6

Concept of Sovereignty Challenged

Critics of Sovereignty

The concept of sovereignty relates specifically to the concept of the State and may lose its essence without it. The state can be seen as an overarching political organization over a territorially demarcated political community. By virtue of this, the State gets a dominant position and tends to regulate various aspects of society, and other associations and organizations of political, social, economic and cultural nature. Understanding the position of the State in this way gets its reflection in understanding sovereignty in a particular way. Identifying sovereignty in terms of its characteristics like absoluteness or illimitability, universal or all-comprehensiveness, indivisibility, inalienability and permanence or perpetuity gives birth to the monist concept of sovereignty, which is based on legal supremacy of the sovereign. This is found in the writings of Bodin, Hobbes and Austin and to some extent, in Bentham. Rousseau's concept of the General Will and popular sovereignty discussed in Chapter 5 can also be considered as contributing to the traditional concept of sovereignty in terms of its characteristics of absoluteness or illimitability, universal or all-comprehensiveness, indivisibility, inalienability and permanence or perpetuity.

Classical formulation in terms of the momst theory of sovereignty has been severely criticized. These critiques are an attack on the concept of sovereignty from different perspectives and dimensions and almost find refutation of the features enumerated previously. These broadly include: (i) denial of possibility of overarching sovereignty to the State in relations to other groups and to protect the rights of individual self development, (ii) the theory of limited sovereignty, and (iii) the denial of any sovereignty to the State. Some are directed as criticism of sovereignty and some as rejection of the State and its sovereignty. These various shades can be identified as follows:

• Pluralist critique
• Guild Socialist critique
• Syndicalist critique
• Anarchist critique
• Modern Individualist critique
• Marxist critique

In addition to these critiques, we have hosts of contemporary challenges the traditional concept of sovereignty faces. These emerge from the factors and processes like:

• Neo-colonialism
• Supra-national/actors and regional organizations
• International concerns like environmental issues, human rights, terrorism, nuclear issue, problem of refugees and migration
• Globalization
• Internal strife and external intervention

Political Pluralism and Pluralist Critiques of Sovereignty

A Brief Introduction to Political Pluralism

The term ‘pluralism’ is often used in many senses like philosophical, ethical, cultural and political. However, for our purpose we are concerned only with ‘political pluralism’ in this chapter. Political pluralism has been viewed as a doctrine, which asserts that certain groups in society (e.g., church, family, professional associations, labour unions, local governments, etc.) embody important social values prior to and independent of their authorization or approval by the State. It sees social life in terms of groups and as such group autonomy, historical priority of associations and organizations in society and plurality of authority vis-à-vis the State is emphasized. K. C. Hsiao in his book Political Pluralism has sought to define a pluralistic state by contrasting it with a monistic state. A monistic state is ‘one which possesses, or which should possess, a single source of authority that is theoretically comprehensive and unlimited in its exercise.’ By contrast, a pluralistic state is ‘one in which there exists no single authority that is all competent and comprehensive, no unified system of law, no centralized organ of administration, no generation of political will.’¹ Broadly, political pluralism is characterized by the following elements:

• Denial of the State as the sole source of law and law as command of the sovereign and positing social and historical sources as competing factors as sources of law.
• Denial of legally unlimited sovereignty to the State and positing state sovereignty in the context of society and along with group autonomy.
• Viewing the State as an association along with other associations and groups, though giving prominence to the state at times.
• Denial of all encompassing allegiance of individuals to the State and positing individuals as having variety of interests and allegiances to a variety of interests groups in society, state being one of them.
• Viewing the State not in terms of ‘sovereignty and power’ but authority and also ‘purpose it serves’ and limiting its authority as per the purpose it serves.
• Viewing sovereignty as irrelevant in the wake of political federalism and decentralization as contemporary necessities.
• Limiting external sovereignty by an effective international law and internationalism.

Sovereignty, Power and Authority

Political pluralism often invokes the dynamics of power and authority in its critiques of monist theory of sovereignty. Legally, sovereignty has been accepted as bestowing the supreme law-making power to the State. However, whether by virtue of this legal supremacy, sovereignty also subsumes supreme political power or authority. If yes, then what are its manifestations? Where is legitimacy of sovereignty drawn from?

If we look at the definitions of sovereignty given by Jean Bodin (sovereignty as supreme power), Hugo Grotius (sovereignty as supreme political power), Thomas Hobbes (all powerful commonwealth with surrender of all natural rights by individuals), John Austin (determinate human superior with power to command) and some of the other commentators like Sir William Blackstone (sovereignty as supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority), Sir F. Pollock (sovereignty as that power which is neither temporary nor delegated), J. W. Burgess (Sovereignty as original, absolute and unlimited power), and others, all have identified power or authority with sovereignty. As such, sovereignty is identified as power or authority of the State over individuals and other groups. Here power is understood in terms of coercive means available to the State due to sovereignty. On the other hand, in a liberal framework authority would depend on legitimacy of state policies and actions. As such, legitimate power, i.e., authority and not power alone is required to sustain sovereignty. For advocates of traditional concept of sovereignty, legitimacy inheres in sovereignty itself. For Hobbes, for example, all powers of the sovereign are legitimate as they are derived from the individuals surrendering their natural rights, which is in the best interests of all. For Austin, a determinate human superior receiving habitual obedience from the bulk of society means that the sovereign can put compulsion on the members of the society if this habitual obedience is not available. We can infer that sovereignty is understood as a self-contained theory of power. In contrast, however, a liberal view would maintain that claim of sovereignty is due to its authority and not naked power. We will see how the pluralist view takes up the concept of authority to challenge the concept of sovereignty and also to argue for dispersal of power amongst different groups.

However, pluralists like Laski who prefer the term authority to sovereignty as characteristics of the State, hold that authority would emerge due to consent and a decentralized decision-making process and not due to the command of a single individual. Further, allegiance to the State is in proportion to the public service it provides. Similarly, for MacIver sovereignty should not be understood in terms of power. This is because ‘will’ on the part of citizens to obey law and not the coercive power of the State is the root of obedience. Further, as sovereignty is limited in proportion to the service to society, then legitimacy would be dependent on service provided. Thus, both Laski and MacIver seek to understand the State and its authority in terms of legitimacy of its purpose and nature of authority and not sovereignty as power.

It is generally observed that the State enjoys regulatory and coercive power and also receives willing compliance from the people. Out of the four elements of the State, it is not difficult to locate which element enables the State such a position. Sovereignty provides a general framework, which gives willing compliance from the constituents to the actions and orders of the State. However, we have a dilemma here. What means does the State have to express its sovereign power? If this means is government, then the actual operation and expression of sovereignty will be dependent on the legitimacy and nature of the government the State has. As such, though sovereignty inheres in all its absoluteness in the State as an institution, its actual expression may vary over a period of time in the State. This could be due to the changing nature and scope of government that exists. The discussion in Chapter 5 relating to political versus legal sovereignty and de jure versus de facto sovereignty gives us some clue as to how actual expression of sovereignty in its legal sense gets restricted. For example, if sovereignty is an immutable and a constant attribute of the State, the German state under Adolph Hitler or Italian State under Benito Mussolini and the two under Gerhard Schroeder and Berlussconi, respectively would not have been different. But we know how the policies, actions and practices followed by the government changes the expression of sovereignty of the state. In fact, political power and legitimacy enjoyed by the government becomes the basis for expression of sovereignty of the state. Political power may be understood in terms of ‘institutionalized power of the state and government—power to make laws and policies, to implement and secure obedience to these and to maintain law and order and justice in society.’² And these, to a large extent, dependent on how government behaves.

There is this realization that sovereignty basically is expressed in the policies, actions and practices of a particular government and that its legitimacy and authority is inseparable from that of the government's actions, policies and practices. This has attracted pluralists like Laski to question the absolute power attributed to sovereignty. For him, sovereignty's claim to preeminence always means sovereignty of a government. And governments consisting of fallible men, cannot claim to have unlimited authority in the name of sovereignty.

In brief, we may say that for Bodin, Hobbes and Austin sovereignty is a coercive or commanding power and its legitimacy and authority is self-emanating, that is, it lies in the source itself. For pluralists, authority is limited by its purpose and hence sovereignty can neither be automatic nor comprehensive. In a Marxian sense, sovereignty or any power in a class divided society is a class power and is used to maintain a class divided society and capitalist mode of production. Mao's famous statement that power flows from the barrel of the gun exemplifies naked and coercive power. Neo-Marxists like Antonio Gramsci has sought to capture the façade of legitimacy and authority in a class divided society through his concept of hegemony about which we will discuss later.

Possible Reasons for Emergence of Doctrine of Political Pluralism

The monist theory of sovereignty (of Bodin, Hobbes and Austin) is characterized by legal supremacy and absoluteness. Rousseau's concept of General Will also adds to its absoluteness and comprehensiveness. According to monists, ‘the State exists to enact and apply law and that the State can not itself be subjected to limitations of the same character as those which it itself established to formulate and apply.’³ Understood as such, sovereignty as an integral element of the State bestows unlimited power to the State. As being the single source of law within any given territory, it is considered as superior to all other social groups. In fact, this leads to attributing to an overarching juristic personality to the state. Up to the nineteenth century, the doctrine of legally unlimited sovereignty was generally accepted.

On the other hand, philosophical formulation of omnipotence of the State in organic-idealist terms had also emerged. In the hands of thinkers like Hegel, Bluntschli, Bosanquet and Bradley, the State has been designated as ‘march of God on earth’ or at least organic personality leading to ‘doctrine of state absolutism, which attributes to the state not only legal supremacy and social and moral utility but also moral supremacy.’⁴ In such a formulation, the State is projected as the only agency for moral development and capable of embracing all social interests. Critics have pointed out that the monist theory of sovereignty and the organic-idealist concept of the State combine to produce a spectre of omnipotent state. In fact, many pluralists identified the Hegelian theory of the State as an example of a monistic State.⁵

This, in turn, leads to reaction from pluralist critics in the form of attributing real personality and juristic personality to various associations and organizations also found in society. Analytical school of jurisprudence and positive law that supported the monist and legal theory of sovereignty came under attack by the sociological school of jurisprudence, which questions the legal sovereignty as the sole source of law and gives primacy to various historical and social factors.

Besides, we should not forget developments in the field of industrial economy, political arrangements and international law while attributing reasons for emergence of pluralist critique. Firstly, industrial economy has given birth to diverse economic interests and groups. By the second half of the nineteenth century, a variety of interests—labour, economic, professional, guilds and other interest groups had emerged which demanded rights and power against the state. Added to this were social, religious and cultural interests that sought freedom and autonomy for their respective fields. This position has been beautifully captured by Professor Laski when he says, ‘the individual is not merely a member of the State. In the society of which he is a part, there are innumerable interests-units to which he may belong. He is a member of a church, an ardent trade-unionist, a keen freemason, a zealous supporter of a movement for compulsory vaccination, a pacifist to whom a conscientious objection to military service is the central principle of life. He is, so to say, intrinsically connected with associations seeking to promote each of these interests.’⁶

Secondly, political federalism has emerged as a means of sharing political power and lawmaking spheres at different levels of government. For example, USA's federal arrangement has given credence to formulation of federal power sharing.

Thirdly, the early twentieth century saw the First World War and hence realization of need for international law and limit on sovereignty. The doctrine of external sovereignty could be associated with war, which involves loss of human life. Pluralist critique of sovereignty more or less coincided with these developments in the international arena. Need for international law for the purpose of regulating behaviour of and relations amongst the states have been insisted. Emergence of international organizations like the League of Nations was somewhat a reflection of gathering momentum of internationalism, what Laski calls ‘international interdependence’ as against the old principle of sovereignty of a state.⁷ We can say that pluralist concept of authority which got prominence in the late nineteenth and first half of twentieth century emerged as a result of above factors.

Features of Political Pluralism and Its Underlying Principles

Doctrine of real or juristic/corporate personality of groups

Otto Van Gierke, a German jurist and F. W. Maitland, an English legal historian, are considered to have given a theoretical basis of political pluralism in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. We may call it Gierke-Maitland thesis, which enunciates the doctrine of real/juristic personality of groups/corporations. The underlying principle of this thesis is that groups and corporations have both a real and juristic personality. They are considered to be real as they have a consciousness and will of their own as distinct from those of their individual members. Groups grow naturally based on the permanent end or purpose pursued by a set of individuals like family-familial affiliation, church-religious expression, trade union-economic interest etc. Based on these naturally grown expressions, groups should be considered as real. They are real in the sense of their independent existence, pursuing naturally grown ends or purposes irrespective of sanction from the State. Secondly, though some of these groups like family, church or some cultural groups may be unincorporated in legal or statutory sense, they are juristic because they have legal rights and responsibilities as a corporate personality. In India, for the purpose of taxation, we have a category of Hindu Undivided Family (HUF). As such for the purpose of taxation law, HUF has corporate or juristic responsibilities.

The word personality derives from the Latin term persona, which refers to the mask worn by an actor’ and latter identified with both the actor and the role-played. In legal sense, ‘person’ refers to individual or body of individuals (a living human being or a group) either or both having legal rights and responsibilities.⁸ As such, it implies juristic personality of the groups, corporations and associations. This for pluralists helps in positing their juristic personality against that of the State. However, the concept of personality is not real in the biological sense. It is real in the sense of not being fictitious or hypothetical or created from without.

Some pluralists, like Barker recognized at least three senses in which the concept of ‘person’ could be applied. These are: (i) psychological sense—groups have power of self-consciousness, (ii) ethical sense—groups have self-consciousness and are self-determining according to certain principles, and (iii) legal sense—groups have ‘power or capacity for legal action and possess certain rights and duties’.⁹ Barker tends to accept only the legal/juristic sense of personality and does not feel comfortable with the psychological and ethical sense of it. Nevertheless, in general, the pluralists treat groups as entities with will and purpose of their own, neither subject to the sanction of the state nor subsumed with that of the State. For them, this provides the basis for: (i) treating groups as juristic persons with their right and duties, (ii) advocating group autonomy as a means to limit sovereignty of the State, (iii) insisting that individuals have deeper loyalties to particular groups and associations than to the State given the depth and immediacy of purpose and ends of these groups and associations, and (iv) envisaging limited political obligation to the State on the part individual.

J. N. Figgis applied the doctrine of real personality in relation to the church. He says the church does not exist by an act of grace on the part of the state but has ‘powers of self-development like a person’. Accordingly, the corporate personality of the church is neither granted nor withheld by the state but has simply to be recognized. Its rights, duties and functions, privileges and obligations are independent of state sanction.

We can contrast the concept of group personality advocated by pluralist with that of Hobbes who unequivocally declared groups as ‘worms in the entrails’ of the body politic and that they must not be allowed independent autonomous characters. For the traditional concept of sovereignty, groups would be treated as artificial entities whose existence is seen as a concession from the sovereign.

It would not be out of place to mention three writers who, though in different contexts, have touched upon the subject of the role of associations and groups in society and state. In certain ways, these writers have given credence to the theoretical basis of pluralism by giving prominence to groups and associations though they did not invoke the doctrine of real personality of associations and groups.

Emile Durkheim, a French sociologist (The Division of Labour in Society, 1893) felt that economic diversification and specialized division of labour in industrial society might result in a situation of normlessness, what Durkheim calls anomie (in the sense of weak social and moral control on individual behaviour). Division of labour means specialization in works based on individual differences and not on similarities. As a possible solution to anomie, he suggested that economic activities should be subject to moral regulation of occupational associations. Durkheim was largely influenced by professional and occupational associations like of doctors and lawyers. As such, he gave an important role to these associations and argued for the restoration of occupational associations as a definitely recognized public institution. However, he sought to maintain a balance between the State and occupational associations. ‘In their (occupation associations) absence, the State may assume despotic power and, conversely, without some form of state regulation, each association may assume despotic control over its members.’¹⁰ We see how Durkheim places associations between the individuals and the State and moderates states’ role in the economic life of individuals by presence of associations. We find echo of this in the formulation of Ernest Barker also.

Like Durkheim in the late ninteenth century, M. J. Paul Boncour at the beginning of the twentieth century (The Economic Federalism, 1901) also found the inevitability of professional and economic associations in society. According to Coker, Boncour argued that these associations emerged spontaneously as voluntary associations and gradually develop into associations with obligatory character where relations between members and these associations became relations of a sovereign character.¹¹ We can find examples of this view in present day Bar Associations (lawyers being regulated and controlled), Medical Council (doctors being regulated and controlled under certain oath) etc.

Arthur F. Bentley (The Process of Government) provided a theoretical ground of group approach to politics, which maintains that society consists of various interest groups each pursuing specific common interests. This provides the ‘functional basis of government’ where politics is understood in terms of group conflict and the government playing the balancing act. In the 1950, David Truman (The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion) furthered the thesis and located the political process in the interest and conflict of various groups.¹² Robert Dahl's theory of polyarchy was an extension of this argument.

Political pluralism views the State in relation to society in sociological terms and not merely in legalistic terms. The pluralist character of the social set-up and political process is marshalled to bring upon the argument that the State cannot and should not claim legal or moral right to be an overarching institution either in relation to groups and associations or individuals. Multiplicity of associations and groups in society have their own interests and prior claims on individuals. Individuals could be members of various groups and associations and their affiliation to them should not be subject to either sanction or approval by the State. In fact, the State is viewed as one of these associations and groups competing for individual's affiliation. The State is not the only association that fulfils or will fulfil all the requirements of an individual. There are different interests involving political, economic, cultural, religious, emotional, educational, artistic and scientific aspects that require an individual's association or affiliation with various groups and associations. Political pluralism puts forward doctrine of pluralistic nature of society in order to limit the claim of overarching sovereignty of the state.

Society not the state as the source of law

Sociological jurists like Léon Duguit (France) and Hugo Krabbe (Holland) have put forward the doctrine of law not emanating from the sovereign but has location in society. This denies sovereign being the source of law, let alone the sole source of law. As such, the State is neither a creator of law nor beyond it. Duguit, for example, opposes the theory that law is a command of an absolute and unlimited sovereign and says that laws are the conditions of social solidarity. As such, law is independent of, and is superior and anterior to political organization. Law for him is objective not because of its source and its emanating from a definite human superior but because of the ends it serve—social solidarity. Laws being necessary for the attainment of social solidarity and interdependence of man are obeyed, as they are a formal expression of social rules. Thus, the state or the sovereign neither creates nor limits laws.

