34

The Impact of Media Policy on Children's Media Exposure

Amy B. Jordan

ABSTRACT

Children's media policy is designed with two primary goals: first, to increase children's access to beneficial content; and second, to decrease their exposure to harmful content. This chapter explores the principles on which US children's media policy has been established. It then outlines current US media policies that address content deemed to be detrimental to children (including junk food advertising and violent content) and seek to improve access to media technology and educational content that is considered beneficial to children (such as E-Rate and the Children's Television Act). In addition to reviewing media policies, the chapter considers research on the implementation and impact of the policies, including the abject failure of the V-chip legislation and the ongoing discourse about privacy protection. The chapter concludes by arguing the need for a more deliberate use of effects research in the development and evaluation of children's media policy.

Foundations of Media Policy

In the United States, as in many countries, children's media policy is designed with two primary goals: first, to increase children's access to beneficial content; and second, to decrease their exposure to harmful content. At the same time, those who craft policy are mindful of the important protection that the First Amendment provides to those who create and distribute media, including commercial content. Policymakers ultimately strive to walk a fine line between worthy but sometimes competing principles: the media's right to free speech and society's interest in protecting and educating the nation's children.

This chapter explores the foundational principles on which US media policy has been established, primarily as the principles relate to the child audience. It then outlines current US media policies that address content deemed to be detrimental to children and seek to improve access to media technology and educational content that is considered beneficial to children. In addition to reviewing media policies, the chapter considers research on the implementation and impact of the policies. The chapter concludes by arguing the need for a more deliberate use of effects research in the development and evaluation of children's media policy.

In the United States, judicial bodies have tended to favor the “least restrictive” approach to ensuring that children are not exposed to age-inappropriate content (Levesque, 2007; Napoli, 2001). Policies that have infringed on the rights of adults to access legal content, such as pornography, have been routinely struck down by the courts (Blevins & Anton, 2008). The Communications Decency Act, for example, proposed to ban indecent and pornographic content from the Internet in the interest of protecting children (Blevins & Anton, 2008). Opponents argued that the Act was a form of censorship, and that it would infringe on adults' rights to access such legal content. Judges agreed, and argued that other measures – such as media education and blocking technology – would provide an alternative means for protecting children (Levesque, 2007). Commercial speech is also deemed to be protected by the First Amendment. Those who would seek to persuade consumers to purchase products are allowed to disseminate their message in any form and to any audience as long as it is not deceptive or misleading (Napoli, 2001). In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission (1980), the US Supreme Court laid out the four-step analysis to determine whether commercial speech regulation is constitutional. In what came to be known as the Central Hudson Test, Justice Powell proposed the following questions: (1) Is the expression protected by the First Amendment? For speech to come within that provision, it must concern lawful activity and not be misleading; (2) Is the asserted governmental interest substantial? (3) Does the regulation advance the governmental interest asserted? and (4) Is the regulation more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest? Thus the notion of the protection of commercial speech was concretized, as was the notion of the least restrictive means of regulation.

The privileging of the free speech rights of advertisers and media companies has created an environment in which the industry is encouraged to self-regulate. When advocacy groups express concern or when lawmakers begin to make inquiries into media practices, the industry is often stirred to preemptive self-censorship (Freedman, 2008). Since networks and advertisers are loathe to risk action by Congress, the Federal Trade Commission, or the Federal Communications Commission, they are on alert for signs of public disapproval and potential new federal actions. This dynamic has been described by Kunkel (1988) and Starr (2004) as “regulation by raised eyebrow” and will be discussed at greater length later in the chapter, as we consider self-regulatory efforts by the industry.

Despite the reticence of the courts to limit speech, there is a long history of regulation in broadcast media. In the early days of radio broadcasting, the federal government recognized the enormous potential of the medium as a public resource for providing information to keep citizens safe, informed, and connected. With the Federal Radio Act of 1927, and later the Communications Act of 1934, a regulatory body was set up to provide licenses, to allocate portions of the spectrum to license holders in both radio and television broadcasting, and to ensure that licensees meet the “public interest, convenience and necessity” (Jordan, 2008). Unlike other media of its day, such as newspapers or film, broadcast radio, and later television was seen as a scarce resource (Jordan, 2008). The Telecommunications Act of 1996, which represented the first major overhaul of the 1934 Act, added new expectations for broadcasters, clarified the role of the FCC in overseeing cable channels, and introduced new regulations for the Internet. Today, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is charged with carrying out the laws of Congress, processing applications and renewals for broadcast licenses, providing guidelines to the telecommunications industry on issues such as network neutrality and digital television, and ensuring that the needs of children and the concerns of parents are being addressed.

The extent to which the FCC is active or laissez-faire and the types of issues the regulatory agency focuses on tends to reflect the political leanings and interests of the presidential administration (Kunkel, 1998). The agency is made up of five commissioners nominated by the president and confirmed by the US Senate for five-year terms (Napoli, 2001). As might be predicted, appointees within the same party as the president will reflect the views of the administration. For example, the United States witnessed a period of deregulation of media, including a loosening of ownership restrictions, during the Reagan/Bush era (McChesney, 1999), and then a renewal of interest in the ability of the FCC to encourage better quality children's television during the Clinton/Gore administration (Kunkel, 1998).

