14

The Relationship between the Media, the Military, and the Public

Examining the Stories Told and Public Opinion

Michel M. Haigh

Media and War

The media play an important role in times of conflict. The stories, photos, blogs, and jokes used to discuss the war may influence the knowledge the public has about war, their attitudes toward war, and their opinion about war. One recent example is when the Bush administration blamed the media for eroding public support of the Iraq War. When the Iraq War started in 2003, more than 70% of US citizens supported it (Benedetto, 2003). By June 2007, 70% of US citizens opposed the Iraq War (http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com). Bush stated the stories about Iraq were negative and failed to depict progress (Cloud, 2005), and this negativity led to a decline in public support.

The relationship between the press and the military can be turbulent. The public relies on the media to ask the tough questions needed to gain information about war in order to make up its mind about war (Aday, Livingston, & Herbert, 2005). However, research shows war coverage by the media is largely uncritical and often patriotic (Kellner, 1992; Newhagen, 1994; Pyle, 1979). When the press acts as a cheerleader, confidence in the press does not decline (Gross, Aday, & Brewer, 2002; Pew Research Center, 2003). During the first Gulf War, “media generally reacted with predictable boosterism” (Mueller, 1994, p. 74) instead of asking the difficult questions.

Previous academic research says military casualties drive public support for war (Mueller, 1973, 1994). The casualty intolerance hypothesis suggests US citizens generally don't support war if there are large numbers of casualties (Larson, 1996; Mueller, 1994). Public support decreases as casualties increase (Larson, 1996), but if the government can say the operation is important, the public may support the losses (Feaver & Gelpi, 2004). Hansen, Haigh, and Pfau (2006) found for every 250 US military casualties in Iraq, the tone of television news coverage was about 14% more positive, confirming Mueller's (1994) hypothesis that the media tend to be cheerleaders for the military and do not want to concentrate on the negatives of war.

There are very few media effects studies examining the relationship between war stories and their impact on the public. This chapter provides an overview of the military/press relationship, explains how the story of the Iraq War was told through the use of embedded reporters, examines the impact of visual images on support for war, and reviews the ways in which the press impacts public opinion.

The Press/Military Relationship

The press/military relationship dates back to the Civil War. The goals of the military and the press often conflict. The military wants the press to tell stories that build support for the war and its credibility (Paul & Kim, 2004); whereas, the media want to tell an accurate account of the military operations. One prominent example of a press/military conflict surfaced regarding the Vietnam War. US citizens watching the news received a mixed message about Vietnam because the military and the administration painted an optimistic picture of the war whereas the press often contradicted official accounts (Paul & Kim, 2004). Reporters were flown to a combat unit, saw the combat operations, wrote their stories, and then returned to their hotels. They would then attend the official military press briefing also known as the “five o'clock follies” (Rid, 2007). Reporters called the briefings the “follies” because the information at the briefing was sanitized, and the briefings did not paint the picture the journalists witnessed first-hand (Rid, 2007). Military officials tried to make the bad news good but as support for the war eroded it became clear the military was not always successful. One explanation, therefore, for the tendency for the news media to provide positively framed, patriotic stories from the warfront is that such coverage is at least in part a result of attempts on the part of the military to control that coverage.

During the Gulf War, reporters had no eyewitness accounts of the war efforts (Brightman, 2003). The military controlled what reporters saw and read the reporters' stories before sending those stories to news agencies in the United States because they were trying to ensure the safety of journalists and the security of the mission (Paul & Kim, 2004).

After the Gulf War, members of the military and the media worked together to develop the Department of Defense (DoD) Principles for News Media Coverage of DoD Operations. The principles state (1) press pools will only be used during the early part of the war or when logistical constraints are present in that it might be too dangerous or hard for the media to maneuver; (2) The military would provide escorts and transportation when possible; (3) Reporters assigned to cover the war would have experience, have access to military units other than special operations, and be independent in their reporting (Paul & Kim, 2004). A group of military and media officials met in January of 2002 to develop the embedded press system used during the war in Iraq (Paul & Kim, 2004). The embedded system was a significant shift in military-press relations.

