2.1.1 Political Science

The term polarization is perhaps best known as “a metaphor used by political scientists when they want to describe a system in which two extremes are the predominant feature.”100 Political scientists may speak, for example, of polarized electorates in which voters are divided along ideological lines into dichotomous positions, or of polarized political systems in which two parties represent diametrically opposite political views. The literature available on the phenomenon of polarization in political science is vast, and there is a rich tradition of research on the topic dating at least to the mid-twentieth century.101 Indeed, the array of literature on the topic of polarization in politics clearly demonstrates that the phenomenon is common and widespread around the world.

Even when limiting our scope to research focusing on the United States in particular, significant work has been done in the last fifty years on the concept of polarization in the body politic, and it is impossible to provide a complete overview of available literature. As Fiorina and Abrams stated in 2009, “the literature on polarization has expanded greatly in recent years, as numerous scholars turned their attention to the contemporary scene.”102 They define polarization as a bimodal distribution of political opinions, with the assumption that the two modes of distribution lie at the extremes.103 Interestingly, Fiorina and Abrams emphasize a distinction between elite polarization and mass polarization. And while they acknowledge that political science research has indeed found significant evidence for the polarization of attitudes in political elites, they noted in 2009 that “the literature indicates that the American public as a whole is no more polarized today than it was a generation ago, whether we focus on general ideological orientations or positions on specific issues.”104 This summary reflected the results of other, earlier reviews of political polarization in the American public done in 1984 and 1996, both of which concluded that while political elites in American society exhibit polarized views and positions, the views and values of the public are much less so.105

Despite the lack of clear evidence for mass polarization in the American public in 2009, Fiorina and Adams indicated that “scholars have begun to study the potential consequences of increased elite polarization (the existence of which is largely noncontroversial) on popular attitudes toward the political system and popular inclinations to participate in politics.”106 In the following case study on the tea party movement in the United States, it will be important to evaluate the effects of polarizing strategies used by political elites in the network on the wider public. Indeed, just a few years after Fiorina and Abrams wrote, a 2012 survey by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press indicated that mass polarization of the American public had occurred over the past decade in accordance with certain sets of “values,” with a particular surge occurring in the late stages of the Bush administration and the first four years of the Obama administration. Specifically, the authors stated that American “values and basic beliefs are more polarized along partisan lines than at any time in the last 25 years.”107

The primary focus of this work is not whether the American public has actually become more polarized over the last few decades, and it is a debate that seems to depend on the way that a given researcher or set of researchers chooses to define the phenomenon.108 What can be gleaned from the wide array of literature on the subject is that political scientists conceive of polarization a distribution of political opinions or values within a society. This conception primarily describes situations in which a population has already formed its opinions (i.e., in which they have already become polarized around a certain topic or set of issues). While political scientists acknowledge that polarization can also be analyzed as a process, here they largely limit their observations to changes in group identification and the degree of polarization over time. And although they would certainly acknowledge the effects that strategic communication can have on public opinion, their research focus clearly lies elsewhere.

As a whole, political scientists tend to attribute polarized opinion distributions to a wide array of factors, including geographic distribution, socioeconomic status, religious views, partisan preferences, and other demographic trends and indicators. These indicators are often sufficient within the field of political science, but they are little help for a rhetorical theory of polarization. Similarly, the conception of polarization as an end state is only marginally useful for a rhetorical concept: rhetoricians must focus on describing the strategy of creating or intensifying the polarized state in an audience through the use of strategically formulated communication.

One important exception within the field of political science is John Dryzek’s work on deliberative democracy and political discourse. With regards to polarization as a rhetorical strategy, Dryzek’s 2010 essay “Rhetoric in Democracy: A Systemic Appreciation” is particularly insightful. In it, Dryzek seeks to define a positive role for rhetoric in a modern democracy despite its illogical tendencies, and in the face of significant criticism of rhetoric from theorists ranging from Plato to John Rawls.109 As he notes: “as rhetoric becomes central in representation, so too does it become urgent to develop tests that distinguish between desirable and undesirable rhetorical invocation.”110 His solution is to develop a “systematic” test by making a distinction between “bridging” and “bonding” rhetoric, whereby “bonding is associating with people who are similar in social background, [and] bridging is associating with people with different social characteristics.”111

Dryzek’s approach is relevant here for a few reasons. First, his description of rhetoric within democratic institutions explicitly acknowledges its central role in shaping political opinions over time. And instead of denouncing or minimizing this role (as many other political theorists have), Dryzek sees it as a critical element of any deliberative democracy. By discussing what he calls a “systemic” instead of a “categorical” test, he seeks to establish normative guidelines for the boundaries of acceptable political rhetoric while accounting for the “communicative system” and context it is used within.112 And with regards to polarizing rhetorical strategies, he clearly states that the use of divisive “bonding” rhetoric can be either positive or negative, depending on the circumstances.113 This point will be discussed further in the conclusion of this work, but can be emphasized here: although they may seem distasteful from a categorical perspective, polarizing rhetorical strategies have no inherent (positive or negative) normative value in a democratic system.

Another reason that Dryzek’s essay is interesting is that his conception of “bonding” rhetoric in many ways mirrors the definition of polarizing rhetoric from a political scientific perspective. In his understanding, “bonding rhetoric is…likely to deepen divisions with out-groups, to invoke dangerous emotions, to mobilize passions, to move groups to extremes,” and Dryzek makes explicit reference “group polarization” as one possible result of bonding rhetoric.114 He even points to President George W. Bush’s communication following the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks—an instance of polarizing rhetoric that will be discussed extensively later in this chapter—as “bonding rhetoric that emphasized solidarity, accompanying a Manichean division of the world.”115 As will be shown here, communication that seeks to simultaneously generate both solidarity and division forms the core of polarizing rhetorical strategies.

