Introduction

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The year 2007 was marked by the cyber-attacks against Estonia, and the wellpublicized waves of cyber-attacks against various State institutions across the world, often attributed to China and Russia. Following this, 2010 was marked by the Stuxnet worm attack on industrial infrastructures. Since then, a number of nations, led by the United States (US), have entered a new era in terms of their policies and strategies for security and national defense, integrating the cybernetic dimension. This can be seen in the publication of White Papers, national cyber-security strategies, military doctrines, the reorganization of players in cyber-security and the creation of cyber-defense units, both civilian and military (national cyber-security agencies, cyber-commands, etc.).

For nearly two decades prior to this turning point, theories and concepts, mainly American in origin, fueled debates about the informatization of armies, revolution in military affairs and the new techno-centric way of waging war. The first Gulf War was presented as the first war in this era of digital information. Since then, the thoughts and strategies developed by the US Department of Defense have been observed, analyzed, copied and adapted by various nations. Russia and above all China have made their presence felt as new major actors in cyber-conflict.

Following years of musings, costly programs and successive plans to improve cyber-security, the US came to a bitter realization: the security policies pursued up to that point had failed, not yielding the results expected (cyber-attacks were never ceasing to increase in number and were upsetting the stable functioning of the global economy). They no longer seemed capable of avoiding the worst, which is yet to come, in the form of attacks against vital, critical infrastructures that are essential to the nation.

Today, all States connected to cyberspace are concerned by the same questions, stakes, problems, challenges and difficulties. However, not all of them can pursue the same ambitions as the US or China – to develop both defensive and offensive capabilities, with equivalent means.

Yet when cyberspace is shared by all and international cooperation appears to be one of the options for dealing with common stakes in terms of security and defense, a place must be offered to the diversity of analyses.

In the West, most of the publications that dominate the field of cyber-security, cyber-defense, cyber-warfare or information warfare, are written in English – and they are mainly American in origin. We need only look at online library databases for proof of this.

Production is not monopolized by the US – merely dominated by it – and little room is left for international works that could offer other perspectives on these questions, which are increasingly a part of issues of security and defense the world over.

The structure of this book

The nine chapters of this book offer an analysis of the strategies and policies developed in Canada, Cuba, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Slovenia and South Africa (the chapters are presented in alphabetical order) in terms of cybersecurity and cyber-defense. They offer a key to the way in which these States interpret the concepts of cyber-warfare, information warfare, cyber-conflict, cyberattacks and cyber-threats. The chapters are drawn from multiple questions that integrate into the field of studies in international relations:

– Most states underline their dependence in terms of cyberspace (the dependence of society built on technology; dependence on the rest of the world by way of that space; mutual interdependence of their systems). How do States deal with the negative effects of that dependence, or get around it?

– What level of autonomy do States have in their strategic choices? To what degree are policies influenced, oriented, guided and determined by the international, geopolitical and economic environment, international alliances and the technical constraints peculiar to cyberspace?

– How efficient are cyber-security and cyber-defense policies? How can that efficiency be defined, measured, evaluated?

– Do these strategies succeed in dealing with all of the issues? Are strategies needed that break away from the traditional approach to problems of security and defense, or should they treat cyberspace like other conventional dimensions?

– What options are foreseeable in terms of security and defense? Should we focus on dealing with threats at the source; limiting the effects of attacks; reducing the scope of attacks; adopt a strictly defensive stance; or adopt an offensive stance? What impact does a nation's posture in terms of cyber-security and cyber-defense have on the international community (both allies and enemies alike)?

– Do cyber-defense policies take account of the stakes involved in international relations? For instance, is the security dilemma one of the factors restricting options in terms of cyber-defensive strategies?

– Is there a single mode of thinking in terms of cyber-security and defense the world over? Are all States driven to pursue the same objectives, deal with the same challenges, and apply the same solutions to problems that seem to arise in a similar way the world over? Is there a place for ‘national’ approaches?

– What are the factors that could favor a genuine absence of strategic diversity: the weight of the influence of the hegemonic American strategy? The constraints imposed by technologies, and consequently by the owners of those technologies?

