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A Framework for Analysis of Shared Authority in Complex Socio-technical Systems

3.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to present a framework for systemic analysis of shared authority and responsibility in complex socio-technical systems. To achieve this, we will use the case study of the field of air traffic management (ATM) that we can consider as a complex socio-technical system within which humans and technical systems cooperate in an interacting manner. In such systems, human operators have different roles and are integrated in different organizational or geographical cultures. Nevertheless, all share the same final objective, which consists of making air transport safe and effective. To improve the overall performance of this socio-technical system, a new generation of air traffic management systems is currently being developed with a view to making air transport safe and operational at a global scale. One of the challenges involved in the design of these new systems relates to their complex, dynamic and highly interconnected nature. In addition, technical systems are destined to become highly automatized so as to provide a comprehensive approach to traffic management and at the same time assist human operators with completion of their tasks. To this end, changing the level of automation does not necessarily mean replacement of tasks allocated to humans in current air traffic management practices, but rather modification or elimination of certain tasks and at the same time creation of new tasks [SHE 83]. In this way, automation of tasks can change the information that the operators will need in order to carry out their own tasks. This evolution raises the question of the utility of the information and the usability of suitable means of communication. When it comes to designing complex socio-technical systems, the problem of automation extends beyond a simple transposition of functions between humans and machines. In a general manner, this would certainly lead to a definition of new roles and to profound changes in the socio-technical environment of human operators and their skills [CUM 06]. The introduction of remote towers represents a recent example of this type of new operations/systems. Indeed, the concept of remote towers allows air traffic control services (ATS) and aerodrome flight information services (AFIS) at airfields where this type of service is not currently available, or on aerodromes where it would be too difficult or costly to install and maintain conventional air traffic control services.

In the context of the evolution of European traffic management, members of the SESAR program have developed a methodology to invent and evaluate levels of automation for air traffic management [SES 13b]. However, levels of automation cannot be defined without taking into account the link to questions of authority and responsibility. Our hypothesis is to consider that research work into authority and responsibility in complex systems requires a suitable approach, which should include a set of methods, tools and theoretical foundations that are adapted to the characteristics of complexity. Indeed, we consider that complexity is not a simple dimension on a continuum between something that would be simple on the one hand, and complex or chaotic on the other hand. We consider complexity as a research subject within sciences of complexity, and, as such, complexity has its own characteristics or criteria that have been brought to the forefront by sciences of complexity. Thus, complexity can be seen as a “paradigm of complexity” [MOR 15]. Using this paradigm of complexity, the notion of agents can be used to characterize an activity that can be carried out by a human and/or a technical entity within an organization [FER 03]. The paradigm of complexity can help to spread the notion of activity independently from the type of agent involved. To reach an expected performance, the agents can use information coming from their internal or external environment as a basis. They can also analyze or make decisions, implement and monitor the consequences of their decisions while having a multitude of cognitive and physical actions available to them. Achieving expected performances also depends on the availability of information related to the activity of other agents and knowledge of their possibilities of cooperation or collaboration. Lastly, situational, societal and organizational characteristics of the environments of agents determine the way in which the actions are carried out, in addition to the specific aspects of each entity such as past experiences or individual motivation factors.

Given that human and technical agents collaborate in achieving a common performance objective [HOC 00], it is essential for human beings to be aware of their responsibility with regard to automated systems. In addition, humans must know to what extent they have control over automated systems or know to what extent automation can carry out, guide or replace their tasks in acceptable conditions of safety and performance. In addition, humans can require the assurance that they will not be held responsible for a decision or for a dangerous measure that has been previously delegated to an automation.

For a few years, several research groups have begun to study concepts of authority and responsibility in an aeronautical field. This research has allowed a set of conceptual definitions and a framework to be established, involving authority and responsibility. However, to this day, there is still no consensus and clear convergence between authors regarding the way in which authority and responsibility are structured with respect to each other. In the field of embedded systems on airplanes, Billings [BIL 97] has already evoked the link between authority and responsibility. Boy and Grote [BOY 12] have developed this approach in more depth and have shown that the concept of authority implies aspects of “control” over systems and also notions of “responsibility” and of “accountability” in system operations. Boy and Grote have also demonstrated that these concepts must be analyzed by considering several human and technical agents that are part of the global organization of air traffic management. According to these authors, there are various ways of organizing “authority”. Thus, they distinguish “delegation”, “distribution”, “sharing” and “trading”. To complete this approach, Miller and Parasuraman [MIL 07] proposed distinctions between various patterns of delegation of authority. Other entities like the US Navy [USN 18] have also proposed distinctions between different types of authorities and accountability. Thus, the US Navy identifies the “legal authority”, referring to the descriptions given in legal texts and/or military code, the “earned authority” that corresponds to mechanisms of social emergence of leaders, “moral authority” that refers to an individual conscience and to legitimacy to act outside a legal framework (which allows resistance movements). The US Navy also describes various levels of accountability in handing accounts in to an authority, mainly via legal and/or financial accountability. To this end, accountability is generally considered to be a counter-power to excess authority that can be requested by the various authority bodies such as military and/or civil justice within the US Navy. Thus, accountability would be exercised only in cases of infraction of a form of authority. Bhattacharyya and Pritchett [BHA 14] have also proposed a predictive model to analyze the notions of “role” and “responsibility” by using an approach based on various scenarios. They have established a set of definitions of autonomy to describe whether an agent can carry out a task in an independent manner; within this framework, authority is related to tasks that an agent must execute, and the responsibility refers to the results of the task for which they can be accountable, in the sense that an authority could ask them to report back. Lastly, the approach proposed by Straussberger et al. [STR 08] recommends completing the scenario-based approach with an approach based on organizational models.

