The Agenda of Positive Psychology

Multiple paradigms and multiple theories within each of the paradigms give positive psychology an array of horizons and assumptions from which to protest. At the Akumal 1 meeting in January 1999, a manifesto for positive psychology was formulated. Here it was stated that “Positive psychology is the scientific study of optimal functioning. It aims to discover and promote the factors that allow individuals and communities to thrive” (Sheldon, Fredrickson, Rathumnde, Csikszentmihalyi, & Haidt, 1999, p. 1). The manifesto, moreover, stated that positive psychology “must consider optimal functioning at multiple levels, including biological, experiential, personal, relational, institutional, cultural, and global” (Sheldon et al., 1999, p. 1).

The first Handbook of Positive Psychology (Seligman, 2002b) gives a more comprehensive definition:

We have discovered that there are human strengths that act as buffers against mental illness: courage, future-mindedness, optimism, interpersonal skill, faith, work ethic, hope, honesty, perseverance, the capacity for flow and insight, to name several. Much of the task of prevention in this new century will be to create a science of human strength whose mission will be to understand and learn how to foster these virtues in young people. (p. 5; italics added)

Furthermore, Seligman (2002b) underlines, “We now need to call for massive research on human strength and virtue” (p. 5). And he concludes, “We need to do the appropriate longitudinal studies and experiments to understand how these strengths grow (or are stunted; Vaillant, 2000). We need to develop and test interventions to build these strengths” (Seligman, 2002b, p. 5). That positive psychology was launched as a protest against some of the predominant taken-for-granted assumptions in mainstream psychology is clearly reflected in the introductory sentence in Seligman's (2002b) article, where he points out:

Psychology after World War II became a clinical psychology largely devoted to healing. It concentrated on repairing damage using a disease model of human functioning. This almost exclusive attention to pathology neglected the idea of a fulfilled individual and a thriving community, and it neglected the possibility that building strength is the most potent weapon in the arsenal of therapy. (p. 3)

Maddux (2002) corroborated this corrective protest when he pointed out that mainstream psychology was not aware of how “powerful sociocultural, political, professional, and economic forces built the illness ideology and the DSM and continue to sustain them” (p. 15; see also Maddux & Lopez, Chapter 25, this volume). With this approach and research agenda of optimal functioning and human strengths and virtues, positive psychology placed itself clearly within an Aristotelian approach to human development (Jørgensen & Nafstad, 2004). To understand the science and movement of positive psychology, therefore, I will also start this time by looking through Aristotle's model of human nature and development. As Waterman (2013a) concludes on the basis of his analysis of positive psychology's and humanistic psychology's respective philosophical foundations, Aristotle is the philosopher “most consistently cited in the writings of positive psychologists” (p. 126; see also Robbins, Chapter 3, this volume).

Positive Psychology and the Aristotelian Foundation

The most fundamental assumption about human nature and functioning from the Aristotelian perspective is the teleological idea that human life and human well-being consist in nature-fulfillment and the human being as inwardly driven by a dynamic of ever more optimal functioning. Within the Aristotelian model, with its four causal factors (causa materialis, causa formalis, causa efficiens, and causa finalis), growth or change becomes the fundamental dimension of the object or phenomenon. The human being is thus understood as a being constantly driven forward by a dynamic principle toward what is better or more perfect. In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle (trans. 2000) clarifies his optimal functioning or perfectionism concept: “Every craft and every line of inquiry, and likewise every action and decision, seems to seek some good; that is why some people were right to describe the good as what everything seeks” (Morgan, 2001, p. 195). Thus the Aristotelian frame of understanding represents a perspective of a core human nature in which change toward something good, better, or more perfect comprises the fundamental aspect. The good is what everything strives toward. The individual is hence a being who will introduce positive goals and values and strive to realize and reach them. The Aristotelian model then takes into account teleological goals: the individual as a being that lives a life in which thoughts and ideas about future positive goals—not only present and past—also influence the direction of actions here and now.

The Aristotelian model introduces a distinction between the individual's possibilities or potentials on the one hand, and the individual's factual characteristics or realization of these potentials on the other hand. In fact, Aristotle's entire metaphysics and psychology are elaborated “from a developmental perspective in which the concepts of potentiality and actuality are fundamental” (Bernstein, 1986, p. 2). The individual is, moreover, according to Aristotle, a being who is characterized by experiencing joy when exercising his or her inherent or acquired abilities and is striving toward realizing them in ways that are experienced as better, more complex, or more perfect. As the philosopher Rawls (1976) states about this strongly positive motivational dynamic principle of human beings that Aristotle formulated, “The Aristotelian Principle runs as follows: other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater the complexity” (p. 426). The Aristotelian model then holds that we will be happy when fulfilling our destiny as good humans and it is the process of exercising itself that is central to the experience of enjoyment. Furthermore, Aristotle's idea is that one should habituate people to realization of their positive virtues in more perfect or complex ways, with the purpose that moral goodness becomes almost instinctive.