Embedded Reporters

The embedded system used during the war in Iraq was, in many ways, more successful than the press pools used in the past. This type of system “embedded” members of the press with units of the military. Being embedded is defined as “living, eating, moving in combat with the unit that [the journalist is] attached to” (Department of Defense [DoD] News Transcript, 2003, p. 2). The embedded press system allowed reporters to “have free access to military personnel at all levels; report general information about troop strength, casualties, and captured enemy forces; report information and location of military targets and objectives previously under attack; and report names and hometowns of service members with their consent” (Paul & Kim, 2004, p. 53). Due to the nature of the embedded system, it cost the news outlets around $100 million to take part in the embed program (Harper, 2003). More than 2,200 reporters and camera crews covered the Iraq War. About 1,400 of those reporters were unilateral (nonembedded). There were more than 600 US and foreign journalists embedded during the beginning of the war (McClane, 2004; Paul & Kim, 2004).

Unfortunately, there are no media effects studies examining how stories told by an embedded or nonembedded reporter impact public support for the war in Iraq. Yet, there is a significant amount of research claiming there are differences in how the story was told based on reporter status (embedded or nonembedded) (e.g., Pfau et al., 2004, 2005a, 2005b). Pfau and his colleagues (2004, 2005a, 2005b) and Haigh and her colleagues (2006) examined the impact of embeds on print and broadcast coverage. These findings are explored here to provide a better understanding of why the effect studies are needed and also to provide insight into how the Iraq story was told.

Pfau and his colleagues (2004) found embedded print reporters use more episodic frames [case study or event-oriented news report, offering concrete instances (Iyengar, 1991)]. In addition, embedded journalists tell more positive stories about the military and depict the military in a more positive light compared to unilateral reporters or reporters with an unknown status. Pfau and colleagues (2004) found during the first five days of the Iraq War, the coverage was more positive compared to the first five days of operation “Enduring Freedom” (the war in Afghanistan starting October 7, 2001), but not as positive as the first five days of the first Gulf War. Consistent with the above study, Pfau and colleagues (2005a) also found television news reports by embedded reporters during the first five days of the Iraq War were more positive in tone and in depiction of the military and employed more episodic frames compared to reports from nonembedded reporters. Thus, the use of embeds in the Iraq War appears to lead to more positive coverage during the start of the war.

If embeds were likely to report more positively on the war, news stories about the war in Iraq would differ after the invasion phase was over because the number of embeds had declined. Pfau and colleagues (2005b) and Haigh and colleagues (2006) compared the first five days of the invasion phase of the war in Iraq to five days of coverage in November 2004, almost nine months after the war started. Specifically, Pfau and colleagues (2005b) examined differences in broadcast news coverage. Embedded reports were more favorable toward the military, more positive in tone and depiction of the military, and more committed to the military's goals. The coverage during the first five days of the invasion phase of the war in Iraq was more positive than the coverage in November. Haigh and colleagues (2006) found print stories by embeds were more favorable toward the military and conveyed greater trust in the military. Print stories by embedded reporters were also deemed more credible by coders than stories from nonembedded reporters. Yet, in the Haigh et al. (2006) study of print news, there were no differences in these variables between the invasion phase and the occupation phase unlike in the broadcast stories in the Pfau et al. study (2005b). Thus, the possibility that the number of embeds shapes coverage at different phases of the war remains unclear.

Perhaps due to the difference in the reporting styles, there are some (Bucy, 2003; Ewers, 2003; Gralnick, 2003; Kalb, 2003) who question how embedding impacts the objectivity of the stories. Does the press act like cheerleaders as they have in the past, or perhaps even more so? Fox and Park (2006) examined CNN's coverage at the beginning of the Iraq War. They found nonembedded reporters to be more likely to use “we” or a form of it when telling a story than embedded reporters. Embedded reporters referred to themselves and the troops when telling the story, placing themselves as characters in the story. Embedded reporters used first-person singular nouns more frequently than nonembedded reporters. However, Fox and Park (2006) did not find the objectivity of the story was impacted by the reporter using “I” or “we.” From these changes in language employed, therefore, it seems embedding reporters leads to a sense of community and greater connection between reporters and troops that may be reflected in the reporters' coverage.

