Crisis and Communication

“Crisis” is an extremely broad term related to disruptions of some kind. For this chapter, we are focusing on organizational crises rather than disasters. Organizational crises refer to situations that affect the relationship between an organization and its stakeholders. An organizational crisis has three essential elements: (1) it involves the perceived violation of stakeholder expectations; (2) the perceived violation threatens to disrupt operations and/or seriously damage reputational assets; and (3) the perceived violations may pose a danger to stakeholders.

Crises are driven by the stakeholder perceptions of the situation. If stakeholders believe there is a problem with the organization, managers must consider that there is a crisis. Ignoring stakeholder concerns may further damage the organization–stakeholder relationship and other vital organizational outcomes (Coombs, 2015).

A crisis will harm an organization in some way, but the extent of that harm is largely dependent on the crisis management efforts. Historically, crisis management was developed to address potential disruptions to operations, what can be termed operational crises. An industrial accident is an example of an operational crisis. Crisis management efforts can prevent an industrial accident from disrupting operations or limit the extent and duration of the disruption. Operational crises tend to be event based (e.g. accidents and product recalls) and pose some threat to the safety and security of stakeholders, such as employees, community members, and customers. The primary concern during an operational crisis is the safety and security of the stakeholders placed at risk by the crisis – the crisis victims (Coombs, 2015).

A crisis will harm organizational reputation in some manner. The crisis response can limit the amount and duration of damage inflicted on the organizational reputation. Reputational crises are situations where the dominant concern is the reputational harm created by the crisis (Sohn & Lariscy, 2014). Advertisements that offend segments of stakeholders, or firms irresponsibly sourcing raw materials are examples of reputational crises. While operational crises inflict reputational damage, the focus of the crisis response will be on the safety threat created by the operational crisis. Reputation crises allow for a more selfish response as managers can focus on protecting the organization’s reputation from the dangers presented by the crisis. Moreover, reputational crises often are removed from specific events, and thus reflect the perceptual nature of crises. Managers must recognize a crisis is emerging and acknowledge the situation is a crisis – validate the perceptions of the stakeholders. Rather than being triggered by events, reputational crises frequently arise from revelations by management. For example, an explosion at a manufacturing facility is an event that most people will perceive as a crisis. In contrast, when some customers are offended by an advertisement, managers must realize that the concern constitutes a crisis (Coombs, 2014). The distinction between operational and reputational crises has implications for the application of various crisis communication theories.

Risk Communication

Risk communication has evolved from a simple, linear transmission model that focuses on understanding the technical aspects of risk to an interactive model that emphasizes the social understanding of risk (Heath & O’Hair, 2009; Lundgren & McMakin, 1998; Palenchar, 2005; Tansey & Rayner, 2009). Risk communication seeks to improve communication between risk bearers (those who might suffer the consequences from the risk) and those creating the risks. The essential elements of risk communication are (1) an interactive communication process that (2) seeks to increase awareness and response to a risk, (3) seeks to build tolerance for a risk, and (4) is premised on understanding and acknowledging perceptions of risk.

Risk communication should include some element of interactivity even if it is limited to gathering information about the affected stakeholders (risk bearers) prior to communicating with them. Ideally, the risk communication is more of a dialogue between the risk bearers and risk creators (Heath & O’Hair, 2009; Palenchar, 2005). Awareness remains a key goal in many crisis risk situations, coupled with a desire for risk bearers to take action based on this new information. For instance, firms want to make customers aware of a harmful product and to return or discontinue use of the product (Freberg, 2012). Government agencies want citizens to be aware of a flu outbreak and to take precautions against it. Another goal is to increase the risk tolerance of risk bearers. Chemical companies have abandoned seeking support for or acceptance of the risks they create because tolerance is a much more realistic outcome (Heath & O’Hair, 2009). Finally, risk communication should begin from the perspective of the risk bearer. Risk communicators must understand how risk bearers perceive the risk and why they hold those perceptions. The focus on the risk bearer assumes an active perceiver and is rooted in cultural theory and the work of Mary Douglas (Tansey & Rayner, 2009).

