10

Fostering resilience

On 7 November 2013, super-typhoon Haiyan crashed into the Philippines with devastating results. Haiyan’s impact caused catastrophic damage throughout much of the islands of Leyte and Samar, devastating property and causing significant loss of life. Early estimates placed the death toll in the tens of thousands, and the economic cost at many billions of dollars. By 11 November, the provinces of Aklan, Capiz, Cebu, Iloilo, Leyte, Palawan and Samar were placed under a state of national calamity, allowing the government to use state funds for disaster relief, rehabilitation and the price control of basic goods. The country’s National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council was responsible for coordinating a disaster response.148

A government situation report ten days after the typhoon struck revealed the scale of the disaster. It showed that 295,000 houses had been completely destroyed, and 300,000 partially destroyed. Over ten million people had been affected. Four million had been displaced to temporary accommodation, indoors and outdoors. In some urban centres, such as Tacloban City, 90 per cent of all structures were destroyed. Twenty-four thousand people, 1,300 vehicles, 98 seacraft and 163 aircraft had been mobilized as part of the emergency response, and 837,975 food packs distributed.

Unfortunately, scientists suggest that these types of catastrophic climatic events will become more common in the future. And it is not only climate-change-related crises that governments have to deal with. In an increasingly complex and interconnected world, the risks that governments face are more numerous and potentially much larger than in the past, from terrorism to drug-resistant pandemics.

Responding dynamically requires three elements: an all-inclusive risk management approach, overarching governance, and national preparedness and resilience.

Diagram 9. A framework for integrated risk management

An all-inclusive risk management approach

It is not just the increase in the number and severity of risk events that poses a problem for governments. Managing risk today requires a comprehensive appreciation of the entire risk environment, as problems in one area may easily have unexpected effects elsewhere.

As a result, states are constructing agencies that provide comprehensive, all-inclusive risk-management, and adopting new approaches to building resilience and improving national preparedness. This extends from information gathering to deploying resources on the ground.

An integrated risk-management approach provides a better appreciation of the interrelated nature of risk. Complex issues can be tackled with a multidisciplinary approach across government departments. Formal processes for addressing risks are developed, and personal links and relationships between departments and agencies established, which are essential for effective cooperation. The threats covered go beyond traditional concerns and include elements such as health, societal events and even the environment. The UK has identified eighty types of event which meet its definition of a civil emergency, with forty others under consideration.149

The scope of governmental risk management is still in flux. Activities that fall within these risk-management programmes vary from country to country. Japan, for example, focuses almost exclusively on natural disasters, whereas the UK’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat monitors risks associated with health, geopolitics, societal unrest, technology and the environment. One common exception is economic risk, usually dealt with by the finance ministry, central bank or treasury.

Through a better understanding of risks, governments learn new ways of addressing them. A holistic view of risk in government might lead a state concerned about the long-term effects of obesity to teach cooking skills in schools, as well as training medical experts in treating obesity-related diseases.

Diagram 10. The UK’s National Risk Register, 2013 (excluding risk of terrorist and other malicious attacks)

Overarching governance

Structures

Governments must develop an effective integrated risk-management function, and ensure coordination of central, regional and local government. They need to avoid a silo mentality when dealing with risk prevention. Clear lines of authority should allow any risk management function to access the information it needs, and also allow its authority to be recognized. Some countries, such as the US and Sweden, house the various functions required within one overarching agency.

The institutional structures created by governments mean that risk-related information can be gathered across functions and departments, and from external sources. These structures also help analyse the information and understand its implications, those immediately apparent and those less obvious, in order to develop a more robust threat assessment.

Coordination and collaboration of the different bodies potentially involved is essential. In the US, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), an internal agency of the Department of Homeland Security, coordinates planning with both individual states and private organizations. Within the federal government, the Homeland Security Council – with the same staff and essentially the same membership as the National Security Council – provides joint advice to the president, who in turn provides coordination across the national government.

The coordinating body will also provide guidance to the rest of government on how to conduct risk assessments. In Singapore, the National Security Coordination Centre, an agency of the National Security Coordination Secretariat, works closely with government ministries to ensure that a broad range of risks, including maritime security and infrastructure protection, are being adequately monitored.

Common standards are an advantage, such as common methods for reporting risk assessments and emergency management plans through information sharing. The relevant departments and agencies should be in regular communication and consultation, to clarify the processes used in the event of a disaster and allow the individuals involved to get to know and trust each other. The Singaporean Centre of Excellence for National Security organizes courses, seminars and workshops for local and foreign national security officers to build networks and promote best practice, for example.