Similarly, Krabbe also maintains that law is independent of, and above the State in its origin. For Krabbe, unlike Duguit however, law is the outcome of men’s sense of right and is independent of the state. The authority of the State is nothing but the authority of law defined as such. Krabbe recognizes the sovereignty of law but assigns it a different location and source.

Characteristic of the State: Not power or sovereignty but the purpose or end it serves

Political pluralism views the State not in terms of power or sovereignty but essentially in terms of purpose and the end it serves or should serve according to R. M. MacIver, Leon Duguit and Hugo Krabbe. According to MacIver, service is the end of the state and power is its means. Since the service of the state is not unlimited (since other associations and groups render numerous services) its power or sovereignty cannot be unlimited too. Accordingly, concept of unlimited sovereignty is ‘dangerously false’. For Duguit, as we have seen above, objectivity of law is because of the end it serves. He considers the modern state primarily as a social service state. For him, public service rather than sovereignty is the essential characteristic of the State where the State does not command but serves. For Krabbe also, power is not the essential feature of the State as state being a legal community performs no function except to impute legal value to certain interests. Political pluralism, thus, instead of endorsing or taking for granted the claim of sovereignty by the State, requires that the State must justify its claim to authority. This claim of authority has to be in proportion to the service it renders. Automatic assumption of sovereignty as an essential element of the State is thereby brought into question by political pluralism.

State as coordinator of interests in society

Despite putting limitations on sovereignty, pluralists assign the State the role of a thereby required to serve the purpose of securing common interest by taking cognizance of interests of all the groups and associations. In the process of public service or social service, the State assumes the role of a coordinator and facilitator of common interest. In this role, the State has been variously designated as ‘association of associations’ (Barker) or ‘organization of organizations’ (Lindsay) or ‘societies of societies’ (Figgis). These formulations give the State a role of coordination and regulation in society.

Ernest Barker does not accept the concept of real personality of groups in the sense of will and consciousness of their own. However, he admits the juristic claim and claim of priority of associations and groups vis-à-vis the state. He has captured the nature of the coordinating and adjusting role of the state when he says that ‘The state as a general and embracing scheme of life, must necessarily adjust the relations of associations to itself, to other associations and to their own members.’¹³ We can compare how Durkheim, as mentioned above, shared Barker's concern for coordination amongst associations by the state.

Lindsay differentiates the State from other organizations by its compulsive and comprehensive membership as contrasted to the voluntary and selective membership of other organizations, and by its coercive functions. He conceded control by the State over corporations within it, provided citizens are prepared to give the state such powers.¹⁴ However, for Lindsay these attributes by no means constitute a character that can be designated as sovereignty.

Similarly, Dr Figgis regarded the State as the communitas communitatum (society of societies) and assigned to it a distinctive function and a superior authority as an agency of coordination and adjustment’. And this was required as ‘each of these groups must by the state be restrained from acts of injustice towards one another and towards others; and it is largely to regulate and to ensure that they do not out-step the bounds of justice that the coercive power of the state exists.’¹⁵

Mary Parker Follett, an American, who also subscribes to political pluralism, in fact, presents a somewhat divergent pluralistic tendency when she says that ‘the home of my soul is in the state.’ She looks upon the state as a unifying agency and not merely a coordinating agency whereby the State acts upon the individuals not only through various groups but also directly. She echoes an unpluralistic chord when she says, ‘no group can enfold me because of my multiple nature … nor number of groups can enfold me.’¹⁶

Thus, we can see how pluralism, despite its commitment to a pluralistic society, remains within the framework of priority of the State. Coker sums up the dilemma of the pluralists so far their dream of non-sovereign state is concerned when he says that ‘pluralists have not made it clear how they would conserve the beneficent services rendered by the State without permitting it to exercise sovereignty—implying a normally compulsive and comprehensive membership with the exclusive authority to apply law.’¹⁷ Even an ardent advocate of political pluralism, Laski admits that ‘legally no one can deny that there exists in every State some organ whose authority is unlimited.’ We see that political pluralism, as a whole, does not reject the idea of the State altogether. At most, they reduce it to a level of any other association in society but reluctantly end up giving primacy to the State. In most of the cases, priority is given to the State and theory of the State is reformulated to fit in the ideas on groups.

Prominence to political federalism and decentralization of authority

As a logical fallout of their argument for existence of multiple interests in society, pluralist thinkers advocate decentralization of authority. Developments in the field of political federalism add yet another dimension in the pluralistic arguments for federal nature of authority. Writers like Sidney and Beatrice Webb, G. D. H. Cole and H. J. Laski have argued for federal and decentralized authority both in economic and political terms.

Cole who is associated with the Guild Socialist theory has advocated functional democracy. This implies that political representation or power and responsibility in society should be related and in proportion to the importance of the functions, which individuals perform in the service of the community.¹⁸ Though guild socialism primarily applies to industrial relations, Cole stressed that legislative power must be divided between several bodies or ‘parliaments’. This is meant to make, as Hsiao opines, the legislative function as a constitutional instrument, a system of balance of powers between many independent functions or organized interests so that every one of them should be supreme in its own sphere. A further exposition of this thesis is found in the writings of the Webbs (A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain) who envisage representation in two forms—political and social. ‘Social Parliament’ is envisaged to represent individuals as members in a social democracy and ‘Political Parliament’ to represent them in capacity of citizens in a political democracy. Though they sound impractical, these formulations nevertheless bring to fore the need for functional representation and diversification of authority in society.

Laski has been one of the clearest advocates of federal authority. Laski's federalist conception of society applies both to economic as well as political spheres. He advocates a concept of society in which authority is not hierarchical (emanating from a single sovereign) but co-ordinate (equal and co-existing). His pluralism manifests in three dimensions—industrial federalism, administrative decentralization and political federalism. Laski suggests autonomy for trade unions as part of general defence of corporate rights of all associations and groups. Here Laski suggests division of power upon the basis of functions. As a corollary of his general disdain for accumulation of power in the hands of the State, Laski recommends administrative decentralization, which he posits as a counter to monistic and hierarchical structure of power. His conception of federal authority also gets support from the emergence of federal politics as response to need for accommodating diversity in society. For example, generally, though not without exception, Indian federal structure at present presents a response to accommodate linguistic and cultural identities in the form of provinces. Further, the Indian Constitution presents a three-tiered federalism, which includes unions, states and local bodies, all three with constitutionally demarcated authority. As centralization is viewed as supportive of unlimited sovereignty, political federalism is considered as a necessary ally towards political pluralism.

Pluralists treated federal organization of state as an important ally of their argument for federalization of authority. As federalism represents a theory of constitutional organization, which is seen as a counterpoise to a unified state, pluralists see this as an important stage towards establishment of a pluralist state. Moreover, the example of a federally organized state is cited as a difficulty in locating the sovereign in the Austinian sense.

Despite the optimism reposed by the pluralist in federal set-up, it can be easily argued that in practice we do not see any sign of federal states like USA or India moving to be a pluralist state. Further, federalism can be best understood as a governmental arrangement and not as division of sovereignty. After all, the authority of all the federal levels flow from the same source—the constitution or a written code. As such, the locational problem of sovereignty should not mislead us in treating federalism as a theory of anti-monism. Hsiao, in fact, alludes to this when he says ‘federalism and monism are not incompatible terms’. If we do not confuse government with sovereignty, this mistake can be avoided.

International law and internationalism limits sovereignty

Pluralists maintain that as far as international law is concerned, state is not legally unlimited in its external relations to other states. Further, internationalism and international organizations having allegiance reaching beyond the limits of the State are also discernable.

Hugo Krabbe (The Modern Idea of the State) tends to extend his idea ot law as outcome of the sense of right into the arena of international relations. To the extent this principle extends to international arena, legal activities of the existing state should contract. He believes that eventually a super-national state will come about and present states will become provinces of that super-national state. However, till such a position is reached, he ruefully concedes that the ‘international community must pass through the phase of the idea of sovereignty’.

Laski, who is considered to be an ardent advocate of internationalism, finds trends towards internationalism and allegiance, which reach beyond the limits of the State. He says, ‘internationally, it is not difficult to conceive the organization of an allegiance which reaches beyond the limits of the State.’¹⁹ He, in fact, envisages an authority predominant over states, which is entrusted the regulation of affairs of more than national interest. This means abolition of state sovereignty on the international side. For Laski, the concept of external sovereignty is a major cause of war. As internationalism increases, cause of war decreases.

Norman Angell, considered as modern individualist, also provides some theoretical basis of allegiance beyond national and geographical boundaries. His contention is that ‘men are united by a community of feeling based on economic interests which not only runs counter to but frequently transcends national and geographical boundaries.’ This, men do because ‘it pays men better to think and feel as members of the universal, economic society whose attribute is peace, than to think and feel as members of limited political societies whose attribute is war.’²⁰ Angell regards the State as merely a ‘piece of administrative mechanism’ which can be ‘superseded and transferred to the evolutionary scrap heap as soon as machinery better calculated to advance men's interests has been devised.’ He would like a national state merged in an international order of society based on an economic basis.

From above, it seems that the pluralists tend to marshal historical and evolutionary factors (family, church etc. as associations), social factor (origin of law), juristic factor (personality), political and administrative factors (federalism, decentralization) and international factors (internationalism, international law) to build a framework of pluralist attack on the monist theory of sovereignty.

Basis of pluralism

From our survey of the underlying principles of political pluralism, we can identify various basis on which the pluralists have attacked and criticized the theory of sovereignty in general and the monist theory of sovereignty in particular. These include historical, social, economic, legal, political, philosophical and international bases.²¹

Historical basis: Pluralism finds a parallel in the medieval political set-up and economic relations. In the chapter on origin of the State we have seen how suzerainty characterized medieval feudal Europe. Power was decentralized and shared amongst the Church, the kings, vassals, feudal lords and other feudatories, which vassalage and sub-infeudation had created. Added to these were guilds and artisan associations which also enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy by way of their trade, handicraft etc. The pluralist’s position that sovereignty may not be the necessary condition for existence of society draws a parallel in medieval Europe.

Social basis: Political pluralism recognizes plurality of social existence and refutes the assumption that a single, unified sovereign can represent interests of the whole society in all its aspects. Pluralists cite the plurality and diversity in society with communities like tribe, city, village and associations like family, church, party etc. We have seen how views and observations of Durkheim and Boncour suggest occupational and vocational diversification and inevitability of their growing control on members and the need for independent authority for them. Social basis of pluralism assumes that there is no unitary interest in society and hence unified sovereignty has no social ground.

Economic basis: Industrial economy has also given rise to organized interest of workers. The pluralists seek to argue against the growing power and its concentration in the hand of economic monopolies and capitalist interests. Hobson, Penty, Cole advocated guild socialism (represent interest of both producer and consumer) and Laski advocated industrial federalism as the basis for organizing industrial relations in a capitalist society. Sydney Webb also supported economic decentralization.

However, in the post–Second World War, due to various factors like defence and strategic concerns, developmental and welfarist role, etc., we have witnessed a more interventionist state than what pluralists would approve. Pluralism may not be successful in effecting distribution of power where capitalist interest is dominant.

Legal basis: The monist concept of sovereignty treats sovereign as the single source of law, and law as command originating from this sovereign. Pluralists like Duguit, Krabbe and MacIver have sought to locate law not in the command of a particular sovereign but as product of social and historical factors and social utility. While for Duguit, basis of law is not command but social solidarity and for Krabbe it is a sense of right. In fact, MacIver argued that law exists prior to state and hence the latter does not create law but only codifi es or modifi es it. The pluralists, in fact recognize the supremacy and authority of law and not of sovereignty. However, while recognizing the overwhelming authority of law, they locate its origin in social, historical and moral factors and not in the command of the sovereign. In this way, they seek to remove the very basis of legal supremacy of the State. MacIver goes to the extent of saying that ‘law is the very antithesis of command’. Pluralists recognize multiplicity of the sources of law like associations, customs and social institutions, state, etc., hence, sovereign is not the only source of law. It is not the command of the sovereign that makes the law binding but its social utility, morality, etc.,that elicit obedience.

Political basis: As we have mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, the monist theory of sovereignty is not conducive for operation of the concepts like consent, representation, majority rule, etc., which are signifi cant for liberal democracy. Though in its original sense liberal democracy would appreciate individual initiative and freedom vis-à-vis the State and its sovereignty, pluralists arguing for autonomy of associations and their members also appealed to those who sought to limit the State. In fact, pluralists more or less argue within the liberal democratic framework. One signifi cant addition by the pluralist to the liberal doctrine of representation is the introduction of the principle of functional representation. This is based on the assumption that elected representatives alone cannot represent the total interests of an individual. Administrative decentralization and political federalism were added developments that provided the basis for pluralists to doubt the absoluteness of sovereignty. Thus, the liberal concept of representation as modifi ed, political federalism and administrative decentralization provided bases for pluralism.

Philosophical basis: Philosophical pluralism is closely linked with the pragmatist school of William James, John Dewey and others. Pragmatism advocates diversity of theories of ‘knowledge or frames of understanding and accepts that knowledge is not fixed but open to perpetual critical change’. William James's book The Pluralistic Universe was based on the theme that we live in a ‘multi-verse’ of meanings and ideas and all beliefs were open to experimental test and criticism. Thus, there is no absolute monistic solution to problems.²² Though not all, but some of the pluralists like Laski were infl uenced by pragmatism.²³

International basis: Inspired by ideal of internationalism and seeing the consequences of war, pluralists’ attack on the concept of external sovereignty emerged. Developments in the field of international organizations and international law further added to this attack.

Views of exponents of political pluralism

Ideas and formulations of Gierke and Maitland (doctrine of real personality), William James (multi-verse and plurality of ideas), Durkheim and Boncour (professional and occupational associations), Bentley (interest groups) have in one way or the other influenced the pluralist criticism of the monist theory of sovereignty. A brief survey of the views and writings of the exponents of political pluralism may help us understand the perspectives from which these writers attack traditional concept of sovereignty and its monist formulation. These exponents have based their formulations and criticisms from the perspective of (i) group autonomy, (ii) functional representation, industrial federalism and economic decentralization, (iii) priority and superiority of law including international law, (iv) internationalism and above all, (v) not only an understanding of a pluralistic nature of society but a vision of such a society. We may briefly survey the views of Duguit, Krabbe, Lindsay, Figgis, Follett, Barker, MacIver and Laski.

Leon Duguit: Léon Duguit, a French Professor of law, criticized the concept of legal sovereignty and maintained that ‘the concept of sovereignty is a fiction without value and without reality and should be banished from the literature of public law.’²⁴ Duguit is not the only pluralist who suggests removal of the concept of sovereignty as Krabbe, Lindsay, Barker and Laski all would like to do the same. However, Duguit along with Krabbe makes this suggestion purely on the legal ground. According to Coker, ‘the most fundamental attack that can be made on the doctrine of sovereignty is that which directly challenges the claim that the State, or some sovereign organization within the State, makes law.’²⁵ Duguit's views on relation of the State to law do this in a systematic manner. His idea of law (droit) and its relation to the State is mainly found in his work Law in the Modern State.

It may be mentioned that Duguit belongs to the Sociological School of Jurisprudence as opposed to the Analytical School of Jurisprudence. While the Analytical School holds laws as positive and direct command of a competent authority, the Sociological School holds that laws are rules already present in society and do not emanate from any agency like the State. According to Sociological School of jurisprudence, the State is not the source of law as law comes from society and social necessity, not from the legislator or creator. It is this attack on the claim of the State to be the source of law or the sole source of law that finds eloquent expression in Duguit. For Duguit, law is not the command of the State or sovereign but conditions of social solidarity. Law has its origin in society and embodies rules of conduct that are binding upon the members for the sake of promoting benefits that society confers. To live in society and enjoy its benefits require interdependence of each other and exchange of services as they have diverse capacities. These facts constitute social solidarity and necessitate fundamental rules of social conduct. The conditions, then, of social solidarity would be ‘respect all acts determined by the end of social solidarity; abstain from acts determined by ends contrary to social solidarity; do everything possible to develop social solidarity.’²⁶ As Coker says, law for Duguit, is independent of, superior and anterior to, political organization, and is objective, not subjective. It is independent because it emanates from society and its requirements; superior because law as condition of social solidarity has moral and legal justification; objective because validity of any rule depends not on its source (as command of the sovereign) but upon the end and objects which it serves—guarantee cooperation towards social solidarity. The state should through its action secure social solidarity. Thus, state is subordinated to the rules of social solidarity because validity of law depends not on its sanction by the State but on its social necessity. Duguit stresses on the public service role of the State as its essential characteristic rather than sovereignty.

Further, Duguit differentiates between state authority and the authority of law. For him, there is no essential connection between a state and law and the State authority has no legal and moral justification. Thus, the State has no claim to law; left alone it being a command of the sovereign. The authority of law itself is supreme to which the State is subject.

Duguit has been criticized for his extreme views on sovereignty. According to Garner, jurists in France like Esmein, Hauriou, Malberg and Michoud have pronounced his theory as ‘doctrinal anarchy’ and ‘anarchic and incompatible with social necessities’, which could lead to ‘reign of force’. Though Duguit declares that ‘there is no sovereignty; there is no commanding and superior will of the State, he defended himself against the criticism of the French jurists that his theory is anarchist by saying that unlike the anarchists, his theory did not deny the necessity or the fact of government.²⁷ Nevertheless, Duguit, by removing the location of law from the sovereign to the society and by questioning the social legitimacy of command of the State, has already taken away what government could claim—authority.

Hugo Krabbe: A Dutch jurist, Krabbe proceeded on the same line as Duguit and recognized sovereignty of law and not sovereignty of the State. In his book, The Modern Idea of the State, he deals with law, its origin, authority and its relationship with the State. Krabbe places law above the State and in origin, independent of it. Like Duguit, he also locates origin of law away from the sovereign. Krabbe accepts only the authority of law as valid and rejects the notion that law is command of the sovereign.