The rapid development and adoption of new media technologies has presented challenges for regulatory agencies. Rules are often applied in accordance with the media platform rather than the media content. For example, commercial broadcasters (one kind of platform) are mandated to provide educational programming for children, but cable casters (another kind of platform) are not. Yet all channels are required to limit advertising during children's programming (Jordan, 2008). Some words are deemed indecent on some television channels (and are subject to heavy fines for indecency) while on other channels profanity is commonplace. Distinctions between broadcast and cable channels are important for regulatory agencies, but are invisible to parents, who tend to see all television channels as “television” (Schmitt, 2000). With media converging, the platform approach to media regulation may be obsolete, particularly as children are increasingly likely to watch television on the computer via network websites and collaboratives such as Hulu.com (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010). Moreover, as the number of “broadcast” channels increases exponentially after the digital switchover, the original premise of regulation based on the scarcity principle must be called into question. Simply put, the notion that broadcast media are scarce resources; that is, that there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies available, may no longer be a good rationale for media policy-making.

Federal Children's Media Policies

This section of the chapter focuses on the ways in which federal policy shapes media content consumed by children. First, the government can encourage the provision of programming it feels serves the public interest – in this case, by addressing the educational needs of the child audience. Second, policies can be put in place that aim to reduce children's exposure to age-inappropriate or otherwise harmful content – for example, exposure to cursing, sex, violence, or excessive or misleading advertising. In some cases, a policy may be designed to do both. The Children's Television Act of 1990, as we will see below, is legislation that addresses the “good” (by encouraging the provision of educational programming) and also the “bad” (by limiting the practice of host selling in advertising).

The Children's Television Act of 1990 and the Subsequent 1997 FCC Processing Guideline

Television during the 1970s and 1980s was perceived by child advocacy groups, such as the Action for Children's Television (ACT), as devoid of enriching and educational content and teeming with commercials and violence (Jordan, 1996). By 1990, after a decade of lobbying by ACT and others, Congress passed the Children's Television Act (CTA). The Act was significant in two respects. First, it took on the hypercommercialism of children's television by reestablishing advertising time limits on children's programming that had been eliminated during the Reagan years of deregulation, and by banning the practice of “host selling” wherein characters from the television program pitch products during ad breaks within and adjacent to that program. Second, the CTA required broadcasters to significantly increase educational and informational program offerings for children (Kunkel, 1998).

Research conducted by Kunkel and Canepa (1994), the Center for Media Education (1992), and The Annenberg Public Policy Center (Jordan, 1996) found that the CTA of 1990 did not yield significant changes in the broadcasters' educational offerings. Programs that were labeled as educational were often of dubious educational value. The cartoon show The Jetsons, for example, was justified as educational because it taught children about the future (Center for Media Education, 1992). Researchers at the Annenberg Public Policy Center looked at the 1995–1996 broadcast season a full five years after the CTA went into effect. They found that the few truly educational programs that were airing in the Philadelphia market – such as Bill Nye, the Science Guy – were on so early in the morning (e.g., 5:00 a.m. on Saturday) that it was unlikely that any children would be awake and in the audience (Jordan, 1996).

After evaluations of the implementation of the CTA were released, and after both President Clinton and Vice President Gore became involved in the issue of children's educational television, the broadcasters accepted new guidelines from the FCC (Kunkel, 1998). Informally known as the Three-Hour Rule, the 1996 FCC processing guidelines stipulated that to be considered for automatic license renewal broadcasters must air three hours a week of core educational programming for children. Core programs must air between 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., be labeled as educational on the air, be specifically designed for children, and be regularly scheduled (FCC, 1996).

The more specific guidelines made a difference. Prior to the implementation of the Three-Hour Rule, the amount of time devoted to educational programming varied widely depending on the local station, which often relied on locally produced or syndicated programming to meet its educational program requirements (Kunkel & Canepa, 1994). With the national networks providing “FCC friendly” educational programs to its affiliates, most stations were able to meet the minimum weekly requirements. Assessments of the educational quality of the programs by the Annenberg Public Policy Center (see Jordan, 2000) and by the advocacy organization Children Now (see Wilson, Kunkel, & Drogos, 2008) reveal that the majority of programs are educational, though each year roughly one-fifth to one-quarter are judged to be of minimal educational value. Broadcasters still make dubious claims about what their programs teach. Additionally, the mere presence of educational programs on the broadcast channels does not necessitate a large child audience. Ultimately, it is unclear the extent to which the mandate has impacted children's viewing choices.

