List of Figures
1.1 | Bathtub curve | 5 |
4.1 | Yeast growth | 27 |
4.2 | ERA process flow (26) | 44 |
4.3 | Proposed layout of PPI west coast location | 46 |
4.4 | Example conceptual model for proposed PPI | 51 |
5.1 | Hierarchical task analysis diagram | 61 |
5.2 | Time line | 62 |
5.3 | Operational sequence diagram | 62 |
6.1 | Infant crib | 77 |
7.1 | Discrete distribution | 89 |
7.2 | Tree diagrams of coin flip | 95 |
7.3 | Tree diagram of being dealt two hearts | 96 |
8.1 | Binning failures | 102 |
8.2 | Relative probability scale | 112 |
8.3 | First-round voting | 113 |
8.4 | Results of the second round | 114 |
10.1 | SCRAM actions for Verify Rods Inserted. The operations personnel should validate this sequence of steps and the sequence changed or notes added as needed | 141 |
10.2 | HRA event tree method | 142 |
10.3 | Verify Rods Inserted | 143 |
10.4 | Another view of Verified Rods | 144 |
10.5 | HRA event structure of coolant flush procedure | 150 |
10.6 | Modified event tree | 151 |
11.1 | Process map from interview | 156 |
11.2 | Process map symbols | 157 |
11.3 | Generic process map for trade group | 158 |
11.4 | Simple incident process map | 159 |
12.1 | Event tree | 164 |
12.2 | Event tree with path probabilities | 165 |
12.3 | Event tree for a portion of a small-break LOCA | 166 |
12.4 | Event tree for Tulsa event figure | 168 |
12.5 | Decision tree 1 format | 169 |
12.6 | Decision tree 2 | 170 |
12.7 | Decision tree 3 | 175 |
12.8 | Chernobyl event sequence | 178 |
13.1 | Interconnection of critical functions | 189 |
13.2 | Flight during an engine failure event | 189 |
13.3 | Critical functional analysis for convenience store | 194 |
13.4 | Critical functional analysis of a chemical reactor system | 195 |
13.5 | Critical functions during process upset | 196 |
13.6 | Rural county critical functions | 200 |
14.1 | Switches representing AND gates | 208 |
14.2 | Switches representing OR gates | 208 |
14.3 | Fault tree analysis of coolant flushing task | 214 |
14.4 | Partial fault tree of sprinkler system failure | 216 |
14.5 | Fault tree for success model | 216 |
14.6 | Fault tree for TAM Linhas Aereas Flight 3054 | 220 |
16.1 | Quantitative research step process | 239 |
16.2 | Investigation cycle | 242 |
16.3 | Example of the design for the visual crack study given to inspectors (12) | 246 |
18.1 | Event tree | 287 |
18.2 | Event tree with path probabilities | 287 |
18.3 | Example fault tree | 290 |
19.1 | General layout of the Medium City | 297 |
19.2 | Fault tree for chemical release event for location A | 303 |
19.3 | Fault tree for chemical release event for location C | 306 |
20.1 | Simplified cholera epidemic fault tree | 310 |
21.1 | Plant diagram | 329 |
21.2 | Fault tree for failing to pump chemical A into the reactor | 339 |
21.3 | Fault tree for a VAD chemical batch | 340 |
21.4 | Sample fault tree for chemical A or B spill | 341 |
21.5 | Sample fault tree for ignition source | 342 |
22.1 | Robot arm and unitized doses of medications | 347 |
22.2 | Station where robot arm drops unitized doses in bag for delivery to patients | 348 |
22.3 | Unitized doses of medication on the pick rack | 348 |
22.4 | Unitized dose packaging. (a) Step 1: drug is selected. (b) Step 2: pills are poured onto packaging machine. (c) Step 3: pills are loaded into hopper. (d) Step 4: pills are packaged | 350 |
22.5 | Fault tree analysis | 352 |
22.6 | Moving fast | 355 |
22.7 | F-16s up close | 356 |
22.8 | Process flow for hydrazine leak | 358 |
22.9 | Event tree | 374 |
22.10 | Food safety fault tree 1 | 374 |
22.11 | Food safety fault tree 2 | 375 |
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