Fußnoten

1 The editors would like to thank Mark Phillips and Adam Orange, Ph.D. students in German Studies at Michigan State University, for their assistance with transcribing the recorded event.
2 Co-sponsored by the Center for Interdisciplinary Research (Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung) at Bielefeld University and the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft), the conference involved scholars of human rights from the social sciences and the humanities and it took place at Bielefeld University on June 28–30, 2013.
3 Hans Joas, The Sacredness of the Person: A New Genealogy of Human Rights. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013.
4 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2010.
5 For more on these terms, see Samuel Moyn, “Substance, Scale, and Salience: The Recent Historiography of Human Rights.” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 8 (2012): 123–140.
6 Hans Joas, The Genesis of Values. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2000; Hans Joas, War and Modernity, trans. Rodney Livingstone. Cambridge: Polity, 2003.
7 Robert N. Bellah and Hans Joas, eds. The Axial Age and Its Consequences. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2012.
8 Oona A. Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” Yale Law Journal 111, no. 8 (June 2002): 1935–2042; Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); see also Samuel Moyn, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make Enough of a Difference?” in Conor Gearty and Costas Douzinas, eds., Cambridge Companion to Human Rights Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
9 Georg Jellinek, Die Erklärung der Menschen- und Bürgerrechte: ein Beitrag zur modernen Verfassungsgeschichte (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1895). The contemporary classic on human rights in the French Revolution is Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007).
10 James Ron et al., “The Struggle for a Truly Global Human Rights Movement,” Open Democracy, http://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/james-ron-david-crow-shannon-golden/struggle-for-truly-grassroots-human-rights-move.
11 Hans Joas, Slavery and Torture in a Global Perspective: Human Rights and the Western Tradition. Leiden: Brill, 2014.
12 This respect-protect-provide triad goes back to Henry Shue’s seminal book Basic Rights, which argues that each basic right gives rise to three distinct correlative duties: to avoid depriving, to protect from deprivation and to aid the deprived (Shue 1996, p. 60). Shue’s typology entered official UN discourse in the 1980ies through Philip Alston and Asbjorn Eide (Alston 1984, pp. 162, 169–174; see generally Alston and Tomaševski 1984).
13 My sketch of the accepted role or function of human rights essentially follows Charles Beitz’ two-level model according to which human rights are urgent interests, with (a) primary responsibility for their fulfillment assigned to the state to which each person belongs, and (b) other states assigned preventive or remedial responsibilities for improving states with a poor human rights record (see Beitz 2009, pp. 108ff).
14 This language is suggested in Waldron (1989, pp. 503, 510). See also Shue (1996, p. 156) and Pogge (2009, p. 113).
15 This point about human rights inflation is made in different ways by Cranston (1973), Wellman (1999) and Orend (2002). See also Griffin (2008) who emphasizes especially the lack of a systematic rationale for the rights currently included.
16 In the same period, the richest five percent of the world’s population succeeded in expanding their share of global household income from 42.87% to 45.75%. Data kindly provided by Branko Milanovic, City University of New York. The cited income shares are based on market exchange rates, not purchasing power parities.
17 There are many pressures toward improving current government spending patterns in poor countries, which are often distorted by corruption, bloated security apparatuses and indifference to the poor. Insofar as such efforts are succeeding, additional revenues would have an even larger human rights impact than Christian Aid is calculating.
18 An example are the “tax holidays” periodically granted by the US Congress, such as the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which enabled US-based MNCs to repatriate profits accumulated in tax havens at a discounted 5.25% – instead of the usual 35% – tax rate (Alexander, Mazza and Scholz 2009). A coalition of 93 corporations spent $282.7 million on a concerted effort to get this Act passed by the US Congress, and these same corporations then repatriated over $200 billion while realizing a total of $62.5 billion in tax savings – $221 of tax savings for every $1 they had invested in lobbying. The losses fell mostly on the populations of the less developed countries from which these MNCs had shifted their profits into tax havens; without the prospect of tax holidays in their home country, MNCs would have little to gain from such profit shifting.
