Chapter 6
The Science of Values in the Culture of Consumption

TIM KASSER

One of positive psychology's key achievements has been its articulation of what it means to have “a good life.” Many thinkers have considered this issue over the course of recorded human thought, but positive psychology, in my mind, has made two special contributions. First, rather than assuming that a good life is defined by the absence of psychopathology, many of the leaders of positive psychology have argued that well-being is a construct to be studied in its own right. Second, positive psychologists insist that conclusions about the meaning of a good life be based on sound empirical research, rather than on anecdotal observation or philosophical speculation. Excellent early examples of the conjoining of these two threads can be seen in the January 2000 issue of the American Psychologist; these initial discussions have been followed by important contributions appearing in the Journal of Positive Psychology and other journals, as well as dozens of books that are being published with increasing rapidity. As can be gleaned from a perusal of this literature, most positive psychologists seem to agree that a good life is represented via a sense of life satisfaction, pleasant affective experience, and personal meaning, and that a good life is more likely to occur when people have good relationships, pursue meaningful work, and engage in activities that provide a sense of deep involvement, vitality, choice, and competence (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Diener, 2000; Haidt, 2006; Lyubomirsky, 2007; Myers, 2000; Peterson, 2006; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Ryff & Keyes, 1995; Seligman, 2002).

As positive psychology continues to move forward in both the articulation and (hopefully) the eventual actualization of its vision of a good life, I believe that it is crucially important to recognize that an opposing, better-publicized vision of the good life vies for space in people's minds. More specifically, every day and in many ways, consumers (née people) are bombarded with powerful, psychologically sophisticated proclamations that the good life is “the goods life.” The message that happiness and well-being come from the attainment of wealth and the purchase and acquisition of goods and services is a pervasive and inescapable fact of modern life across most of the planet. Such messages are found not only in increasingly omnipresent advertisements, but also in the subtext of political debates, business decisions, and educational practices (see, e.g., Kasser, Cohn, Kanner, & Ryan, 2007; or Schwartz, 1994).

For the past two decades, my colleagues and I have been studying the content of people's values and goals as a means of testing which of these two visions of the good life really fulfills their promises. We have reasoned that people's values and goals provide a valid means of assessing if their vision of the ideal (a standard definition of values; e.g., Rokeach, 1973) and the way they are attempting to create their lives (a standard definition of goals; e.g., Emmons, 1989) are oriented toward the good life articulated by positive psychology or the goods life encouraged by consumer culture. To reflect this distinction, we have described two types of goals and values (Grouzet et al., 2005; Kasser & Ryan, 1996). Extrinsic goals and values become prominent when people “buy into” the messages of consumer culture and organize their lives around the pursuit of money, possessions, image, and status. These goals are extrinsic in the sense that such pursuits are primarily focused on the attainment of external rewards and praise, and are typically means to some other end. In contrast, intrinsic goals and values involve striving for personal growth, intimacy, and contribution to the community. We call this latter group of aims intrinsic because they are inherently more satisfying to pursue and are more likely to satisfy the deeper psychological needs that are necessary for happiness and well-being (Kasser, 2002a; Ryan & Deci, 2000).

Substantial cross-cultural evidence supports the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic goals. The specific aspirations representing the two types of goals fall on distinct factors in samples of students from Germany (Schmuck, Kasser, & Ryan, 2000), Russia (Ryan et al., 1999), and South Korea (Kim, Kasser, & Lee, 2003), and in samples of adults from the United States (Kasser & Ryan, 1996) and Peru (Guillen-Royo & Kasser, in press). Even more compelling evidence for the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic aspirations derives from the work of Grouzet et al. (2005), who collected data from undergraduate students in 15 cultures (Australia, Bulgaria, Canada [Quebec], China, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Romania, South Korea, Spain, and the United States). Using statistical techniques such as multidimensional scaling analysis and circular stochastic modeling, Grouzet et al. found evidence for a “circumplex” model of goals, in which intrinsic goals are clustered together (representing the psychological compatibility of caring about personal growth, connections with others, and helping the community) and extrinsic goals are clustered together (representing the psychological compatibility of caring about money, image, and status). Further, Grouzet et al. showed that people experience intrinsic and extrinsic goals as existing in psychological conflict with each other; that is, people find it to be relatively difficult to simultaneously prioritize an intrinsic goal (such as “being generous”) and an extrinsic goal (such as “accumulating a good deal of money”).

The Associations of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Aspirations With the Good Life

Although positive psychologists have done much to articulate a coherent vision of the good life, in my opinion they far too frequently have defined the good life solely in terms of a particular person's own happiness and well-being. Such a definition gives relatively short shrift to how one's lifestyle might influence the well-being of other people, future generations of people, and other species. As Deneulin and McGregor (2010) write, it is necessary to “generate the social understandings, agreements, and institutions to live together in ways that do not cause us irreparable harms” (p. 511, emphasis added). Said differently, I would argue that a good life requires living in ways that support a good life for other living beings, not just for one's own person.

The available empirical evidence makes it clear that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic goals is among the factors predicting such a multifaceted definition of the good life. Specifically, as will be reviewed in this chapter, the relative prioritization of intrinsic goals has been shown to be associated both with higher levels of personal well-being and with the kinds of prosocial and ecologically sustainable behaviors and attitudes likely to support others' well-being. In contrast, a focus on extrinsic goals is consistently associated with lower levels of personal well-being and with attitudes and behaviors that are likely to diminish the well-being of others.