2.1.2 Sociology

The concept of polarization has also garnered significant attention in the field of sociology. Much of this research understands polarization similarly to political scientists, and describes populations and groups as polarized when attitudes about a topic are arranged at the opposite ends of a spectrum of possible opinions, or when social indicators such as income, demographics, or religious beliefs are distributed in a dichotomous way within a society or group. Accordingly, there is a wide array of work on polarization in various aspects of society and social life.116

One of the main points of debate surrounding the concept of polarization within sociology is how to measure and quantify it. As Paul DiMaggio, John Evans, and Bethany Bryson wrote in 1996, “polarization is both a state and a process. Polarization as a state refers to the extent to which opinions on an issue are opposed in relation to some theoretical maximum. Polarization as a process refers to the increase in such opposition over time.”117 While this work did not focus on the causes of polarization, it did seek to find ways to quantitatively describe and define opinion polarization. As the authors put it:

Public opinion on an issue can be characterized as polarized to the extent that opinions are diverse, “far apart” in content, and relatively balanced between the ends of the opinion spectrum [...] Public opinion is also polarized insofar as people with different positions on an issue cluster into separate camps, with locations between the two modal positions sparsely occupied.118

Using statistical approaches to calculate the presence and degree of polarization, these researchers and others have sought to clearly define a method for assessing the phenomenon in social groups.119

The preceding discussion illustrates that the debate over how to best identify and describe the phenomenon of polarization in social groups is ongoing, and this debate is certainly of importance to a rhetorical theory of polarization. As we will later see, the efficacy of polarizing rhetorical strategies can only be confirmed by looking at the actual distribution of opinions around a given topic before and after the strategy has been implemented. To be more specific to the case study here, it will be important to look at polling and sociological data in order to determine whether the polarizing strategies implemented by orators within the tea party network were successful in creating increased divergence between opinion groups and increased clustering within opinion groups in the American public and political system.

Other sociologists have sought to describe polarization from a less quantitative and more qualitative perspective. Such approaches can be helpful for a rhetorical theory of polarization because they provide insight into the social conditions under which polarization occurs. In his influential 1972 essay Insiders and Outsiders: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge, Robert Merton described processes through which “knowledge” and “fact” become intertwined with a conception of group identification and the formation of an “Insider-Outsider” dichotomy within a society.120 He contends that the formation of groups that explicitly exclude others leads to a conflict in their claims to knowledge:

As the society becomes polarized, so do the contending claims to truth. At the extreme, an active and reciprocal distrust between groups finds expression in intellectual perspectives that are no longer located within the same universe of discourse. The more deep-seated the mutual distrust, the more does the argument of the other appear so palpably implausible or absurd that one no longer inquires […] to assess its truth claims.121

Thus, when two groups are polarized around an issue (knowledge claim), they no longer have the capacity to rationally discuss their differences: their individual identification with a group opinion overrides rational discourse and analysis. As group identity solidifies, so too does the idea of an outsider, of an other that does not belong to the group. Merton insists that the more group identification solidifies, the more the inside group begins to believe it has privileged access to knowledge, and begins to use specialized discourse and terminology to downplay or even deny the epistemological claims of outsiders. Thus, Nazi scientists “could refer without hesitation to ‘Protestant and Catholic science, German and Jewish science,’” and, later, African American sociologists could “draw a sharp contrast between the concepts of ‘a black social science’ and a ‘white social science.’”122

This idea of communicative action mirroring (and influencing) the group identification of speakers is central to a contemporary rhetorical theory of polarization. As Merton constantly points out in his analysis of the insider-outsider dynamic, group identification is expressed by all members of society through their public and interpersonal communication. Such public expression of identity is particularly prominent in polarized systems:

Polarization in the underlying social structure becomes reflected in the polarization of claims in the intellectual and ideological domain, as groups or collectivities seek to capture what Heidegger called the “public interpretation of reality.” With varying degrees of intent, groups in conflict want to make their interpretation the prevailing one of how things were and are and will be.123

Accordingly, competing social groups will use rhetorical tactics to assert their own group’s primacy, while at the same time seeking to deny their opponents’ legitimacy.

While sociological perspectives are helpful in describing the social situations in which polarization occurs and in providing insight into the reasons that it occurs, the sociological focus is too broad for a rhetorical theory of polarizing processes. Sociology acknowledges the important role that discourse can play in creating a polarized state in a group or society, but its conception of polarization includes a significant number of elements that are not related to communication or discourse. A rhetorical theory of polarization must focus on opinion change in an audience through the use of specifically formulated texts, and must describe the situations and circumstances necessary to cause division within audiences.

Similar social dynamics are at the core of Richard L. Lanigan’s 1970 essay, Urban Crisis: Polarization and Communication. Describing polarization as “an effect stimulated by […] isolation or confrontation,” Lanigan analyzed the formation of polarized social groups in American urban environments in the late 1960s. As he put it, the sociological phenomenon of “polarization creates a lived perspective of reality based on value divisions that characterize one individual as ‘good, right, lawful, rational, and the like,’ while his neighbor becomes ‘evil, wrong, unlawful, irrational, and so on.’”124 According to his model, “isolational polarization” occurs when the in-group seeks to define itself as different from the out-group or when a segment of the in-group attempts to broaden the definition of the in-group to gain control of the new broader group. “Confrontational polarization,” on the other hand, occurs when the in-group openly confronts the out-group in an effort “to force uncommitted persons to choose within the polarity,” or when a segment of the in-group seeks to gain leadership of the overall group by asserting its own primacy.125

Lanigan’s idea of confrontational polarization is most applicable to a rhetorical model of the phenomenon. It is an “offensive” tactic, designed to illustrate the clear differences between the in-group and the out-group to a wider audience. Lanigan offers insight into the motivation for such polarizing tactics by stating that “the underlying assumption […] is that the majority of people (the public at large) belong to an uncommitted middle which will be moved by a minority willing to commit itself to […] overt action.”126 He uses examples from both the “New Left” and the “Far Right” to illustrate cases where social groups used organizational tactics, synchronized rallies, and communicative situations to disrupt and attack their chosen enemies. Again, he indicates that the motivation for such tactics presume “that a confrontation of power blocs will force the uncommitted middle to rally to the ‘just’ side—theirs!”127 From a communicative perspective, Lanigan states that competing ideologies “are couched in one dimensional terms of kind, where the compromise of degree is not admitted.”128

Another interesting form of polarization occurs when a sub-group of a faction chooses to engage in confrontational polarization with another. When this occurs, “there must be a plan of action for the confrontation to be an in-group success. This requirement generally […] generates an in-group faction of ideology makers to lead the in-group organization.”129 As will be shown later in this work, a significant factor in the use of polarizing strategies and the selection of polarizing issues within the tea party oratorical network was due to factional infighting within the Republican Party, with anti-establishment tea partiers seeking to wrest control of the party from more moderate politicians and ideologies.

