2Explaining Why Foreign Policy Changed During the Carter Presidency

The fact that the Carter Administration changed its Middle East policy throughout its presidential term is today undeniable. Numerous studies have registered this transformation (c. f., Aronoff, 2006; Auten, 2008; Bliddal, 2011; Garthoff, 1985; Glad, 2009; Kupchan, 1987; Jackson, 2007; Lebow and Stein, 1993; Little, 2008; Nichols, 2002; Njølstad, 1995, 2004; Odom, 2006; Palmer, 1999; Rosati, 1991, 1994; Skidmore, 1996; Smith, 1986; Westad, 1997); hence, I will not devote any additional effort to reinforcing this observation. However, the explanations for such a change have diverged considerably among researchers. Different researchers have tackled the issue using different approaches and, consequently, reached different conclusions.

In general, the change in the Carter Administration’s foreign policy and the subsequent advent of the Carter Doctrine has traditionally been explained by using a realist frame of analysis. Structural realism (i. e., neorealism), in particular, focuses on the role of the international system in constraining the behavior of states (Keohane, 1986; Waltz, 1979). While the two main strands of neorealism – that is, offensive realism and defensive realism – differ in their assumptions about the reaction of states to international events, both emphasize the determinant influence of external forces on states’ behavior.19 At the core of structural realism is the idea that “decision-makers will behave in a similar fashion and will be affected not by personal or other idiosyncratic factors but only by the nature of the situation and the structure of the global environment” (Vasquez, 1999: 156). Nevertheless, despite Waltz’s (1996) admonition about using realist theories of international politics to explain foreign policy, many researchers persist in explaining foreign policy by means of external forces.20

This has certainly been the case regarding the majority of the assessments of the Carter Administration’s foreign policy. Most generic accounts of US foreign policy during the Cold War assume that the Carter Administration changed its foreign policy as a reaction to external events, particularly Soviet behavior in the Third World and events in the Middle East (c. f., Brown, 1994; Dobson and Marsh, 2001; Freedman, 2009; Gaddis, 2005; Palmer, 1999; Wittkopf et al., 2008; Yetiv, 2008). As Yetiv (2004) argues, the rational actor principle underlying realist thought assumes that states respond to perceived threats to their national interest. These threats are usually accentuated during periods of international crises, which bring issues into the political agenda and catalyze the need for action (Rosati and Scott, 2011). Therefore, according to most realist accounts, Soviet interventionism (and that of its proxy Cuba) in the Third World and domestic turmoil in the Middle East forced the Carter Administration to abandon its initial idealistic foreign policy agenda and assume a more realistic and assertive foreign policy.

It should be noted that there is considerable divergence in the literature as to the nature of Carter‘s initial foreign policy agenda. Several schools of thought have emerged over the last three decades presenting different accounts of the Carter Administration’s initial foreign policy orientations and beliefs. One leading school of thought argues that in the early years of the Carter Presidency, the Administration lacked a consistent and coherent foreign policy orientation – that is, the chaos thesis (Njølstad, 1995). According to this perspective, the Carter Administration was unable to provide a discernable and comprehensive vision for US foreign policy (Aronoff, 2006; Brown, 1994; Colucci, 2012; Gaddis, 2005; Kaufman, 1993; Nichols, 2002). The Administration failed to provide a conceptual framework for defining objectives, priorities, means, and threats to safeguard American national interests. Adherents of the chaos thesis argue that Carter trifled incongruously with a range of disparate issues such as human rights, nonproliferation, multilateralism, and self-determination.

The chaos thesis is generally attributed to the lack of a shared worldview among the Administration’s senior foreign policy decision makers. However, President Carter has also been deemed personally responsible for the failure to develop a coherent foreign policy. According to presidential historian Schlesinger Jr. (2004), Carter failed to achieve the two indispensable requirements to become an effective President: 1) the capacity to steer the country towards an identifiable destination and 2) explain to the public why that destination was right for the nation. As a result, “After four years of the Carter Presidency, no one knew where Carter wished to steer the country” (Schlesinger Jr., 2004: 438). Former speechwriter for the Carter Administration, James Fallows, has confirmed this view. While acknowledging Carter’s elevated moral virtues and his intellectual skills, Fallows chastises the President for not being able to inspire the nation nor those around him. Therefore, Carter’s ambiguity on numerous crucial issues was responsible for the Admiration’s many shortcomings. In the words of Fallows (1979), “no one could carry out the Carter program, because Carter has resisted providing the overall guidelines that might explain what his program is.”