Personal Well-Being

Across numerous studies, a large number of means of assessing well-being have been connected to the focus people place on intrinsic relative to extrinsic goals. Generally speaking, the extent to which people prioritize intrinsic over extrinsic goals has been associated with higher self-reported levels of self-actualization, vitality, life satisfaction, and pleasant affect and with lower self-reported levels of depression, anxiety, and negative affect (see Kasser, 2002b, for a review; see Dittmar, Bond, Hurst, & Kasser, in press, for a meta-analysis). People's focus on intrinsic relative to extrinsic goals also relates to diary reports of emotional experience (Kasser & Ryan, 1996; Sheldon & Kasser, 1995) and to interviewer assessments of participants' levels of social functioning, general mental health, and various forms of psychopathology (Cohen & Cohen, 1996; Kasser & Ryan, 1993).

The differential correlations between well-being and intrinsic versus extrinsic values also replicate across various participant characteristics. A strong focus on materialistic aims (one type of extrinsic goal) has been associated with lower well-being in children as young as 10 years old (Kasser, 2005; Schor, 2004) and with numerous samples of adolescents and of adults (Kasser & Ryan, 1996; Sheldon & Kasser, 2001). Findings also replicate in samples of business students and entrepreneurs (Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002; Srivastava, Locke, & Bortol, 2001), that is, individuals who exist in environments that often encourage extrinsic aims. What's more, the positive associations between personal well-being and a relative focus on intrinsic versus extrinsic goals have been reported in a variety of cultures, including the Canada, China (Lekes, Gingras, Phillipe, Koestner, & Fang, 2010), Germany (Schmuck et al., 2000), Hungary (Martos & Kopp, 2012), Peru (Guillen-Royo & Kasser, in press), Russia (Ryan et al., 1999), Singapore (Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002), South Korea (Kim et al., 2003), Spain (Romero, Gomez-Fraguela, & Villar, 2011), the United Kingdom (Chan & Joseph, 2000), and the United States (Kasser & Ryan, 1993, 1996).

Finally, some recent research has expanded beyond the cross-sectional nature of the studies just reviewed by reporting longitudinal and experimental evidence. Specifically, in samples of U.S. young adults and Icelandic adults over time spans from 6 months to 12 years, decreases in the relative prioritization of the extrinsic value of financial success are associated with decreases in levels of psychopathology and increases in levels of subjective well-being (Kasser et al., 2014). What's more, brief reminders of the extrinsic goal of financial success, compared to a control topic, are associated with decrements in mood moments later (Bauer, Wilkie, Kim, & Bodenhausen, 2012).

In sum, a large body of research supports the hypothesis that prioritization of the goals and values embodied in the “good life” articulated by positive psychology is indeed associated with higher levels of well-being, whereas focusing on the goals and values embodied in the “goods life” encouraged by consumer society is associated with lower levels of well-being and higher levels of distress.

Social Well-Being

Numerous studies show that one's prioritization of intrinsic relative to extrinsic values and goals also has predictable associations with how one treats other people. For example, Sheldon and Kasser (1995) found that a strong focus on extrinsic values is associated with engaging in fewer prosocial activities (like sharing and helping) and with having less empathy for others (i.e., being less interested in trying to understand another's point of view). People also tend toward more manipulative, Machiavellian, and competitive (versus cooperative) behaviors to the extent they prioritize extrinsic relative to intrinsic values (Khanna & Kasser, 1999; McHoskey, 1999; Sheldon, Sheldon, & Osbaldiston, 2000). In contrast, an intrinsic goal orientation is associated with less prejudicial attitudes about people outside of one's own group (Duriez, Vansteenkiste, Soenens, & De Witte, 2007), and, as shown by a recent meta-analysis, with a rejection of the notion that members of other groups deserve the lower status they might have (i.e., lower social dominance orientation; Onraet, Van Hiel, & Dhont, 2013).

Experimental studies complement this research by showing that activation of extrinsic values decreases how much people help others who are in need. For example, Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006) randomly assigned U.S. college students to create phrases out of money-related words or out of neutral words; soon afterward, participants had the opportunity to behave in either a helpful or selfish manner. Those who had thoughts of money (and thus extrinsic values) spent significantly less time helping a confused person who asked for aid, were less helpful to an experimenter who had dropped some pencils, and donated less of their study honorarium to a charity. Such findings have been conceptually replicated with other means of activating values and with other measures of prosocial outcomes (Maio, Pakizeh, Cheung, & Rees, 2009). Other work shows that the activation of intrinsic values can increase concern for children in wealthy nations who are poor and for children in economically developing nations who are dying, even among people who are dispositionally prone to focus on extrinsic goals (Chilton, Crompton, Kasser, Maio, & Nolan, 2012).

In sum, the research shows that when people prioritize extrinsic values, they are likely to hold attitudes and behave in ways that undermine the well-being of other people, whereas the prioritization of intrinsic values is associated with attitudes and behaviors that are more likely to support other individuals' attempts to live a good life.