2.1.3 Social Psychology

The field of social psychology is a third academic discipline of particular interest for a rhetorical theory of polarization. As with political science and sociology, there has been a significant amount of research into the phenomenon of polarization by social psychologists in the last twenty years, and it is impossible to give a complete overview here. What is important to note is that, in contrast to the other two disciplines mentioned, social psychology is much more concerned with describing the processes that create polarization and discovering the causes of opinion polarization in groups. Instead of focusing on broader sociological polarization, social psychologists are usually more interested in how opinion or attitude polarization occurs within smaller groups, and they utilize clear experimental trials to observe the phenomenon of polarization “in action.” Thus, the general definition of polarization in the field is also somewhat different to that used by political scientists and sociologists: “Group polarization is the tendency of individuals in a group setting to engage in more extreme decisions than their original private individual decisions.”130

In a seminal 1982 essay, David G. Meyers described and summarized the results of a foundational research program on group polarization that had run since the mid-1960s and whose results have been heavily cited since.131 A central initial finding of the program was that polarization within and among social groups is heavily influenced by group discussion: internal communication in groups leads to a more consolidated and more extreme average opinion position than the individuals had before group discussion. With years of experimental and field tests and significant support from other research in the field, Meyers was able to demonstrate that “discussion with similarly minded other people will increase the attitude gap between the two groups.”132 Real-world observations of student organizations, criminal gangs, and group counseling sessions confirmed these experimental results. More recent research has utilized and expanded upon and confirmed Meyers’ conception.133

Meyers’ second task was to develop a theoretical explanation for why such polarization tends to occur. His results showed that there are two main elements that influence polarization in group discussion: the former “stresses our rational capacities—persuasive discussion arguments are presumed to predominantly favor the initially preferred alternative, thereby enhancing it,” while the latter “stresses social motivation—people presumably want to perceive and present themselves favorably, so exposure to others’ opinions may stimulate them to adjust their responses in order to maintain a desirable image.”134 As we will later see, both of these factors can be important motivators for orators utilizing polarizing strategies.

Of particular interest for the formulation of polarizing texts are Meyers’ findings regarding the type of information that leads to polarized reactions:

The amount of group shift is determined by three factors: the direction of each argument (which side it favors), its cogency, and its novelty [...] The theory also clearly implies the conditions under which group polarization is to be expected: when discussion generates potent information predominantly in one direction.135

Such insights are crucial for a modern rhetorical theory of polarization. By clearly identifying the factors involved in creating a polarized group shift, Meyers has provided clues to the types of texts that a potential orator could use to induce a polarized shift in their audience: those that are clearly one sided, that deal with an issue that is relevant to the audience, and that are new or “potent.”

Another branch of social psychological research has attempted to explain the internal motivation of individuals who choose polarizing communicative strategies. Such work is also interesting for a rhetorical theory of polarization because it approaches the issue from the speaker’s side of the equation. Instead of seeking an explanation for polarization in the minds of group members as a whole, it tries to explain the internal psychological makeup of persuasively acting individuals. In the same year that Meyers released his data, Schlenker and Goldman at the University of Florida published an essay outlining the results of their research into the internal motivations of speakers in group situations. Their work used the formulation of persuasive texts by study participants to gauge the relationship between group self-identification and the expression of polarized positions.136

This and other studies have demonstrated aspects of speaker psychology and argumentative structure that are relevant for a theory of polarization as a rhetorical strategy. The communicative role taken by a speaker (whether persuasive or not) directly influences the degree of polarization in the texts they create. Those who seek to persuade their audience tend to formulate more polarizing texts, and the stronger a speaker personally identifies with a particular group’s claim to knowledge, the more polarized their speech becomes. In other words, the more a speaker wishes to be publicly identified with a particular group or position, the more polarizing their communication becomes.137

Although the detailed analysis of speaker psychology and group identity formation is outside the scope of rhetorical theory, aspects of such research are useful in both identifying the necessary contextual conditions for the successful use of polarization, and in determining possible oratorical intentions for using the strategy. But while social psychological research has much to offer, there are also significant limitations to the utility of these approaches and results for a rhetorical theory of polarization. To begin with, the conception of polarization as synonymous with “choice shift” in a group is too broad, and comes exceedingly close to the definition of persuasion discussed in Chapter 1.138 Additionally, the majority of social psychological research is more concerned with group reactions as opposed to individual motivational goal setting and action within groups.139 This research focus is obviously important, but a rhetorical theory of communication must always approach theory building from the perspective of a strategically motivated actor or actors.140 Finally, while the experimental and statistical rigor of social psychological research is to be commended, its findings are beyond the scope of this work and much of rhetorical scholarship. To be clear, statistical data showing the presence of a polarized state can be a useful diagnostic to help determine whether polarization of an audience has occurred, and some such data will be discussed in the analysis of the tea party to come. Still, a good rhetorical theory should describe how polarizing texts are formed and function, the contextual conditions in which polarizing strategies can be successful, and (perhaps most importantly) the strategic considerations that an orator should make before implementing polarizing strategies.

2.2.1 The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control

In 1970, John W. Bowers and Donovan J. Ochs published a highly influential book, The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control, which was one of the first to directly use the term “polarization” in the context of strategic communication.145 According to the authors, the “rhetoric of agitation” occurs “when people outside the normal decision-making establishment advocate significant social change and encounter a degree of resistance within the establishment such as to require more than the normal discursive means of persuasion.”146 Thus, the strategies described by Bowers and Ochs become necessary when certain individuals or groups feel they are not being heard or accepted by established channels and decision makers. The rhetoric of agitation involves the utilization of communicative tactics outside of the normally acceptable parameters of public discourse and represents a provocative act designed to gain attention for the speaker and their cause from the wider public.

Within this framework, Bowers and Ochs discussed the concept of polarization as one of a series of “Strategies of Agitation.” They defined polarization as a strategy that “encompasses tactics designed to move the individual into the agitation ranks—to force a conscious choice between agitation and control.”147 Polarizing strategies seek to “move” listeners and to compel them to make a choice between the speaker’s chosen cause (agitation) and that of their opponents (control). This forceful strategy “assumes that any individual who has not [yet] committed to the agitation supports the establishment,” and thus, orators that utilize polarization “are no longer interested in addressing nuances. The fact that the uncommitted might agree with their ideology but not their tactics [...] is not of interest. In using polarization, the agitator forces individuals to choose between the agitator and the establishment.”148 Bowers and Ochs cite Eldridge Cleaver’s famous line “You are either part of the problem or part of the solution,” to illustrate a typical example of polarizing communication.

