Towards a Holistic Development Framework for the Caribbean
Key Theoretical Notions and Policy Implications
Nikolaos Karagiannis and C. J. Polychroniou
Summary
Chapter 2 describes the historic impact of colonialism on the Caribbean development, presents Caribbean development efforts since the end of World War II, cautiously makes the case for institutional political involvement in local industrial expansion in the era of neoliberal globalization, and proposes main themes and notions towards framing an alternative egalitarian development paradigm for the region.
Introduction: The Political Economy of Caribbean Development in Retrospect
Historically, the Caribbean countries developed under the tutelage of different European empires, and more recently under North American dominance. As a result, the Caribbean came to be a classic case of plantation society as there is a certain unity to the region’s development and in its patterns of historical evolution. Furthermore, the plantation economy models emphasized the historical continuity of the Caribbean dependence from the slave plantation to modification following emancipation, to further modification in the postcolonial era. Political independence established national sovereignty (i.e., “flag independence”) in older and newer nations of the Commonwealth Caribbean when both groups were integrated into the international system. Consequently, the political process of national independence converted states, societies, and nations that had evolved as integral parts of the global system. The effect was to legitimize their autonomy based on concepts of self-determination (Payne and Sutton 2001).
In the case of the newer nations, independence coincided with the beginning of a new era that was defined by the decline of the old great powers and the rise of two superpowers with antagonistic ideologies and strategic interests: the United States and the Soviet Union. Main features of the post-World War II global capitalist economy (the creation of a post-World War II global socialist economy was also undertaken by the Soviet Union) were the emergence of the monetary regime of Bretton Woods, with global institutions at its core (the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, now known as the World Bank) that were designed to facilitate the incorporation of the developing nations into the global capitalist system via the shaping of the macroeconomic policy of the South; a dramatic increase in the integration of national economies in terms of trade, finance, and foreign direct investment; the emergence of the U.S. dollar as the dominant international currency, which reflected America’s hegemonic role in the global capitalist economy; and the rise of a “cooperative-security” organization (NATO) under the aegis of the U.S. whose mission was to protect western capitalism from the perceived threat of Soviet communism.
During the last five decades or so, the region has tried different development models, ranging from industrialization based on imported inputs and technology, to models of structural change which prioritized tourism and other services, to open regionalism which blends regional integration with efforts to boost the export competitiveness of tradable goods and services. However, despite all these models, various strategies and policies have often been conducted with poor rigor on a political level and have repeatedly set Caribbean initiatives up for failure. Evidently, the main Caribbean trajectory has relied on metropolitan initiatives in investment, technology and marketing, and on continued metropolitan ownership and control of the region’s main means of production and domestic demand. The political independence of Caribbean nations has not been accompanied by any significant advancement of their national economies: unbalanced economic structures; international specialization based on unequal exchange; excessive foreign financial and technological penetration; chronic current account deficits; and a dependent monetary system, are among the outstanding features of the Caribbean “blocked development” or “underdevelopment.” Largely, foreign decisions determine the growth prospects of Caribbean economies whereas most local resources, natural, human, and technological, remain basically underdeveloped. Therefore, Caribbean economies have been seriously challenged by a lack of indigenous industrial capacity and export competitiveness, which are among the main factors needed for the achievement of sustained growth and endogenous development.
Past Development Efforts
A depiction of Caribbean development efforts since the end of World War II may distinguish four broad phases: the 1950s up to the mid-1960s; the late 1960s and the 1970s; the 1980s; and the 1990s and beyond. The first phase, the 1950s and 1960s, was characterized by the promotion of the modernizing potential of industrialization and economic diversification as a means of overcoming the traditional Caribbean problems of “smallness” and high dependence on agriculture, and created expectations that other economic benefits would also follow. In some countries (e.g., Jamaica and Trinidad), the emergence of modern export industries in the mineral sector was a strong sign of this development thrust (Payne and Sutton 2001: 2–3).
W. Arthur Lewis1 extensive work on industrialization and his “dual economy model” (1954) in an underdeveloped country provided the theoretical insights underpinning this strategy. He saw industrialization as an essential process for shifting labor into manufacturing, where it is more productive. Consequently, industrialization was expected to help the region overcome the dual problems of markets and resources: the region was short of capital, industrial power was expensive and the available raw material base limited, but wage rates were low by the developed world’s standards.