For him law ‘springs from men's feeling or sense of right’²⁸ and is not command of the sovereign. We may proceed by analysing Krabbe's view of law and its origin by asking, from whose sense of right does law derive and what is its validity? For Krabbe, law is neither for individual nor determined by individual feeling or sense of right. If so, then each individual will recognize as law those rules, which are derived from sense of right and there would be no common end. Hence, law must be based on the feeling or sense of right of community. Law is rule of the community, which has a social or common end. Law is characteristic of groups or community whose members are convinced or unanimous as to what is right. As such, sense of right requires legal unity, as there could be a variety of opinions within the community as to what is demanded by a sense of right. The operative mechanism suggested by Krabbe for securing legal unity is ‘sense of right of the majority of the people’. There cannot be a single rule except by recognizing the principle of majority. Like Duguit, Krabbe also holds that law does not originate from any organ or group of organs occupying a position as sovereign within the State. He, however, does not deny that there could be organs that issue commands and make decisions obeyed by the bulk of the community in a state.

For Duguit, as we have seen above, validity of any rule depends not on its source, but upon the end and objects which it serves. Krabbe, however, is not inclined to find such an objective test for the definition of law. For him, law is determined by the source from which it springs (sense of right) and not by its object. But unlike the traditional concept of source of law as sovereign, for Krabbe this source is different. ‘Law is objective in so far as the human will is concerned.’ But law is essentially ‘subjective, for law is the totality of rules, general or special, written or unwritten.’²⁹

Krabbe though gives supremacy to the authority of law, differs from Duguit's view that the State is unrelated to law. Krabbe does not accept the view that political relations are relations of the stronger to the weaker. He rejects the idea that power is an essential feature of the State and recognizes the State as a legal community—a portion of mankind having its own independent body of legal relations. The essence of state lies in operation of legal relations and imputing legal value to certain interests. Krabbe thus recognizes the statutory law though he feels that if statutory law goes against the sense of right of majority, unwritten law will soon bring it in conformity with that sense of right. He further holds that ‘where the power of the State or decree of the court enforces or applies rules that do not come from the sense of right, they are applying something other than law.’³⁰ In this way, Krabbe differs from Duguit in his views on the relation of state and law.

With respect to extension of his concept of law as sense of right to international relations, we have already seen his concept of present states evolving as provinces of one super-national state.

A. D. Lindsay: Professor Lindsay of the Oxford University is one of the pluralists in England who advocated autonomy of corporate personalities. He presented his pluralist ideas in the oft-quoted article titled ‘The State in Recent Political Theory’ published in The Political Quarterly, (February 1914).³¹ Lindsay accepts the juristic/corporate personality theory of organizations and argues that the State is only one of a number of other associations or organizations which posses a corporate personality and will of their own.³² These organizations are characterized by performance of various public services similar to those performed by the State. Lindsay feels that given their homogenous nature and representing a closer community of interests, many of the smaller organizations may attract deeper loyalties of their members and ‘if permitted to act autonomously, prove themselves to be more effective agencies of social coordination than the State itself’.³³ Lindsay went on to declare, ‘if we look at the facts it is clear enough that the theory of sovereign state has broken down.’

However, Lindsay, like some other pluralists, recognizes the State as ‘organization of organizations’ and gives the State a coordinating and regulatory role. He differentiates it from other organizations by its compulsive and comprehensive membership as contrasted to voluntary and selective membership of other organizations and also by its coercive functions. However, as Coker says, he does not regard these attributes as qualifying the State to be designated as a sovereign. This is because power of the State over its members depends upon the will of the members themselves. Therefore, the State could have control over the corporations within it so far as the citizens are prepared to give it such power. To the extent that loyalty of citizens to non-political associations, a class, or a church, or a trade union is greater than their loyalty to the State, the State's power over the trade unions or churches or classes diminished.

We can infer that Lindsay having accepted the personality theory of groups and making them the location of deeper loyalty of members, adds to the pluralistic view that the State must interact with individuals not as mere individuals but as members of a variety of associations and organizations. However, despite his remarks that theory of sovereignty has broken down, Lindsay tend to leave the State with some preeminence by way of its compulsory and comprehensive membership.

Dr J. Neville Figgis: Dr J. Neville Figgis is one the English writers who was greatly influenced by the real personality doctrine of Gierke. Figgis's general emphasis is that the proper spheres of essential social groups such as churches, trade unions, local communities and family should be protected. In his book Churches in the Modern State, he advocated that all such groups have character of public associations and they should have a large discretion and initiative in controlling their respective interests.³⁴ He advocated a pluralist society with multiplicity of associations and social organizations.

Figgis's main focus, however, was to stress the independent legal personality of the Church. He asserted that the church does not exist by the grace of the State but has real personality and power of self-development as a person. In the true pluralist sense, he says that the corporate personality of the church is neither granted nor withheld by the State but has simply to be recognized.³⁵ He advocated priority and autonomy of certain associations particularly the church in relation to the State. Their origin and purpose is independent of the State. A second pluralist theme found in his views relates to interaction of the State with the individuals. As mentioned here, the pluralists maintain that the State must interact with individuals not as mere individuals but as members of a variety of associations and organizations. For Figgis, society is not a ‘sand heap of individuals related only through the State, but an ascending hierarchy of groups’. And as such, the relationship between the individual and the State is always mediated through these groups or hierarchy of groups. A third theme, though related to the second, is a pluralist's concern for liberty of the individual himself. For pluralists, as Andrew Vincent has remarked, ‘liberty was not primarily the result of the establishment of constitutional rights but rather the dispersal of power amongst natural groups.’³⁶ And for Figgis, the origin of the dispersal of power and the consequent protection of liberty lay in religious groupings. For pluralists, liberty of an individual has to be seen in the context of groups. The theme of liberty found its expression in these words in Churches in the Modern State, above all, we must be willing to put liberty above other ends as a political goal, and to learn that true liberty will be found by allowing full play to the uncounted forms of the associative instincts.³⁷ Liberty of an individual is not posed as a direct anti-thesis to the State but as a mediated process where autonomous groups based on associative and natural affiliations and deep loyalties of their members will ensure the liberty and freedom for them. And this fact gets echo in yet another writing of Figgis (The AntiChrist and Other Sermons) when he says ‘the battle for freedom in this century is the battle of small societies to maintain their inherent life against the all-devouring Leviathan of the whole.’³⁸

Figgis was also appreciative of the guild socialists as he thought of guild socialism as a form of pluralism. For him, the guild socialists recognized the State ‘as merely the final bond of a multitude of bodies, Churches, trade Unions, families, all possessing inherent life, a real thing, recognized and regulated by government.’³⁹ Guild socialism based on the appreciation of medieval guild system was partially, a reaction against the statist inclination of the Fabian socialism. As such, guild socialism was for plurality of associations and their rights as posed against the State. In pluralist cause, Figgis appreciated guild socialists.

On the one hand, Figgis took the cause of pluralism, on the other, as some writers have pointed out, he did not deny the role of the state as distinct from other forms of associations or groups. For him the State is a single entity formed by the collectivity of partially autonomous groups. Figgis assigns a coordinating role to the state so that the groups must be restrained from acts of injustice towards one another and towards others. In fact, Nicholls maintains that Figgis intentionally entitled his book as Churches in the Modern State instead, as a pluralist would have done, Churches and the modern State.⁴⁰ This may be to show the primacy of the State over the Church and also other associations. However, he maintains that these groups and corporations make their own contribution in the processes of law making by the state.

Mary Parker Follett: Mary Parker Follett along with R. M. MacIver is considered as a supporter of pluralism in America. Follett's book The New State: Group Organization, the Solution of Popular Government explores the ‘nature of authority in a complex modern democracy and the problem of winning the consent of the governed.’⁴¹ She recognized the growing need for organizations and groups in the life of individuals. This may be attributed to her understanding that the concept of majority held by traditional liberal democracy is not sufficient to fulfil the requirement of people in terms of participative democracy and spontaneous and effective consent (as compared to representative or delegated consent).

She favoured pluralistic organization of authority in the State and argued for emergence of small grassroots groups and social centre movements. In fact, her book The New State, according to Lord Haldane, a British statesman, presents ‘hopeful possibilities of the group or neighbourhood method of bringing the state into reality in the individual.’⁴² One example of group or neighbourhood method found practical expression in her attempt to create a collaborative network of elected community representatives, public health officials and doctors to coordinate health care initiatives designed to combat milk-borne tuberculosis and high infant mortality in Cincinnati, USA.⁴³ These initiatives and methods of organizing small grassroots groups resulted out of her belief that ‘potentialities of the individuals remain potentialities until they are released by group life.’ This way of conceiving relationship between individual and groups and her support for grassroots movements presents a pluralist approach to authority and group participation in the state.

Follett, like some other pluralists, was not discrediting the state. For her, despite multiplicity of groups, one requires the State for a fuller expression of individual life. She echoed this very aptly when she said ‘no number of groups can enfold me’ and declared in an unpluralistic chord that ‘the home of my soul is in the state.’⁴⁴ As such, no one group or any number of groups can claim the uniqueness as that of the State. She assigns the State a superior position and unifying role in society. Follett conceived the State ‘like a tree, its branches will widen as its roots spread’ and an organic, ever-changing entity that requires individual involvement, action and experimentation to achieve organizational goals.’⁴⁵ Thus, the State for Follett is a unique agency and must stand above other organizations.

Ernest Barker: Professor Ernest Barker of Oxford University contributed to the pluralist thought, on the one hand, by exploring the pluralistic trend in recent political thought, and on the other, by analysing the negative aspects of the all-powerful and sovereign state. In his book Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day (1915), Barker explores the independent existence and purpose of groups. As he was writing during the period when First World War had made the State powerful internally and engendered hostility internationally, he argued against this tendency. In his article entitled, ‘The Discredited State’ which appeared in The Political Quarterly (No. 5, February 1915), Barker expressed a very pluralistic opinion thus, ‘No Political theory has become more arid and unfruitful than the doctrine of sovereignty.’⁴⁶ He, like the other pluralists, Krabbe, Lindsay and Laski, also sees the classical doctrine of sovereignty as giving omnipotence to the State unnecessarily.

Barker advocates juristic personality of groups with their own functions, rights and responsibilities. He also admits that permanent groups in society existed prior to the State and have corporate character. However, as we have seen previously, he does not accept the doctrine of real personality. He rejects the view that groups have power of self-consciousness (psychological sense) or are self-conscious and self-determining according to certain principles (in ethical sense). The doctrine of real personality means that the groups have a consciousness and will of their own as distinct from those of their individual members. Barker might have been uncomfortable distinguishing real personality as understood by some of the pluralists from its biological and organic sense as propounded by Bluntschli, Hegel and Bosanquet. For him, when members of a group possess a unifying purpose, the group becomes a person, not because it has its own will or self-consciousness. For analogy, he likens unifying purpose with ‘public mind’ of the whole community. By public mind we mean general consensus amongst the public. Similarly, unifying purpose is a goal about which the members or a group of people feel in the same manner. For example, church, temple or mosque, all represent a unifying purpose of group of people in the form of religious affiliation.

Having said that groups have a unifying purpose and an organizing goal, Barker sees individuals united in various groups with common life and end. In pluralist sense, thus groups become the intermediate stage between the state and the individual. For him, the relationship between individual and groups, groups and the state and individual and the state is expressed in a related manner in pluralist state. Barker's pluralist state is ‘an association of individuals, already united in various groups each with a common life, in a further and higher group and more embracing common purpose.’⁴⁷ Thus, it becomes easier for Barker to view the state as ‘association of associations’ to further the cause of pluralism.

Despite his pluralistic chord, he gave a unique role to the state by giving it wide-ranging scope of coordination and adjustment. Barker's ‘…the more embracing common purpose’ and ‘higher group’ mentioned above refers to the primacy of the state as reflecting higher purpose. Barker (Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day) would like the state to ‘adjust the relations of associations to itself, to other associations and to their own members to itself in order to maintain integrity of its own schemes; to other associations, in order to preserve the equality of associations before law; and to their own members, in order to preserve the individual from the possible tyranny of the group.’⁴⁸ He is of the opinion that despite the claims of rights by the guild, the national groups or the Church, ‘the state will remain a necessary adjusting force’., Though Barker espouses the pluralist cause and demonstrates that the state is faced with not only the individuals but by association of individuals, he assigns the state primacy over associations and gives it an adjusting role.

R. M. MacIver: MacIver, a Canadian-American political sociologist, criticized the legalistic conception of sovereignty. He explored the state–society and state–association relationship to disqualify the conception of unlimited sovereignty. MacIver sought to show that society being a natural phenomenon is prior to the State and that the State exists within the society like any other social organizations. He went on to explore how other social associations like family and church are equally natural and embedded in society. Thus, he brought the State at par and in league with the socially evolved associations. Being a supporter of sociological school of jurisprudence, he rejected the legalistic view of Austin on sovereignty and criticized it by invoking historical and social bases of law as customs, conventions and traditions. In his book The Modern State and also in The Web of Government, he approached the state–society relationship from the sociological point of view. His pluralist ideas and critiques of the monist theory of sovereignty may be discussed in terms of: (i) analysis of state–society relationships and primacy of social over the political, (ii) position of the State with respect to other associations, (iii) authority of law and its social basis, and (iv) end of the State and basis of sovereignty.

Society and the State: Primacy of the Social Over the Political

The general tendency of MacIver's views on state-society relationship suggests that he is critical of the idealist political thinkers like Plato, Rousseau, Hegel, Bosanquet, who do not differentiate between the two. In his The Modern State, MacIver terms as ‘grossest of all confusions’ to identify the social with the political.⁴⁹ For MacIver, society is prior to the State and the latter exists only within society. Further, the State serves only a limited purpose in terms of the system of order and control and regulating relationships of human beings in society. This regulation is to give a form of unity to the whole system of social relationships. Existence of society and many of the associations embedded in social relationships like familial affiliations, religious identification, emotional and cultural expressions are independent of the State sanction and regulation. Thus, MacIver tends to assigns primacy to society over the State.

State and Other Associations in Society: Is the State First Among the Equals?

From this primacy of society and social needs of human beings, flows another logical argument that supports the pluralist's view. MacIver asserted that social forms like families or churches or clubs, owe neither their origin nor their sustenance to the State. For him, associations in society serve different interests of human beings and that include emotional, cultural, economic relationships.

In his writings, we can find certain reasons for treating the State at par and in league with other associations in society. Firstly, he maintains that ‘other associations are as native to the soil of society as the State itself.’⁵⁰ The State is not their creator and even is incapable of refusing existence of such associations as family or church. For MacIver then the State belongs to the same category of associations as the family or the church and like family and church, it consists of a group of members organized in a definite way for limited purpose. Its limitation arises from not being able to fulfil the purpose of the family or the church or the trade union or cultural associations. The State cannot, for the most part, make or unmake them. Hence, MacIver declares, ‘the organization of the state is not all social organization.’⁵¹ Secondly, from the limited purpose that each association, including the State, serves, flows the basis of authority that MacIver employs to declare parity between the State and the associations. For him, ‘every association of any magnitude has grades of authority and control analogous to those of the state.’⁵² For example, business corporations and their managers and stakeholders or church hierarchy and its membership also entail authority and control amongst themselves. Similarly, authority of the State relates to its people and their will or the will of the majority as reflected in the government. Thus, the State has an essential character of a corporation. As a corporation is recognized by law and has certain rights and obligations, the State has ‘definite limits, definite powers, and responsibilities.’⁵³ Thirdly, unlike Lindsay and Barker who either directly or indirectly, attribute to the State the role of regulating associations and corporations, MacIver presents a different opinion. He denies the State any role or power of either controlling or regulating the internal affairs of these associations. And in denying this, MacIver says, ‘Today the great associations are neither parts of the State nor its mere subjects. They exist in their own right no less than it. They exercise powers that are their own, just as surely as does the State.’⁵⁴ MacIver limits the scope of authority of the State by invoking variety of purposes and interests being served by different associations and denies the State any regulating power. By denying any regulating power he seeks to secure the pluralist logic of not giving the State any primacy over other associations.

Given this, how does the State then regulate to serve the common interest and give a form of unity to the whole system of social relationship? We can find two specific references in the writings of MacIver that may enable us capture an answer to this question. In his book The Modern State, he argues that the State stands for common interest, though not for the whole of the common interest. He accepts that the objective of the State is general. This would be possible only when the State resolves the conflicting interest of different associations to make ‘the common interest sufficiently unified to admit of political expression and legal regulation’. Differentiating between the State and other associations, MacIver says, ‘the other associations are limited primarily by their objective, which is particular, whereas the State is limited primarily by its instrument, which is particular while its objective is general, within the limits so imposed.’⁵⁵ Thus, while the objective of the church is to seek religious loyalties of its members, the State does not have a particular objective to associate its people but seeks a general objective of political expression and legal regulation. The State is limited by its instrument and it is based on the will of the people which for MacIver is will of the majority or the dominant will.

Secondly, in his book, The Web of Government which it seems presents a revisit to MacIver's thought on the role of the State, he ‘makes a distinction between two types of organizations—those which serve the emotional and cultural interests of men and cannot be regulated by the State; and those which serve the economic interests of different groups, and have to be regulated to serve the common interests.’⁵⁶ MacIver feels that given the uniqueness and requirements of differences in cultural and religious expressions, the State should not coordinate, as this would destroy their characteristics qualities. However, he gives regulating space to the State with respect to associations formed to serve economic interests. He says, ‘economic activities cannot be left to the free arbitrament of individuals and groups without serious interference with public order.’⁵⁷ He cites the examples of ensuring minimum wages to employees, maximum hours of labour, prudent use of one's property so that the source of livelihood of others is not harmed as some of the important considerations to regulate economic activities and associations.

MacIver, despite building a strong pluralist ground for pushing the state back, in the end, concedes regulatory functions to the state. However, he remains true to his ground by holding that the State cannot capture all the expressions of the individual and as such, cannot claim their overarching loyalty.