A second major school of thought posits that the Administration did come to office with a consistent and coherent worldview and foreign policy agenda (Auten, 2008; McCrisken, 2003; Njølstad, 1995; Rosati, 1991; Skidmore, 1996; Tucker, 1979; Westad, 1997). In contrast to the previous orientation, Rosati (1988: 496) claims that empirical research has accurately proven that the Carter Administration did in fact have “a cohesive worldview that changed from optimism to pessimism over time.” Adherents of this school of thought do however provide varied accounts of the Administration’s foreign policy orientations and objectives. Nevertheless, most researchers tend to stress a few key traits of Carter’s initial foreign policy. Tucker (1979: 462) has neatly summarized the Carter Administration’s initial worldview as being “characterized by truly global interests, by growing mutual dependencies, by far less hierarchy, by less concern with equilibrium, and by the recognition that much less reliance could be placed on the forcible methods of the past.”

Notwithstanding the variety of different outlooks in Carter’s initial foreign policy beliefs and agenda, for the most part realists agree that during the Carter Presidency foreign policy underwent a profound reorientation, namely in favor of a more assertive and confrontational US policy. For instance, in his monumental study on détente, Garthoff (1985) argues that while at the outset the Carter Administration did not place US–USSR relations at the forefront of its foreign policy agenda, it did seek to achieve a cooperative relationship with the Soviets based on reciprocity and mutual respect and benefit. According to the same author, the Carter Administration sought, above all, to enhance relations outside the East-West rivalry, namely with Latin America, Africa, and Asia. In particular, Carter wanted a comprehensive settlement to the Middle East conflict which would involve Soviet participation and cooperation.

The Administration’s initial defense policy also seemed to signal a tendency to favor nonmilitary options. From the outset, Carter sought to keep his campaign promise of reducing US defense spending. In this vein, the Administration canceled and curtailed several significant defense projects such as the B1 bomber, the MX missile system, the Enhanced Radiation Weapon (a. k. a., the neutron bomb), the Navy ship construction program, and the defense budget for 1979 (Williams, 1984). Following the same reasoning, Carter initially presented the Soviets with a “deep cuts” proposal in strategic forces for the SALT II negotiations. This proposal greatly augmented the reductions originally negotiated between the US and the USSR in the 1974 Vladivostok Agreements.21

In due course, however, Soviet behavior in the Third World altered the Administration’s perception of Soviet intentions and led to the implementation of a more aggressive US foreign policy focusing on containment. The prevailing policy of détente was thus replaced by a policy of greater confrontation which emphasized castigating Soviet adventurism, particularly in Central Asia, and preventing Soviet expansion into other regions (Garthoff, 1985).

The Administration’s more assertive foreign policy was embodied in the newly proclaimed Carter Doctrine. By repudiating the Nixon Doctrine’s reliance on local forces to guarantee their own security, the Carter Doctrine presented itself as a major revision of US policy. From that moment on, the US committed itself to a renewed policy of containment involving a greater American political and military commitment to preventing further Soviet extension into the Southwest Asia-Persian Gulf region, a more active diplomatic effort to confront the USSR, particularly via relations with China, and a general buildup of US military power – both strategic and conventional forces (Garthoff, 1985).

Ultimately, all realists concur that external forces and events led the Carter Administration to relinquish a policy of détente in favor of a policy of increased international assertiveness and reliance on military means and solutions. In particular, events in the Middle East pressed the US to commit itself to assuming the responsibility for guaranteeing regional stability and preventing further Soviet penetration (Kupchan, 1987; Palmer, 1999).

In addition, there is also some scholarly dispute as to which events most affected the Administration’s foreign policy. Realists have acknowledged several different critical events for setting in motion a comprehensive change of the Administration’s foreign policy – for example, the fall of the Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran, the Iranian hostage crisis, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Numerous authors tend, however, to favor a combination of these events. Some authors even charge the buildup of Soviet military power as the main catalyst of Carter’s foreign policy change (Auten, 2008). I will develop this issue in greater depth in the following section. For the moment it suffices to accept that most studies analyzing the Carter Administration hold external actors and events accountable for its wholesale foreign policy change.