This work provides an important starting point in an analysis of the existing literature on polarizing rhetoric, and Bowers and Ochs’ book is frequently cited in many of the studies that will be discussed here. Their definition of polarization provides insight into orator psychology and intentionality: by the time an orator is prepared to use polarization, other less-destructive methods of persuasion have often been tried and have failed. By eliminating nuance and detail from their argumentation, orators using polarization offer a simplified version of a debate in the strongest possible terms in order to force audience members to confront the issue. The authors note that polarizing rhetoric represents something of a scorched-earth strategy: not only does it seek to demonize the opponent, but often also those who might be sympathetic to the position advocated by the speaker but uncommitted to action.

Bowers and Ochs also detail specific elements that speakers can use to formulate polarizing texts: the use of flag individuals, focusing on flag issues, and “the invention of derogatory jargon.”149 Flagging individuals and issues serves to demarcate the in-groups and out-groups as the polarizing speaker conceives of them, to focus public discourse into a dichotomous “black-and-white” choice for the audience and, perhaps most importantly, to garner wider attention for their communication. As Bowers and Ochs put it:

Attacking these issues or individuals (sometimes a group or an organization, rather than a person) attracts media attention. The targets of attack generally make it easier for potential converts to choose the agitators rather than the establishment […] The choice of flag individuals is important to the success of the movement.150

In the third edition of the book, they highlight examples from real-world demonstrations against the Dow Chemical Company during the Vietnam War and against political figures throughout late twentieth century American politics, and identify individuals such as Presidents Johnson, Nixon, and George W. Bush (as well as members of their administrations) as the targets of polarizing campaigns by activist demonstrators. Their analysis of these real-world cases helps shed light on both the internal motivation of polarizing speakers as well as the practical intent of polarizing communication:

They were intent on polarizing uncommitted individuals. The agitators hope to accomplish the polarization by forcing such a strong negative reaction to the emotionally charged flag individual or issue that condemnation of those flag individuals and groups would follow.151

Similarly, the use of derogatory language belittles and dehumanizes a speaker’s opponents and makes it more difficult for those in the audience to identify themselves with the other, particularly if their attitudes and opinions tend to sympathize with the speaker’s chosen issue.152 “This specialized vocabulary attacks the establishment while at the same time building internal cohesiveness. Words are chosen for powerful images or sentiments they evoke.”153

Although Bowers and Ochs provided significant insight into the concept of polarization as a rhetorical strategy, their contribution was limited to about two pages of definitions and conceptual work. And although they provided plausible real-world examples, the lack of in-depth analysis provided little methodological indication of how real-world examples of polarization should be identified and studied. At most, their analysis suggested that real-world communication should be studied for specific textual patterns that indicate the presence of polarizing elements and for circumstances in which the polarizing strategy could be helpful to a potential communicator. Finally, Bowers and Ochs’ concept of polarization was constrained by their insistence that the strategy be limited to groups of agitators seeking to gain attention in public forums for their fight against established interests, systems, and individuals. As we will soon see, however, the strategy of polarization can easily be found in establishment rhetoric as well.

2.2.2 Nixon, Agnew, and the Rhetoric of Polarization

In 1971, communications scholars Andrew A. King and Floyd Douglas Anderson undertook a systematic analysis of what they called “the rhetoric of polarization” based on public statements made by President Richard Nixon and his Vice President, Spiro Agnew following the 1968 presidential campaign.154 Considering that only one year prior, Bowers and Ochs had cited Nixon as a prime example of a targeted flag individual in the polarizing rhetoric of anti-establishment protesters, it is somewhat ironic that this in-depth analysis illustrated how Nixon’s ‘establishment’ administration utilized polarizing strategies between his election as president in 1968 and the 1970 congressional elections. And although they leaned heavily on Bowers and Ochs’ initial conception, King and Anderson’s definition of polarization and their methodology in analyzing it were significantly more detailed and nuanced. Because this work (like that of Bowers and Ochs) proved to be highly influential for later works on polarizing rhetoric, it is important to provide a detailed overview of their theories and analytical methodology.

King and Anderson defined polarization as “a rhetorical phenomenon,” as “the process by which an extremely diversified public is coalesced into two or more highly contrasting, mutually exclusive groups sharing a high degree of internal solidarity in those beliefs which the persuader considers salient.”155 This definition paralleled that of Bowers and Ochs and emphasized that speakers consciously seek to create a dichotomous division of public opinion. More explicitly, King and Anderson asserted that the two dichotomous social groups are (at least partially) created by the polarizing strategy, which seeks out preexisting differences in public opinion and intensifies them to such an extent that social division appears. This “intensification of real differences” occurs through the use of explicit communicative structures and strategies, and King and Anderson identified two “dimensions” of rhetorical polarization that these strategies seek to create:

On the one hand, [polarization] implies a powerful feeling of solidarity—strong group cohesiveness, unity, we feeling, human homogenization. On the other hand, polarization also presupposes the existence of a “common foe” which the group must oppose.156

Even though the concept of polarization is more often associated with a process of division, King and Anderson’s emphasize the idea of solidarity. This is important for a terminologically distinct definition of the polarization as a rhetorical phenomenon: while neighboring strategies such as polemics also seek to tear down and attack opponents, polarizing strategies simultaneously attempt to create an ideologically coherent in-group.157 Thus, “a rhetoric of polarization always encompasses two principle strategies: a strategy of affirmation and a strategy of subversion.”158 While the former uses imagery and language that will promote internal group solidarity and cohesion, the latter “is concerned with the careful selection of those images that will undermine the ethos of competing groups, ideologies, or institutions.”159 Importantly, King and Anderson assert that “both strategies are always present, in varying degrees, in all rhetorical situations which may be termed ‘polarized.’”160

The remainder of their essay is devoted to a case study illustrating the use of such strategies by the Nixon administration to create a polarized electorate during the years between the 1968 presidential election and the 1970 midterm elections. Describing and examining King and Anderson’s methodology provides insights that can be used to develop an approach to the tea party case study to come in Chapter 3. More specifically, King and Anderson describe both affirmative and marginalizing strategies, illustrate overarching frameworks addressed by members of the administration and Nixon himself, identify individual orators responsible for disseminating polarizing texts and ideas, and analyze specific rhetorical situations and the textual markers of polarizing communication associated with them.