19 Even the OECD’s new landmark model agreement on automatic exchange of financial information is likely to exclude many less developed countries from its benefits because they lack the resources to set up the data collection arrangements required to qualify as a reciprocating partner.
20 For more on human rights and tax justice, see IBAHRI 2013.
21 Additional case studies could easily be supplied. Grandfathered into the WTO Agreement, protectionist policies by the affluent countries, especially in agriculture, continue to unfairly deprive poor populations of export opportunities. The absence of effective pollution regulation enables the richer countries to undermine living conditions in the poorer countries without providing reasonable compensation. The absence of substantial global labor standards organizes a race to the bottom in which poor countries, to attract foreign investment, must offer ever more exploitable workforces. Recognizing rulers on the basis of effective power alone as entitled to borrow money and sell natural resources on “their” country’s behalf enhances the staying power of oppressive rulers and encourages coups and civil wars to captures these spoils. A largely unregulated international arms trade further aggravates these problems. These additional cases are discussed in Pogge 2008.
22 The faithful execution of such official roles would be slightly less demanding if its responsibilities were thought of as merely taking lexical priority over the occupant’s private loyalties and commitments, which could then still serve as tie breakers among otherwise admissible options. If her son put in a bid that is exactly as good as that of another bidder, a procurement officer could then favor the bid of her son because he is her son. Our commitment to impartiality is such that, even in this case, we tend to feel better about the mother if she tosses a coin or disqualifies herself from the decision.
23 A compelling case can be made for the exclusion of children from democratic decision making: some rare exceptions notwithstanding, children are generally lacking the knowledge, experience and judgment requisite to making sound political decisions, and their interests are typically better protected by the political rights of their adult relatives as well as by their own future political rights.
24 See Rawls 1971, sec. 82, and especially Rawls 1993. Rawls would have regarded the US Supreme Court’s judgments in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (558 U.S. 310, 2010) and McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (572 U.S. __, 2014) as flagrant violations of his first principle of justice: “Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value” (Rawls 1993, p. 5).
25 The intended meaning of (ii) is: those who would do better with a decision in favor of N1 would do worse under N1 than those who would do better with a decision in favor of N2 would do under N2. Together, (ii) and (iii) entail that, even under N1, those who would do better with a decision in favor of N1 would do worse than those who would do better with a decision in favor of N2.
26 This demand is a very weak version of the Pigou-Dalton condition familiar to economists.
27 I discuss this global impartiality requirement in Pogge (2008, ch. 5). Central to that book is, however, a weaker account of global justice: global institutional arrangements must be designed to fulfill human rights insofar as this is reasonably possible. Beyond this requirement, those involved in the design of global institutional arrangements would be free to give special weight to the (other) interests of their family, friends or compatriots.
28 Fully developed, this prescription would extend equal concern also to future generations. Those who, weighing in on matters of global institutional design, give priority to the needs and interests of members of their own generation over the needs and interests of the members of future and past generations act on reasons that are subtly agent-relative.
29 This condition could in principle be met by international decision making in a world of broadly democratic states where it is through their elected government’s appointed emissaries, delegates or negotiators that individuals exert political influence upon the formulation of global rules and of the global institutional arrangements that are implementing and enforcing these rules. The condition is not met in our world, of course, where the political influence one US billionaire can exert on global institutional design is vastly greater than that of a million poor citizens of Niger or Haiti.
30 In light of the huge discrepancy between the sketched demands of a global impartiality requirement and such common practices and perceptions, one might wonder whether a commitment to the moral equality of all human beings really leads to the global impartiality requirement with the four implications I have outlined. Such doubts might be substantiated in two distinct ways. One can argue that even in regard to national political decision making, mere moral equality does not have any of the implications most political philosophers believe it to have. Alternatively one could argue that whatever implications moral equality has for national political decision-making lack analogues in the realm of global political decision making. One would then have to explain, case by case, why moral equality should have a certain implication at the level of national politics without having the analogous cosmopolitan implication at the level of global politics. A paradigmatic effort in this vein is Nagel (2005), pointing to certain special features of intra-societal cooperation that supposedly make principles of egalitarian distributive justice applicable within, but not beyond societies. A general problem for such arguments is that they must explain why such principles apply even to societies in which the special features are absent: to societies divided by caste, class or religion, for instance, in which the rulers make no pretensions to ruling in the name or for the benefit of all.