Issues Management

An issue is a point of contention between two or more parties. Issues management began as a systematic and effective means for business to influence public policy decisions (Chase, 1984). It has since evolved into to a broader set of communicative interventions designed to influence decisions. The essential elements of issues management are (1) a systematic set of communication interventions, (2) designed to influence decision‐making, (3) predicated on issue identification and analysis, and (4) requires balancing the interests of organizations and stakeholders to facilitate mutually beneficial relationships. Issues management is a complex process that involves a variety of communicative interventions designed to influence people in various ways. The discussion of the catalytic model (also called the issue catalyst model) will illustrate this point.

The primary purpose of issues management is to influence decisions. Decisions can include policy decisions made by political actors and organizational decisions made by managers. At its core, issues management is about exercising influence. Issues management was intended to be proactive. A proactive approach requires managers to scan the environment in order to identify potential and existing issues that could affect the organization. Once an issue is identified, managers analyze the issue to determine if action is needed, and if so, what types of communicative actions to take. Issue identification and analysis guide the strategic focus of the issue management efforts. Finally, organizations cannot abuse their power positions to win issue battles without consideration for the effects on their relationships with other stakeholders. Heath and Palenchar (2009) caution that issues management efforts should “increase satisfaction between parties and foster mutual benefits” (p. 14). Abusing power in the issues management process can ferment long‐term damage to relationships.

Proactive Actions

Part of crisis communication is mitigation and preparation, and this phase is termed the precrisis phase. Crisis communication can be used before a crisis (when) to prepare organizations and stakeholders for when a crisis does occur (why). The how of precrisis communication involves a number of communication activities. Inside the organization, managers must create crisis communication plans and train crisis management teams. Managers must scan regularly for crisis risks and monitor any actions taken to mitigate those risks. Outside the organizations, stakeholders must be trained in how to prepare for a crisis. For instance, community members may need to learn how to shelter‐in‐place. The precrisis focus on risk illustrates how crisis and risk communication can overlap. Mitigation prevents a crisis from occurring and harming stakeholders and/or organizational assets. It facilitates both relationship management and organizational objective achievement.

Organizations have a need to educate people about emerging health, safety, and environmental risks. Chemical manufactures are mandated by law to engage in risk communication about their chemicals with the community. Government agencies frequently warn citizens about emerging health or safety threats. The risk communication involves creating awareness of the risk, educating people about the risk, and trying to persuade people to take action to limit their exposure to the risk. Risk communication seeks to keep people informed about risks and ways to protect themselves from the risk. This promotes public safety. Risk communication also may attempt to reduce the stakeholder outrage created by a risk.

Managers can create an issue that will work to their advantage. The catalytic model is devoted to the idea of creating rather than reacting to an issue (Crable & Vibbert, 1985). Managers can push for regulatory or legislative changes that will give their organization a competitive advantage. The various communication strategies identified in the catalytic model can be used to facilitate the creation of an issue, awareness of the issue, and support for the issue, and build pressure for a favorable policy decision. In a similar way, stakeholders can engage in issues management to define an organization’s behavior as an issue of irresponsibility. Communication strategies can be used to define the behavior as irresponsible, create awareness of the irresponsible behavior, and pressure the organization to change the behavior. Returning to the Detox campaign, Greenpeace defined the use of a certain toxic chemical as irresponsible, used social media and in‐store protests to make customers aware that H&M, a global retailer based in Sweden, was using the toxic chemical in its clothes, and eventually forced H&M to remove the chemical from its clothes – H&M detoxed (Coombs, 2014). This case illustrates how risk can be used to create an issue that threatens to become a reputational crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2015a).

Reactive Actions

Mitigation is never 100%. Hence, organizations often need to respond to actual crises. Crises can be events or perceptions of a situation as problematic. When a crisis occurs, managers must act to protect both stakeholders and the organization from the ill‐effects of the crisis. When a crisis creates a threat to public health and safety, the first task for crisis managers is to supply instructing and adjusting information to stakeholders. Instructing information helps people to protect themselves physically from a crisis, while adjusting information helps people to cope psychologically with a crisis.

Once instructing and adjusting information is provided, crisis managers can add reputation management strategies. Typical reputation management strategies in an operations crisis include an apology, compensation, and bolstering. An apology is when the organization accepts responsibility for a crisis and asks for forgiveness. Compensation is when stakeholders are offered money, goods, or services above reimbursements for costs incurred by the crisis. For example, covering medical costs would be part of adjusting information, while giving the victims an additional $5,000 would be compensation. Bolstering reminds stakeholders of past good works by the organization or praises those who have helped during the crisis.

