Index
Note: The index does not include the preface to the paperback edition.
9/11 attacks: chemical facilities security after, 193–99, 204; counterterrorism efforts as response to, 8–9, 60–61, 68–71, 75–76, 77, 81–82, 126, 311, 322; diverted air traffic during, 214; first responders and communication during, 49; nuclear facilities security after, 135, 138–39, 176; Patriot Act as response to, 102; planning and execution of, 305–9, 313; preparedness prior to, 293–94. See also 9/11 Commission Report
9/11 Commission Report: civil liberties provisions in, 125; on communication failures between intelligence agencies, 79; reorganization as response to, 107, 122, 308; on terrorist organizations, 305–6, 308
Against All Enemies (Clarke), 80–81, 105–6
agency theory, 331
agriculture: in California Central Valley, 33–34; crop insurance, 45, 46–47; deconcentration of, 16–17, 323; flooding risks increased by modern, 17–18; food safety and concentration of production, 7, 16–17, 299–300, 323; water availability and, 33–34; wetlands polluted by, 20
airline industry: computer network failures at airports, 258; deregulation of, 7; diverted air traffic during 9/11 response, 214; security measures at airports, 117–18; as terrorist target, 7, 70, 126
Allbaugh, Joseph, 96, 109, 243
“all hazards” approach: DHS and, 127; FEMA and, 50, 54; reduction of target size as effective, 310, 314
Al Qaeda: chemical attacks and, 180–81; electrical grid as target for planned cyber attack by, 215; intelligence regarding threat, 73, 75, 79, 311; Iraq invasion and, 105, 305; as network organization, 304–5; nuclear plants as targets of, 135; organizational failures in, 305–7, 308–9; strategic objectives of, 69–70, 313. See also 9/11 attacks
Alverez, Robert, 136
American Chemistry Council (ACC), 190, 197, 203
American Society of Chemical Engineers (ASCE), 181–82
America the Vulnerable (Flynn), 6
Andrew (1992), 30, 37, 50, 51–52, 62, 64, 67, 181; costs or losses of, 38; FEMA response during, 57–58
anthrax attacks, 94–95, 123, 312
“anthropogenic forcing” of climate change, 18
Army Corps of Engineers, 20, 113, 192, 322
Ashcroft, John, 101
Ashford, Nicholas, 182, 205, 208
Atta, Mohammed, 308
Barton, Joe, 242–43
Belden, Timothy, 238
Bhopal, India (Union Carbide plant disaster), 175–76, 177–81, 202
Bier, Vicki, 113
bin Laden, Osama, 76, 308, 313
biohazards: agricultural practices and, 299; anthrax attacks, 94–95; biochemical attacks, 127; biological attacks, 94–95, 127, 299–300, 312–13; public health laboratories and, 98
blackouts: Canadian disaster response and, 214; causes of, 211–12, 233, 244–45; costs of, 211, 213–14, 234; deaths caused by, 213; deliberate manipulation of transmission schedules to cause, 233; deregulation and, 228, 233, 236–37, 243–45; electrical power grid vulnerabilities and, 227; incident rates for, 219; scope of, 211
Border Patrol, 97–98
border security, 5, 75, 107, 126, 310; funding for, 97–98; Homeland Security and, 9, 86, 93–94, 97–98, 126, 310; jurisdictional issues and, 94, 125
botulism, 299–300
Broderick, Matthew E., 113–14
Brookings Institution, 89, 106
Brown, Michael, 108–9, 111, 114, 116
building codes, 5, 16, 30, 37, 66
Busch, R. W., 168
Bush, George H. W.: deregulation of energy industry and, 235; FEMA and, 51–52, 54, 59
Bush, George W.: campaign contributions from industry, 148–49; chemical plant security and, 199; civil liberties and, 124–25; cold war ideology and priorities of, 73–74; consolidation of power in the executive branch, 69, 77–78, 84–87, 125–26; counterterrorism and, 123–24, 126, 293–94; cronyism and political appointments, 116–17; cyber-security plan of, 269; “deunionizing” of civil service employees, 104–5, 116, 322; DHS and, 87–88, 116; disaster preparedness as low priority of, 19, 109–10; energy industry and, 149, 243, 317–18; executive failures of, 293–94; FEMA and, 8, 19, 54, 64, 108–14, 115, 117; Iraq invasion, 105; liability of industry reduced by, 317–18; natural disaster policy and, 19; organizational failures during, 126; pro-business orientation of, 317–18; “small government” goal of, 116; terrorism preparedness of, 72, 74–76, 78, 79–80, 122–23, 126, 293–94
Byrd, Robert, 124–25
California: agricultural vulnerability in, 299–300; Central Valley of, 15, 20–21, 32–35; chemical industry in, 34, 208; deliberate creation of energy crisis in, 233, 235–43; DHS funds allocated to, 103–4; earthquakes and, 16, 33–35, 48, 50; ecoterrorism, 215; flooding risk in, 15, 20; population concentration in, 29, 32–35, 39
campaign financing: “captive” agencies linked to, 173; chemical industry and, 173, 176, 200, 210; energy industry and, 148–49, 169, 173, 228, 242–43; Internet advertising and less need for funds, 315–16; laws regulating, 228; political influence and campaign contributions, 173; reform proposals, 316
Canada: border security with, 97; disaster response successes in, 214; shared electrical grid with U.S., 211–13, 231
“captive agencies,” 61, 168–73, 323
Carson, Rachel, 201
Carter, Jimmy, 48–49; FEMA’s creation and, 52, 54
Casazza, John, 228
cascading failures (compound failures), complexity and increased likelihood of, 164–65, 213, 219, 257–58, 261
catastrophic potential: chemical industry and, 176, 182, 206–7; concentration and increase in, 182, 206–7; of nuclear power plants, 142, 171–72; organizational failures and, 165–66; scale related to, 206–7
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 89
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 94–95
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 59; biological attack study by, 312; counter-terrorism efforts of, 59, 74–75; cyber security at, 257; FBI and, 77–79, 122, 292; reorganization and, 87, 107
centralization or centralized control: 9/11 Commission’s recommendations, 107; arguments for, 82–83, 107; as barrier to rapid response and communication, 5, 118; centralized control model of organizational structures, 69; DHS and, 118; flexibility hampered by, 118; innovation and flexibility prevented by, 118, 225; of Internet, 286; organizational failure linked to, 106–8, 118; as political response to organizational failure, 106–8; of telecommunications, 284, 298
Central Valley of California, 15, 20–21, 32–35
Central Valley Project, 33–34
Challenger accident, 293
Changnon, David, 30
Changnon, Stanley, 30
chemical attacks: Al Qaeda and, 180–81; improvised chemical devices and terrorists, 1–2, 312–13; preparedness for, 98
chemical industry: American Society of Chemical Engineers (ASCE) and minimum standards for, 181–812; Bhopal, India (Union Carbide plant disaster), 177–81; carcinogen exposure and, 200–201, 203–4; catastrophic potential and, 176, 182, 206–7; Coast Guard inspection responsibilities and, 192–93; concentration of explosive and toxic materials and, 10, 182, 192; contract workers in, 182; disaster prevention costs, 176; earthquakes and, 34; emissions of, 176; environmental concerns and “proactive” stance of, 200–203; federal security legislation proposed for, 193–94, 199; incidence rate for accidents at, 187; inventory and storage as hazard in, 1–2, 10, 192, 200, 205–8, 207; in Los Angeles, 34; natural disasters and threats to chemical plants, 10, 34, 175–76, 181–82; in New Jersey, 197–99; organizational failures and accidents in, 183–86; population concentrations near facilities, 196, 209; reduction of targets in, 10, 176–77, 192, 200, 205–10; regulation of, 86, 176, 183, 186–88, 190–91; Responsible Care Management program of ACC, 190–91, 193; safety devices at facilities, 185; scale of facilities, 10, 182, 205; security breaches at facilities, 195–96; self-regulation of, 10, 176, 190–91; spills of hazardous chemicals, 24–26, 34, 113, 174–75, 183–85, 209; storage releases as risk, 205; substitutions of safer materials by, 195, 204–9, 210; terrorism targets in, 1–2, 98, 176, 191, 195–97, 209–10, 312–13; transport accident risks, 180–81, 183–85, 209–10
Chemical Manufacturers Association (American Chemistry Council), 190
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB), 183, 187
Chertoff, Michael, 99–100, 113–14, 115; on funding for counterterrorism, 198; regulation resisted by, 194–95
chlorine, 2, 183–85; accidental releases of, 34, 183–86, 188–89; lack of security for, 196–98; rail transportation and risk of spills, 174, 188; safer alternatives for, 195, 207–8; worst-case scenarios, 188–89
choke points, 296–97, 301; committees as legislative, 324