31 This work draws on the material from Paul Slovic and Daniel Västfjäll (2013): “The More Who Die, The Less We Care: Psychic Numbing and Genocide”. In: Behavioural Public Policy. Edited by Adam Oliver. Cambridge University Press. Reproduced with permission.
This material is based upon work supported by the Hewlett Foundation, and by the U.S. National Science Foundation under Grant Nos. SES-1024808, SES-1227729, and SES-1427414. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Hewlett Foundation or the National Science Foundation.
32 Full text available at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/
33 She struggles to think straight about the great losses that the world ignores: “More than two million children die a year from diarrhea and eight hundred thousand from measles. Do we blink? Stalin starved seven million Ukrainians in one year, Pol Pot killed two million Cambodians. …” (Dillard, 1999, pp. 130–131).
34 For a helpful explanation of the difference between subjective rights and objective right, between Anrecht and Recht, see Geuss (2008), p. 60–67. For details of the genesis of the subjective rights idiom, see Tierney (1997), esp. chap. 2.
35 See Diogenes Laertius VII 87 and Philo Alexandrinus, de Ioseph II 46 (von Arnim 1903–1924, III 4 and 323).
36 On this point see Thomson (1986), p. 13??f.
37 Here I follow MacIntyre (1981), p. 67.
38 Kant (1914), p. 237.
39 Griffin (2008), p. 29.
40 The declaration of independence (1776), para. 2.
41 Geuss (2001), p. 143??f.
42 On this question see Campbell et al. (eds.), (2011).
43 This seems to be the reply emerging from Koschorke et al. (2007) as well as from Lüdemann (2004).
44 Lüdemann (2004), p. 27.
45 Koschorke (2007), p. 62.
46 I am following here Kohns (2013).
47 Castoriadis (1975).
48 O’Neill (1986), p. 119.
49 O’Neill (1986), p. 104, (1989), p. 190. See also the more recent (2005).
50 Pogge (1992).
51 Pogge (2008).
52 See Wood (1981), chap. 9.
53 Marx (1974), p. 22.
54 This paragraph follows Foot’s (2002b). However, she disavows that paper to some extent both in her (2001), chap. 1 and in (2002a).
55 Moyn (2010).
56 Here I am indebted to Raymond Geuss, private communication.
57 Morgenstern (1947), p. 165??f.
58 This paper benefitted from helpful comments by Sam Kerstein and the editors of this volume.
59 All translations are mine unless otherwise stated.
60 The three conventions provided an international framework for rescuing people in distress at sea regardless of citizenship, mode of transportation, and number.
61 I borrow the term “mobilizing shame” from Thomas Keenan who draws upon Kant to argue that “mobilizing shame has Enlightenment roots” insofar as reason constitudes a faculty of public exchange that “exposes, reveals, and argues” (Keenan 2004, p. 436).
62 Jacques Rancière refers to Book III of Plato’s Laws to specify how the seventh possible qualification for government is illustrative of this paradox. Four of the seven qualifications (axiomata) are traditional insofar as they are related to “positions of authority” (master and slave, parents and children) and “the difference of birth” (young and old, nobles and serfs). The fifth qualification has to do with “the principle of principles” and that is “the power of those with a superior nature, of the strong over the weak.” The sixth qualification is grounded in science; it is “the power of those who know over those who do not.” As Rancière goes on to say, Plato does not stop there. He adds a seventh one, which introduces a “paradox” to democratic rule. Here, “democracy is characterized by the drawing of lots, or the complete absence of any entitlement to govern.” In other words, democratic rule originates in “the absence of entitlement” (Rancière 2010, p. 31).