Older reporters with more experience have been found to be more positive about the embed experience (Fahmy & Johnson, 2007). Two-thirds of the journalist respondents in this study agreed their stories provided a fragmented view of the war; but also said their reports were fair. Unilateral or nonembedded reporters reported being able to pursue more stories and interact more freely with the Iraqi people, but had limited access to members of the military. The differences in access to military or Iraqi people impact how the story was told, according to the respondents. The reporters thought it was the editor's job to take the reports and combine them for a complete picture.

It is important to understand how reporters' status impacts the story told about the Iraq War because the type of story may impact support for the war. When people were supporting the war, the number of embeds was at its peak and the coverage was more positive in tone. Thus, the next direction in research should examine how reports from embedded or nonembedded reporters impact support for the war. The previous research explains how the use of embeds changed the way the Iraq War story was told and how the reporters felt they did telling the story, but the missing link is the audience's perception of the use of embedded reporters. Future inquiries should address this critical topic.

Visual Images of War

Television has become the main source of information about war (Rid, 2007). There have been a number of books written about how television has been used to tell the war story (e.g., Hoskins, 2004; Morrison, 1992; Taylor, 1998). The consistent conclusion is that television has the power to influence public support for/against the war. One powerful aspect of war is the visual image. Images may show military casualties, which are defined as “any person who is lost to the organization by having been declared dead, missing, ill, injured, or duty status-whereabouts unknown” (http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O63-casualty.html). There are limited studies examining the impact of war images on attitudes toward the war, but before these studies are examined it is important to understand what war visuals the public sees in the media.

Some scholarly research finds limited visual coverage of casualties for the Iraq War (Aday, 2005; Griffin, 2004; King & Lester, 2005). Silcock, Schwalbe, and Keith (2008) examined more than 2,500 images of casualties appearing on US television, in US newspapers, news magazines, and online news sites during the first five weeks of the war in Iraq. They found across media types only 10% of images included a dead or injured person (casualty). They did not find any images of dead or injured Iraqi troops. 15% of the images shown on television during the first five weeks of the war depicted casualties.

It is assumed public opinion is influenced by the visual images of combat operations (Gartner & Secura, 1998). Some believe images of war have the power to sway public opinion for or against combat operations (Perlmutter, 1999). During World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt imposed a ban on photographs of casualties but later relented saying the photos could galvanize support for the war (Perlmutter, 1999). Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan were photographed at ceremonies honoring those that fell during conflicts in Pakistan, Beirut, San Salvador, and the Persian Gulf. During the Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush banned photos showing the remains of dead soldiers arriving at Dover Air Force Base after several television networks showed him giving a press briefing, while the other side of the split screen depicted coffins arriving at Dover (Milbank, 2003). President Bill Clinton lifted the ban only to have it reinstituted by President George W. Bush (Milbank, 2003). President Barack Obama and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates lifted the ban in favor of having the families decide on a case-by-case basis if the photos should be taken (National Press Photographers Association, 2009). The photos from Dover are often referred to as “The Dover Test.” It is the assumption that witnessing military coffins delivered to the Dover air base influences public support for the war (Penrod, 2004). Senator John Glenn asked, “Will public opinion and will support in the Congress still be there when the body bags or coffins start coming back through Dover, Delaware?” (Penrod, 2004, p. 7).

The possible influence of more or less sanitization in news coverage of war is severely understudied. Domke, Spratt, and Perlmutter (2002) state, “systematic investigations of the [...] influence of visual news images are rare” (p. 194). Perlmutter (2005) calls for systematic study of “the actual influences of visual images on foreign affairs” (p. 111). In a rare example of both a content study and a related effects study, Sherr-Pollard (2001) performed a content analysis of news photographs and then conducted an experiment assessing emotional impact of news images. The content analysis showed photographs depicting violence were rare, and these photographs elicited negative affect in the experiment.