There are typically three ways to meet integrated risk management objectives. Existing government departments can be merged; small, yet influential, departments under the control of heads of government can be created; or an existing ministry can take on the risk function.

Even if a dedicated department is created, dealing with certain risks requires political coordination at the ministerial level, especially during a crisis. Most countries have a high-level body that provides a forum for consultation, and confers political authority on the results. This might be the entire cabinet, as in the Netherlands, or a cabinet subcommittee, as with Japan’s Central Disaster Management Council.

In some countries the relevant cabinet body may only meet in anticipation of or during an emergency. Examples are the UK’s Committee on Civil Contingencies, (popularly known as COBRA, after Cabinet Office Briefing Room A, where the committee frequently held their meetings), and Singapore’s Homefront Crisis Management Ministerial Committee, which uses a regular quarterly meeting of senior civil servants in its Strategy Committee to coordinate planning.

A number of governments adopt an integrated risk-management approach in a specific policy area. Most commonly, this will be for security, public safety and disaster management. Take the US Department of Homeland Security, created from the merger of twenty-two separate agencies in 2002 in response to the September 11 attack. The department’s original remit focused on the defence of domestic territory, but, after FEMA became part of the department in 2003, its scope was expanded to include disaster relief.

There are numerous other examples. Public Safety Canada was created in 2003 to coordinate the efforts of federal government departments to keep citizens safe from crime, natural disaster and terrorism. In the UK, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat emphasizes preparation and planning for disasters, including horizon scanning for risks. Japan’s Disaster Management Office, within its Cabinet Office, plans for and coordinates responses to disasters. The Netherlands’ risk coordination is in the hands of the Directorate General for Public Order and Safety within the Ministry of the Interior and the National Crisis Centre.

Joint risk-management bodies also exist in non-security fields. Following the banking crisis of 2008–9, the EU’s Committee of European Banking Supervisors took on such a role. In America and within the US Office of the Chief Information Officer, the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program provides joint authorizations and continuous security monitoring services of cloud computing systems intended for multi-agency use.150

Legislation

Governments must act quickly in a crisis, with any action having a solid basis in legislation. A clear, well-understood, legal and constitutional basis for any rapid response should be established. The legal framework should clarify ministerial powers and responsibilities, when and how emergency powers can be established (both for central and regional government authorities), what committees are to be formed and what processes are to be followed. It may also allocate responsibilities for various aspects of preparedness, resilience and long-term recovery.

Agencies or departments that will take the lead in different situations, against different threats, should be specified in advance. A public health threat might involve the health ministry and possibly a more specialized agency, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. For a natural disaster, responsibilities might lie with the Ministry of Civil Defence and Disaster Relief, the Home Office, possibly the defence ministry, and specialist agencies such as FEMA in the US.

Central departments and agencies, through a pre-designated committee, will assume responsibility for incidents of a certain level or severity. Planning will include details such as the composition of the committee and where it will meet, as it may need to meet in a secure location. At the same time, the committee will coordinate and work with a variety of agencies responsible for specific functions such as evacuation, rescue, public order and so on.

Not all crisis situations require nationally coordinated responses. Initially, many incidents will involve local or regional authorities. One common principle in these situations is that responsibility for decision making is assumed by the lowest level of appropriate authority. So with a storm, for example, the authorities in the areas affected by that storm deal with the initial emergency response, but then ask for regional or national authorities’ involvement if the local authority is unable to cope with the situation.

There should also be protocols for dealing with other organizations and institutions. Some of these are likely to be outside the public sector. They may include lifeline utilities such as communication services, transportation, energy and water utilities, certain NGOs and others. In Japan, for example, about fifty public corporations – for example, the Bank of Japan, the Japanese Red Cross, and utility and telecommunications providers – are accountable by law for various functions in the case of a disaster, in addition to government ministries and agencies.

There is a trend to broaden the scope of national security risks to include natural hazards. As the New Zealand National Security System puts it: ‘National security policies were traditionally focused on protecting the State against military threats or political violence. While responding to any such threats remains a fundamental responsibility of government, modern concepts of national security manage civil contingencies and societal risks alongside these traditional priorities.’

