Sabine Hess

Border as Conflict Zone

Critical Approaches on the Border and Migration Nexus

“Far from disappearing, many borders are being reasserted and remade through ambitious and innovative state efforts to regulate the transnational movement of people.” This conclusion by Peter Andreas and Timothy Snyder in their seminal work The Wall around the West (Andreas and Snyder 2000, 2) never seemed as up-to-date as today, when we consider the US president’s announcement of his intent to construct a nine-meter-high wall on the US-Mexican border, or when we look at recent developments across the European continent in the wake of the so-called ‘summer of migration’ of 2015, when unexpectedly high numbers of refugee-migrants managed to make their paths to western European countries by – quite literally – overrunning the various border technologies and infrastructures installed by European Union nation-states and supra-national organizations over the last decade. Since then, we have been witnessing an unexpected reemergence of national and regional border apparatuses on the European continent,29 in their very material shape of fences, ditches, dogs, and watch-towers such as along the Macedonian-Greek, Hungarian-Serbian, and Hungarian-Croatian land borders. Even prior to 2015, fences as border-control mechanisms have been reemerging: around the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla, for example, and along the Greek-Turkish and Bulgarian-Turkish land borders separating Europe from “the rest,” as Stuart Hall described this post-colonial division of the world (Hall 1992). In addition to these obvious and manifest acts and architectures of re-bordering, a large number of rather technological border apparatuses have been installed, even long before 2015, which tend to be more or less ‘invisible’: radar- and computer-controlled, digital, intelligent border surveillance technologies that establish network-like security spaces (integrating satellites, drones, and radar systems with big data banks) such as Spain’s Integrated System for External Vigilance (Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior, SIVE), introduced in 2002; the Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) system, introduced in 2005; and the European Border Surveillance (EUROSUR) system, introduced by the EU in 2013 alongside big databases like the fingerprint data bank Eurodac, the Schengen Information System (SIS), and the Visa Information System (VIS). Funds amounting to millions are flowing into research and development of this type of technology, while civil and military protagonists are becoming increasingly fused. In relation to the control of the Mediterranean, Sergio Carrera and Leonhard den Hertog, from the Center for European Policy Studies, have described these developments as a “surveillance race” (2015, 16), which is producing a new spatialization and digitalization of borders. This extension and multiplication of the border from what used to be a recognized line around the territory of nation-states led Etienne Balibar to speak of the “ubiquity of borders” already at the beginning of the new century (2002, 84).

The hope for a “borderless world,” associated with the end of the Cold War, with the enlargement and harmonization of the European Union – especially with its creation of “Schengenland” as an “area of freedom, security and justice” alongside the internal market (Walters and Haahr 2004) – as well as in the general context of the ongoing economic, cultural, and political globalization processes seem to belong to the past (see Newmann 2006; Donnan and Wilson 2010, 2). During the high phase of the globalization debate, in social and cultural sciences and in the public alike, there were already dozens of academic reports and approaches warning against an overly simplistic and overly euphoric assessment of globalization (see Ong 1999; Smith and Guarnizo 1998), proposing instead medium-range concepts like glocalization (Robertson 1998) or transnationalism (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Szanton Blanc 1995). Nevertheless, the social- and cultural-science debate at that time was dominated by metaphors of ‘flow’ and ‘network’ (see Castells 2000; Sassen 2002); and by the proclamation of paradigm shifts that favored mobility, fluidity, and hybridity over seditiousness, fixity, and homogeneity, as in James Clifford’s volume Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century (1997) or John Urry’s concept of ‘mobility turn’ (2000).