citizens: as first responders, 5, 89–90, 107, 297, 306; right to sue in industry liability cases, 320–22
City of Quartz (Davis), 33
civil defense, FEMA and, 50, 54–56, 57, 59–60, 69
civil liberties, 86–87, 195, 322–23; Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act and, 124–25; racial profiling, 195
Clarke, Lee, 3, 4, 56, 175, 187
Clarke, Richard, 74, 80–81, 85, 105–6
Clean Air Act (1970), 183, 201
Clean Water Act, 21
Clinton, Hillary, 148
Clinton, William: cyber security and, 248–49, 269; deregulation and, 232, 235; FEMA and, 54, 60–61, 66, 110, 117; information security plan of, 269; intelligence agency reforms during, 78–79, 81, 292; “reinventing government” program, 59–60; terrorism policy and initiatives, 74–76, 126
coastal erosion, 28–29
Coast Guard, 97, 109, 113, 192–93
cognitive agents, 218
cold war: Bush, George W.’s administration ideology linked to, 73–74; shift from civil defense after end of, 61
Collins, Susan M., 104
color-coded alert system, 120
commonality interdependency, 222, 297–98
common goods: communication infrastructure as common carriers, 275, 281–82; electrical utilities as, 223, 246; infrastructure as, 221–22
communication: 9/11 and telecom failures, 298; among intelligence agencies, 77; Bush, George W. and restricted information flow, 75; color-coded alert system, 120; dedicated systems vs. Internet, 274; dependency in telecommunications, 297; DHS communication failures, 120; FEMA and failures of, 50–51, 56–58, 59, 111–12, 292; FEMA’s information technology network, 55–56, 57, 63; first responders and need for, 98; information sharing between agencies, 71; integrated communication plan for FEMA, 49–50, 56; interagency communication failures, 63, 77, 79, 120; Katrina and communication failures, 63–64, 111–12; network systems for, 63; “panic” model as barrier to information sharing, 4–5; “reverse 911” calls and emergency evacuations, 185; terrorists and use of Internet for, 255. See also Internet
Community Redevelopment Authority of Los Angeles, 34
competition: consolidation and, 173; deregulation and, 7, 143, 156, 166–67, 172, 221–22, 224, 229, 246; diversification as strategy, 156; innovation linked to, 231, 272, 275, 285; Internet and, 259, 268–69, 273, 277, 282–83; market control and, 221, 265; market rigging by energy companies, 233, 242–43; multiplicity and, 300; networks of small firms and, 331; security enhanced by, 268–69. See also monopolies
complexity: compound or cascading failures and, 164–65, 213, 219, 257–58, 261; error as inevitable in complex systems, 245; interactive complexity, 219, 261, 327; networked systems and, 260–65; nuclear power facilities and, 142, 152, 154, 171–72; reliability and, 260–63
concentration: catastrophic potential increased by, 182, 309; centralization of telecommunications, 284, 298; chemical facilities, 10, 181, 182, 205–6; of chemical plants in Mississippi delta, 181; choke points caused by, 301; decentralization of industry and, 303–4, 319; dependency increased by, 296; of economic and political power, 7, 303; “open access” or “net neutrality” issues, 12, 275, 277, 281–84; economic motives for, 182; of energy, 6; of explosives or flammable substances, 6; federal policy and neglect of, 47; industrial, 133–34; network nodes as vulnerability point, 69–70, 279, 284–85, 301, 321; privatization and, 9; scale of facilities, 10, 182, 205; spatial dependency and, 297–99; terrorism threat and, 12; of toxic substances, 6, 10, 192; transportation corridors and risks, 300; vulnerability linked to, 4, 14–15. See also economic power, concentration of; population concentration; reduction of target size; scale
congestion: choke points, 296–97, 301. See also transmission congestion
Congress: business orientation of congress, 126–27 (See also lobbying); “captive agencies” and, 61, 168–73; committees and political power in, 49, 66, 82–83, 324; counterterrorism efforts and oversight by, 69–70, 75, 82, 86–87, 102–3; DHS and, 9, 49, 81–82, 84–89, 210; FEMA and congressional oversight, 43, 46, 49, 53, 55, 57–58, 60, 99; fragmentation and committee structure of, 82–83; intelligence agencies and, 87, 121, 123–25; jurisdictional conflicts and, 70–71, 85, 121; NRC and, 171; public pressure and, 200–201, 325; regulatory efforts and, 10, 21, 47, 193–94 (See also specific regulatory agencies); “supercommittee” model, 83. See also campaign financing; lobbying
Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control (DPUC), Northeast Utilities lawsuit, 164–65, 168
contract workers, as security risks, 192
cooperation: between agencies, 49, 78–79, 85–86, 90, 94–96, 292; communication failures as barriers to, 49; corporate models of successful, 91–92; decentralized systems and, 225; electrical grid management as example of, 216–18, 221; Federal Bureau of Investigation and, 80, 94–95, 122; FEMA and lack of, 49–50, 56–57, 59; informal personal relationship and, 94–95; interdependencies and, 297, 298, 300–301; international flood control and, 21; international transportation as example of, 225; jurisdictional conflicts and, 94–96; lack of routines or protocols for, 94–95; leadership essential to successful, 90; networks and, 91–92; reciprocity, 223, 298, 301, 305, 331
corruption: disaster funding and, 43–44, 47; favoritism in Homeland Security, 92; political access and influence, 315; regulation and protection against, 4
Corzine, Jon, 193–94, 197, 199, 319
costs: of blackouts, 211, 213–14, 234; of cyber attacks, 254, 256–57; damage estimation using GIS software, 62–63; of delta reclamation, 26–27; of disaster prevention in chemical industry, 176; federal funding for uninsured losses, 45; of hurricane losses, 29, 38, 45; insured losses, 30; losses as “cross-subsidized” or “socialized, 46; of man-made disasters, 1–2n; of Mississippi River flood (1993), 18; of mitigation, 36–37; of natural disasters, 2n, 14, 29, 38, 45; of terrorist attacks, 2n
Council on Foreign Relations, 89
counterterrorism: agencies as unprepared to assume new responsibilities, 93–94; Bush, George W. and, 123–24, 126, 293–94; congressional oversight committees and, 69–70, 75, 82; decentralization of efforts in, 307–8; formula used to allocate funding, 102–4, 198, 324; funding for, 74–78, 102–4, 198, 310, 329; intelligence tracking center planned, 119–20; jurisdictional disputes and, 71; organizational failure and inadequacies of, 291–92; Patriot Act and, 86–87, 102; preparedness for attacks, 72, 74–76, 78, 79–80, 293–94; racial profiling and, 195; target reduction as strategy for, 128–29, 309–10
Cox Bay, oil spill during Katrina, 26
cross-subsidization: of insurance, 65–66; of losses or costs, 46
Crowley, Timothy, 114
Crucibles of Hazard: Megacities and Disasters in Transition (Wisner), 33
cyber attacks: costs of, 254, 256–57; data control or manipulation, 253; distributed denial of service attacks, 252, 253, 259; on electrical grid, 215, 266; financial crimes, 254, 269; hacking tools and, 255–56; malware attacks, 252, 255, 270; Microsoft products and vulnerability to, 253; on military installations, 257; as military strategy, 27; nuclear power plants as vulnerable to, 256; on root servers, 330
Darken, Rudy, 157
data-mining, 87
Dauphin Island, Alabama, 37–38
Davis, Mike, 33
Davis-Besse nuclear power plant, 148–53; aging facilities at, 148, 149; blackout in 2003 linked to, 212; cyber attack at, 256; deregulation and near meltdown at, 148–50; executive failures at, 152–53; market forces and managerial decisions at, 166; NRC and regulatory responsibilities at, 149, 150–52; whistle blowers at, 150
deaths: biological agents and, 299; chemical industry related, 10, 175, 177, 183, 187, 209; electrical blackouts and, 213–14; industrial accidents and, 1–2n1; natural disaster related, 2n1, 5, 15, 23, 72, 324; nuclear plant related, 142, 145–46, 168; OSHA fines for deaths or serious injury, 186; “panic model” and increased, 5; reduction of population in risky areas fewer, 39; terrorism related, 1–2n1, 72
Deceit and Denial: The Deadly Politics of Industrial Pollution (Markowitz and Rosner), 203–4
decentralization: executive order coordination and, 78; feasibility of industrial, 303–4; vs. fragmentation, 78, 225; information sharing and, 35; Internet as example of decentralized system, 274, 277–78, 329–30; interoperability and, 222; social benefits of economic, 302–3. See also network systems
declarations of disaster: delayed response and, 115; as politically motivated, 46, 66, 102