Stakeholders expect organizations to address the concerns of victims. This expectation means the failure to provide instructing and adjusting information will intensify a crisis. Showing concern can lessen anger toward an organization, while omitting instructing and adjusting information can increase anger. Anger motivates stakeholders to engage in negative behaviors toward the organization and erodes the organizational reputation. Instructing and adjusting information can limit the damage a crisis inflicts on the organization and its stakeholders. Apology, compensation, and bolstering communication strategies try to offset some of the negativity created by the crisis by adding positive organizational actions to the situation. Research supports the idea that adjusting information, apology, compensation, and bolstering can all benefit an organization during a crisis by limiting reputational damage, protecting purchase intentions, and reducing anger (Coombs, 2007; Ma & Zhan, 2016). Successful crisis communication can reduce the perceived risk associated with the organization and lessen the likelihood of the crisis spawning an issue. However, if stakeholders see a need for the government to regulate organizational behavior as a means of preventing similar crises in the future, stakeholders may initiate issue management to address perceived risks posed by organizational operations.

Risk managers may face situations where stakeholders are outraged by the risk. Although outrage often is caused by people overestimating the risk, the outrage exists and can be challenging to manage. Simply reporting the “correct estimation” of the risk, as determined by science experts, will not end outrage. Risk estimates by stakeholders are driven by perceptions, not by analytics. If people are worried about a risk, simply telling them the risk is low does not constitute effective risk communication. When people are outraged or concerned about a risk, managers must engage in a dialogue to identify and to validate those concerns. Through dialogue, risk managers seek to create tolerance of the risk by stakeholders and to build trust. If stakeholders tolerate the risk, they are less likely to oppose the organization. However, it is unlikely these stakeholders will support the organization. Tolerance simply creates quiescence. Stakeholder quiescence can aid achievement of organization objectives, while opposition can hinder those same efforts. For instance, if community members continually protest a manufacturing facility, the managers of the facility will find it more difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to achieve its desired outcomes. The reactive use of risk communication tries to limit the negative effect that risk can have on achieving organizational goals.

Issues management involves multiple actors seeking a variety of outcomes (Crable & Vibbert, 1985). It probably is more common for managers to be reacting to issues being managed by others than to be creating their own issues. An essential part of issues management is scanning for issues. When managers locate an emerging issue or encounter a prominent issue through scanning, their issues management effort is considered reactive. Once identified, various communication strategies can be used to prevent the issue from becoming policy or to change the nature of the final policy decision (Jones & Chase, 1979). The communication strategies for issues management include redefining the issue, questioning the legitimacy of an issue, and promoting an alternative policy solution option to the issue (Crable & Vibbert, 1985; Jones & Chase, 1979).

Crisis Communication Theory

Image repair/restoration theory (IRT) draws from the rhetorical tradition to identify a list of crisis response strategies that can be used to categorize and critique crisis responses. IRT assumes that people perceive a wrongdoing and that the organization is responsible for the wrongdoing. Moreover, IRT assumes communication is goal‐directed and reputation management is a common goal in communication (Benoit, 1995). IRT identifies five categories of crisis responses (image repair strategies): (1) denial, claims the organization has no responsibility for the crisis; (2) evading responsibility, seeks to reduce perceived responsibility for a crisis; (3) reducing offensiveness, attempts to improve perceptions of the organization; (4) corrective action, restores the situation to its precrisis state and/or seeks to prevent a repeat of the crisis; and (5) mortification, seeks forgiveness by accepting responsibility for the crisis and expressing sympathy to victims (Benoit, 1995). IRT is used to analyze the organization’s reactive response to accusations of wrongdoing. Additional data are collected to indicate the success or failure of the crisis communication. The critic then interprets the results by connecting the choices of crisis response strategies to the outcomes of the crisis communication effort. The dominant research method for IRT is qualitative case study.

Situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) is cognitive‐based, derived from attribution theory, and centers on crisis responsibility (Coombs, 1995; Coombs & Holladay, 2002). People naturally make attributions for negative events. They create explanations for their occurrence (Weiner, 1995). Crisis responsibility refers to the amount of responsibility for the crisis that stakeholders assign to the organization experiencing the crisis. SCCT is premised on the finding that as attributions of crisis responsibility increase, so too does the damage a crisis inflicts on an organization. That damage can be to the organizational reputation and purchase intentions (Coombs, 2007). SCCT posits that the crisis response should match the communicative demands of the crisis situation. Moreover, SCCT argues that reputation management should occur only after managers have conveyed instructing information (told people how to protect themselves physically from a crisis) and adjusting information (helped people to cope psychologically with a crisis). SCCT recommends providing instructing and adjusting information any time a crisis creates victims or potential victims. Reputation management strategies, such as compensation and apology, should be added when crisis responsibility is high. Crisis responsibility will be high when crises are viewed as preventable or the organization has a history of crises and/or a negative prior reputation (Coombs, 2007).

SCCT is prescriptive in its recommendations. A crisis communication effort can be evaluated by identifying the key elements of the crisis situation, the crisis response, and the outcomes of the crisis communication effort. Ideally, the proper or improper application of SCCT’s recommendations can explain the success or failure of the crisis communication effort. SCCT relies heavily upon quantitative experiments and quasi‐experiments to test its assumptions and recommendations (Ma & Zhan, 2016).

Stealing thunder emphasizes the timing of a crisis response. A number of studies consistently have shown that when an organization is the first to disclose the existence of a crisis, the crisis inflicts less harm on the organization (Arpan & Pompper, 2003; Claeys, 2017; Claeys & Cauberghe, 2012). For instance, less reputational damage is experienced by an organization when the organization itself discloses its own crisis compared to when the news media disclose the same crisis information (Claeys & Cauberghe, 2012). Stealing thunder does have some boundaries. It is not always possible for an organization to steal thunder, managers are hesitant to steal thunder (Claeys & Opgenhaffen, 2016), and stealing thunder is more effective for product harm crises than for moral violation crises (Beldad, Hegner, & van Laar, 2017). Overall, research consistently supports the benefits of stealing thunder for crisis communication.

Issues Management Theory

Drawing upon the work of Taylor, Vasquez and Doorley (2003), we have identified systems, rhetorical, and engagement as the three theories to feature from issues management. The systems approach emphasizes environmental scanning and the systematic nature of issues management. Managers limit surprises by using issues management to locate threats and opportunities in the environment. Issues management offers a structured approach to using communication tactics to influence decisions. The Jones and Chase model captures the systems approach to issues management with its five steps: (1) identification of issues through environmental scanning, (2) prioritization of issues in terms of salience to the organization, (3) selection of a response strategy, (4) creation and implementation of the response, and (5) evaluation of the issues management effort (Jones & Chase, 1979).

The rhetorical approach to issues management focuses on meaning management with an emphasis on defining the issue. The catalytic model represents the rhetorical approach and outlines the life cycle of an issue that is composed of five stages or statuses: (1) potential, an issue is recognized, (2) imminent, support for the issue builds, (3) current, widespread recognition of the issue develops, (4) critical, pressure to make a decision about the issue builds, and (5) dormant, the issue is considered resolved for a time. Four communicative strategies are used in attempts to move an issue through its life cycle. Definition is used to create the issue. Legitimacy is used to build a base of support for the issue. Polarization seeks to force people to choose a side in the issue conflict. Identification is used to persuade people to support a particular course of action for resolving the issue (Crable & Vibbert, 1985). The issue definition strategy is critical because issue managers seek to define an issue in a way that favors their course of action for resolving the issue (Coombs, 1992).

The engagement approach to issues management centers on relationship building. Issues management is seen as an opportunity to build organization–public relations rather than a simple contest between opposing sides of an issue. “An engagement approach posits that it is the convergence of organizational interests with public interests that provides both parties with the greatest opportunity for issue resolution through communication” (Taylor et al., 2003, p. 261). The engagement approach seeks mutual benefit, an outcome that is lacking in the systems and rhetorical approaches.

Risk Communication Theory

According to the social amplification of risk framework, cultural beliefs and worldviews determine how people experience and interpret risks (Kasperson et al., 1988). In other words, this framework proposes that how social institutions and individuals perceive risk will affect its impact upon society and the responses of management institutions (Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996).