Positive psychology is clearly inspired by the Aristotelian model of human nature: To grow, improve, and function optimally is for positive psychology a fundamental or core concept. Positive psychology also strongly draws on the concept of exercise and practice. As Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) adopt and reformulate this Aristotelian view on joy and exercise:

Enjoyment, on the other hand, refers to the good feelings people experience when they break through the limits of homeostasis—when they do something that stretches them beyond what they were—in an athletic event, an artistic performance, a good deed, a stimulating conversation. Enjoyment, rather than pleasure, is what leads to personal growth and long-term happiness. (p. 12)

Within (developmental) psychology there are three types of theories explaining human development. First, endogenous or essential theories—such as the Aristotelian—describe and explain development as predominantly a result of internal influences. The emphasis is on the organism's internal nature and the theory locates change and development mechanisms within the internal component of the organism (software/blueprint for growth, hereditary plan, etc.). Second, there are theories anchored in the exogenous paradigm that explain development as a result of specific environmental factors external to the individual or organism. The third type, constructivist theories, rather than arguing development as being either innately or environmentally determined, view development as a synthesis of progressive organizations and reorganizations constructed, formed, and shaped in the process of the human individual adapting to and interacting with the external world (Green & Piel, 2002).

As now shown, positive psychology clearly adopts and revitalizes an Aristotelian frame of reference and argues that the science of psychology should once again include assumptions about the essence-driven motivation toward something better—that is, more optimal functioning. In accordance with the Aristotelian root—an essential or endogenous developmental theory—positive psychology, moreover, as a consequence takes as its point of departure that the human being is “preprogrammed” with moral “software” of justice, courage, fairness, and so on. The Aristotelian model—an essentialist theory—holds that development of any organism, including human beings, is the unfolding of natural, fixed, or innate potentialities. Within the Aristotelian model of development, therefore, there is a right, optimal, or perfect functioning that is teleologically fixed as the realization of innate patterns of growth. The Aristotelian model, moreover, clearly underlines how the developmental process of fulfilling human nature results in well-being. Or as Haybron (2008) points out, “In broad terms, Aristotelian theories identify well-being with ‘well-functioning,’ which is to say functioning or living well as a human being: the fulfillment of nature” (p. 35). The Aristotelian approach is, as Haybron (2008) formulates it, “The teleological idea that well-being consists in nature fulfillment” (p. 35; italics in the original). Dynamic teleological determinism is thereby, as shown, concerned with describing and explaining where the organism is going rather than where it has come from (Hopkins & Butterworth, 1990).

For positive psychology, in congruence with the Aristotelian model, goodness and morality thus do not come from outside the person. They do not arise from cultural sources or from the moral rules of society, but from the potentials of the human being him- or herself. Aristotle also claims that “none of the virtues of character arise in us naturally Rather we are by nature able to acquire them, and we are completed through habit” (Morgan, 2001, p. 206). Thus, it is up to the individual to realize his or her full potential. Positive psychology also argues that strengths and virtues can be and must be cultivated, and their development and realization is the route to happiness and well-being (Peterson, Ruch, Beermann, Park, & Seligman, 2007; Ryff & Singer, 2006; Seligman, 2002b; Waterman, 2013b). As a consequence, a most particular aim for positive psychology is to develop and test interventions to build these strengths (Seligman, 2002b; Wong, 2006).

As shown, the Aristotelian model focuses on the virtuous individual and those inner traits, dispositions, and motives that qualify the individual to be virtuous. Within the Aristotelian model, the virtues of the soul are of two sorts: virtue of thought and virtue of character. “Virtue of thought arises and grows mostly from teaching; that is why it needs experience and time. Virtue of character (i.e., of ethos) results from habit (ethos)” (Morgan, 2001, pp. 205–206). Hence it is also clear, as Aristotle states, that both types of virtues have to be cultivated—“none of the virtues of character arise in us naturally” (Morgan, 2001, p. 206). The topic of intellectual activities, giftedness, creativity, and exceptional cognitive performance is central to positive psychology. But equally important, as now shown, positive psychology stresses that there are virtues of a different kind: The concept of good character constitutes one of the other conceptual cornerstones of positive psychology. In the course of past decades, ethical theory in philosophy has focused increasingly on the assumption of the individual as having virtuous motives (Baron, Petit, & Slote, 1997) and positive psychology tries to revitalize this idea of human nature. Positive psychology, wisdom, courage, humanity, gratitude, justice, temperance, and transcendence, for example, are categories of virtue that are postulated to be universal virtues (Dahlsgaard, Peterson, & Seligman, 2001; Emmons & McCullough, 2004; Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Seligman, 2002b).