– Does cyberspace tend to unify approaches, and impose immovable solutions? Can there truly be national approaches to cyber-security/cyber-defense?

– Can we identify significant differences or original aspects between the various approaches to cyber-security/cyber-defense?

– How do States manage to get around the constraints to impose their own vision of the treatment that can be afforded to cyberspace and its use?

– Not all States integrate the cybernetic dimension into their security/defense policies at the same rate: how can these differences be explained? Which variables lead States to integrate the cybernetic dimension, and which result in them rejecting or delaying it?

– What happens when concepts/theories that are American in origin, and applicable to an American-centered cyberspace (because of its infrastructure), meet States, modes of government, cultures, etc., which are different?

– Are there notable differences in the definitions of cyber-security, cyberdefense, cyber-warfare and information warfare? How do these concepts fit into the trajectories of the defense policies and strategies of the States examined herein? Has the relatively recent introduction of these questions into policies of national defense and security significantly altered these policies? Can we speak of a revolution in terms of security and defense policies, or of prolongation and continuity? Is cyberspace a central or peripheral factor in policies relating to security and defense?

– Do these States desire more international standardization and dependence in terms of international and supranational instances, to guarantee their cyber-defense, or, on the contrary, do they favor national initiatives? What place does the expression of sovereignty have?

These are only some of the questions to which we attempt to provide a certain degree of a response in this book.

Canada

The development of a cyber-security policy in Canada has clearly accelerated between 2001 and 2011. Throughout this period, the Canadian federal government's major concern in terms of national security related to the protection of the essential infrastructures. These infrastructures, particularly the computer networks of the different governments in Canada, are mutually interdependent to an increasing degree, but are also dependent on the country's other essential infrastructures. Hence, during the decade in question, we observe a raised awareness of the vulnerabilities this interdependence implies. Thus, computer security has become the main issue in trans-border security. The different versions of Canada's cybersecurity policy are aimed at reducing the scope of and the effects of potential cyberattacks and responding to them efficiently.

In 2010, the Canadian federal government published the National Strategy and Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure, and later the same year, Canada's Cyber Security Strategy. These two documents implement a plan to combat cyber-threats and protect Canada's cyber-systems.

Cuba

In Cuba, the political regime views cyberspace as a threat to its stability, believing that by way of the Internet, the country could fall victim to foreign influence, its subversive ideas and attempts at destabilization. Thus, cyberspace is not allowed to exist unless it defends the principles of the revolution. For this reason, a germ of cyberspace exists in this country, but is subjected to control, surveillance and strict regulation, the objective being to control the flow of information by controlling this tool.

Cuba has one of the world's lowest ratios of Internet users to head of population. The regime blames the US for this situation. Despite this, it is careful to control Internet access, to create national content, and to isolate its Internet users from the rest of the world.

France

In the chapter on France, we go back to the 19th Century to discover the origins of musings on the creation of a telecommunications space, the ancestor of today's cyberspace (still largely founded on the telephonic infrastructures of the last century), when visionaries imagined the outlines of what would become the Internet, and information technology (IT). This foray into the past lends itself to a reflection on the evolution of the concepts and their introduction into the areas of policies and strategies for national security and defense.

The chapter looks at the way in which France defines cyberspace, cyber-security, cyber-defense, the threat, information warfare, and information operations. What is France's view of the world, and of its challenges and threats? What are its responses to these threats, and how does it structure its security and defense in order to deal with these challenges?

Greece

Greece's geopolitical importance is such that the country's approach to information operations and cyber-warfare has a bearing in several international contexts, including maritime transportation, banking, energy, telecommunications, the Balkans, the Middle East, NATO and the European Union.

Although Greek conceptions of information operations and cyber-warfare are still emerging, it is safe to say that they will continue to be decisively shaped by the country's particular historical experiences and strategic concerns, particularly in relation to its geopolitical arch-rival, Turkey. The asymmetrical promise embedded in the concept of information warfare appeals to Greek defense planners, who seek ways of maintaining Greece's internal military equilibrium, combating the growing demographic gap between Greece and Turkey, and reinvigorating Greece's geopolitical dynamic without directly antagonizing the Turkish military.