Research by Schmitt (2000) reveals that parents do not recognize the symbol that indicates educational programming (see Figure 34.1). “E/I” (which stands for “educational and informational”) is not a meaningful cue to them. As a result, parents are unlikely to encourage their children to watch more enriching fare on broadcast stations. In addition, the majority of programs that air as core educational programs are what scholars call “prosocial.” Prosocial television shows are programs which teach children lessons about subjects like friendship or honesty rather than address traditionally academic subjects such as math or science (Jordan & Woodard, 2004; Wilson, Kunkel, & Drogos, 2008; see Chapter 29, this volume). Research suggests that prosocial programs are not viewed by parents as “educational,” even though they meet the FCC's definition for what would count as educational (Schmitt, 2000).

Broadcasters complain that educational programs are less profitable than entertainment cartoons, and that children will simply watch entertainment shows on cable channels that do not have to comply with the FCC's educational television guidelines. But observers note that it is likely that broadcasters would have stopped airing any programs for children, particularly since adult programming is so much more profitable. Thus, one could argue, the mandate ensured that the child audience was served in a meaningful way (Jordan, 1996). Independent producers complain that there is no longer a market for their educational fare, since the networks and their affiliates find it cheaper to make or acquire it at the national level, and since they can charge more for advertising space if the “reach” is greater (Jordan & Sullivan, 1997). Locally produced educational programming for children is now obsolete in most markets (Sullivan & Jordan, 1999). Despite these unintentional consequences, however, legislation has resulted in a substantial increase in the presence of educational and prosocial programming for children on the broadcast networks.

images

Figure 34.1 Educational TV (E/I) icon on ABC's The Emperor's New School.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the V-chip Mandate

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 represented a massive overhaul of the 1934 Communications Act, although it continues to structure policy on a medium-by-medium basis in much the same way as the original law. For example, broadcast media stations such as Fox or ABC do not enjoy the same First Amendment protections as Comedy Central or HBO. The Telecommunications Act represented significant shifts, however, and one of the most noticeable changes it brought to the screen was the system of ratings and the technology to block programming based on these ratings (see Figure 34.2).

The system of rating television programs for age and content was designed by an industry advisory board, not by federal regulators; although the Telecommunications Act said that if the industry did not come up with a system then the regulatory agency would do so for them. Age-based ratings indicate the appropriateness of programs for children of different ages (e.g., TV–14 suggests content is appropriate for children aged 14 and older). Content ratings flag the presence of content that parents might find objectionable, such as harsh language (L), sex (S), or violence (V). By 1998, most producers and programmers began labeling their shows using a system that followed the basic structure of the movie ratings (Cantor, 1998). The impetus behind the ratings was two-fold. First, policymakers believed that providing parents with information about the appropriateness of programming would empower them to more effectively direct children's viewing. Second, the Telecommunications Act required that computer chips be built into television sets manufactured after the year 2000. The computer chips, which had been developed and implemented first in Canada, could be programmed to read these ratings and would allow parents to block shows with certain kinds of content. The computer chip, known as the V-chip, became widely available by the year 2000.

images

Figure 34.2 Age and content rating for Fox TV's American Idol.

Evaluations of the ratings and the V-chip mandate have shown that the policy was of limited success (Kaiser Family Foundation, 1998, Scantlin & Jordan, 2006). Surveys of parents have shown that television ratings are used much less frequently than movie ratings as a guide for children's viewing (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2004). One reason may lie in the fact that ratings across media are idiosyncratic. A ratings indicator for child-appropriate content for the medium of television would be TV–Y or TV–Y7; while for movies it would be G or PG; and for videogames it would be EC or E (Jordan, 2008). The content labels are equally confusing, and not universally applied. The content rating FV in children's programming (see Figure 34.3) means that there is “fantasy violence,” but parents are more likely to think it means “family viewing” (Schmitt, 2000). Despite these shortcomings, the presence of labels to signify potentially objectionable content on television and the means by which concerned parents and caregivers could limit access to such content have been a significant development in media policy.

images

Figure 34.3 Age and content rating for Cartoon Network's Chowder.

Research conducted by both the Annenberg Public Policy Center (APPC) (Scantlin & Jordan, 2006) and the Kaiser Family Foundation (2004) has also indicated that the V-chip blocking device is neither well-understood nor frequently used. In an APPC field experiment, families were provided with V-chip equipped television sets just as the TVs were becoming available to the general public (Jordan & Woodard, 2004). In the “high information” condition, parents were told about the ratings and instructed as to how to program the V-chip to block shows they did not want their 7- to 13-year-old children to see. In the “low information” condition, parents were provided with the V-chip equipped television set and briefly told about the feature as well as other features of the set (such as the sleep timer). In the “control” condition, families were not provided with a television set, but were tracked over the same period. At the end of the nine-month study, parents in the high-information condition were significantly more likely to try to program the V-chip than parents in the low-information or control condition. Overall, however, of the 150 families in the study less than 10% of the participants had engaged their V-chip or any other blocking technology as a means to control children's viewing. Interviews with a subsample of parents in the study suggest that some felt it simply unnecessary to use a technological device to mediate television, but many found the V-chip menu confusing to navigate (see Figure 34.4) and the program ratings difficult to understand. In addition, since most homes had more than one television set, children whose choices are thwarted on the V-chip-equipped TV were seen as having the option to simply go to another room to watch the forbidden show (Scantlin & Jordan, 2006). As media technologies develop, blocking opportunities are no longer solely available through the “hardware” of the television set itself. Cable and satellite companies now offer parents the choice of setting program options that prohibit channels or programs from being available in the home (and thus avoiding the difficulty of having to program V-chips on multiple TV sets).

images

Figure 34.4 V-chip programming screen.

The Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act

The V-chip mandate and program ratings would seem to have shown tangible evidence that broadcasters were providing parents with the tools and technology they would need to protect children from age-inappropriate programming. Though many advocates and researchers argued that these were not being taken up by parents, policymakers felt that they had addressed their constituents' concerns with a “least restrictive” policy. The broadcasters' arguments that they were protecting the child audience began to fall apart, however, with several high-profile incidents of indecency mistakenly broadcast on major network programs viewed by adults and children alike. In 2003, during a live broadcast of the Golden Globe Awards, the lead singer of the band U2 thanked the presenters for his award and exclaimed “This is really, really fucking brilliant” (USA Today, 2004). Several months later, again during a live awards show, Nicole Richie accepting an award for her reality program A Simple Life said: “Have you ever tried to get dog shit out of a Prada purse? It isn't so fucking simple” (Mears, 2009). Finally, in the most widely known incident of “indecency” in the United States, a 2004 Super Bowl halftime show featuring Justin Timberlake and Janet Jackson briefly showed Jackson's breast after Timberlake mistakenly ripped off her bodice in what producers called a “wardrobe malfunction” (Belmas, Love, & Foy, 2007).

After receiving complaints, the Federal Communications Commission cited and in some cases fined the broadcasters for indecency. Indecent language has always been banned from the public airwaves. Indeed the Supreme Court has, on several occasions, revisited whether the FCC should fine broadcasters for airing indecent content, including the landmark FCC v. Pacifica Foundation ruling. In this ruling, the court ruled that the agency should fine broadcasters as the unique qualities of the broadcast media justified the “special treatment of indecent broadcasting” (1978, p. 750 as cited in Levesque, 2007). In this case, the FCC cited a fine to a New York-based radio station for airing George Carlin's monologue about the seven dirty words you can never say on the radio or TV. More recently, ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox appealed FCC fines, and won a lower court ruling which cited the Commission's policy as “arbitrary and capricious” (Mears, 2009). The FCC appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking restoration of its power to regulate indecency. It won its case.

One area of consternation in FCC indecency citations, which George Carlin explored in his “seven dirty words” monologue, is the loose definition of indecent language. The FCC defines indecency as “language or material that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory organs or activities” (FCC Consumer Facts at www.fcc.gov). In the case of Bono's language, for example, it is not obvious that the F-word is a sexual reference; indeed, it seems more an adjective of emphasis. The court, however, agreed that the use of the F-word is “indecent”, with Justice Scalia writing, “Even when used as an expletive, the F-word's power to insult and offend derives from its sexual meaning” (Mears, 2009). And in the case of non-scripted live programs, the court agreed that it should retain the power to fine isolated instances of profanity known as “fleeting expletives.” Some broadcasters now rely on a five second delay to avoid accidentally airing profanity (Eggerton, 2006).

Such programming mishaps would not be caught by either ratings or the V-chip. Sports events like the Super Bowl are not rated under the industry's system (nor are news programs). And the ratings on unscripted live awards programs will not be rated as containing offensive language if the producer is not expecting it. Moreover, during this period, many broadcasters were beginning to “push the envelope” of what would be allowable on broadcast TV. Thus, Congress again felt compelled to act. They viewed the FCC fine of $32,500 as an ineffective deterrent, and drew up legislation that would increase fines tenfold and would allow the FCC to fine for each act of indecency. The Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act, signed by George W. Bush in 2005, gives the FCC the authority to fine stations up to $325,000 for each act of indecent content that airs between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. This means that any given network may be subject to fines in excess of one million dollars (since fines are imposed on the stations that air the programming, and networks own the stations). It also means that networks are more likely to fight the fines. In July 2010, a federal appeals court struck down the FCC's policy barring “fleeting expletives” like Bono's and Richie's (see above) (Wyatt, 2010). The decision, which has been appealed to the Supreme Court, said such a policy violates the First Amendment because it is vague and could inhibit free speech. The FCC has appealed the decision, arguing that the court's decision threatened to have a “wide-ranging adverse impact” on the agency's ability to prevent indecent material from being broadcast. Indeed, broadcasters' challenges to FCC indecency fines have effectively brought the FCC's enforcement efforts to a halt (Schatz, 2010).