Pfau and colleagues (2006, 2008) also provide evidence for how visuals impact attitudes and emotions about the war in Iraq. Pfau and colleagues (2008) compare the impact of network television news reports of combat operations of the Iraq War (with and without graphic combat footage) on viewers. Pfau and colleagues (2008) found broadcast news stories showing visual footage of combat did not elicit greater emotional responses than the same story packaged as a “reader” (meaning, without visuals). However, participants who viewed television news stories showing visual footage of combat had less pride in the US military than those watching a “reader.”

Pfau and colleagues (2008) found television news stories accompanied by visual footage influenced attitudes toward the war in Iraq. Broadcast stories with visual footage of combat undermined viewers' attitudes about continued US military presence in Iraq (Pfau et al., 2008). 70% of the stories about the war in Iraq in late 2005 discussed setbacks or obstacles to success in Iraq, and more stories were focusing on US casualties (30%) (Noyes, 2005). This coverage corresponds with a decline in public support for the war (Milbank & Deane, 2005). Pfau and colleagues (2008) state the results of their study indicate “television news stories featuring visual footage of combat reduced viewers' pride about US military presence in Iraq, enhanced their involvement levels about the war, and reduced viewers' support for continued US military presence in Iraq” (p. 318).

Similar results are found when examining print stories and photos of casualties. Pfau and colleagues (2006) examined print photographs of the Iraq War and the ways in which these photos may impact public support for the war. They compared a number of different ways to package the news story (e.g., photo plus caption, full-text story with no photo, or a full-text story with a photo and a caption). Findings indicate print photographs of casualties caused emotional responses in readers. News stories showing a photograph plus caption elicited more negative emotions (e.g., puzzlement, anger, and sadness) than stories about casualties without a photo. Pfau et al.'s (2006) findings confirmed Sherr-Pollard's (2001) findings. Photographs depicting violence elicit negative emotions in readers.

Pfau et al. (2006) also found stories without photos and stories with a photo reduce readers' support for continued US military presence in Iraq. “As people encounter repetitions of the same visual images and/or additional complementary images, it is likely that effects would grow” (Pfau et al., 2006, p. 161). Pfau et al. (2006) found when print news stories (regardless of how they were presented) discussed the battle for Fallujah, this topic led to greater support for US military presence in Iraq, suggesting support for a war can be increased by discussing ongoing battles, which may depict progress in the war. Thus, the impact of not just one news story seen in isolation but a series of news stories seen through repeated news exposure to the war should be further examined in future research.

Public Opinion and War

The military blamed the press for losing the Vietnam War, and former President Bush blamed the media for losing support for the Iraq War. In the end, there is a debate over what really drives public opinion. When examining previous research, the argument for the “casualties hypothesis” is the most common (Burk, 1999). This hypothesis suggests US citizens do not want to get involved in international conflict when people die. Burk (1999) developed this idea based on Mueller's (1973) research stating public support for war is inversely related to cumulative casualties. Mueller (1973, 1994) examined the Korean and Vietnam conflicts as well as the Gulf War. This research consistently shows support for the war declines as the number of casualties increases. Larson (1996) also argues there is a cost-benefit calculation at play. The public decides to support the conflict if the objectives are clear and there is a high probability of success. Thus, there also has to be ongoing success and a victorious end for public support (Feaver & Gelpi, 2004).

Feaver and Gelpi (2004) propose communication moderates the public's reaction. “If policy makers can make the case that the operation is important, then we would expect the public to show a willingness to shoulder greater cost” (p. 146). If communication about the war “demonizes” the enemy, then support for the war increases (Feaver & Gelpi, 2004). Therefore, the characteristics of the news coverage of the war are important.