To sum up, by placing itself clearly within the Aristotelian model, positive psychology argues the view of the good person; the idea of the individual with a positive character, strengths, and given virtues; and the idea of the basic distinction between “man as he happens to be” and “man as he could be if he realized his essential nature” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 52). As shown, the Aristotelian model also combines realizing human teleos and happiness: “Since happiness is a certain sort of activity of the social in accord with complete virtue, we must examine virtue, for that will perhaps also be a way to study happiness better” (Morgan, 2001, p. 204). These ideas of a common core nature for all human beings and continuous development and realization of these human potentials as the source of well-being and happiness constitute the central agenda for positive psychology.

Teleological determinism, which relates to the Aristotelian idea of final cause, strongly argues a preprogrammed directiveness to human development. However, notions or ideas of ideal teleos are in the end created and formed in a subtle interplay with values and ideals in society. We will later come back to this issue.

The Place of Social and Moral Motivation Within Positive Psychology

Positive psychology articulates the presumptions of the Aristotelian approach to human nature and development, and this includes the view of the good person—the idea of the individual with a positive character, strengths, and given virtues. The basic starting point for positive psychology then is that the human being has given dynamic potentials for positive virtues or character.

Science may, in many ways, be considered what the philosophically and ecologically oriented psychologist Howard (1985) terms a “witch's caldron” in which different a priori starting points, values, axioms, and basic assumptions, as well as different concrete theories, “boil” and vie for dominance. Every position and concrete theory thus wishes to become the one recognized, the one accepted as the truth and an expression of reality. Another more systematic way to explicate positive psychology's assumptions and foundations is therefore to ask what kind of theories of human motivations mainstream psychology puts into the “witch's caldron” as compared with the questions that positive psychology raises.

The concept of relationship is one of the most used in psychology and the social sciences. As Noam and Fischer (1996) point out, “Many of the most important classic works in social science, including psychology and philosophy, have recognized the foundational role of relationships” (p. ix). Social relationships thus comprise one of today's most central concepts in analyses of human motivation and the individual as a social and moral being. It is therefore natural to go to the huge field of social relationships where social motivation and human morality are core issues to more systematically answer this question of human motivation.

Fiske (1992) maintains, concerning today's situation in mainstream psychology about social relationships and human social motivation:

From Freud to contemporary sociobiologists, from Skinner to social cognitionists, from Goffman to game theorists, the prevailing assumption in Western psychology has been that humans are by nature asocial individualists. Psychologists (and most other social scientists) then usually explain social relationships as instrumental means to extrinsic, non-social ends, or as constraints on the satisfaction of individual desires. (p. 689)

And van Lange (2000) points out,

Within the domain of psychological theory, this assumption of rational self-interest is embedded in several key constructs, such as reinforcement, the pursuit of pleasure, utility maximization (as developed in the context of behavioristic theory, including social learning theory), psychoanalytic theory, and theories of social decision making. (p. 299)

Nafstad (2002) concludes, “Fundamentally viewed, within mainstream psychology, the person has thus one goal for own actions also in social relations: Consideration for oneself” (p. 6). This goal or teleos for human development represents, therefore, an integral component of today's Western motivation theories and thereby also theories of morality. As this shows, in mainstream psychology as well as in the other social sciences, the axiomatic postulate of human beings as asocial and egoistic individuals is the prioritized and tacitly taken-for-granted perspective.

Within contemporary psychology and the other social sciences, the individual is thus often a priori limited to being constantly motivated by consuming the social and material world, with the goal of attaining the best possible benefits for him- or herself. To keep order in a society made up of individuals who are strongly motivated by individual desires, hedonism, and consumption, society needs norms and rules of morality. Without such moral rules or social norms, the individual as acting subject would not give any consideration to others as long as this might be unpleasant and affect his or her own comfort negatively. It was the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1651) who was first to argue in favor of such a view of human nature, a position that has predominated modern psychology's view of human motivation. The Greek philosophy that prevailed before Hobbes, however, held the view that human beings were positive and fundamentally social by nature. Hobbes launched the doctrine that maintained that human beings were basically bad, and not much may be done about it. Thus morality cannot be anything but social contracts between self-seeking, hedonistic, and ruthless human beings. Morality therefore became the same as obedience to law. This is a deeply negative view of human nature—a human nature without given positive virtue potentials.

The doctrine opposed to that of Hobbes, the view that human beings are born as moral beings with a dynamic potential for goodness, was proposed by Rousseau (1762). Within psychology, Spencer (1870, 1872) and McDougall (1908, 1932) around the turn of the previous century also attempted to oppose this predominating negative position of psychological egoism and hedonism within psychology. McDougall (1908) argued in fact that human beings have an empathic instinct. However, this view did not gain approval. According to mainstream psychology at that time as well as today, the individual has only one motivation system (Darley, 1991; Nafstad, 2002, 2004). Self-interest is regarded as the primary and true motivation, the one from which other motives, including moral and social ones, derive. Thus human beings as simply pleasure-pain organisms is modern psychology's predominant assumption about human motivation, from which a variety of different more negative self-interest motivation theories have been developed (Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & Penner, 2006). Within social and developmental psychology, however, there has been research on prosocial behavior, opening the way for more complex motivation systems (Batson, 1991; Batson, Ahmad, Lishner, & Tsang, 2002; Eisenberg, 1982, 1986; Hoffman, 1975, 2000; for a review, see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010). In fact, in 1751, the philosopher Hume suggested that sympathy and empathy play a major role in altruistic or sympathetic behavior. The modern philosopher Blum (1980) also strongly argued this perspective that altruistic behavior is often motivated by altruistic emotions such as compassion or sympathy. Furthermore, modern humanistic and existential personality theorists took as their point of departure that the human nature is basically benign (Frankl, 1967; Maslow, 1954; May, 1966; Rogers, 1961).