Now, on the contrary, one could speak of a ‘border turn’ or border paradigm. In this regard, in his 2006 overview on concepts and approaches of/in the interdisciplinary field of border studies, David Newman was already emphasizing that the “contemporary studies of borders has become a major growth industry” (Newman 2006, 144). Even if this does not hold true for the German-speaking academic context – as, to this day, no research center or professorship with such a denomination exists – we can nevertheless observe a certain kind of “explosion” of studies and research projects on borders, as Hastings Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson described in their 2010 compendium Borderlands: Ethnographic Approaches to Security, Power, and Identity. But not only in border studies, also in the much wider field of migration and mobility studies, the new and growing significance of the “border” can be noted. For example, in their recent article “Regimes of Mobility across the Globe” (2013), Nina Glick Schiller and Noel B. Salazar also centrally address this issue. Glick Schiller and Salazar note an accelerated return of national borders and lines of ethnic separation in the midst of global economic crises, following Ronen Shamir’s observation that a “single global mobility regime” is arising that is “oriented to closure and to the blocking of access, premised not only on ‘old’ national or local grounds but on a principle of perceived universal dangerous personhoods […] In practice, this means that local, national, and regional boundaries are now being rebuilt and consolidated” (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, 199).

However, what is meant in the different texts by the notion of ‘border’ or ‘boundary’? And how can we conceptualize the relation between borders and movements, especially the movement that is politically labeled as ‘international migration’? In the following, I sketch out recent debates in border studies on how to conceptualize ‘the border’ and how to make sense of its role and function, illustrating that conceptualizations that are customary in international border studies also view this as a relationship with a top-down structure. On the one hand, this produces a representational regime in which migrants appear as the dependent variable, as structurally powerless and as ‘victims.’ On the other hand, it also leads – even in critical research work – to a reification of the controlling power of the border regime. But how can the cross-border practices of migration be incorporated into a theorization of the border that would do justice to the agency of migration, while at the same time being capable of analytically examining the expansion of the border regime?

This question, which I attempt to address in the final section, brings me back to the starting point for my first interdisciplinary research project, “Transit Migration,” which considered the construction of the European border regime in 2002. In the early 2000s, this project led me, with an interdisciplinary group of seven other researchers, to Southeastern Europe, which at that time was already being seen as a ‘migration hot spot’ and a target of attention of European media and politicians (Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe 2007). In the face of the migrants’ compelling and evidently unrestrainable desire to reach a safer and better life in Europe – as they described it to us at that time in the transit- and buffer-zones in Southeastern Europe – we developed a conception of Europe’s external border as representing a “zone of conflict and interaction” (Karakayali and Tsianos 2007; Hess 2012). We therefore referred to the ‘border regime’ as a dynamic ensemble consisting of various agents, discourses, and practices. This enabled us to formulate our approach as “ethnographic border regime analysis” that incorporates migration as a powerful force into the way in which the border itself was theorized, rather than regarding migration merely as being an object of the border (Karakayali and Tsianos 2007; Tsianos and Hess 2010). The developments that took place in the summer and fall 2015 – which were astonishing for me as a longtime observer – put the force of migration (that we had then already noted) back on the international agenda, in a breathtaking and sometimes disturbing way.

1Border as Barrier, Gate, and Transformation Regime?

David Newman stresses that there is no single theory of borders (2006, 145). However, a notion of ‘border’ prevails across all disciplines: this still focuses on the territorial “state border,”30 despite widely recognized and profound changes in regard to its shape, territoriality, and spatialization; its production and governance; as well as its character, role, and function (Donnan and Wilson 2010). In this regard, following Etienne Balibar’s quote on the ubiquity of borders, it is ‘common sense’ in international border studies that state borders can no longer be conceptualized as static lines or demarcations of sovereignty and nation-state power encompassing a national territory that ontologically possess an ‘essence,’ as the manifesto “Lines in the Sand: Towards an Agenda for Critical Border Studies” (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2009) also firmly stresses.

This shift induced not only a geographical refocusing of research away from the level of the state – down to regions, municipalities, and even neighborhoods (e.g., gated communities); and up to transnational, regional, or global settings (such as the EU or NAFTA) – but also a methodological reorientation with a focus on bordering processes and practices, “rather than [on] the border per se” (Newman 2006, 144). Nevertheless, most studies primarily conceptualize “the border” as a “barrier of exclusion and protection” even as concrete research, like that of Hastings Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson, focuses on borderlands and the daily border-crossing practices of “borderlanders” (Donnan and Wilson 2010, 11). Borders in this respect are seen as ordering technology – in a Foucauldian sense – that differentiates ‘us’ from ‘them,’ ‘here’ from ‘there,’ and ‘inside’ from ‘outside,’ as Henk van Houtum and Ton van Naerssen have also spelled out in their article “Bordering, Ordering and Othering” (2002).31 This thinking of borders as boundary-drawing technologies invites a wide metaphorical usage of the notion of ‘border’ in a de-territorial and rather social sense that comes very close to the concept of boundary drawing spelled out by Fredrik Barth (1998).