63 It is beyond the scope of this essay to explore Foucault’s deep suspicion toward the visual as a principal mode of sense-making in Western culture. According to Martin Jay, Foucault does not completely ignore the difference between truth-telling and “truth-showing.” For more information, see Jay (2008, p. 53). Andrew Herscher has also investigated the problematic use of satellite images not only for human rights advocacy, but also for interstate violence. He refers to this development as “‘surveillance witnessing,’” that is, “a hybrid visual practice that has emerged at the intersection between satellite surveillance and human rights witnessing.” Used by governments, businesses, and non-governmental organizations, this praxis compromises the work that human rights advocacy has historically given itself. See Herscher (2014, p. 473).
64 For a critical examination of Kant’s Entwurf in allusion to Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s Projet, see Wood (1998, p. 66).
65 Foucault publishes a more polished, shorter and slightly different version of his text in 1984. See Foucault (1984b, pp. 32–50). In this essay, I refer mostly to his lecture because of its sustained connection between Aufklärung and parrhesia.
66 As David Macey points out, Foucault calls upon Maurice Agulhon, president of the Société d’Histoire de la Révolution de 1848, during a public debate in May 1978 to consider the same point of departure for a rigorously historical and philosophical inquiry into the penal system: “‘Why not begin a major historical enquiry into the way the Aufklärung has been perceived, thought, imagined, exorcised, anathemised and reactivated in the Europe of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? That might be an interesting piece of ‘historico-philosophical’ work. Relations between historians and philosophers could be ‘put to the test’” (Macey 1993, p. 405).
67 I refer to Kant at this point because he begins his essay with the following widely recognized sentences: “Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed nonage. Nonage is the inability to use one’s own understanding without another’s guidance. This nonage is self-imposed if its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in indecision and lack of courage to use one’s own mind without another’s guidance” (“Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit. Unmündigkeit ist das Unvermögen, sich seines Verstandes ohne Leitung eines anderen zu bedienen”) (Kant 1784, p. 481).
68 As Rancière writes in his definition of politics, “the meaning of arkhein” is “to walk at the head.” Consequently, he goes on to say, “if there is one who walks at the head, then the others must necessarily walk behind” (Rancière 2010, p. 30).
69 It is important to note that Foucault begins his first lecture with a complaint about the distance between himself and the public. The lecture series is open to everyone and, as such, it involves Foucault’s public use of reason. The opening remark makes clear, though, how difficult it is for him to resist private use of reason within the predetermined institutional context at the Collège de France.
70 As Macey documents, this self-critical awareness resonates with Foucault’s broader concern with the role of intellectuals in critique of conservative resurgence during the early 1980s (1993, p. 459).
71 According to Janet Afary, it is important to differentiate Foucault’s intimate spectatorship of the Iranian Revolution – that is, Komeini’s Islamic fight against the modern and authoritative Shah – from the other human rights-related events. She writes: “While in no way minimizing the political significance of these interventions over Poland and the Vietnamese boat people, each of which had an impact on French politics, we maintain that they had a character very different from Foucault’s writings on Iran.” First, she claims, Foucault wrote a lot more about Iran than he did about Poland or Vietnam. Second, his support for the Polish movement and the Vietnamese boat people was in line with others, most notably Jean-Paul Sartre and Raymond Aron, Pierre Bourdieu and Simone Signoret. On Iran, though, he was completely alone. See Afary (2005, p. 8). Macey also illustrates how Foucault’s journalistic coverage of events in Iran exposes a deep “dilemma in terms of the duties of the intellectual” (1993, p. 411).
72 I thank Brianne Rodgers, Yasna Causevic, Iris Castro, and Tilman Zülch for their assistance. On Biafra’s impact in West Germany, see Florian Hannig 2014a, Heerten 2011, and Heerten 2014.