Adopting an Aristotelian perspective, positive psychology clearly opposes mainstream psychology's predominant negative assumption of human motivational nature. Positive psychology takes as its starting point that the individual is a socially and morally motivated being. Seligman (2002a) argued this position very strongly: “Current dogma may say that negative motivation is fundamental to human nature and positive motivation merely derives from it, but I have not seen a shred of evidence that compels us to believe this” (p. 211). As Seligman (2002a) formulates this claim of an alternative to the “witch's caldron” about the human being as a social and moral individual: “This unpacks the meaning of the claim that human beings are moral animals” (p. 133). In addition, positive psychology underlines that humans have capacity for both good and evil: “Evolution has selected both sorts of traits, and any number of niches support morality, cooperation, altruism, and goodness, just as any number support murder, theft, self-seeking, and badness” (p. 211).

By taking the standpoint that humans are fundamentally social and moral, positive psychology again places itself clearly in the midst of the Greek tradition and virtue ethics. In Greek philosophy, the individual was not considered to be an enough-unto-itself-being, an individual concerned only with taking care of his or her own interests. Goods, resources, and advantages, Aristotle maintained (Barnes, 1984), were not the property of individuals to such a great degree as is implied in our social time and culture. Within the Aristotelian frame of reference, the person who acts egoistically is making a fundamental error, which in practice excludes the person from social relationships and therefore also from well-being and the good life. Social relationships were concerned with sharing, giving, and taking care of others (Vetlesen, 1994). Within the Aristotelian frame of understanding, a friendship was a relationship of equality and mutuality, not a “one-way affair” (Vetlesen & Nortvedt, 2000) in which other people are considered a means for gain or becoming better off. As Vetlesen and Nortvedt (2000) described the social relationship of friendship within the Aristotelian approach, “Friendship is inseparable from sharing with the other and reciprocating the feelings received” (p. 23). Within the Aristotelian model, the individual thus has both characteristics that serve to preserve his own welfare, as well as civic virtues that are concerned with preserving the welfare of others. Central to Aristotle's philosophy of human nature, therefore, is that there is a human core nature that entails positive relations and communal responsibility. Building on the Aristotelian model, positive psychology today revitalizes within psychology the very idea of the moral and good motivated human being and the idea of the individual also being a good citizen. Thus positive psychology clearly adopts and revitalizes this Aristotelian frame of reference for our time and argues that the science of psychology should once again include assumptions about the good or essence-driven motivation and the good person within its core assumptions of what a human being is.

For positive psychology, in congruence with the Aristotelian model, goodness and morality, to sum up, do not come from outside the person. They do not arise from cultural sources or from the moral rules of society, but from the potentials of the human being him- or herself. Positive psychology, in accordance with the Aristotelian root, takes as its point of departure that the human being is “preprogrammed” with moral “software” of justice, courage, fairness, and so on. Aristotle claims, however, that “none of the virtues of character arise in us naturally Rather we are by nature able to acquire them, and we are completed through habit” (Morgan, 2001, p. 206). As Vetlesen (1994) formulates this Aristotelian view of human nature, “It is only through such an ongoing process of education and habituation that the individual acquires the virtues” (p. 30). Thus, it is up to the individual to realize his or her full potential. People have an inherent capacity for constructive growth, for kindness, generosity, and so on. But it needs to be continuously exercised. To use Seligman's (2002b) concept, “fostering these virtues” (p. 5) is therefore a central aim for positive psychology. Strength interventions and strength therapy are also one of the central parts of positive psychology's research and applied agenda today (Linley & Joseph, 2004; Wong, 2006).

Positive Psychology and the Universalistic Perspective

Positive psychology and the Aristotelian model, with its teleological determinism, is an endogenous theory and, as mentioned, inevitably faces a challenge when answering what is better, more optimal, more excellent. It can be argued that against all definitions of goals and teleos, critical objections may be raised: Notions or ideas about ideal teleos are in the end inevitably created and formed in a subtle interplay between the values and ideals in society, the social and cultural conditions within which the researcher in question works, as well as the traditions of the discipline (Baumrind, 1982; Bruner, 1986; Cirillo & Wapner, 1986). Maintaining and giving priority to certain developmental goals and not others will thus be an expression of the predominant values and power structures of the culture and time period in question (Bruner, 1986; Cirillo & Wapner, 1986; Foucault, 1972, 1980; Gergen, 1989, 1991). Seligman (2002a) also argues that “fully functioning” is a culture-bound concept.