Due to their direct impact on human behavior, it is essential to understand how authority, responsibility and accountability are designed and broadcast within a socio-technical system and how these concepts can be managed during an engineering process of these systems. In effect, engineering processes are able to provide an overall methodology to study and manage the impact of human performance on air traffic management. A process of this kind effectively exists in the SESAR human performance assessment process (HPAP) [SES 13a]. The HPAP firstly specifies how to define and evaluate problems and advantages related to human performance, leading to iterative improvement of air traffic management systems by managing recommendations and demands, and secondly how to apply unitary operational concepts as well as integrated applications of these unitary operational concepts. However, for the moment, the HPAP does not efficiently address problems associated with authority, responsibility and accountability as well as their dissemination in new concepts of air traffic management. In fact, the main current problem is the lack of shared understanding of the terminology and the processes that are capable of correctly deciphering authority, responsibility and accountability in such a way as to make them compatible with an engineering process.

The main aim of this chapter is to present a proposed design and analysis framework that is capable of understanding authority, responsibility and accountability in complex systems of air traffic management. This design framework is focused on users and is capable of eliciting and resolving human factor problems before making new air traffic control concepts operational. It intends to increase awareness in designers and direct their thought processes with regard to notions of authority, responsibility and accountability and further promotes the difference between a systematic and a systemic approach. In addition, this work framework aims to guide the analyses and the impact of design through four levels: nano, micro, meso and macro, and finally, the use of this work framework will be illustrated by a preliminary analysis of visual separation operations on-board airplanes from the point of view of the cockpit, even though we consider that an approach of this kind can be applied to any field of air traffic management whatsoever.

3.2. From the systematic approach to the systemic approach: a different approach of sharing authority and responsibility

The current view of shared authority is often characterized as systematic, which must be understood as a synonym of methodical. For example, in the military field, the chain of command can be an example of a systematic, linear and vertical (top down) approach to authority. This classic approach to authority is found in definitions such as: “Right to order, power to impose obedience. The authority of the superior over their subordinates (hierarchy)”.

A systematic approach to authority can address the aspects of authority, control or responsibility. However, this approach will make it difficult to describe the dynamics in place between these various aspects. An example of a systematic application of authority can be observed in a task to separate airplanes in categories of air space that will mainly be under the responsibility of an air traffic controller.

In aviation, the authority is known as the place and/or the moment when someone has the authority to influence the course of events in the short term. In a similar way, in terms of human–computer interaction, control is understood to be the capacity to influence a situation while remaining in the interactive loop, therefore being informed of the states of human–system interaction and having the means to indirectly influence the current or future state of the system. This notion of control in aviation is similar to the notion of “user control” in the field of usability engineering [BAS 95]. These notions are related to the need to know what state the system is in and the capacity for the user to take control of the system, to the point of stopping it.

This systematic approach to authority is, however, no longer suitable when it is a question of thinking about authority in systems that involve complex levels of automation. In effect, air traffic control can be considered to be a complex adaptive system in which a high number of agents can interact, adapt or even learn [HOL 06]. It is therefore appropriate to understand the design of air traffic management systems through the paradigm of complexity. Cilliers [CIL 98] has thus proposed a set of characteristics of complex systems that are relevant to the characteristics particular to aeronautics:

  • – the number of elements is sufficiently high for conventional descriptions (e.g. a system of differential equations) to not only be unsuitable but also counterproductive for understanding the system. In addition, the elements of the system interact in a dynamic manner and these interactions can be physical and/or based on exchanges of information;
  • – interactions of this kind are rich, meaning that every element or sub-system of the system is affected by and affects several other elements or sub-systems. Thus, aeronautics is generally described as a system of systems;
  • – these interactions are nonlinear. Thus, small variations in inputs such as physical interactions or stimuli can cause significant effects or very significant changes to the outputs of the complex system. This phenomenon is often illustrated by the butterfly effect;
  • – interactions take place as a priority but not exclusively between agents within a close environment and the effects of these interactions are modulated;
  • – all interaction implies direct or indirect retroaction. Retroactions can vary in quality and thus be positive or negative. This is also called recurrence;
  • – complex systems are open and it can be difficult or impossible to define the limits of the system;
  • – complex systems are far from equilibrium conditions. There must be a constant flow of energy to maintain organization and overall structure of the system;
  • – complex systems have a history. They evolve and their past is jointly responsible for their current behavior;
  • – the system elements can ignore the behavior of the system as a whole. They only respond to the information or to physical stimuli that are made available to them locally.

Based on the consideration that air traffic management is a complex system, a systemic approach to authority, to responsibility and to accountability allows us to consider that these aspects affect the socio-technical system as a whole, instead of being restricted to sub-parts, in a dynamic context, and in interaction with multiple factors and agents. The structure of this multi-agent work framework corresponds to this systemic approach since it allows representation of the dynamic nature of tasks between human and technical agents, as well as their organizational and societal context.

For a systemic approach, a clear distribution of the allocation of authority, responsibility and accountability is necessary, even though this allocation can take place at different levels and depends on the dynamic nature of situations. This can occur at a detailed level of a function or of a task, or it can occur on an organizational or societal level. We use the concept of “action” [GOL 96] to characterize behavior of agents that is orientated towards or by specific objectives. To determine the levels to which the action is connected, the terms nano, micro, meso and macro will be used in the rest of this chapter. The sections that follow describe how these elements are included in the context of a systemic approach to design, in other words, in the context of the work framework that we propose.

3.3. A framework of analysis and design of authority and responsibility

The framework of analysis and design that we propose constitutes the summary of a set of different projects in the SESAR program, in which questions involving allocation of authority and responsibility are recurrent subjects of study, leading to lively debates between air traffic controllers, users of air space and aeronautical engineers at various levels of design, ranging from construction of human–computer interactions (HCI) to the development of regulations at an international scale.

