General Aspects of Culture Change

Culture as an equilibrium. A culture is not a painted picture—it is a living process, composed of countless social interactions. Like a river whose form and velocity are determined by the balance of those forces that tend to make the water flow faster, and the friction that tends to make the water flow more slowly —the cultural pattern of a people at a given time is maintained by a balance of counteracting forces. The study of cultures on a smaller scale indicates that, for instance, the speed of production or other aspects of a factory has to be understood as an equilibrium, or more precisely, as an ‘equilibrium in movement.’

Once a given level is established, certain self-regulatory processes come into function which tend to keep the group life on that level. One speaks of “work habits,” “established customs,” the “accepted way of doing things.” Special occasions may bring about a momentary rise of production, a festival may create for a day or two a different social atmosphere between management and workers, but quickly the effect of the “shot in the arm” will fade out and the basic constellation of forces will re-establish the old forms of everyday living.

The general problem, therefore, of changing the social atmosphere of a factory or of German culture can be formulated somewhat more precisely in this way: How can a situation be brought about which would permanently change the level on which the counteracting forces find their quasi-stationary equilibrium?

Democratic Leadership

In all of the experiments mentioned, the problem of leadership plays an important role. As the earlier experiments show…a group atmosphere can be changed radically in a relatively short time by introducing new leadership techniques…

Autocratic and democratic leadership consists of playing a certain role. These roles of the leader cannot be carried through without the followers playing certain complementary roles, namely, those of an autocratic or a democratic follower. Educating a group of people in democracy or re-educating them from either autocracy or laissez-faire cannot be accomplished by a passive behavior of the democratic leader. It is a fallacy to assume that individuals, if left alone, will form themselves naturally into democratic groups—it is much more likely that chaos or a primitive pattern of organization through autocratic dominance will result. Establishing democracy in a group implies an active education. The democratic follower has to learn to play a role which implies, among other points, a fair share of responsibility toward the group and a sensitivity to other people’s feelings. Sometimes, particularly in the beginning of the process of re-education, individuals may have to be made aware in a rather forceful manner of the two-way interdependence which exists between themselves and others within a democratic group. To create such a change the leader has to be in power and has to be able to hold his power. As the followers learn democracy, other aspects of the democratic leader’s power and function become prevalent.

What holds for the education of democratic followers holds true also for the education of democratic leaders. In fact, it seems to be the same process through which persons learn to play either of these roles, and it seems that both roles have to be learned if either one is to be played well.

1. It is important to realize that democratic behavior cannot be learned by autocratic means. This does not mean that democratic education or democratic leadership has to diminish the power aspect of group organization in a way which would place the group life on the laissez-faire point of the triangle. Efficient democracy means organization, but it means organization and leadership on different principles than autocracy.

These principles might be clarified by lectures, but they can be learned, finally, only by democratic living. The ‘training on the job’ of the democratic leaders…is but one example for the fact that teaching democracy presupposes the establishing of a democratic atmosphere (my bolding).

In Lewinian planned change, people in positions of power must be engaged in the change, whether within organizations such as Harwood, or in community change such as in Connecticut (where business leaders and newspaper editors were invited into the process). To do so, individuals in positions of power need “on the job training” in effective leading and following. The restraining force is not hierarchy. The restraining force in most systems is lack of clarity about effective authority through democratic principles, and an over-abundance of autocratic or laissez-faire leadership (and followership). Power is part of the system, and must be part of the change or it will surely become a restraining force.

White and Lippitt conclude that, “The most efficient procedure does appear to be, as a rule, democracy—if democracy is sharply differentiated from laissez-faire, with clear acceptance not only of active leadership but also of the firm use of authority when firmness is called for, and explicit delegation of authority to certain individuals when such delegation is appropriate. A leader or boss must be prepared at one time to exert authority so broadly and energetically that his opponents are sure to call him autocratic, and at other times to let other people take all the initiative…or all the glory. A parent, teacher, or employer who wants to be democratic and also efficient should continually seek to broaden the base of participation in decision making, whenever participation is really functional and not too time consuming; yet they should usually (not always) exert active leadership and they should unhesitatingly, without the slightest feeling of guilt, use their natural authority whenever the situation calls for firm control or for swift, decisive coordinated action (White and Lippitt, 1960, p292).”

With leadership comes the force field created by goal clarity (or the lack of it). Goal clarity is a key driving or restraining force. On the extreme end of clarity, Lewin witnessed the effect of a true “burning platform” in the midst of his work at Harwood:

“This chapter was written before December 7, 1941; now we are at war. The effect on the morale of the country has been immediate and striking—a circumstance which bears out some of the points we have discussed…

Before December 7, what was a realistic outlook for one individual was doubted by a second and ridiculed as impossible by a third. Now the situation has been clarified. Countless conflicts, whether among factions in the population or within each individual himself, have ceased now that the major aspects of the time perspectives are definitely set.