Humans are born into a sociocultural world defining and valuing what is important in life (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). In fact, the concept of optimal or “fully” functioning must be defined and analyzed in terms of five elements or dimensions: motivation, action, goals, physical and psychological context, and (social) time. So far, optimal functioning has been discussed from a motivation, action, and goal perspective. But physical and psychological context and (social) time also have to be part of the analysis. Hence, when conceptualizing in terms of what is optimal, good or bad, wise or not wise, noble or ignoble, admirable or deplorable, positive psychology must decide how to deal with the influences of culture and social or historical time. In the end, in fact, almost all discussions about approaches and paradigms in psychology are related in some way or another to this theme of the individual, history, social context(s), and/or the interaction between them (Bronfenbrenner, 1979, 1992; Lewin, 1935; Pettigrew, 1997; Walsh, Craik, & Price, 1992). Thus, a most crucial question for psychology throughout its history has been: Where are the defining and stabilizing forces of individual functioning to be found? Mostly in the individual? Primarily in the contexts? Or in the interactions between them? Within psychology there are three types of theories offering different approaches and answers to this question: the endogenous, the exogenous, and the constructive theories. How universalistic then is positive psychology's approach? Or formulated differently, because endogenous theories emphasize environment differently, is positive psychology arguing in favor of a strong or a more “soft” universal psychology?

Let us once more start our analysis by examining Aristotle's position. Aristotle argues that when we travel and meet people in different cultures, we nevertheless “can see how every human being is akin and beloved to a human being” (Morgan, 2001, p. 268; italics added). Aristotle thus argues the position of common human features in different cultural groups. Parts of psychology and other social sciences have always taken as a starting point that people in the past, present, and future have some given common capacities or characteristics. Furthermore, it has been assumed that existing and adapting are experiences that also give common characteristics and similarities (see Darwin, 1859). The task then becomes to describe validly that which is common or universal to human beings. Within such a universalist approach, groups of people are thus compared in order to illuminate aspects of the assumed common and homogeneous core. As Rohner (1975) formulated the universalist position, “The universalist approach asks about the nature of human nature, or, more specifically, about researchable features of ‘human nature’” (p. 2).

Within psychology and the other social sciences, however, researchers have also adopted a fundamentally different point of departure on the human being: Every individual, every society is unique and different from all others. This assumption, the idiographic tradition, takes its principal arguments from, among others, Kierkegaard's philosophy. Kierkegaard's (1843/1962, 1846/1968) philosophy did indeed represent a protest against the philosophy of his time, which was concerned only with what was common to all human beings. Kierkegaard's idea was, on the contrary, that it is the individual, the single person, who must be the frame of reference. Moreover, the individual as he or she exists and lives is more than the universal human being. The individual is thus a uniquely existing being. Consequently, it is not the species of mankind, but the single individual with whom we should be concerned. When one studies human life and development, one must start with the individual or the person. All human beings are committed to their subjective truths, and it is always only the single individual who acts.

The idiographic position, with the idea of uniquely subjective experience as the basis of human actions, thus constitutes another important and central approach within psychological research. The influential psychologist Gordon Allport was the first to be associated with this debate between nomothetic versus idiographic approaches within psychology. Allport (1937/1961, 1946, 1960) maintained that both perspectives were legitimate, but that an idiographic basis was to be preferred in studies of personality. As Allport (1937/1961) formulated his position of the human person, “He is more than a representative of his species, more than a citizen, more than an incident in the movements of mankind. He transcends them all” (p. 573). Eysenck (1947, 1955, 1956, 1967) held, on the other hand, the opposite standpoint: Personality psychology, too, must be nomothetically oriented. Thus the debate between a nomothetic versus idiographic approach in psychology was primarily raised in the field of personality psychology.

Within anthropology, the unique or radical relativistic approach has maintained that no cultures are alike. Consequently, it is not possible to make generalizations. Hypotheses about cross-cultural or universal similarities and possible common claims of cause and effect are impossible (Benedict, 1934, 1946). Each culture must be considered as a unique configuration and may only be understood in its totality. A cultural element has no meaning except in its context. The single elements may be understood, and can only be understood, within the network of interpretations that the culture itself represents. The task of seeking what is common is thus meaningless. All cultures are special and unique. Nomothetically oriented psychology and social science consequently represent an impossible idea.

