Ways to Think about Strategy

Alberto Pena (2001) proposed eight dimensions of strategy: anticipation, decision, method, position, frame of reference, perspective, discourse, and relationship with the environment. Strategy as anticipation refers to considering the future and its probabilities. Organizations define their vision, mission, and objectives to look toward the future, and they therefore employ strategy. The dimension of decision will be addressed in the next section from a public relations perspective.

Strategy as a method focuses on how to achieve the purpose of a public relations campaign or activity. That is, once it is clear what to do, it is a priority to determine the necessary steps to achieve it. Therefore, strategy as a method considers the sequence of actions to achieve the desired results.

Strategy as a position and as an advantage refers to the permanent desire to maintain a privileged situation so that a professional’s interests, clients, employers, and/or causes are promoted. This aspect of strategy requires professionals to know their own organizations and client well, both their strengths and weaknesses. Without this understanding, professionals would have difficulty in determining what positioning generates advantage. This model of strategic position has two currents (Pena, 2001), one that refers to achieving a favorable location, with a static understanding of position, and a second with a more projective emphasis, which points out the right way to go to about achieving a position of advantage.

Strategy as a frame of reference refers to the ability of a professional to frame collective behavior. In managerial terms, it refers to the collective understanding of the purposes and actions taken by an organization. When this understanding is in writing, it delineates the minimum and maximum actions, both individual and group, needed to generate coherence and move a strategic idea from concept to reality.

The framework of a strategy must be known, learned, and shared by the entire group of people who contribute to its execution and fulfillment. Having a shared framework allows integration, unity, and coherence, while also reducing unforeseen events.

Strategy as perspective and vision highlights the necessity of having a clear idea about what one aspires to be, to obtain, or to gain. These qualities help professionals to define the focus of their efforts, so that the decisions they make guide the way and identify the appropriate position for the organization, its people, and its products. Perspective and vision help professionals to solidify their purpose while moving beyond identifying goals to achieving them.

Strategy as discourse and logical action draws attention to how all strategy relies on prediction. Pena (2001), using the work of Ricoeur (2008), stated that discourse is the way in which human beings say what they do. Professionals need to understand that strategy is in itself a discourse of action. When a strategy is stated in a logical manner and explains what will be done, why it will be done, what will motivate publics to act in desired ways and with what means and for what purpose, it moves beyond intuition because meaning is articulated.

Strategy as a realm of the environment reminds practitioners of the anticipative sense needed to gauge the environment. Strategies are, therefore, planned, anticipatory, and projective. However, the professional needs to scan the environment to determine how best to develop relationships with the different publics that will be affected by a strategy.

Developing and Writing Strategies

The use of the strategy in economic and business areas has diverse antecedents, but experts agree with Peter Drucker’s introduction to his book The practice of management (1954). The concept of strategic decision makes explicit the relationship of business policies to the setting of objectives, the definition of real and possible actions, the optimization of factors, and the forecast of micro and macro economic environments (Levitt, 1960; Chandler, 1962; Ansoff, 1965)

Communication strategies are developed from the same concept of strategic decision, specified in a planned communication with intention, objectives, and duly justified actions. These strategic decisions in communication are based on research and on a permanent evaluation of the actions that involve the organization with its stakeholders. A contemporary approach to public relations is strategic, and most practitioners see themselves as strategic communicators (Smith, 2013).

Strategic management, and its application in strategic communication, requires the development of four phases. Different public relations authors have written about the application of these phases, summarized in acronyms that complement each other. Smith (2013) summarized these contributions in RACE (research, action, communication, evaluation), introduced by Marston (1963); ROPE (research, objectives, programming, evaluation), presented by Hendrix and Hayes (2009); and RAISE (research, adaptation, implementation strategy, evaluation) (Kendall, 1997). Other authors, such as Kelly (2001) and Crifasi (2000), each introduce a fifth step in ROPES (research, objectives, strategy, program, evaluation stewardship) and ROSIE (research, objectives, strategy, implementation, evaluation), respectively.

The strategic management process refers to the methods by which strategies are derived and consists of different phases or steps. These phases are interactive and do not necessarily always occur in the order presented below.