National preparedness and resilience

Many governments are reviewing and strengthening approaches to preparedness and resilience. The World Economic Forum defines a resilient country as one with the capability to ‘adapt to changing contexts; withstand sudden shock and recover to a desired equilibrium, either the previous one or a new one, while preserving the continuity of its operations. The three elements in this definition encompass both recoverability (the capacity for speedy recovery after a crisis) and adaptability (timely adaptation in response to a changing environment).’151

Mapping risk exposures

Before risk-mitigation planning, a comprehensive inventory of the risk exposures facing a country is required. A specialist department or agency is usually given the task of compiling this inventory. Each risk exposure is scored depending on the probability of the risk occurring and the impact of that risk should it occur. This will provide leadership with a synthesized view of national vulnerabilities and allow governments to prioritize the management of and preparation for risk exposures.

A comprehensive risk framework also includes regional risk assessments to identify and manage key risks that have a more localized effect, such as flooding or pollution. In New Zealand, regional groups produce regional risk assessments that identify specific regional risks. Local community groups may also keep location-specific lists of risks. In the UK, for example, Community Risk Registers include local risk factors, mainly for non-malicious risks.

Risk exposures change over time. Climate change may increase the probability of severe weather events. Advances in medical science may alter our understanding of the likelihood of pandemics. Geopolitical shifts may make certain types of terrorist risk more or less likely. As a result, regular updates are necessary, accompanied by any investment required to update the risk assessment capability – recruiting a particular type of technical expertise, for example.

The results of the risk assessment will be taken into account when governments invest in measures to strengthen the prevention, mitigation, response and recovery stages of their risk management framework. For example, countries exposed to natural disasters such as earthquakes are likely to invest in and strengthen areas such as public education, community resilience and the mobilization of the population. Where there is a high risk of events such as a pandemic or terrorist strike, investment is likely to be focused on safeguarding critical infrastructure and ensuring that mass-care services can be provided quickly and effectively.

Partnering with communities

Increasingly, governments are building partnerships with communities when preparing to deal with risks and build community resilience. The role of communities is essential in preparing for and responding to disasters. In community partnerships, governments work with and support various community organizations, and also promote citizen volunteerism.

Engaging with communities means having the appropriate structures to connect with those communities and integrate their risk-management role within the larger risk-management framework. In Singapore, for example, investment in community engagement takes place through the People’s Association, the community wing of the governing party. The People’s Association has a presence throughout Singapore. It delivers community emergency preparedness plans and structures, conducts training, raises public awareness, and provides emergency response teams and other resources. Other community-based organizations (e.g. local clubs) may also get involved.

Community groups are, by their nature, widely dispersed across countries. Governments, therefore, need to provide coordinating mechanisms for volunteer groups, as well as training them. A good example is the Australian Emergency Management Volunteer Forum, which facilitates communication between Australian volunteer groups and the national government, and supports volunteer leadership training.

In the United States, ten-person Community Emergency Response Teams were integrated into the formal emergency response system, working with full-time staff. The teams are trained to undertake functions like search and rescue, evacuation, casualty clearance and triage, basic firefighting and crowd control.

National and regional disaster management may need many people to be involved in order to help deliver a response on the ground. Some countries operate a system in which local authorities maintain organized bodies of civil defence volunteers to help with emergency management services during large-scale emergencies. For example, Australia has about 350,000 emergency management response and recovery volunteers, while Japan has close to a million people involved with voluntary flood-fighting teams.

Safeguarding critical infrastructure and services

In the event of a serious incident it is essential to the continuing stability of the country, the effective functioning of society and the economy that key infrastructure and services are safeguarded and continue to operate. This includes, for example, energy, transport, communications and water supplies, as well as banking and food distribution. While temporary disruption will cause problems, anything longer will impose substantial costs, making the impact of the emergency worse.

To ensure continuity of services, governments first draw up an inventory of key infrastructure services in both the private and public sectors. Once critical infrastructure is identified it is possible to specify codes and standards, construction methods and materials, for example, which will make the infrastructure more robust and less susceptible to identified risks. Creating an infrastructure inventory also allows governments to build some redundancy into the system, where possible.

Similar to the way that government and regional authorities work with the community and other partners to provide the personnel to deal with a crisis more effectively, partnerships are also essential when safeguarding infrastructure and services. In many countries critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector, possibly even by foreign corporations. Governments have to work in partnerships, sharing best practice and working together to ensure resilience. In Australia, for example, the Trusted Information Sharing Network for Critical Infrastructure Resilience consists of representatives from key companies and organizations and other experts, all working together to enhance the resilience of critical infrastructure.