The objective of our framework for analysis and design is to summarize the main dimensions that should be taken into account in the design of allocation of authority/responsibility of future operational concepts in air traffic management. These dimensions are particularly important for the design of future concepts that involve new technical perspectives, and take into account dynamic and adaptive concepts that mobilize, through construction, different forms of cooperation between humans and automation. In other words, this framework for analysis and design is an initial attempt to improve considerations of the problems of authority, responsibility and accountability during the design of future aeronautical concepts and the integration of ground and airborne elements. An initial dimension established a distinction between authority, responsibility and accountability by basing itself on the concept of action. A second dimension refers to the levels of actions in their environments. A third dimension relates to the type of action patterns between agents. In the next sections, we describe these different dimensions. Each element of the design framework is described and illustrated using examples in order to support the reader’s understanding.

3.3.1. Actions in a perspective of authority, responsibility and accountability

To allow adequate analysis of the impacts on human performance, a concise understanding of authority, responsibility and accountability is necessary in order to characterize the various components of interactions between humans and systems. We will call on the concept of action to allow us to distinguish between these three notions because the concept of action focuses on general human behavior directed by goals and targets. By means of this concept, individual and motivational factors determine concrete actions. However, we do not just use concepts of tasks and activity [LEP 83]. Indeed, by definition, these concepts associate the objectives of the tasks with the means assigned to accomplish these tasks; however, they do not provide a framework for analysis of overall behavior that is able to capture the dynamic and individual motivations behind the actions that are effectively carried out by humans. For more details about the aspects that impact human actions, interested readers may refer to more specialized literature such as Gollwitzer and Bargh [GOL 96]. The actions take place in a certain context and are determined by the characteristics of the agents and of their environment [GOL 96]. In a temporal dimension, the actions can be considered to be the perspective of planned actions, the process envisaged for execution of actions and objective completion of them. In a similar manner, time organization can also be transferred to notions of authority, responsibility and accountability. An action can be planned with an objective in mind, an action can be carried out in order to achieve an objective, and the result of the action is verified with respect to the initial objective. Actions can be described on a very detailed level or also in a combined manner and they have been introduced into the design of automation by different authors [HAR 03]. The action model proposed by SESAR guides for automatization provides a standardized work framework for analysis of actions in this way by describing the information acquisition [I-AC], information analysis [I_AN], action selection and decision [AS_D], and action implementation [A_I]. For purposes of simplification, we refer hereafter only to a “cycle of action” without dividing it up further.

In the framework for analysis and design that we propose, the concepts of responsibility, accountability and authority are clearly linked to the concept of action. With this in mind, the description of concepts hereafter should be understood as a prerequisite to the use of the analysis and design framework. The objective of these descriptions is to allow common understanding and to establish a clear distinction between these various concepts in the context of air traffic management.

Responsibility is generally understood as an “obligation for an operator to carry out a task that has been explicitly assigned to them in order to guarantee security of operations” [SKY 13]. Consequently, responsibility refers to aspects where actions have been planned a priori. When the actions are planned for a specific agent, this is generally formalized in the form of tasks expected in the description of a role or of a job. These definitions may come from regulatory bodies and/or airline companies. For example, an agent could be responsible for the overall security of a flight (ordinarily this responsibility falls to the onboard commander, as described in the “rules of the air”), another agent of the tactical prediction of conflicts in the air (this responsibility generally falls to the traffic alert and collision avoidance systems (TCAS) from the onboard standpoint, and to the short-term conflict alert system (STCA) from the point of view of air traffic control), or another of making reliable weather data available (from the onboard point of view, this responsibility falls to the airplane’s weather radar). In the aeronautical context, the emergence of complex systems requires a clear allocation of the responsibilities between the various agents that are involved. We can consider that not all the planned actions are formalized, but that the knowledge of planned actions can be shared implicitly. Even though the responsibility is often defined from a regulatory standpoint, organizations can in addition specify the responsibilities concerning specific organizational objectives.

“Supervision control” refers to the responsibility of monitoring the results of a complex process that implicates one or several agents [SHE 92]. Supervision control is closely linked to the concept of “user control” that we encounter in the field of HCI [BIL 97]. This responsibility should be accompanied with means of controlling or short-circuiting/stopping a system under supervision in the event of its failure. For example, supervision control of an air traffic controller can refer to their responsibility to avoid a traffic conflict; whereas the supervision control of a pilot can refer to their responsibility to make their airplane leave on time or to prevent any delays postponing the departure time.

Accountability evokes instead the action that is effectively carried out and its results, such as the obligation to demonstrate accomplishment of a task to another agent (a federal administration, public authorities, employees or even clients) in response to an action; this is expressed as justification for an action or a decision that is made. Accountability is therefore characterized as a situation a posteriori to actions that are already carried out. Accountability is located on a level where an agent calls itself into question in order to justify the elements that have led them to carry out actions and decisions in a specific manner. Justifications of this kind can be related to a system of reporting. Accountability can also be envisaged in the framework of a system of rights, which will not be developed further in the framework of this chapter.

Responsibility and accountability should be considered to be conditions a priori and a posteriori. Authority is mostly related to the power to act and is thus associated with the conditions for completion of the actions permitted by design and determined by their dynamics and their contexts. At the same time, the actions that are really carried out are impacted by the specifications of technical systems that can lead them to a certain level of autonomy. As has already been identified by Boy and Grote [BOY 12], authority is related to the notion of control. Management of an action based on authority often requires decision-making. For example, a pilot knows his or her responsibility (the tasks supposed to be accomplished), as well as at what time they have control and therefore responsibility and the possibility of taking back control over automation in order to carry out actions in acceptable conditions of security and performance. The power to act also depends on the skills of the agent, their effectiveness, their expertise and their knowledge; however, it may also be directed by the legitimacy of an agent to carry out an action. The dynamics of situations can also lead an agent to take power to carry out an action for which no responsibility has been previously defined. These situations can lead to a notion of “emerging authority”.