The territorial state border was, in this regard, always more than simply a territorial line on the ground manifested or enforced by a material infrastructure at that location. Borders always required the performance of further social and cultural ingredients and investments, as historical research clearly indicates how difficult it was to establish borders and border practices (François, Seifarth, and Struck 2007). Borders are not only “meaning making and meaning carrying” (Donnan and Wilson 2010, 4), they also need to have a place in our mental maps, cultural imaginaries, and moral judgments; they additionally require laws and re-presentations to be enacted by various people and institutions in the first place. In his seminal paper “Mapping Schengenland: Denaturalizing the Border,” William Walters outlines three historical typologies of borders: the “geopolitical,” the “national,” and the “biopolitical border.” He asserts that even the “geopolitical border,” as the expression of the 18th and 19th century understanding of nation-states as territorially defined and fixed units – when the border was the potential line where armed forces are arrayed – has to be thought of as an “assemblage.” He states: “There is a whole apparatus connected with the geopolitical border – not just a police and military system, but cartographic, diplomatic, legal, geological, and geographical knowledges and practices” (Walters 2002, 563). Walters speaks of borders as an “art of government,” and during the colonial period, border-making was especially an “art of international government” (Walters 2002, 564).

But the border is not only a ‘barrier of exclusion,’ and perhaps, as I outline below, it is decreasingly thought of as a spatially employed barrier. Rather, the border was always also a gate, and, in this respect, an institution of mobility,32 “designed to break up and manage the flow of items and personnel into and out of the state” (Donnan and Wilson 2010). Borders differ considerably in regard to this flow-management capacity, not only if flows are slowed or quickened, but rather what kind of flows are treated, and how. In this respect, borders are experienced very differently by different people – a fact that the European Union developed into a distinct and globally unique feature via its differentiation between free internal circulation for the newly constructed entity of “European citizens,” and its “external border” presented to the so-called “third country nationals” (Walters and Haahr 2004; Hess and Tsianos 2007). The US cultural anthropologist Michael Kearney referred to this capacity of borders quite early in his research on the long-militarized US-Mexican border in the following way:

Rhetoric aside, and as noted above, the de facto immigration policy of the unitedstatesian government is not to make the U.S.-Mexican border impermeable to the passage of ‘illegal’ entrants, but rather to regulate their ‘flow’, while at the same time maintaining the official distinctions between […] kinds of people, that is to constitute classes of peoples. (Kearney 1991, 58)

Kearney thus goes a step beyond just referring to the “filtering” function of border control “that separates out the unwanted from the wanted cross-border flows” (Anderson 2000, 4). In this regard, Peter Andreas already broke with a widely held societal ‘wisdom’ that nourishes metaphors like “fortress Europe” by pointing to the fact that “the wall around the west […] is by design highly permeable” (Andreas 2000, 4). Chris Rumford describes borders in this respect as “asymmetric membranes” (2008, 3) and William Walters uses the metaphor of a “firewall” that hits and selects on a very differentiated grid (Walters 2006, 197).