The amplification process starts with either a physical event, such as an industrial accident, or the recognition of an unfavorable effect, such as global warming. Amplification is the intensification or attenuation of the risk and can be influenced by individual and social stations. The individual stations of amplification are people themselves and the filters they use to interpret the risk and make sense of it. Social stations of amplification include governments, the news media, and voluntary organizations (Renn et al., 1992).

The amplification process for individuals could be divided into the following steps: passing through attention filters; decoding of signals; drawing inferences; comparing the decoded messages with other messages; evaluating messages; forming specific beliefs; rationalizing their beliefs; and forming a propensity to take corresponding actions (Renn et al, 1992). Characteristic for the risk interpretation of individual stations of amplification is that if the message is perceived to be consistent with the person’s values or previous beliefs, the perception of risk is intensified. On the other hand, if the components of the decoded message contradict the values and beliefs of the receiver, the message is ignored or attenuated.

When people perceive and interpret risk as social stations of amplification, they do so according to the rules of their home organization, public institution, or social group (Renn et al., 1992). These rules often are determined by professional standards and rules pertaining to the specific position of the receiver of the information.

According to the framework, the social amplification of risk will evoke behavioral responses from individuals. These behavioral responses can lead to secondary impacts such as impact on business sales, political and social pressure, changes in education, etc. Furthermore, secondary impacts can, in turn, produce third‐order impacts when perceived by other individuals or social groups. These impacts may have a “ripple” effect to other parties, which can spread outward, first to the directly affected victims, then touching the next level of those affected (e.g. a company or an organization), and, in extreme cases, can even reach to other social arenas that face similar risks (Kasperson et al., 1988). The second‐ and third‐order impacts can trigger (by means of risk amplification) or hinder (by means of risk attenuation) positive changes for risk reduction.

The theory of risk perception is a broad theory based in the work of Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1982). It is driven by a need to understand what people consider to be risky. This theory holds that risk is a function of how people perceive or assess the risk rather than the scientific determination of risk. Sandman (2003) refers to the scientific assessment of risk as “hazard” and the personal perceptual aspect as “outrage.” These concepts lead to his widely cited formula: Risk = Hazard + Outrage. The perceptual nature of risk can lead people to be apathetic about risks that are serious and to be overly concerned about risks that are relatively minor. As a result, risk communication sometimes seeks to increase concern when a risk is underestimated and to decrease concern when a risk is overestimated (Covello & Sandman, 2001). The key point is that risk is a subjective judgment that must be central to any hazard management efforts.

Risk perception is complex and multidimensional, but not unknowable. Research in this area has sought to identify the factors that influence risk perception and develop an understanding of and an ability to anticipate perceived risk. Slovic et al. (1982) posit that “perceived risk is quantifiable and predictable” (p. 85). A long list of variables that affect perceived risk have been identified. Because there is not enough space in this chapter to discuss all variables that can facilitate outrage, we have identified a few to illustrate the point. People are more likely to view something as risky if it is unfamiliar to them and affects children. A strange, new foodborne illness that can harm children should be viewed as riskier than a well‐known foodborne illness that poses little risk to children. Refer to Covello and Sandman (2001) for a more complete list of the outrage factors. Risk communication should be built upon understanding the risk perceptions of stakeholders. This knowledge provides the starting point for dialogues and partnerships between those creating the risk and those who must bear the risk (Palenchar, 2005; Slovic et al., 1982).

The extended parallel process model (EPPM) is used in risk communication research to guide message design and account for successes and failures in risk communication efforts (Witte, 1992). EPPM, grounded in work on fear appeals and message processing (Witte & Allen, 2000), assumes subjective understandings of risks and responses. Risk messages can be viewed as fear appeals designed to alert people to threats and prompt them to engage in recommended actions. When exposed to risk messages, people first appraise the threat (i.e. risk) to determine how and if it applies to them. Greater perceived vulnerability to the threat arouses fear, which leads to appraisals of the recommended response to the threat. Appraisals of the recommended actions trigger fear control processes and danger control responses.

Risk messages that elicit danger control responses create a protection motivation that leads to adaptive changes. These messages should be the most effective in promoting attitude change and gaining compliance with recommended actions. In contrast, messages that generate fear without providing efficacy lead people to focus on managing their fears rather than changing their behaviors to avoid or manage risks. Defensive motivations manifest through psychological protections such as denial, avoidance, and message distortion.