The Communications Decency Act

Concern over children's access to Internet pornography – whether intentional or accidental – led many groups to support legislation that would restrict pornography online. The Communications Decency Act of 1996, introduced as part of the Telecommunications Bill, made it illegal to knowingly transmit obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age. It also made it unlawful to send or display patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to a person that is under 18. The CDA was immediately challenged as unconstitutional. Opponents argued that it infringed upon the rights of adults to access legal content. Moreover, they argued, there are less restrictive means of protecting children from accessing such content, including the implementation of blocking technology, without prohibiting adults' access. The courts agreed, noting the absence of a tradition of government supervision over the Internet, and the fact that the medium was not as invasive or subject to accidental exposure to unwanted material as is broadcast (Levesque, 2007, p. 177).

The CDA was unanimously struck down by the Supreme Court, though the law prohibiting child pornography remains in effect. The law has taken an interesting twist recently, since some prosecutors have argued that the adolescent practice of “sexting” violates the CDA provision. Adolescents who take pictures of themselves or other adolescents and share them via cell phone or post them on the Web are open to criminal charges, including felony child pornography charges and being listed on a sex offender registry for decades to come. A 2009 study from the Pew Research Center's Internet and American Life Project found that 4% of cell-owning teens aged 12 to 17 say they have sent sexually suggestive nude or nearly nude images or videos of themselves to someone else via text messaging; 15% say they have received such images of someone they know via text message (Lenhart, 2009). While there is a growing consensus that such laws may be “too blunt an instrument to deal with an adolescent cyber culture in which all kinds of sexual pictures circulate” (Lewin, 2010, p. A1), there is a recognition that the circulation of images – even among youth – may have dangerous implications that we do not yet understand.

The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act

The 1998 Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) was the result of the efforts of advocacy groups, including the Center for Media Education, that were alarmed by the extent to which websites had been collecting information about their child users (Ciochetti, 2007). COPPA is chiefly concerned with privacy and security risks that are created when children under 13 years of age are online, and requires that parental permission is sought before collecting or using information from children under 13. Enforced by the Federal Trade Commission, websites can be fined for not complying with the COPPA. The law is intended to prevent marketers from using kids' sites to get family information. Website operators must post clear and comprehensive privacy policies on their websites describing their practices for children's personal information. The rule does not apply to Internet users who are aged 13 or older. A social networking site like MySpace asks users to verify their age before they can join by putting in their birth date. Unfortunately, such obstacles are easily circumvented by children, who can calculate an “old enough” birth year on the registration page but post their real age on their home page.

Federal Funding Programs

The US government's influence on the content of children's media goes beyond regulatory statutes. To fully understand the landscape of children's media one must also examine ways in which federal funding impacts children's access to new technology and the availability of educational content.

In the early days of the Internet, when most homes had access via a desktop computer and a dial-up modem connection, concern arose over a growing “digital divide.” Families without access to the Internet were disproportionately low-income and from ethnic or racial minority backgrounds (Fox, 2005; Hoffman & Novak, 2000). Observers worried that a technology gap would lead to a knowledge gap, an education gap, and an earnings gap (Devaraj & Kohli, 2003; Livingstone & Helsper, 2007). Indeed, research had shown that children with home computers and Internet access performed better in school and in tests of reading and writing than their peers without computers (Jackson et al., 2006).

The Schools and Libraries Universal Service Support Mechanism, commonly known as E-Rate, was authorized as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (section 234) and championed by then Vice President Al Gore as a way of equalizing access to the Internet and enhancing telecommunications services. Administered by the FCC, applying schools or libraries would receive a discount ranging from 20% to 90% depending on the percentage of students eligible for free or reduced school lunch. Importantly, the program provides only connectivity. Applicants must provide additional resources including end-user equipment, such as computers, software, and professional development (www.universalservice.org/sl/about/overview-program.aspx).

By many standards, the E-Rate program has been successful. In the period since its inception, the digital divide in America's schools has been considerably reduced, with more than 90% of all schools now reporting that they are connected to the Internet (Jayakar & Park, 2009). In spite of E-Rate, however, there remains a gap in Internet accessibility. According to the National Center for Educational Statistics, 97% of classrooms in town schools have Internet access whereas only 90% of classrooms in city schools do. This has led some to question whether the funds have gone to the neediest schools. Observers note that the complex and multistage application process which is time-consuming and labor intensive may prevent some schools from applying, particularly if they lack technical expertise and administrative support (Hudson, 2004). Others argue more advantaged schools take advantage of the program by applying for grants that supplement already state-of-the-art computer technology, a practice known as “gold-plating.”

In February, 2010, a bill known as “E-Rate 2.0” was introduced to expand and extend the program beyond the initial cap of $2.25 billion and to streamline the application process (H.R. 4619 from the Energy and Commerce Communications, Technology and the Internet Subcommittee). Key in the proposed legislation is funding for broadband equipment, which has yet to reach many hard-to-access students in rural communities, and a streamlining of the application process. As the divide in digital access begins to close, scholars have begun to observe difference in how new technologies are used. While in the United States, public policy has largely focused on physical access (but not broadband access), other governments, such as Canada's, have included the promotion of digital literacy and the development of cultural content online (Howard, Busch, & Sheets, 2010). Children who have more opportunity to explore computers and the Internet in informal settings like the home may develop distinct ways of approaching the technology.