73 Beyond the Society’s own publications, the main published account is Wüst 1999, pp. 237– 271.
74 The Society’s current statement of goals is “Aufgaben und Ziele,” n.d., n.p.
75 At the end of 2012, it had 5,643 members and 3,359 Bedrohte Völker – Pogrom subscribers. See Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker (2013). See Wüst 1999, pp. 240–244 for older membership statistics.
76 In 1977 and 1978 the Society sponsored U.S. Indians on speaking tours of West Germany that were well attended; see the special issue Pogrom 9, no. 54–56 (1978). On Sinti and Roma, see Zülch 1979a and Zülch 1983.
77 See “Bilanz” 1969, on Kurds, Pogrom 5, no. 29–30 (1974), and on Indians, Lewis 1969.
78 Untitled flier dated 17 February 1970, in biafrahilfe-all.pdf. This is why the Society did not work on well-known cases such as the Vietnam War or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
79 A rare exception, itself criticizing the idea of clear or homogeneous group identity, is Schultze and Schultze 1974.
80 A late example of such a statement is Duve 1998a.
81 E.g. regarding Bangladesh, Pogrom 2, no. 9 (1971), p. 1; regarding South Sudan, Pogrom 6, no. 37 (1975), p. 56.
82 See “Editorial I” (1971); “Das Antirassismusprogramm” (1971); “Editorial. Weltkirchenrat” (1973); and Pogrom 10, no. 64 (1979), p. 4.
83 On ethnic Germans in the East Bloc, see Rogall 1989, Zülch 1989a, Kotzian 1989. A more recent example of how a “threatened people” need not be culturally different is the 2011 work by the Society for the so-called wolf children (Wolfskinder), orphaned and homeless children left behind at the time of the expulsions who had grown up marginalized in Lithuania, and were left out of the welfare provisions offered to refugees and expellees in West and unified Germany. “Letzte Zeitzeugen” 2011. What was important for the Society’s work with this group was that they were forgotten, not that they were or were not in some sense German.
84 Tilman Zülch, personal communication, Göttingen, 24 May 2012.
85 “Bilanz” 1969 and untitled flier thanking donors dated April 1969 in biafra-all.pdf.
86 Tilman Zülch, personal communication, Göttingen, 24 May 2012.
87 Untitled flier recruiting new members, n.d., in biafrahilfe-all.pdf.
88 Tilman Zülch, personal communication, Göttingen, 24 May 2012.
89 On the importance of not defining genocide too narrowly, see Zülch and Guercke 1969, p. 158. On not letting one’s concern about genocide be restricted to the past, see Pogrom 1, no. 3 (July 1970), inside front cover. Regarding Bangladesh, see Pogrom 2, no. 9 (1971), p. 5.
90 There is no scholarly consensus today on defining genocides, of course. See Bloxham and Moses 2010 and references cited there.
91 Münzel’s first report appeared in Pogrom 4, no. 18 (1973); see also Pogrom 5, no. 28 (1974); Pogrom 8, no. 49 (1977); and Pogrom 8, no. 50–51 (1977). See also Zülch 1975, pp. 147–161. From 1976 on, Münzel served on Pogrom’s editorial board. See also the work of an American scholar making the same claim of genocide: Arens 1976.
92 Zülch and Guercke 1969. I used that second edition. The first edition was entitled Biafra: Todesurteil für ein Volk? Eine Dokumentation (Berlin: Lettner-Verlag, 1968).
93 See “An unsere Leser” 1976, where it is mentioned that the readership increased sharply in 1975.
94 Duve was editor of the series from 1970. See Duve 1998b and “20 Jahre” 1981, p. 243.
95 See “Vorbemerkung” 1974 and Pogrom 7, no. 41 (1976), p. 4.
96 See “Bengalen” 1971, “Auschwitz” 1971, and Pogrom 2, no. 11 (1971), inside back cover.
97 See Pogrom 5, no. 26 (1974), p. 6 and “Bruch” 1980.
98 See, e.g., Pogrom 5, no. 26 (1974), Sheehy 1975, and Vollmer and Zülch 1989. Ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union were mentioned briefly in the 1974 Pogrom issue and at greater length in Vollmer and Zülch 1989; see below.