Example: Strategic Plans of the North and South of the Aburrá Valley in Medellín, Colombia

To exemplify what is meant by strategy building, we can examine the communication and public relations strategy implemented by the multisectoral alliance called Strategic Plans of the North and South of the Aburrá Valley, in Medellín, Colombia. In this example, the target publics who were recipients of the public communication strategy used by the multisectoral alliance were classified into three main levels:

• Level 1: Residents of the area: at this level, the inhabitants of the area comprised of families, the elderly, adults, young people, and children were brought together, with communication products for broad dissemination and messages of an informative and persuasive nature to achieve a favorable attitude toward the general activities of the alliance.
• Level 2: Strategic actors: this level included community artistic, environmental, civic, and political organizations, citizen representatives, administrators and officials, municipal planning councils, entrepreneurs from each municipality and the various sectors of the economy, and mass media. These publics were necessary in order to influence others and help garner favorable attitudes about the activities of the alliance.
• Level 3: At this level, people and institutions responsible for administrative and regulatory decisions of the 10 municipalities of the Aburrá Valley (such as the Metropolitan Board) were integrated to ensure the execution and continuity of the projects. This public was important because of its impact upon guidelines and conventions.

Once priority publics are identified, and the components of the strategy are specified and grand tactics that integrate actions to achieve strategies are employed. In the case of the public relations strategy for the Strategic Plans of the North and South of the Aburrá Valley, in Colombia, the tactical components were visual identity, public information, discussion and conciliation processes, and lobbying.

In the visual identity component, the visual element reflecting the alliance was developed. This logo was used in all promotional pieces such as print and digital, stationery and graphic products, book dividers, posters, and billboards. The design and development of this visual identity allowed professionals to use these communication products in all the phases of the process because there was a coherent visual strategy at work.

The public information component included information management. Information meant for mass media and alternative media was disseminated at strategic intervals so the public was aware of the alliance’s work and progress. Information was also shared with the public through newsletters, websites, and audiovisual products, further allowing the professionals to release information in planned and strategic ways.

The third tactical component was the hosting of events, workshops, forums, and meetings to foster two‐way communication. All constituents were invited to join these planned events and were encouraged to listen and also to express their opinions. The exchange of information in such a personalized and direct manner helped to build relationships among constituents, and also made it easier for people to meet in the future.

Finally, lobbying, defined here as strategic relations and communication actions to influence legislative or executive decisions, focused on the action of influence in the municipal and metropolitan representation bodies, the formulation of interinstitutional documents resulting from the deliberations, and the sharing of these initiatives with citizens.

Digital communication, the immediacy of information, and mobile devices demand a strategic perspective that adapts to a complex, diverse, and connected world. Capabilities for strategic analysis and action must be constantly developed and updated.

The NO Strategy

On October 2, 2016, the president of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, asked the voting public to endorse the peace agreement signed with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Havana, Cuba in September 2016, after four years of negotiation. The FARC was established as an insurgent movement against the government and the political and economic elites of Colombia in 1964 (Botero, 2017, p. 370). It demanded agrarian reforms and land rights for peasants. The armed confrontations lasted five decades and affected more than six million victims, including more than 600,000 deaths, in addition to many kidnappings and attacks across the country (Semana, 2014).

The Colombian government announced a plebiscite for citizens to vote Yes or No to the final agreement to end the conflict with the guerrilla group, planned in the midst of a polarized environment in this South American country. Campaigns in favor and against the peace agreement took place. The campaign to motivate voters to support the peace agreement brought together an alliance of political parties and movements that were also supportive of Santos’s government. In public declarations, a representative of the Colombia Yes to Peace foundation, Mauricio Vega, agreed that this organization would focus its messaging on requesting the pardon of Rodrigo Londoño (a top FARC leader) after the signing of the final peace agreement. This foundation would also reinforce the campaign for Yes with overwhelming support from the international community for the peace process (M. Vega, quoted in El Tiempo, September 28, 2016). To position this message, Colombia Yes for Peace used traditional mass media such as radio and television, as well as town halls and meetings where community members in the different regions of the country had direct contact with the leaders of the various political groups. “Our strategy will focus on radio and television commercials, and on Sunday we will receive the results in an event to which the President of the Republic and the heads of all political parties, among others, are invited” (M. Vega, quoted in El Tiempo, September 28, 2016).

However, there were also people who did not support the rush to Yes for the peace agreement. The movement promoting the No was led by former president (2002–2010) Álvaro Uribe Vélez and his followers. Uribe Vélez led an opposition movement against the Santos administration, and therefore did everything possible for the peace agreement to fail. In an interview offered to the newspaper La República, the director of the campaign in support of No in the plebiscite for peace explained the strategic thinking behind the campaign and how it was developed in consultation with Colombian citizens.