Within contemporary philosophy and psychology there are also many who argue that it is difficult or impossible to hold on to this idea of human nature having any such common core potentials (Bruner, 1986, 1990; Gergen, 1991, 1994; Kvale, 1992; Shotter & Gergen, 1989). The Aristotelian idea that the human being is “preprogrammed” with a personal and moral “software” of justice, wisdom, and so on, and that such dispositions are up to the individual to realize, is according to these scholars not at all reasonable. Gergen (1982, 1994) therefore argues in favor of a psychology concerned with understanding and attempting to account for social processes in terms of social contexts and social and historical time, which create and fill a culture's concepts, for example, the concepts of human nature, the nature of human motivation, our personality or our self, and so on. Each culture thus creates at all times its own content of truth as to what human nature and good life contains. The descriptions and concepts that psychology has at its disposal must not then be understood as anything but what they indeed are: cultural and historical objects. Every culture and every historical epoch creates its discourses, its forms of understanding, and its truths; for example, about the concept of human nature and human virtues, and motivation. The nomenclature of psychology is thus not given its content through some form of more independent reality about how human nature “really” is. Consequently, the task of seeking the common virtuous being, what is common and similar among individuals, is not meaningful. Every culture will create its own content of meaning as to what human nature is. Human nature, virtues, and individuality are thus created by the prevailing concrete cultural patterns. People must adapt to, maintain, and reproduce this pattern of cultural values and images about what human nature and personality are and should be.

Thus, the historical-cultural approach argued by the social constructivists (e.g., Cushman, 1990; Gergen, 1989, 1994; Kvale, 1992; Shotter & Gergen, 1989) maintains that it is not a meaningful research issue to seek what is universal, common, and similar. The idea of ordered development, for example from the simple to the more complex and excellent (Werner, 1926/1957a, 1957b), therefore is rejected as being a typical idea from the romantic and humanistic tradition in Western culture. And what would be, in any case, better or more perfect functioning?

Positive psychology argues, in the same way as Aristotle, that there are some common dimensions or dispositions in core human nature. However, this does not imply that positive psychology does not accept the idea that human nature also is a product of history and cultural environment. As Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2001) contended, “We are acutely aware that what one considers positive is, in part, a function of one's particular ethnic tradition and social condition” (p. 90). However, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2001) also stressed that:

We believe that our common humanity is strong enough to suggest psychological goals to strive for that cut across social and cultural divides. Just as physical health, adequate nutrition, and freedom from harm and exploitation are universally valued, so must psychologists ultimately aim to understand the positive states, traits, and institutions that all cultures value. (p. 90)

Going back to the Aristotelian position, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2001) thus take as given and embrace the Aristotelian basic position that (a) “what I strive toward as an individual is the perfection of what it means to be a man” (Vetlesen, 1994, p. 30), and (b) what is good for me as a unique person is what is good for humans as universal beings. As a consequence, social practices for positive psychology will be compared to and evaluated in the light of a core human nature of virtues that may, and should, be developed and realized. We might therefore conclude that positive psychology does not only revitalize the Aristotelian idea of the positive individual, but also the view of a more universal individual. Positive psychology then takes as point of departure that it is possible to compare psychological constructs across cultures, and most of positive psychology's ongoing studies are cross-cultural, not studies of one particular culture (Gelfand, Chiu, & Hong, 2011). For example, currently there exists within positive psychology a huge body of cross-cultural research analyzing the meaning and value of happiness across the world (Delle Fave, 2013; Delle Fave, Brdar, Freire, Vella-Brodrick, & Wissing, 2011; Selin & Davey, 2012; Veenhoven, 2010). A prioritized approach to the concept of happiness within positive psychology, therefore, is the position that people in one way or another seek happiness. However, what constitutes happiness may be markedly different in different cultures and needs to be explored.

Positive Psychology and Humanistic and Existential Psychology

Through the history of any scientific field, successive bodies of theoretical and empirical knowledge are established and constitute a foundation for succeeding generation(s). What then about positive psychology and its relations to the previous traditions of modern humanistic and existential psychology, which also hold a more positive view of the human being? Psychology was in the last century characterized by grand theories. The grand theories within humanistic and existential psychology were preoccupied by the same idea of the basically positive nature of the human being as is positive psychology today (Frankl, 1967; Maslow, 1954; May, 1966; Rogers, 1961). The grand humanistic and existential theories of personality were also to a large extent theories of human motivation. Moreover, existential and humanistic personality theories were developed as critical alternatives to that time's predominant psychoanalytic framework, and psychoanalytic psychology held a strongly negative view of human motivation. The psychoanalytic horizon and theories were at the time the study of negative, often strongly perverse human nature. Roudinesco (2009) in her study of perversity as an aspect of human psychology from the Middle Ages up to the era of Nazism in the 20th century in fact starts her presentation by noting “as for the word structure or term ‘perversion,’ it has been studied only by psychoanalysts” (p. 1).