99 See, e.g, Schneider and Schenz 1997. Zülch claimed to me that the Society was not always treated well in the pages of Germany’s main progressive newspaper, taz, die tageszeitung. Tilman Zülch, personal communication, Göttingen, 24 May 2012. He named an example that rankled: journalist Philipp Mausshardt confronted Zülch with the fact that one of the Society’s inaugural board members, journalist Peter Grubbe, was in fact the Nazi-era war criminal Claus Peter Volkmann. Grubbe became known after the war as a critical left-leaning journalist well versed in Third World topics. Zülch removed him from the Society’s board (Mausshardt 1995). In Zülch’s view, the article drew disproportionate attention to the Society among the various organizations where Grubbe/ Volkmann had worked. However, I have not found consistently negative coverage of the Society in the taz. The case of Grubbe/Volkmann would seem to have much to do with postwar German society but nothing specifically to do with the Society.
100 See e.g. La Banda Vaga 1999; “Die Gesellschaft kämpft” 2001; Fischer 2004; “Völkische Gesellschaft?” 2008.
101 For usage of “Volksgruppe,” see, e.g., Pogrom 1, no. 1 (1970), inside front cover. On Volksgruppenrecht, see Schönwälder 1996 and Wildenthal 2012, pp. 45–62, 101–131. These concepts were discussed at conferences such as those held by the Federal Union of European Nationalities (Föderalistischer Verein Europäischer Volksgruppen, FUEV), which Zülch and other Society members attended, and to which the Society formally belonged. Zülch gives a partly critical account of meetings of these European nationality rights activists, mentioning far-Right Sudeten German representatives and a disruption by some West German neo-Nazis, and mentioning with apparent approval the principles of Volksgruppenrecht (Zülch 1979b). See also materials on pages following, on the Internationaler Verband zum Schutze bedrohter Sprachen und Kulturen, FUEV, and Volksgruppenrecht. Zülch was acquainted with the international law work on Volksgruppenrecht by e.g. Theodor Veiter and Rudolf Laun: ibid. and Tilman Zülch, personal communication, Göttingen, 25 May 2012. See also his positive mention of FUEV (Zülch 1989b, p. 278).
102 See its website http://www.sfvv.de/, visited on 31 July 2014.
103 A note on citations from “biafrahilfe-all.pdf”: Some archival documents from the Society for Threatened Peoples that are cited below were consulted using a scanned collection of Biafra-related documents prepared for internal use by Society staff member Abdul Raffert. I designate this electronic collection as he did, “biafrahilfe-all.pdf.” I thank him for providing me a copy. The originals of those scans are held in the Society’s archive at its main office in Göttingen, which I visited in May 2012. While at the archive, I also consulted an overlapping set of documents in their original form, which are organized by boxes. If an archival document has a clear author or title, it is cited with its own bibliography entry; if not, details are given in a footnote.
104 73,475 according to the Kenya 2009 census. The figures for Diani were provided to me by the Diani Chief’s office.
105 The names of all individuals I interviewed have been changed, and I also altered other aspects of their stories to ensure anonymity. I provide a more detailed discussion of the activities of the Müllers, in the context of historical patterns of aid to Africa, in Berman 2013.
106 Jeffrey Sachs is one of the most prominent supporters of development aid. For a summary of his main points, see Sachs 2014.
107 I was unable to find scholarly literature about these two institutions. My discussion is based on extended conversations with villagers in the Diani area during 2009 and 2014 and on observations made since I first visited Diani in the early 1980s.
108 The term able-bodied was used by villagers I interviewed.
109 Balibar bases his argument on reading Arendt’s essay “On Civil Disobedience.”
110 Rancière speaks of the “plainly contemptuous tone” in Arendt’s statement that “nobody wants to oppress” the stateless refugees: “It is as if these people were guilty of not even being able to be oppressed, not even worthy of being oppressed” (Rancière 2004, p. 299).
