Chapter 1
1. Rudd and Lawson (2007).
2. This and the following section draw heavily from Phatak and Habib (1996), pp. 30–38.
3. Johnson (2004), p. 4.
4. Baelman and Davidson (2010), pp. 15–20.
5. “Ultimatum for the Avon Lady” (1998), p. 58.
6. Nelson (2003), p. 1.
7. Moran (2011).
8. Jain (2008), pp. 161–162.
9. Deardorff (2009).
10. Thompson (2009), pp. 31–52.
Chapter 2
1. Taylor (1871), p. 1.
2. Hall (1977), p. 16.
3. Lewicki et al. (2001), pp. 196–200.
4. Ricks (1998), p. 11; Dinker et al. (1998), pp. 337–345.
5. Foster (1992), p. 281.
6. Herbig and Kramer (1992), pp. 287–298.
7. Hall (1973); Sebenius (2002), pp. 76–89.
8. Hofstede (1980).
9. Hofstede (1991), pp. 164–173.
10. Sebenius (2002), pp. 76–89.
11. Oliver (1996).
12. Salacuse (2005), pp. 1–6.
Chapter 3
1. Kale (1999), pp. 21–38.
2. Weiss (1994), pp. 51–61.
3. Herbig and Kramer (2001).
4. Gregersen, Morrison, and Black (1998), pp. 21–23.
5. Jandt (1985).
6. Foster (1992), chap. 8.
7. Weiss (2004).
8. Allred (2000), pp. 387–397.
Chapter 4
1. Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton (2001), chap. 2.
2. Acuff (2008).
3. Lewicki et al. (2001).
4. Salacuse (1991).
5. Jain (2004).
6. See Fisher and Ury (1991).
7. Thompson (1998). Also see Thompson (2008).
8. Kublin (1995).
9. Graham (1986), pp. 58–70. Also see Avruch (2004), pp. 330–346.
10. Black and Mendenhall (1993), pp. 49–53.
11. Hendon, Hendon, and Herbig (1996).
12. U.S. Purchasing Professionals (1993).
13. Valentine (1998), p. 400.
Chapter 5
1. Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton (2001), pp. 67–68.
2. Cialdini (1993).
3. Eyuboglu and Buja (1993), pp. 47–65.
4. O’Quin and Aronoff (2005), pp. 349–357.
5. Thompson (1998), pp. 38–42.
Chapter 6
1. Koch (1998).
2. Jensen and Unt (2002).
3. Ghosh (1996), pp. 312–325.
4. Olekalns, Smith, and Walsh (1996), pp. 68–77.
5. Gruder and Duslak (1973), pp. 162–174.
6. Pruitt (1994), pp. 217–230.
7. Yukl (1974), pp. 323–335.
8. Koch (1998).
Chapter 7
1. Pechter (2002), pp. 46–50.
2. The discussion on pricing factors draws heavily from Jain (2008), chap. 13.
3. Jain (2008), chap. 13.
4. Lester (2005), p. 8.
5. Narayandas, Quelch, and Swartz (2001), pp. 61–69.
Chapter 8
1. Moran and Stripp (1991).
2. Riley and Zeckhauser (1983), pp. 267–289.
3. Foster (1992).
4. Ghauri (1986), pp. 72–82.
5. Graham (1986), pp. 58–70.
6. Campbell, Graham, Joliber, and Meissur (1988), pp. 49–62.
7. Axtell (1993).
Chapter 9
1. Salacuse (1991).
2. Salacuse (1991), p. 149.
3. Pinnells (1997), pp. 125–131.
4. This section draws heavily from Salacuse (1991).
5. Carolyn Blackman, Negotiating In China: Case Studies and Strategies (Sydney, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1997).
Chapter 10
1. Rudd and Lawson (2007), chaps. 4 and 6.
2. Discussion in this chapter draws heavily from Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton (1997), pp. 114–122.
3. Moran, Harris, and Moran (2011), pp. 52–54.
4. Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton (1997), pp. 124–127.