The most common polarizing framework of the Nixon administration was the idea of the “Silent Majority” in American society of the late 1960s and early 1970s. As King and Anderson describe it, Nixon sought to establish a new group identity under which he could unify disparate elements of the electorate into one cohesive in-group. These people, generally skeptical of the tumultuous social changes taking place in American society at the end of the 1960s, came from a number of different backgrounds, and for the most part had no common political identity. Using a clear strategy of affirmation, Nixon often described such citizens as the “broad and vital center,” as “the good people,” “the decent people” who “pay their taxes,” and who were a part of “Middle America.” Nixon claimed that these people had become “the forgotten Americans,” in comparison to the vociferous critics of the Vietnam War or the flamboyant leading figures of the Cultural Revolution.161 Although no common political identity had yet existed to coalesce such voters into one bloc, Nixon was able to do just that by “providing them with a political image which they could perceive as being legitimate, coherent, and significant.”162 This gave disaffected individuals a “ready-made group identity,” and prompted “self-protective responses” that made the identity a reality.163

Although such language was consistently used by Nixon throughout his 1968 presidential campaign and after his election, King and Anderson identify a specific rhetorical situation in which Nixon first clearly branded this coalition the “Silent Majority.” Facing increased pressure from antiwar groups and ever growing public protests in late 1969, President Nixon gave a nationally televised speech on the Vietnam War in which he explicitly appealed to “the great silent majority of my fellow Americans,” to stand up against a “vocal minority” that sought to bring chaos to the streets of the country.164 The effects of the speech could be seen almost immediately: telephone polling directly after the speech showed a 77 percent approval rate, and the number of people who approved of Nixon’s presidency rose to a peak of over 68 percent soon after. More importantly for the analysis here is that “within a few weeks, large subgroups of the American population actively identified themselves as members of the ‘Silent Majority.’”165

Using a clear affirmative strategy, Nixon was able to create a sociopolitical identity that hadn’t existed before made up of individuals from a wide array of economic, social, and political backgrounds. And the Silent Majority became an identity that would have a powerful impact in American politics for years to come. This event illustrates the power of strategic communication to shape the world; as King and Anderson put it, “by defining the ‘Silent Majority’ as a real entity, he prompted modes of behavior that made […] his originally false depiction of the situation […] come true, at least in its consequences.”166

This specific situation also illustrates the way in which strategies of affirmation and marginalization work together to establish group identities, create solidarity within the chosen in-group, and provide the distinctions necessary for polarization of opinions to occur. At the same time that Nixon affirmed the identity of his positive in-group by “focus[ing] attention […] on the shared features” that defined them (“non-shouters, non-demonstrators, tax payers, respecters of law and order”), he also sought to subvert and group his diverse opponents into one “vocal minority.”167 The dichotomous and exaggerated image created by such depictions of both sides worked hand in hand to drive polarization in audiences.

The strategy of marginalization utilized by the Nixon administration was not limited to a single speech or a single orator. Indeed, the administration consistently sought to find simple and memorable signifiers under which to group those who opposed his policies and his politics. To put it in Bowers and Ochs’ terminology, the Nixon administration consistently used derogatory language to dehumanize and belittle opponents and sought to use flag individuals as scapegoats for the ills of the country. By depicting opponents as “external enemies,” as “the merchants of crime and corruption in American society,” and as “radical faculty […] poisoning the student mind against the validity of the system,” Nixon sought to undermine the ethos of his opponents. Those in Congress who opposed him were subject to similar defamation.168 King and Anderson point explicitly to the midterm campaign of 1970 as the point at which the Nixon administration found the ultimate signifier: the “Radical-Liberal.”

Interestingly, the orator who most bluntly deployed marginalizing strategies was not Nixon himself, but his Vice President, Spiro Agnew. As will be shown later, the use of surrogates to employ the marginalizing side of polarization is a tactic often used by orators to shield themselves from criticism that they are divisive or overly negative.169 As Agnew traveled the country, his descriptions grew more flamboyant and the number of individuals belonging to the “Radical-Liberal” camp continually increased. Agnew decried the “social permissivists,” the people “responsible for the erosion of decency,” and “those charging from the far left of the political spectrum.”170 He continually sought to link members of the Democratic Party with the most extreme elements of social unrest of the time; while he initially only accused one senator of being a “full-fledged Radical-Liberal,” the list soon expanded to at least ten others. Indeed, Agnew asserted that “this radicalism that infects our Congress and poisons our country is at best a bizarre mutation of Democratic liberalism,” declared at one campaign stop that electing the Republican would “help rescue the Democratic Party from the radical liberals,” and consistently claimed that the Democrats he opposed were “stimulating and encouraging these people.”171

Over time, however, Agnew’s excessive use of marginalization and provocative language tarnished his image and reduced his effectiveness as a surrogate for the administration. The damage done to Agnew’s political image due to his use of marginalizing rhetoric illustrates an important lesson when it comes to polarizing strategies, namely, that they can be extremely dangerous to a speaker’s ethos over time. Although King and Anderson did not dwell on this point, the dangers of polarizing rhetorical strategies for orators will be discussed in depth later in this chapter.

While King and Anderson claimed that Nixon’s administration did everything necessary to create polarization in the electorate, they also noted that the strategy had limited effectiveness when it came to winning elections. The 1970 midterm election ended largely in a stalemate, and many of the Democratic politicians designated as “Radical-Liberals” won easily. According to their analysis, Nixon’s strategy of affirmation was indeed a large success, with a significant portion of the American population self-identifying with the Silent Majority that he had called into existence.172 But his strategy of marginalization was less successful. King and Anderson provided little indication as to why this might have been the case, stating merely that the “images of liberal Democrats it sought to foster lacked a high degree of correspondence with the images already held by the electorate.”173 They concluded with a final assessment that “few will deny that polarization does exist; its effective utilization is quite another matter.”174

As mentioned previously, King and Anderson’s analysis has been highly influential in research on the rhetorical strategy of polarization, and many theoretical and methodological lessons can be drawn. From a theoretical perspective, their insight that polarization involves both divisive as well as solidarity-forming strategies is of critical importance. It is not enough to merely define a common enemy; a common positive identity must be created as well, and the interplay of assertion and marginalization creates the polarizing effect. In this sense, King and Anderson’s conception of polarization is as an effect of other, more basic rhetorical strategies. This distinction allows for a more detailed analysis of the strategy by breaking it into smaller units that can be clearly identified in communicative instances.