Influenced by Lewis, a number of Caribbean countries developed import substitution policies to facilitate light manufacturing industries. To attract much needed investments by foreign firms, he proposed a package of investment incentives modeled upon the Puerto Rican experience. The inflow of foreign investments would result in higher levels of profits and local savings, and would transmit industrial skills to local people to set in motion self-sustaining growth (Payne and Sutton 2001: 3–4). In the Caribbean, Lewis also addressed issues in education policy and problems of export orientation and political integration.
Lewis policy proposal for industrialization had an immediate impact on newly emerging Commonwealth Caribbean nations as foreign capital responded to the appeals of their governments and flowed in substantial amounts to set up several manufacturing industries. By the late 1960s, manufacturing contributed 15 percent of GDP in Jamaica, 16 percent in Trinidad, 13 percent in Guyana, and 9 percent in Barbados.2 However, the newly set-up industries were only “final-touch” firms, were based on the assembly of imported inputs, had relatively little local value-added, and generally failed to penetrate export markets. The established industries produced few jobs, had often limited commitment to local development, and were finding it profitable to move their operations to other locations offering new or better options of inducements and conditions. Furthermore, in the 1970s, Caribbean countries faced severe economic difficulties. Therefore, the validity of the Lewis’ model of development came increasingly under question in scholarly and political discussions and, in a number of countries, the government was pushed into a position of greater involvement in the management of the economy.
Tourism was the other new sector on which Caribbean nations started placing special emphasis in the 1950s and 1960s. In some islands, tourism was heralded as the “road to prosperity” even though the sector was vulnerable to the vagaries of world markets and the international political economy. As the industry was geared towards the affluent North American and, to a lesser degree, European societies, it was able to compete only by maintaining high standards of accommodation and hospitality. This required high levels of imports, especially food, and brought about inflated import bills and significant profit repatriation. By and large, tourism became an “enclave” within the Caribbean economy having few forward and backward linkages with, and contributing little to the development of other local sectors and activities and sustained growth (Payne and Sutton 2001: 4).
As these weaknesses of the modernization view were being exposed and debated by the region’s governments and advisers,3 radical scholars emphasized the dependence of the Caribbean economy on hegemonic centers for: markets and supplies, transfers of income and capital, banking and financial services, business and technical skills, and even for knowledge and ideas about themselves. While part of the broader international radical political economy analysis where development and underdevelopment were two sides of a single world capitalist system, and where underdevelopment followed, more or less, consequentially from dependency relationships between core and periphery, Caribbean dependency thought had its own special characteristics, associated with “the theory of plantation economy and society.”
During the second phase, the early postcolonial period of the 1960s and 1970s, these notions grew into a distinct school of thought: the “Caribbean dependency thought.” Dependency thinking generated intense scholarly and political debate, and had a significant impact on the intellectual and political life of the region and on government policies. It attributed the problems of development to the region’s continuing epistemic, economic, cultural, and psychological dependence on the metropolitan world, and called for an extension of political decolonization to these spheres. The bulk of the explanation had come from systematic examination of the instruments that control the Caribbean economies, which brought about a lack of capacity to manipulate the operative mechanisms of the economic system along with several underdevelopment biases of plantation agriculture (Girvan 2006: 330; see also Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Overview of authors and themes in Caribbean dependency writings: 1960s and 1970s
All these perspectives collectively constituted a powerful radical line of argument against the multifaceted conditions of dependency of the Commonwealth Caribbean, and undermined the intellectual credibility of the conventional modernization strategy that was pursued by Caribbean governments.4 Indeed, the strong dismissal of the “industrialization by invitation” proposal as an “externally propelled” development strategy is a notable rejection of Lewis policy prescription. However, no strong alternative model of development and no thorough strategies were offered, and this serious shortcoming became the beginning of an impasse in the Caribbean development debate. Evidently, real-world experiments based on the prescriptive content of Caribbean dependency thought were often undermined by poor implementation, and had generally failed to promote self-reliant growth and political survival (Girvan 2006: 344). In addition, the collapse of the Grenadian revolution brought to an end the second phase of Caribbean development efforts.