These broader strategic parameters have been revised through the prism of several formative experiences in information operations, including – but not limited to – the Öcalan affair, the Vodafone wiretapping of 2004–2005, and the Ergenekon conspiracy. While damaging on a number of fronts in exposing substantial holes in Greece's defensive info-dominance, these experiences have also proved constructive in highlighting – even to non-experts – the urgent need to reinterpret Greece's traditional geopolitical concerns and strategic interests through the all-encompassing lens of the information society. These experiences have therefore helped make the country's decision-makers progressively more aware of the country's vulnerability to information operations.

Italy

After a brief introduction on information and cyber warfare, Chapter 5, “Moving toward an Italian Cyber Defense and Security Strategy”, analyzes the current Italian geo-political situation from a perspective comparing it with other countries, and the legal framework upon which Italy is constructing its cyber-security and cyberdefense strategy.

The active involvement of Italy in peacekeeping operations abroad, its role within NATO and its high dependence on information and communication technology systems and networks, make it particularly vulnerable to information and cyber-warfare. While Italy has successfully built up agencies and policies to tackle cybercrime and protect intellectual property rights, it is still at an early stage in developing its information and cyber-warfare strategy, as demonstrated by the fact that studies and conferences on the subject have only recently been delivered, the outcomes of which are presented.

This chapter then introduces the debate about the creation of a cyber-defense command and the other solutions put forward. It concludes by examining the necessity for a Cyber Security National Strategic Plan entailing an integrated and coordinated approach among key stakeholders. This should be achieved through the establishment of a one-stop coordination center for national cyber-security and defense.

Japan

The Constitution of 1947 forbade Japan from resorting to war to solve its international problems. Since then, Japan's defense policy has always been restricted by the conditions imposed by the Constitution and subjected to the conditions of the alliance with the US. However, in the past few decades, the international environment has changed: the emerging figure of China is exerting pressure in the Asia-Pacific region – economically, politically and militarily; North Korea, by way of its military saber-rattling, represents a significant threat to peace in the region, and in the world at large.

Japan has gradually regained its autonomy in terms of defense and now plays a role in maintaining regional and international peace. In 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan's rise to power marked an important turning point in the definition of political choices in terms of defense. A new strategy has been put forward, which for the first time includes cyberspace and the use of it in the field of defense policy and military doctrine. Does the introduction of the cyberspace dimension into strategy and doctrine constitute a major step in Japan's evolution? Does the strategy of cyber-defense alter the trajectory of Japan's defense policies? Possible answers to these questions are discussed.

Singapore

The Singaporean government officially treats information warfare in two ways.

First, acting upon the threat label of “cyber-warfare” – which encapsulates attacks by sources employing the World Wide Web and attacks by insiders with access to intranets – the government has created the Singapore Infocomm Technology Security Authority. This watchdog and strategic controlling outfit, housed in the Ministry of Home Affairs, is trying to engage private sector firms and individuals to collaborate with the government in establishing a joint Cyber Defender Program to defend against threats to the island state's highly globalized economic links with the world. This takes place against the background of a steep increase in the number of hacking and viral attacks against private sector corporations in the past three years. Whether this will be a foolproof territorial defense remains to be seen.

Second, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) largely subscribe to the Americanoriginated understanding of information warfare as a realm of military operations aimed at disrupting the enemy's decision-making capabilities while enhancing its own. However, the implementation of military informational measures is often subsumed to the rhetoric of general high-tech improvements. This sort of logic is typical of the militaries of developing countries aspiring to modernize by acquiring missiles and aircraft with offensive and defensive capabilities. This chapter will argue, however, that the Singaporean defense planners have creatively treated information warfare in three dimensions of capability expansion:

– redoubling their forces;

– generating asymmetrical advantages in operational transparency; and

– continually revitalizing existing conventional arms capabilities.

In short, the Singaporean military approach is not revolutionary but evolutionary in nature.