Education and awareness

It is not just the government and other authorities that need to be ready to deal with a large-scale emergency. The general population needs to be prepared, as well. Governments will, through a range of media, raise awareness and educate the public about national and local risks, depending on the nature and probability of those risks. With certain types of risk, such as pandemics or terrorism, it may not be appropriate to have regular public campaigns; however, there will be a capability to rapidly scale up a public information campaign if required.

There may even be specific days dedicated to disseminating disaster prevention knowledge and raising public awareness. Japan has had a Disaster Reduction Day for many years. China has a National Day of Disaster Prevention and Reduction. Globally, the UN promotes an International Day for Disaster Reduction in October.

Education is another route for raising public awareness about disaster preparedness. Countries can integrate disaster management awareness into the school curriculum – by using the school system, children are educated directly and their parents receive the information indirectly. Australia, for example, has a Disaster Resilience Education for Schools programme. This is an emergency management resource for students and teachers, complete with lesson plans and interactive teaching tools, and with learning outcomes that map into key areas of the national curriculum.

Public education is particularly important in countries with large, relatively new, immigrant or transient communities. New arrivals may have less of an understanding of national and regional risks, or not understand what to do in case of an emergency. Equally, language differences may make it more difficult to provide information to these communities, and so they may need specifically targeting in ways appropriate to the particular community.

Building and maintaining critical capabilities

Regular drills and exercises that involve all the relevant agencies and organizations will help develop capabilities for dealing with disasters. These need to take place frequently enough to ensure that there is a common understanding of procedures and responsibilities, and that the system works under pressure. These exercises should be inter-agency and organized around the key exposures the government or region faces. As an example, the Ministry of Health in Singapore has regularly held full-scale mass-casualty drills. In the past, there has been an exercise simulating an incident on the public transport system, as well as one testing the contingency plan for a major oil tank fire. One terrorism response exercise involved evacuating 18,000 employees in ten CBD office blocks. The Singapore Civil Defense Force has also run several exercises involving communities, schools, businesses and hotels.

Depending on the type of incident, different departments or agencies may take the lead. Health authorities will develop plans to train medical personnel for a rapid response, for example. The private sector will often be involved in these exercises and drills. There may also be arrangements for other countries to assist with disaster response, particularly where specialist capabilities are needed, and this might even involve joint training and exercises with these countries to ensure that emergency responders are used to working with each other.

Responding rapidly

A number of factors are critical to a successful rapid response to an emergency. The appropriate government committees and processes need to be launched immediately, an emergency declared, and decision-making and coordination activities started. Physical facilities, command centres and dedicated communications may be required.

A rescue and recovery response is a complex undertaking. Governments that keep up to date with best practice, including operational issues identified in past emergency responses, will be better prepared. For example, evaluation of emergency responses in recent years has highlighted the potential for problems with communications between emergency responders because of overloaded mobile phone networks, and a lack of clarity on the ground as to operational responsibility. Best-practice solutions involve dedicated communication lines, and clear operating protocols for emergency services.

An effective emergency response is one that avoids panic and provides enough information to avoid an information vacuum and the spread of rumours as a result. Clear, consistent and timely public communication will provide information about the incident and what action is required of the general public.

Although the provision of information can be difficult in a rapidly evolving situation, incomplete information or the absence of any information can be worse – as was the case in the Fukushima nuclear reactor incident in Japan. In modern society, there is little prospect of government being able to hide information about an emerging crisis. The ubiquitous nature of social media such as Facebook and Twitter means that information will be quickly and widely disseminated by the public in real time. Governments must use these tools to manage information.

In many emergency situations, health services and other life-critical services will be required immediately. Getting these services operational is an immediate priority. There needs to be coordination with those charitable and other organizations also providing emergency relief and support.

Maintaining a lifeline

The performance of providers of critical emergency infrastructure and services is key to a successful emergency response. These lifeline utilities – such as communication, transport and energy – will need to function to the fullest extent possible during and after the crisis, assisting the relevant authorities free of charge.

Damaged infrastructure needs to be repaired quickly and key personnel should be at their posts as soon as possible. Having adequate construction capacity is useful. In Japan, following the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami disaster, much of the transport and communication infrastructure was back up very quickly, with government, the military and private sector firms cooperating to ensure the integrity of the infrastructure was restored.

Other services, beyond infrastructure resilience, need safeguarding in the event of an emergency. These include ongoing food supplies, and access to medical supplies and to banking and financial services. Private companies will often be involved in the provision of these services. Thus governments must enter into the necessary contractual agreements to ensure adequate provision of services in the event of an emergency. Note that there is increasing emphasis on strengthening the resilience of the system, rather than the traditional approach of stockpiling essential services.