In summary, while responsibility is a formalization of the actions expected by the agents or the organizations a priori to the execution of actions, accountability for its part can be seen as a formalization of the impacts of actions concretely brought to the attention of other agents or organizations. Authority must be included as a process of execution of the actions themselves, but the way in which the actions are carried out will be determined by responsibility a priori and accountability a posteriori, and the coherence between these concepts, related to the action, must be guaranteed during design of new solutions of air traffic management. Research into the coherence between the responsibility, authority and accountability must be looked at in particular detail if new automation is envisaged in future concepts. Indeed, in this case, execution of the actions could have an impact on the patterns that define the allocation of authority, responsibility and accountability. Figure 3.1 shows the relations between these concepts from the point of view of the agent. These relations can be characterized by anticipation loops and retroactions.

3.3.2. Levels of authority and responsibility

Since agents in complex systems carry out actions in collaboration and cooperation with other entities, it is therefore important to describe the organization of these entities in more detail in order to understand the overall impact of their actions. Actions within a complex system can be carried out by human or technical agents when it is a case of intervening on equivalent spatial, temporal and social levels. These can be characterized on a scale of four levels ranging from the nano level, the most detailed, to the macro level, which is the highest. This differentiation of complex systems into levels is quite common in different disciplines such as economy, sociology or ecology.

In line with the ecological model of human development that was introduced by Bronfenbrenner [BRO 79], the micro level covers types of activities and roles in a specific context that can be considered only at the individual scale. The meso level relates to actions in which an individual is engaged for a certain time duration (e.g. the duration of a commercial airplane flight). The macro level involves a set of cultural and social values that are going to exert a strong influence on individual behaviors. An agent can therefore be connected to these various levels at the same time. As a function of the level involved, it will have different effects and consequently the description of authority, responsibility and accountability will be carried out via characteristics that correspond to the level considered. The important thing to know, when we create new concepts, is at what level the responsibility is defined and to whom the agent will be accountable. The following sections propose instantiations of the different properties of the four levels that we consider in the field of aeronautics.

The macro level corresponds to social groups of large amplitude such as nations, international institutions, cultures or societies (e.g. Eastern and Western societies). The macro level typically prescribes the responsibilities of socio-technical components of aviation as a whole. The aeronautical authorities (e.g. military authorities, civil authorities, the FAA, EASA) generally finalize the aeronautical rules and major actors in aeronautics such as the aeronautical industry, accident investigation offices, standardization groups or even the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) that define the principles of high level operation such as the separations between airplanes, the organization of airspace or even free-route spaces. The rules defined at this level are going to have an impact on the actions of agents in a direct manner (by application of the rules or regulations) or indirectly (by application of the rules defined on a meso level). On a macro level, it is possible to identify problems of definition and allocation of actions to be carried out between agents at this level, which are entities in themselves. The action time at the macro level is long and is going to involve many contributors whose decisions and actions could have an indirect impact on human activities, technical systems, organizations and the environment (e.g. the reduction in emissions of carbon dioxide, the air traffic capacity).

The meso level refers to social organizations of intermediate size that can be structured in organizations of groups of agents that execute high level rules defined on a macro level or that share common activities. These organizations (e.g. airlines, industrial collaborations, pilots’ associations or air traffic controllers) define global missions that structure activity. The meso level mainly refers to management of the phases of planning and execution of assignments and commercial flights. Responsibilities at this level involve an entire sector, a flight, an assignment or many other types of work. The assignments defined at this level are going to have a direct impact on the actions of agents in charge of the execution of the activity. Problems related to both the allocation and completion of tasks can be identified at this level. The time scale at this level follows the same logic and is based on the time for an assignment or for a flight. Environmental considerations are also based on the scale of an assignment and are mainly supported by forecasts (e.g. the density of air traffic, weather conditions).

The micro level refers to unitary agents that can be human or technical. The events produced at this level only relate to the execution phase and not the planning phase. An example of an agent at this level could be a system of alerts that can provide information and specific guidance suitable for a local context. This level concerns the allocation of authority between humans and machines, as is the case for example with the TCAS. At the micro level, we can consider the properties of agents such as their skills, their strengths and weaknesses and their authorities and responsibilities to carry out actions. At this level, the timescale is tactical (e.g. less than 10 minutes of anticipation) and the environmental considerations are based on detection by sensors.

Lastly, the nano level refers to specific properties (e.g. concrete decisions, elementary actions such as the fact of pressing a button) or specific components (such as a system function) that are going to produce actions. At a nano level, the allocation of tasks between agents can also be envisaged. At this level, the roles correspond to sets of actions that are linked to each other and that can be executed by one and the same agent that has several roles. Effectively, an agent can play different roles that depend on the societal context in which they are involved. The time scale at this level is immediate, as it is for the environment. Figure 3.1 shows how the various levels are related to the actions based on an example of distribution of authority and which can be instantiated case by case by means of these levels. These various distributions of authority can evolve over time.