Ecological Well-Being

A good life requires a healthy habitat in which to live, but the evidence shows that a relatively high focus on extrinsic compared to intrinsic values is associated with holding attitudes and behaving in ways that contribute to environmental degradation (for a review, see Crompton & Kasser, 2009; for a meta-analysis see Hurst, Dittmar, Bond, & Kasser, 2013). For example, the priority placed on materialistic (extrinsic) values by U.S. and U.K. adolescents is associated with engaging less frequently in ecologically friendly behaviors such as buying second-hand, recycling, riding a bicycle, reusing paper, and so on (Gatersleben, Meadows, Abrahamse, & Jackson, 2008; Kasser, 2005). Findings from one study of 400 North American adults showed that those who cared more about extrinsic relative to intrinsic values had substantially higher “ecological footprints,” and thus used more of Earth's limited resources to meet their housing, food, and transportation lifestyle choices (Brown & Kasser, 2005). Individuals high in extrinsic values also act in greedier, more ecologically destructive, and less sustainable ways when they play forest-management simulation games in the laboratory, compared to their more intrinsically oriented counterparts (Sheldon & McGregor, 2000).

Experimental manipulations again support a causal role for values in these processes. In one study with Belgian education students (Vansteenkiste, Simons, Lens, Sheldon, & Deci, 2004), recycling was framed either as being beneficial to one's community (i.e., intrinsic values) or as likely to save money (i.e., extrinsic values). Individuals who had the behavior framed in an extrinsic fashion were subsequently less likely to take advantage of later opportunities to learn more about recycling than were those who had the behavior framed in an intrinsic fashion. Other studies with U.S. college students (Sheldon, Nichols, & Kasser, 2011) and U.K. adults (Chilton et al., 2012) have found that brief reminders of intrinsic (versus extrinsic) values improve people's expressed attitudes toward the importance of making political and lifestyle changes to combat environmental destruction.

In sum, whereas extrinsic values conduce toward environmental lifestyles and attitudes that undermine the ability of future humans and other species to live a good life, intrinsic values are associated with more ecologically sustainable approaches to living a good life.

Implications for Practice

As I hope this brief literature review demonstrates, the versions of the good life espoused by positive psychology and of the goods life encouraged by consumer culture are not only at odds, but have very different outcomes. Whereas people who organize their lives around the intrinsic values of the good life are happier, treat others in more humane ways, and pursue more ecologically sustainable lifestyles, those who focus on the extrinsic values of the goods life report more distress, treat others in more manipulative and objectifying ways, and pursue lifestyles that contribute more to ecological degradation.

Given these results, it seems to me that if positive psychology is to reach its highest potential as a scientific and practical endeavor, there is much work to do. Not only must the vision of the good life reflected in intrinsic values and positive psychology be supported, but the vision of the goods life reflected in extrinsic values and our money-driven, consumer culture must be weakened. To these ends, I discuss next a variety of different interventions and initiatives that positive psychologists might undertake, all of which have the dual purposes of dislodging the psychological and social processes that support extrinsic values and nurturing the processes that encourage intrinsic values and goals.

Clinical Practice

As reviewed earlier in the chapter, intrinsic and extrinsic values have been empirically associated with many of the psychological difficulties that clinicians see in their practices, including depression, anxiety, somatic complaints, personality disorders, substance abuse, and childhood disorders, not to mention the general malaise associated with diminished happiness and satisfaction with life. Value orientations are also relevant to compulsive consumption, which is characterized by strong, often irresistible urges to purchase goods (see Faber, 2004, for a review; see Dittmar et al., in press, for meta-analytic results).

Unfortunately, as noted by Kottler, Montgomery, and Shepard (2004), clinicians frequently overlook the many ways in which consumption, materialism, and extrinsic values interact with, and potentially cause, some of their clients' problems. This may be in part due to current diagnostic systems, such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), which recognize few consumption-related issues relevant to psychopathology. Further, to my knowledge, young clinicians are rarely trained to consider consumption issues as they learn their trade, probably in part because no well-articulated clinical theories direct their practitioners to examine important aspects of life such as spending patterns, debt, or materialism. Although space precludes a longer exposition on this topic, I would like to describe two themes that might be worth exploring with clients (see Kottler et al., 2004, for more treatment ideas).

The first theme concerns people's psychological needs. Substantial theorizing and research suggests that psychological well-being is enhanced when people have experiences that satisfy four psychological needs: security and safety, competence and efficacy, connection to others, and autonomy and authenticity (see Bandura, 1977; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Kasser, 2002b; Maslow, 1954; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Sheldon, Elliot, Kim, & Kasser, 2001). Marketers and advertisers also recognize the importance of these needs, as they frequently use psychologically sophisticated and well-researched advertisements to suggest that the acquisition of products and services will satisfy these needs. To take just the example of automobiles, common advertisement scripts suggest to viewers that a sport utility vehicle can be used to protect one from dangerous conditions (i.e., safety), to show that one has made it in life (i.e., competence), to attract members of the opposite sex (i.e., relatedness), and to escape to wherever one's heart desires (i.e., autonomy). The problem, however, is that these ads sell a false bill of goods. As I have reviewed elsewhere (Kasser, 2002b), the research shows that when people organize their lives around attaining the extrinsic goals promoted by the goods life, they actually experience lower satisfaction of needs for safety (due largely to past experiences of threat), for competence and efficacy (because they have a lower and more contingent sense of self-esteem and are exposed to more upward social comparisons that make them dissatisfied with themselves), for connection (because they have shorter, more conflictual relationships), and for autonomy and authenticity (because they often feel more controlled and less free). Even when people succeed in their pursuit of extrinsic goals, they often report relatively low satisfaction of their needs, and their well-being does not improve (Niemiec, Deci, & Ryan, 2009; Sheldon & Kasser, 1998).

