1.1 Example: The TCP User’s Game
1.2 Definition of Games in Normal Form
1.3 More Examples of Normal-Form Games
1.4 Strategies in Normal-form Games
2. Analyzing Games: From Optimality To Equilibrium
2.2 Defining Best Response and Nash Equilibrium
3. Further Solution Concepts for Normal-Form Games
3.1 Maxmin and Minmax Strategies
3.3 Removal of Dominated Strategies
3.6 Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium
3.8 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
4. Games With Sequential Actions: The Perfect-information Extensive Form
4.3 Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium
5. Generalizing the Extensive Form: Imperfect-Information Games
6. Repeated and Stochastic Games
6.3.2 Strategies and Equilibria
7. Uncertainty About Payoffs: Bayesian Games
7.1.2 Extensive Form with Chance Moves
8.1 Coalitional Games with Transferable Utility
8.2 Classes of Coalitional Games
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