Contents

Credits and Acknowledgments

Preface

1. Games in Normal Form

1.1 Example: The TCP User’s Game

1.2 Definition of Games in Normal Form

1.3 More Examples of Normal-Form Games

1.3.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma

1.3.2 Common-payoff Games

1.3.3 Zero-sum Games

1.3.4 Battle of the Sexes

1.4 Strategies in Normal-form Games

2. Analyzing Games: From Optimality To Equilibrium

2.1 Pareto optimality

2.2 Defining Best Response and Nash Equilibrium

2.3 Finding Nash Equilibria

3. Further Solution Concepts for Normal-Form Games

3.1 Maxmin and Minmax Strategies

3.2 Minimax Regret

3.3 Removal of Dominated Strategies

3.4 Rationalizability

3.5 Correlated Equilibrium

3.6 Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium

3.7 image-Nash Equilibrium

3.8 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies

4. Games With Sequential Actions: The Perfect-information Extensive Form

4.1 Definition

4.2 Strategies and Equilibria

4.3 Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium

4.4 Backward Induction

5. Generalizing the Extensive Form: Imperfect-Information Games

5.1 Definition

5.2 Strategies and Equilibria

5.3 Sequential Equilibrium

6. Repeated and Stochastic Games

6.1 Finitely Repeated Games

6.2 Infinitely Repeated Games

6.3 Stochastic Games

6.3.1 Definition

6.3.2 Strategies and Equilibria

7. Uncertainty About Payoffs: Bayesian Games

7.1 Definition

7.1.1 Information Sets

7.1.2 Extensive Form with Chance Moves

7.1.3 Epistemic Types

7.2 Strategies and Equilibria

7.3 Computing Equilibria

7.4 Ex-post Equilibria

8. Coalitional Game Theory

8.1 Coalitional Games with Transferable Utility

8.2 Classes of Coalitional Games

8.3 Analyzing Coalitional Games

8.3.1 The Shapley Value

8.3.2 The Core

History and References

References

Index

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