In the 1980s, the third broad phase in Caribbean development, the international climate had radically changed. The United States managed to reshape the agenda of politics and international political economy and was able to lay down the parameters of what could be done and even what could be articulated. In addition, the neoliberal policy prescription was enforced by the IMF and the World Bank under the “structural adjustment” programs. This policy package was guided by the mantra stabilize, privatize, and liberalize. Specific measures included, among other policies: trade reform marked by lower tariffs to open the economy to greater competition and efficiency; tax reform to remove distortions that retard the flow of investment into productive activity; and financial liberalization and privatization of state enterprises to improve their efficiency of operations and services. The main goal of neoliberalism with respect to economic development was to create in the region a growing number of market-based economies capable of competing successfully in international export markets.
However, the international recession of the early 1980s severely reduced demand for a number of the region’s main exports, especially, bauxite, petroleum products and sugar, and reduced the number of tourists visiting Caribbean islands. “The paradox is that the actual dependence of Caribbean economies became more acute in the era of structural adjustment and globalization of the 1980s and 1990s. Heightened indebtedness and the dismantling of traditional trade preferences have increased the economic vulnerability of Caribbean countries, exposing them to pervasive external intrusions into domestic policy making in the form of conditionalities imposed by the Washington-based international financial institutions and bilateral donors” (Girvan 2006: 345). What was seen was three crises in one in nearly all Caribbean economies: balance of payments constraints, fiscal imbalances, and a national debt crisis. Besides, the market-based reforms did not deliver the expected economic growth and employment levels. Desperate for financial support, Commonwealth Caribbean nations turned to the IMF and other multilateral financial institutions. As a result, their governments were forced to follow the neoliberal prescription during the 1980s and beyond. The favored policy measures were the same: liberalization of foreign exchange and import controls, devaluation of the currency, and the deflation of domestic demand. After following this prescription, the economy in question would be ready to return to the global marketplace able to achieve higher levels of exports and economic growth.
What is most striking about the Caribbean’s embrace of neoliberalism in the 1980s is that the intellectual driving force behind its development strategy came, once again, from outside the region. However, the social costs of such neoliberal policies, measured in terms of unemployment, inflation, growing poverty and sharply declining living standards, were immense. At the end of the 1980s, Caribbean economies still faced major structural problems associated with the character of their production base and the distribution of their economic assets. Critical analyses of the economic and social impact of structural adjustment appeared and had their impact, especially in drawing attention to the peculiarly harsh costs imposed by such programs (Polanyi-Levitt 1991, among others). In addition, neoliberal prescriptions failed miserably to chart any sort of realistic alternative course of action for Caribbean governments in the critical arenas of economic management and national development.5
The last phase of Caribbean development efforts, the 1990s and beyond, was characterized by what might be called the consolidation of the neoliberal revolution, tempered only by the realization that more policy attention had to be paid to human resource development if the new technological imperatives of a globalizing economy were not to pass the region by. The agreement establishing the World Trade Organization in 1994, in which all Caribbean countries participate, “extends international trade disciplines to services, intellectual property, and the treatment of [trans-national] corporations, thereby significantly constricting the policy space previously available to developing countries. National development of the kind that was the accepted objective in the era of decolonization has been replaced by the mantra of integration into the global economy. The new dependency associated with globalization is presented as interdependence in the effort to obfuscate its asymmetries” (Girvan 2006: 345). Development was seen as a market-driven private sector-led process. The role of the state should be to meet the demands for “good governance” based on efficiency considerations and imposed by the international financial institutions, thereby fashioned to submissively serve the logic of deregulated competitive markets and integrated global production, led and directed by powerful transnational corporations.
Indeed, under the influence of the neoliberal narrative, the belief that emerged throughout the developing world by the 1990s, including the Caribbean, was that national economic growth could be significantly enhanced via links with major international economic actors such as multinational corporations, by encouraging foreign direct investment and privatization projects. In this undertaking, the role of the state was essential in facilitating the process for greater economic integration and for securing the emergence of a socio-economic order in which the market itself functioned as a form of social regulation—the ultimate goal of the neoliberal vision.