Maslow (1954, 1968) and Rogers (1951, 1961), in opposition to the dominating psychoanalytic view at that time, asserted that human nature is positive; that human beings strive to fulfill benign potentials. According to Rogers (1951, 1961), the human being is motivated by a single positive force: an innate tendency to develop constructive and healthy capacities. Furthermore, Rogers takes a teleological perspective on human nature. Maslow shares Rogers's view that human innate dynamic tendencies are predominantly constructive and benign. Maslow's (1954, 1968) theory is a dualistic theory of motivation including both deficiency and growth motives. Growth motives include development and fulfillment of one's own inner potentials and capacities as well as nonpossessive and unselfish caregiving and love to others. As Maslow (1968) pointed out, “Satisfying deficiencies avoids illness; growth satisfactions produce positive health” (p. 32). For the existentialist clinical psychologist May (1967), life is also about fulfilling one's own innate potentials. But this is a continuous fight; we are all too vulnerable to potential nonbeing. Therefore, May (1967) argues, “The aim of therapy is that the patient experiences his existence as real…which includes becoming aware of his potentials, and becoming able to act on the basis of them” (p. 85).

Each of these grand humanistic or existentialist personality theories was developed in opposition to and as a critique of the predominant strongly negative and destructive perspective on human motivation and human behavior stemming from psychoanalytic theory as caused only by childhood experiences. As we have now seen, modern humanistic and existential psychology on one hand and the movement of positive psychology on the other are both trying to open up the horizon for the positively motivated and benign human being. Also, Seligman (2002b) remarks that “I well recognize that positive psychology is not a new idea. It has many distinguished ancestors (e.g., Allport, 1961; Maslow, 1971)” (p. 7). But Seligman (2002b) comments critically about these ancestors: “But they somehow failed to attract a cumulative and empirical body of research to ground their ideas” (p. 7).

Science may be divided into separate but related levels of activity. A pragmatic division of scientific levels of activity is used to distinguish between (a) metatheory, (b) theory, (c) design, (d) primary method, (e) data, and (f) phenomenon. Compared to the traditions of humanistic and existential psychology, positive psychology has, as Seligman (2002b) clearly stated, decided on other approaches with regard to theory development, design, and methodology. Waterman (2013a) also concluded his comparative analysis of positive psychology and humanistic psychology: Humanistic psychology has a phenomenological and ideographic underpinning and prefers qualitative methodological research. Positive psychology on the other hand prioritizes quantitative design: the experiment and survey design. Thus positive psychology argues for and uses design and methods in accordance with quantitative methodology and the logical positivistic paradigm of research. Mainstream psychology has, however, for some time now argued for the necessity of using mixed design; both qualitative and quantitative approaches, a both/and approach (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003). Also within positive psychology there is now an opening for qualitative methodology (Linley & Joseph, 2004), and in the most recent phase of positive psychology, empirical research combining quantitative and qualitative methodology is being conducted (e.g., Delle Fave et al., 2011). Let it also be mentioned that there might be more acceptance for combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies within psychology in Europe as compared to North America. In Europe, the strong influence of Piaget (1960; see also Dasen, 1972), who used clinical interviews and standard stimulus tasks to map out universal developmental patterns, clearly challenged the assumption that experimental control and quantitative measurements represent the only approach to studies of general principles of human (optimal) functioning.

Modern humanistic psychology is concerned with the more philosophical questions of how to manage apparent meanings of life and what it means to exist at one moment and place in an eternity of time. This is clearly different from positive psychology as Waterman (2013a) concludes: “Rather, the philosophical assumptions underlying positive psychology interventions are based on pragmatics, that is, directing the client's attention to what can be done now to make incremental improvements in quality of life” (p. 129). Compared to humanistic and existentialist psychology, positive psychology then is more preoccupied with the pragmatics of daily life. King (2011) expresses this pragmatic approach of positive psychology as follows:

I would hope that positive psychology stays relevant to everyday human experience, in theory, methods, and applications. Positive psychology would do well to emerge as the scientific study of the ordinary and the simple that are, simultaneously, the graceful, the beautiful, and the wondrous that we see in everyday human life. (p. 444)

However, in the current phase of positive psychology, we see systematic debates of the conceptual and theoretical links between humanistic and positive psychology (Joseph & Murphy, 2013; Linley, 2013; Linley, Joseph, Harrington, & Wood, 2006; Waterman, 2013b).

The Paradigm of Growth and Optimal Functioning and Positive Psychology's Research and Practice: Concluding Remarks