At the same time, King and Anderson are somewhat unclear as to the prerequisite audience conditions for successful polarization. On the one hand, they state that it intensifies “real differences that already divided Americans,” and that the orator seeking to polarize requires “a core of potentially sympathetic individuals” to be successful.175 This implies that the rhetorical act of polarization merely reinforces group memberships and self-identification of audience members, pushing people with existing attitudes, beliefs, and group identities into dichotomous camps. On the other hand, they also imply that Nixon created his positive in-group of the Silent Majority from thin air, and that “his use of the phrase generated the illusory consciousness of a common identity among many traditionally hostile groups.”176 This distinction touches on an important question for the concept of a rhetorical polarization: does the process create new identities, or does it merely solidify existing identities?

Another relevant aspect of King and Anderson’s work is the idea that polarizing rhetoric is something that can be organized among different individuals over the course of a political campaign. Although other works (to be discussed later) deal more explicitly with the use of polarizing strategies in political movements, the analysis of both Nixon and Agnew illustrates how multiple speakers can use the same issues, individuals, and textual structures in tandem to create the polarizing effect. As King and Anderson describe it, it seems that the overall strategy of the Nixon administration was to have the president himself engage in a strategy of affirmation and have the vice president engage in marginalization. Once Agnew’s image had become so tarnished as to make him ineffective, however, Nixon himself had to take part in marginalizing strategies as well. As will be shown later, this division of labor is an important element in the sustained efficacy of polarization over the course of persuasive campaigns.

Other important aspects touched on by King and Anderson are the elements of speaker motivation and the effectiveness of polarizing rhetoric at meeting real-world goals. Although they do not devote much space to either, they state that the motivation behind Nixon’s polarizing rhetoric was his lack of a solid constituency among American voters. Like Bowers and Ochs, they imply that the strategy is something of a last resort; that if Nixon had had other options, he would have avoided polarization altogether. The direct effects of Nixon’s rhetoric were the creation of a “new” in-group sociopolitical identity and the definition of a negative out-group that Nixon was opposed to. The fact that Nixon sought to mobilize his “Silent Majority” against “Radical-Liberals” is clear, but the mixed effectiveness of this strategy to meet his real-world electoral goals is interesting. King and Anderson imply that Nixon was successful in polarizing his audience, but that the strategy did not create the real-world consequences he sought. Determining the necessary conditions for a polarizing strategy to be successful is an important area of concern; without it, orators choosing to polarize will have no indication of whether the strategy can help them meet their real-world goals.

From a methodological perspective, King and Anderson offer a model with which further research on polarization can occur, and their analytical approach has been mirrored in later works. The first step involves identifying polarizing frameworks and flag issues used by the orator(s) in question. Second, their method involves analyzing concrete texts in which specific orators utilized strategies of affirmation and marginalization involving their chosen framework and target groups. In the case of Nixon in particular, King and Anderson pointed specifically to the speech in which he first clearly formulated his chosen label of the Silent Majority. Other concrete instances of communication by Agnew and Nixon were identified as well. Finally, their methodology sought out specific textual markers that indicated polarizing strategies of affirmation and marginalization. They identified both positive and negative labels, keywords, and verbal constructions used by Nixon and Agnew to generate either affirmation or marginalization in their audiences. In the end, their multi-pronged analysis allowed King and Anderson to establish when the strategy of polarization was implemented, which frameworks and issues were the focus of the strategy, and the concrete textual elements the speakers used to implement their strategy. Each of these elements will be relevant for the analysis of polarizing strategies in tea party rhetoric to come.

2.2.3 George C. Wallace’s Polarizing Rhetoric

In the years following King and Anderson’s analysis of the Nixon administration, the political rhetoric of the late 1960s and early 1970s remained a focus for communications scholars interested in the concept of polarization. Two works, from 1974 and 1976 respectively, dealt directly with the “rhetoric of polarization” found in the speeches of George C. Wallace, the bombastic Democratic Governor of Alabama.177 Wallace was famous for his confrontational, combative, and energetic speaking style, and was a “national figure of long standing” who “employed a message that remained essentially unchanged from 1964-1972.”178 Underwood and Kneupper, focusing explicitly on his third-party 1968 presidential campaign, also emphasized that he used “one ‘standard’ speech,” that was almost identical regardless of where he spoke.179 Because of his consistent use of the same message, imagery, and frameworks, Wallace was a perfect subject of research into the strategy and tactics of polarizing rhetoric.

The analyses of Wallace’s rhetorical strategies are particularly interesting for this work due to the clear parallels that can be drawn between the in-group he sought to create and that of the tea party, as well as the frames and issues that Wallace drew upon to polarize the American public. Indeed, in some respects, the rhetoric of the tea party movement can be seen as a direct descendent of the communicative strategies employed by Wallace and his campaign.180 As Raum and Measell describe, elements of Wallace’s campaign appearances were designed to emphasize frameworks of, “rabid patriotism, fundamental Protestant religion, and nostalgia,” all of which were also common themes in tea party rhetoric.181 For their part, Underwood and Kneupper discuss the “independent,” white, and grassroots nature of the majority of Wallace’s supporters and audiences, which were elements that came to define the base of the tea party movement.182

Despite their shared object of investigation and their similar ultimate conclusions, each of these scholarly pairs took different approaches to analyzing Wallace’s polarizing rhetoric. While Raum and Measell clearly focused on the strategic formulation of messages and non-message variables to heighten polarization within audiences, Underwood and Kneupper asserted that Wallace’s audiences were already highly polarized to begin with, and instead described how he used this polarized state to his advantage. It is important to emphasize here that both research pairs insisted that a state of opinion polarization was already present within the population and audiences to which Wallace spoke. While Raum and Measell praise King and Anderson’s prior conceptual framework on polarization, they explicitly criticize the “presumption that a speaker may create polarization where none existed.” Instead, they claim that it “would be more realistic if they assumed that degrees of polarization are already existent in certain rhetorical situations.”183 Underwood and Kneupper, focusing even more on the psychological state of Wallace’s audiences, wrote that Wallace “consistently attracted highly and diversely polarized auditors,” and that his speeches consisted of “a series of messages directed toward auditors holding polarized views.”184