Key Aspects of an Alternative Development Paradigm for the Caribbean
If we were to consider the present state of orthodox and “New Right” economics, we would find that there has been little of worth contributed to framing rational strategies to cope with those complex problems which center on developing the productive forces of the small, open, dependent and underdeveloped economies of the Caribbean. In these analyses, geographical determinism seeks to explain underdevelopment as a product of the limitations of the physical environment (in terms of soil, natural resources and climate), while cultural notions may also be taken into consideration. Consequently, little attention has been paid to developing thorough planning frameworks to deal with the multidimensional problems of underdevelopment and material exploitation in the specific context of the small dependent economies of the Caribbean region. More specifically, neoclassical and neoliberal theories of growth, characterized by a vexing absence of historical understanding and awareness (i.e., the poverty of orthodox analysis), do not place emphasis on designing development strategies for transforming small dependent economies, which must undergo this transformation during the present neocolonial era (Thomas 1974).
Nevertheless, “smallness” is not the cause, but the spatial, demographic, and resource context in which socio-political relations are formed and developed, and the mode of production is organized. In other words, smallness can be simply interpreted as constituting, in a certain sense, an additional aspect of underdevelopment: of the nature of the structural dependence of small underdeveloped economies on international capitalism. As a consequence, the strength of indigenous political, social, cultural and economic forces and institutions vis-à-vis international capitalism is vastly inferior. Besides, the conjunction of production relations and productive forces in the region is of such a character and is organized in such a way that Caribbean communities have internalized through their social relations of production and the use of their productive forces a pattern of consumption that does not represent the needs of the community, and a pattern of production that is not oriented to either local consumption or domestic needs (Thomas 1974: 58–59). In fact, international trade and capital flows can penetrate deeper into the workings of the dependent small island economies of the Caribbean, affecting their production structures in general, and income distribution, job creation, and productivity growth in particular. Therefore, the notion of smallness has to be seen within a “holistic development” perspective which allows for dynamic changes in population, resources, output, technology, competency and institutions.
Also, most Caribbean countries’ output and exports rely heavily on one or two industries (e.g., tourism in the services sector, energy-related products in the manufacturing sector, and bananas or sugar in the agricultural sector). But despite the relatively high per capita incomes for a number of Caribbean countries, many have substantial social development problems, such as high poverty rates, income inequality, unemployment, underemployment, and susceptibility to external forces (including weather, U.S. economic fluctuations, and changes in global commodity prices).
Between the early 1960s and the early 1980s, the majority of Britain’s Caribbean colonies gained independence, and even though the colonial power had formally departed, it left in place political institutions and norms based on Britain’s Westminster model of government. However, while the state has survived as a democratic institution (largely so), it lost a great deal of its effectiveness as a development tool because it was transformed into a mechanism for winning elections and meeting populist demands. Because of the “winner takes all syndrome” in Caribbean territories, the state became an instrument of disintegration rather than an institution around which society could cohere to deal with the development challenges. In a small society, the state is a large institution as an employer and dispenser of resources—hence the intense desire by various groups, not just special interests, to capture it. Still, fiscal budgets in the Caribbean via the political process often reflect the view of the political parties in power, and the class and interest group biases are usually maintained. In fact, although this deliberate policy is used, the politicization of the budgetary process in Caribbean states highlights programs and policies which are akin to what is called “pork barrel policies.” This process has a great deal of importance in shaping fiscal policies of Caribbean states.
Since the 2000s, orthodox development policy proposals by international organizations (U.S. International Trade Commission 2008; UN-ECLAC 2012; IMF 2013)6 and local economists have been offered as modern economic solutions to the region’s complex problems. However, these orthodox policy recommendations—which by and large focus on total factor productivity, market-conforming suggestions, and more effective governance—have not resulted in significant socio-economic development, local industrial growth, endogenous competency and competitiveness. While conducive macroeconomic policies can contribute much towards enhancing the performance of Caribbean economies, such policies can only deal with the “symptoms” of economic problems. Arguably, the general concept of a developmental role for the state is rather alien to the general economic and political culture in the Caribbean.