However, what Kearney is hinting at with his formulation, “constitutes classes of people,” delineates the border not as a repressive instrument that selectively deters, but rather as a “productive” mechanism, in the sense of Foucault’s notion of bio-power as opposed to the traditional conceptualization of power following a repression hypothesis. The border, in this understanding, can be seen as a transformational regime of rights and statuses – questioning and sometimes even removing the civic status that people had at the moment of their crossing by delegitimizing the cross-border mobility as illegal or irregular, and hence ascribing to them a status of being ‘undocumented’ or ‘unlawful,’ without citizenship rights. In this sense, the border is a gigantic transformational regime, producing new hierarchies of people by categorizing and processing the unchecked mobilities as different ‘migration’ categories. This leads to a “differential inclusion” (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013, 7) and “civic stratification” (Morris 2002), and to what Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson termed the “multiplication of labor” (2013, 20). William Walters sums up this role and function of the border as a “locale where power is produced” in his concept of the “biopolitical border”:

The biopolitization of the border is signaled by the political concerns, events, and means by which the border will become a privileged instrument in the systematic regulation of national and transnational populations – their movements, health, and security. (Walters 2002, 571)

As such, Walters shows that nation-state immigration policies only started to “become in any way systematic” around the turn of the last century, in the wake of “economic downturns in many countries” and heightened national security concerns with the introduction of passports, visas, foreigner police, and respective foreigner laws. Even the US only started to federally regulate immigration in the 1880s. If already the “geopolitical border” cannot be reduced to a line in the sand, as I have just outlined, then the biopolitical border has to be imagined rather as the “machine” that Walters describes, or as a regime “with an assortment of technologies, simple and complex, old and new. These include passports, visas, healthy certificates, invitation papers, transit passes, identity cards, watchtowers, disembarkation areas, holding zones, laws, regulations, customs and excise officials, medical and immigration authorities” (Walters 2002, 572).

Walters points here to an additional function of the border that is distinct from understandings that focus on its exclusionary aspects. Rather, Walters is stressing the fact that borders are a “privileged site” where political authorities can acquire biopolitical knowledge about populations: “In a sense, then, the border actually contributes to the production of population as a knowable, governable entity” (Walters 2002, 573).

2The EU as a New Border Laboratory

A common denominator of border studies is an emphasis on the transformation of the border from a demarcation line surrounding national territory to an ubiquitous, techno-social, deterritorialized apparatus or regime producing geographically stretched borderscapes.33 This holds especially true for the European Union – as Bernd Kasparek and I argue in the recent article, “De- and Restabilising Schengen: The European Border Regime after the Summer of Migration” (Hess and Kasparek 2017) – which can be regarded as a “laboratory” of said transformation. With the Schengen agreement of 1985, the European project heralded the creation of a continental border regime, with the newly created notion of an ‘external border’ as the pivotal mechanism and space for migration control. Even despite being initially outside the formal EC/EU framework, this globally unique process of regionalization and of supra-national harmonization was a driving force towards an accelerated and deepened process of Europeanization, culminating in both the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) and later the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). The process resulted in the creation of an “area of freedom, security and justice” through the Treaty of Amsterdam and the parallel construction of the European border regime as a fluid, multi-scalar assemblage. This assemblage involves European Union agencies like FRONTEX (the European border and coast guard agency), bodies of European law (like the Common European Asylum System), processes of standardizations and harmonizations especially in the field of border management (called “Integrated Border Management”), and a growing military-industrial-academic complex largely funded by the EU, alongside more traditional political national apparatuses of migration control that had evolved since the 1970s and a flexible involvement of IGOs (international and intergovernmental organizations such as the UNHCR or the IOM).

If there is one central rationale at the core of the European border regime, it is driven by what Gallya Lahav and Virginie Guiraudon have called the fundamental “control dilemma” (2000). With the creation of the EU internal market at its peak, this dilemma refers to the question how to reconcile a neoliberal economic paradigm of the (preferably global) free circulation of goods, services, and capital, with the continued biopolitical desire to control the movements of people. While the EU upholds these four freedoms internally, towards outside entities, the EU is merely committed to the first three of these freedoms. There is no commitment to a global freedom of movement for people; rather, many authors of border studies and European studies have pointed to the fact that the creation of the single EU market opened the door to a wide field of security actors and led to an intensified securitization of questions of mobility (Huysmans 2000; Bigo and Guild 2005). William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr argue in this respect: “Schengenland can be seen as having certain acts of securitisation as its conditions of possibility” (2004, 95).

