Press reports in June 1991 indicated that firefighter Red Adair was frustrated. He couldn’t seem to get things quickly organized and supported. His monumental efforts to blow out the fires and cap the wells that had been torched by the retreating Iraqi army were moving erratically amid various kinds of logistical, administrative, and political confusion. Red was quoted as saying that he needed a Norm Schwarzkopf to lead the attack, implying that Norm’s obvious leadership ability would surely bring order out of chaos.
The problems in the Kuwaiti oil fields after the Gulf War were only one of the major problems that we, as members of the global village, witnessed in 1991. We literally watched macro geopolitical systems changing in quick time. It is not surprising, then, that people are turning to General Schwarzkopf as a model for leadership, given the success of the venture he led. My hunch is, however, that some of the lessons that are being drawn from his example, and perhaps from the example of other conspicuous military and political leaders of today, will be simplistic and incorrect.
In the case of Norm Schwarzkopf I can foresee at least two incorrect lessons.
One Incorrect Lesson. One lesson that might be drawn is that in challenging times a strong leader will suddenly come off the bench and by powerful personal example mold an efficient, effective organization—even if circumstances are fearsomely complex. This lesson says that it was Schwarzkopf’s drive, vigor, decisiveness, and personal magnetism that was the key ingredient for the success of Operation Desert Storm.
A Better Analysis. There is no doubt that Norm Schwarzkopf splendidly represented the essence of the U.S. Army’s professional values of Commitment, Competence, Candor, and Courage. But his most important contribution was not thirty days of high-profile decisiveness. It was his thirty years of learning, practicing, and developing; and the immediately prior thirty months of planning, team-building, and standard-setting that enhanced a culture, established systems, and developed the thousands of leaders whose competence and confidence were collectively responsible for the success of the operation. Without a strong existing culture, and a host of informed and motivated leaders at all levels, Norm probably would be the first to tell Red Adair that more than dynamic leadership at the top would be needed to put out those fires!
Another Incorrect Lesson. A second lesson that might be drawn from Operation Desert Storm is that to get the job done, decentralization and empowerment are the key: The Gulf War was characterized by Washington keeping hands off and letting the field commander call the shots—the exact opposite of the micromanaged Vietnam War.
A Better Analysis. Yes, in contrast to Vietnam, where we had a President often selecting targets for individual aircraft to strike, the Gulf War was an example of the top headquarters focusing on basic strategy and gathering of resources while the responsible commander in the field executed the strategy without inappropriate meddling from those in remote, high-level positions. And it is often true that people in high places do meddle—because of a perceived need for immediate status reports, a compulsion to get into the action, or an inability to trust and delegate. But the idea of “hands off” after the mission is assigned is nonsensical. Any boss who articulates a goal and then stands back is asking for trouble. (The Iran-Contra affair is a classic case of such folly.) The issue is how and when to influence the operation once the subordinate echelon has been given its instructions and resources.
Most days in the Gulf War Norm Schwarzkopf and his boss Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had lengthy phone conversations. The commander in the field was probably given some guidance, had some questions answered, and made requests that were approved or denied or modified. The latitude given him notwithstanding, Norm Schwarzkopf operated routinely within two types of powerful guidelines: the value system of his profession (differentiating those actions that were proper from those that were improper), and the current macro political and resource realities as defined for him by his superiors.
A Basic Lesson. In summary, high-profile, decisive leadership is often appropriate but rarely by itself sufficient. Building the team and nourishing the culture over time is crucial. And although empowered and committed junior leaders are essential to organizational success, a laissez-faire style of leading can be as dysfunctional as can micromanagement.
[Originally published in Issues & Observations, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1992]