In summary, the approaches to both civilian cyber-warfare and military information warfare render the case of Singapore unique on the grounds of its division of focus, but the question of effectiveness, as for most nation-states, remains unanswered in this new realm of national defense.

Slovenia

The Republic of Slovenia is a small and relatively marginal country with its own language. The Slovenian information and communication technology infrastructure ranks amongst the most highly developed countries in the world. Slovenia is one of the 27 European Union Member States (EU-27) and a member of NATO, so it must act in the field of information and communication technology security in such a way as to meet its obligations to both organizations.

Beyond a commitment to fulfill its EU-27 and NATO obligations, unfortunately the Republic of Slovenia does not possess a clear strategy defining the objectives it needs to pursue to achieve sufficient information and communication security policies, and much less clear directions on how it will achieve these objectives. From most of the strategic documents adopted we can conclude that the problem of information and communication technology security in Slovenia is underestimated.

Besides the high cost, which is extremely difficult to justify, the main barrier to investment in information and communication technology security is the relatively high sense of security, which can be seen throughout Slovenian society. In almost all strategic documents, cyber-threats are only mentioned, mostly in the domain of cyber-crime. Defense against these threats is limited to general responses and intentions to design new strategies and new government bodies. At the present time, Slovenia is not adequately prepared for cyber-attacks, especially for advanced cyber-attacks on critical information and communication infrastructure.

South Africa

South Africa has the most developed communications infrastructure in Africa, and it is exhibiting rapid growth. This developed infrastructure necessitates the development of a national cyber-defense plan to protect it from potential attackers, which has been identified as an area of national strategic importance. The chapter on South Africa outlines and compares the national models and structure of information warfare with those of other nations, and the potential limitations of information warfare on the African continent.

South Africa is in the process of developing relevant legislation and policies for cyber-security, and the national stance and agencies involved in cyber-defense are described. The cyber-environment of Africa exhibits widespread vulnerabilities and the potential for exploitation in a cyber-warfare scenario. The cyber-environment on the continent is discussed, along with existing reports of cyber-conflict, and the authors' estimations of the threats and potential for future conflict in the cyberdomain are presented.

About the authors

The chapter on Canada is written by Hugo Loiseau and Lina Lemay.

Hugo Loiseau has held the post of professor at the School of Applied Politics at the University of Sherbrooke, Quebec, Canada, since 2004. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from that university. He also has a Masters in political science from Laval University, Quebec, Canada, where he obtained his doctorate in political sciences in 2006. He teaches and conducts research in the field of research methodology in political and social sciences, in the domain of military sociology and in studies on cyberspace. In addition, he is a specialist in the political systems of Latin America. He co-authored Carte mentale et Science Politique, Regards et Perspectives Critiques sur l'Emploi d'un Outil Prometteur (The Cognitive Map and Political Science – Views and Critical Perspectives on the Use of a Promising Tool) with Sandra Breux and Min Reuchamps [BRE 10].

Lina Lemay is a professional in emergency measures and sustainable development at the Centre de Santé et de Services Sociaux – Institut Universitaire de Gériatrie (Center for Health and Social Services – University Institute of Geriatrics) in Sherbrooke, Quebec, Canada, having held this post since 2011. She is the holder of a Masters in applied politics from the University of Sherbrooke, Quebec, Canada, obtained in 2010. During her masters, she received research grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the Fonds de Recherche sur la Société et la Culture (Social and Cultural Research Fund), as well as being a research assistant from 2008 to 2010. Her research interests relate to public policies, management of risks and threats and civil security. During her studies and in parallel to her current job, she continues to pursue her research and has presented lectures, including one at the Congrès Annuel de la Société Québécoise de Science Politique (Annual congress on political sciences in Quebec society) in May 2011 in Montreal, entitled: “La sécurité civile: une politique publique comme une autre? Réflexion à partir du Québec” (Civil Security: a public policy like any other? Reflections from Quebec), that was produced with Dany Deschênes and Vicky Chainey.