In regard to the border regime, the main practical answer to the control dilemma was, according to Lahav and Guiraudon’s intriguing title of the paper, to move border controls “away from the border and outside the states” (Lahav and Guiraudon 2000), leading to a new spatialization and geographical expansion. In this, the European Commission’s vision was a “smart,” techno-scientific, invisible yet selective border that is able to distinguish between bonafide travelers and unwanted migrants (Commission of the European Communities 2008).

To this end, broadly speaking, four paradigms were enacted within the European border regime. The first was a paradigm of “remote control” and externalization that led to an unforeseen multiplication and diversification of actors from state to non-state, from international actors to very local ones (Lavenex 2004; Lahav and Guiraudon 2000; Zolberg 2006; Hess and Tsianos 2007; Bialasiewicz 2012). The second, as already indicated, was a paradigm of a fortified, yet smart external border through technology, digitalization, and biometrization (Koslowski 2005; Broeders 2007; Dijstelbloem, Meijer, and Besters 2011; Kuster and Tsianos 2014). These two dimensions have been analyzed extensively by border studies, yet a third also exists, namely, an internal regime steeped in the institution of asylum and put into practice through the Dublin/Eurodac regulations, which aims at the immobilization of migrant populations within the European territory (Schuster 2011; Kasparek 2016; Borri and Fontanari 2015).

The fourth and final paradigm, evident especially in recent years, is an increasing humanitarization34 of the border, described by Walters as the “birth of the humanitarian border” (2011). This accelerated in the context of the growing number of deadly shipwrecks and tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea in recent years, as the crossing of the border became, very obviously, a “matter of life and death.” However, the humanitarian discourse dates further back to the “White Paper” of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair from the year 2002, entitled “Secure Border, Safe Haven.” It is mostly read as a founding document for externalization. But it is more than that as the paper also used and – I would say - instrumentalized a strong humanitarian rhetoric to legitimize further externalization and an intensification of border controls.

Also in the context of our first Transit Migration research project in the early 2000s, mentioned above, we deduced processes that we called “NGOization” and a “governmentalization of politics,” pointing to the fact that the expansion of the border regime not only functioned by means of “security-actors,” but particularly operated via the specific appeal to and articulation of humanitarian positions, as in the field of anti-trafficking policies and in the context of asylum (Hess and Karakayali 2007). After the deaths of more than 600 migrants in the Lampedusa shipwreck of 2013, this became a discourse in its own right. This paradigmatic shift seemed to have been possible due to wider hegemonic changes, which in part were also due to incessant migration struggles, transnational solidarity networks, and the professionalized critical knowledge practices of NGOs and legal interventions, all of which have led to a further juridification of the border regime and human rights based approaches over the last years (see Hess 2016).

Confronted with a vast new quantity of migrant arrival, this architecture of the European border regime collapsed in summer 2015. In the end, the massive movements of migration challenged not only the European Union’s border and migration regime, but the EU and the European project as a whole.

3“Border Work” and the Agency of Migration as an Excluded Category

These new territorially and deterritorialized extended border spaces are also being described using terms such as ‘border zones,’ ‘borderlands’ or ‘borderscapes.’ At the same time, these concepts include ideas of mobile, fluid, selective, and differentiated border situations. Such talk is thus also of “mobile borders” (Kuster and Tsianos 2014, 3) or “networked borders” (Rumford 2006, 153). In this context, Balibar argues in favor of describing borders as “overdetermined, polysemic (that is to say that borders never exist in the same way for individuals belonging to different social groups), and heterogeneous” (cited in Salter 2011, 67). Those who have the relevant economic resources, nationality, and documents have thus over the last years enjoyed the pan-European free travel zone. Others, by contrast, such as those belonging to states in the global South, now face the border in trains and in railway stations, or in airports, schools, and health-care facilities on the level of the municipality. With the Eurodac system, the ‘border’ is now stamped on the body.