If true, such assessments imply that polarizing rhetorical strategies cannot on their own create a polarization of attitudes in their audiences. Instead, they can at most, “effect modifications in those dispositions and presumptions which intensify polarization.”185 In practical terms, this would mean that an orator attempting to successfully employ a strategy of polarization should seek out preexisting polarized opinions and dispositions within their audience, and should seek to clarify and heighten the distinctions between the two groups. But this is a theoretical gap that can be bridged: while it may be the case that the attitudes present in an audience must have some preexisting diversity in order for polarization to be possible, Raum and Measell’s analysis of Wallace’s rhetoric makes it clear that they believe such opinions can be driven further apart by rhetorical techniques, and that in-group/out-group identification can be affected as well.186

Raum and Measell’s analysis of the polarizing message variables found in Wallace’s speeches provides significantly more detail regarding the specific textual markers found in polarizing communication. They break down the “style of the rhetoric of polarization” into distinct textual categories of “concrete description devices” and “copula tactics.” The former category includes “the use of god-and devil-terms, reductio ad absurdum, and exaggeration,” while the latter consists of “artificial dichotomies, we/they distinctions, monolithic opposition, motive disparagement, and self-assertion.”187 By illustrating each of these textual elements in Wallace’s speaking, Raum and Measell provide a methodological roadmap to the analysis of polarizing texts. According to their analysis, all three of these concrete descriptive devices served the same purpose:

Each of the three […] is designed to portray people and events in such vivid, forceful language that the auditor is forced to respond. He cannot maintain neutrality, for the verbal images created by the speaker provide only for feelings of absolute attraction or absolute repulsion.188

Thus, these textual structures serve to provoke a psychological response in audience members, triggering in-group/out-group sorting and reinforcing social grouping.

Because Raum and Measell assert that polarized attitudes cannot be created through rhetorical means, the implication is that the issues and terminology selected by the orator must align with attitudes and opinions already present in their audience. In a sense, the function of these textual elements is to highlight the differences already present and trigger a reaction. The use of “God- and devil-terms,” involves clearly labeling one opinion group in positive terms, while portraying those holding the opposite opinion in morally negative terms.189 In the case of George Wallace, terms such as, “law-abiding citizen” and the issue of “law and order” were key god-terms, while “anarchists,” “communists,” and “liberals” became negatively connoted devil-terms. Each of these labels “served to vivify the characteristics of opposition and to increase solidarity with concepts favored by Wallace’s audience.”190 The use of reductio ad absurdum and exaggeration served a similar purpose, consistently casting opponents in a ridiculous, cartoonish light and making their threat to Wallace’s version of America seem greater than it actually was. “Both […] serve to polarize the auditors’ responses to the people and events depicted by encouraging an extreme avoidance response.”191 These descriptive devices parallel the use of flag individuals and flag issues as well as the invention of derogatory language that had been detailed by Bowers and Ochs a few years earlier.

The copula tactics described by Raum and Measell are intended to place the labels and issues designated by concrete descriptive devices into a contrasting and competitive relationship. The most important and fundamental of these tactics “is the drawing of artificial dichotomies, for it is upon these that other tactics […] depend.” In drawing an artificial dichotomy, “the speaker openly states that only two alternatives can be chosen by the auditor […] it is the reduction of a many-faceted situation to two diametrically opposed alternatives that creates polarization.”192 The dichotomy is then directly associated with the two social groups implied by the god- and devil-terms, the positive of which becomes “we” and the negative of which “they.” This “we/they distinction both underscores the in-group vs. out-group dichotomy and promotes in-group solidarity.”193

In philosophical terms, the use of such tactics asserts the essential nature of a conflict between the morally just in-group and the morally corrupt out-group.194 The reinforcing tactic of presenting the opposition as monolithic dehumanizes members of the out-group and further undermines their moral standing. Regardless of the actual range of opinions held by various individuals, the polarizing speaker asserts that they all, without exception, have “despicable motives” against the in-group and society as a whole. Wallace, for instance, asserted, “that his opponents have no interest in the well-being of the people, but are frivolous and self-serving instead.”195 The final copula tactic found in polarizing communication involves offering oneself as the sole savior of the in-group. In doing so, the speaker emphasizes the primacy of his views, the “reality” of his depicted dichotomy and conflict, and “becomes the embodiment of the god-terms and the leader of the ‘we.’”196

Each of these elements combines to create a text that highlights differences already present in society or an audience, crystallizes these differences into two mutually exclusive and diametrically opposed groups, attaches positive and negative labels to each group, and exhorts (and psychologically manipulates) listeners to choose the speaker’s side over the “other.” In other words, Raum and Measell’s discussion of the textual structures associated with polarizing rhetoric illustrates the ways in which the strategies of assertion and marginalization described by King and Anderson (and the processes of isolation and confrontation described by Lanigan) can be translated into concrete texts.197

But simply creating a text with these polarizing elements is not enough to drive the process of polarization. The second part of Raum and Measell’s analysis is devoted to the “extra-message and non-message variables” that polarizing rhetoric depends on to be successful. In particular, they emphasize the importance of external stimuli to generate an emotional response in the audience based on frameworks of the speaker’s choosing. By combining both textual with para-textual elements, Wallace was able to create a “frenzied atmosphere” that “[bound] the hearers together,” and increased their receptivity to the polarizing text of his speech.

These situational factors were also the focus of Underwood and Kneupper’s work on Wallace’s rhetoric. Mirroring Raum and Measell’s assertion that rhetorical strategies (merely) serve to emphasize preexisting polarization, Underwood and Kneupper note that Wallace’s audiences were already highly polarized before attending his campaign rallies: “The rhetorical situation […] attracted diversely polarized auditors […] Wallace’s campaign speaking [was] a series of messages directed toward auditors holding polarized views.”198 In effect, Underwood and Kneupper claim that Wallace responded to the preexisting psychological makeup of his audiences, and did so in a way that emphasized the strength and righteousness of those who supported him. Describing his audiences as primarily made up of “closed-positive” and “closed-negative” individuals, they make it clear that the vast majority of those who showed up to a Wallace political rally were no longer open to persuasion.