In the US, the emergency authorities are integrating private providers into the emergency response systems. This is partly due to the experience of Hurricane Katrina, where the logistical capacities of companies like Walmart proved invaluable in getting food and other supplies to affected communities.

Crisis healthcare

The provision of health and related services will need to be scaled up to deal with larger numbers of people than usual during an emergency. Governments must plan for this accordingly. This means guaranteeing infrastructure such as beds and accommodation, healthcare supplies such as medicines and plasma, and adequately trained personnel. Backup provisions are also important, should medical facilities be unavailable due to the emergency, for example. The health department will usually take the lead on this.

Correct deployment of trained staff is essential. Some staff will need to be first responders at the site of the emergency and at local medical facilities, while others will be required at designated facilities where the majority of casualties will be treated. An adequate supply of volunteers will help alleviate the pressure on specialist medical staff, who can then focus on serious cases.

Mass care is about more than the immediate physical care of people injured in an emergency; it also extends to the provision of mortuary services where there are large numbers of casualties. This is important in order to avoid further incidence of disease. In many situations, it will also involve the provision of psychological support for those people involved, and they may include the staff providing emergency services. Post-traumatic stress disorder, for example, is common among people providing assistance in extreme emergencies, as it is for victims directly affected by a disaster.

Basic essentials

A supply of the basic necessities of life must be guaranteed during an emergency. This includes water, food and shelter, and heating. Governments should designate temporary evacuation centres in school halls, civic centres and other similar facilities, for example. As well as the basic essentials of life, information and advice can also be provided at these centres.

These basic essentials may need to be supplied for some time, depending on the circumstances of the emergency. For example, following the Japanese Tohoku earthquake and tsunami disaster in 2011, hundreds of thousands of people were evacuated from the area around the nuclear reactors at Fukushima. Two-and-a-half years later, approximately 50,000 of them were still in temporary housing units.152

Beyond the essentials, when people are displaced for lengthy periods of time, government may also need to consider additional assistance for the more vulnerable groups in the community, such as young children and the elderly. Financial relief may be required to purchase essentials. Governments may supply prepaid credit cards temporarily, for example.

Civil society (including NGOs and charities) plays a very important role in the provision of the basic essentials of life, either on a short- or longer-term basis. These organizations often provide emergency assistance, such as food and drink, accommodation and clothing, and other support services, such as counselling and helping to locate other family members. Volunteers and charitable emergency aid are often the most visible aspect of an emergency response.

The role of the private sector as a partner in the initial emergency response phase has also grown. Private corporations are able to deploy their supply chain expertise, their distribution networks and logistics capabilities to deliver essential supplies such as food to affected areas, for example. In many countries, from Finland to the US, private firms are part of the formal emergency response.

Recovery and reconstruction

When the initial response to an emergency is over and the threat contained, there may be a period of reconstruction. In the case of major natural disasters, such as hurricanes, typhoons and earthquakes, the cost of reconstruction may represent a sizeable proportion of national income. To prepare for the financial burden imposed by major emergencies, governments usually take a number of steps.

To start with, many governments expect businesses and citizens to have private insurance that covers them for a variety of risks, including natural events such as storms and earthquakes. They may even require mandatory insurance in some cases, such as for properties in flood risk areas. Clearly, there is likely to be a discussion between governments and private insurers about the extent of insurance coverage that is possible and what contribution government should make.

Governments should also have appropriate insurance and reinsurance arrangements to help fund the rebuilding. There is an emphasis on self-reliance for funding in most countries, to encourage people and organizations to make appropriate decisions about insurance, risk mitigation and the resilience of assets.

Where it is not possible to obtain private insurance cover for risks, the government may have to step in. A good example of this in practice is the Earthquake Commission in New Zealand, which provides various forms of government-provided insurance for locations where this is not available through other routes. It also administers the country’s Natural Disaster Fund, and funds research and education on natural disasters and ways of reducing their impact.

Besides insurance, the government may provide direct financial assistance to the victims of a disaster. This financial aid may be in the form of emergency relief and reconstruction funding for households and businesses, or the financing of infrastructure reconstruction projects, or even providing low-interest loans to local authorities to get affected areas back up and running. Often, government financial aid will be supplemented by donations from charitable organizations or trusts, either those already established or those specifically set up to provide assistance in the wake of the emergency.

For long-term reconstruction, new government entities or agencies may need to be established to coordinate and oversee the reconstruction process.