deconcentration: executive failure risks mitigated by, 294–95. See also reduction of target size
Defense, Department of (DOD): datamining by, 87; FEMA and, 55–57, 58, 61–62; Internet development by, 274, 276–77; military use of cyber attacks, 257; vulnerability to cyber attacks, 248–49, 270, 284
defense industry, 72–73
Departments. See specific, i.e. Defense, Department of or Homeland Security, Department of
dependencies: globalization and, 301–2; physical dependencies, 296–97; small firm networks and interdependency vs. dependence, 303; spatial, 297–99; vulnerability and, 12
deregulation: of airlines, 7; arguments for, 170–71, 234–35; blackouts linked to, 228, 233, 236–37, 243–45; Bush (G.H.W.) and, 235; competition and, 7, 143, 156, 166–67, 172, 221–22, 224, 229, 246; concentration of economic and political power linked to, 7, 227–29, 232–35; consolidation of electrical power industry linked to, 146, 153, 227–34; EIA on expected benefits of, 229–30; of electrical power industry, 11, 143, 146, 152, 155–56, 159, 166; grid under increased stresses after, 231, 233, 246; industry responses to, 166; investment in facilities improvements after, 234; market manipulation in context of, 232, 233; market pressures and, 155; nuclear plant accidents linked to, 148–50; rates to consumers and, 229, 230, 233, 236–39, 246; research and development investment reduced after, 222, 225, 234, 246; shortage of reactive power linked to, 231; transmission lines as commodity after, 221–22; of transport industry, 224–26, 227, 246; vulnerabilities increased by, 215, 234; whole-sale energy trading in context of, 232–34
derivative trading, 235
design-basis threat (DBT), 138, 154–55
Diane (1955), 45
disaster policy: declarations as politically motivated, 46, 66; domestic policy as challenging to control, 77–78; federal insurance programs as part of, 46–47, 319; French model for, 65–66; history of federal protective services, 44–47; lack of political “constituency” for disaster planning, 43; long-range planning and preparedness, 43–44; as “patchwork” of uncoordinated agencies and programs, 45, 48; political influence and funding for, 45–46; potential for reforms in, 67; as reactive vs. proactive, 43, 47; threat model and, 72–74. See also Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); specific presidential administrations
Disaster Relief Act (1974), 48
disasters: incidence rate in U.S., 1–2, 18, 19; intelligence required for response to, 127; man-made disasters, 1–2n. See also industrial accidents; natural disasters; terrorism
diseases, 16–17, 94, 299, 312, 323
diversity in systems, 258–66
Domenici, Pete, 171
domestic security. See Homeland Security, Department of (DHS); intelligence agencies; military
domestic terrorism, 123, 134, 136, 310, 314
“downsizing” government, 133
DPC Enterprises (Festus, Missouri), 183–85
drug interdiction programs, 77, 105, 123
Dynergy (electrical power company), 232, 238–39, 242
earthquakes, 16, 301–2; California and vulnerability to, 33; chemical industry and, 34; flooding linked to, 20–21
economic power, concentration of, 7, 303. See also monopolies; deregulation and, 227–29, 232–35; Internet and, 12; networks as resistant to, 223
economics: of defense industry, 72–73; of flood control, 21–22; income and vulnerability to disaster, 13n, 31; of long-range disaster planning, 12, 24, 31–32; market manipulation and wholesale trade in energy, 232, 236–40, 241–42; risk as “externality,” 156; wealth and development in vulnerable areas, 29–30. See also costs; economic power, concentration of; market forces
ecoterrorism at, 136
Edison Electric Institute, 149
Edmonds, Sibel, 79
electrical grid: choke points in, 296–97; compared to Internet, 226–27; cyber attacks on, 215, 266; as decentralized system, 216–20; deregulation linked to increase in grid failure, 213, 220; economic motives for creating disturbances in, 236–38; incident rate for failures in, 219; independent service operators (ISOs), 216; “intelligent agents” and self-organization of, 217–19; investment in maintenance or improvements to, 227, 233, 246; links as vulnerability in, 226–27; as network system, 213, 220, 221–22, 226–27, 245–46, 327; nodes or links in, 226, 236, 296–97, 327; operational or equipment errors and, 211–12; parallel path flow or loop flow, 219–20n; redundancies in, 327; shortage of reactive power for transmission, 231; as terrorist target, 214–15, 245, 247, 254, 255; transmission congestion on, 219, 224, 226, 231, 235, 236–39; transmis sion distance as factor in efficiency of, 226–27, 231, 244–45, 246–47, 296; vulnerabilities of, 213, 214–15, 226–27, 244–45; “wheeling” as pressure on, 227, 228, 231, 233, 237, 244, 296
electrical power industry: alternative energy sources and, 173; centralization or consolidation of economic power and vulnerability in, 7; consolidation linked to unsafe practices at nuclear plants, 134; deregulation and, 11, 146, 152, 155–56, 159, 166; derivative trading in, 235; independent power producers (IPPs) in, 224; investment in improvements to facilities, 227, 233; local utilities as “natural monopolies,” 232; political influence and, 149, 228, 242–43, 246, 255–56; prices to consumers, 229, 230; research and development and, 230–31; self-regulation of, 11, 224, 243–44; terrorism targets, 254; transmission companies, 227, 232–33, 237–38; vulnerabilities of, 2, 7, 213, 214–15, 244–45, 256; wholesale energy trading, 240–41. See also blackouts; deregulation; electrical grid; nuclear power plants
Electric Reliability Councils, 216–17, 224, 243–44
El Paso (electrical power company), 232, 238–39, 242
Emily (1993), 62–63
emissions, chemical industry and, 200–201
Energy, Department of (DOE), 86, 135
Energy Information Administration (EIA), 228
Energy Policy Act (2005), 227–28, 317–18
Enron: executive failures at, 234–40, 293; government obstruction of investigation, 241; political contexts for scandal, 246; Snohomish district investigation of, 240–43; trading abuses by, 232, 233, 240–41
environmental issues: chemical industry and, 200–203; ecoterrorism, 136; erosion of regulations, 320; global warming, 17–18; public pressure and, 10; regulation and, 200–201; scale of facilities linked to amount of pollution, 10, 206; state vs. federal environmental protections, 10, 315. See also Environmental Protection Agency
Environmental Protection Agency, 86, 188, 190, 194, 320; chemical industry and, 193, 199; enforcement by, 201–2; establishment of, 201
Ervin, Clark Kent, 92, 101–2, 121
Europe: cooperation regarding flood control, 21; transport system and infrastructure in, 225–26. See also specific nations
evacuations, 46, 301; after 9/11, 297; after Katrina, 112; in nuclear attack scenarios, 56; nuclear power accidents and, 147–48; planning for, 5, 147–48; “reverse 911” calls and emergency evacuations, 185
executive failure, 9–10; Bush, George W. and, 293–94; at Davis-Besse, 152–53; deconcentration and mitigation of, 294–95; Enron as example of, 234–40, 293; as inadvertent rather than intentional, 294; litigation as strategy to curb, 294–95; at nuclear power facilities, 143–44, 145, 152–53, 165–68, 292, 293–94; in nuclear power facilities, 172; organizational failure and, 143–44, 165–68, 292–93; regulation and, 294–95; strategic failure as misnomer for, 167
executive order coordination, advantages of, 78
exercises, 71, 93; company safety drills, 185; at nuclear facilities, 137–40; privatization of security drills, 139–40; responsibility for scenarios and, 111; as unrealistic, 137–39
explosive materials, 10; fertilizer plant explosion at Toulouse, 189–90; natural disasters and, 19; reactivity of, 177; theft of by terrorists, 134
“externalities,” risks as, 156
Fastow, Andy, 234
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 126
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 75–76, 77; cooperation with other agencies by, 80, 94–95, 122; counterterrorism role of, 78, 291–92; cyber attacks on, 255, 284; DHS and, 121–22; Homeland Security and, 119–20; organizational failures in, 291–92; personnel transferred to DHS, 106; reorganization legislation and, 107; whistle-blower reports of problems within, 79
Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, 49