The example of the Uberlingen accident (2002) reflects how organization of the responsibility in relation to the TCAS (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System) was carried out. This technical agent triggers the appearance of instructions to the pilot who has the authority to execute a tactical avoidance maneuver. Before the Uberlingen accident, there was no harmonization between the Russian and German procedures at a macro level. One procedure gave the authority to make a decision to the TCAS agent; the other giving authority to the air traffic controller. This lack of harmonization led the pilots and the controller, at a nano level, to follow different and non-coordinated instructions during the execution of the action that led to the collision of two airplanes mid-flight. This means that an event at a nano level can lead to modification at a macro level, which will have a positive retroaction at a nano level. Figure 3.2 shows the dynamic interaction between the levels by basing itself on the case of the evolution of shared authority related to the TCAS following the Uberlingen accident.

Another example is related to the events of September 11, 2001, which have drastically changed the cockpit access procedures during the execution phase of a commercial flight. After these events, at a macro level, the regulatory bodies (the FAA and the EASA) asked the airlines to install an access to the cockpit that is capable of resisting intrusions for a period of 20 minutes (meaning the average time required to reach an airport). Nevertheless, these regulatory bodies have delegated authority to airlines, at a meso level, for implementation of suitable technical measures, without specifying any solutions to adhere to. This has allowed airline companies to manage this new constraint with respect to their operational contexts. Companies have then delegated responsibility to pilots at a micro level to manage access to the cockpit on a case by case basis. At a nano level, technical solutions put in place can vary depending on the company (e.g. control of commands or of entry codes), this has an impact on the allocation of authority to agents (e.g. depending on the position of a command control in the cockpit, the cabin personnel will or will not be able to access the cockpit). In this case, management of the risk of intrusion in the cockpit was carried out in a systematic manner with a view to delegating vertical authority. Even though we may believe that this approach is very effective, it however does not adapt itself very easily to the diversity of operational situations. Taking account of the variety of agents and situations, alternative solutions could be imagined that have a different impact on the allocations of authority and of responsibility at micro and nano levels.

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Figure 3.1. Relations between the authority, responsibility and accountability

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Figure 3.2. Dynamic relations between the notions of authority, responsibility and accountability following an event across the different levels

3.3.3. Patterns of actions in relation to authority and responsibility

Based on the attributed authority/responsibility, the execution of actions between agents can be described by different patterns, as has already been proposed by Boy and Grote [BOY 12] and more widely detailed in the following sections. In most cases, we could consider that an agent is accountable if they are responsible. However, this basic hypothesis may be called into question during design of a new allocation of authority and, in this case, incoherencies may emerge when the pattern of allocation of responsibility is not compatible with the pattern of allocation of authority and accountability. To simplify explanation of the principle of allocation patterns, we will develop these by highlighting authority, because this allows improved illustration of the dynamic of patterns via concrete examples and connections to responsibility and accountability. However, we can postulate that equivalent patterns, based on the same principles, can be established concerning responsibility and accountability and serve as a basis for analysis of the coherence between these concepts during design. Nevertheless, to date this has not been detailed.

3.3.3.1. Authority sharing

Authority sharing involves a context of tasks in which agents must reach a common objective and have a given objective. In this situation, at least two agents make separate decisions but are focused on achievement of the same objective, and each agent controls their own actions and is responsible for the consequences of their decision-making. Although they have independent actions to carry out, these actions should be synchronized in such a way as to achieve the common objective. To this end, awareness of the mutual situation is essential. Behavior of these agents involves joint use of resources. An example of a resource could be the trajectory of an airplane. Consequently, agents act cooperatively on this trajectory because they pursue the same objective and this objective will be reached by sharing a common representation of the current situation. In order to cooperate, the agents should be able to share a common reference framework [HOC 01] to provide awareness of the appropriate situation.

This pattern of authority is related to the joint actions and distributed cooperations. Cooperation is finalized because it aims to reach a common objective. This involves distribution of tasks and sub-tasks among the various agents. However, this allocation pattern can be modified in line with modifications to the environment. Cooperation requires preparation in order to allow an approved representation of each agent in the objective to be achieved and in the manner in which it is reached. Elaboration of this reference framework is made essentially through communication and allows operators to synchronize themselves at a cognitive level, in order to attribute representations to each agent concerning the objectives to be reached and the way in which they are reached. Then, the agents synchronize themselves in their actions and coordinate the actions to be carried out.

Difficulties can appear when agents must share a common reference framework. Effectively, these agents may not have the same understanding and/or interpretation of the situation or state of systems. The common reference framework is directly linked to the concept of mediation because it is a means of sharing a common and appropriate understanding of a current situation in such a way as to be capable of cooperating. As a result, the common reference framework is central in authority sharing because each agent needs to be able to understand what the other says and does.

In a context of authority sharing, there is a goal/objective shared by all the agents involved: a common goal. In order to achieve this common goal, each agent will have particular tasks (whatever this task is: action or decision-making). Since there is an interdependence between the agents and therefore between the tasks, the various agents involved must cooperate to achieve the overall objective. Furthermore, each of their actions/decisions must imperatively be coordinated with the others, in other words, these agents must be capable of synchronizing themselves.

Since each agent involved in achieving the common objective must carry out the tasks that are assigned to them or for which they are responsible, responsibility of each actor is engaged in one part of the overall action. In the context of an event that is going to put the safety of operations at risk, each agent would become accountable and would need to be able to justify and explain why they acted in one way or another and which would lead them to make a particular decision.

When authority is shared between the human and technical agents, the presence of an appropriate guidance that represents the internal state of systems and the progression of process then becomes compulsory at a micro/nano level. This guidance helps the agents to synchronize their actions in a context in which the tasks are interdependent. This guidance will also contribute to constructing a common reference framework and conscience of the appropriate situation.

3.3.3.2. Authority distribution

Authority distribution is a pattern of authority that makes reference to situations in which functions are distributed among a set of agents. This pattern can be related to the concept of division because authority is divided, in the sense that an agent is in charge of a specific task, another agent of another task and so on. The pattern of distribution of authority is also directly linked to the allocation of functions or, in other terms, to the more classical design of automation.