Being within this new and definite situation means that certain basic goals and necessary actions are “given.” In such a situation no special effort is required to keep morale high. The very combination of a definite objective, the belief in final success, and the realistic facing of great difficulties is high morale. The individual who makes extreme efforts and accepts great risks for worth-while goals does not feel that he is making a sacrifice instead, he merely feels that he is acting naturally (Lewin, 1942, 1997, p92).”

Of course, not allgoals areas clear and inspiring as defending a nation from attack and defeating totalitarianism, nor do they need to be. Over-hyping the current needs of an organization creates a counterforce of skepticism and mistrust. Like Chicken Little, when the organization truly needs extraordinary focus and effort, credibility may be hard to achieve. On the other hand, a lack of sensible yet challenging goals is like a petri dish for the restraining forces of lethargy, lack of focus, and low morale. During times of relative stability and during times of challenge goals must be consistently set that are both challenging and achievable if goal clarity is to be leveraged as a driving force for higher productivity and morale.

“One aspect of time perspective which is essential for morale is realism. Here again we encounter the same paradox as that underlying productivity: one criterion of morale is the height of the goal level which the individual is ready to accept seriously. For high morale, the objective to be reached will represent a great step forward from the present state of affairs…Morale demands both a goal sufficiently above the present state of affairs, and an effort to reach the distant goal through actions planned with sufficient realism to promise an actual step forward. One might say that this paradox—to be realistic, and at the same time be guided by high goals—lies at the heart of the problem of morale, at least as far as time perspective is concerned (my bolding) (Lewin, 1942, 1997, p90).”

This brings us back to the application of democratic principles and the aforementioned group decision as a change procedure. Under Lewin’s guidance, groups at Harwood influenced their own production rates. This did not occur in a vacuum of course. If the groups had set too low a rate, management have to intervene. Group members understand these dynamics, and are much more likely to stretch themselves than to advocate for a low level of performance.

On a related note, while reflecting on Harwood, Lewin notes that discussion without decision does not have nearly the impact on productivity and morale as discussion and decision:

“…it is one thing to be motivated, another to transform motivation into concrete goals and into stabilizing these goals in a way which would carry the individual through to the actual completion of the work. Controlled experiments under comparable conditions show that a discussion without decision did not lead to a parallel increase in production. There are indications that, even if the discussion leads to the general decision of raising production without setting definite production goals to be reached in a definite time, the effect is much less marked (Lewin, 1944, 1999, p288).”

Lewin’s action research clearly supported the effectiveness of group decision, as described in the following excerpt from The Dynamics of Group Action (Lewin, 1944, 1999, p287):

Discussion, Decision, and Action

In school as well as in industry, certain standards exist concerning the rate of learning or production. These standards are set up by the teacher or the management and are upheld by these authorities with a certain amount of pressure. It is assumed that relaxing the standards will slow down the work of the group members.

This assumption is probably true, but it has little to do with the problem of democracy. Lowering the standards or relaxing the pressure to keep up the standards in an autocratic atmosphere means shifting to a softer form of autocracy… It does not mean a shift in the direction of democracy. Such a shift would involve…a shift from imposed goals to goals which the group has set for itself.

It is by no means certain that production goals set for themselves by work teams…would be higher than those ordered by an authority. However, it is by no means certain that they would be lower…

Experiments in industry under controlled conditions show a substantial permanent increase of production created in a short time by certain methods of ‘team decision,’ an increase in production that was not accomplished by many months of the usual factory pressure (my bolding).

The following graphic (Figure 11.1) supports the power of group decision making:

Figure 11.1
Effect of group decision…(Lewin, 1947, 1997, p320)

It is hard to imagine an approach to planned change that embodies more respect for the individual than Lewin’s methods. Leaders are not to be vilified…they are to be taught democratic principles. Workers, citizens, and students are to be engaged in dialogue and decision making. Lewin’s empathy and democratic values shone through in everything he did, inside and outside of industry. It is good fortune that the same values, applied with effective methodology, consistently lead to the best results.

A nagging problem at Harwood offers another example. Supervisors were frustrated when experienced workers lost productivity and morale following transfers to new job assignments. For years the problem was interpreted primarily as one of individual attitude and “pressure” was applied with predictably miserable results (high tension, low productivity and moral, scapegoating). Lewin assessed the problem with his usual clarity and empathy, and to everyone’s relief, conditions improved dramatically:

“There are indications that the transfer in these cases is indeed accompanied by a marked lowering of work morale in the sense of drive to higher production. If this interpretation is correct, learning after transfer should be slow, and indeed it is astonishingly slow. Although these workers are familiar with the machines, their speed improves so slowly that it is more profitable for the factory to hire new workers than to change the job of experienced workers.