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA): agencies absorbed into, 99–100; “all hazard” orientation of, 50, 54; assistance programs (Individual and Family Grants), 38; Brown as director of, 108–9, 111; Bush, George W. and, 19, 54, 64, 108–14, 115, 117; civil defense and, 50, 54–56, 57, 59–60, 69; “classified” operations and, 55–56, 58; Clinton and, 54, 60–61, 110; communication failures and, 50–51, 56–58, 59, 111–12, 292; congressional oversight and, 43, 46, 49, 53, 55, 57–58, 60, 99; consolidation of responsibilities in, 48–49; corruption in, 58–59; counterterrorism and, 96–97, 109–10; cronyism and political appointments to, 50, 52–53, 57, 58, 60, 116–17; DHS and, 6, 96–97, 109–10, 113–14; DOD and resources of, 55–57, 58, 61–62; establishment of, 48–49; funding for, 58, 110–11; history of, 8; information technology and, 49–50, 59–62; Iran-Contra affair and, 58; jurisdiction issues, 53; Katrina and failures of, 53–54, 108–9, 111–14, 116–17; lack of cooperation and communication between agencies, 49–50, 56–58, 59, 113–14; natural disaster response as mission of, 50, 56, 57, 96–97, 109–10; as political tool, 8, 58–59; population relocated from risky areas, 19, 318–19; as reactive rather than proactive, 51, 116; reputation of agency, 8, 57; Rita response failures, 113; as “umbrella” agency, 49–50, 56; Witt as director of, 60–62
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), 239, 241
Federal Insurance Administration, 48
Federal Power Act, 241
Federal Preparedness Agency, 49
Feinstein, Diane, 104
FEMA. See Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
fines or penalties: for chemical industry violations, 186–87, 266; institutional failures and, 180; levied by Enron on Snohomish district, 240; levied by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 146, 159; OSHA fines for deaths or serious injury, 186; penalties for energy market manipulation, 238, 241; Reagan and reduction in, 186; Union Carbide and Bhopal disaster, 180
fires: blackouts as cause of, 211; concentrations of flammable substances and vulnerability to, 6; fire departments (See first responders); hazardous materials and, 174–75, 187, 206, 210, 298; natural disasters and flammable materials, 19; at nuclear facilities, 140; wild fires, 16, 40, 240
FirstEnergy, 149, 150, 153, 160, 166, 212
first responders: Bush, George W. and reduction of, 75; citizens as, 5, 89–90, 107, 297, 306; communications needs of, 98; DHS support for, 4; equipment needs of, 98–99; funding for, 4, 89–90, 98–99, 198; hazardous materials and, 99–100, 185; National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), 99–100, 114; organizational culture and failures on the part of, 291
flammable materials, 6, 16, 19. See also fires
flood plains: development on, 5, 19–22, 318; Supreme Court and designation of, 5, 39–40
floods, 15; agricultural practices and increased risk of, 17–18; Central Valley Project and flood control, 33–34; climate change and, 18, 19, 23; development in flood plains, 5, 19–22, 318; FEMA and relocation programs, 19; flood insurance programs, 37–38, 46–47, 48, 64–65, 319; hazardous materials spills during, 18–19, 40; levees and, 19–23; Mississippi River (1993), 17–23; National Flood Insurance Reform Act (1994), 64–65; oil and chemical spills during, 24–26, 113; population concentration in vulnerable areas, 15; wetlands and, 5, 20
Florida: 2004 hurricanes (Charley, Frances, Ivan, Jeanne), 108, 115; Everglades, 20, 27; Florida Keys, 31; Lake Okeechobee flooding, 20
Florida Keys, 31
Flynn, Steven, 6
food production: concentration and vulnerability in, 7, 16–17, 299–300; Gulf Coast seafood harvests, 24
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 87
fragmentation: centralized control as response to, 107; vs. decentralization, 78; efforts to address, 82–83; electrical power industry as “balkanized,” 229–30; of intelligence agencies, 120
France: chemical accidents in, 189–90; nuclear accidents in, 140
funding: allocations as politically motivated, 46; corruption and, 43–44; for counterterrorism programs, 74–78, 96, 198, 310; for CSB investigations of chemical facility accidents, 183; for delta reclamation, 26–27; for FBI, 75–76; federal assistance programs, 38; for first responders, 4, 89–90, 98–99, 198; formula for distribution of Homeland Security funds, 102–4; for Homeland Security, 88, 96–100; for intelligence agencies, 124, 127; intelligence and rational allocation of, 120; lobbying and federal subsidies, 46; lobbyists and “homeland security” industry, 100–101; mandates as unfunded, 96; military-related security spending, 121; misdirection of, 40; for mitigation projects, 110; for natural disaster preparedness, 110; for nuclear defense system through FEMA budget, 56; for Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 154, 171; for nuclear weapon and waste security, 135; politics of, 43–44, 47, 102–4, 199; supplemental disaster appropriations, 65; for vulnerability reduction, 46; waste and fraud, 5–6, 92, 101–2
Funk, John, 148–49
Galatis, George, 161, 162–63, 168
Garrett, Thomas, 46
Gilmore Commission, 81–82
GIS software, 62–63
Glasser, Susan, 85–86, 88, 109
globalization, 301–2
global vulnerabilities, concentration and, 14–15
global warming. See climate change
Gore, Albert, 59–60
Gorsuch, Ann Burford, 202
Governmental Accountability Office (GAO): on chemical industry, 210; on DHS, 106, 210; on electrical industry as terrorist target, 255; Homeland Security reports, 89–91; on meltdown risk at Davis-Besse, 149–50; on NRC failures, 151; on nuclear plant security, 137–40; on worst case scenarios for chemical industry facilities, 188–89
Gramm, Wendy, 235
Grant, Don, 206
Grunwald, Michael, 85–86, 88–89, 109
Gulf Coast, 8, 28, 39, 318–19, 324
Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, 28
Gup, Ted, 56
hackers, 252, 253–54, 284; electrical grid SCADA control systems and cyber attack, 215, 266; government systems as vulnerable to, 248–49, 257; hacking tools, 255–56; intelligence agencies as vulnerable to, 257. See also cyber attacks
Hale, Kate, 51–52
Hammond, Thomas H., 122–23
Hanjour, Hani, 308
Harbin, China, 209
Hatch, Orrin, 281
hazardous materials (hazmats): concentrations of, 6, 10, 13, 23–24, 176–77, 298–99; earthquakes and risks of spills, 35; fires and, 174–75, 187, 206, 210, 298; fires and releases of, 174–75; first responders and, 99–100, 185; flammability, 177; floods and, 18–19, 40; inventories of, 5, 192, 200, 205–6; natural disasters and, 16, 18–19, 24–26, 113, 181, 189; in New Orleans, 23–26, 113; reactivity, 177; as terrorist targets, 69–70; toxicity, 177; transportation as accident risk, 174–75, 300; transport regulation, 189; volatility, 177. See also chemical industry
Health and Human Services, Department of, 86; jurisdictional conflicts, 99
Heritage Foundation, 89
high reliability theory, 164
Holland (Netherlands), 21, 39, 318
Hollings, Ernest “Fritz,” 57
Homeland Security, Department of (DHS): border security as facet of, 97–98; Bush, George W. and formation of, 87–88, 104–5, 115, 116; centralized control of, 118; chemical industry and, 198–200, 210; congressional oversight of, 9, 49, 81–82, 84–87, 84–89, 89, 210; counterterrorism mission of, 119–20, 198–99; cyber security failures at, 270; departure of qualified and experienced personnel, 105–6; “de-unionizing” of civil employees linked, 104–5, 115, 322; as dysfunctional organization, 9, 116, 324; effects on safety and security, 99–100, 127; executive coordination (White House control) option, 76–81; failures during Katrina and Rita, 114; FBI and, 121–22; FEMA integrated into, 6, 67, 96–97; first responder support by, 4; formula for distribution of funds used by, 102–4; funding for, 88, 102–4, 198–99; GAO reports on, 106; as “high-risk” agency, 90–91; industrial accidents and, 127; intelligence agencies excluded from, 86–87, 107, 119–22; intelligence coordination as mission of, 119–22, 125; internal accountability, 92; jurisdictional disputes and, 71, 86; lobbyists and “homeland security” industry, 100–101; morale in, 106, 116–17; natural disasters and, 114, 127–28; non-security functions assigned to, 91; as organizational failure, 6, 87–91, 93, 116, 324; performance during first five years of operation analyzed, 126–29; as politicized and ineffectual, 80–81; size of, 91; staffing and facilities inadequacies at, 88, 105–6, 116–17; “statutory coordination” (power sharing) option, 81–83; waste and fraud in, 5, 92, 101–2; White House control of, 76–81
Homeland Security Act, 85
homeland security as lucrative industry, 139–40
Homeland Security Operations Center, 113
Housing and Urban Development, disaster assistance role of, 48–49
Hughes, Karen, 109