On the opposite end of the field, innenpolitik approaches justify the change in the Carter Administration’s foreign policy using domestic considerations. The innenpolitik school of thought argues that foreign policy is driven by internal, rather than external forces – that is, domestic political and economic ideology, electoral cycles, national character, partisan politics, and/or social and economic structures (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999; Quandt, 1986a; Rose, 1998; Zakaria, 1992). The basic postulate underlying this perspective is that the main catalyst of change during the Carter Presidency was located within the domestic arena.

Skidmore (1994a, 1996) is at the forefront of this line of reasoning in explaining the change in the Carter Administration’s foreign policy. The author’s main argument focuses on the Administration’s inability to overcome domestic political constraints and carry out its initial political agenda. According to Skidmore (1996), the Carter Administration came to office seeking to adjust US foreign policy to the intricacies of the international environment, particularly by addressing the “Lippmann Gap” – that is, the growing imbalance between the nation’s commitments and power.22 In Skidmore’s (1996: 31) account, the Carter Administration sought to implement a strategy of adjustment in which the US could rebalance its foreign policy objectives and commitments, namely by “reducing US commitments in peripheral areas, sharing burdens more evenly with friends and allies and seeking accommodation with adversaries or rivals where this proved consistent with US interests.” In order for this strategy to succeed, the Administration would have to introduce selective cutbacks in US overseas commitments, while simultaneously enhancing its diplomatic activities.23

Acknowledging the relative decline of US power, Carter came to the White House seeking to maintain a policy of détente while devaluing the traditional East–West focus on international relations. In particular, Skidmore (1996) argues that, for the Carter Administration to diffuse potential confrontations with the Soviets, preventive diplomacy was essential in dealing with the Third World – that is, resolving emerging conflicts in their initial stages. The Administration believed that the US still maintained several competitive advantages – for example, economic, cultural, and political – over the Soviet Union on which it could capitalize.

However, according to Skidmore (1994a, 1996), the Administration was unable to maintain its strategy of adjustment throughout the Carter Presidency. In fact, the relationship with the USSR soon deteriorated and, by the end of 1979, little remained of the Administration’s policy of détente (Skidmore, 1996). Consequently, the SALT II Treaty was deferred as new strategic systems were approved to match the Soviet threat. Moreover, in contrast with Carter’s early cuts in defense spending, the last 2 years of the Presidency witnessed a significant budgetary increase for national defense, with particular emphasis on Third World intervention forces, for example, Rapid Deployment Force.24 In addition, the plans to remove US troops from South Korea were revoked and diplomatic recognition of Angola, Cuba, and Vietnam was postponed.

While some initial policies survived throughout the term, Skidmore (1996: 51) unequivocally asserts that during the Carter Presidency, “American foreign policy underwent a broad paradigm shift” in which an “initially coherent strategy of adjustment gradually gave way to an almost equally coherent strategy of resistance.” Therefore, the Carter Administration abandoned its commitment to liberal internationalism and returned the US to a policy of containment of Soviet expansion. However, contrary to most orthodox accounts of the Carter Administration, Skidmore suggests that it was domestic politics which most contributed to the Administration’s foreign policy change:

Carter’s wholesale retreat from his initial approach and the confusion into which his foreign policies eventually descended stemmed principally from his inability to gain domestic legitimacy for the administration’s early world view or the policies associated with it. The evolution of Carter’s foreign policies was therefore driven by contradictory sets of international and domestic pressures. International incentives, arising from the dynamics of US decline, initially pulled the administration toward a strategy of adjustment to external change. Domestic constraints favoring policy rigidity, however, eventually forced Carter to abandon much of his early reformist approach in an effort to salvage his dwindling domestic popularity. (Skidmore, 1994a: 700)

