whereas in everyday contexts it is often referred to as being substantial in nature: Coal contains energy; I've run out of energy.
From this point of view, learning science involves coming to terms with the conceptual tools and associated epistemology and ontology of the scientific social language. If the differences between scientific and everyday ways of reasoning are great, then the topic in question appears difficult to learn (and to teach). The key point here is that the concept of learning demand is framed in terms of the differences between social languages and draws on aspects of the “individual cognition” literature in identifying the epistemological and ontological aspects of learning demand.
In the cognitive literature, ontological recategorization (for example) is presented as a mental process, possibly as a psychological barrier to learning a specific science concept. The account of ontological barriers to successful learning presented here, however, begins by recognizing that ontological differences exist between the social languages of everyday talk and school science. Any ontological re-categorization required of learners therefore has its origins in social language, and we can begin to address these through systematic teaching.
One might argue that all of this adds up to the same thing, and in a sense it does. The systematic teaching still requires individual cognitive effort by the student if learning is to take place. Nevertheless, it might be helpful in thinking about teaching and learning science in classroom settings, to cast the issue in terms of the aspects of learning demand to be worked on by teacher and students. In this way, there is greater clarity about what it is that needs to be taught and learned in any topic area of school science.
This realization of what it is is extended still further by Lemke's (2003) social semiotic analysis. As outlined earlier, Lemke emphasized that learning school science involves developing the ability to integrate and use all of the semiotic resources of science, pulling together the languages of visual representation, mathematical symbolism, and experimental operations. Lemke was absolutely clear in stating that it is the responsibility of the teacher to show students “how to move back and forth among the different mathematical, visual, and operational representations” (p. 5).
All of these preceding points relate to achieving greater clarity about what it is that needs to be taught if students are to come to understand and to be able to use the social language of science with its distinctive conceptual tools, epistemological and ontological framing, and range of semiotic resources. Within this account, there are also half-exposed hints about the kinds of instructional approaches that might be taken in addressing these learning targets. There is clearly a central role for the teacher in introducing these new conceptual tools and helping the students to make links to their existing ways of thinking. This communicative aspect of the teaching role, focusing on both language-based and broader multimodal approaches, has been developed in detail elsewhere (Kress et al., 2001; Lemke, 1990; Mortimer & Scott, 2003; Ogborn et al., 1996; Scott, 1998). It must also be a priority for the students to begin to use these ideas for themselves and to start talking and thinking with the scientific social language(s) if they are to engage with them meaningfully.
In these ways, we can see how Sfard's conclusion that “one metaphor is not enough” (p. 10) might be addressed, in the context of teaching and learning science contexts, as elements of theory are drawn on from the camps of both acquisition and participation.
LOOKING AHEAD: FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
One measure of the extent to which science education research can be regarded as a progressive field of activity concerns the impact of that research on practice (see Fensham, 2004). The picture that is painted in this review points to areas of research on science concept learning where our knowledge is extensive. Thus, as a community, we are familiar with students’ typical alternative conceptions in a wide range of science topic areas; we are able to identify the main barriers to conceptual learning as scientific ideas are introduced against a backdrop of everyday ways of talking and thinking; we are aware of the ways in which learning involves both engaging in the social contexts of the classroom and steps of personal meaning making. The list can be further developed and, given the relatively short history of research in science education, is impressive in its extent. This body of knowledge is both broad and reliable and is based upon aspects of theory along with extensive empirical studies.
What remains far more problematic concerns the instructional approaches that might be taken to advance that learning. Put briefly, science education researchers are currently in the position where we can point with confidence to the likely conceptual starting points and challenges for students in any area of science learning, but we have rather less to say about how to shape instruction in order to help students come to terms with the scientific point of view. The challenge remains one of crossing the bridge from our insights on learning to making the link to reliable approaches to instruction.
Some argue that teaching is an idiosyncratic, highly personalised activity such that the very notions of best practice or an optimal instructional approach do not make sense. Although it is clear that teaching is a responsive activity and that to an extent it must therefore depend upon the circumstances prevailing in specific contexts (this class of children, at this time of the week, in this particular school, with this teacher), it might still be argued that some instructional approaches are likely to be more effective than others in supporting student learning. Why should this be the case? Possibly because the particular instructional approach is tightly linked to clear teaching objectives, or involves a motivating activity for the students, or challenges students’ thinking in an engaging way, or allows students the opportunity to articulate their developing understandings.
Following this line of argument, the central challenge for science education researchers remains one of building upon insights about learning to develop robust guidelines (both science domain specific and general) to support instructional design. If such research activity is to have an impact upon practice in schools, then it needs to engage with the professional knowledge and expertise of practicing teachers and their priorities for professional development. This is a substantial project that has as its ultimate aim the exciting prospect of allowing students such as Alice to develop deeper insights into the power and elegance of scientific knowledge.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thanks to Michael Beeth and Beverly Bell, who reviewed this chapter.
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1. Intelligence organizes the world by organizing itself.