hurricanes: building codes and level of damage during, 37; chemical plants and, 181–82; costs of, 29, 38, 45; Diane (1955), 45; federal funding for uninsured losses caused by, 45; FEMA and, 50–51, 57, 113–15 (See also Katrina (2005)); in Florida (2004), 108, 115; Galveston (1900), 47; GIS software and, 62–63; Hugo (1989), 50, 57, 181; oil industry facilities and, 24–26, 113, 181; population concentration in vulnerable areas, 15; preparedness for, 115. See also Andrew (1992); Katrina (2005)
ICANN and monitoring of Internet, 280–81
IETF and monitoring of Internet, 280–81
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 101–2, 126
incidence rates: chemical industry accidents, 182, 187; for disasters, 1–2, 18, 19; for electrical grid failures, 219; for floods, 18, 19; for industrial accidents, 182; of transportation accidents, 175–76
independent service operators (ISOs), 216
Indian Point power plant, 144, 145–48; evacuation plants for area, 148–49; management failures at, 146–47; meltdown risks at, 147
Individual and Family Grants, 38
industrial accidents, 9; coastal locations and industrial development, 31; damage to infrastructure caused by, 174; deaths caused by, 1–2n; DHS and, 127; incidence rates for, 182; natural disasters as triggers for, 24–26; “operator error” as most common explanation for, 260; preparedness for, 185, 210; scale linked to increase in, 10; threat assessment, 311. See also specific industries
“information asymmetry,” 35
information technology: barriers to information sharing between agencies, 71; GIS software, 62–63. See also Internet
Information Technology Services, 62
infrastructure: as common goods, 221–22; dependency and interdependency in industrial structures, 296–302; as federal responsibility, 314–15; privatization of, 9, 314–15; transport system, 224–26; vulnerability of, 1, 28
Inhofe, James M., 199
innovation: centralization or centralized control as barrier to, 118, 225; competition linked to, 231, 272, 275, 285; investment in, 231, 285; research and development, 222, 225, 234; small firm networks and, 303, 332
Institute, West Virginia (Union Carbide plant at), 178–80
Institute of Nuclear Power Operators (INPO), 154–55, 160, 169–70
institutional change. See organizational change
instrumental use of organizations, 3, 8, 9, 44–47, 58–59, 100–105, 124, 176
insurance, 37–38; crop insurance, 45, 46–47; cross-subsidization of, 65–66; cyber insurance, 270–71; enforcement of requirements for, 65–66; federal assistance programs as alternative to, 38; federal disaster relief and, 48, 64–65, 314; federal legislation and, 45; federally subsidized, 64–65, 314; as incentive for risk taking, 8; insured losses, 30; lack of incentives for purchase of, 46–47; National Flood Insurance Act (1968), 48; National Flood Insurance Program, 37–38, 319; regulation and, 270
intelligence agencies: barriers to information sharing between, 77, 79; congressional oversight of, 125; cooperation among, 78–79, 292; cyber attacks as vulnerability of, 257; exempted from DHS control, 86–87, 107; fragmentation of, 120; Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004), 123–24; lack of coordination and communication among, 122; Pentagon and, 125; reorganization legislation, 107; resistance to institutional change in, 79–80, 122
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004), 123–24
“intelligent agents” and self-organization, 217–18, 227
interactive complexity, 261
interdependencies, 297, 300–301; commonality interdependency, 222, 297–98; reciprocal interdependency, 298, 301
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 23, 28
Internet: access devices as point of vulnerability, 249–50, 266, 284; bandwidth as limited resource, 282, 283, 328; “botnets” and proliferation of malware, 252; business espionage on, 253–54; caching data on, 280; competition and improved security, 268–69; data manipulation attacks, 249–50; as decentralized system, 274, 277–78, 286; Defense Department and development of, 276–77; denial-of-service attacks, 252, 253, 258–59, 259; development and design of, 274–75; diversity in systems as security strategy for, 258–66; Domain Names System (DNS) servers, 280, 283, 329–30; encryption and security, 252; FEMA and, 59–60; financial crimes and, 250, 254, 269; government agencies and cyber security breaches, 270; hardware and access to, 251; hierarchy of servers in, 328, 330; hubs, 279; ICANN and monitoring of, 280–81; IETF and monitoring of, 281; malware (viruses, worms, etc.) attacks, 252, 255, 270; Microsoft “monoculture” and vulnerability of, 7, 11, 250, 253, 258, 261–74; as network system, 4, 11, 226–27, 249–50, 274–75, 327; nodes in, 226, 250–52, 258–59, 278–79, 284–85; “open access” or “net neutrality” issues, 12, 275, 277, 281–84; open-source and security on, 268–69, 271–74, 285–86; operating systems as element of, 250, 258; peering link redundancy in, 328–29; political campaigns and, 315–16; protocols and interoperability, 275–77; redundancies in and security of, 277–78, 301, 327; reliability of, 274, 277–81, 286, 329–30; replication/ link redundancy in, 329–30; root servers, 280, 283, 330; as “scale-free” system, 278–79; security structures in, 252; self-regulation of, 280–81; servers, 262–63, 265, 279–80; software and access to, 251; terrorism and, 248–50; as tool for terrorism, 254, 255; transmission congestion on, 226, 252, 283. See also hackers
interoperability, 222, 267, 274–77
Iran-Contra affair, 58
Islamic terrorism, 71–72, 107, 123, 310, 312–13. See also Al Qaeda
Jackson, Shirley, 161–62
Jaskow, Paul, 239
Jilin, China, 209
Johnson, Lyndon, 242
judiciary, 164–65, 168; antitrust cases, 262–63, 273–74, 275; liability for cyber security failures, 269–70, 273, 286–87; Microsoft case, 262–63, 273–74; Snohomish district vs. Enron, 240–43; telecommunications industry and antitrust actions, 275. See also Supreme Court decisions
jurisdictional issues: border security and, 94, 125; Congress and, 70–71, 85, 121; cooperation and, 94; DHS and, 71, 86; FEMA and, 53; Health and Human Services and, 99; “patchwork” of regulatory responsibilities, 94–96, 199–200; regulatory failures and “patchwork” of, 199–200; state-level regulation efforts and, 10, 36, 300, 317
Katrina (2005), 22–30; communication failure during, 63–64, 116; costs or losses of, 38; deaths during, 324; disaster awareness after, 324; FEMA’s failures during, 53–54, 108–9, 111–14, 116–17; New Orleans and rebuilding after, 27–28; notification of FEMA, DHS, and White House, 64; oil and chemical spills, 24–26, 113, 181; organizational failures during, 291; “panic” model and failures during, 5; pollution in aftermath of, 23–26; preparedness plans in place, 111; Rita compared to, 114–15; social and culture costs of, 28; waste and fraud after, 5–6
Kettl, Donald F., 84
Kleindorfer, Paul, 206
Koff, Stephen, 152
Kolbert, Elizabeth, 145
Kunreuther, Howard, 65
Lake Okeechobee, 20
landslides, 17
leadership: barriers to successful, 88–89; cooperation as dependent upon, 90; failures during Katrina, 108–9, 111–12, 113–14, 117–19; organizational structures and, 119, 126; shirking, 331; successful reorganizations and, 201–2; White House support as essential to success, 108, 126. See also executive failure
Leahy, Patrick, 102–3
legislation: chemical plant security proposals, 193–94, 199, 324; Disaster Relief Act (1974), 48; Energy Policy Act (2005), 317–18; Homeland Security Act, 85; intelligence agencies reorganization proposals, 107, 123–24; Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004), 123–24; lobbying and defeat of proposed, 194, 199–200, 246; National Flood Insurance Act (1968), 48; National Flood Insurance Reform Act (1994), 64–65; occupational safety legislation, 45; Patriot Act, 86–87, 102, 124; public pressure and, 200, 325
Leitenberg, Milton, 313
levees: construction standards for, 322; earthquakes and failure of, 20–21; as inadequate, 19, 22, 39; Katrina and failure of, 113; negative effects of construction, 19–20, 40, 46–47; regulation and standards for, 295
Leverett, Flynt, 106
liability, corporate: Bush, George W. policies and industrial, 317–18; cyber security and, 269–70, 273, 286–87, 321, 323–24; executive failure curbed by litigation, 294–95; government regulation and, 44–45, 172, 317–18; insurance companies and, 38–40, 321, 323–24; for nuclear accidents, 172; rights of citizens to sue, 320–21
Lieberman, Joseph, 85, 104, 106
limiting damage, 5
Lindblom, Charles, 128
Liu, Yifan, 299–300