This conceptualization also initiated a practice turn in border studies focusing on processes of doing and performing borders (see van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002, 126; Salter 2011). The border is now being conceptualized as an effect of a multiplicity of agents and practices, as becomes clear in the concept of ‘border work’ (see Rumford 2008; Salter 2011). The concept of border work in particular draws attention to the everyday micropractices of politicians, border guards, journalists, academics, judges, NGO staff, and transport personnel, who need to reinterpret the border again and again in order to enact it. In recent years, the concept has been enlarged also to draw attention to the growing arsenal of technologies such as drones, satellites, heat-detecting cameras, scanners, and databases. Following these perspectives, bordering is to be understood as a performative act. Drawing on Judith Butler’s notion of performance, Marc Salter points to the fact that also “sovereignty, like gender, has no essence, and must continually be articulated and rearticulated in terms of ‘stylized repetition of acts’ of sovereignty” (Salter 2011, 66).

All these recent practice-oriented conceptualizations indeed understand the border as an effect of a multitude of actors and practices, human and non-human alike. However, many of these highly interesting constructivist approaches still completely ignore the constitutive power of migration, or once again conceptualize migrants as structurally powerless and as ‘victims.’ The dominant focus of border studies, especially these ones following the classical securitization approach on the function of the border as a barrier or filter to exclude people, seem to lead to an epistemological exclusion of the agency of migrants.

By contrast, the recently published volume Border as Method by Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson (2013), for example, takes up the standpoint of the autonomy of migration approach. In this respect, the authors define borders as “social institutions, which are marked by tensions between practices of border reinforcement and border crossing” (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013, 3) and emphasize the decisive role that “border struggles” play in constituting a specific border regime and its localized enactments and implementations.

This has many aspects in common with our approach, which we labeled “ethnographic border regime analysis,” as a methodology to theorize the border from the perspective of the autonomy of migration (Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe 2007). This approach makes it possible to regard the border regime as a space of constant tension, of conflict and contestation in the face of the power and agency of the migration movements, without minimizing the border regime’s militarization and brutality. These conceptualizations represent a methodological and theoretical attempt not only to think about the relationship between migration movements and control regimes in a way that is different from the classical sociological way of object-structure, but also to conceive of migration differently than the previous dominant practice in the cultural and social sciences – namely, not thinking about it in the sense of a ‘deviation’ from the paradigm of the settled way of life in the modern nation-state, or as a functionalist variable of economic processes and rationalities. Instead, this theoretical and methodological approach represents an attempt to conceptualize migration both historically and also structurally as an act of ‘flight’ and as ‘imperceptible’ form of resistance, in the sense of withdrawal and escape from miserable, exploitative conditions of existence such as those described by Dimitris Papadopoulos, Niamh Stephenson and Vassilis Tsianos (2008). Yann Moulier Boutang (2006) described this aspect as the “autonomy of migration.” This draws attention to migration as a co-constitutive factor for the border, with the forces of the movements of migration that are challenging and reshaping the border every single day (Hess 2016).

4The Autonomy of Migration as a Prism

What would change if we were to conceptualize migration in the way expressed by the concept of ‘the autonomy of migration’? The concept of the autonomy of migration is often wrongly interpreted to mean the autonomy of migrants. However, this misses the concept’s intent, which instead needs to be understood as a structural argument drawn from a historical materialist reading of history. Nor does the concept intend to obscure the suffering and plight of numerous migration projects. Instead, it represents an attempt by Moulier Boutang and other researchers to re-situate migration within the history of labor, capitalism, and modern forms of government that focuses on the previously little-considered ability of living labor to escape from unbearable conditions of (re-)production (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). Moulier Boutang writes, for example, “If one links it with Foucault’s ‘desire of the masses not to be governed in this way’ and connects it to the concept of flight or exile, it becomes fruitful: because flight is the masses’ refusal to let themselves be governed, a response to asymmetric power relations” (Moulier Boutang 2006, 172).

In his theoretical approach, Moulier Boutang draws strongly on the theoretical tradition of operaismo (workerism). ‘Operaismo’ originated on the one hand as a political movement and on the other emerged from 1960s political theory in Italy in opposition to the Marxist mainstream. Two central insights of this ‘workerism’ appear to be crucial for the change in perspective emphasized by a migration research approach focusing on the autonomy of migration. First, workerism conceives of the history of capitalism as being driven by workers’ struggles. From this viewpoint, for example, both industrialization and the development of the factory appear as a political response to the mass flight from rural regions and workers’ resistance. Secondly, ‘resistance’ is conceived empirically by taking into account silent, unorganized, apparently insignificant forms of subversion and withdrawal such as slow working. Analogously, Moulier Boutang regards capitalist developments not simply as being motivated by the dynamics of the profit rate but as representing reactions to the lived mobility of the labor force, and as a constant attempt to control living labor and its ability and desire to mount resistance and escape from the existing conditions (Moulier Boutang 2006; Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos 2008).