The prerequisite for implementation of a pattern of distribution of authority, during an automation, is a task analysis. This is essential for a task or a function to be allocated to an identified agent. To do this, the tasks and cognitive functions must imperatively be described precisely. At this stage, it would make sense to look at the impact of automation on global interactions, coordination and synchronization in the global socio-technical system.

To design the distribution of authority, it is firstly of use to carry out a precise analysis of the tasks and activities in order to consider all the tasks carried out by human operators in a normal situation. This analysis need not take into account tasks sensitive to context and the abnormal situations, but rather the variability of the situations that the agents have to manage. To this end, in the design phase, it is important to precisely define cases of use that are representative of the variability of contexts and tasks.

Moreover, since the distribution of authority involves automation, it can be thought about locally, but must be coordinated between the various agents and therefore between the attributed functions. Although the tasks and the authority are distributed, these tasks are included in a work flow. To this end, if certain tasks or functions are automated in an uncorrelated manner, we will be able to expect problems to occur in the work flow due to interdependence of tasks.

Since the results of a specific task can be used as a contribution to another, it is necessary to think about automation in a holistic manner. The most significant factor in a distribution of authority is to correctly take into account the relations between the various functions as well as the functions themselves. Consequently, the functions of automation must be jointly defined between themselves.

Allocation of functions is a process that is complex to address, because once the initial organization of work is transformed into a new organization, several new functions are going to emerge, which will need to be discovered and taken into account in the automation process itself. Effectively, if the automation is considered to be a multi-agent process in which certain functions that were previously executed by humans are transferred to machines, then new functions devoted to humans will inevitably occur, which will naturally emerge from new types of interaction. The essential question is to know how to make these new emerging functions explicit. To achieve this, methods dedicated to this question must be optimized, as it is difficult to address this question for the moment.

Regarding the pattern of authority, the distribution of authority in itself, it will only be possible to determine it once the allocation of functions has been completed. In this case, each agent will have a task that will correspond to a particular function that has been allocated to it and for which they will be responsible. Consequently, this agent will have the obligation to carry out this task correctly. At the same time, they will have the obligation to demonstrate completion of their tasks that will cover their accountability.

For example, in an aeronautical context, there can be failures in certain agents in the general flow of work. Let us look at the example of a strike movement by ground agents that are responsible for refueling airplanes with kerosene. Generally, these agents are part of airport operations and are not directly associated with a particular airline company. Nevertheless, these agents are essential for an airplane to leave on time, and if these agents cease their work, then the airplanes run the risk of departing late. Nevertheless, the regulations of commercial aviation (on a macro level) require airlines to inform their passengers of late departures that they are believed to be responsible for. In other words, airlines are accountable, with regard to their client, for information about a delay that is the consequence of non-completion of an action for which the airline is responsible. In these cases, we are able to observe a systematic/direct approach of the relationship between the responsibility, authority and accountability. In this type of situation of striking ground agents, involving delays, the airline cannot be held responsible and therefore accountable for information given to their clients. Nevertheless, a systemic pattern of distribution of authority could in this case bring to the forefront a decorrelation between responsibility and accountability, because even though the airline company is not at the origin of the airplane’s delay, it remains nevertheless responsible for the well-being of its clients and consequently accountable for information about the reasons for delay. Using this example of use, we can see how an inadequate distribution of authority, responsibility and accountability can lead to situations that do not make sense from a global point of view and that may appear to be absurd from the point of view of certain agents, as is the case with the passengers of the airline company that will have a late airplane, from their point of view unjustified. In return, this will have a negative retroactive impact on the airline’s brand image.

3.3.3.3. Authority delegation

This pattern of authority evokes a situation in which an agent transfers its authority to another agent to carry out an action. This supposes that this other agent possesses the appropriate skills, expertise and knowledge to execute the action that is demanded of them.

It is also important, in this case, that the action that is delegated is defined clearly and that the two agents have a shared representation of the prerequisites for carrying out the action and its consequences, and in certain cases of the process involved by carrying out the action. Moreover, the agent initiating the delegation of authority may or may not maintain responsibility for execution of the delegated action. Delegation implies the notion of contract that must be managed by the delegating agent. We consider that if the delegated agent executes the terms of the contract for the delegator of the action, the latter must verify that the contract is executed correctly by the delegated agent. In the end, the delegating agent will always remain accountable for performance of the delegated agent. In the case where the delegated agent does not respect execution of the contract, the delegating agent will nevertheless remain responsible and accountable for the non-execution of the action. In this latter case, only authority is delegated.

When an action is more complicated to carry out or it surpasses human capabilities of a first agent who carries out the action, part of this action/task can be delegated to a second agent in order to better carry out the action as a whole.

Each time an agent delegates an action/task, they lose direct control over the execution of this action, they lose authority over it. Nevertheless, they remain responsible for delegated actions, and for maintaining a form of super-control, the delegating agent will have to go through the process of a delegated task management activity. Thus, the agent who delegates will imperatively need to manage the coordination between what the delegated agents do and their own activity, in such a way as to ensure an overall performance.