Marginal casualties accumulating at an increasing rate are critical in predicting the direction and magnitude of change in the level of opposition at home (Gartner & Segura, 1998). “Marginal” is defined as those casualties above and beyond what is experienced in normal operations. The term could encompass casualties resulting from a single catastrophic event or higher than the usual casualties suffered in an ordinary combat event. Mueller (1973) posits the log function of the amount of cumulative casualties alone swayed public opinion about the Korean and Vietnam wars. Other researchers disagree. According to Gartner and Segura (1998), it is the marginal casualties, not cumulative casualties that are important in determining support for a particular war. Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2005–2006) see casualty tolerance depending on the decision of going to war (was it the right one?) and the expectations about winning. An additional complicating factor is that the US public cannot accurately estimate the cumulative casualty numbers (Berinsky & Druckman, 2007; Boettcher & Cobb, 2006). Support for the war depends on the frame of the story, political ideology and attitudes, as well as individual attitudes about casualties of war (Boettcher & Cobb, 2006).

Hansen, Haigh, and Pfau (2006) aligned public opinion polls about Iraq with a content analysis of media coverage. They found when the tone of the television news coverage is positive and the number of casualties increases, public support for the war declines less compared to when the television news coverage is negative in tone and the number of casualties increases. In the data, support for the war erodes with positive coverage but at a slower rate than when the coverage is negative, supporting Feaver and Gelpi's (2004) theory. When the tone of television coverage is positive it appears victory is possible so people continue to support the conflict. This effect was only found for television news and not for print news stories. Hansen et al. (2006) explain this difference by concluding newspaper readers have stronger attitudes about the war and are not as easily swayed by the news content (Wenmouth, Jr., Shapiro, & Cutbirth, 1982). Hansen et al. (2006) find when newspaper stories were more positive, the decline in support for the war lessens (significantly) compared to negative coverage. These findings were not found for television news.

Nontraditional Sources of Information

Late Night Comedy

The public relies on sources other than the mainstream media for news. Two sources linked to political knowledge are late night comedy shows (Chapter 21, this volume) and blogs (Chapter 23, this volume). Research examining late night comedy reveals a number of political implications between late night comedy viewing and perceptions of candidate image (e.g., Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Young, 2004) and political behaviors (Moy, Xenos, & Hess, 2005a, 2005b; Pfau, Houston, & Semmler, 2005). The Pew Research Center (2004) found 39% of people between the ages of 30 and 49 report learning something by watching comedy or late night comedy shows.

Late night comedy provides information about what is going on in the world, but comedians are supposed to be funny even in times of trouble, such as during the Vietnam or Iraq Wars (Peterson, 2008). One example occurred on January 11, 1991 (George H. W. Bush's deadline for Iraqi troop withdrawal in the first Gulf War). Johnny Carson started his monologue with a joke about Doc Severinsen's coat and Delta Burke's salary dispute before discussing the impending war. However, times have changed. During the Iraq War, Jay Leno employed the opposite strategy by leading with jokes about the war and then working toward less meaningful topics (Peterson, 2008). Thus, comedians and program hosts differ in their tendencies toward directly oppositional jokes about war.

The Smothers Brothers or Laugh-In used comedy to take aim at the government during the Vietnam War, while Carson tended to either avoid the topic or tell “soft” jokes about it (Peterson, 2008). During the war in Iraq, Jay Leno, David Letterman, and other late night comics told more jokes about Saddam Hussein and the UN allies rather than discussing George W. Bush's plans to invade Iraq in March 2003 (Peterson, 2008).

Haigh and Heresco (2010) analyzed almost 1,000 late night jokes about Iraq told from March 19, 2003 to April 9, 2007. Results indicate late night comics (Jay Leno, David Letterman, and Conan O'Brien) told prowar jokes during the first week of the war and then more neutral jokes later. The comedians depicted the US government negatively from 2003 to 2005, and more positively in 2006. The hosts told the most positive jokes about Iraq in 2006 and 2007 compared to 2003 to 2005, but this could be because they were telling fewer jokes as the war progressed. Hosts told the most jokes about Iraq in 2003 (354 jokes). This number declined each year (202 jokes in 2004; 172 jokes in 2005; and 173 jokes in 2006).