lobbying: DHS and, 9, 86, 100–101; disaster funds and, 46; electrical power industry and, 242–43, 246; Homeland Security initiatives impeded by, 126; reforms, 243, 316; regulation or legislation defeated by (find more), 194, 199–200, 246
Lochbaum, David, 171
Loma Prieta earthquake (1989), 35, 50
Los Alamos National Laboratory, 147
Los Angeles, 33–34
Louisiana: climate change and risks in, 28; delta of Mississippi River in, 15, 22; funding for mitigation projects in, 110; hurricane preparedness in, 31, 111, 115; levees and, 22–23. See also New Orleans
MacAvoy, Paul, 156, 158, 159, 161–62, 163, 165–67
Macy, John, 54
Mangels, John, 148–49, 153, 169
market forces: accident prevention as market failure, 35; deregulation and, 213; development in vulnerable areas linked to, 35; economies of scale, 12, 182, 298–300; horizontal vs. vertical market control, 221; market manipulation in electrical power industry, 232, 236–40, 241–42; nuclear power plants management and, 141, 143–44, 156–57, 158, 164, 166, 171–72. See also competition
Markowitz, Gerald, 203–4
mass production, 332–33
McFarlane, Robert, 58
McWilliams, Carey, 33
media: chemical security problems publicized by, 195–200; as information source during Katrina, 111; political campaigns and, 315–16; public awareness of risk and, 149; Time magazine on nuclear power industry, 160–61
Microsoft: antitrust case, 262–63, 273–74; computer monoculture and vulnerability of Internet, 7, 11, 250, 253, 258–71, 285; critical infrastructure and dependence on, 259; government dependence on products, 186, 266–67; lack of incentives to improve security and reliability of products, 267, 269; near-monopoly control of industry, 265–71, 272–74, 285; open-source as alternative to, 268–69, 271–74; “patches” as security strategy of, 263, 268–69, 271; tight coupling of design linked to system vulnerability, 261–63, 271
Mileti, Denis, 36–37
military: cyber attacks on installations, 257; disaster response role of, 52, 112, 114, 118–19; funding for military-related security spending, 121. See also Defense, Department of (DOD)
Millstone nuclear facility (New London, Conn.), 145, 155–66; executive failures at, 292, 293–94; management failures at, 143–44, 145, 152–53, 158, 159, 165–67; NRC regulatory responsibilities and, 157–60, 163–64
Mineta, Norman Y., 57
Mississippi River: 1993 flood, 17–23, 318; concentration of chemical plants in delta, 181; costs of delta rescue plan, 27; flooding, 8; hurricane and flooding risks in delta, 22; Louisiana delta of, 15, 22; reclamation of delta, 26–27, 324
mitigation: costs and priority of, 36–37; effectiveness of efforts, 29; FEMA’s Project Impact as model program, 110; inadequacies of strategy dependent upon, 109, 292, 310; incentives for, 29, 65; Project Impact, 110
Mobile Emergency Response Systems (MERS), 64
Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh, 308
monopolies: as concentration of economic power, 7, 13; electrical power industry and, 221, 232; local utilities as “natural monopolies,” 232; Microsoft and operation system “monoculture,” 7, 11, 258–74, 285; Microsoft as near-monopoly, 265–71, 272–74, 285; telecommunications industry and antitrust actions, 275; vulnerability and, 285, 301
morale: in DHS, 106, 116–17; at nuclear power plants, 138, 157; organizational culture and, 116–18
“moral hazard” problems, 47
Mount, Geoffrey, 21
Muller, Robert, 78
multiplicity, 300
Narduzzo, Allesandro, 327–29
National Academy of Sciences, 298–99
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 257, 293
National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), 99–100, 114
National Fire Prevention and Control Administration, 49
National Flood Insurance Act (1968), 48
National Flood Insurance Program, 37–38
National Flood Insurance Reform Act (1994), 64–65
National Governors Association, 48
National Guard, role during Katrina, 112, 114, 118–19
National Preparedness Directorate (NPD), 55–57, 62
National Response Plan, 111
National Security Council (NCS), 55–56, 61, 81
National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program, 49
natural disasters: Central Valley of California as vulnerable to, 15; chemical facilities and, 10, 34, 175–76, 181–82; concentration and vulnerability to, 2–3; costs of, 14, 29; deaths caused by, 15; DHS and, 114, 127–28; FEMA and, 50, 56, 57, 96–97, 109–10; hazardous materials and, 16, 18–19, 24–26, 113, 181, 189; legislation in response to, 48; Louisiana delta as vulnerable to, 15; pollution in aftermath of, 23–24, 113; population concentrations in vulnerable areas, 8, 14, 15; terrorism as risk relative to, 70, 110; threat as underestimated, 40, 311. See also earthquakes; floods; hurricanes
Negroponte, John, 125–26
network systems, 11; cascading failures in, 164–65, 257–58, 261; complexity and vulnerability of, 260–65; cooperation in organizational networks, 91–92; as decentralized systems, 216–20; diversity in systems as security strategy for, 258–66; electrical grid as example of, 4, 213, 216–22, 226–27; FEMA telecommunications system, 63; interdependencies, 297, 300–301; Internet as example of, 4, 11, 226–27, 249–50, 274–75, 327; interoperability in, 222, 274–77; modular design for increased flexibility and resilience, 262, 263–64; network analysis, 226–27; redundancies in systems as security strategy for, 258, 277–78, 301, 327; as resilient and less vulnerable, 4, 301; as scale-free, 278–79; as self-organizing, 217–19, 297; small firms in economic networks, 302–4, 319, 331–34; social benefits of small firm networks, 302–3; terrorism organizations as, 304–8; tight coupling in, 261–63, 271; vulnerabilities of, 254, 257–58, 261–62, 271
Neumann, Peter, 250
New Jersey: cyber attacks on military installations at, 257; hazardous materials near population concentrations in, 188, 197; “most dangerous two miles in America” found in, 197–98; state-level efforts at regulation of hazardous materials, 10, 194–95, 208, 300, 319; terrorism targets in, 198–99, 210
New Orleans: disaster awareness and, 324; hazardous material concentration in, 23–24; infrastructure vulnerability in, 28; levees and, 22–23; mitigation of risk in, 318–19; oil spills and pollution of St. Bernard Parish, 24–26, 113; population concentration in, 2, 23–24, 28, 322; poverty and lack of preparedness in, 31; rebuilding after Katrina, 27–28, 322. See also Katrina (2005)
New York City: blackouts and, 211; chemical facilities and, 188, 197; counter-terrorism funds and, 102–4; nuclear facilities and, 134–35, 145–48; as target, 68, 74, 102–3
9/11 attacks and 9/11 Commission Report. See beginning of index
Nixon, Richard, 201
nodes in networks: electrical grid and, 226, 236; hubs on the Internet, 279; Internet and, 226, 250–52, 258–59, 278–79, 284–85; transmission congestion and, 226, 236; as vulnerability point, 69–70, 278–79, 284–85, 301, 321
“normal accidents” and normal accident theory, 212, 213, 219, 261
Normal Accidents (Perrow), 172, 186
Northeast Utilities, 155–56, 160; DPUC hearings and lawsuit, 164–65, 168; management failures at, 165–67
North Korea, 74
Northridge earthquake (1994), 64
nuclear attacks: Bush, George W. missile defense proposal, 74; evacuation planning for, 56; FEMA’s civil defense role and, 50, 54–55, 59–60, 69; missile defense systems, 74
nuclear power plants, 9–10; accidents at, 133, 140–41, 143, 145–47, 323; aging facilities and equipment at, 134, 141–42, 145–46, 156; catastrophic potential of, 142, 171–72; cooling systems as vulnerability in, 128, 135, 136, 150–51, 159, 161, 168, 298; cyber attacks on, 256, 284; dependency within systems of, 298; deregulation of energy industry and, 143, 148–50, 152, 153; design and inherent vulnerabilities in, 138, 140–41, 154, 169–72; economics of power production at, 173; ecoterrorism and, 136; electrical power outages as risk in, 134–35, 136, 146; European regulatory models, 142–43; executive failures in, 143–44, 165–68, 172; forced shutdowns at, 157, 159; incident rate for serious events, 142; Indian Point, 144–49; in Japan, 143–44; liability for accidents at, 172; maintenance and repairs neglected at, 141, 156–57, 159, 172; management failures at, 143–44, 145, 146–47, 152–53, 154, 158, 159, 165–67, 172; market forces and management of, 141, 143–44, 156–57, 158, 164, 166, 171–72; morale at, 157; operational safety at, 140–48; political influence of industry, 171; privatization and operational safety at, 144; proximity to population centers, 145–46, 147; radiation release risks, 133; regulation of, 142–43; security issues, 133, 135–40, 174–76; self-regulation in, 159–60, 169–70; shareholder value as greater priority than safety, 156, 157–58, 161, 166, 167–68; Soviet Union regulatory models, 142–43; spent-fuel storage pools, 135–36; as terrorist targets, 128, 133–40, 136, 173, 298, 314; Three Mile Island, 140, 141; violations at, 146, 165; waste storage and transport security, 133, 135–36, 174–75; watchdog groups and public interest, 172–73. See also Davis-Besse nuclear power plant