Thus, two categories of factors determine people’s responses to threat: (1) susceptibility, and (2) efficacy. Perceived susceptibility to the threat (relevance of the threat, similar to likelihood or probability) and perceived severity of the threat (significance of the threat, similar to impact or severity of consequences) are appraised. Second, efficacy is evaluated in terms of perceived response efficacy (the effectiveness of the recommended actions in avoiding the risk) and perceived self‐efficacy (the belief in one’s ability to perform the recommended actions). The challenge is to develop risk messages that optimally address these two factors by activating danger control responses that lead to self‐protective changes and avoiding fear control responses that prompt dysfunctional cognitive coping responses rather than beneficial actions. When perceptions of threat exceed perceptions of efficacy, fear control processes are triggered to the detriment of danger control processes.

When a risk or threat is perceived as both severe and relevant (high susceptibility and severity), and people believe the recommended behavior will be effective in addressing the threat and they are able to perform the behavior (high response efficacy and self‐efficacy), people are more likely to experience danger control processes that prompt the recommended behaviors. Messages in which perceptions of efficacy are stronger than perceived threat will be more likely to evoke the desired behaviors.

If a risk or threat is perceived as irrelevant or minor (low susceptibility and severity), people are unlikely to respond to the message. They will not appraise response efficacy or engage in the desired protective behaviors. Additionally, if the perceived threat is high (high susceptibility and severity), and the recommended behavioral response is perceived to be ineffective in addressing the threat (low response efficacy), or if people believe they would be unsuccessful in enacting the behaviors to avoid the risk (low self‐efficacy), people are unlikely to follow recommendations in risk messages. In this case, people focus on managing their fear rather than managing the danger.

Summary of Public Relations Theories Used in Crisis/Risk/Issues Management

Table 3.1 provides a summary of the nine theories we have presented in this chapter. Their primary purposes are categorized as either (1) descriptive and explanatory, or (2) prescriptive and predictive. The descriptive and explanatory theories concentrate on detailing how something is done and providing understanding of the topic. The prescriptive and predictive theories provide guidelines for professional communicators and predict specific outcomes for public relations interventions. Table 3.1 also indicates the core contribution each theory makes to public relations thinking.

Crisis

1. 1 When stakeholder expectations for organizational behavior are not met, one of the conditions for a crisis is established. Why do some violations of expectations lead to crises and others do not? Are some stakeholder groups more likely to perceive that their expectations for organizational behavior are not being met? Why might the expectations of some stakeholder groups be perceived as more important than the expectations of other stakeholder groups?
2. 2 This chapter focused on crisis communication with external stakeholders. How might crisis communication with internal stakeholders (employees) need to differ from crisis communication with external stakeholders? How might crisis communication with internal stakeholders about operational crises differ from crisis communication about reputational crises?

Risk

1. 3 In what situations might risk messages need to be adapted to different stakeholder groups? How could the need for adaptation be identified? How could a range of different message contents be created without appearing to be inconsistent?
2. 4 Identify examples of risk messages you have seen. For example, think about risk messages on products, in restaurants, and at transportation facilities like airports and train stations. What commonalities are evident in these messages? Are these messages examples of an organization’s proactive or reactive actions? What recommendations do you have for making the content of risk messages easy to understand?
3. 5 How scary should risk messages be to prompt appropriate action but avoid exaggerating a threat? What might happen when risk messages fail to provide response efficacy information? How do people develop self‐efficacy? Is it the organization’s responsibility to help people develop self‐efficacy?

Issues Management

1. 6 How does the issues management process differ from conflict between an organization and a stakeholder group? Are there areas of overlap between conflict management and issues management?
2. 7 Identify recent examples where you have seen the issues management process at work. To prompt your thinking, consider cases that have generated controversy and received considerable media attention, such as conflicts between consumers and organizations over how personal data is handled in online environments or ongoing conflicts between groups holding different positions on how the right to free speech should be guaranteed in online and offline environments. How could the catalytic model be applied to understand how the conflict unfolded through the communication efforts of opposing groups? Can you identify the specific communication strategies used by opposing groups?

Suggested Readings

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