The second theme concerns the fact that some people habitually use acquisition, consumption, and other extrinsically oriented activities to try to cope with feelings of insecurity and unpleasant emotional states (Kasser, 2002b), including those that might result from poor need satisfaction. Like substance use, cutting one's body, sexual promiscuity, and other high-risk behaviors, obsessive acquisition and “retail therapy” are relatively maladaptive ways that some people try to cope with their unpleasant mood states. Evidence on compulsive buying supports this claim, as compulsive buyers typically report that negative mood states precede their buying binges, and that when they feel badly, they like to shop (see Faber, 2004). Experimental manipulations similarly show that people become more materialistic and more desirous of consuming when they experience a variety of types of threats, including confronting the fact of their own mortality, being made aware that they have failed to live up to important ideals, and being reminded of feelings of isolation or meaninglessness (Braun & Wicklund, 1989; Chang & Arkin, 2002; Kasser & Sheldon, 2000; Sheldon & Kasser, 2008). Although, like drinking and cutting, shopping and acquiring might temporarily distract people from their unpleasant feelings, such consumeristic behavior does little to help them actively confront and solve the problems that brought about the negative mood states in the first place. Additionally, such behavior can lead to increased debt, family conflicts, and even poorer need satisfaction, thus diminishing quality of life.

Clinicians might raise these themes with their clients and help them to explore the irrational thoughts, unpleasant feelings, and situational reinforcements that maintain an unsatisfying extrinsic-value orientation. Once clients begin to realize that the promises of consumer culture are false and that retail therapy does little more than temporarily distract them and increase their credit card debt, they may become motivated to search out a different system of meaning in their lives. At this point, clinicians might introduce the idea of intrinsic values to help their clients reorganize their lives. For example, when stressed or insecure, clients might learn other, more adaptive coping strategies such as reaching out to other people and one's community or pursuing fun activities (like painting, exercising, or playing music) that are more likely to help them to grow as a person than will buying another sweater or pair of shoes. Switching activities in these ways should not only be effective at alleviating unpleasant feelings, but should also help to build the values of affiliation, community feeling, and personal growth that are key intrinsic values. Similarly, helping individuals learn to satisfy their psychological needs through the pursuit of self-knowledge and self-acceptance, through close relations to others, and through contribution to the community will not only work to dislodge extrinsic values, but also should increase the likelihood that people will have the types of experiences that really do satisfy their psychological needs.

In addition to exploring these themes, clinicians may want to consider having their clients engage in certain deep reflective practices that have shown promise in orienting people toward intrinsic values and away from extrinsic values. Studies show that people who have developed mindfulness, or the capacity to experience themselves and others in a nonjudgmental, moment-to-moment way, also report a greater preference for intrinsic relative to extrinsic values, in addition to higher levels of well-being and more ecologically sustainable lifestyles (Brown & Kasser, 2005; Brown & Ryan, 2003). What's more, an intervention designed to improve mindfulness skills increased how content participants felt with their material possessions and financial situation (i.e., extrinsic values), with consequent improvements in personal well-being (Brown, Kasser, Ryan, Linley, & Orzech, 2009). Another promising type of reflective practice involves deeply and regularly considering the fact of one's own mortality. Although some studies have shown that brief reminders of death typically shift people toward extrinsic values and away from intrinsic values, other studies suggest that sustained reflection on death shifts people toward intrinsic and away from extrinsic aims in life (Cozzolinno, Staples, Meyers, & Samboceti, 2004; Lykins, Segerstrom, Averill, Evans, & Kemeny, 2007). Two processes may explain why these types of reflective practices have beneficial effects on people's value orientation. First, rather than responding to threats by automatically endorsing extrinsic values, people who engage in reflective practices may act in less defensive and more autonomous ways, thereby derailing the largely unconscious processes that would typically push them toward money, image, and status as coping mechanisms. Second, such reflective practices may help people become more attuned to the aims in life that actually meet their psychological needs (i.e., intrinsic values), thereby improving their well-being, as well as their treatment of others and of the ecosystem.

One last point clinicians might attend to concerns relapse prevention. As they would with former alcoholics and overeaters who are tempted every day to return to their earlier problematic behaviors and thought patterns, therapists would do well to help their clients recognize that we all live in a world that is a veritable cornucopia of consumption that continually will encourage a return to an extrinsically oriented lifestyle. Discussing these issues before termination and helping clients develop ways of dealing with relapses might help ensure longer-term successes.

Prevention Practices

Although the psychotherapeutic efforts previously described may prove helpful, it would of course be better to prevent people from undervaluing intrinsic and overvaluing extrinsic goals in the first place. Psychologists can use many of their skills to develop a variety of types of interventions in this regard. Although others could be discussed, here I focus on two broad foci of interventions.