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC): as “captured” agency, 61, 168–73, 323; construction oversight by, 141; criticism of, 153–54; Davis-Besse as example of regulatory failure by, 149, 150–51; deregulation and lack of rigor on part of, 152, 153; dereliction of responsibility by, 168; design-basis issues and, 138, 154–55, 161, 169–70; “enforcement discretion” policy at, 161–62; fines levied by, 146, 159; funding for, 154, 171; Indian Point cited for violations by, 146; inspections reduced by, 169, 171; Millstone as example of regulatory failure by, 157–60; privatization of security authorized by, 136–37; public participation and comment, 171; “regulatory accounting” practices as incentive to take risks, 157; “risk-informed regulation,” 152; transport of wastes monitored by, 174–75
nuclear waste, 133, 135–36, 174–75
nuclear weapons installations, 137, 139–40
occupational safety, 45
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 325; chemical industry inspection responsibilities of, 178–80; fines levied by, 186
Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), 93, 110–11
oil industry: environmentalism and, 200–201; Exxon Valdez (1989) spill, 202; hurricanes and, 24–26, 113, 181; Murphy Oil, 24–26, 113; spills, 24–26
“open access” or “net neutrality” issues, 12, 275, 277, 281–84
OpenSSL Project, 271–72
operating systems: open-source alternatives, 268; vulnerability of, 249, 252
“operator error”: Bhopal disaster and, 177–78; design flaws as contributory to, 260; as most common explanation for industrial accidents, 260
organizational change: agency reorganization efforts, 81–83; formation of Homeland Security and, 92–93; organizational cultures as resistant to, 164; resistance to, 78, 82–83, 122, 293; “safety culture” and, 293; time required for successful, 81
organizational culture: low morale and, 116–18; market economics and, 144; “safety culture” as part of, 152–53, 163–64, 293
organizational failures: catastrophic potential and, 165–66; centralization as political response to, 106–8; chemical accidents as, 183–86; Department of Homeland Security as example of, 6; executive failures, 9–10, 143–44, 167–68, 292–93; FEMA and, 8, 54; managerial failures as part of, 167; in nuclear power industry, 133; at nuclear power plants, 173; organization culture as cause of, 291–93; “safety culture” and, 164; use of organizations as tools linked to, 3
organizational structures: centralized control model, 69; electrical grid as decentralized system, 216–17; flexibility within, 116–17; of intelligence agencies, 122; “intelligent agents” and self-organization, 217–18; leadership failures neutralized by, 119; morale and organizational culture, 116–18; resistance to change and, 91–92, 122; top-down, command-and-control model, 118, 202. See also network systems
organizations as tools, 3, 8, 9, 44–47, 58–59, 100–105, 124, 176
Ozzie, Ray, 272–73
“panic” model, 4–5
parallel path flow or loop flow in electrical grid, 219–20n
participation by public in policy formation: California’s Central Valley and, 32–33; Homeland Security and, 89–90; Internet and, 281; lack of “constituency” for disaster planning, 43; oil spills and public reactions, 35; public interest groups and nuclear power industry, 153, 171; watchdog groups and, 172–73
Pataki, George, 147–48
Patterson, Kathy, 189
peering links, 328
pesticides, 200–201
petroleum. See oil industry
Plum Island Animal Disease Center, 92–93, 95
Poindexter, John, 89
politics: declaration of disaster areas as politically motivated, 46, 66; Enron as example of scandal related to, 246; lack of “constituency” for disaster planning, 43. See also campaign financing; lobbying
pollution: water contamination, 20, 209. See also chemical industry; environmental issues
popular culture, disaster scenarios in, 1
population concentration, 7; chemical accidents and threats to, 189, 196, 197; costs of disasters linked to, 29–30; deconcentration of, 13; hazardous materials and elevated risks, 19, 188, 196, 197, 209; in high risk areas, 8, 14; natural disasters and, 8, 14, 15; in New Orleans, 2, 28; nuclear accidents in proximity to, 145–46, 147; railroad accidents and threats to, 174–75; relocation away from risky areas, 19, 28, 318–19; in risky areas, 15, 23–24, 28–29, 32–35; transport accident risks and, 180–81, 188; water and, 28–29
port security, 93, 126–27, 302, 310, 334
poverty, vulnerability to disaster and, 13n, 31
preparedness: “all hazards” approach, 54; Bush, George W. and, 19, 51, 72, 74–76, 78, 79–80, 109–10, 293–94; for chemical attacks, 98; civil defense and, 50, 54–56, 57, 59–60, 69; DHS and, 81; economics and, 12, 31; exercises for, 71, 93, 137–40, 185; FEMA and, 48–49, 50, 51, 99, 110, 111, 118; of first responders, 4, 98–99, 185; funding redirected to homeland security, 110–11; hurricanes and, 31, 51, 97, 111, 115; for industrial accidents, 185, 210; long-range planning and, 43–44; medical first response, 99–100; for natural disasters, 110; Office for Domestic Preparedness, 93, 110–11; post-Katrina failures in, 40; rap song as education in, 101; reduction of target size as essential to, 325; at state and local levels, 110; for terrorist attacks, 72, 74–76, 78, 79–80, 293–94
prevention: chemical industry and economics of, 176; economics of, 5–6; neglected in federal disaster policy, 47; terrorism detection, 71, 123–24
principal-agent theory, 331
Prine, Carl, 195–96
privatization, 111–12, 116; “net neutrality” issues, 12, 275, 277, 281–84; of nuclear plant security, 136–37; nuclear power industry and, 132
profit motives: deregulation and, 11; long-range planning discouraged by, 31; long-term planning neglected because of, 24
Project Impact, 110
Project on Government Oversight (POGO), 138
railroads: chemical, 183, 209–10; derailments and spills, 174–75; reduction of hazards, 300; security breaches at, 189, 192, 196; transport accident risks, 12, 34, 174–75, 180–81, 183–85, 192, 196, 300
Rand Corporation, 89
Reagan, Ronald, 8, 77–78; civil defense focus of, 96; EPA and, 202; FEMA and, 50, 54–55, 57, 292; fines for violations reduced during administration of, 186; Soviet nuclear threat as priority of, 59
reciprocity, 331; among terrorist cells, 305; in network systems, 223, 305; reciprocal interdependency, 298, 301
reduction of target size, 291; as “all-hazards” approach, 310, 314; as counterterrorism strategy, 128–29, 309–10; feasibility of, 207; hazardous materials concentrations and, 176–77, 295–96 (See also inventory reductions at chemical facilities under this heading); inventory reductions at chemical facilities, 10, 192, 200, 205–8, 210; multiplicity and, 300–301; neglected in policy formation, 66; population centers and, 13, 295–96; as proactive strategy, 1–2, 6–8, 68, 128–29, 309–10; as situationally difficult or impossible, 68; substitutions of safer materials by chemical industry, 195, 204–9, 210
redundancies, 258, 301, 327–30; dependency and, 298; Internet link redundancies and mirroring, 277–78, 329–30; mechanical backups, 258; replacement redundancy, 258, 328, 330; replication/ link redundancy in Internet, 328–29; system failures and, 327
regulation: building codes, 5, 16, 30, 37, 66; of chemical industry, 10, 86, 176, 183, 186–88, 190–91, 199–200, 210; Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board responsibilities, 183; commonality interdependency, 222, 297–98; of cyberspace and cyber security, 269–70; decentralization and, 35–36; economic arguments for reduction of, 170–71, 234–35; effectiveness of, 320; of electrical power industry, 229–30, 241–44; “enforcement discretion” policy at NRC, 161–62; EPA and, 201–2; executive failure and, 294–95; federal “floor” vs. “ceiling” for, 317, 319; functions of, 3–4; future prospects for effective, 323–25; industry standards as ineffective or inappropriate, 24–26; jurisdictional “patchwork” and regulatory failures, 199–200; market economics and, 191; minimum standards, 35–36; of nuclear power industry, 133, 136–37, 159–60, 170 (See also Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)); organizational failures linked to, 3; political influence of industry and, 176, 242–43; price caps, 239; “risk-informed regulation,” 152; self-regulation by industries, 10–11, 159–60, 170, 176, 190–91, 199–200, 224, 243–44, 280–81; special interests and resistance to, 66; state-level efforts, 10, 20, 194–95, 208, 300, 317, 319; state vs. federal level of, 164–65, 300; transport regulation for hazardous materials, 189; violations as response to, 170; watchdog groups and public interest, 172–73. See also deregulation; legislation; Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); Supreme Court decisions