There is the potential for these patterns in late night comedy joke-telling to have an impact on the audience. Young (2004) found humor that was mocking candidates made negative character traits more salient with some viewers. This same pattern may be found for jokes mocking US policy. Future media effects research should also examine the differences between network late night content and cable content. Monologue jokes by Leno and Letterman may not have the same impact on viewers' political knowledge or political attitudes toward policies and candidates when compared to the skits on the Daily Show. Future media effects research could also examine if watching late night television comedy might impact political behaviors, such as having a discussion or contacting political representatives about war efforts. This type of finding would support Moy, Xenos and Hess' (2005a) research. They found a positive correlation between watching late night television comedy and political involvement and discussions.

Blogs

Since the war in Iraq started in 2003, individuals have received information about the war from broadcast stories, print stories, and blogs. The use of online forms of information about the war has led to the war in Iraq being called an “Internet war” (Berenger, 2005; Hewitt, 2005; Weideman, 2003). Research examines how stories about the war are framed on US news websites (Schwalbe, 2006), how coverage of the war varies between United States and international online sources (Dimitrova & Neznanski, 2006), and what celebrity blogs say about the war (Trammell, 2006).

Tom Ricks suggests “milblogs” blur the distance between the military and civilian worlds (Hewitt, 2003). Milblogs are blogs written by service members overseas, former service members, individuals supporting the military, or family members of those serving. The blogs discuss the military, news and information about events, policies, and procedures (blogworldexpo.com, 2009). The milblog phenomenon began with Sergeant Stryker's Daily Briefing, which was created when a service member became disappointed with mainstream media coverage of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (The Mudville Gazette, 2005). By October 2009, milblogging.com was tracking 2,500 milblogs (http://www.milblogging.com, 2009). Milbloggers do not replace the mainstream press but “cover the story of Captain Helberg and Charlie Company when the mainstream media won't; and they will cover it in a way – with the kind of empathy born of shared experience – that the mainstream press can't” (McLeary, 2008, p. 40).

A study by Haigh and colleagues (2007) examined what milblogs discuss and whether milblogs influence people's attitudes about the war in Iraq more so than online news stories. Results indicate almost half (47.8%) of milblogs analyzed in the study discussed what was printed in the mainstream news (e.g., USA Today, New York Times, etc.). Diary-type posts discussed: other blogs, what the milblogger did that day, what the milbloggers' friends did, wounded or fallen soldiers, political figures, public support for the war, and special dates (e.g., celebrations of Mother's Day, Father's Day, or an anniversary). Less common topics discussed on milblogs included: Iraqi civilians, Iraqi forces, prisoner abuse, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and the Iraqi constitution. More than half of the blog posts linked to outside information (e.g., other blogs, videos, photos, or news stories), and 13.4% included a photo. According to the Haigh and colleagues (2007) study, milblogs tend to be neutral in their depiction of the military and typically use a neutral tone to discuss the topics much like a traditional news reporter would.

Haigh et al. (2007) sought to determine whether milblogs, compared to online news stories, exert different effects on perceptions of credibility and attitudes toward the US war in Iraq. Experimental results show participants' attitudes toward the war and perceptions of source credibility (online news source or milblogger) did not differ based on the where the story appeared. Milblogs were considered by participants to be the most credible source to discuss IEDs, whereas online news stories were deemed more credible when discussing the Iraqi constitution or training Iraqi forces.

Milblogs could have the power to influence public opinion and public policies (Berenger, 2006; Schwab, 2007). However, Haigh et al. (2007) did not find milblogs impact attitudes more than online news stories. The topic of the story (training Iraqi forces, IEDs, Iraqi constitution) appears to impact individuals' attitudes, not the source of the story. As might be expected, attitudes tend to be more positive about the war when the stories individuals read indicate progress in Iraq (training Iraqi forces or ratifying the Iraqi constitution) (Haigh et al., 2007).