The chapter on Greece is written by Joseph Fitsanakis, who coordinates the Security and Intelligence Studies program at King College in Tennessee, USA, where he teaches classes on intelligence, espionage, terrorism, security, covert action and geopolitics, among other subjects. He has written extensively in the areas of communications surveillance [FIT 98] and communications interception [FIT 03]; the US National Security Agency [FIT 06]; information warfare [FIT 09]; and the impact of social networking on intelligence gathering [FIT 11]. Dr Fitsanakis is senior editor of intelNews.org, and a frequent commentator on intelligence and security. His work has been referenced in international media outlets including The Washington Post, ABC Radio, RT Television, The Boston Herald, The Guardian, Político, Al Jazeera, The Diplomat, Le Monde Diplomatique, Libération, The Huffington Post, El País, Wired and Studies in Intelligence (the journal of the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]). Dr Fitsanakis is a member of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, the International Association for Intelligence Education, and the International Advisory Board of the Mediterranean Council for Intelligence Studies, among other professional bodies. His research interests lie in the areas of international espionage, domestic security and surveillance, and the history of intelligence with particular reference to the CIA and the National Security Agency.

The chapter on Italy is written by Stefania Ducci, who is senior analyst at the Research Institute for European and American Studies, Deputy Chair of the Mediterranean Council for Intelligence Studies, Director of Cyber Intelligence and Cyber Security Studies at the European Intelligence Academy, and freelance Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Analyst. She holds a Doctorate in Law (University of Bologna, Italy) and an MA in Criminology and Security Studies (University of Turin, Italy); both her Doctoral and MA degrees were earned Summa Cum Laude. From September 2003 to December 2008, Dr Ducci held the position of Research Fellow at the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, as well as the post of Program Manager on projects regarding organized crime, particularly cybercrime, human trafficking and smuggling. She currently lectures at postgraduate level on the subjects of peacekeeping intelligence and security studies, at the University of Roma Tre (Rome, Italy) and International University of Social Sciences (Popular University UNINTESS, Mantua, Italy). In addition, Dr Ducci regularly publishes articles, scholarly papers and books, as well as contributing to the development of training manuals on national and international security issues [DUC 08, DUC 11a, DUC 11b]. She regularly participates as a speaker and lecturer at academic institutions, international conferences and seminars.

The chapter on Singapore is written by Alan Chong, who is Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. He has published widely on the notion of soft power and the role of ideas in constructing the international relations of Singapore and Asia. His publications have appeared in The Pacific Review, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Asian Survey, East Asia (an international quarterly), the Journal of International Relations and Development, the Review of International Studies, the Cambridge Review of International Affairs and in Politics, Religion and Ideology. His recent book was Foreign Policy in Global Information Space: Actualizing Soft Power [CHO 07]. He is currently working on several projects exploring the notion of “Asian international theory”. His interest in soft power has also led to inquiry into the sociological and philosophical foundations of international communication. Taking off from his interest in the transformative impact of IT on politics, he is presently exploring the role of information warfare as a matter of national strategy, and is currently completing a book manuscript titled The International Politics of Communication: Representing Community in a Globalizing World. He has frequently been interviewed by the Asian media and has consulted in think-tank networks in the region.

The chapter on Slovenia is written by Igor Bernik, Iztok Podbregar, Gorazd Praprotnik and Bojan Tičar.

Igor Bernik, PhD, is Assistant Professor of Information Sciences and the Head of Information Security Department at the Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security, University of Maribor, Slovenia. His research fields are information systems, information security and the growing requirement for information security awareness. He has recently been involved in the international project: eSEC – Competency Based e-portal of Security and Safety Engineering. He is a member of the editorial board of the Organizacija – Journal of Management, Informatics and Human Resources and European Journal of Security and Safety. He is co-author of articles on cybercrime, information warfare, cyber terrorism and risk assessment in information systems and has published a book about cybercrime and information warfare.