However, in contrast to state interventions which are consonant with the market failure analysis, a government attempting to actively boost industrial growth needs to have a dominant developmental orientation. For these reasons, and perhaps for others, the construction of a production-based approach to economic development and a much sharper focus on strategic industrial policy should be important parts of a “Caribbean-type” developmental state framework—even though the lessons to be drawn from the success of the East Asian experience are themselves very controversial, are seen to be necessary to resolve structural problems, and offer concrete alternative solutions to Caribbean economies. Indeed, strategic industrial policy targets and centers around key strategic sectors, which can be expected to fuel diversification, industrial renaissance, and self-sustained economic growth. By recognizing differentiation of new and promising activities, particular branches and industrial sectors, thorough technically proficient policy can take care of the necessary human, material, and financial requisites and thus become effective (Karagiannis 2002). But a thorough identification of strategic targets depends on the democratic specification of multiple political goals, especially in view of possible trade-offs between different goals, and on the capability of the administration to pick or create the potential “winners” with reference to these goals.
Which industries will be able to respond to national interests in the future is a crucial question of industrial targeting. The main objective of such an important undertaking must be to increase rigor and effectiveness in the selection of strategic industries, promoting a more transparent procedure of decision making. This objective builds on the idea to clearly identify a rigorous priorities formation and to modify or fix certain criteria useful in supporting the identification of strategic industries, given the selected national and regional goals. This justifies why industrial targeting as an essential component of a national development agenda requires clear and transparent specification of political priorities and rationales that aim to be more certain, more transparent, and more immune to social and political pressures, partial interests, and policy makers’ discretionality.
In some sectors, the region already has a strong basis on which to build (tourism and hospitality, entertainment, agro-processing, and food production). These sectors as well as modern activities of high potential—like those based on alternative or renewable forms of energy—require significant investment, rejuvenation and repositioning, and have to address a number of serious economic, social, institutional, and environmental issues simultaneously. Provided that the immediate problems are solved, the targeted sectors are clearly capable of considerable further expansion. In fact, the mutually beneficial relationship between different types of tourism and planned industrial activities of high growth potential and achievability can provide the solid foundation on which alternative endogenous development strategies can build. Once the priorities are right, and with effective “policy spillovers,” resources will increasingly be allocated efficiently, production, productivity and profitability will increase, and the propulsive and dynamic sectors will become increasingly attractive to the private sector.
In addition, the approach used here seeks to link the process of growth and change in various sectors with that in the economy as a whole. On the other hand, the growth process in conjunction with higher levels of tourist arrivals are expected to lead to a widening of local markets, which in turn can bring about better transportation and communications systems. After resources have been developed and/or put to use, better industrial capabilities will broaden the Caribbean production base, will anchor the growth of domestic knowledge and technological capacity, and will provide sufficient stimulus to the mobilization of resources of all kinds and the inducement to invest. But domestic industrial capabilities formation (which encompasses knowledge, financial, and technical supporting institutions) is a sequential and cumulative process that can flourish in an environment of macroeconomic and political stability.
There is no need for vast bureaucratic machinery and procedure because the approach is clearly entrepreneurial. Such a radical approach needs to: emphasize substantive national development goals while being mindful of the constraints that the international political economy imposes; consider key relevant aspects of the East Asian trajectory towards boosting production expansion while making the necessary modifications to reflect the Caribbean history, culture, social psychology and politico-institutional arrangements; acknowledge the importance of authoritative and focused government agencies in overseeing the course of Caribbean industrial resurrection; and determine the quality and impact of policy intervention. A successful implementation, however, will require wide consultation, broad consensus, government intervention of high quality, determination, realism, commitment, and special emphasis on production-oriented growth.
The proposed framework takes into account dynamic relations among a number of “stylized facts”: local resources, capital, social structure, technology and skills, scale and scope, institutions, history, culture, and social psychology. Such a pragmatic policy approach can successfully contribute to long-term supply-side initiatives aimed at creating or promoting selected sectors and prioritized activities, and can create economies of scale and scope, conditions and opportunities conducive to faster growth of existing and incoming enterprises (a “big push”). Economies of scale and learning will bring about multiple effects on, and changes in, the structure of local economies. The objective, of course, would be to improve industrial capabilities, increase both value add to the sectors and job opportunities, and strengthen forward and backward linkages, which would then be capable of spilling their expansionary forces into other sectors and activities: the support and development of indigenous resources, firms, and industries; the maximum utilization of investment (mainly in relevant R&D, innovation and skills to support new distinctively Caribbean industries); the removal of constraints on both the demand and supply sides which are imposed by the narrow size of the local markets and poor manufacturing base of Caribbean nations; an improvement in the range of services available to people and to industry (e.g., transportation, information, communication); the exploitation of economies of scale and scope; the application of productivity-enhancing production methods and techniques so as to raise industrial performance and competitiveness; the rejuvenation, restructuring, diversification, and global repositioning of Caribbean economic activity; and, the capacity to correct the Caribbean tendency toward external disequilibrium and high dependency on foreign economic activity, and withstand the effects of future cyclical downswings and structural changes (Karagiannis 2002).