Children and Their Parents

Children are a sort of holy grail for marketers and advertisers because young people have a relatively large percentage of disposable income, can influence their parents' purchases through whining and nagging, and might become lifelong consumers of a product if they are hooked early in their lives (Levin & Linn, 2004; Schor, 2004). Children are also particularly susceptible to messages tying security, self-worth, love, and freedom to the purchase of products, given that their cognitive skills are still in the process of developing and that they are often strongly motivated to fit in with their peers (Banerjee & Dittmar, 2008). Moreover, the enormous amount of time that children are exposed to commercial messages on television, on the radio, and on the Internet is now amplified by the spread of marketing strategies that connect the movies (e.g., Star Wars) with toys (e.g., Star Wars action figures) and food (e.g., Star Wars Happy Meals) that children are encouraged to purchase (Levin & Linn, 2004). In sum, from the time they wake up until they go to bed, children are increasingly exposed to a constant stream of psychologically sophisticated propaganda that propounds the worth of the goods life and of extrinsic values. It should thus be of little surprise that between the late 1960s and mid-2000s, increasingly large percentages of U.S. youth endorsed materialistic aims in life, increases that have been statistically associated with both increases in levels of youth psychopathology (Twenge et al., 2010) and the amount of advertising expenditures present in the nation (Twenge & Kasser, 2013).

How might positive psychologists help stem this rising tide? First, we must recognize that some children are at higher risk for taking on the messages of the goods life than are others. Research shows that children are more likely to emphasize extrinsic relative to intrinsic values if their parents are controlling or harsh, if they come from a divorced household, and if they are poorer (Cohen & Cohen, 1996; Kasser, Ryan, Zax, & Sameroff, 1995; Rindfleisch, Burroughs, & Denton, 1997). Additionally, African Americans and young girls are particularly targeted by marketers (Kilbourne, 2004; LaPoint & Hambrick-Dixon, 2004), and unpopular children seem to believe that extrinsic pursuits will help them to fit in better (Banerjee & Dittmar, 2008). Thus, psychologists interested in prevention efforts with at-risk groups might do well to focus on these populations.

A variety of interventions might be developed and tested after choosing a particular population with whom to work. Among the most often-used interventions are media literacy campaigns designed to help children understand the purposes and strategies of advertisements. Another possibility might be to “capitalize on” teenagers' sense of rebellion and educate them about the many ways that marketers attempt to manipulate and brand teens (Quart, 2003); teens' resulting anger might then be turned against the marketers to help dethrone extrinsic values. Interventions based in cognitive-dissonance theory, which are effective for behaviors such as condom use (Aronson, Fried, & Stone, 1991), might also be adapted; for example, many teens hold strong environmental beliefs, and if they can be shown how their actual consumption behavior is inconsistent with their ideals, dissonance might motivate a change in behavior. Programs that improve children's self-esteem might also decrease their materialistic values, as suggested by one experiment (Chaplin & John, 2007).

Recently we conducted an in-depth intervention with parents and teens to attempt to reduce the teens' orientation toward extrinsic, materialistic values (Kasser et al., 2014). After filling out baseline survey packets, teens and their parents were randomly assigned to a no-treatment control group or to an intervention group that underwent three 3-hour sessions based on an established program designed to help orient adolescents away from “spending” and toward “sharing” and “saving” (www.sharesavespend.com). In these sessions, parents and teens discussed a variety of topics, including the distinction between “needs” and “wants,” the influence of advertisements on financial attitudes and behaviors, the importance of imitating good models of sharing and saving behaviors, and optimal strategies for giving allowances; homework assignments were also given between sessions, including tracking one's spending behavior and the advertisements to which one was exposed. When they were surveyed both 6 weeks and 8 months after the intervention ended, adolescents who underwent the intervention reported decreases in materialism (i.e., extrinsic values), relative to the control group. Further, those adolescents who began the study relatively high in materialism (extrinsic values) and who received the intervention evidenced significantly higher increases in self-esteem both 6 weeks and 8 months later than did other groups; indeed, those who began the study high in materialism and who did not receive the intervention evidenced declines in self-esteem over the time period assessed. Although these results are clearly in need of replication, they point to the possibility that interventions with parents and their teenaged children hold promise for shifting children's value orientations, to the benefit of their well-being.

Other interventions might focus more on parents, who are of course important influences on children's value systems (Kasser et al., 1995). For example, parents could be helped to examine how they may be inadvertently modeling extrinsic values to their children by each working 60 hours per week so that they can afford two large cars, a 3,500-square-foot house, and a large-screen plasma television. Such behavior clearly sends children not-so-subtle messages about what is important in life. Helping parents to model intrinsic values instead should not only increase their children's intrinsic values, but should also help to make the parents happier and healthier. Another aim of research could be to study the types of parenting practices that help build resilience in the face of consumer messages. For example, is it better to hit the mute button during commercials to demonstrate that commercials are unimportant and not worth listening to, or is it better to leave the commercials on so that the parent can critique and decode the commercial messages? Some publications provide advice about how to raise children who are living in a consumer culture (e.g., Taylor, 2003), but more empirical research and psychological theorizing are needed to help guide parents (see Buijzen & Valkenburg, 2005, for some initial steps).

Voluntary Simplicity Interventions

Although movements toward a more materially simple life have been notable in U.S. history since the colonial era (Shi, 1985), voluntary simplicity (VS) experienced a resurgence at the end of the 20th century (Etzioni, 1998) with the publication of books like Voluntary Simplicity by Elgin (1993), Your Money or Your Life by Dominguez and Robin (1992), and The Circle of Simplicity by Andrews (1998). These, and other books published since, describe a lifestyle that rejects consumerism and instead focuses on a more “inwardly rich” life focused on personal growth, family, and volunteerism. Not surprisingly, then, Brown and Kasser (2005) found that, compared to a matched control group, people who self-identify as voluntary simplifiers place less emphasis on extrinsic aims and more emphasis on intrinsic aims; they also reported higher personal well-being and more ecologically responsible behaviors and lifestyles. Similar results have been reported by Boujbel and d'Astous (2012), Iwata (1999), and Leonard-Barton (1981).