Above all, Skidmore argues, Carter was unable to fend off the attacks of the conservative opposition, which assailed the Administration’s foreign policy for being frail and unintelligible. At the forefront of this opposition were groups such as the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) and the American Security Council (ASC). With an extensive list of former government officials, the CPD wielded vast influence in the Cold War establishment and maintained a wide array of influence and contacts. The CPD was able to mobilize considerable resources to counter Carter’s foreign policy initiatives. For instance, in order to derail the SALT II initiative, the CPD expended over $750,000 campaigning and lobbying against the treaty. Moreover, key members of the CPD testified before several Senate committees deliberating on the treaty and “participated in 479 television and radio programs, press conferences, public debates, briefings of influential citizens, and major speeches on arms control and defense” (Skidmore, 1996: 137–138). Similarly, the ASC also mobilized popular opposition to Administration’s foreign policy. In the summer of 1978 the ASC launched the Coalition for Peace through Strength, which sought to organize opposition to SALT II and support increased defense budgets. The coalition aggregated over 200 congressman and 2,500 retired generals and admirals who, with funding of over $2.5 million, were able to increase widespread challenge to SALT II (Skidmore, 1996). Furthermore, the coalition widened its activities openly supporting and lobbying in favor of the Republicans and the Reagan campaign against Carter and his policies (Bellant, 1991). These opposition groups were able to employ considerable leverage on public opinion by harnessing their multiple resources to discredit the Carter Administration’s foreign policy. Furthermore, conservative groups increasingly managed to define public perceptions and the meanings of international events. In contrast, Skidmore (1994a, 1996) argues that the sponsors of liberal internationalism were unable to compete with their more conservative political opponents. One of the main reasons for the liberal internationalists’ shortfall was the complexity involved in Carter’s strategy of adjustment. Rather than fall back on the traditional and simple containment discourse of the Cold War, the adjustment strategy required a pragmatic and flexible approach to foreign policy that implied customized responses to the specific requirements of each individual situation. The Carter Administration’s characterization of the USSR was a particularly difficult sell to the American public. In contrast to the traditional Cold War image of a hostile Soviet Union, Carter presented the Soviets as a limited adversary, that is, neither friend nor foe. This proved too complex and messy a concept to muster public endorsement and support. Moreover, since the end of Vietnam War, public opinion in America was once again leaning toward conservative internationalism with its emphasis on anticommunism, containment of the USSR, and military preparedness (Skidmore, 1996). Therefore, in order to regain political support and legitimacy for his policies at home, Carter opted to replace his initial multifaceted foreign policy with a more simple and clear-cut approach to international challenges:

Without an effective means of selling his overall strategy to the American people, Carter’s pursuit of reform led to substantial domestic political costs. When these costs eventually became intolerable, Carter fell back upon both the legitimative techniques and the associated policies of the cold war era in an effort to shore up his political position at home. Once domestic priorities became paramount to the administration, it had little choice but to abandon much of its early foreign policy agenda. (Skidmore, 1994a: 710)

Attentive to public sentiments and cherished beliefs, the Carter Administration aligned its foreign policy to match the American public’s more conservative outlook. This new policy implied adopting a doctrinal approach to foreign policy, based on simple and pragmatic concepts and arguments. As a result, the Carter Administration began representing the USSR as an aggressive and treacherous enemy, overselling Soviet activities as an imminent threat to US and Western interests (Skidmore, 1994a).

An analogous interpretation is put forward by William Quandt in analyzing the American electoral cycle. According to the Quandt (1986a: 14), “A skillful president will learn how to make use of the political cycle to enhance the chances of success in his foreign policy; a careless one will probably pay a high price for ignoring domestic realities.” Nevertheless, there are patterns of behavior associated with the political cycle, which can be identified. For instance, Quandt (1986a) argues that in the first year, Presidents and their advisors usually lack a deep understanding of foreign policy issues, particularly regarding the Middle East. Normally the positions put forward during the Presidential campaign set the initial political agenda and policies; this is a period involving considerable activism in creating an ambitious policy. A newly elected President will tend to reveal a high level of optimism about his ability to achieve significant results in foreign policy. The second year presents the best opportunities for achieving foreign policy results. Experience has transformed the initial ambition into more modest and workable policy options. In contrast, the third year reveals greater political prudence. As the electoral process starts to emerge on the horizon, Presidents will try to avoid commitments, which might not materialize in the immediate future. Prospects that do not guarantee success will be abandoned and the President will disengage from potentially costly political initiatives. Finally, in the fourth year, domestic political considerations triumph over foreign policy. The demands on a Presidential candidate do not provide much time for engaging in complex political reflections or demanding foreign policy initiatives. In addition, the concern for not affronting certain influential interest groups, substantially moderates political behavior. Therefore, in the final year of his tenure, a President will seek to avoid unnecessary controversy, consequently shying away from any bold initiatives.