The E-Rate program had an effect on another federal initiative: The Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA). CIPA requires schools and libraries to install blocking software on their computers to protect children from age-inappropriate content such as pornography. The American Library Association and others have complained that blocking technology filters are too crude, and block educational content along with offensive content. They also argue that the filters block adult access to legal content. Despite these arguments, CIPA remains in place, primarily because the federal funds that go into the E-Rate program are contingent on schools and libraries installing filters which, they point out, can be turned on or off depending on the user.

Government funding also shapes the landscape of children's educational programming. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the Children's Television Act of 1990 (and the subsequent processing guideline commonly referred to as the Three-Hour Rule) mandates that broadcasters provide educational programming specifically designed for the child audience. Beyond this, public broadcasting stations in the United States are mandated to serve children's educational needs. The core institution of public broadcasting is the local station, and virtually all US television viewers have access to at least one public television signal (Aufderheide, 1996). The stations are independent, and many are powerful program-producing stations. Funds for these stations come from multiple sources, including viewers and corporate sponsors. Funds also come through the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), a nongovernment entity with a politically appointed and balanced (along partisan lines) board, funded solely by federal tax dollars. While CPB does not distribute children's programs, it does fund their production. Funding is also allocated at the federal level through agencies that serve “priority” areas. Since 2000, for example, The Department of Education's Ready To Learn Television initiative invested close to two billion dollars in children's educational programming (www.ed.gov/programs/rtltv/index.html). Ready To Learn is an initiative that supports the development of educational media for preschool and early elementary school age children and their families – primarily in the area of literacy. Some of the programs that have emerged as a result of Ready To Learn include Between the Lions, Super Why! and the New Electric Company. The National Science Foundation has also been active in funding media production – as informal science education – with the goal of increasing students' interest and skills related to science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. Their STEM grants of tens of millions of dollars have funded productions including Fetch! With Ruff Rufman, Peep and the Big Wide World and DragonflyTV.

Self-Regulation

Media and advertising industries are protective of their free-speech rights under the First Amendment, but they are also sensitive to shifts in public opinion that may increase the likelihood of greater regulation. Often, they will seek to preempt policy initiatives by implementing a voluntary set of guidelines for members. Perhaps nowhere is self-regulation more evident than in the voluntary ratings that mediamakers provide for their products. Movies, television, video and computer games, and music, each provide an indication of the content and/or age appropriateness of their titles. Industry-rating efforts have virtually always followed episodes of heightened public concern, with government threatening to take action if the industry does not. Movie ratings came first, in 1968, after dramatic social upheavals, including the sexual revolution, Vietnam War protests, and assassinations of US public figures. These events led policymakers and the larger public to scrutinize the contribution of media to the problems of the culture (Strasburger, Wilson, & Jordan, 2009).

During the 1980s, the Parents Music Resource Center admonished the music industry for its increasingly violent, sexual and misogynistic lyrics. The group, made up primarily of wives of prominent Washington lawmakers led by Tipper Gore, argued that such lyrics had negative effects on the psychological well-being of listeners (Gore, 1987). After a series of Senate hearings and an extensive public debate, which weighed the well-being of children against the free-speech rights of musicians, the Recording Industry Association of America agreed to ask its members to participate voluntarily in a system of labeling their recordings and offering less explicit versions of lyrics alongside the original version. Today the Parental Advisory Label system (sometimes referred to as the “Tipper Sticker”) alerts parents with a warning label, voluntarily placed on recordings by producers and distributors.

Each medium has handled the application of ratings differently, however, with television and music producers determining ratings and film and video and computer game titles submitting to an independent but industry-funded board. This has resulted in what one scholar has termed an “alphabet soup” of ratings indicators (Greenberg, 2001). It has also led to some unevenness in how the ratings are applied to media content. In the case of television, for example, Signorielli found that while 8 out of 10 prime time network programs were labeled with an age-based rating (e.g., TV–14), fewer than 4 in 10 were also labeled with content-based ratings (e.g., V for violence or S for sex), despite the fact that they contained that content (Signorielli, 2005).

Another example of self-regulation can be found in the Children's Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative. This initiative was launched as the Federal Trade Commission and Federal Communications Commission were initiating reports concerning food marketing to children (Holt, Ippolito, Desroches, & Kelley, 2007). It represented a coalition of major food companies pledging to improve the nutritional quality of foods advertised to children, and laid out a series of efforts the companies would undertake with target dates and objectives. A 2009 evaluation of the effectiveness of the self-regulation by Kunkel and colleagues reveals that though the companies signing the pledges lived up to their promises, the pledges themselves were idiosyncratic. The authors of the report provide the following example: “Cocoa Puffs cereal meets all the applicable criteria specified by its parent corporation, General Mills, to qualify as a healthy product. It contains no more than 175 calories per serving, no trans fats, and no more than 12 grams of added sugar, among other criteria. If the same product was marketed by Kraft Foods, however, it would fall short of Kraft's guideline, which specifies that a healthy product contains no more than 25% total calories from added sugar. This means that Cocoa Puffs is considered a healthy product according to nutritional guidelines for cereals specified by General Mills, but it would not qualify as healthy according to the nutritional guidelines for cereals markets by Kraft Foods” (Kunkel, McKinley, & Wright, 2009, p. 28).