This point is critical because it speaks to the non-persuasive nature of polarizing strategies. Instead, “Wallace’s standard speech […] was designed to achieve maximum acceptability through expression of the sentiments of a large segment of the population. This segment […] may be characterized as ‘closed-positive’ auditors who tended to strongly accept Wallace’s statements because of his source credibility.”199 In a sense, Wallace was preaching to the already converted, and geared his speeches to emphasize their preexisting beliefs and biases. Others in his audiences were closed-negative, and “tended to reject statements because of the low credibility they associated to the source.” A third group of listeners, “frequently the smallest in number, consisted of ‘open’ neutral or slightly biased (frequently negatively-biased) observers.”200

Thus, Wallace’s audiences based their assessment of his statements and speech largely according to their preexisting notions of his credibility and image as a speaker. By emphasizing the importance of speaker ethos prior to the rhetorical situation, Underwood and Kneupper minimize the importance of what the polarizing speaker actually says; audience members will accept or reject it based on their already held beliefs about the speaker. In fact, Underwood and Kneupper seem to deny Wallace the agency to change the opinions of his audience members at all: because the majority of his listeners were closed-minded, Wallace was reduced to rallying his own supporters as opposed to speaking persuasively. This conception aligns well with Bowers and Ochs’ idea of polarization as a rhetorical last resort. 201 But is also implies that Wallace had no choice but to utilize polarizing strategies.

What Underwood and Kneupper do not offer, however, is any analysis of why Wallace’s audiences were already so strongly polarized. By the 1968 presidential campaign, Wallace had already had a long political career, and his ethos as a political and as a public speaker had already been established. This explains why his audiences knew what to expect and likely explains why most were already so closed-minded. It is possible that prior to 1968, Wallace had already attempted other persuasive rhetorical methods and had failed to garner the public support using less destructive strategies. In light of Raum and Measell’s assertion that he employed “a message that remained essentially unchanged from 1964-1972,” however, it seems more likely that Wallace had long ago chosen to employ polarizing tactics in his speeches, and that through his consistent use of polarizing textual structures, his ethos had become associated with the rhetoric of polarization. To put it more bluntly, Wallace’s audiences were likely already polarized because he had already polarized them at some prior time with his rhetorical actions.

For the purposes of this work and the analysis to come, individuals whose ethos has become directly associated with the process of polarization in the minds of the public (or their situative audiences) will be called polarizing figures.202 While a detailed discussion of this concept will be saved for later, the case of Wallace introduces this important aspect of polarizing strategies. Like Wallace by 1968, polarizing figures have become so associated with the strategy that any given audience is likely to already be divided into closed-positive and closed-negative individuals, their opinions formed by the mere force of the speaker’s ethos. This speaks clearly to the dangers of utilizing polarizing rhetorical techniques; if an orator becomes associated with the process of polarization, it may become difficult to attract persuadable audiences or even to get a fair hearing of their ideas by listeners in the future. In Wallace’s case, “through speaking in terms acceptable to the closed-positive and barely open auditor, he also limited his candidacy as acceptable only to those auditors.”203

Still, despite the clearly polarized distribution of audience member opinions, Wallace could have chosen a different rhetorical route in his 1968 presidential campaign. He could have sought to persuade the few persuadable individuals in his audiences through thoughtful and even-keeled speeches. This change in tone would have undermined his established image as a firebrand and a “demagogue,” a move that might have even jolted some closed-negative individuals into reassessing their prior evaluations of his ethos.204 Instead, Wallace made a conscious choice to exacerbate the polarized views of his audiences.

In addition to clearly employing the range of textual and argumentative structures described by Raum and Measell, Wallace also utilized situational tactics to emphasize the in-group vs. out-group dynamic at his rallies. By directly confronting hecklers and protesters who spoke out at his speeches, he heightened their isolation from his chosen in-group. As Raum and Measell put it, “the presence of hecklers at Wallace rallies provided ample opportunity to dramatize the distinctions between the in-group and the out-group and Wallace frequently took advantage of such moments.”205 Indeed, as Underwood and Kneupper note:

Not only did he handle these protests effectively, he thrived on them. Vocal heckling was used to raise the anger of his followers and demonstrate to all who would listen the problems of America […] Utilizing hecklers for “demonstration by example” became an integral part of the campaign speech […] adding immediacy to build an emotional intensity of his message.206

The Wallace campaign even purposefully allowed a few demonstrators into each rally at key moments, giving the candidate an opportunity to plan for protesters and integrate them into his polarizing strategy.

This confrontational tactic strongly reinforced in-group and out-group social polarization in Wallace’s audiences. On the one hand, it directly reinforced the out-group’s status in a negatively marginalizing way; disruptive hecklers and demonstrators became illustrative examples, and his often sarcastic and patronizing tone undermined their image with others in the audience.207 Perhaps more importantly, this tactic allowed Wallace “to effectively use the group which remained closed-negative as a means of reinforcing closed-positive auditors.”208 In other words, Wallace was able to generate solidarity and group cohesion among his supporters by directly confronting the “enemy” among them. The manipulation of situational factors to emphasize group identification, heighten the emotional impact of words, and convey specific in-group frameworks served to make polarizing textual structures more effective.209

Taken as a whole, the research on George Wallace presented here is highly relevant to the theoretical work of this chapter. Raum and Measell’s description of textual markers is extremely useful and (along with Underwood and Kneupper) their perspectives on situational control, audience psychology, and the need for preexisting social division indicate important contextual factors that must be accounted for in the development of a comprehensive theory of rhetorical polarization. Finally, the study of George C. Wallace is particularly interesting as a comparative object to the case study on the tea party network to come, as many of the polarizing frameworks, textual markers, and situational factors parallel the more modern movement.

2.2.4George H.W. Bush and the Politics of Division

After the 1970s, theoretical and definitional research on polarizing rhetoric largely took a back seat to the practical application of existing models to real-world political communication. Presidential rhetoric, and the rhetorical strategies used by established political figures, remained a particular focus of analysis. Although they did not always use the explicit term of polarization, over the following 25 years, researchers analyzed rhetoric used by presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush, and determined that each polarized their audiences and the American public to varying degrees.210 As a whole, scholars largely followed the methods and models set out by their predecessors: they analyzed specific speeches for polarizing textual structures, identified flag issues and individuals functionalized by each president, provided insight into orator psychology in using such divisive rhetoric, and described the effects of polarizing communication on the attitudes and actions of the American public and government.