Although the empirical literature on VS is relatively sparse, the self-help literature is burgeoning, and many types of workshops and programs have been designed to help people “downshift” and simplify their lives. Here, I will mention just two examples. First, working from Andrews's (1998) book, “simplicity circles” have sprouted up around the world. These essentially act as support groups for those who are trying to simplify their lives, providing a place where people can talk with like-minded others about their challenges and can share ideas and resources in the form of cooperative and barter systems. Second, many workshops based on Your Money or Your Life (YMYL) are presented every year. Essentially these programs teach people how to live in a more frugal manner while they save their extra earnings; eventually a point of “financial independence” is reached when individuals are spending so little money each year that they can live off of the interest of the savings that have been accumulated (which is far below what most people consider necessary to have in their individual retirement accounts). At this time, they can quit their jobs and devote their time to their own growth, their families, and the community.

Simplicity circles and YMYL programs have attracted tens of thousands of adherents and provide well-designed interventions that could be tested in randomized, controlled studies. Psychologists could study how successfully people move away from extrinsic and toward intrinsic pursuits and how their well-being changes upon simplifying. If appropriately adapted, such interventions might even be useful for high school and college students before they head out into the world of work.

Public Policy Initiatives

Although each of the ideas suggested above has some potential, they all suffer from a problem analogous to what family therapists have recognized about therapy with children and what sociocultural theorists have recognized about psychopathology in general. Consider, for example, the likely efficacy of providing 1 hour of intervention per week to a child diagnosed with oppositional-defiant disorder who lives in an abusive home with an alcoholic father in a poverty-stricken, gang-ridden neighborhood in a nation that provides relatively few social services for the poor. So long as the broader family and social structures remain unchanged, the intervention is not likely to be very successful. In addition, acting as though the child is the one with the problem smacks of “blaming the victim,” because in fact it is his family, neighborhood, and broader social environment that are actually sick and largely responsible for his problems (although each would probably deny that this is so).

Analogously, then, we must wonder about the potential efficacy of any clinical or prevention interventions so long as people live in a culture where extrinsic values are frequently encouraged, where intrinsic values are co-opted for marketing purposes, and where the media, government, and educational systems have all become outlets for materialistic interests. If this is the state of our culture, is it reasonable to say that individual citizens should be solely responsible for their value orientations? When children are targeted by marketers and pressured by peers to want the newest “in” products, is it reasonable to say that parents should just turn off the television and resist their children's complaints? In the face of the glorification of the goods life and statements by the U.S. president that people should “go shopping” after a national tragedy like 9/11 (“Excerpts,” 2001), is it reasonable to believe that people can switch to a more materially simple lifestyle without being viewed as weird, unpatriotic, or subversive?

If indeed the broader social processes, structures, and agendas relevant to consumerism are important to address, psychologists must begin to overcome their disciplinary reticence to become involved in public policy issues (see Kasser & Kanner, 2004, for a discussion) and begin to work for broader structural changes. Elsewhere, I have written about a variety of areas of public policy psychologists might work on (see, e.g., Kasser, 2002b, 2011), but here I discuss two.

The Commercialization of Childhood

Capitalist markets must expand in order to satisfy their quest for ever-increasing profits, and in the past few decades, marketers have broken new ground by focusing on children and teens, who purchase or influence their parents' purchase of around $1.2 trillion worth of products and services annually (Robinson, 2012). Not surprisingly, marketers have consequently spent a great deal of time, effort, and money trying to influence children's desires for more stuff. Although some may claim that this is a natural and appropriate way to increase consumption and thus economic progress (i.e., extrinsic pursuits), there are good reasons to be uneasy about this development.

As has been well-documented in books by Linn (2004) and Schor (2004), a great deal of evidence suggests that many of the messages and products that are marketed to children are unhealthy in one way or another. These authors review evidence that when children consume consumer culture, they are placed at increased risk of developing eating disorders (both obesity and anorexia/bulimia), being violent and sexually promiscuous, feeling less happy, having more arguments with their families, and believing that materialistic values are important in life. Indeed, two studies of U.S. (Schor, 2004) and U.K. (Nairn, Ormrod, & Bottomley, 2007) adolescents have found support for path models showing that exposure to more media leads to high levels of “consumer involvement” and materialism, which in turn are associated with more depression, anxiety, and physical symptoms, as well as lower self-esteem. Further, as noted earlier in the chapter, time-series analyses have shown that materialism rates of teenagers are higher during times when a larger percentage of the U.S. gross domestic product comes from advertising expenditures (Twenge & Kasser, 2013).

There are other reasons to be particularly concerned about marketing to children. For one, children are often exposed to advertisements in schools; because attendance at school is compulsory, children are thus forced to see corporate banners in the hallways, study curricula sponsored by corporations, or even watch television shows such as Channel One that contain advertisements (Linn, 2004; Schor, 2004). Another problem concerns children's still-developing cognitive abilities. The American Psychological Association Task Force on Advertising and Children (2004) concluded that children under age 8 have great difficulty understanding the persuasive intent of advertising. Thus, although older children and adults typically have the cognitive capacity to become aware of how advertisements are attempting to manipulate them and can understand the biases inherent in advertising, most children (especially the very young) typically trust the messages they see in advertisements, and are thus at the mercy of those who create them.