An additional challenge to self-regulation – in all areas, not just in food marketing – is that it is not necessarily the case that all members of the industry will either participate or self-regulate. Though the television industry came up with a system for identifying age-inappropriate content by designating both age (e.g., TVY –appropriate for all children, TV-MA – appropriate for mature audiences only) and content (e.g., S – for sexual content, V – for violent content, etc.), many networks have chosen not to include content identifiers. Similarly, not all food marketers signed up for the Children's Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative. More than one quarter of the food and beverage ads airing during children's programs come from companies that did not sign pledges, resulting in a landscape of “junk food marketing” that remained virtually unchanged by industry self-regulation (Kunkel et al., 2009). The hazards of self-regulation, then, include noncompliance (usually without repercussions) as well as the dubious nature of the industries with economic imperatives policing themselves.

Conclusion

From the evidence laid out in this chapter, it is clear that social science research can and should play a more prominent role in the making of effective media policy. First, communication researchers must highlight areas in need of funding for basic research. In some areas of effects research we seem to know plenty (for example, the effects of exposure to violent content). But rapid technological developments have led to enormous gaps in our understanding of, for example, how the use of social networking sites shapes identity formation among young adolescents. (See Chapter 31 for a summary of the fledgling research in this area.) What we know about the effects of media is tied up with the funding that goes toward studying the problem. Without externally funded, objective, rigorous research, we cannot hope to make policies that address the real issues of how today's youth use and are affected by the media they consume.

Second, it is critical that scientific research be used in both the formation and the evaluation of children's media policy. Politicians often rely on public opinion research to identify areas on which to focus their legislative efforts. This is an important first step, but as social scientists, human beings, and parents, we recognize that what we say and what we do are often two very different things. An example of this can be found in the research the Annenberg Public Policy Center conducted around the V-chip policy. Prior to the introduction of the V-chip, we surveyed 150 parents about their interest in using a device, built into their TV, that could block out program content they felt inappropriate for their child. 70% of those surveyed said they would be very interested in using such a device. One year later, after these same parents were provided with television sets that had the V-chip technology, we found that 70% had never even tried to employ the device (Jordan & Woodard, 2004). In this regulatory effort, and in others, empirical research could have informed not only what parents think, in the abstract, but also what parents do, in the real-life setting of the home.

Finally, it is important for scholars to be active in getting research into the forefront of debates about media policy. Decades of media violence effects research (and the testimonials of effects researchers) led policymakers to try to reduce children's exposure to violence. Similarly, research on the beneficial effects of educational content has led to funding for PBS programming on television and in new media platforms. Moreover, the basis for limiting children's exposure to advertising content has been grounded in studies that demonstrate young children's weak understanding of the persuasive intent of advertising messages. There is great potential for communication research to inform children's media policy and national discourse about the role of the media in the life of the developing child. As Wartella has argued, “[W]e need to understand . . . what research questions we take up in our work, how we situate them within the national public and intellectual debates, and how we attempt to convey our work to the segment of the ‘public arena’ we believe we are addressing” (2002, p. 372).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author would like to thank Hannah M. Cope for her assistance with this chapter.

REFERENCES

Ahrens, F. (2006, June 8). The price for on-air indecency goes up: Congress approves tenfold increase in fines FCC can assess. Washington Post, Financial Section, Final Edition, p. D01.

Associated Press. (2004, March 18). FCC cites Howard Stern, Bono for indecency. USA Today, Money, p. D1. Retrieved from www.usatoday.com/money/media/2004-03018-fcc-fines_x.htm

Aufderheide, P. (1996). Public service broadcasting in the United States. Journal of Media Economics, 9, 63–76.

Belmas, G. I., Love, G. D., & Foy, B. C. (2007). In the dark: A consumer perspective on FCC broadcast indecency denials. Federal Communications Law Journal, 60, 67–109.

Blevins, J., & Anton, L. (2008). Muted voices in the legislative process: The role of scholarship in US Congressional efforts to protect children from Internet pornography. New Media and Society, 10, 115–138.

Cantor, J. (1998). Ratings for program content: The role of research findings. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 557, 54–69.

Center for Media Education. (1992). A report on station compliance with the Children's Television Act. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Law Center.

Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 US 557. (1980).

Ciochetti, C. A. (2007, Spring). E-commerce and information privacy: Privacy policies as personal information protectors. American Business Law Journal, 44, 55.

Devaraj, S., & Kohli, R. (2003). Performance impacts of information technology: Is actual usage the missing link? Management Science, 49, 273–289.