Specifically, the following sets of policy and reforms are deemed to be necessary:7
1. Aggregate demand—along “functional finance” lines—and aggregate supply interaction
2. Egalitarian socially-sensitive policies (as important causal components of economic growth) to address real, basic needs of large population segments of Caribbean societies
3. The need for national strategic planning systems in place (FDIs would have to be positioned within such planning frameworks)
4. Thorough, technically proficient industrial growth strategies
5. Mixture of domestic and competitive developmentalism (with a more inward focus in the first instance and export promotion coming as an extension)
6. Selective incentives, disincentives, and planned investments on the modern factors of local growth and competency
7. Greater emphasis on production and operations quality
8. Enabling political, economic, and other social institutions; necessary politico-institutional reforms and enhanced democratic participation.
Culturally, the idea of underdevelopment can be seen as a “mental structure” (to paraphrase Wolfgang Sachs), where the underdeveloped nations desire to be like the developed ones. However, the Western lifestyle may neither be a realistic nor a desirable goal for the Caribbean population, as “externally endorsed” development can exacerbate underdevelopment and may result in a loss of a country’s culture, people’s perception of themselves, and modes of life. Uncritical borrowing of foreign models without the intervening stage of endogenous theoretical formulation serves merely to import ideas which neither recognize the possibilities of change permitted by local conditions nor respect the limits on these possibilities imposed by them.8 Clearly, dependency thinking has been an important part of the oppositional tradition in the sphere of knowledge, and one of various manifestations of resistance in the behavioral, religious, ideological and philosophical elements that have their roots deep within Caribbean society, with its experience of colonialism, slavery, and indentured servitude (New World Group 1971: 241; Girvan 2006: 347).
Furthermore, notions like “poverty” are very culturally embedded and can differ a lot among cultures. Recent years have seen a spate of interest in holistic development aspects due to disenchantment with the complacent orthodoxy and failed neoliberalism. As the institutes which voice concern over underdevelopment are very Western-oriented, genuine, distinctively Caribbean national development efforts call for a broader cultural involvement in development thinking, and propose a vision of society which removes itself from the ideas and social psychology which currently dominate it. Ultimately, the best road ahead can only be found by way of analysis of history, and of the specific economic, social, and cultural conditions of the society (New World Group 1971: 241). Such a holistic development approach for Caribbean territories is interested instead in local culture and knowledge, a critical view against established sciences, and the promotion of local grassroots movements. In addition, social change is absolutely vital in order to reach solidarity, reciprocity, and a larger involvement in local knowledge enhancement.
Needless to say, any hope for a shift in economic and social policy away from the neoliberal project mandates the radicalization of popular struggles. Dependency thought resonates with other currents of critical and counter-hegemonic perspectives in the Caribbean and in the global South (Girvan 2006: 347). Challenging neoliberalism at the intellectual and ideological level alone is hardly sufficient for compelling policymakers to confront the deadly shortcomings of the dominant socio-economic policies and embark in turn on development strategies that help improve the overall conditions of Caribbean societies. What is required within each particular nation is the spread of a social movement that believes in an alternative future but relies on its own national experience to overcome underdevelopment, economic pressures and social injustice while building bridges of international solidarity with other like-minded movements and governments.
Challenging neoliberal globalization does not imply a rejection of globalization itself but reflects a wider global project of counter-hegemonic resistance which calls into question the nature of economic, social, and cultural interconnectedness that define the contemporary world. Social movements and activists bent on weakening or even overthrowing neoliberal policies in their respective territories should study the contemporary history of anti-globalization struggles for useful insights and appropriate strategies.9 As recent experience in several Latin American, Asian, and European countries has demonstrated, an alternative future to “barbaric neoliberalism” is very much possible.