Stretching back over at least 15 years, positive psychology does not recognize disciplinary boundaries, but has prioritized and offered a growth and optimal functioning paradigm to all subdisciplines of psychology, arguing that such a paradigm will enrich psychology as a science both in theory as well as in practice. Consequently, positive psychology as a field of research and practice cannot be defined to belong to any one of mainstream psychology's different subdisciplines, such as social psychology, cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, or personality psychology. Thereby, positive psychology has from 2000 on initiated an academic and applied agenda across psychology's different subdisciplines, analyzing the mechanisms, structures, and processes accounting for growth and development at the individual and social levels. In this period, positive psychology has been focusing on the issue of how to enable individuals to develop their capacities to a more optimal level so that they can grow intellectually as well as socially and morally and achieve optimal functioning and well-being (Linley & Joseph, 2004; Sheldon, Kashdan, & Steger, 2011; Snyder & Lopez, 2002). In tune with this perspective of growth and more optimal functioning, positive psychology's research and practice above all have turned their focus to nonclinical areas of psychology, especially education and training and lifestyle programs. How to foster positive emotions, positive traits, and positive social relationships in life (for example, how colleges and universities can equip young people with the understanding and skills of responsible citizenship), has thus been an issue (Colby, Beaumont, Ehrlich, & Corngold, 2007). Currently, positive training programs to build emotional, social, and spiritual fitness are also offered on a large scale in the military, not only for all ranks of soldiers, but also for their families (Cornum, Matthews, & Seligman, 2011). Positive psychology is also offering the growth paradigm to the subdiscipline of clinical psychology and psychotherapy. Positive psychology is therefore now facing the problem of how not only to increase psychological growth but also to relieve suffering—an endeavor person-centered therapy has been addressing for a long time (Joseph & Murphy, 2013). Paradigmatic metadiscussions, moreover, are still very active: Some point out, for example, that positive psychology too often has relied on individual happiness as the ultimate outcome criterion of human fulfillment (Kashdan & Steger, 2011). Others claim that the outcome of interest for positive psychology ought not to be simply happiness, but the one that emerges from doing good acts (see King, 2011; Tiberius, 2013.) Another claim is that positive psychology is facing the problem of a language of constraint in studying growth and optimal or full functioning; the illness ideology and pathological language are still too dominating (Joseph & Murphy, 2013; Maddux, 2002). Still others are discussing that positive psychology in this phase, as in Western mainstream psychology, has prioritized the individual at the cost of the societal level as the basic unit of analysis and practice (Biswas-Diener, Linley, Govindji, & Woolston, 2011). As a consequence, the well-being of community and society is neglected. Another relevant discussion is that positive psychology as currently developed has not addressed more systematically the complex issue of how sociocultural contexts, institutions, and public policy sometimes do not create or recreate experiences that can enhance individual positive growth and quality of life (Duncan, 2010; Myers, 2004; Selin & Davey, 2012). However, looking back on these 15 years, one can conclude that leading psychologists around the world within psychology's various subdisciplines are involved in doing basic and applied research and practice inspired by Aristotelian models of growth and optimal functioning, thereby strongly broadening the scope of today's psychological science and practice.

Howard (1985) concludes by referring to Mahatma Gandhi, who argued that there are seven sins in the world: wealth without work, pleasure without conscience, knowledge without character, commerce without morality, science without humanity, worship without sacrifice, and politics without principle. What did Gandhi mean by science without humanity? The meaning might be very different for every science. Given the subject of psychology, the human being, the answer is of course critical. I agree with Howard (1985) when he concluded, “Our legacy could be an impoverished vision of humanity. By viewing humans from an unduly narrow perspective, we may perpetuate a paralyzing myopia that serves to diminish rather than expand humans' potential as individuals and as species” (p. 264). I also endorse Howard's (1985) formulation of the challenge for psychology: “Our challenge, then, is to construct a science of humans built upon an image of humanity that reflects and reveres human nature in all its diversity, complexity, and subtlety” (p. 264).

Since its launch in 2000, positive psychology has represented a dynamic and strong revitalization of paradigmatic discussions within psychology. Positive psychology has initiated and established new and vital empirical research and practice fields of growth, virtues, strengths, engagement, and different ways or routes to how to live a good life. Maybe future psychologists will look back on this time as a turning point—the point of time when psychology in research and practice with strong consequences for promoting individual and community well-being paradigmatically reinvented the human being as a genuinely good, socially responsible, and virtuous organism.

Summary Points

• Paradigms stake out perspectives and development of theories and thereby decide what it implies to be a human being. As scientists, practicians, and students, we therefore all have an obligation continuously to analyze and discuss horizons and paradigms in our different disciplines and fields of research.
• In practice, it is most important to know the intellectual roots and the implicitly taken-for-granted assumptions in our field.
• Within science every paradigm with its concrete theories wishes to become the one accepted as being the truth and an expression of reality. A strong obligation for science is therefore to identify ignored, neglected, or even excluded perspectives and positions about human nature.
• Positive psychology started as a protest against predominating and taken-for-granted assumptions in mainstream psychology: the ideology of illness, of pathology, faults, and dysfunctions, as well as the paradigmatic assumption that humans have only one motivation system: asocial self-interest.
• Inspired by the Aristotelian model of human nature, positive psychology revitalized the idea of the human being with a positive character, strengths, and given virtues. Positive psychology takes a point of departure that realization of human potentials is the source of well-being and happiness.
• Since its launch in 2000, positive psychology has initiated and established a vital and disciplined empirical research field of virtues, strengths, engagement, and different ways or routes to how to live a good life.
• To conclude: As scientific knowledge shapes and forms peoples' meaning structure of what it means to be a human being, it is an ethical obligation of researchers, practitioners, and students to discuss what it means to be a human being.

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