Probably, several factors combine to decrease the force …after transfer: a worker in good standing who is proud of his achievement is thrown back into a state of low working status. This is likely to affect his morale and eagerness. The goal of working at a level ‘above standard’ has been a realistic possibility before transfer; now it is ‘too’ high, it is out of reach. The studies on level of aspiration have shown that under these circumstances a person tends to ‘give up.’ This would explain the decrease…After group decision the learning curve rises, probably because the setting up of new goals brings about a resultant force toward higher levels without which learning may not take place (Lewin, 1947, 1997, p324).”

Although it is not documented, one hopes that CEO Marrow heeded the message about not moving experienced workers needlessly (which would then require on-going group interventions). Many employers today move workers because they want them to be “multi-skilled,” and then are surprised when restraining forces impact their system in various ways.

The following case study, initiated to address conflict in a work group, nicely combines most of the elements of Lewin’s approach to organization development. He begins the story near the end:

The accomplishments thus far may be summarized as follows: The mechanic and the supervisor who were ready to leave are back in the plant. The perception of all three fighting parties—the mechanic, the supervisor and the most critical, active group, the operators—who had been preoccupied with the issue of the “lie” and prestige has been turned toward the objective difficulties of production. Without any direct contact between the three parties, it has been established that their views of the production difficulties agree to a reasonable extent. All individuals involved have freely and without pressure expressed their agreement to some future steps. All three parties are in good and friendly rapport with the psychologist.

The procedure of the psychologist is based on the hypothesis that the permanent conflict is at least partly the result of some faulty organization of production. Therefore, before a remedy can be found the production procedure has to be analyzed realistically and sufficiently deeply to lay open the source of the difficulty.

The group lowest in the factory hierarchy is made the foundation for the factfinding…because these operators are most immediately affected and should be most realistically aware of at least some aspects of the problem. Then too, since the operators have a lower position in the factory hierarchy any rule suggested by the authorities, or even a view presented by them as a “fact,” is likely to be felt by the operators as something of an imposition. To gain their wholehearted co-operation later on it seems best to start the detailed fact-finding here, and it is also necessary to have the first suggestions for the new rules of production worked out by this group.

Not all the operators but only those who did the most complaining were consulted. This seems strange if one considers that those operators who have less inclination for “trouble-making” are likely to give a more objective picture of the situation. The trouble-makers were made the cornerstone of the investigation since they are particularly important for the group dynamics in the factory.

Furthermore, if those operators who usually did not make trouble were to initiate a solution, the trouble-makers would probably resist, feeling that they had been first left out and later pushed into something.

The psychologist as leader of the group discussion presents the problem as an objective question of production procedure. The fact that he has no difficulty in holding the group’s attention on this aspect of the situation indicates that the preliminary interviews have set the stage for this perception (my bolding) (Lewin, 1944, 1997, p97).

So many pearls of wisdom—the engagement of “the group lowest in the factory hierarchy”—the engagement of the “trouble-makers”—Lewin was brilliant at turning restraining forces into driving forces. The final comment—“that the preliminary interviews have set the stage for this perception” —is another gem. I’m not sure how I learned it (probably from dad), but it is common practice for me to use preliminary interviews mostly to establish relationships and the beginnings of trust, and to begin influencing how the people I am serving think about the challenges they are facing. To only a small degree am I in the “expert mode,” i.e., there to gather information and adjust my basic “prescription.” My prescription already is that some form of democratic principles/action research is going to both address the presenting problem and help develop the organization. I am there primarily to connect and begin to teach a new social construction of reality. This is exactly how Lewin’s psychologist, Bavelas, begins:

“This attempt to change perception by an ‘action interview’ (as distinguished from a mere ‘fact-finding interview’) is one of the basic elements of treatment. By reorienting (the mechanic’s and the supervisor’s) perception from the field of personal emotional relationship to the same field of ‘objective’ facts, the life-spaces which guide the action of these persons have become more similar although the persons themselves are not yet aware of this similarity (my bolding) (Lewin, 1944, 1997 p97).”

Lewin continues: “Fact-finding in this method is consciously used as a first step of action. The psychologist’s or expert’s knowing the facts does not have any influence unless these data are ‘accepted as facts’ by the group members. Here lies a particular advantage of making the fact-finding a group endeavor. Coming together to discuss the facts and set up a plan is already an endeavor in co-operative action. It goes a long way to establish the atmosphere of co-operation, openness, and confidence toward which this procedure strives. Although the mechanic and the supervisor do not participate directly in the group discussion of the operators, we have seen that the psychologist was very careful to involve them actively in the total scheme of fact-finding and planning (my bolding) (Lewin, 1944, 1997, p104).”