It would be one thing if marketers had children's best interests at heart, but a quick read through the writings of Schor (2004) or Linn (2004) makes it clear that many marketers care little about the welfare of the children to whom they sell. Consider the following quote, for instance:

Advertising at its best is making people feel that without their product, you're a loser Kids are very sensitive to that. If you tell them to buy something they are resistant, but if you tell them that they'll be a dork if they don't, you've got their attention. You open up emotional vulnerabilities, and it's very easy to do with kids because they're the most emotionally vulnerable. (Harris, 1989, p. 1)

Given the research on extrinsic aspirations previously reviewed, it is perhaps not surprising that some marketers speak about children in this way. That is, people's extrinsic pursuits are associated with caring less about others' welfare, being less empathic, and endorsing a more Machiavellian stance toward other people. It therefore logically follows that individuals who are interested in making money off of children would be willing to manipulate children, sell them unhealthy products, and promote materialism and extrinsic pursuits.

Several policy suggestions to counteract marketing to children have been proposed by Linn (2004) and Schor (2004), as well as by an organization known as Commercial Alert, which drafted a nine-point Parent's Bill of Rights (Commercial Alert, 2003). Here, I would like to highlight four sets of proposals mentioned by these sources that could work to decrease the spread of extrinsic aspirations in children, as well as to block the actions of those marketers so taken with extrinsic aspirations that they are willing to advertise harmful products and messages.

The first set of proposals concerns disclosure. Advertisements are increasingly present in television shows, movies, and video games; even chat rooms and everyday interactions have been infiltrated by actors hired to promote certain products without revealing that they are paid to do so. Clearly many of these methods involve an intent to deceive and get “below the radar screen” of the viewer/player/person. For this reason, Linn (2004), Schor (2004), and Commercial Alert (2003) all recommend that marketers must clearly state when an advertisement is occurring, and that such statements be made in age-appropriate ways so that even young children exposed to advertisements know that an advertisement is occurring. Such a policy would help decrease much of the unconscious conditioning by which marketers promote their products and extrinsic pursuits.

A second set of suggestions is to make marketing research abide by the same stringent ethical review processes that are required in academic settings. Currently, marketers conducting research do not have to follow any of the standard procedures that require academics and other researchers to obtain subjects' consent, to protect minors, or to notify subjects of potential harms that might occur from participating in the research (Jacoby, Johar, & Morrin, 1998). It is important to force marketers to operate under the same ethical standards that occur in other research settings, given the evidence that marketers often sell products that are harmful and given that they have even conducted studies designed to understand how to increase the likelihood that children's “purchase requests” (i.e., nagging) are supported by parents (i.e., the parents give) (Western Media International, 1998).

A third approach concerns reforming tax laws so as to remove existing subsidies for advertising to children. Commercial Alert (2003), for example, suggests that Congress end the practice of allowing corporations to deduct advertising expenses. An even stronger approach endorsed by both Schor (2004) and Linn (2004) is to levy a tax on advertising that is aimed at audiences with high proportions of children and teenagers. The money raised from such taxes could then be devoted to commercial-free public television, to media literacy campaigns, and to programs designed to support and encourage intrinsic values and goals. At the same time, such changes in tax laws would affect extrinsically oriented marketers and corporations in the pocketbook, thereby potentially diminishing the amount of ambient advertising in the environment.

Finally, outright bans on marketing in certain situations, marketing of certain products, marketing in certain ways, and marketing to children under certain ages have been proposed. Most activists agree that marketing in schools or on school property (including school buses) should be outlawed, given that it is inescapable and at odds with the educational mission of schools. Schor (2004) and Linn (2004) have both suggested following the lead of New Zealand by banning all advertisements of junk food. Linn (2004) also suggests banning advertisements that demean adults, or that suggest that ownership of a certain product will promote peer acceptance. Finally, many activists agree that nations concerned about the welfare of children should follow the lead of Brazil, Sweden, Norway, and the Canadian province of Quebec by banning all advertisements to children under certain ages, although disagreement exists about whether the appropriate age is 5, 8, or 12 years old.

Time Affluence

Contemporary society, with its capitalist economic organization dependent on consumer spending, places substantial emphasis on increasing material affluence as a barometer of progress. Given the significant psychological, social, and ecological costs associated with organizing one's life around the pursuit of the extrinsic goals embodied in material affluence, and given that in economically developed countries improvements in material affluence do not translate into improved subjective well-being (Diener & Seligman, 2004), other models of the good life are needed to supplant that of material affluence.

Time affluence is one such model. Even after controlling for feelings of material affluence, individuals who feel like they have enough time and are not overly rushed report higher levels of personal well-being (Kasser & Sheldon, 2009). Other research shows that people report higher levels of personal well-being on the weekend (i.e., when they are less likely to be working for money; Ryan, Bernstein, & Brown, 2010) and that brief reminders of time (versus money or neutral topics) increase people's happiness over the coming hours (Mogilner, 2010). Time affluence seems to provide these well-being benefits because it provides opportunities for people to pursue intrinsic aspirations (Kasser & Sheldon, 2009); to satisfy their psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness (Ryan et al., 2010); and to have social interactions with others (Mogilner, 2010). Working fewer hours is also associated with greater levels of ecological sustainability, both at the level of the person (Kasser & Brown, 2003) and at the level of the nation (Hayden & Shandra, 2009; Rosnick & Weisbrot, 2006).