The Campaign for No concentrated its strategic messaging on motivating citizens to demonstrate their disdain for the signing of the peace agreement. The campaign organizers motivated this outrage by bringing up sensitive issues such as impunity, eligibility, and tax reform. They then worked to reach segments of the publics via specific mass and social media and used framing theory, in an unethical way, to convey a message of indignation by playing up sensitive issues. Using social media, the Campaign for No had an even broader reach. Due to the expansive power of social media, the movement for No and its supporters multiplied the power and influence of their messages, regardless of the truth of the information they delivered. According to the testimony of Juan Carlos Vélez, director of the movement for No, this strategy can be summarized as follows:

We discovered the viral power of social networks. For example, in a visit to Apartadó, Antioquia, a councilman passed me an image of Santos and “Timochenko” [leader of the FARC] with a message about why the guerrillas would be given money if the country was in the pot [bankrupt]. I published it on my Facebook and last Saturday had 130,000 shares with a reach of six million people.

We made an initial stage of reactivating the entire structure of the Democratic Center in the regions by distributing leaflets in the cities. Some strategists from Panama and Brazil told us that the strategy was to stop explaining the agreement to focus the message on the outrage. In broadcasters of medium and high strata we rely on non‐impunity, eligibility and tax reform, while in low‐income stations we focus on subsidies. Regarding the segment in each region we use their respective accents. On the coast we sing the message that we were going to become Venezuela. And here he did not win without paying a peso. In eight municipalities of Cauca we passed radio propaganda on Saturday night focused on victims. (J. C. Vélez, quoted in El Colombiano, October 6, 2016, in translation)

The referendum results were very close and the strategy using framing theory unethically won in the polls by a small margin (0.43%). The message of outrage, strategically framed in specifically targeted mass media and especially in social media, garnered the desired effect of tipping the vote toward the option of No. President Santos did not need to call for a plebiscite, he did it as an expression of democratic participation. The results were a total surprise for the national and international community because it was defeated by a manipulative campaign led by a populist movement with a conservative orientation or center‐right perspective. However, we can not say whether the results are good or bad for Colombia. The fact is that the peace agreement was signed. The future may change the direction of this historical moment because in the second round of the presidential election of June 17, 2018, the candidate of the Democratic Center won and may challenge aspects of the agreement.

Although the margin of difference between the No (50.21%) and the Yes (49.78%) was minimal (53,894 votes) (Registraduría Nacional de Colombia, 2016), this strategy became a political phenomenon for three reasons.

First, the results of this referendum vote did not support the peace accords signed a few days earlier by the Colombian government and FARC. Second, the statements of the director of the Campaign for No, who explained in an interview with the newspaper La República the details of the strategy, were scandalous. It was only three days after the elections and the director implied his manipulation of information, misrepresented the content of the peace agreement, and used social media to help false information about sensitive issues compete with value judgments. The political Democratic Center disavowed the head of the Campaign for No and he was forced to resign, but not before retracting his statements, which put sponsors, businesspeople, and political leaders in a compromising situation (Sarmiento, 2017; El Colombiano, 2016). Third, more than half of voters, 62.56%, abstained from voting in the referendum. Only 37.4% of Colombians eligible to vote went to the polls to affirm or withhold their approval of the peace agreement meant to end an internal conflict of more than 50 years. This example is a cautionary tale about how strategy and theory can be used by unethical professionals to manipulate the public.

The Green Tunnel Strategy

Members of a community group in the municipality of Envigado in the Metropolitan Area of the Aburrá Valley, in Colombia, became quite active when they learned of the imminent felling of more than two hundred trees along an environmental boulevard in an urban area. The trees were to be removed in order to build a bus system of medium capacity called Metroplús. Spontaneously, the young people of the community who opposed the decision of the mayor of Envigado to remove the trees, designed communication messages for different publics through social media and called for direct and public action, such as stakeholder meetings, on the boulevard surrounded by the trees.

The communication strategy used to mobilize members of the public focused on ensuring the civil rights of the citizens of the community, generating enthusiasm for citizen participation, and gathering favorable public opinion behind the idea that people had the right to a city with an environmental heritage. In a few months, what had been spontaneous tactics consolidated to form a public relations strategy for environmental concerns that even reached the neighboring municipalities.

Using agenda‐setting theory, the organizers of this movement managed their messages in the news media through meetings with leaders of environmental movements, media tours with experts, researchers, and academics from the leading universities of the city, meetings with representatives of the municipal government, and social networks such as Facebook and Twitter to disseminate information, issue calls for marches, and gather feedback from stakeholders.