Iztok Podbregar is a Full Professor and a Senior Research Scientist in the field of leadership and management of security organizations, lecturing and researching in several faculties at the University of Maribor. He is Head of the Security Sciences Department at the Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security, Professor of Crisis and Strategic Management at the Faculty of Organizational Sciences and Head of the Military Logistics Department at the Faculty of Logistics. He was appointed to the rank of Full Professor at the University of Maribor in 2011. He holds a PhD in organizational sciences (human resources management) from the University of Maribor (Faculty of Organizational Sciences), which was awarded in 2000. Prior to that, he was an National Security Advisor to the President of the Republic of Slovenia, Director of the Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency (SOVA), National Counter-terrorism Coordinator, Minister-Counselor in the Prime Minister's Office and State Secretary at the Ministry of Defence. In 1999 he held a lecture on the developed model including smaller countries in peace operations at the US Army War College, in Germany, Denmark and Bulgaria, at the UN headquarters (in New York) and at NATO (in Brussels). Prior to that, he held the positions of Deputy Chief and later Chief of the Slovenian Armed Forces General Staff. He was also a member of the Slovenian delegation appointed to initiate dialog on the Republic of Slovenia's accession to the NATO Alliance, International Inspector for Weapons Supervision within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and Chief of the Air Force Section in the Republic Territorial Defence Staff. He holds the personal Slovene military rank of Lieutenant Colonel General.

Gorazd Praprotnik is a Lecturer at the College of Information Technology, where he teaches Computer Networks and Communications. He is also a professional programmer. He has held a MSc in electrical engineering sciences from the Faculty of Electrical Engineering (University of Ljubljana) since 2002. He is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security (University of Maribor) and a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Electrical Engineering (University of Ljubljana). He has also completed military Reserve Officer training and holds the military rank of Lieutenant.

Bojan Tičar holds a PhD in public and financial law from the Faculty of Law, Ljubljana, Slovenia. In 2005, he joined the University of Maribor, Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security and the University of Primorska, Faculty of Management, where he is an Associate Professor for Administrative Law and Legal Regulation of Management in the Public Sector. At present, he is Vice Dean of the Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security of the University of Maribor.

The chapter on South Africa is written by Brett van Niekerk and Manoj Maharaj.

Brett van Niekerk completed his BSc in electronic engineering in 2002 at the University of Natal, and graduated with an MSc in electronic engineering (his dissertation was on next-generation communications) in 2006 from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. He worked at ThoroughTec Simulation on mining and military projects, and managed the electronic design department. He is currently completing his PhD research in information systems and technology at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, analyzing potential vulnerabilities in 3G communication infrastructures from information warfare and electronic warfare perspectives. He has published journal articles on information warfare, most recently on the Arab Spring events [VAN 11a] and proposing a consolidated information warfare model [VAN 11b]. He has also spoken at conferences and as a guest lecturer on information warfare.

Manoj Maharaj, PhD, is currently Associate Professor at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, where he teaches information systems, specializing in information systems strategy and information security. He has supervised numerous postgraduate students from throughout Africa at MA, MBA, DBA and PhD levels. He has consulted widely in the IT industry and has presented workshops on topics including IT Auditing, IT strategy, information security, risk management and others. He has published extensively, and his most recent publications on information warfare include analysis of the Arab Spring [VAN 11a] and the proposal for a consolidated information warfare model [VAN 11b].

The chapters on France, Cuba and Japan are written by Daniel Ventre, who is the editor of this book.

Daniel Ventre, CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique – National Center for Scientific Research) conducts research at the Centre de Recherche sur le Droit et les Institutions Pénales (Center for Research on Law and Penal Institutions) laboratory of the CNRS, the University of Versailles and the French Ministry of Justice. He is Secretary General of Groupe Européen de Recherches sur les Normativités (the European Research Group on Norms). His work in political sciences/international relations deals with cyber-conflict, cyber-security and cyberdefense. He has published numerous articles as well as several books (monographs and edited collections) about information warfare and cyber-warfare – particularly [VEN 07, VEN 09, VEN 10, VEN 11a, VEN 11b, VEN 11c, VEN 11d]. Since 2010, he has been in charge of the Cyberconflict and Cybercrime series published by ISTE-Wiley (London), and also published in French by Hermès-Lavoisier. He is a part-time lecturer at Telecom ParisTech and is regularly called upon to dispense courses in France and abroad, to talk at international conferences and to the media.

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