Authority of Law and its Social Basis

MacIver declares that conception of unlimited sovereignty is ‘dangerously false’. He rejects the concept of legal sovereignty as propounded by Austin. The monist concept of sovereignty derives it force from the formulation that sovereign is the source of all law and is omnipotent. Since sovereignty is characteristic of the state, it is also all-powerful. We have seen how MacIver refutes this by assigning limited purpose to the state. Further, while dealing with the monist's doctrine of law as command of the sovereign, he shakes the very foundation of analytical and positive view of law. He challenges the singularity of source of law and the doctrine, ‘law is command of the sovereign. MacIver's position on the source of law can be understood in the context of his support to the Sociological school of jurisprudence. For him, law does not originate from any person or designated authority in the State, it has source in social customs, traditions and conventions. And since it is grounded in society, which is prior to the State, law is prior to the State. Thus, law exists independent and prior to the State and is universal. Now, a pertinent question that arises here is: if law is independent, prior and universal then how is it connected with the State? Answer to this provides MacIver's denial to the monist's concept of sovereignty.

For MacIver, state gives expression to law, which means that the state is source of legal enactment and gives formal expression to a particular law instead of itself being the source of law. In his words, ‘the social law is expressed in custom, tradition, the thousand forms of use and wont. Part of this in turn is reinforced, reaffirmed, and enlarged as the law of the state.’⁵⁸ Law reinforced, reaffirmed and enlarged means law presented in the form of statutes, codified and modified as required by the State. It is neither created nor remade by the State. MacIver echoes this when he says, drawing an analogy with human body, ‘the state can no more reconstitute at any time the law as a whole than a man can remake his body.’

Having refuted the notion that the sovereign or the State is the sole source of law, MacIver seeks to argue that law instead of being command of the sovereign is ‘very anti-thesis of command’. MacIver substantiates this by invoking the two arguments. In the first place, he says command separates the giver and the receiver—command issued from the sovereign to subjects/people. It is possible that the interest of the sovereign and the subjects/people may differ. On the other hand, law is not meant to separate but to unite. Law must be equally applicable to the legislator and the legislated upon. In this way, MacIver, suggests applicability of constitutional law to the State and general statutes to the people. Following from this is the second statement, which MacIver makes, ‘the state is both child and the parent of law.’ Thus, the State is subject to constitutional law and cannot claim arbitrary power in the name of sovereignty. In this sense, it is child of law. Since it enacts or as MacIver himself says, ‘reinforces, reaffirms or enlarges’ law, it is parent of it. However, it is not convincing as how the State will be ‘parent’ without being the creator of law. Also, why at all the State is required to be parent, if law has its own source and authority? This leaves a gap in his formulation of law as independent and beyond the state.

The question at this stage, that remains unanswered is: what makes society follow the legal enactment by the State? As we have seen, MacIver gives the state the role to regulate activities of some of the associations and also serve the common interest? For MacIver, the legal enactment by the State in the form of laws is not command or an expression of sovereignty but is made on behalf of the community. In this sense, enforceability of law is because it carries social approval and ‘will to obey’. The State becomes guardian of law and seeks compliance from the people based on its utility. In the present context, we generally see that the State does not pass laws that are anti-social or has no general consensus. This may be due to the fact that social groups and society at large have the means of interest articulation, i.e., expressing their voice through interest groups and public opinion and interest aggregation in the form of political parties.

The authority of the State is not based on its own sovereign power, but is derived form the authority of law. This has two aspects. Firstly, the State derives its authority from constitutional law, and secondly, laws it enacts carry their own acceptability and compulsion. Both ways, supremacy of law is established. Thus, the authority and power of the State is not based on sovereignty but derives its power, enforceability and legitimacy from law, which, in turn, derives its force and authority from society. In line with this, MacIver suggests, ‘to law, therefore, we must turn, and not to sovereignty as such, if we are to attain a true definition of the state.’⁵⁹ This, we can say is a statement of a constitutional state.

End of the State and Basis of Sovereignty

Hobbes, Austin and others talk about sovereign authority of the State. Underlying principle in this is that power is an important ingredient of the State. However, MacIver holds that power in itself has no meaning for the State unless it is lawful. He says, ‘in the last resort force can be entrusted to the State, that it may be everywhere subjected to law.’ And further, coercive power of the State may be its criterion but cannot be its essence. As such, supremacy of the State should not be built around the concept of sovereignty and power. The State, according to MacIver, should be known by the service it renders. For him, service is the end of State and his ‘service state’ is an agent of society, which has the function of guaranteeing rights and unity of social relationship and order in society. Power is only an instrument or means of these services. As service rendered by the State is limited, its power must also be limited. The State commands only because it serves; it owns only because it owes.

MacIver's views on primacy of society, multiplicity of associations and depth of loyalties of their members, authority and supremacy of law and limitation on power or sovereignty of the State appear in his book The Modern State, which Bottomore terms as ‘one of the major statements of a pluralist view’.⁶⁰ To sum up MacIver's position, we may quote him, ‘the organization of the state is not all social organization; the ends for which the state stands are not all the ends which humanity seeks; and quite obviously, the ways in which the state pursues its objects are only some of the ways in which within society men strive for the objects of their desire.’⁶¹ In MacIver, we find a clear presentation of pluralist position from sociological point of view.

Harold Joseph Laski

The pluralist position of Professor Laski of the London School of Economics and Political Science is found in his various writings. He has waged a multi-sided attack on the concept of sovereignty of the State. However, he is also the one who subsequently reconsidered his position on the State and has shown a shift from a liberal pluralist position to a democratic socialist position, in between sympathizing and embracing the Guild socialist and Fabian socialist expectations. He, in one of his writings (Foundations of Sovereignty), conceded that ‘legally no one can deny that there exists in every state some organ whose authority is unlimited.’⁶² We would survey and analyse his pluralist position within a liberal pluralist framework as an outright critic of the concept of sovereignty and unlimited power of the State. In the end, Laski argued from a positive liberal position accepting the role of the State as a regulator.

Laski's pluralist views are spread across many of his writings. Prominent amongst them are: The Problem of Sovereignty (1917), Authority in the Modern State (1919),⁶³ Foundations of Sovereignty and Other Essays (1921), The State in the New Social Order (1922), The Grammar of Politics (1925), Liberty in the Modern State (1930), An Introduction to Politics (1931), The State in Theory and Practice (1935). As we have hinted above, Laski visited many political streams ranging from liberal pluralism to guild socialism to Fabian socialism to positive liberalism and also to class approach to society and state. As it would not be within our scope to cover all his ideas, we will restrict as far as possible, to survey his approach that relates to political pluralist ground.

Within this limit, we may organize Laski's views in the following categories: (i) Criticism of monist/Austin's theory of sovereignty, (ii) Concept of pluralist authority and rejection of absolute sovereignty, (iii) State and government—sovereignty of fallible men? (iv) The place of the State in the great society: State and other associations, (v) Internationalism and the state.

Criticism of Monist/Austin's Theory of Sovereignty

Laski's rejection of sovereignty and absolutist state begins with the criticism of the monist theory of sovereignty. He employs three grounds for refuting monist concept of sovereignty and these do not necessarily involve pluralistic arguments. His criticism is based on three grounds—historical, legal and political. In his Grammar of Politics and Foundations of Sovereignty, Laski provides refutations of the monist theory on these grounds.

According to Laski, historically the concept of sovereignty has not been universal and perpetual. It has historical origin and the historical period is associated with the struggle of the State against religious claims of temporal supremacy. In his Grammar of Politics, he says, ‘the territorial and omnipotent state is the off-spring of the religious struggles of the sixteenth century’ and ‘the sovereign state emerges to vindicate the supremacy of the secular order against religious claims.’⁶⁴ In our survey of the evolution of the State, we have seen how claim of religious and ecclesiastical supremacy by the church in the medieval period sought to extend to temporal supremacy. As monarchy was struggling to gain its ground against this church-claimed supremacy, theorists like Bodin gave the concept of sovereignty to provide a theoretical basis to the claim of monarchy against the religious claims of the church. In his book, Foundations of Sovereignty, Laski gives elaboration of this position and maintains that monist theory of sovereignty is born and revered as a result of crisis.⁶⁵ For example, Bodin asserted the supremacy of the State in an age of religious warfare. Similarly, Hobbes sought the means of order in a period when the King-in-Parliament battled for the balance of power. Hobbes argued for absolute state power lest anarchy would follow and drew analogy of the state of nature. According to Laski, Austin's book was conceived at a time when the middle classes of France and England had achieved the conquest of a state hitherto partly open to their ambition.⁶⁶ And Austin's concept of sovereignty was to provide a device for perpetual status quo. Laski, in unmistakable terms, explains the historical origin of sovereignty when he says, ‘its (the state) character as a sovereign body was a product of a long chain of historical circumstances of which the most important was the need, at a time of the Reformation, to find a plane of organization to which all claims to authority could be referred for ultimate decision. The State secured its primacy over all other associations because at that period, it offered prospects of ordered peace such as no other body could pretend to secure.’⁶⁷

Thus, sovereignty emerged in a particular period and was asserted to fulfil particular demands or interests. Dispersal of political power in medieval Europe on the one hand, and contest between religious and temporal forces on the other, created condition for the theory of sovereignty. It was felt necessary for making general rules capable of securing order and peace. Historically, the concept of sovereignty was absent in the Greek period and during the medieval period, which is known more by lack of sovereignty than by its presence. In fact, it is generally agreed that in medieval Europe power was decentralized and represented an ensemble of suzerainty than sovereignty. Further, present times show evolution of international organization of an allegiance that reaches beyond the limits of the state. In his An Introduction to Politics, Laski says, ‘Austin's world was one in which the state seemed the last term in the evolution of institutions’ and further adds, ‘our world is different world. What impresses us is not national separation but international dependence.’ Laski's remark in this regard is conclusive when he says, ‘the sovereignty of the state in the world to which we belong is as obsolete as the sovereignty of the Roman Church three hundred years ago.’⁶⁸ In yet another reference in his Liberty in the Modern State Laski writes, ‘we have entered upon an epoch in which it is daily more clear that the principle of national sovereignty has exhausted its usefulness. Certain functions of government are so clearly international in character that we cannot rely upon the cooperation of so-called ‘independent and equal’ sovereign states to achieve the cosmopolitan law-making that has become essential.’⁶⁹ As a result of these historical factors, Laski finds that sovereignty was neither there to begin with nor required in our times of international dependence and cooperation.

Secondly, he criticized Austin's theory on legal ground. Legal supremacy of the sovereign reflected in the doctrine, law is command of the sovereign, may be considered as the backbone of the Austin's theory and of the monist concept of sovereignty. Laski attacked the concept of sovereignty and rejected that: (i) sovereign possess unlimited power, (ii) law is merely command of the sovereign, and (iii) state is a legal order.

Laski was inclined to accept the historical analysis of Henry Maine and his criticism of Austin's theory. Henry Maine's historical survey of authority and power of rulers showed that the non-legal factors like customs, traditions and conventions put a limit on the power of the sovereign. Henry Maine has cited the example of Maharaja Ranjit Singh of Punjab to show how he respected social conventions, customs and traditions. Laski also feels that no sovereign anywhere has possessed unlimited power.

Further, Laski refuses to accept that law is command of the sovereign. For him, the State does not create law, rather it is built on the general social environment and originate in community of groups. He cites the King-in-Parliament in Britain as a perfect example of sovereign power in Austin's sense, if any. If law is command of the sovereign, then the King-in-Parliament can command to prohibit somebody's religion or put limitations on it. However, we know this in practice will be almost an impossibility. Laski elucidates this limitation thus, ‘no parliament would dare to disenfranchise the Roman Catholics or to prohibit the existence of trade unions.’⁷⁰ We can say that by pointing to these limitations, Laski seeks to demonstrate that law must be reconciled with social realities and social requirements. To show the influence of social pressure on the law-making power of the state, Laski in his Grammar of Politics says, ‘…we shall fail completely to understand the character of society, unless we seek to grasp exactly how the sovereign is compelled to will things desired by bodies in law inferior to itself.’⁷¹ Here Laski seeks to underline the idea that a variety of social, cultural and economic groups influence the law-making by the state. We find that his views regarding origin of law is in line with other pluralists like Duguit, Krabbe and MacIver who hold that law emanates from social conditions and requirements and not from the sovereign. As the group life in society reflects the natural and inner desire of people, law of the state cannot pretend to be based on anything than demands of these associations. For Laski, ‘what, in fact, it (the state) should largely seek to register as law is the body of demands it encounters among them (the associations) which represent the largest total of satisfaction in society.’⁷²

Laski also rejected the idea that ‘there must be in every social order some single centre of ultimate reference.’ This means that Laski was actively against the idea of having a central power in every state and given the existence of variety of groups, he feels there is no logical requirement for a central authority as a source of law. Thus, Laski favours the federal nature of authority in society. Though Laski rejects need for a political sovereign in terms of a central authority, he accepts Dicey's concept of political sovereignty, which gives primacy to the electorate to whom governments generally would not like to alienate. In his Grammar of Politics, he says, ‘Behind … the legally omnipotent authority it is not very difficult to discern an electorate to whose opinions and desires increasing deference must be shown.’⁷³ For Laski, sovereign organs of government become nothing but a machine for registering decisions arrived at elsewhere. And this ‘elsewhere’ is apparently the electorate organized into associations. This makes Laski feel that the Austin's formulation of sovereign as determinate and indivisible is not correct. Laski's short point is that in practice, the concept of legally unlimited power of the sovereign in Austin's sense is unworkable. He feels that certain fundamental rights given to citizens also put limitations on the sovereign. We can take the example of the Fundamental Rights provided in Part III of the Constitution of India. These Fundamental Rights put limitations on the legislative powers of Parliament and the judicial process protects the sanctity of these rights. Though there are reasonable restrictions on the exercise of these rights in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, public order etc., these reasonable restrictions could also be reviewed by the judiciary.⁷⁴ All these go to deny ‘state as a legal order’. State as legal order implies that there is a definite body of men or organ of the state entitled by its position to impose its imperative upon its citizens. Laski seeks to prove that historically and legally this is not the case. He also rejects Rousseau's concept of popular sovereignty and its elements of indivisibility and absoluteness.

Thirdly, Laski rejects the monist concept of sovereignty on political grounds. According to him, Austin's theory of Sovereignty cannot fit as a theory of political organization particularly in federal set up. Political organization in the form of federal state makes it difficult to locate a determinate human superior. He cites the example of the American constitution with division of powers between constituents as a case in point. We can also take the example of Indian Constitution to elucidate Laski's point. Though the Indian Constitution gives primacy to Parliament in legislative affairs pertaining to the country as a whole, the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India demarcates the legislative sphere of the States. However, one may argue that a unitary state then can be suited to Austin's concept of sovereignty. But we have already seen Laski having refuted such a possibility in Britain, which is a unitary state. Further, Laski also cited the example of the Belgian constitution, which is a unitary state to show absence of sovereign organs in the Austinian sense.

Laski feels that historically, legally and politically Austin's monist concept of sovereignty cannot be sustained. For him, it is more a conceptual formulation than a practical one, as in practice there is no absolute sovereign, either historically or legally or politically.

Concept of Pluralist Authority and Rejection of Absolute Sovereignty

Laski opposes the idea of a centralized power in a state. Like other pluralists, he thinks it neither practical nor required. The basic assumption that leads him to think so is his idea that since society is federal, authority must also be federal. Laski says, ‘… society, at the bottom, is essentially federal in nature.’⁷⁵ Society consists of associations and groups, which are expressions of felt needs of men. The appeal of associations to their members is deep and members’ allegiance to these associations more effective because people have chosen voluntarily to express their outlook through these associations. At the heart of Laski's criticism of the monist view of power is his rejection of a centralized power either in legal or political sense. Legally, the state is not the source of law and politically it should not be a repository of ultimate power. In his Foundations of Sovereignty, he says, ‘The monistic state is a hierarchical structure in which power is, for ultimate purpose, collected at a single centre. The advocates of pluralism are convinced that this is both administratively incomplete and ethically inadequate.’⁷⁶ As a counter, Laski would like the State and its authority to be federal which, in essence, means its decision-making should be participative and based on consultation with those who will be affected by the result of its operation.

Federal nature of society requires that power in a state be dispersed, as this would make its operations more effective. Laski cites ‘three primary reasons’⁷⁷ why authority should be federal. Firstly, ‘the more men have responsibility for the result of law, the more likely they are to be interested in its result.’ In a centralized state, obedience is not creative but mechanical and inert. Participative law-making and decentralized decision-making on the other hand, evokes sense of responsible cooperation. Secondly, ‘Centralization … makes for uniformity; it lacks the genius of time and place.’ Centralized administration will generally as a rule seek to avoid experimentations and novelty. Thirdly, ‘centralization … means an inability to cope with the problem of time in government.’ A centralized system would have to deal not only with a large number of issues but a variety of them. Due to pressure, many things that require consideration may pass without it or with it, at most, in haste. We find that Laski's view of federal authority is opposed to the centralizing tendency of the state in the name of sovereign authority. Writing in the early 1930s, he argues that ‘centralisation was less dangerous a hundred years ago than now, simply because the ambit of state-activity was so much smaller.’⁷⁸ Contrarily, now the State reaches in many aspects of the social fabric where flexible and rapid action is required. Given this necessity Laski argues for a more federal and dispersed authority. In India, we may say, the concept of Panchayati Raj Institutions and Urban Local Bodies somewhat seeks participative and dispersed decision-making.

For Laski, federal authority and dispersal of power has to be in geographical as well as in functional terms.⁷⁹ Thus, while London or Manchester or Paris or Delhi (in sense of urban municipal administration) should be fully responsible for and independent of the central government in all matters that are local in character, interest units like cotton industry, professional groups need their appropriate governmental institutions. In Laski's support for geographical and functional basis of administration, we find the basis for administrative decentralization and industrial federalism. This implies federal authority both in political as well as in economic spheres. Laski, unlike the guild socialists especially Cole, does not support only functional representation. He, in fact, finds guild socialist position inadequate. This is due to the fact that if one cannot be represented as a citizen fully as the guild socialists say, one cannot be represented as an engineer or a doctor fully either. It suggests that Laski supports both territorial and functional representation supplementing each other.

His idea of federal authority, on the one hand, refutes the basis of absolute sovereignty by denying its necessity, and on the other, provides a reinterpretation of the doctrine of consent and representation. Federal authority and decentralized and participative decision-making becomes the basis for responsible and cooperative allegiance of the people towards the state. Herein also lies Laski's solution for a legitimate democratic authority.

State and Government—Sovereignty of Fallible Men?