Concluding Remarks
The chapter has sought to describe the historic impact of colonialism on the Caribbean development; present Caribbean development efforts since the end of World War II; carefully make the case for centralized political involvement in industrial expansion in the era of neoliberal globalization; and propose essential themes and notions towards framing an alternative egalitarian development paradigm for the region.
In the past, critical thought has identified the way in which the Caribbean was integrated into the world economy as principal explanation for the region’s poverty and underdevelopment. The modern challenge is to “monitor and assess the impact of constant changes in the international economy on the region’s development possibilities.” On this basis, critical thought must fashion new strategies for “active participation in the world economy on terms which are favorable to the region’s economies and peoples” (Witter and Lindsay 1996: xxvi).
Evidently, the recent globalization era has already impacted the economies and societies of the Caribbean. As the effects of globalization will more likely intensify, and given its complexity and its potentially disruptive power along with its opportunities, there is clearly an urgent need to understand it, to take advantage of whatever benefits it offers, and to minimize potentially negative outcomes. However, to successfully confront contemporary realities, institutional policy intervention ought to be a crucial positive force in pursuing national purpose priorities.
Finally, an alternative holistic development paradigm for the Caribbean, influenced by the developmental state analysis, is proposed here. This developmental state argument is advanced as a necessary approach for the support of selected growth industries in the region while leaving space for stimulating further social and political development. Mindful of both its limitations and the need for the relevant and necessary modifications, this approach tries to develop through rigorous planning societies that are prepared to go to the next level of development. For a realistic understanding of a development process, one has to take seriously into account history, culture, geopolitics, and modern international relations, and firmly base discussion on the evolution and interconnectedness of the national and global socioeconomic settings in which Caribbean economies and societies operate.
Notes
1. Lewis, W. A. (1950). “The Industrialization of the British West Indies”, Caribbean Economic Review 2(1): 1–51; and (1954). “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour”, Manchester School 22(2): 139–191.
2. See UN-ECLAC, various national accounts and economic statistics during the last 50 years or so; Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), Social and Economic Indicators, various issues; and CARICOM Secretariat (2013), CARICOM’s Selected Economic Indicators 2002–2011. www.caricomstats.org
3. Overall, as the Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Secretariat admitted in 1972 (From CARIFTA to Caribbean Community. Georgetown):
[The postwar era of growth represented] a continuation of the centuries-old pattern of West Indian economy—growth without development; growth accompanied by imbalances and distortions; growth generated from outside rather than within; growth without the fullest possible use of West Indian manpower, entrepreneurial, capital and natural resources; growth resting on a foreign rather than indigenous technological base; and growth accompanied by imported consumption patterns.
4. For a full discussion, see: Payne, A. and P. Sutton (2001). Charting Caribbean Development. London: Macmillan-Caribbean.
5. Ibid. See also Girvan, N. (2006). “Caribbean Dependency Thought Revisited”, Canadian Journal of Development Studies 27(3): 329–352; Girvan, N. and O. Jefferson (eds) (1971). Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean. Mona, Jamaica: New World Group.
6. U.S. International Trade Commission (2008). Caribbean Region: Review of Economic Growth and Development; UN-ECLAC (2012). Development Paths in the Caribbean; IMF (2013). Caribbean Small States: Challenges of High Debt and Low Growth.
7. Karagiannis (2000–2013) has published extensively on these development policy issues. See, for example, Karagiannis, N. (2002). Developmental Policy and the State: The European Union, East Asia, and the Caribbean. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. See also Thomas, C. Y. (1988). The Poor and the Powerless: Economic Policy and Change in the Caribbean. London: Latin American Bureau.
8. Another term used to describe this condition was “dysfunctional ideologizing” (Best 1965). See also Witter, M. and L. Lindsay (1996). “Introduction”, in K. Polanyi Levitt and M. Witter (eds), The Critical Tradition of Caribbean Political Economy: The Legacy of George Beckford. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, xxi-xxvi.
9. A comparative analysis of anti-globalization strategies can be found in Amory Starr (2001). Naming the Enemy: Anti-Corporate Movements Confront Globalization. London: Zed Books.