5. Hendon, Hendon, and Herbig (1996), pp. 63–64.
6. Kublin (1995), pp. 119–125.
7. Klopf (1991), p. 197.
8. Salacuse (1991), pp. 31–33.
Chapter 11
1. Habeeb (1988).
2. Banks (1987), pp. 67–75.
3. Berten, Kimura, and Zartman (1999).
4. Cross (1996), pp. 153–178.
5. Druckman (1983).
6. Raiffa (1982).
7. Pizer (1998).
Chapter 12
1. McGrath and Hollingshed (1999).
2. Sproull and Keisler (1991).
3. Silkenat, Aresty, and Klosek (2009).
4. McGrath and Hollingshed (1999).
5. McGuire, Keisler, and Siegler (2001), pp. 917–930.
6. Dorlet and Morris (1995).
7. Kramer (1995), pp. 95–120.
8. Thompson (1998), pp. 264–265.
9. Arunchalan and Dilla (2003), pp. 258–290.
Chapter 13
1. Anderson (1994).
2. Lewicki and Robinson (2000), pp. 665–692.
3. Herring (1996).
4. Lewis (2001).
5. Hofstede (1991).
6. Katz (2006).
7. Adler and Izraeli (1994).
8. Babcock and Laschever (2003).
9. Eyerson and Fletcher (2005), pp. 69–94.
10. Harvard Business School Cases No. 9-801-421 and No. 9-801-422.
Chapter 14
1. Cohen (2002).
2. Koch (1998).
3. Watkins (2002).
4. Collins and Porras (1994).
5. Dawson (1995).
Case F
1. This claim ignored Ford’s takeover of Mazda in 1996.
2. Raiffa (2002), p. 9.
3. See “Kenneth S. Courtis,” 2000. Also, as Tagliabue (2000) has put it, “the company [never had] more at stake.”
4. Such information overreaches Watkins’s framework but appears here as background information for the reader.
5. To some extent, therefore, negotiators can define the rules by their choice of game.
6. Schweitzer’s executives had evidently negotiated with only one Japanese company: transmissions manufacturer NTN. The companies reached a coproduction agreement in December 1998. Renault’s only previous cooperation with the Japanese dated back to 1951, when Renault licensed technology to Hino Motors.
7. For major issues in an M&A negotiation.
8. There were no salient examples of prior Franco-Japanese ventures in the auto industry.
9. Interests may also underlie interests (e.g., critical mass versus long-term viability) (Rubin & Pruitt, 1986, p. 149).
10. Note the remaining points of analysis for this step in Figure A.1.
11. This estimate is based on a comparable companies calculation (a multiple of 17 × earnings per share of ¥39.79 × 2.513 billion shares).
12. Attributed to consultant Grégoire Van de Velde (Diem, 1999).
14. A Renault source told the lead author that fewer than 10 people on each side participated directly in the talks.
15. Early on, Schweitzer had suggested cross-shareholding, but Hanawa demurred, due to lack of funds.
16. His possible motivations included preempting Renault from acquiring Nissan Diesel, which would affect the contest in commercial vehicles; bidding up the price Renault had to pay for Nissan Motor to weaken Renault; increasing DaimlerChrysler’s limited presence in Asia; and consolidating DaimlerChrysler’s position as a megacompetitor in the industry.
17. As one outsider observed, “You’ve got two cultures here that are extremely nationalistic and believe that their way is the right way. There will be some major control issues” (Edmondson et al., 1999).
18. For the comparable companies estimate, refer to note 11. Nissan Motor share prices ranged from a low of about ¥300 in November 1998 to a high of ¥450 in March 1999. Thus, the market value of the company was ¥754 billion (approx. $6.4 billion) in November versus ¥1,130 billion ($9.6 billion) in March. The exchange rate also fluctuated as much as 20% between June 1998 (¥142/$1), January 1999 (¥113/$1), and March 1999 (¥118/$1).
19. The Japan Fair Trade Commission ruled, favorably, on Renault’s acquisition of Nissan shares.
20. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1977), p. 1276.
21. Schweitzer’s justification to shareholders emphasized Nissan’s contribution to Renault’s goal of profitable growth, the two companies’ complementarity, and their global scale as a unified competitor (Renault, S. A., n.d.).
22. Watkins (2002, pp. 49, 75, 104) himself invites broad use of his diagnostic elements, and they parallel other versions of negotiation analysis (e.g., Raiffa, 1982; Sebenius, 1991). However, Watkins has also discussed 3 steps beyond diagnosis, namely, shaping the structure, managing the process, and assessing the results.
23. Similarly, Raiffa (2002, p. 9) contends that negotiation analysis should promote justification for decisions and satisfaction with consequences.
24. If Renault’s share of Nissan Diesel is valued at ¥3.4 billion (22.5% of ¥15 billion) and subtracted from the ¥605 total price, then Renault’s 36.8% implies a total Nissan Motor value of ¥1,635 billion.
25. At the same time, additional criteria may be necessary or relevant (see, e.g., Fisher & Ury, 1981, p. 86ff).
26. Korine et al. (2002, p. 44) concluded that these talks were, above all, about “the process.”
27. Watkins (2002) only alludes to a few psychological factors (cf. Auster & Sirower [2002] on factors in M&As).
28. French scholars such as Faure et al. (2000, p. 186) have pointed out that American analyses tend to neglect power, equity considerations, and negotiation stakes.