111 The English translation by Geoffrey Skelton, adapted into verse by Adrian Mitchell, was commissioned by Peter Brook for his famous 1964 production by the Royal Shakespeare Company. Anne Beggs mentions Brook’s interest in Antonin Artaud’s “theater of cruelty” and notes that, “the English version was crafted with the aim of putting into dialogue the Artaudian aesthetics of non-verbal affect and a Brechtian dialectic of reason and human action inherent in Weiss’s drama” (Beggs 2013, p. 61).
112 In a passionate reply to this partiality, literary critic Hans Mayer expresses his disappointment that Weiss appears willing to give up the play’s openness, a key characteristic of the play: “If Peter Weiss, as interpreter of his own play, decides retroactively and without reservation in favor of Marat, then his play becomes meaningless” (“Peter Weiss über die Inszenierung” 1967, p. 112).
113 Other estimates put the death toll at between 800,000 up to 1.5 million; see Adanir and Kaiser (2000), p. 282.
114 An English translation of the Declaration can be found, for example, at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp. The first article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 – “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” – is an almost verbatim quote of this sentence; see http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.
115 “… entsprach dem bloßen Menschsein keinerlei Recht mehr”; see Arendt (2006), p. 619. The passage in which this phrase appears in the German version is missing in the English version.
116 The conversation between Lepsius and Enver Pasha and the account of the deportation of the inhabitants of Zeitun are in parts taken verbatim from Lepsius’ report; see Lepsius (1930), p. xii–xviii, and 4–11. As for the events on Musa Dagh, Werfel based his account on the priest Dikran Andreasian’s report about “Zeitun and Suedije,” which was published in German translation in 1919 in an anthology edited by Lepsius; see Kugler (2000), p. 124.
117 The German original reads “nationales Reich”; see Werfel (1990), p. 164.
118 “… vierzigjährige Wüstenwanderung der Kinder Israels”; see Werfel (1990), p. 780. This passage has been left out in the (abridged) 1934 translation.
119 According to Slaughter, the genre of the Bildungsroman has “double subjects”: “it imagines a relational individualism – a harmonious concordance of the person’s universalist predispositions and the interpellative force of social formations and relations, of which the human personality is a part and an effect” (Slaughter 2007, p. 100).
120 This fundamental ambivalence inherent in the notion of the “people” has been described by Agamben: “It is as if, in other words, what we call people was actually not a unitary subject but rather a dialectical oscillation between two opposite poles: on the one hand, the People as a whole and as an integral body politic and, on the other hand, the people as a subset and as fragmentary multiplicity of needy and excluded bodies; on the one hand, an inclusive concept that pretends to be without remainder while, on the other hand, an exclusive concept known to afford no hope”; see Agamben (2000), p. 30.
121 “… das hündische Gefühl der Angst und Ergebenheit gegen diesen wohlwollenden Staat wurde auch der Armeniersohn nicht los”; see Werfel (1990), p. 247. This sentence has been left out in the (abridged) English translation.
122 See Heizer (1996), p. 87–88; Buch (1987), p. 114–115; Eke (1997): 715; and Kugler (2000), p. 144–145.
123 Such an equation, for instance, informs Elaine Scarry’s seminal account of trauma in The Body in Pain. Moreover, it pervades theorizations of political practice. Even Arendt associates “the loss of the relevance of speech” with “the loss of all human relationship” (1968, p. 297). For another recent example of this linkage, see Giorgio Agamben, The Sacrament of Language.
124 For a more extensive discussion of this tension, see Anker (2012).
125 See Brown 2010.
126 Merleau-Ponty’s important works include The Phenomenology of Perception and Nature: Course Notes from the College de France and The Visible and the Invisible.
127 A substatially abbreviated version of this essay was published in Frame, Journal of Literary Studies 26.1 (2014): 11–26.
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