Laski makes a distinction between the State as a concept and its reflection in practice as government. Government for all practical purposes invokes the power of the State and makes decisions, issues orders and enforces obedience. Thus, power of the State is expressed in the government. Laski says, ‘A theory of State … is essentially a theory of governmental act.’⁸⁰ This makes us infer that for Laski, government is the operative organ of the State and all the powers or authority or sovereignty that is attributed to the state would be in practice enjoyed by the government concerned. In his Grammar of Politics Laski suggests that it is ‘the realization that the State's claim to pre-eminence always means, in fact, the sovereignty of a government composed of fallible men whose intentions alone are not a sufficient justification for so vast a claim’⁸¹ that pluralist doctrine was derived. It is this notion of government, being the short hand for the state and being its agent, that makes Laski deny handing over of overwhelming power to a group of men who constitute the government. The fallibility of these men can arise due to their own selfish interest or mistaking private interest of a few for interest of the whole community. Further, we have seen Laski arguing for wider representation. Given his doubt regarding adequate representation of all aspects of society in the existing set-up of government, he would prefer not to assign supreme authority to the State to be misused by government. And this provides yet another reason of Laski's criticism of the concept of absolute sovereignty of the State.

Place of the State in the Great Society: State and Other Associations

In line with the pluralist position, Laski supports the independent and prior existence of associations in society as compared to the State. According to Laski, ‘The state is only one among may forms of human association and as compared with the other associations, has no superior claims to the individual's allegiance.’⁸² The State becomes as one of the associations competing for allegiance of the individuals as those of other associations like the church, trade union or club. It may be appropriate to mention here that Laski's thinking on the nature of the State and its place in society evolved in dynamic way, starting early on, with administrative decentralization and industrial federalism; to a liberal pluralist state; to a positive liberal state and to a Marxian class analysis by the 1930s. In his writings like Problem of Sovereignty, Authority in the Modern State, Foundations of Sovereignty and Other Essays, The State in the New Social Order, Grammar of Politics, and An Introduction to Politics, his views on associations and state–society relationships are contained.

Laski's views on state-association relationship as contained in his writings mentioned earlier and so far as they do not give primacy to the state to which he shifted subsequently, may be summarized in the following manner:

• General social life of individuals consists of a variety of interests which lead to or manifest in a variety of associative impulses.
• These associative impulses are reflected in a variety of associations in society, which are real and purposeful, and perform useful functions including emotional (family), religious (Church), economic (trade unions), and cultural (clubs) and hence these associations are natural.
• The State is one of such associations with certain functions and purpose, generally of political and legal in nature.
• Since each association including the State has its specified role in the life of the individual, no one can claim primacy.
• In fact, it can happen that the allegiance of individuals to some of the associations like the family or the church could be deeper and far more effective than that to the State.
• As these associations are natural and have a personality of their own, the State, due to its specific function which is legal and political, too has a personality.
• The State is made to compete for the allegiance of citizens with all other associations in society.
• Society at the bottom is federal in nature, hence authority in society must be federal too.

It would be appropriate to mention that at this stage, Laski argues that ‘…the will of the State is no more than a competition with the wills of other groups …’though subsequently, he argues that ‘the will of the state is formed by the struggle that takes place among competing wills.’⁸³ This shift in Laski's position in treating the state as one amongst the equals to first amongst the equals may be attributed to his dilemma which many other pluralists also face. This dilemma emerges from the fact that an individual being a creature of various associative impulses and interests may at times come in conflict with one another. Now, what mechanism or machinery does a pluralist have to regulate and coordinate these relations. For Barker, Lindsay, Figgis and Follett, the state provides such an agency and performs the coordinating function. Laski follows this line of thinking and resolves this dilemma by assigning the State the role of ‘coordinating agency’. His consideration of the society–state relationships in his An Introduction to Politics in terms of what he says, ‘The Place of the State in the Great Society’, on the one hand, seeks to build a case for a pluralist state and on the other, punctuates it by assigning primacy to the State. This position of Laski is contained in the paragraph, wherein he says,

… the individual is not merely a member of the state. In the society of which he is a part, there are innumerable interests—units to which he may belong. He is a member of a church, an ardent trade-unionist, a keen freemason, a zealous supporter of a movement for compulsory vaccination, a pacifist to whom a conscientious objection to military service is the central principle of life. He is, so to say, intrinsically connected with associations seeking to promote each of these interests.

 

And next he adds:

They (associations) live, for the most part, within the ambit of the rules which the state lays down. It's (the state) wills settles the boundaries within which their wills, as associations, must operate. Their wills bind their members, in law, only to the point of accordance with the legal imperatives which the state lays down.⁸⁴

For Laski, multiplicity of associations in society needs a federal nature of authority. The complexity of relationship between individuals and groups, groups and the State, and individual and the State requires division of authority between the state and groups to which individuals are equally committed. To achieve this, Laski supports administrative decentralization, industrial federalism/self-government for industry, co-existence of territorial and functional representation, participative decision-making through consultation with functional groups, etc.

Notwithstanding his case for a pluralist state, Laski concedes that ‘the state, so to say, is the crowning-point of the modern social edifice, and it is in its supremacy over all other associations of social grouping that its special nature is to be found.’⁸⁵ The reasons, which Laski attributes for this special nature, can be summarized as follows:

• Legally, every state has an organ whose authority is unlimited (Foundations of Sovereignty)
• State is an association in which membership is compulsory (Grammar of Politics)
• State is territorial in nature (Grammar of Politics)
• State enforces law upon all who live within its boundaries (An Introduction to Politics)
• State is a way of regulating human conduct (An Introduction to Politics)
• State being a ‘public service corporation’ serving common needs of members must control other associations to the degree that secures from them the service such needs require (Grammar of Politics)

Laski's varying position between the pluralist state and the state as crowning-point of modern social edifice needs to be reconciled at one point or the other with an overall coordinating role he concedes to the State. This reconciliation we find in the condition he invokes in giving allegiance to the State. Laski says, ‘we give … our allegiance to the state always upon the condition that its end, as a state, satisfies the end we set before ourselves. Its sovereignty is contingent upon our agreement to its exercise.’⁸⁶ Thus, the interest, happiness and good that the State seeks and pursues are the ones which we seek and in this the state provides the condition for individual happiness and development. This way, Laski provides his solution to the individual–state and groupstate anti-thesis. Laski elucidates this with the example of rights of citizens against the State, which the State itself lays and provides conditions for individuals attaining happiness.

We can say that though Laski starts as advocating a pluralist state he ends up conceding a coordinating role to the State. This leaves him with no option but to compromise with the existence of sovereignty, though contingent upon the State maintaining a condition of happiness of the individual. Laski's views of pluralism do not renounce sovereignty but rather reinterprets it to adjust to overall formulation of pluralism.

Internationalism and the State

The adherents of the traditional concept of sovereignty maintain that legally, international law and treaty obligations do not constitute legal limitations on the state's sovereignty. This is primarily due to the fact that they are at most, self-restricted as ‘voluntary assent of the state is necessary to their binding validity and that assent once given can be withdrawn.’⁸⁷ We can find examples of this in the approval or ratification procedure of nations. For example, in USA an international treaty or agreement to be effective and binding has to be ratified by the Senate. Similarly, approval of the Parliament is required for a treaty or agreement to be effective in India. As such, application of international law and treaty obligations can be considered as an extension of sovereign power of the states.

However, advocates of international law feel that in practice, universally recognized principle of international responsibility and international intercourse do not give much room for volition. We generally see that in today's world, nation's ability to stay away from forces of international law is really limited. Take, for example, the obligations under the World Trade Organization or the nuclear non-proliferation regimes. Notwithstanding participation of the nations in their negotiation and subjection of these treaties and obligations to their respective ratification, it is really doubtful whether nations could escape the force of these obligations without either being internationally sidelined or faced with economic or political sanctions.

We have seen previously, how Krabbe, Laski and Angell considered international law and internationalism as a factor limiting the state sovereignty.

Laski examines the logical outcome of the traditional theory of sovereignty, which may not regard international law in the same way as the national law is regarded given the superiority of the national law as command of the sovereign. Laski says ‘if … legal imperatives of the state are to be supreme, no other imperatives can be, logically, superior to them.’⁸⁸ He further adds that international law then can be valid only to the extent that the given state is willing to accept its substance. As such, international law in itself has no binding force and will become a law in a particular state through recognition as such by a given state.

Laski proceeds to refute these assumptions of the traditional theory of sovereignty on the following lines:⁸⁹

• International customs, treaties and arbitration agreements have given rise to a body of well-settled principles which, in the normal intercourse of the states, limit their activities in the same way as their national law does to its citizens.
• When a new state comes into being, it finds these settled principles as binding upon itself as though it were responsible for their creation.
• Scientific and economic changes in contemporary times make it impossible to leave the individual state free to make its own decisions in matters of common world concerns; unfettered discretion leads to war and is ‘fatal to the peace of other states’.
• As the will of the State secured primacy over all other associations within its territory, so has it become a political necessity to secure primacy of a common will within the society of states over the will of any given state. In other words, as individual will is subject to the system of legal imperatives laid down by the state, the will of the State must be subject to an overriding will in matters of common world concern.
• ‘Municipal law should be legally subordinate to international law.’ This is because demand by individual states for unfettered discretion is as impossible of acceptance as demand by the individual citizen for legal right to an unlimited will.
• The fact that states break international law should not diminish the importance of the latter as municipal law is also violated by individual citizens.
• The argument that the society of states has not yet evolved satisfactory organs in the legislative spheres for the development of international law cannot vitiate its necessity. The creation of the League of Nations (and latter of the United Nations) presents a record of conflict between the new principle of ‘international interdependence and its consequences, and the old principle of sovereignty’.
• ‘Unlimited and irresponsible state is incompatible with the interests of humanity’⁹⁰ and the ‘sovereignty of the state in the world to which we belong is as obsolete as the sovereignty of the Roman Church three hundred years ago.’⁹¹

Critical Evaluation of Pluralist Theory

Our critical evaluation of the pluralist theory may assess it as a critique of the monist theory of sovereignty and as a theory of a pluralist state.

The advocates of the monist doctrine of sovereignty focused on legal functions of the State at the cost of exclusion of social forces, which determine the content and limits of law. Although writers like Bodin and Austin recognized limits on the sovereign, their recognition was more a moral concession than politically constructed restrictions. Bodin puts limitations in terms of law of God and nature (inviolability of private property) and Salic law (exclusion of females from French dynastic rules) and Austin in terms of opinion and sentiments current in the community as limiting legal control of the State. These at best, can be described as amorphous and particularistic limitations which cannot be part of a well constructed limitation on the state so far as individual liberty and group autonomy in society are concerned. Further, Hobbes's Leviathan cannot even tolerate groups, which he describes as ‘worms in the entrails’ of the body politic. In the hands of some of the idealist writers like Hegel, it is taken to tyrannical implications in political spheres in the cover of moral absolutism of the State—’march of the god on earth’.

Pluralists’ attack on the traditional theory of sovereignty emerges out of this fear and the monistic claim of legal supremacy. On the one hand, this makes the pluralists repudiate the traditional theory of sovereignty and on the other, to supplant it with a vision of pluralist state. We may analyse how successful the pluralist approach has been in this endeavour without forgetting the context in which it emerged and the valuable contributions it made to the political concepts of limited government, political consent and representation, individual and group liberty, authority etc.

Failure of the pluralist approach as critique of traditional/monist concept of sovereignty may be summarized as follows:

• On legal basis, pluralists’ rejection of sovereignty depends on the denial of the idea of legal sovereignty. They deny that law is command of the sovereign and is created by the State. They also reject the idea that state is a legal order with a determinate superior or body of men to sanction and impose its imperatives. Duguit, Krabbe and MacIver seek to locate the origin of law in society—'sense of right’ or ‘condition of social solidarity’ or social customs, traditions and its requirements. By doing so, they are arguing for the contents of law and not merely its formalization. However, though they seek to shift the location and origin of law, they fail to provide an answer to the question: how to decide and formalize what is sense of right or condition of social solidarity and who decides when these give rise to conflict in society? Secondly, they invariably end up conceding to the State or its organ, the right to formalize and give expression to these social requirements or laws.
• For Duguit, the State should, through its action, secure social solidarity, while Krabbe does not deny that there could be organs that issue commands and make decisions obeyed by the bulk of the community in a state. According to MacIver, part of social law, which has origin in society, in turn is reinforced, reaffirmed, and enlarged as the law of the state. This way, despite shifting the location and origin of law from the sovereign to the social platform, the pluralist could not completely challenge the traditional claim that any law to be called law per se requires state's sanction and must be, what Coker calls, prescribed. Coker opines that ‘law is what the community demands to be attained through the prescription of the state.’⁹² Laski in his Foundations of Sovereignty accepts that there exists a definite organ in the State to which prescription of law can be attributed. He says, ‘legally no one can deny that there exists in every state some organ whose authority is unlimited.’⁹³ Thus, neither legal primacy of the State nor it as a legal order is adequately challenged by pluralists. We have seen previously, how Duguit's doctrine of law was challenged and denounced by French jurists like Esmein, Hauriou, Malberg and Michoud as ‘legal anarchism. K. C. Hsiao, on the other hand, feels that the principle of social solidarity as the basis of law will substitute ‘a social monism for political absolutism.’⁹⁴
• Suppose we accept that law, to be legitimately enforced, requires its content and essential characteristics to be socially relevant, i.e., based on social practices and prevalent opinion. Even then pluralists cannot escape the contradiction, which springs from state acting against many prevalent social practices that are inhuman, retrograde and exploitative. Lets us take the example of social legislation in India in the field of abolition of untouchability, sati, child marriage, etc. These are practices, which in a historical context have been socially or religiously accepted. If these represent ‘sense of right’ of majority or ‘condition of social solidarity’ or requirement of society, then the Indian state, instead of abolishing them, should have crowned them as law. In short, we can say that the State through its law may achieve exactly the opposite of what the pluralists seek in social basis.
• In the Marxian sense, pluralism by giving primacy to ‘condition of social solidarity’ or ‘sense of right’ as basis of law actually amounts to sanctioning dominant economic relations in society. In some respects, like the law protecting right to private property may be said to have been a reflection of dominant economic relations in a society. In any case, for the Marxian perspective, law in a class-divided society, either in the form of command of the sovereign or condition of social solidarity or sense of right of the majority, is a class instrument and part of an ideological apparatus. Laski, in his Grammar of Politics accepted that ‘the weakness, as now I see, of pluralism is clear enough. It did not sufficiently realize the nature of the state as an expression of class relations’ and further added that ‘if it be the fact … that the State is inevitably the instrument of that class which owns the instruments of production, the objective of the pluralist must be the classless society.’⁹⁵ However, this Marxian position for Laski equally applies in refuting legal order. He says, ‘The legal order is a mask behind which a dominant economic interest secures the benefit of political authority.’⁹⁶
• By posing the doctrine of group personality, pluralists seek not only to recognize existence of diverse groups but also argue for dispersal of power amongst these groups. This dispersal of power, of course, is meant to downsize state sovereignty. Existence of diversity and groups in society has been accepted and cherished in different degrees by a series of political and social thinkers including Aristotle, Durkheim, Syndicalists, Guild Socialists, group theorists like Bentley and Dahl and others. In fact, it was Plato, Hobbes and Hegel who actively derided such groups in society. For Plato and Hegel, it was challenge to organic unity of the State and for Hobbes they were worms in the body politic, a challenge to the Leviathan. In order to refute not only the legal but also the moral sovereignty, the State is placed at par with and in the league with other associations and groups by pluralists. By doing so, they deal with a fundamental issue of political theory, i.e., individual–state anti-thesis. Within the overall framework of liberal theory, pluralism seems to suggest that an individual seeks liberty and development of self as a member of a variety of groups to which his/her affiliations are natural and loyalty deeper. Family, Church, Club and Trade Union, all are expressions of emotional, religious, cultural or recreational and economic or professional requirements. As such, these groups are independent of and prior to state's sanction. This premise is to challenge the monist concepts that groups persons as collection of individuals can be only a fiction, ‘individual is the only juridical personality’⁹⁷ worth their rights and duties and existence of groups is only a concession of the sovereign authority. This way the concept that sovereign is a grantor of rights and duties to any group in juridical terms is refuted.
• How far are pluralists successful in refuting the sovereignty of the State by posing the doctrine of group personality? First of all, some of the pluralists like Barker do not agree with the ‘real personality’ concept and accept only jurist terms. Secondly, different pluralists argue for different associations. For example, Figgis focused primarily on church. Though pluralists generally argue that loyalties of individuals to groups are deeper and their affiliations more natural, Laski and Follett agree that no one group can encompass all the interests of an individual. It is also generally true that loyalty of an individual cannot be exclusive, as groups do not exist parallel to each other. For example, loyalty to church and trade union at times may be at variation. Given this, how can we accept primacy of any one group? In fact, this would do just the opposite to what pluralists seek. Thirdly, while arguing for decentralization of authority to groups, pluralists, it seems, speak of decentralization of sovereignty. Laski says ‘Sovereignty, in fact, necessarily to be distributed in order that the purpose of men may be achieved.’⁹⁸ It seems sovereignty is not completely abandoned but what Andrew Vincent calls, pluralized. This presents a contradiction in itself. If sovereignty implies supremacy, how can this be possible that at the same time various groups are supreme? Will it not be like declaring all ethnic and linguistic groups as nations though saying that they are part of a nation-state?
• Barker, Lindsay, Follett and Laski accept that groups should be regulated by the State. And this is required in most of the cases to ensure individual liberty from coercion of groups. For example, in case of independence of the church, what guarantee is there that its members will not be subjected to coercion under various pretexts? Coker's remark in this context is worth considering. He says, ‘There appears to be an underlying assumption in most pluralistic writing that if only an individual is released from state control, then we shall have a condition in which spontaneous action, self-expression and initiative, will enjoy free play. But many who raise the loudest outcry against state encroachments upon individual or group freedom are the most ardent supporters, or the most complacent tolerant, of other forms of social coercion.’⁹⁹ We find that while pluralists seek to enlarge individual freedom and freedom of groups against the State, they fail to secure freedom of the individual against the groups, lest they invite the State to do that. Not only this, state's intervention is also called upon when there is conflict between interests of the individual as member of one association with that of the other or for that matter, with that of the State itself. As such, the individual–state antithesis remains unresolved and individual–group anti-thesis is to be mediated first. This requires the State to be a regulator.
• The freedom or independence of groups and their equality vis-à-vis the state poses another significant practical problem in a multi-religious and welfare state. For example, freedom for church in a multi-religious society amounts to equal freedom for all religious groups and their institutionalized seat of religious organization be it Christian church, Muslim mosque, Hindu temple, Jewish synagogue or Buddhist vihara. Left without intervention, potential conflict amongst these groups cannot be avoided. Further, the concept of secular state requires that not any one of these groups dictate their terms to the detriment of any minority group in the political, economic and other fields. Not only to avoid social conflict but also to fulfil certain welfare functions, the primacy of the state is called for. As one writer maintains, this would call for subjecting the groups to both civil and criminal law of the land formulated by the State and also to the taxation law.¹⁰⁰
• Laski and MacIver have sought to relate the authority of the State with the service provided by it. MacIver says that since the State does not provide an all-encompassing service, it has no claim to an overarching authority. Similarly, Laski says, ‘The authority of the State is a function of its ability to satisfy the effective demands that are made upon it.’¹⁰¹ However, we can argue that it is not the quantitative aspects of service—how many types of service the State provides—rather whether, as Coker says, ‘the comprehensive and compulsive authority exercised by the State is essential for maintenance of justice and social welfare.’¹⁰² In fact, several functions of the State are of primary importance even as conditions for existence of these groups. Functions like defence, policing, taxation, public infrastructure, etc., cannot be done by any group.
• Pluralists not only reject the monist doctrine but also cherish a vision of a pluralist state. This vision gets its reflection in phrases which term the state as ‘association of associations’, organization of organizations’, or ‘societies of societies’. In this way, state becomes an ensemble of various groups and its authority federal leading to dispersal of power. This formulation also implies that authority, instead of being vertical, is coordinate or parallel. Now, given the fact that state cannot be either ‘association of associations’ or ‘organization of organizations’ or ‘societies of societies’ without assuming a coordinating, regulative and adjudicating role over other groups, pluralists with varying degrees accept the primacy of the state in this field. Some, like Follett, sound unpluralistic as when she declares that ‘home of my soul is in the state.’ Laski is equally conceding when he terms the state as ‘crowning-point of modern social edifice’ enjoying supremacy over other social groupings. In this way, authority necessarily becomes vertical or pyramidal with the State having larger or even a supreme share. Pluralists, while pointing to a goal in which the state is reduced to a lower level or at par with and in league with other groups, at times come back to what Coker says, ‘pretty closely to a thoroughly monistic position.’
• Pluralists also fail to clearly state the objective and organizational structure of the pluralist state. What is the organization, scheme and authority structure of a non-sovereign pluralist state? The fact that the pluralist state is ‘association of associations’, organization of organizations’, or ‘societies of societies’, it ‘integrates but does not absorb’ groups. K. C. Hsiao has defined pluralist state as one in which ‘there exists no single source of authority that is all competent and comprehensive.’¹⁰³ If this is the pluralist state, then who does the regulation, adjustment and coordination, which pluralists seek.
• Significantly, the pluralist state is not aimed at advocating social and cultural pluralism. It does not envisage a multicultural society or does not support cultural relativism. It seeks only to advocate diversity of groups for limiting state sovereignty. It says power should be dispersed amongst various groups in society, but it is silent as how the parity and equality of this power be maintained amongst the groups.