To date, air traffic controllers have full authority to send orders to airplanes in order to provide tactical instructions and clearances. An exception to this authority was introduced when TCAS were installed on-board airplanes, delegating the authority to the TCAS agent to provide tactical instructions to pilots. This delegation took place in order to avoid confusions during decision-making processes. When two airplanes enter into conflict, each of the TCAS of the two airplanes provides information on the surrounding traffic and advice about resolution of the conflict. For example, a TCAS is going to ask the pilot to gain altitude and the other TCAS will ask the pilot to descend. These orders are coordinated. When a TCAS gives an order to the pilot, the latter must carry it out to avoid a collision with the other airplane by losing or gaining altitude. In this case, the action regarding decision-making, to resolve the conflict, has been delegated to the TCAS who must indicate to the pilot the procedure to follow. However, the pilot maintains the authority over execution of the avoidance maneuver. Responsibility has also been modified with integration of the TCAS. The TCAS is now responsible for providing an “acquisition of information” and a correct “analysis of information”, as well as a suitable and coordinated “decision and action selection”. Pilots remain responsible for correctly carrying out the action based on a decision made by the TCAS agent. Figure 3.3 presents an example about the way in which this delegation of authority can be presented.

image

Figure 3.3. Example of characterization of the delegation of authority in the case of conflict resolution by TCAS

3.3.3.4. Contractualization of authority

Authority trading corresponds to the situation where two or several agents establish and steer contracts to define the conditions of the authority patterns described in the previous sections. This means that authority trading restricts the conditions of exercise of authority in terms of time and this exercise of authority can be reallocated in real time as a function of the operational context.

Such contractualization implies planning the exercise of authority and consequently it increases the predictability of the situations. Contractualization also implies adaptability to the resolution of problems in real time. Contractualization of authority can be managed on a macro and meso level within organizations, in such a way as to increase the predictability of operations, but it can also be managed locally (on a meso and micro level) in order to allow an adaptability to local specificities in space and in time. To this end, management of contractualization of macro and micro authority can sometimes become contradictory, and hence contractualization of authority must be orientated by principles and criteria such as safety and performance.

This contractualization can be established with the issue of a flight plan and/or business trajectory in the framework of 4D operations. In this case, airline operations establish a flight plan that is provided to the central unit of air traffic flow management that will transfer this flight plan to the relevant control authorities who will confirm its impact and ensure that it is included in the overall management of planned air traffic. During preparation for the flight, the pilots will insert the approved flight plan into the onboard computer (Flight Management System – FMS) and check that this flight plan remains suitable depending on the planned and/or known environmental context. In this way, the entire organization is involved in this planning and this flight plan is made in such a way as to improve the predictability, environmental impact, commercial profitability and fluidification of the circulation. From a tactical point of view, the flight plan remains a reference framework for evaluation of the separations between airplanes to be applied and for planning the maneuvers between airplanes in order to prevent collision conflicts. If an unexpected event occurs during the flight execution phase, such as a weather phenomenon on the airplane trajectory, a contractualization between the team and air traffic control will have to take place, which will require additional communication tasks in order to finalize the best avoidance strategy. However, for their part, the air traffic controller must evaluate the impact of this strategy on the surrounding traffic and their own flight plans. Thus, the initial conditions of authority contractualization can be reviewed while the flight is executed.

3.3.4. Dynamic relations between the dimensions of the analysis framework

This section describes the dynamic relations between the dimensions of the framework for analysis and design. The first dimension of the analysis framework characterizes the way in which the responsibility, authority and accountability are related to the way in which the action is carried out.

The second dimension illustrates how these three components are spread out across four levels that designate the social environment of agents. The macro level distributes the prescriptions of responsibility and authority and defines the roles of agents, their profile (their capabilities, the level of reliability, the level of training, etc.) and the agents that must interact with each other. The meso level concerns the entire management of a mission in which the pilots, air traffic controllers, flight supervision centers (OCC) and automation is involved. The meso level allows authority to emerge, as a function of the context and under supervised control. At this level, responsibility and authority can become an adjustment variable or an adaptive factor to take into account the variability of contexts and operational environments more correctly. The micro level relates to the responsibility and the authority allocated to an agent who will be able to give direct orders to an airplane. The nano level makes reference only to the selected actions.

The last dimension of an analysis framework considers that responsibility and authority follow various interaction templates between the various agents involved in the overall and completed actions.

The essential aspects to consider in a systemic approach to authority are the dynamic relations between the different elements of each of the dimensions, described below, due to the temporal and situational evolution of active agents and environments. Similar actions will be able to be associated with different characteristics of responsibility/authority/accountability, at different macro/meso/micro/nano levels, or follow different templates for interaction as a function of the context and of the operational environment. Nevertheless, the dynamics involved, although they are adaptable, present completed characteristics that may be the subject of an analysis and guided design.

The definitions of responsibility and accountability must be relative to the action carried out. For this reason, the variability in this action must be well understood. The methods in the field of ergonomics and human factors, such as the methods of cognitive modeling, modeling of tasks/activities and organizational modeling, allow us to understand and better master the variability of actions in organizations. However, it is also important to understand to what level a certain authority and responsibility refer (macro or micro). Lastly, the most efficient interaction template between sharing/distribution/delegation/trading has to be identified and formalized in order for the performance expectation to be achieved. Moreover, communication and cooperation between the various agents should be maintained, supported by interfaces (logical or even HCI) and means between and within the various levels.

In order to avoid the appearance of problems related to human factors during operations, synchronization between these various elements should be ensured when new operational concepts are introduced. This would allow incoherencies or differences to be avoided between these various elements in relation to the final action of agents.

The main challenge for design resides in the articulation of the understanding of actions currently carried out and linked to the action cycle with their allocated authority and the definition of their responsibility and accountability.

3.4. Management of wake turbulence in visual separation: a study of preliminary cases

For a better understanding of how this analysis framework would concretely help to design new concepts from the point of view of authority and responsibility, we will conduct an analysis of a case study in this section. This case study is linked to management of the risk associated with wake turbulence in a visual separation during an approach from a pilot’s point of view.