Quandt (1986a) argues that Carter revealed these traits during his Presidency. Carter arrived in Washington looking to promote a comprehensive peace settlement for the Middle East. By the second year of his Presidency, an attempt to reach an agreement between Egypt and Israel dictated most of Carter’s political initiatives in the region. While in the third year Carter did undertake considerable political risks to secure the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, he quickly disengaged with the peace process as domestic protests mounted and other international events diverted his attention. Specifically, the Palestinian issue was scaled back and a comprehensive settlement was deferred. In his last year in Office, beleaguered by other problems in the region, Carter completely detached himself from the Middle East in order to try to limit his losses. Ultimately, his initial ambitious agenda for the Middle East was retracted as he “was also weakened by the normal workings of the American political system, which forces a first-term president to devote enormous time and energy to his reelection campaign” (Quandt, 1986a: 29).

Another strand of research based on an innenpolitik approach emphasizes the internal struggle to determine the Administration’s foreign policy. This line of reasoning posits that the transformation in foreign policy during the Carter Presidency resulted chiefly from the competition between the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance. According to these accounts, Brzezinski was able to impose on Carter his more assertive policy recommendations and transform the President’s worldview. Smith (1986) has argued that the growing public demand to challenge Soviet expansion, particularly in Afghanistan, strengthened proposals for a more assertive American foreign policy. As a result, Carter ingenuously embraced Brzezinski’s agenda endorsing a more confrontational stance toward the Soviet Union and significantly augmenting America’s military capabilities.

This interpretation of the Carter Administration’s foreign policy change has received considerable backing from numerous academic investigations. Many researchers have testified to the visceral struggle to define foreign policy within the Administration. (c. f., Aronoff, 2006; Brown, 1994; Garrison, 2002; Hoyt and Garrison, 1997; Moens, 1991; Rothkopf, 2005). In particular, internal divisions were aggravated during international crises, further eroding the Administration’s political cohesion.

According to Brown (1994), several different visions for guiding US foreign policy coexisted early on in the Carter Administration. A highly idealistic foreign policy, based on human rights and universal democratic values, was initially espoused by Carter and championed by officials such as his Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young. A more geopolitically oriented approach was supported by Brzezinski, who advocated a more assertive policy towards the Soviet Union. A more pragmatic and institutional vision was sponsored by Vance. For Vance, case-by-case analyses and negotiated solutions were the principal building blocks for US–Soviet relations and international stability and peace. In the face of these frequently contrasting visions, Brown (1994: 314) argues that Carter “could be swayed by the worldviews and preferred style of each of these approaches; and at times during his campaign for the presidency and during his tenure in the White House he would appear to have adopted one or the other, and at times some confusing hybrid of all of them.” Eventually, Brzezinski’s view prevailed as Vance and Young left the Administration in the final years of the Presidency. In the words of the author, “Vance’s resignation marked the ascendency of the Brzezinski approach – the renewed preoccupation with the Soviet threat and the tendency to resort to confrontationist postures in dealing with adversaries” (Brown, 1994: 320).

Brown’s general argument aligns with those of most scholars of the Carter Administration (c. f., Bill, 1988; Cottam, 1992; Garrison, 2002; Garthoff, 1985; Glad, 2009; Hoyt and Garrison, 1997; Little, 2008; Njølstad, 1995; Rothkopf, 2005). In fact, the majority of the research on Carter’s foreign policy demonstrates that as international crises proliferated throughout the tenure of the Carter Presidency, positions were increasingly radicalized within the Administration and, ultimately, the more assertive policies sponsored by Brzezinski finally came to dominate the foreign policy agenda, leading to a wholesale transformation of Carter’s initial objectives.

Moens’ (1991) account of the Administration’s handling of the Iranian crisis in 1978–1979 illustratively reveals the intense internal struggle to define policy options and manage the policy process.25 Moens claims to depart from the conventional arguments focused on the internal conflict between the APNSA and the Secretary of State by exposing the flawed nature of the policy process. All the same, the author’s research clearly highlights the conflictual dynamics involved between the key officials involved in the foreign policy decision-making process.