Thus, we find that despite their rejection of the monist theory of sovereignty, pluralists have not been able to give a coherently structured alternative. We can capture the pluralist's dilemma as follows:

• They want sovereignty to be rejected but at the same time seek to pluralize it, which is a contradiction in itself.
• They want the state to be discredited but also that it should be there to regulate, adjust and coordinate the group activities and social life. And that too without precision and scope of this regulation, adjustment or coordination.
• They say authority of law is beyond the State, but want the State to give it formal expression.
• They want a pluralist state with ‘maximal diversity of groups but within an over-arching authority’.¹⁰⁴
• They want to ensure individual liberty and freedom by securing autonomy of groups to which an individual has deeper loyalties. But accept that no one group encompasses all the interests of the individual and there can be conflict between the one and the other requiring the same freedom to be preserved by the state against which they labour their arguments.
• In their zeal to protect group autonomy, pluralists forget that groups can be equally, if not more, ‘oppressive, mean-minded and destructive of liberty as any state’.
• Summing up their dilemma, Coker says, ‘The pluralists have not made clear the implication of their criticism of the monistic doctrine … Will they expunge from political theory the principle of compulsory taxation and compulsory citizenship applied to persons by virtue of residence rather by virtue of voluntary memberships?’¹⁰⁵

However, notwithstanding their dilemma, the pluralist approach underlined the fact that state should not claim moral absolutism and legal supremacy at the cost of the freedom that an individual enjoyed through affiliations to various groups in society. Mary Parker Follett, a pluralist but at times waging an unpluralistic note, summarizes contribution of pluralism as¹⁰⁶:

• Pluralists prickled the bubble of the State's right to supremacy.
• They recognized the value of the groups and pointed out that the significance of variety of group life must be recognized in political life.
• They pleaded that the interests of the State is always identical with the interests of its parts.
• Pluralism thus marked the beginning of disappearance of the people as a mere crowd.
• It seized upon the problem of associations and federalism in respect of sovereignty.

Nevertheless, we should not miss the fact that pluralists argue for what Vincent calls ‘a notion of the state’ and that notion is based on ‘pluralist state mediated by a complex vision of group life’. Thus, in the end it seems, they retain the State and adjust it to suit pluralist vision. While they denounce and expunge state sovereignty and declare it unfruitful, they concede enough roles to the state and at times, they reach the same conclusion that an innocuous monist would reach. Our present-day experience in the functioning of the welfare state suggests that authority of the state has been justified. On the other hand, however, influence of groups cannot be ignored either, which appears in the form of pressure or interest groups. The theories of power élite (C. Wright Mills) or dominant proprietary classes (Pranab Bardhan) suggest that pluralist's idea of power dispersal may not be realistic as it would always be taken advantage of by a few groups. Robert Dahl's theory of polyarchy, however, shows that bargaining by various groups within the polity amongst themselves and also with the State may ensure equilibrium and fair play.

We can conclude by saying that to see the problem of sovereignty and power of the State only in legal terms as if it is detached from the power relations in society and seek a solution by distributing it amongst the groups in society, as the pluralists do, is to miss the real issue. Without addressing the issue of power structure in society and its economic relations, neither legal sovereignty nor pluralized sovereignty can secure the real freedom and self-realization of the individual. In fact, ‘liberal-capitalist society will become unworkable without some hegemony of power …’¹⁰⁷ and the pluralist state conceptualized within the liberal framework will come very near to what the anarchists argue for. To save this ignominy, the pluralists rightly install ‘the state as neutral arbiter or umpire’ and in the end do not disturb the liberal-capitalist apple cart.

Other Critiques of Sovereignty

After a rather lengthy discussion on the pluralists’ criticism of sovereignty, we may now turn to some other trends or approaches, which besides being critical to the state and sovereignty also, at times, reject the necessity of state and sovereignty. These criticisms may involve: (i) pluralistic arguments based on groups like professional and economic associations by the Guild socialists; (ii) class arguments based on trade unions by Syndicalists; (iii) rule of the proletariat like Marxists; (iv) arguments in terms of interest-based feeling of individual by Modern individualists; and (v) arguments based on denial of any authority by anarchists. Their criticism of the State implies a denial or dilution of sovereignty. In fact, our taking up these approaches as criticism of sovereignty is premised on the fact that they share a common theme of ‘opposition to a centrally constituted authority’ i.e., the state. Pluralists, Guild socialists, Syndicalists, Anarchists and Modern Individualists and Marxists approaches, all share the same theme, though in different degrees.

Guild Socialism

During medieval Europe, Guild system has emerged as a part of the diffused power structure. Guild refers to ‘association of merchants and craftspeople in medieval Europe, formed to give help and advice to its members and to make regulations and set standards for a particular trade.’¹⁰⁸ Each member of an autonomous Guild owned the instruments with which he worked, and determined the nature and extent of his work. Many of the ideas of the pluralists, like role of groups and dispersal of power, were influenced by the medieval Guild system and their autonomy. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, while pluralism was gaining its momentum against the constituted authority of the state, writers like A. J. Penty in his book The Restoration of the Guild System advocated ‘a return to the medieval principle of self-government in industry.¹⁰⁹ The idea of organizing industry on the basis of craftsman further emerged in the form of the argument that the decision-making structure either in economic or political field, should be organized on the professional or occupational basis. After Penty, S. G. Hobson, A. R. Orage and significantly, G. D. H. Cole contributed to the Guild Socialist theory. Cole in his book, Self-Government in Industry, advocated a clear-cut theory of self-government in industry by the workers. We find that Laski also advocated industrial federalism and was sympathetic to the Guild Socialist cause. Figgis, in fact, thought that Guild Socialism was a form of pluralism and might be successfully practised.¹¹⁰ It may not be inappropriate to mention that Guild Socialism as a trend was primarily confined in Britain.

The Guild Socialist theory can be said to be a critique of the theory of state and sovereignty in two ways. Firstly, it advocates industrial democracy, i.e., self-government in industry so that industry is administered by the workers and rejects any role of the state in industrial and production functions. As we will see below, Cole denies any role to the State in production and industrial matters and also rejects any coordinating role to the State. Secondly, it also enunciates the principle that ‘power and responsibility in society should be related and proportional to the importance of the functions which individuals perform in the service of the community.’¹¹¹ Thus, as a reaction against a centralized and all-embracing State, it advocates devolution of powers and functions to a number of different bodies in the form of functional democracy. Functional democracy implies representation on functional criteria and not merely on territorial criteria.

Cole's book Self-Government in Industry by advocating industrial democracy was also an implied criticism of Collectivism and State Socialism. Both, Collectivism and State Socialism supported the state's role in the industrial and production field. Cole thought that the state is the most unsuitable agency for conducting industrial activities. This unsuitability arises from what Guild Socialists say evils of bureaucracy and its conducting public-owned industry in a manner organized from above. Instead, they say control of administration of industry must be organized from below. Further, this exclusion of the State from industrial and production activities is also premised on the reasoning that ‘those spheres of social action which affect different members of it in different degrees and in different ways’¹¹² should be excluded from the primary function of the state. As production is largely related to respective workers, the State should not interfere. Cole divides the activities in what the state can control, like consumer activities (income, prices) and political activities, and which it cannot control like economic activities, production and coordinating functions. Not only Cole restricts the State from production activities, he denies any coordination activity to the State.

Cole regarded the state as an association of consumers and as one of many associations. He held that the State ‘ought not to be dominant over other associations which represent men in their different capacity as producers, fellow-worshippers, common believers, etc.’¹¹³ Like pluralists, Cole supports the existence of variety of groups and associations as representing affiliations of individuals. As such, in Guild Socialism, the State would be relegated to ‘the role of an association of consumers, representing a number of bodies elected on national basis for the purpose of negotiating with the big producing Guilds.’¹¹⁴ As compared to pluralists like Barker, Lindsay, Follett and Laski who conceded coordinating function to the state, Cole gives no coordination or adjusting function to the State and hence no sovereignty. He says, ‘To entrust the State with the function of coordination would be to entrust it, in many cases, with the task of arbitrating between itself and some other functional associations.’¹¹⁵

S. G. Hobson also thought the state as an unsuitable agency for economic functions and running the industry. However, he assigned legislative and executive functions to the State like civic amenities, taxation, education, health, protection, etc. Moreover, unlike Cole, Hobson allows sovereignty of the State over the guilds when he says, ‘we remain socialists because we believe that in the final analysis the State as representing the community at large must be the final arbiter.’¹¹⁶

The theory of functional democracy is applied by the Guild Socialists both in industrial as well as political spheres. Industrial activities and production should be organized in the form of a National Guild and similarly in the political sphere, there should be provision of functional representation where all interests of society are represented. Thus, producers’ guilds, consumers’ councils, cultural councils, health councils, etc. are advocated. In general, all these functional interests are conceived to federate locally and regionally. According to Cole, producers and functional interests federated as such would result in National Guilds and would be the basis for a National Guild Congress. On the other hand, consumers’ interests and interests which are national affairs affecting equally all the inhabitants like taxation and law, defence, standard of education etc., could be represented on geographical basis. Joad, understanding Cole in the latter sense, adds, ‘men's will in respect to them are best represented on a national body not dissimilar to the existing parliament.’¹¹⁷ Thus, we have a National Guild Congress and a Parliament as representative bodies both representing two streams of interests and as a check on each other. But for Cole, none is sovereign, ‘Neither parliament not the Guild congress can claim to be ultimate sovereign: the one is supreme territorial association, the other, the supreme professional association.’¹¹⁸ Thus, we find that Guild Socialism, seeks to limit state power and its sovereignty.

We may mention here that Sydney and Beatrice Webb, Fabian Socialists, also conceived of two parliaments namely, ‘Social Parliament’ and ‘Political Parliament’ on similar lines. However, it would be very difficult to divide the interests of individuals as such. It may be mentioned that in some of the existing parliaments, for example in India, some representation is ensured on the basis of various interests in terms of culture, social service, industry, etc.

We should not forget that the Guild Socialists were arguing from the Marxist perspective that ‘economic power precedes political power’ and thought that production and economic activity must be in control of the workers and producers. Based on their understanding of the economic relations, they argued for a limited state intervention on behalf of the consumers and territorial based interests. As such, we can say that Guild Socialism, on the one hand, supports the pluralist idea of recognition of a variety of interests in society and on the other, deals with the aspects of class nature of economic relations, which pluralism lacked. It advocates a higher degree of opposition to the State and its sovereignty than pluralism. And this happens primarily due to the shift from a liberal framework to which pluralism remains committed to a Marxian framework which Guild Socialism espouses.

Syndicalism

As mentioned above, from pluralism to Guild Socialism, the degree of opposition to the State and its sovereignty increases. Syndicalism presents even a higher degree of rejection of the concept of State and its sovereignty. Syndicalism is based on the idea that Trade Union organizations as representatives of the interests of the workers should take over not only the means of production but also political functions presently performed by the State. The Syndicalist perspective is based on the understanding of society in class terms on the line of Marx and on Proudhon's ‘Associative Communism’¹¹⁹ implying free organization of voluntary associations. Syndicalism was primarily a French phenomenon and it influenced French Trade Unionism in a large way though it was also prominent in United States. Syndicalism was influenced by Marxian concepts and Proudhon's ideas. Its philosophic advocates and propagandists include Sorel, Lagardelle, Pelloutier, Pouget and others.

Basic understanding of Syndicalism on society, state and economic relations can be summarized as follows:

• Economic relations based on private ownership is characterized by irreconcilable class war, as Marx says.
• Capital is viewed primarily as theft as Proudhon advocated.
• State is viewed as a bourgeois and middle-class institution serving as an instrument of capitalist exploitation.
• Service of the state is characterized as bureaucratic and unsympathetic to the needs of the workers who are engaged in actual work of production.
• Democracy, political parties or any form of state organization of society cannot serve the interests of the workers.
• The workers who create value should be controllers of society—principle of producer's control.
• Principle of producer's control means that workers as producers should exercise control not only in economic or industrial spheres but also in political spheres.
• Political sphere with the State as its organ should cease to exist and its functions should be taken over by bodies of producers organized on vocational basis.

Unlike Guild Socialism, Syndicalism advocated an anti-state theory. From the perspective of producers’ control, state vanishes and its functions are taken over by voluntary associations. However, having advocated only from the producer's perspective, Syndicalists faced criticism due to their neglect of consumers’ perspective. For example, it was pointed out that who should control services likes fire and police protection, administration of justice or for that matter, sewers? Is it not that these should be controlled by consumers of these services than those engaged in these occupations—the producers. Largely to contain such criticisms, in 1919, the CGT (Confederation Generale du Travail—federation of local and district trade unions in France that was instrumental in the Syndicalist movement) adopted a programme, which called for nationalization of key industries with joint control of producers and consumers.¹²⁰

Anarchism

Now we may turn to a theory that stands for a categorical rejection of the State as an ‘unnecessary evil’ and advocates liberation of the individual from any form of authority. Anarchism, as a political philosophy, not only rejects state sovereignty but denounces any form of authority—yoke of private property, authority of religion and yoke of state and law. The basic Anarchist anti-state thought emerges from their belief that origin of state and any form of authority is due to force. As such, any authority or relationship based on force impedes fuller development of the individual and progress towards perfection. Prominent advocates of the Anarchist doctrine include William Godwin, Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Michael Bakunin and Prince Peter Kropotkin.

Anarchism mounts its criticism of the state and its power or sovereignty using the orthodox Marxian framework. The goal of free organization without any coercive authority advocated by Anarchism is similar to that stage in the post-revolutionary phase, which in the Marxian scheme of things comes after the state ‘withers away’. According to Kropotkin, Anarchism is ‘a principle or theory of life and conduct under which, society is conceived without government—harmony in such a society being obtained not by submission to law, or by obedience to any authority, but by free agreements concluded between the various groups, territorial and professional …’¹²¹ Thus, government or any authority or law stands abolished and a society based on free groups is envisaged. All Anarchists were driven by the vision that only in an Anarchist society the individual would be able to develop his full capacity and to realize his full potential.

Anarchists are opposed to any form of government or law or state. They believe that the State has been an instrument to protect monopolies and property, which belong to all. Government and law have so far been used to ensure what has been produced by all is shared unjustly. Anarchists show that the state is ‘superfluous’ and reason out that the State is not necessary. They invoke concrete illustrations and show that the state is not necessary for education, defence, security, art, science, or even business matters. In short, we can say that the Anarchist advocates a theory of abolition of state, law, government, courts, private property, religion and any form of power that coerces individual and corrupts men's nature. They declare the State to be superfluous, government as unnecessary, private property as theft, religion as an ally of the state, and power as corrupting. Thus, we have a theory, which is an unmitigated denial of any authority and advocates abolition of the State.