Passing policies that help people to maximize their time affluence (rather than their material affluence) is thus a promising way of promoting intrinsic aspirations, undermining extrinsic aspirations, and supporting the multifaceted vision of the good life described here. Again, many scholars and activists agree on some basic policies that could be useful in this respect (see, e.g, de Graaf, 2004; Jackson, 2009; and Schor, 2010).

First, policy could improve workers' access to paid family leave. In the United States, the Family and Medical Leave Act allows workers only 12 weeks of unpaid leave to care for newborn children or sick relatives; this stands in contrast to the vast majority of nations of the world that provide substantially longer periods of paid family leave. Passing laws that support or expand paid family leave would have the important effect of allowing individuals to pursue the intrinsic aspirations of affiliation, particularly in critical moments of transition in life (e.g., births and deaths).

A second proposition concerns the minimum amount of paid vacation workers receive. The European Union requires a legal minimum of 4 weeks of paid vacation. In contrast, the United States has no law ensuring minimum paid vacation for workers; many workers do receive 2 weeks, but many other American workers, particularly low-income women, receive no paid vacation at all. By passing laws that increase vacation time, individuals would have the opportunity to pursue their personal interests, spend time with their family, and actually pause and reflect on their lives rather than continue the helter-skelter lifestyle so prominent in contemporary Western nations. Such a law might be decried by those in business who concern themselves primarily with profit, but, as noted, we must recognize that other aims in life besides money need to be supported by our legal mechanisms.

A third proposal is in regard to overtime. In the United States, there is no mandatory number of maximum hours that an employer can ask their workers to work, despite the fact that most other economically developed nations do have such maximums. Rather than being held hostage by employers who threaten the loss of job security and future raises if employees do not work more, passage of such laws would enable workers to be more in charge of their lives (thus supporting personal growth aspirations), as well as potentially have more time to spend with friends and family (i.e., affiliation aspirations) and in civic and volunteer activities (i.e., community feeling).

Finally, de Graaf (2004) proposes that the United States should “make Election Day a holiday.” Voter turnout for U.S. citizens has generally been on the decline, despite the fact that the close election of 2000 showed the importance of every single vote. Voter turnout is not particularly high in other democratic nations either. Were nations to recognize that civic responsibilities (i.e., community feeling aspirations) need to be supported in the face of the press of work obligations (i.e., extrinsic pursuits), perhaps more individuals would take the time to become involved in this important aspect of democracy.

In sum, these four legislative proposals hold promise for improving “the good life” by decreasing citizens' focus on material affluence (extrinsic aspirations) and instead supporting people's efforts to pursue intrinsic aspirations by providing them with the time needed to do so.

Conclusion

In summary, I have tried in this chapter to demonstrate that a large and growing body of empirical evidence suggests that consumer culture's vision of the goods life, as reflected in the pursuit of extrinsic aims for money, image, and popularity, is associated with a relatively low quality of life. In contrast, positive psychology's vision of the good life, as reflected in the pursuit of intrinsic values for personal growth, affiliation, and community contribution, seems to do substantially better at fulfilling its promises of happiness and enhanced well-being, while also promoting more prosocial and ecologically sustainable attitudes and behaviors. Psychologists might help individuals and society move away from extrinsic and toward intrinsic values by developing and testing interventions with clients, children, and adults, and by working at a policy level to end advertising to children and to provide individuals with more time affluence. Such efforts might help to loosen the grip of the goods life and free people to pursue the truly good life.

Summary Points

  • Substantial cross-cultural evidence supports a theoretical distinction between intrinsic goals and values (for personal growth, affiliation, and community feeling) and extrinsic goals and values (for money, image, and popularity).
  • Because intrinsic goals do a relatively good job of satisfying inherent psychological needs, research shows that people who focus on them generally have high levels of well-being and low levels of distress; prioritizing extrinsic goals, in contrast, is consistently associated with lower well-being and greater distress.
  • Compared to those focused on extrinsic values, research shows that people who organize their lives around intrinsic values also treat others in more humane ways and pursue more ecologically sustainable lifestyles, thus supporting others' well-being.
  • The quality of people's lives can thus be improved by encouraging the intrinsic values and goals reflected in positive psychology and by discouraging the vision of “the goods life” reflected in extrinsic values and our money-driven, consumer culture.
  • One means of implementing this strategy is to develop psychotherapeutic means of helping clients prioritize intrinsic goals and deprioritize extrinsic goals.
  • Preventive interventions can also be developed to help children and young people orient away from the extrinsic goals of consumer society and instead orient their lives around the pursuit of intrinsic goals.
  • The possibility of fully supporting a good life, however, will also require psychologists to overcome their reticence to be involved in public policy issues, as the consumer culture in which contemporary humans exist frequently encourages extrinsic goals.
  • Two such sets of policies are, first, to limit the extent to which children are exposed to advertisements, which usually encourage extrinsic goals, and, second, to promote policies that allow for greater time affluence, thereby allowing more opportunities to pursue intrinsic goals successfully.

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