According to Moens (1991), Brzezinski sidelined policy recommendations with which he did not agree, concealing them from other foreign policy officials. For instance, Brzezinski shelved the first policy recommendation memorandum produced by the State Department on 24 October, 1978 on how to deal with the Iranian crisis. Among the many observations, the memorandum recommended that the US should increase contacts with the opposition to the Pahlavi regime, namely with the mullahs and the Ayatollah Khomeini – a position at odds with that of Brzezinski who did not believe that the Shah should grant additional concessions to the opposition. Later that year, Brzezinski once again stonewalled policy proposals from the State Department calling for a compromise with the Khomeini forces. In this episode, Brzezinski refused to present the recommendations put forward by Henry Precht, the Department of State’s desk officer for Iran, for removing the Shah from power and conceding the government to the Khomeini-led opposition. More precisely, Newsome (quoted in Moens, 1991: 226–227) asserts that “Henry Precht, who was trying to bring home the reality of the events in Iran, was subsequently excluded from SCC meetings by Brzezinski.”

Another incident that testifies to the struggle for power in determining the Administration’s foreign policy involves the Secretary of State. Moens (1991) reports that, on 28 December, 1978, Brown, Brzezinski, Schlesinger, Turner, and Vance discussed possible solutions to Iranian crisis. The group essentially discussed the possibility of the regime using an “Iron Fist” option to put down the opposition and restore order in the country. Not reaching a consensual recommendation, the officials decided to write a compromise message for Ambassador Sullivan to transmit to the Shah. Discontented with the content of the message, Vance pressured the President to alter the text to better suit his outlook. More precisely, Vance convinced Carter to replace the call for a “firm military government” with a suggestion for “a government which would end disorder, violence and bloodshed” (Moens, 1991: 227).

The dispute within the Administration to control the foreign policy decision-making process during the Iranian crisis has led some researchers to declare that “a type of guerrilla warfare ensued” between the contending parties – that is, the State Department and the NSC (Kaufman, 1993: 128). Moreover, it is only one example of the numerous incidents in which researchers have identified internecine competition between key foreign policy officials to define US policy – for example, in relation to China (Garrison, 2002), Horn of Africa (Garthoff, 1985; Jackson, 2007, 2010), Iranian hostage crisis (Waugh Jr., 1990), Nicaragua (Cottam, 1992), and Vietnam (Hurst, 1997). Ultimately, according to this school of thought, internal rivalries would cripple the Administration’s capability to develop and implement a coherent course of action regarding international affairs (Smith, 1986).

This rationale has been sanctioned and strengthened by many of the Administrations’ officials own accounts of the Carter Presidency, particularly that of Vance (1983). According to the former Secretary of State, the different views on how to deal with the Soviets ultimately and irreparably fragmented the Administrations’ foreign policy consensus. While conceding that there had always been multiple perspectives on US–Soviet relations within the Administration, Vance (1983: 394) admits that in the final years of the Presidency “it became increasingly difficult to hold the coalition together.”

Cognitive analyses of the Carter Administration also accentuate this competitive dynamic. Rosati (1991) has carried out one of the most exhaustive studies on the Administration’s cognitive images and has confirmed the change in its general worldview. Rosati assessed the worldviews of the Administration’s top foreign policy decision makers – that is, Carter, Brzezinski, and Vance – by applying content analysis to their major public statements and using an events data set to determine their behavior throughout the term of the Carter Presidency.

Rosati’s research reveals findings consistent with the research carried out by Skidmore (1994a, 1996), which was mentioned above. Rosati claims that the Carter Administration came to office with a consensual and coherent worldview. In particular, the top officials shared an image of a complex international system, characterized by “the emergence of a variety of important issues and actors, all of which had to be addressed if the United States was to respond positively to the changes taking place throughout the globe” (Rosati, 1991: 39). For the Administration, interdependence was a key feature of the contemporary international system and, therefore, cooperation between the major powers was essential for resolving emerging disputes – that is, the creation of a global community. According to Rosati (1991: 42), “in order to pursue a community among nations, the Carter Administration rejected the policy of containment as the basis of American foreign policy.” In its place, Carter sought to further promote détente by cooperating with the Soviet Union, which the Administration’s top officials did not consider an imminent threat. In fact, the Soviets were viewed as partners in solving many international issues, particularly the Arab–Israeli conflict (Rosati, 1991).