Modern Individualism

Views and arguments put forward by some of the writers like Norman Angell and Graham Wallas have been grouped as emerging from ‘distrust of the power of the overdeveloped state’. Emergence of various groups and voluntary associations for economic and ethical purposes to which many of individual's need could be met like trade unions, clubs, questions the exclusivity of the state. Further, due to various factors like war and ‘war-time psychology’ and also perceived tyranny of the majority rule, realization to secure the liberty of the individual has been felt. Some writers have expressed apprehension of the dangers of majority rule, spontaneity of mob mind, weight of public opinion, which may jeopardize individual liberty and minority opinion. Joad has formulated this reaction in these words:

It has become important, therefore, to evolve a political theory which would recognize in the first place that the transfer of legal sovereignty to the majority of the moment under the name of the State is no guarantee of universal happiness, and would endeavour in the second, by dispersing the powers and functions of the State over as wide an area as possible, to afford the individual some protection against the mass.¹²²

Basically, modern individualism seeks to protect the individual from tyranny of the majority and public opinion, which results from representative governments. Legal sovereignty of the state, for all practical purposes, is expressed through the government and generally government is elected on a majority basis. Public opinion and spontaneous mass mind works in producing a government. If it is left to itself, individual liberty and minority opinion would get a setback. We may note here that J. S. Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville had expressed similar apprehension against majoritarian tyranny. Laski has also opposed sovereignty by saying that government is run by fallible men and leaving enormous power in the hands of government in the name of state sovereignty is inimical.

Norman Angell advocated that men are united by a ‘community of feeling based on economic interests … which transcends national and geographical boundaries’.¹²³ This was against the call for patriotic feeling during war-time as it advocated para-national bond. He hoped that national state might get merged in an international order of society based on economic class basis. Graham Wallas argued that the territorially elected government might not be useful and representative of the society to administer the socially owned means of production in case of transference of means of production from private to social ownership. Geographical basis of election may not result in a representative government due to influence of the popular press, boosted by various interests etc. He advocated two Chambers, one for representing geographical basis and other for vocational basis. His objective is to safeguard the individual from the evils of the unrestricted majority rule.

Advocates of modern individualism argue that state power is not required for the development of individual. Two main reasons that emerge are common economic interests transcending state boundary and majority rule based on public opinion. State power and its sovereignty should not be pleaded for, lest it may result in government based on majority crushing the minority and the individual.

Marxist Critique of State Sovereignty

Central to the Marxist understanding of society is the differentiation between infrastructure and superstructure. The Marxian theory gives primacy to the economic structure of society, which consists of forces and relation of production. Forces of production imply the capacity of society to produce and may include organization of human labour, scientific and technical knowledge, technological equipments and forces, etc. Relation of production, arising out of the productive process, implies relations in ownership of the means of production. For example, in a capitalist society, proletariat or the working class represents the human force of production and capitalist ownership defines the relations of production. For Marx, it is this ‘infrastructure’ or the ‘base’ consisting of forces of production and relation of production that determines all other aspects of society. These all other aspects of society constitute the ‘superstructure’ and include political and legal, social and cultural, religious and philosophical and ideological aspects and are determined by what happens to the infrastructure. Generally, notwithstanding variations in treatment of state by different theorists within the Marxist fold, it is agreed that the State belongs to the ‘superstructure’. Though ‘Marx did not develop a systematic or coherent theory of the state … In general sense, he believed that the state is part of a “superstructure” that is determined or conditioned by the economic “base” …’¹²⁴

It follows that whosoever owns the means of production and has a dominant position in relations of production will determine the nature of the superstructure. In the capitalist society, the capitalist, as a class, owns the means of production and its interests will be the primary concern that the superstructure will reflect. The State as part of the superstructure is an instrument to serve the interests of the dominant class. Since the capitalist relation of production is exploitative, the State is a coercive apparatus, which help maintain and sustain capitalist means of production. In The Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx declares, ‘Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political advance of that class. … the bourgeoisie has at last, …, conquered for itself in the modern representative State, exclusive sway. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.’¹²⁵ This view of the State as product of need of and dependent on the dominant class and as instrument of class exploitation finds its support in Engels in his book The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State and in Lenin in his book The State and Revolution. Engels writes,¹²⁶ ‘The state is, …, by no means a power forced on society from without; …, it is a product of society at a certain stage of development …’and further,

Because the state arose from the need to hold class antagonism in check, but because it arose, at the same time, in the midst of conflict of these, it is as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which, through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class.

Similarly, Lenin¹²⁷ also describes the state as ‘a Product of the Irreconcilability of Class Antagonism’ and ‘an Instrument of the Exploitation of the Oppressed Class.’ It means that when the need for and condition of exploitation ends, state may not be necessary. With the triumph of the proletariat and social means of production, state shall, what Engels calls, ‘wither away’.

From the above orthodox Marxian position on state, we may summarize and imply the following criticism of state and sovereignty:

• State is a historical product and has emerged due to emergence of antagonist classes in society.
• State belongs to superstructure which is conditioned by the relations obtaining in the economic structure (base or infrastructure), it serves the interests of the dominant class.
• State is a coercive and exploitative instrument which is used against the proletariat.
• State is used to coerce the working class and maintain order so that unequal capitalist relation and exploitative conditions are maintained.
• State is neither natural nor essential; when class antagonism ends with the triumph of the majority, i.e., the rule of the working class and social means of production is installed after the revolution, state will ‘wither away’.

However, before the State withers away, the proletariat will use the State during the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ to repress and subdue the other classes. This is primarily because ‘The dictatorship of proletariat was seen as a means of safeguarding the gains of the revolution by preventing counter-revolution mounted by the dispossessed bourgeoisie.’¹²⁸ Lenin while discussing the withering away of the State, and violent revolution says, ‘The proletariat seizes state power and turns the means of production into state property to begin with. But thereby it abolishes itself as the proletariat, abolishes all class distinctions and class antagonism, and abolishes also the state as state.’¹²⁹ We find that the capitalist state will not wither away as such unless it has been taken over by the proletariat as a consequence of the revolution and used in the transition phase for bringing what Lenin calls ‘complete democracy’. State as complete democracy is characterized by rule of the proletariat, taking possession of means of production in the name of whole society, removing any presence of bourgeois class and abolition of all classes. According to Lenin, ‘the political form of the “state” at that time is the most complete democracy.’ And he adds, ‘the state in general, i.e., the most complete democracy can only “wither away’”¹³⁰ Thus, Marxian view of state treats it as an instrument of power and force and seeks to use it as such before writing its epitaph. Sovereignty in the Marxian sense is nothing but coercive power of the State that is used by each dominant class. So will the dominant class of the proletariat use it after the revolution and before both the class distinction and the State vanish.

An alternative view of Marx relating to the state and its position in the mode of production where it has been hinted that the State could be ‘relatively autonomous’ from the class system and which has been further elaborated by neo-Marxists like Miliband, Poulantzas, Althusser and Gramsci will be taken up later in this book. Suffice it to say here that these theorists have argued that by maintaining a position of relative autonomy, the state creates a position of hegemony, which largely helps maintain bourgeois domination. Hegemony can be defined as ‘the ability of a dominant class to exercise power by winning the consent of those it subjugates, as an alternative to the use of coercion.’¹³¹ Thus, both the Marxian positions—state as class instrument and state as relatively autonomous, emphasize that state can be understood only in terms of unequal class relations and as a means either of oppression or subtle hegemony. In both the cases, it serves the capitalist society and the capitalist class.

Contemporary Challenges to Sovereignty

The preceding approaches and criticism of the traditional concept of legal supremacy of the State present theoretical perspectives against the centralized and organized authority of the State understood as sovereignty. In the following discussions, our aim is to present those factors and challenges that are the result of interactive processes and not theoretical but processual. These processual challenges emerge not only from the phenomenon called globalization but also from interstate relations including foreign policy intervention; subtle form of dependencies like neo-colonialism; interaction with para-statal organizations like MNCs, NGOs; influence of multilateral organizations like IMF, World Bank and WTO; global issues transcending state boundaries like environmental issues, nuclear issues and human rights and terrorism. There are also factors like intra-state ethnic and civil strife, sub-nationalism, and secessionist movements within the State that severely challenge and restrict the power of the State. Due to all these factors and processes we find that the traditional concept of the sovereignty stands severely challenged and at times, left doubtful both in terms of external and internal sovereignty.

Neo-colonialism

Imperialism and colonialism implied relationship of dominance on and subjugation of the acquired state/territory. And as such, the sovereignty of the State conquered did not exist independent of the colonial rule. It has been argued that imperialism and colonialism, now, has been substituted by a new phenomenon called ‘neo-colonialism’. Kwame Nkrumah in his book, Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism declared that after imperialism, relations between the developed and post-colonial states manifested in the new form of dependencies. Nkrumah having struggled anti-colonial struggle and being the first president of Ghana was apprehensive of the new form of dependency of the post-colonial states on their erstwhile masters and major powers and their influence on the autonomy, decision making and developmental priorities of the post colonial states. His apprehension was based on the dominance of the former colonial powers and other major powers in the international monetary bodies, world markets, operation of the multinational corporations and a variety of other institutions.

Neo-colonialism has been identified as a ‘subtle form of imperialism … through which industrialized powers control foreign territory by economic domination while respecting the territory's formal political independence.’¹³² As such, it represents a relationship between the former colonies and the imperialist powers in which despite political independence of the former, host of factors hampers their independent decision-making about resources, development and industrial progress. Without political domination, the erstwhile imperial powers and capitalist and financial interests in these countries continue to benefit in terms of raw material, cheap labour, market and at times arms supply. In a way, neo-colonialism challenges the traditional concept of state sovereignty, particularly its external sovereignty and internal priorities.

While discussing the relationships between the developed capitalist colonial powers, which he calls ‘metropolis’ and the underdeveloped countries, which he calls ‘periphery’, Andre Gunder Frank has captured the nature of neo-colonialism very succinctly. He says:

political independence and decolonization have not brought with them greater economic independence or accelerated economic development in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The post war years have been a period of ever greater incorporation of the underdeveloped economies into the world wide capitalist-imperialist system, penetrating them more deeply, tying them more firmly, and aggravating the structure of and the amount of underdevelopment still further.¹³³

Most of the post-colonial countries are dependent on their erstwhile imperialist powers/major powers in terms of: (i) Capital and investment, (ii) Technical expertise, (iii) Technology and heavy machinery, (iv) Arms and defence equipments, etc. Due to these dependencies, the post-colonial countries though they have acquired status of nation-states; remain within the ‘sphere of influence’ of former colonial powers.¹³⁴ Their formal independence has not led to real independence where they can choose their won developmental strategy and decide their national priorities.

Apart from dependencies in terms of factors mentioned above, operation of the multinational corporations, which invariably originate in the erstwhile colonial countries, furthers neo-colonial relations. The effort through the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the United Nation Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to achieve an equitable international economic order and favourable terms of trade has been replaced by the process of World Trade Organization (WTO). It goes without saying that developing countries are still struggling to gain favourable terms of trade and economic transactions. Other than petroleum prices for which formation of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has, to some extent, ensured favourable terms of trade, no such platform or initiatives exist for other raw materials of trade and commerce.

The above descriptions and analysis suggest that neo-colonialism has largely hampered and restricted universal evolution of the nation-state and distorted its emergence in most parts of Africa, Asia and America. Our exposition of globalization could further develop on this aspect and it is interesting to see whether globalization has any bearing on this relationship. It is widely felt in the developing countries that the operation of the American-European based MNCs, regulation of international economic-financial market and trade and commerce by the IMF–World Bank–WTO trio along with the policy of the major powers on various issues of international concerns like nuclear, human rights, environmental, etc. do not give a favourable condition for the development and progress of the developing countries and severely restrict their sovereign decision-making.

Supra-national and Para-statal Organizations and Sovereignty

The nation-state has never acted in vacuum and the very fact of interaction amongst them could lead to some form of integration or consolidation or association, transcending the logic of national boundary. Broadly, three forms of association or supra-national integration could be observed: politico-military associations in the form of military blocs, economic associations in the form of regional economic or trade cooperation and cultural associations. These three may not operate exclusively of each other but may feed and get fed by the other. Further, they generally involve some form of regionalism.

Politico-military blocs like NATO and Warsaw Pact affected the operation of nation-states during the cold war periods by setting bloc priorities over the priorities of the nation-states in terms of communist and capitalist goals. In the post–cold-war era, NATO continues to exist and in the absence of its original opposition (the communist bloc states), keeps looking for, and in many cases creates new enemies. In fact, after the formal declaration of end of cold war, NATO has extended its membership to even newly liberated states, who were part of erstwhile Warsaw Pact bloc. NATO acts on the doctrine of collective defence, which stands for the principle that aggression or violation of national security of one nation-state is considered as aggression and violation of all the members. This doctrine of collective defence gives a new dimension to the concept of national security and arguably makes the nation-state no longer the primary focus of a standing national army. It may be added that the UN also enshrines the concept of collective security as the basis of international peace and security. Both these concepts have led to military interventions in the affairs of other nation-states.

During the bloc politics of the cold war, external sovereignty of many states was influenced by the First and the Second World conflict. However, most of the post-colonial/underdeveloped and developing states sought to maintain their autonomy of decision-making in the form of a movement and a foreign policy doctrine called Non-Alignment. Non-Alignment stands for policy of independence and autonomy maintained by a group of post-colonial/underdeveloped and developing countries in their decision-making and a strategy of equidistance from the bloc politics. Non-Alignment, as such, seemingly provides a basis for protecting external sovereignty. However, in the wake of our discussion on neo-colonialism, it may be argued that whatever independence non-alignment would have secured could get neutralized by the impact of neocolonialism on sovereignty.

In contemporary times, supra-national organizations and regional economic groups and common trade and monetary arrangements are visible. The likes of the Group of 8 (G-8), industrially and economically advanced countries which also includes Russia, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South Asia Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and most of all, the European Union (EU), are prime examples of external process that in some way or the other affect the traditional concept of a sovereign state. In fact, in some of the cases, there are tendencies towards supra-national integration. For example, the European Union is an attempt to create what has been termed by some writers as ‘European super-nation’.¹³⁵

Growing importance of regional and continental economic groupings emerges from the needs and interests of business, trade and market on a wider scale. The supra-national groupings are to facilitate better trade and commerce between the members, evolve a common currency and monetary system, minimize intra-and inter-regional competitions, harness common resources for collective benefits, etc.

It has been argued by international economists, like Fred Bergstein, that regionalism because of integrating and locking the different national economies into some kind of trade, monetary and economic association, could prove to be beneficial for emergence of integrated world economy. This argument is based on the presumption that autarchic and isolated economies could be locked in regional and supra-national bonds, in this way. However, on the contrary, some others have argued that regionalism and globalization are two contradictory processes and regional economic groups may not augur well for a world economic order being sought under the WTO process. WTO has come to be accepted by the member countries as a regulator and facilitator of world trade. At the same time, economic regionalism by giving certain preferential treatments to member states violates many clauses of the WTO agreements. Either way, the nation-states are not in full control and regulation of their trade, commerce and economic transactions and hence the sovereign decision-making is largely affected.

Besides, politico-military and regional economic supra-nation organizations, there are also efforts to transcend national identity and boundaries in cultural sense. This has reflected in mobilizing consciousness and forging pan cultural identities. Instances of this supra-national cultural process could be found in the movements like pan-Arabism, pan-Africanism, pan Europeanism, pan-Latin-Americanism, pan-Slavism etc., In case of pan-Arabism and pan-Africanism; in fact, seeking supra-national consciousness has been considered a solution to transcend the problem of lack of national consciousness where segmental and tribal affiliations beset any chance of emergence of national consciousness. People like Nelson Mandela of South Africa, Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt have been associated with these efforts. In Europe, Jean Monnet and the European Movement founded in 1948 in The Hague advocated pan-Europeanism.¹³⁶ Pan-Europeanism has sought to advocate the distinct European bond and shared cultural and emotional experiences. This could probably be flowing from renaissance and other historical experience. However, none of these efforts has been successful and differences in Africa, Arab world and Europe vis-à-vis the difference on Maastricht Treaty could prove that pan-cultural efforts have failed at least for now.

Certain other supra-national forces have also emerged as a result of either economic process of globalization or espousal of global concerns. While emergence and operation of MNCs can be taken as example of the first category, birth of global NGOs like environmental groups, human rights groups and civil rights or anti-globalization activists, as examples of the second category.

Global Concerns and Sovereignty

There have emerged certain issues which are, by their very nature, of global concerns. These concerns, on the one hand, require global effort and to that extent compromise on external sovereignty and, on the other, challenge the concept of territorial or geographical impermeability of the state boundary. To list some of them, they include issues of environmental degradation and damage; human rights; nuclear proliferation, terrorism; poverty, hunger and human migrations; etc. These issues affect the states irrespective of their geography and territorial boundary thus questioning the concept of geographical defence and territorial impermeability. Further, they bring multilateral pressure to affect the external decision-making of the states. This also questions the distinction between the internal and external sphere of state activities.

Environmental movements and multilateral conferences like Green movement, UN Stockholm's Conference on Human Environment (1972), Rio Earth Summit (1992), Kyoto Protocol (1997), etc., affect the decision-making of states in a large way. Similarly, human rights movements like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, etc., affect even the policy of internal security of the states. Human rights issues have been deployed by one state to influence the decisions and behaviour of the other state. For example, USA, UK and other developed countries use human rights issues to influence even the internal security and ethnic policy of China (Tibet) and India (Kashmir). The issue of nuclear proliferation is equally important from the point of view of state sovereignty. One the one hand, fear of nuclear proliferation has led the group of five dominant and recognized nuclear powers to influence the decision of other states and restrict their ability to acquire such a capability. On the other, inter-continental ballistic missiles tipped with nuclear weapons threaten the boundary of the state. Terrorism, of late, has also threatened the impermeability of states and global terrorism has challenged the concept of both internal and external security that the tradition concept of state enjoyed. We find that in many poor countries, ethnic violence and civil strife leads to human migration and refugee problem. In most of Africa, this is has posed problems for the state to provide for itself a secure boundary. Thus, we can say that the traditional concept of state as a sovereign and impermeable entity has come in question.