Haigh et al. (2007) did not find any differences in perceived credibility among the story sources (news story or milblog). Milblogs were deemed just as credible as online news stories in this study. This may be explained by the milbloggers being deemed “trustworthy” and “experts” because they are in the line of fire and have first-hand experience. This supports previous research (Goldsmith, Lafferty, & Newell, 2000) suggesting milbloggers can be trusted because they are experts on the topic, the same as the reporters reporting news stories. We can conclude, therefore, that milblogs as well as other forms of blogging and online news sources join more traditional sources in bringing aspects of the war home to the public.

Conclusion

It is important to understand the relationship between the military and the media because it impacts how the story is told and the information the public has on which to form attitudes about the war. One significant change in the press and the military relationship is the creation and use of embedded reporters to report from the warfront. Future research should examine how the use of embedded reporters impacts public opinion. There is an abundance of research examining the differences between embedded and nonembedded stories and how the journalists thought they did telling the story, but there is a lack of research examining if these different stories impact public opinion.

There is also a lack of research examining how visual images influence attitudes about war. Pfau and colleagues (2006, 2008) and Sherr-Pollard (2001) have examined how visuals impact attitudes but more research can be done in this area. Pfau and colleagues (2006, 2008) used a sample of college students. Results might vary for audiences who watch more television news, read the paper more frequently, and have had more life experiences. College-aged students provide a good sample for experimental research, but it is worth investigating these results outside of a laboratory setting. Research has found the US media is very sanitized when showing visuals of casualties. It is worth exploring the differences in support for war for individuals outside the US who are presumably exposed to more graphic images of war. The military is very concerned about US public opinion, but these images may be influencing global public opinion. Scholars also need to start analyzing public opinion and media content simultaneously much like Hansen et al. (2006) did in their study.

This chapter touches on a number of topics, but the overall theme is the lack of media effects studies. There are a number of content analysis studies and studies aligning survey questions with media use habits, but overall there are few studies examining the effects of information on public support for the war. The literature used to discuss each topic in this chapter (embeds, visuals, blogs, late night comedy) could be expanded to include direct studies of media effects. Researchers still have a lot to learn about the impact media have on individuals' attitudes and support for war.

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FURTHER READING

Bennett, L. W., Lawrence, R. G., & Livingston, S. (2007). When the press fails: Political power and the news media from Iraq to Katrina. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Berenger, R. (Ed.). (2004). Global media go to war: Role of news and entertainment media during the 2003 Iraq War. Spokane, WA: Marquette Books.

Berenger, R. (Ed.). (2006). Cybermedia go to war: Role of converging media during and after the 2003 Iraq War. Spokane, WA: Marquette Books.

Berinsky, A. J. (2009). In time of war: Understanding American public opinion from World War II to Iraq. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Fahmy, S., & Johnson, T. J. (2005). “How we performed”: Embedded journalists' attitudes and perceptions towards covering the Iraq War. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 82, 301–317.

Griffin, M., & Lee, J. (1995). Picturing the Gulf War: Constructing an image of the war in Time, Newsweek, and U. S. News & World Report. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 72, 813–825.

Haigh, M. M., Pfau, M., Anderson, B., Bielling, P., Bissell, S., Burke, R. et al. (n.d.). Don't tread on my blog: A content analysis and experiment of military web logs. (Unpublished manuscript.)

Hallin. D. C. (1986). The “uncensored war”: The media and Vietnam. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Hayes, A. F., & Myers, T. A. (2009). Testing the “proximate casualties hypothesis”: Local troop loss, attention to news, and support for military intervention, Mass Communication and Society, 12, 379–402.

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Johnson, T., & Kaye, B. (2004b). Wag the blog: How reliance on traditional media and the Internet influence credibility perceptions of weblogs among blog users. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 81, 622–642.

Johnson, T., & Kaye, B. (2006). Blog day afternoon: Are blogs stealing audiences away from traditional media sources? In R. D. Berenger (Ed.), Cybermedia go to war: Role of converging media during and after the 2003 Iraq War (pp. 316–333). Spokane, WA: Marquette Books.

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Mitchell, G. (2008). So wrong for so long: How the press, the pundits – and the President – failed on Iraq. New York, NY: Sterling.

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