The media’s coverage of the messages of the organizers gave the campaign third‐party endorsement. The legitimacy of the message was further enhanced by international events such as the Colombia Moda fashion week and cultural shows, which allowed it to become part of the national agenda. In this way, municipal governments were informed of citizen dissatisfaction with unilateral decisions that ignored the importance of a road infrastructure designed to create a corridor of trees. This green tunnel was meant to keep citizens and the environment healthy. The unilateral decision by the local government to fell the trees threatened the right of citizens to a healthy environment and the protection of an environmental resource, which bordered the municipalities. In the end, the local government and the Metro and Metroplús transportation companies had to agree to a design review of their plans, as well as to holding meetings with citizens so they could have a say in the proposals and voice any concerns or disagreements. In addition, there was a legal ruling which called for a review of the environmental authorizations for logging. The tactics and messaging used in this campaign targeted emotions as well as the importance of the preservation of the trees as part of the cultural assets of the inhabitants of the Envigado municipality, which built solidarity with the citizens of Medellín.

Thanks to the precautionary measure taken and the popular action provoked by the Colectivo Túnel Verde with the help of the legal clinic of the University of Medellín, a legal ruling to stop the construction of the Metroplús line pending further consultation with the community came out in favor of the social movement, but above all in favor of the citizenry. The efforts of volunteers to collect more than twenty thousand physical signatures, as well as the resolve, desires, donations, and other resources of volunteers and members of the Green Tunnel Collective demonstrate how strategy and theory can help a reactive and spontaneous response become an example of a campaign based in consistency and coherence which helped to build citizen–government relations while defending citizens’ rights to an environmentally green and healthy city.

The Rural Strategy of Carmen de Viboral

In the Department of Antioquia, in Colombia, the government of the municipality of El Carmen de Viboral states that the development of the territory takes place with community participation. The municipality’s belief in the “common benefit” helps create conditions of equity in both the urban and the rural areas of the territory. The local government uses tools such as a multidimensional approach to frame development and generate trust in communities, which allows a dynamic environment for inhabitants. The framework of the community is built around developing, training, acquiring, and sharing values that put peaceful coexistence in the forefront of decisions (El Carmen de Viboral, 2016). To foster these ideals, the 2016–2019 municipal development plan has six strategic goals:

• El Carmen de Viboral, territory of life and peace;
• citizen security and well‐being;
• building identity through the social;
• infrastructure for equity;
• agricultural and environmental sustainability;
• modern institutionalization, a government for people.

The projects undertaken by each government office follow these strategic guidelines. The third line, “building identity through the social,” has been instrumental in strengthening the culture of the area because it acts as the axis of the social dynamics of the municipality. In other words, the strategic approach taken by the municipality is grounded in relationship management theory. Factors such as trust, satisfaction, and commitment are developed communally, through effective access to basic community needs such as health, education, sports and recreation, housing, and employment.

In order to build better relationships with the youth of the area, the municipal administration of Carmen de Viboral has been reaching out to teens. Government officials want to build two‐way communication between themselves and the local youth to gain an understanding of teens’ personal health decisions and behaviors, as well as family life. It is hoped that with this understanding, municipal officials can help young people to become advocates for their health and educational concerns. By building trust with these constituents, the government officials want to challenge and encourage teens to exercise their right to be heard, to be present in participatory processes, to engage in citizenship, and become the main actors in the human and social development of their local municipalities.

In the first semester of 2016, an unusual event occurred in one of the schools of the municipality. Two high school students were found consuming psychoactive substances inside the educational buildings. To address the situation, a meeting was held between the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, and the directors of educational institutions, in order to find solutions to mitigate and put an end to the problem. While investigating the occurrence, it was discovered that mental health prevention actions and information had not been distributed or implemented in either of the two municipal institutions since 2011. With this knowledge, a strategic public relations campaign was designed to increase the knowledge of adolescent students about the effects of drug use. Both parents and educators were brought together to raise awareness about drug use among local teens. By bringing these constituents together, trust was enhanced and relationships were forged.

The primary strategy of the program used relationship management theory as well as dialogue theory. Activities for teens to enjoy after school were developed. Tactics such as workshops and conferences were employed to foster discussion and communication among the key publics. Based on these conversations, several outreach programs were developed. The most successful of these activities was a theater contest. Teens were challenged to develop plays and skits to reinforce the lessons they learned about abuse of drugs and psychotropic substances. These performances were evaluated by a panel of experts from the municipality’s Institute of Culture. Through dialogue and relationship building, not only did government and educational leaders see a change in the attitudes and behaviors displayed by young people about using drugs, but it also led to opening more discussion about other important topics affecting adolescents, such as parents, other family members, teachers, and others in the community struggling with addiction.

Suggested Readings

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