This viewpoint of the autonomy of migration does not end by assuming that migration can be understood as an active force and as a form of everyday silent resistance. Instead, this approach asks about the ways in which migration intervenes in the center of knowledge production (Hess 2015). Bernd Kasparek and Maria Schwertl recently summed up the theoretical implications of the autonomy of migration as follows: “The autonomy of migration is less a conclusion to arrive at but a perspective that opens up new ways of interrogation and doing research. Or, to quote Moulier Boutang, autonomy of migration is not a slogan, but a method” (Hess, Kasparek, and Schwertl 2017).

If we follow the concept of the autonomy of migration in the sense of a method or a prism, the question inevitably arises of what such a viewpoint may enable us to see. First, the approach conceives of migration and mobility as a social movement not in the classical sense of an organized, ideological driven movement, but rather in the sense of world-making collective practice, and consequently as a fundamentally political, social, and transformative project. Through migration, social agents escape from their normalized representations and reshape themselves and their own conditions of existence. According to Papadopoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos, migration represents an active transformation of the social space:

Migration is not the evacuation of a place and the occupation of a different one; it is the making and remaking of one’s own life on the scenery of the world. World-making. You cannot measure migration in changes of position or location, but in the increase in inclusiveness and the amplitude of its intensities. Even if migration starts sometimes as a form of dislocation (forced by poverty, patriarchal exploitation, war, famine), its target is not relocation but the active transformation of social space. (Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos 2008, 169–170)

Second, when we look at the border and the migration regime, the way in which we conceptualize the border and consequently the way in which we understand the ‘state’ or ‘sovereignty’ also changes. The formerly monolithic border apparatus breaks down and dissolves into multiple factors: agents, practices, discourses, technologies, bodies, emotions, processes, and contestations become visible, and migration can be conceived of as one of the driving forces behind this (Heimeshoff, Hess, Kron, and Schwenken 2014, 13–14). This way of conceiving the border discards simplified binary models that locate the structure as a simple opposite of the power to act. Instead, the border is newly conceptualized as a space of challenge, of conflict and negotiation. The ethnographic border regime analysis developed by the Transit Migration Research Group in the 2000s attempts to provide a methodological operationalization of these theoretical implications (Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe 2007; Tsianos and Hess 2010).

The ethnographic border regime analysis draws on a political-science notion of ‘regime’ as well as a Foucauldian notion in order to take into account the border work of a variety of agents, institutions, and other human and non-human factors, without simplifying the diverse interests and rationalities of these forces into a simple or linear logic or hidden agenda (like that of capital or European racism). The ethnographic border regime analysis is rather based on an empirical and theoretical conceptualization of the border as a location of continual encounters and tensions, so that migration becomes a constitutive component of the border. According to Giuseppe Sciortino, the regime is “rather a mix of implicit conceptual frames, generations of turf wars among bureaucracies and waves after waves of ‘quick fixes’ to emergencies […] the life of a regime is the result of continuous repair work through practices” (Sciortino 2004, 32–33).

Accordingly to the regime approach, the continual and structurally conflict-ridden reconfiguration of the border must be understood primarily as a reaction to the movements of migration that challenge, cross, and reshape borders. From this point of view, it is the migration movements that produce the socioeconomic phenomenon of the border space: border spaces represent the product of a collectivized excessive desire to overcome borders, of networks of people on the move and of collective knowledge practices of border crossing (Fröhlich 2015). It is this “excess” of autonomy that is the target of control, regulation, and exploitation by state border agencies and policies in order to construct the border as a stable, controllable, and manageable tool for selective and differential inclusion.

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