Debrief and best practice

Finally, following a major incident, whether national, regional or local, it is essential that there is a debriefing process. All the parties involved – public and private sector and non-profits – need to engage in a collaborative process that analyses the response to the emergency. The response should be subjected to frank and rigorous questioning to determine what could be improved in the future. This may require specific government committees to be set up with the power to call and question third parties.

Consequently, any elements of poor practice or best practice that emerge must be captured and disseminated to the whole ecosystem. Elements of best practice should be embedded in the risk-management framework.

A national preparedness and resilience checklist for government

Part I: Strategic organizing framework

1. Governance and legislative arrangements
   1. Is a lead agency given overall accountability for delivery of the national strategy and functioning of the national preparedness and resilience system?
   2. Do formal coordination structures exist to ensure participation among relevant government agencies?
   3. Is the organizational model sufficiently flexible so that it can respond to unexpected and emerging events?
2. Risk assessment
   1. Is there an integrated, coordinated approach to the overall risk-assessment process?
   2. Do risk assessments generate an appropriate level of detail?
   3. Is the risk-assessment process clearly linked to decision making and resource allocation?
3. International cooperation
   1. Does the government participate in international information-sharing platforms?
   2. Does the government cooperate with other countries to monitor specific risk exposures?
   3. Does the government participate in international platforms for cross-border action?

Part II: Mitigation, resilience and preparedness

4. Long-term vulnerability reduction
   1. Is there a structured process for identifying national priorities for long-term vulnerability reduction?
   2. Is there a coherent national strategy with specific actions to remove or reduce underlying vulnerabilities?
   3. Is there a comprehensive approach to reduce the risk exposure to outstanding vulnerabilities?
5. Protecting key infrastructure and vital services
   1. Is an infrastructure protection strategy in place and are formal institutions established to lead it?
   2. Has the government established robust standards and codes?
   3. Has the government established mechanisms and institutions to allow it to work with the private sector?
   4. Have business continuity arrangements been established – particularly for lifeline utilities?
6. Building social resilience
   1. Does the government have a clear strategy for strengthening the community?
   2. Is the government enabling the facilities, infrastructure and other resources that promote social cohesion?
   3. Is the government enabling the cultural and psychological foundations for social cohesion?
   4. Is the government acting to encourage and support volunteering?
7. Public education
   1. Is there a lead agency with a clear mandate to develop and own the public education strategy?
   2. Does the strategy have a broad reach, using multiple platforms?
   3. Does the strategy deliver simple, actionable messages that are accessible to all?

Part III: Emergency response and recovery

8. Building emergency response capacity
   1. Are there clearly specified governance and accountability arrangements regarding the emergency response?
   2. Is there functional inter-operability between emergency response agencies?
   3. Is the government actively building a trust-based culture between agencies?
   4. Is there a structured programme of regular training exercises and drills?
   5. Have clear and robust logistical arrangements been made in advance?
   6. Is there structured engagement with the private sector and civil society/volunteers?
9. Public communications
   1. Is there a lead government agency that is responsible for the public communications strategy?
   2. Is the government investing in building well-functioning communications platforms?
   3. Is there a clear strategy for how to undertake real-time
      communication in an emergency?
10. Providing mass-care services
    1. Does the government have clear governance arrangements in place for mass-care services
    2. Are there clear systems and arrangements regarding the immediate mass-care response?
    3. Has the government built capacity to provide medium-term mass care?

In a nutshell: fostering resilience

Fast changes are transforming the global risk landscape. There are new sources of natural and man-made hazards, new socio-economic trends – such as population concentrations in dangerous geographic areas – and high degrees of technical integration and economic interdependence, which are all increasing the frequency of crises and the magnitude of their damaging impacts.

As a result, governments need to prepare for, protect against, respond to and recover from crises through an integrated, centrally driven, all-hazards approach to risk management. This can be enabled by a central government agency responsible for integrated risk management, a framework policy or legislation for all-hazards risk management, a cross-government committee or processes to drive integration of risk management and resilience-building efforts.

A comprehensive risk-management process starts by identifying and assessing national risks (across all sectors: social, economic, environment, infrastructure, governance, security) through a robust methodology, followed by an evaluation of the preparedness capabilities needed to mitigate and prevent these risks.

Based on the risk assessment and capabilities evaluation, governments need to: foster national resilience by building, sustaining and improving their national capability to mitigate risks (through investment in public mitigation programmes that meet priority needs); ensure protection of critical infrastructure; reinforce community resilience and business continuity; and develop public and private partnerships in the management of disasters, and in risk-transfer solutions.