Finally, the conflict is approached as a symptom of group dynamics, especially the field of forces pertaining to production:

“The realistic demands of production have to be satisfied in a way which conforms with the nature of group dynamics. To bring about a permanent solution it does not suffice to create amicable relations.

The conflict described arose out of an aspect of production where overlapping authorities existed in a cognitively unclear situation. The procedure is guided to an equal degree by the consideration of production and the problem of social relations. As to details, one might mention the following points. The factory work can be seen as a process in which the speed is determined by certain driving and restraining forces. The production process runs through certain ‘channels’ as determined by the physical and social setting, particularly by certain ‘rules’ and by the authorities in power (management). To increase production one can try to increase the driving forces by higher incentives or pressure, or try to weaken those forces that keep production down. The procedure described here follows the latter possibility. It tries to eliminate certain conflicts within the group and certain psychological forces acting on a key individual (the mechanic) which deter his efforts (my bolding) (Lewin, 1944, 1997, p102).”

By engaging the group in action research, production and morale increased, and tension around the presenting problem decreased to a level where it was no longer relevant because real problems of production that were increasing tension were addressed, while the social construction of reality had been simultaneously altered:

“It might be worthwhile to note that the original issue —namely, the lie and the resulting threat of quitting by the mechanic and the supervisor seems to have evaporated into thin air without ever having been treated directly. It seems that with a change in perception of the situation from that of a power problem to that of factory production, the lie issue, in the beginning a hard fact blocking smooth-running factory life, has lost the character of a ‘fact.’ This itself can be taken as a symptom of how deep and real the change of the perception and the psychological situation of all parties concerned has been (Lewin, 1944, 1997, p105).”

Using similar methods, I have seen similar changes time and again. Lewin didn’t try to get everyone to “get along.” Instead, he engaged the entire group in solving their common dilemmas of production. In the process, training on being more objective about work relationships eroded the strong judgments and feelings being held, while progress on production issues grounded in a real increase in the ability to influence built trust and improved morale.

In Frontiers in Group Dynamics, Lewin, again with clear non-blaming clarity, summarizes group dynamics at Harwood this way (Lewin, 1947, 1997, p319):

Production in a Factory

The output of a factory as a whole or of a work-team frequently shows a relatively constant level of output through an extended period of time. It can be viewed as a quasi-stationary equilibrium. An analysis of the relevant forces is of prime importance for understanding and planning changes.

One of the forces keeping production down is the strain of hard or fast work. There is an upper ceiling for human activity. For many types of work the force away from the strain… increases faster the closer one comes to the upper limit. The force field has probably a gradient similar to an exponential curve.

The common belief views the desire to make more money (fP, m) as the most important force toward higher production levels. To counter the gradient of the forces…away from fast work, various incentive systems are used which offer higher rates of pay above a certain standard.

Several reasons make it unlikely that the force toward greater output is actually proportional to the unit pay rate. An increase in earning a certain amount means quite different things to different people. Some factories which moved from a northern state to the South ten years ago found it impossible for years to reach a level of production which was at all comparable to that of northern workers. One of the reasons was the fact that for the rural southern girls the weekly pay was so much above previous living standards that they did not care to make more money even for a relatively small additional effort.

In teamwork one of the strongest forces is the desire to remain not too far above or below the rest of the group. This holds particularly between “parallel workers” or “friends” in an assembly line. An important force against increase of speed may be the fear that a temporary increase of speed would bring about pressure from the supervisor or foreman permanently to keep up the higher speed (my bolding).

In the following graphic (Figure 11.2), yet another group sets and achieves a higher standard, and then sustains it:

Figure 11.2
The effect of group decision…(Lewin, 1948, 1999, p283)

The same principles and methods apply to inter-group behavior (and pave the way for effective “whole system” interventions): “It seems to be impossible to predict group behavior without taking into account group goals, group standards, group values, and the way a group ‘sees’ its own situation and that of other groups. Group conflicts would have quite different solutions if the various groups concerned did not perceive differently the situation existing at a given time (Lewin, 1947, 1997, p308).” I’ll say more on cross-group and whole systems interventions in Chapter 13.

Finally, Lewin offers a word of caution to those who think one solution fits all (or that they can replicate his results without understanding his methods):

“One should be slow in generalizing experimental findings. Any type of organization like a factory, a business enterprise, a community center, a school system, or the Army has characteristics of its own. What democracy means technically has to be determined in each organization in line with its particular objective (my bolding) (Lewin, 1944, 1999, p290).”

Involving the people “locally” in doing their own action research is the best way to make that determination.

Let us turn now to a practitioner’s past, present, and future application of Lewinian methods of planned change.