However, beginning in 1978, Soviet and Cuban intervention in the Third World began to challenge the Administration’s optimistic worldview. Brzezinski’s image of the international system was particularly transformed by Soviet interventionism. By the end of the year, Rosati (1991) claims that Brzezinski had abandoned hope for a cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union, preferring instead a more robust policy for containing Soviet initiatives in the Third World. In contrast, despite some disenchantment with Soviet behavior, Carter and Vance continued to maintain an optimistic image of the international system, particularly regarding US–Soviet relations, and were committed to a cooperative posture for dealing with the most pressing global issues. Therefore, Rosati (1991) claims that while differences emerged among the principal foreign policy decision makers, particularly regarding the USSR, nonetheless a common worldview persisted.

As Soviet activity in the Third World continued, Brzezinski’s image of the international system kept getting grimmer. Carter’s Assistant for National Security Affairs increasingly accused the Soviet Union of creating international instability and called for a reinforcement of US military power to counter Soviet global ascension. As a result, Rosati asserts that, by 1979, Carter wavered between his two main foreign policy advisors divergent worldviews. Consequently, US foreign policy reflected Carter’s endeavor to balance these conflicting perspectives. As Carter increasingly moved toward Brzezinski’s pessimistic image, the events of late 1979 ultimately led to a wholesale conversion of the Carter’s worldview. According to Rosati’s research, events in the Middle East pushed the Administration to embrace a hostile image of the USSR and abandon a cooperative and optimistic approach to international affairs, particularly regarding US–Soviet relations.

The containment of Soviet expansion became, once again, the raison d’être of US foreign policy. In particular, the Administration’s attention was focused on Brzezinski’s “arc of crisis” and concerns with issues such as human rights, preventive diplomacy, and national independence took a back seat to responding to growing Soviet assertiveness. More importantly, in order to face the Soviet challenge, the Carter Administration came to emphasize the role of military power in achieving its foreign policy objectives. The Carter Doctrine was the corollary of the Administration’s new worldview as military force was judged the most effective means for restraining Soviet expansion.

Thus, in unison with other approaches in FPA, Rosati’s cognitive analysis of the Carter Administration’s foreign policy revealed a dramatic change during its term in office:

The Administration’s image of global complexity and the quest for global community did not stay in its pure form for long. During 1978 and 1979, the early image was modified: Brzezinski rejected it, and President Carter grew more skeptical. By 1980, the idealistic image of a complex global community was lost: the world was perceived to have become increasingly fragmented and unstable. A pessimistic image had completely replaced the earlier optimism in accordance with realpolitik. No longer did the Administration look to the future – global change was likely to be detrimental to US interests. Instead, Carter’s foreign policy became status-quo oriented in order to prevent Soviet expansionism and to promote global stability. Consequently, in 1980 the Carter Administration reinstated the policy of containment against the Soviet Union. (Rosati, 1991: 157)

Other accounts of the Carter Administration’s cognitive images support Rosati’s findings. In her study on the political conversion of Jimmy Carter, Aronoff (2006) also contends that Jimmy Carter experienced a radical change of his worldview, particularly concerning the relationship with the USSR. According to Aronoff (2006: 447), Soviet initiatives in Southwest Asia catalyzed the radical transformation of Carter’s cognitive image of the Soviets, leading him, in turn, “to alter his administration’s policies towards the Soviet Union drastically, virtually breaking off relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.” Similar conclusions have also been reached by Lebow and Stein (1993) in their study on Carter’s response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The authors reiterate that the Administration’s reaction to the events in Afghanistan “represents a case of dramatic change in beliefs, attributions and attitudes” towards the Soviet Union (Lebow and Stein, 1993: 97).

However, regardless of the approach espoused by the different researchers, we are able to identify a common strand in all the accounts of the Carter Administration’s foreign policy change. In fact, while normally unstated, most research presents very similar accounts of how the change occurred. Most present the Administration’s foreign policy change as an abrupt and radical break with the policies previously pursued. While not openly, and many times consciously acknowledging it as such, the descriptions of the Administration’s foreign policy change are in perfect harmony with the assumptions of punctuated equilibrium theory. The failure in the scholarly literature to acknowledge this is certainly due to the fact that most accounts of the change in the Carter Administration’s foreign policy lack a comprehensive framework for understanding the change process. For the most part, scholars are more interested in explaining why foreign policy changed, disregarding how it came about.26 Therefore, the existing accounts tend to limit themselves to narrating events, providing a particular reason (or combination of reasons) for explaining change. However, this fact limits a deeper understanding of the dynamics involved in foreign policy change. It obscures the complex processes at work in foreign policy-making.