Globalization and Challenge to Sovereignty

Globalization may be described as a process, which creates networks of interdependence at worldwide distances.¹³⁷ This means that irrespective of geographical distances, events occurring all over the world are affecting the lives and decisions of people everywhere despite their national locations. In short, ‘Globalization is the emergence of a complex web of interconnectedness that means that our lives are increasingly shaped by events that occur, and decisions that are made, at a great distance from us.’¹³⁸ It is generally agreed that globalization refers to the increasing transnational dimensions of economic, socio-cultural and political life influenced by technological change, global spread of production and communication technologies. Globalization as a multifaceted process resulting in interconnectedness, leads to relationships of interdependence amongst nation-states in the form of economic integration, cultural diffusion and political actions. However, most of these processes are beyond the full control of the nation-state and neither the interconnectedness nor interdependence ensures equality of relationship or decision making by all nation-states. Operation of the MNCs/TNCs and penetration of the capitalist mode of production; regulation of trade, commerce, international finance and investment and international market by IMF–World Bank–WTO; Information Technology and Internet; means of electronic mass communication, etc., present processes at the global level that transcend and ignore state boundaries.

Traditionally, nation-states have been exercising exclusive authority over specified territorial domain in terms of regulation of economic, trade and commercial activities. They have also been keeping vigilance over cultural, social and other activities of the citizens. As such, sovereignty and territorial integrity both in physical terms like defence through standing army, and in emotional terms like cultural symbols, life styles and entertainment, has been largely monitored by the nation-state. However, presently, nation-state is faced with a host of trends within globalization that challenge it. We can analyse these trends in the forms of economic, political and cultural globalization.

Most significant amongst the dimensions of globalization has been the economic dimension. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, barring the colonial countries, nation-states provided effective context for development of market economy in terms of unified national market for the expansion of domestic industry, internally and externally, protection against external competition and support for overseas markets. Thus, it was focused on ‘national economy. But the emergence of the world market and world economy now presents a qualitative change in contemporary times. Two significant factors that have given rise to this situation can be identified as MNCs/TNCs and world monetary/financial/trade organizations like IMF/WTO and the World Bank. Single national markets protected by the nation-state have proved to be insufficient for the capitalist economy both from the angle of production and consumption. Access to external resources both material and human, international finance and markets has made MNCs/TNCs operate without reference to a particular national economy. These TNCs/MNCs present advanced capitalism in its global phase. Their huge budgets as large as many nation-states, skilled personnel as big as bureaucracy of many nation-states, massive investments, widespread markets and advanced technologies are integral to capitalist modernization in contemporary phase.¹³⁹ The presence and evolution of world organizations like the IMF, World Bank and the WTO to regulate and facilitate international finance, currency, trade and commerce add supportive dimension to this operation. In such a situation, the nation-state may provide human resources, material infrastructure and other supporting services for the operation of the MNCs/TNCs in their respective boundaries, most of the decisions related to economic activities of these entities would be beyond the control of the nation-state.

A combination of various economic factors has led to the interdependence of countries and their economies. This economic interdependence manifests at various levels. In the field of trade and commerce, we find dependence of nation-states on international markets. For example, oil producing nations who are combined in the form of OPEC (MNCs also operate in the field of oil production) where decision by the latter to produce or not to produce oil leads to increase and decrease in the prices of various products based on crude oil in other countries (cascading effect), quantum of subsidy by Indian government to its farmers decides the level of competition of Indian agro-products in European and American markets, cheap Chinese products affects the small-scale industries in India and less expensive textiles exported from India to USA leads to reduction in employees in US textile firms.

In the field of financial transactions and financial markets, interdependence could also be discerned. For example, terrorists’ attacks at World Trade Centre in USA and Metro Rail in UK leads to crash of sensex and share markets all over the world. Similarly, decision of the US investors to withdraw their investment from South East Asia in 1990s led to crisis of market and production there. Mobility of finance capital and foreign direct investments along with electronic trading and transactions have created a network of financial markets for stocks, commodities, currencies, debts and investments all over the world.

Manufacturing is also increasingly organized on global basis. For example, many of the MNCs/TNCs manufacture different items of a product in different countries to realize cost effectiveness and economy of scale before assembling as a product. They also set up turnkey assembly plants in developing countries having cheap labour and resources. For example, Nike set up its manufacturing first in South Korea then in Indonesia, China, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand.

Not only manufacturing, but also technical support services have got a global spread. This has been largely due to information technology and communication revolution. For example, USA's recent decision not to restrict outsourcing of various services to outside firms and agencies leads to growth in the Information Technology Enabled Services (ITeS) in India and ban on the same leads to feeling of cut in employment in India. It has been observed that computer operators in the US pass on system defects to computer engineers in India for trouble shooting in the evening (US time) while leaving office and because of time difference, are able to get them rectified the following morning. Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) is yet another example of integration where US software companies outsource product development to India. Huge work relating to customer help line, online solutions, medical transcription and even tax filing are assigned to IT service organizations in India by other countries, particularly the USA.

Secondly, cultural interaction has also been an important parallel process along with economic integration, which transcends national boundaries. It has been argued that global economic spread of capitalism requires concomitant culture of mass consumerism of which mass advertising, material inducement and packaging are considered integral. These are requirements of economic changes and are presented as if they are nation-neutral. This means that ideas, symbols, images presented in consumer culture are universal and bypass nation-states. Increasingly, local mores, symbols and cultural practices are invoked to support capitalist-financial interests. Typical examples could be taken from the advertisements by the HSBC regarding finance and banking where local mores and cultural practices of the people for salutation, gesturing etc., are invoked to validate the claimed-knowledge of requirement of finance as well. Similarly, in one of the advertisements of Visa Credit Card, a sister's emotions and well-wishing motive for her brother is replaced with the credit card profligacy of Richard Gere, the Hollywood actor.

However, these overwhelming changes though closely associated with economic changes, are mainly a consequence of the new systems of electronic mass communications and information technologies. Expansion of information technology, mass media, telecommunication, internet, 24-hour TV channels etc., have prompted observers like Marshall McLuhan to declare that ‘globe is no more than a village’.¹⁴⁰ Global mass media, through advertisements, 24 hours news reporting and features, offer access to a variety of social and physical settings and socio-cultural and political events of the remote areas of the world from one corner to the other. The coverage of fall of Nicole Ceausescu in Romania and Students protest at Tiananmen Square in China in 1989, live coverage of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001, capture of Saddam Hussain, spectre of famine and refugees in Sub-Sahara and other African countries, all enhance the immediacy of happenings from one part of the world to the other. Not only this, it leads to some kind of emotional reactions from people who become part of this visual community. Needless to mention, at times these have led to mass protests and support rallies from people living in other parts of the world thereby ‘globalizing protest and resistance’ as well.

As noted above, the process of cultural globalization has been identified with the requirement of global capitalism. Writers like Leslie Sklair see close link between cultural and economic globalization to the extent that even the former sustaining the ‘culture-ideology of consumerism.¹⁴¹ Consumerism has its objective to foster needs beyond perceived requirements of the people. For example, in the Visa Credit Card advertisement featuring Richard Gere in Rajasthan (Indian State) locale, well-wishing need for five pigeons have been inflated to many. Similarly, in advertisements relating to cosmetics, need to appear fair has been inflated and over-emphasized. Thus, on the one hand, cultural globalization promises flow of information and sharing of plight of the people all over the world, on the other, it seeks to sustain global capitalism. Nevertheless, in either case, cultural globalization transcends national boundaries and questions the traditional concept of internal and external sovereignty.

It is often mentioned that contemporary times have seen the spread and mass acceptance of American jeans, Hollywood movies and Macdonald's burgers. These three symbols of American popular culture have earned the name of symbols of ‘cultural imperialism’ and ‘Trojan horse of cultural imperialism’, which threaten national cultural symbols and identities of nations. Generally, Hollywood is termed as Trojan horse bringing with it Disneyland, fast-food chains, free advertising for American goods like clothes, rock music, etc. Food habits are more and more showing what has been termed as ‘McDonaldization’ ‘whereby global commodities and commercial and marketing practices associated with the fast food industry have come to dominate more and more economic sectors.’¹⁴² This raises a question, whether contemporary global culture can avoid ‘cultural imperialism’ and become cosmopolitan. The dominance of the English language, American and European lifestyle, post renaissance art and architecture, modernist-urban behavioural and attitudinal expectations, all point to dominance of Anglo-American culture and lifestyles any way. Similarly, it is difficult to avoid identification of what is called ‘global culture’ with what owes its growth ‘to the power and prestige of one or the other of the great metropolitan power centres and cultures of contemporary worlds’.¹⁴³ Presently, this has taken the form of Pax Europeana and Pax Americana.

Thirdly, globalization can be seen in political dimension as well. Political globalizing trends could be seen in growing importance of international and intergovernmental organizations and in various global political actions in areas perceived increasingly global in scope. For example, global environmental movements, human rights movements, women rights, rights of indigenous and ethnic minorities, anti-nuclear movements, movements against terrorism, etc. A host of public bodies and NGOs have taken up these causes with their global networks and consortiums. In fact, many of them have reacted against the adverse impact of capitalist and economic globalization at the cost of other factors. This aspect of globalization leads to expectation that global civil society may emerge. We also find a host of other Supranational and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) in the field of political, defence and strategic cooperation like UN bodies, IMF, WTO, expanding NATO, EU etc. which acquire the status of supra-national or international regimes and are highly political in nature. Added to this is emphasis on ‘democratization’, ‘political modernization’ and ‘good governance’ as universal political ideals. It has been observed that these bodies and organizations when ‘conform to the principle of intergovernmentalism, [they] provide a mechanism that enable states, … to take concerted action without sacrificing national sovereignty.’¹⁴⁴ Thus, interaction between states is based on sovereign independence, e.g. UNO, treaties and agreements, etc. However, mostly principle of supra-nationalism is followed and supra-national bodies invariably impose their will on the nation-state. Supra-nationalism has been described as ‘the existence of an authority that is “higher” than that of the nation-state and capable of imposing its will on it.’¹⁴⁵

As a result of these factors and pressures, many observers have written epitaph of the nation-state. One of the famous commentators and globalist, Kenichi Ohmae has declared: ‘The Nation-State … as an unnatural, even dysfunctional unit for organizing human activity and managing economic endeavour in borderless world’ and has predicted emergence of ‘region-state’ based on economic factor of market for goods and services and not political fiat.¹⁴⁶ We see the preeminence of economic factors over political considerations in globalizing world. It may be possible that the doctrine of regional economic cooperation is a pointer to Ohmae's prediction of Region State and a prime example could be the European Union.

Internal Strife and External Intervention

In addition to the factors like neo-colonialism, supra-national organizations, global concerns and globalization, we find a few more factors and forces that challenge the traditional concept of sovereign state. These factors and forces can be identified as external interventions, intra-state ethnic and civil strife, sub-national and secessionist movements.

Internal strife

Let us take up the pulls and the pressures, which arise from within and challenge the concept of a sovereign state. In many post-colonial societies, a situation has emerged where neither the state nor the nation exists. The case of what has come to be identified as ‘failed states’ is in point. Consider the societies and states, at various times, in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Burundi, Iraq (after Saddam's fall), Rwanda, Somalia, etc., and in some post-communist countries. In most of these cases, conflict and civil war situation exists as to not only the legitimacy of the central authority but also the population and its territory. There is neither state nor nation and both are playing hide-and-seek. Due to inter-ethnic and inter-tribal/clan conflict, formation of integrated political community or national consciousness has not happened. Further, lack of central authority and a disintegrated state apparatus has put many of them in the category of failed states and their sovereignty in doubt.

A second category of challenge comes from sub-national and secessionist forces that challenge the central authority of the existing state and legitimacy of its sovereignty. In this sense, the traditional concept of sovereignty as centrally located, faces internal pressures in the form of demand for more autonomy or a separate nation by various ethnically and culturally organized minorities. This has put even the logic of nation-based state into question. When an ethnic/cultural group demands for a separate nation-state, the very logic and principle of a nation-state is not in question as per the principle of right to self-determination but it brings to doubt the logic of national-state or state-nation, which we have discussed in chapter on the State.

India is a prime example of various sub-national movements challenging its sovereign authority. Various ethnic and sub-national groups also appear in other states like the Tamils in Srilanka, the Basque separatists in Spain, or for that matter, the Lega Norde (Northern League) in Italy.

External intervention

The challenge posed by bloc politics of the Cold War and intervention by USA and USSR in the internal affairs of many countries is well known. Interference by either power in the name of protecting the interest of communism or capitalism and democracy amounted to violation of the sovereign right of the concerned nation-state to have control over their internal affairs.

The post-Cold War era, has also witnessed several interventionist initiatives and doctrines of ‘shared sovereignty’. General refrain of these interventionist initiatives and doctrines have been humanitarian assistance and human rights, democracy, freedom, world peace, etc. A few examples may elucidate the points made here. ‘these include interventions in Iraq to establish a safe haven for Kurds, in Bosnia to ensure the delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo, in Somalia to create a secure environment for the supply of humanitarian assistance, NATO intervention in Kosovo and UN Intervention Force in East Timor.’¹⁴⁷ Most of these interventions could be witnessed in the countries, which can be identified as failed states due to ethnic and tribal conflict or states having emerged as a result of collapse of the erstwhile USSR and are in disarray. Problems of lack of central authority, ethnic and tribal clashes and extermination, displacement, refugees and human migration, etc., have given opportunities for interference which otherwise may serve geo-political interest of major powers.

In fact, developing and post-colonial societies are faced with the problem of active intervention from major powers either in bloc or individually. The very nature of these societies and states have prompted the interested powers to intervene in the developing countries in the name of human rights, democracy or at times to protect the rights of oppressed nationalities or the citizens against their own oppressive regimes. We may differentiate between collective humanitarian intervention under the auspices of the UN and political and military intervention by major powers, though at times invoking UN sanctions.

On the one hand, intervention can be described as a foreign policy instrument on the part of the major powers to interfere in the affairs of other nation-states to serve their geo-strategic and political interests, on the other, it is a means for the UN to intervene for humanitarian assistance, peace keeping, etc. Generally, the following situations could give rise to intervention either by the major powers or by the UN

• Civil-conflict situations in a state where two or more warring sides are involved against each other or the regime. The case of failed states like Afghanistan, Haiti and Somalia and USA's intervention are examples.
• Rising of group of people/communities with particular affiliations against the political regime alleging oppression and claiming autonomy or independence. The example of USA's intervention under UN aegis in Timor Leste for its independence from Indonesia is an example. The case of Timor Leste has been cited as of ‘shared sovereignty’, i.e., before it became a full-fledged self-governing state, major powers under the UN umbrella supervised and monitored its transition.
• Protection of human rights and interest of democracy has prompted active and military intervention by USA in Iraq.
• Humanitarian assistance, protection of rights of displaced and refugees has also led to UN as well as intervention by major powers.
• Intervention could also be in the name of ensuring regional and global peace and security.
• Intervention for peace-making, peace-building and peace-keeping or peace-enforcement by the multilateral forces/UN Peace Keeping Force.

Is intervention in itself problematic? Does it violate the principles of sovereign equality of nation-states? Justification for intervention can be put under three broad categories. Firstly, intervention has been enunciated in the UN Charter itself as part of the principle of collective security where threat by one state on another is considered a threat to peace and security of other member states. Secondly, intervention by UN or UN-backed multilateral forces for peace making/building/keeping/enforcing or/and humanitarian assistance or/and in situations of humanitarian crisis has long been recognized. Thirdly, intervention as foreign policy instruments of major powers in the name of democracy, human rights, etc. has been justified.

Some analysts argue in defence of active intervention by USA in the name of democracy, human rights, etc.¹⁴⁸ On the other hand, it has been argued by some others that there should be only limited intervention in a failed state or there is possibility of unnecessary involvement.¹⁴⁹ However, the argument for limited and impartial intervention has been challenged. It has been argued that there cannot be a feasibility of a limited intervention as well as an impartial intervention in a civil conflict situation.¹⁵⁰ Limited intervention can end the civil conflict situation when the intervenor takes sides and tilts the local balance, but in this case it cannot be impartial. Impartial intervention can end civil conflict situation, when the intervenor take full control of the situation. But in this case it cannot be a limited intervention. Notwithstanding the debate on the nature of intervention, it can be said that intervention either indicates or leads to a situation where the State has either failed or is sharing its sovereignty. Intervention as such poses great challenge to many nation-states vis-à-vis, major powers.

Taken all together, the trends and factors mentioned above have contributed to what has been described by Bob Jessop as ‘hollowing out’¹⁵¹ of the State both from outside and from inside. Sovereignty as the turbo power of the State is running out of fuel while the State has not only a lot of speed-breakers ahead of it but also uncharted tracks. Is that the race, the nation-state started after the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 is coming to an end or is it that the track needs to be changed? We may wait and watch.

Review Questions

1. What are the pluralist critiques of concept of sovereignty and what are the other perspectives that put limitations on the concept of sovereignty?
2. Examine the statement: ‘Because society is federal, authority must be federal’ (H. J. Laski) OR ‘Federalism and monism are not incompatible terms’ (K. C. Hsiao) with a view to establish a relationship between sovereignty, government and society.’
3. Examine the statement that ‘pluralist critique of sovereignty is a theory of limited sovereignty of the State and not its denial’ or ‘Pluralists instead of discrediting the State, seeks to pluralize it,
4. Critically evaluate the statement: ‘The theory of the sovereign state has broken down’ (A. D. Lindsay), OR ‘No political common place has become so arid and unfruitful than the doctrine of the sovereign state’ (E. Barker), OR ‘the notion of sovereignty must be expunged from the political theory’ (H. Krabbe) OR ‘It would be of lasting benefit to political science if the whole concept of sovereignty were surrendered’ (H. J. Laski) OR ‘State is merely a piece of administrative mechanism which can be superceded and transferred to the evolutionary scrape heap so soon as machinery better calculated to advance men's interests has been devised.’ (Norman Angell)
5. Critically evaluate concept of sovereignty in the context of globalization.
6. ‘Military and humanitarian interventions in the internal affairs of states have led to undermining of the concept of sovereignty.’ Evaluate the doctrine of ‘shared sovereignty’ in this context.
7. Is sovereignty withering away due to trans-boundary factors and global issues?
8. Discuss the factors that have led to ‘hollowing out’ of the state and its sovereignty.