In the United States, visual separations between airplanes on their final approach are a daily activity, which allow airports to increase their capacity to absorb air traffic. These separations consist of maintaining a visual separation with a previous airplane by using direct visual information from this airplane (called a target airplane). This type of operation has a significant impact on the responsibility of each agent. Indeed, when the crew of an airplane accepts to maintain a visual separation, the responsibility of this separation is delegated to the crew and is no longer within the remit of the approach air traffic controller. Visual separation allows the separation between two airplanes following each other during an approach to be reduced with respect to the minimal separation of standard operations (in other words, the categories of separations due to wake turbulence). Visual separations on an approach are not, for the moment, supported by an onboard system and are only supported by the trained members of the airplane’s crew. In other words, the pilot’s task consists of analyzing the distance that separates them from the preceding airplane, taking into account the contextual information that can guarantee that their own airplane does not encounter wake turbulence from the preceding airplane and, very obviously, prevent all risk of collision with this airplane.

image

Figure 3.4. Application of the framework for analysis of responsibility and authority to a concept of assisted visual separation

Figure 3.4 shows the overview of a concept of visual separation assisted by an onboard system, by using the framework of analysis of authority and responsibility. For each level and action, responsibility [R] and authority [A] are identified. Figure 3.4 shows all the relationships in the concept as it could be set up, without thinking about the specific details of execution or those related to the mission.

3.4.1. At the nano level

At the nano level, the detailed actions are analyzed during the execution phase, since one or several agents can be required to lead actions towards the same objective. As a result, the most suitable item on this level is not the responsibility, because it is allocated to an agent defined within other levels. However, it is above all the authority that will be the most suitable at this level. Indeed, the authority to decide on the most suitable distance to be maintained with respect to the target airplane is given to the pilot.

At this level, it is possible to identify a potential negative impact on human performance in carrying out this action, because today there are no tools supporting this task. It is possible to raise the question of the interest that a human and/or a machine would have in analyzing or deciding on the distance and the adjustment speed to maintain as a function of the behavior of the target airplane. A situation of this kind would imply a delegation of authority by the pilot to an onboard system. Figure 3.4 shows the ADS-B as a potential means that could be used in design of a tool of this kind.

3.4.2. At the micro level

In controlled air spaces, the responsibility for separations between airplanes is allocated to air traffic controllers. However, once a visual separation is accepted by a crew, the pilot becomes responsible for this separation.

The pilot has the authority to accept or not accept the task of visual separation. The separation is not under their responsibility because they are not obliged to accept, if we trust operational descriptions. They become responsible only from the moment when they have explicitly accepted the visual separation. As a result, the actions at the nano level where the pilot analyzes the distance to the previous airplane must be considered in relation to the authority at the micro level.

From the point of view of the authority pattern, the situation can be characterized as a delegation of the responsibility of the separation from the controller to the pilot. Indeed, the delegation pattern must be accompanied by a communication that allows explicit delegation of responsibility. In order to reinforce this transfer, an evolution of the phraseology and/or recourse to dedicated HCI could take place at the meso level. Indeed, in the analysis framework that we use, we can consider that formalization of the delegation pattern must be decided at the meso level and that the effective delegation will take place during execution of the maneuver directly between the controller and the pilot at the micro level.

In case a tool that helps in carrying out this task is introduced, the question of authority between humans and the system should be re-studied as a function of the local and organizational context in which the operation will be carried out.

Nevertheless, even though the pilot is responsible for the separation and the controller is no longer responsible for this separation, the latter will maintain an interest in this separation in the context of a supervision task (the controller keeps an eye out for this). Because if it so happens that something goes wrong with the airplane under visual separation, even though it is no longer under their direct responsibility, there can be an impact on the actions related to the area under the responsibility of the controller and consequently, their accountability comes into play.

3.4.3. At the meso level

At a meso level, the responsibility between the actors and the social entities can, for example, be related to the way in which airlines define their directives for pilots as a function of the globality of their mission. Directives of this kind could be related to management of assignments and to recommendations to maintain a larger separation than that judged acceptable by the pilot, or the airlines could even give advice about visual separations. Indeed, at this level, airlines can have the authority to take action to install additional safety measures, because airlines are responsible for putting in place a suitable system for management of the safety of their fleet in the air.

3.4.4. At the macro level

Lastly, at a macro level, institutions define laws, for example regarding the fact of maintaining a certain separation from the preceding airplane as a function of their weight categories. Thus, institutions have a considerable impact on the accountability of actors. International institutions, such as the ICAO, have the authority to introduce new regulations, but it is down to national authorities to transform them into concrete actions. In addition, different rules depending on the European or North American context can be applied. For example, pilots in the United States and in Europe will apply different procedures with regard to the fact that they must manage a potential go-around during visual separation. Along the same lines, the industrial sector, within the framework of researching aids to visual separation, is responsible for proposing technical solutions and also has the authority to carry out evaluations of the global efficiency of the solutions that they propose.

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter has presented a global framework of analysis and systemic design of authority/responsibility/accountability in the new concepts of air traffic control. This analysis framework is described across four different societal/organizational levels. This approach can be integrated into the existing processes of engineering and human performance that have been established to construct the evolutions of European air traffic control, such as the human performance assessment process. The application of this approach requires integrated research studies dedicated to the relationships between authority, responsibility and accountability, which are currently often researched separately and from a systematic perspective.

In order to examine in more detail the understanding of templates of authority/responsibility/accountability of future concepts, more advanced studies are required and in particular to give detail of the systemic relations between the patterns and the agents involved throughout the various levels. Methods of visualization of these relationships could in particular be optimized. Guides could also be written up in order to allow the application of this analysis framework by designers of air traffic control.

Indeed, it is only through this type of approach that shortcomings could be discovered, anticipated and resolved during design or evolution of future air operations.

3.6. References

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Chapter written by Cédric BACH and Sonja BIEDE.

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