reliability: complexity and reduction in, 260–63; high reliability theory, 164; of Internet, 274, 277–81, 286; security and, 250, 260
Reliant Energy, 238–39, 241, 242–43, 246
research and development: deregulation and, 222, 225, 234; investment in, 222, 246
Responsible Care Management program of ACC, 190–91, 193
“reverse 911” calls, 185
Ridge, Tom, 76, 80–81, 84, 88, 100, 109, 110–11, 119–20, 197
“risk-informed regulation,” 152
Rita (2005), 64; compared to Katrina, 114–15; disaster response failures after, 113, 114
Robins, David, 61
Roosevelt, Franklin, 77–78
Rosenthal, Jean, 156, 158, 159, 161–62, 163, 165–67
Rosner, David, 203–4
Ruckelshaus, William, 201–2
Russia: toxic contamination of water supply in, 209. See also Soviet Union
Sacramento River, 20
“safety culture,” 152–53, 163–64, 293
safety devices: failures in, 174, 183–84, 185; maintenance neglected on, 178; “single-point failure” vs. compound failures and, 261; as sources of system failures, 327
St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana, 25–26, 113
St. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, 26
San Joaquin River, 20
SCADA control systems and cyber attack, 215, 266
scale: catastrophic potential linked to, 206–7; “downsizing” government, 133; economies of, 12, 182, 298–300, 332–33; of facilities, 10, 182, 205, 247; industrial accidents linked to increase in, 10; networks as “scale-free” systems, 278–79; pollution linked to increase in, 10; security costs and, 206; spatial dependency and, 298–99. See also reduction of target size
Scanlon, Joseph, 214
scenarios: DHS responsibility for creating, 111; natural disaster preparedness and, 71; worst case scenarios prepared by chemical facilities, 188–89
Schroeder, Aaron, 51–52, 60–61
Secord, Richard, 58
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. See 9/11 attacks at beginning of index
servers, 262–63, 279–80; root servers, 280, 283, 330
Shapiro, Jake, 70
shirking, 331
Siemaszko, Andrew, 149–50, 153, 163
Silent Spring (Carson), 201
Skilling, Jeffrey, 234
Sobel, Russell, 46
social structure and culture: mass production and social costs, 332–33; social and culture costs of Katrina, 28; vulnerabilities linked to, 3
software: open-source alternatives, 268; vulnerability of, 249
Soviet Union: Chernobyl nuclear accident, 136, 140–41, 143; collapse of, 73; nuclear regulatory model in, 142–43; as perceived threat, 59, 73
space shuttle accidents, 10, 164, 293
spatial dependency, 297–99
Stephan, Robert, 199–200
Stickney, Wallace, 59
strategic failure vs. executive failure, 167
Supreme Court decisions: common goods and, 221–22, 233; corporate liability and, 323–24; electrical power industry deregulation and, 232–33; flood plain and wetlands regulations eviscerated by, 5, 21, 39–40; on railways and transport, 300; state-level regulations overturned by, 10, 36, 300, 317; telecommunications industry and, 282–83
telecommunications: antitrust actions, 275; centralization of, 284, 298; competition and innovation in, 285; dependency in, 297, 298; FEMA telecommunications system, 63; Supreme Court decisions, 282–83
terrorism, 8–9, 12; airports and airlines as targets, 7, 70, 126; anthrax attacks, 94–95, 312; biological attacks and, 94–95, 127, 299–300, 312–13; border security and, 97–98; Bush, George W. and preparedness for, 72, 74–76, 78, 79–80, 293–94; chemical industry and, 1–2, 98, 176, 191, 195–97, 209–10, 312–13; Clinton policy and initiatives, 74–76, 126; as “decentralized” enemy, 107; domestic terrorism, 123, 134, 136, 310, 314; electrical power facilities and grid as target, 214–15, 245, 247, 254, 255; Gilmore Commission, 81–82; hazardous materials as target of, 1–2, 69–70, 98, 189, 312; as industry scapegoat, 190; Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004), 123–24; Internet as target for, 257; Internet as tool for, 254, 255; Iraq invasion and, 105, 304–5; Islamic jihadists, 71–72, 107, 123; natural disasters contrasted with, 70, 110; as network system, 304–8; nuclear plants as targets of, 128, 133–40, 173, 298, 314; organizational failures in terrorist networks, 305–7, 308–9; as relative risk, 40, 70, 127, 305–6, 309–14, 324; state-sponsored vs. non-state or “nationless,” 122–23, 293; as strategic, 69–70, 309–10; water treatment plants as targets for, 197. See also 9/11 attacks; counterterrorism; cyber attacks
Three Mile Island nuclear plant, 140, 141
Tierney, Kathleen, 5
tight coupling: dependency and, 298; Microsoft product vulnerability linked to tight integration of design, 261–63, 271; in network systems, 261–63, 271; within nuclear power plants, 298
Toledo, Ohio. See Davis-Besse nuclear power plant
Toole, Loren, 231
Total Information Awareness, 87, 89
Toulouse, France, chemical accidents in, 189–90
toxic materials. See hazardous materials (hazmats)
transmission congestion: on electrical grid, 219, 224, 226, 231, 235, 236–39; on Internet, 226, 282, 283; market manipulation and created, 233; wholesale energy trading and, 235–37
transportation accidents: chemical industry and, 180–81, 183–85, 205–6, 209–10; chlorine spill at DPC Enterprises in Festus, Missouri, 183–85; frequency of incidence, 175–76; hazardous materials and, 174–75, 300; population concentrations at risk during, 180–81, 188; railroad security, 192; regulation of hazardous materials transport, 189; train derailments and spills, 174–75
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), 101–2, 113, 118, 125, 292
transport deregulation, 246
Union Carbide, Bhopal disaster and, 177–81
Union of Concerned Scientists, 141–42, 153, 171
unions, creation of Homeland Security as opportunity for “de-unionizing” civil employees, 104–5, 116, 322
van Heerden, Ivor, 23–24
Vaughan, Diane, 10
violations: in chemical industry, 179–80, 186–87, 266; executives and, 167–68; at nuclear power plants, 146, 157, 159, 162, 165, 169; Reagan and reduced fines for, 186; regulation as shaped by, 170
volcanoes, 16
vulnerabilities: concentration of, 14–15; deconcentration as reduction strategy, 1–2, 6–8, 68, 309–10; dependency vs. interdependency and, 12; of electrical grid, 2, 213, 214–15, 226–27, 244–45; FEMA and issue of, 67; of networked systems, 254, 257–58, 261–62; of nuclear power plants, 128, 134–35, 136, 150–51. See also reduction of target size
Wackenhut Corporation, 139
Wampler, Joseph, 163
waste and fraud: in Homeland Security, 5, 92, 101–2; mismanagement of government contracts and, 292
water supply, 20; toxic spills and contamination of, 209; urbanization of California linked to, 33
water treatment plants, hazardous chemicals and, 196, 208, 209–10
Waxman, Henry, 317
weapons of mass destruction (WMD): chemical stockpiles as potential, 1–2, 312; preparedness for attacks, 98. See also nuclear attacks
Wein, Lawrence, 299–300
Weldon, Curt, 125
wetlands, 19; agricultural run-off and pollution of, 20; flood-control measures and destruction of, 20; industrial or residential development of, 21; in Louisiana delta, 22, 26–27, 324; political and legislative issues, 21; preservation and protection of, 21, 192, 318, 324
wheeling, 227, 228, 231, 233, 237, 244, 296
whistle blowers, 124, 143; at nuclear power plants, 149–50, 153, 161, 162–63, 164; punishment of, 157, 163, 164, 292
wholesale trade in energy, market manipulation and, 232, 236–40, 241–42
Williams Companies (energy wholesaler), 241, 242
Williamson, Oliver, 331
Wise, Charles, 76
Wisner, Ben, 33
Witt, James Lee, 60–62, 90, 148
worker safety: in chemical industry, 182, 203; contract workers, 182, 192; federal regulation of, 45, 323
World Wide Web: defined and described, 250–51; as scale-free network, 279. See also Internet
Wyoming, DHS funds allocated to, 103–4
Young, Don, 96
Yucca Flats (Nev.), 133
Zahn, Paula, 111
Zegart, Amy, 80