Eggerton, J. (2006, February 3). ABC to tape-delay Super Bowl. Broadcasting and Cable Magazine.

Federal Communications Commission. (1996). Policies and rules concerning children's television programming: Revision of programming policies for television broadcast stations. MM Docket No. 93–48.

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726. (1978).

Freedman, D. (2008). The politics of media policy. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

Greenberg, B. (2001). The alphabet soup of television program ratings. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Hoffman, D. L., & Novak, T. P. (2000). The growing digital divide: Implications for an open research agenda. In E. Brynjolfsson & B. Kahin (Eds.), Understanding the digital economy: Data, tools, research (pp. 245–260). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Holt, D. J., Ippolito, P. M., Desroches, D. M., & Kelley, C. R. (2007, June 1). Children's exposure to TV advertising in 1977 and 2004: Information for the obesity debate (Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Economics Staff Report).

Howard, P. N., Busch, L., & Sheets, P. (2010). Comparing digital divides: Access and social Inequality in Canada and the United States. Canadian Journal of Communication, 35, 109–128.

Hudson, H. (2004). Universal access: What have we learned from the E-rate? Telecommunications Policy, 28, 309–321.

Jackson, L. A., von Eye, A., Biocca, F. A., Barbatsis, G., Zhao, Y., & Fitzgerald, H. E. (2006). Does home Internet use influence the academic performance of low-income children? Developmental Psychology, 42, 429–435.

Jordan, A. B. (1996). The state of children's television: An examination of quantity, quality, and industry beliefs (Annenberg Public Policy Center Report No. 2). Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania.

Jordan, A. B. (2000). Is the Three-Hour Rule living up to its potential? An analysis of educational television for children in the 1999/2000 broadcast season. Retrieved February 29, 2012, from http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/Media_and_Developing_Child/Childrens_Programming/20000626_Three_hour_rule_report/20000626_three_hour_rule_report.pdf

Jordan, A. B. (2002). The Three-Hour Rule and educational television for children. Popular Communication, 2, 103–18.

Jordan, A. B. (2008). Children's media policy. The Future of Children, 18, 235–249.

Jordan, A. B., & Sullivan, J. L. (1997). Children's educational television regulations and the local broadcaster: Impact and implementation (Annenberg Public Policy Center Report No. 13). Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania.

Jordan, A. B., & Woodard, E. H. (2004). Parents' use of the V-chip to supervise children's television use. Philadelphia, PA: Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania.

Kaiser Family Foundation. (1998, May). Parents, children and the television ratings system. Menlo Park, CA: Kaiser Family Foundation.

Kaiser Family Foundation. (2004, Fall). Parents, media and public policy: A Kaiser Family Foundation Survey (Report No. 7156). Menlo Park, CA: Kaiser Family Foundation.

Kaiser Family Foundation. (2010, January). Generation M2: Media in the lives of 8- to 18-year-olds. Menlo Park, CA: Kaiser Family Foundation.

Kunkel, D. (1988). From a raised eyebrow to a turned back: The FCC and children's product-related programming. Journal of Communication, 38, 90–108.

Kunkel, D. (1998). Policy battles over defining children's educational television. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 57, 39–53.

Kunkel, D., & Canepa, J. (1994). Broadcasters' license renewal claims regarding children's educational programming. Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 38, 397–416.

Kunkel, D., McKinley, C., & Wright, P. (2009). The impact of industry self-regulation on the nutritional quality of foods advertised on television to children. Oakland, CA: Children Now. Retrieved from www.childrennow.org

Lenhart, A. (2009, December). Teens and sexting: How and why minor teens are sending sexually suggestive nude or nearly nude images via text messaging. Washington, DC: Pew Internet & American Life Project Report.

Levesque, R. J. R. (2007). Adolescents, media, and the law: What developmental science reveals and free speech requires. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Lewin, T. (2010, March 21). Rethinking sex offender laws for youths showing off online. New York Times, p. A1.

Livingstone, S., & Helsper, E. (2007). Gradations in digital inclusion: Children, young people and the digital divide. New Media and Society, 9, 671–696.

McChesney, R. (1999). Rich media, poor democracy: Communication politics in dubious times. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Mears, B. (2009, April 28). Supreme Court rules against networks on indecent speech. CNN.com. Retrieved from www.cnn.com/2009/US/04/28/supreme.court.indecent.speech/index.html

Napoli, P. M. (2001). Foundations of communications policy: Principles and process in the regulation of electronic media. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Scantlin, R., & Jordan, A. B. (2006). Families' experiences with the V-chip: An exploratory study. Journal of Family Communication, 6, 139–159.

Schatz, A. (2010, August 26). FCC appeals “fleeting expletives” decision. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved December 10, 2010, from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703959704575453492807569162.html

Schmitt, K. L. (2000). Public policy, family rules and children's media use in the home (Annenberg Public Policy Center Report No. 35). Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania.

Signorielli, N. (2005). Age-based ratings, content designations, and television content: Is there a problem? Mass Communication and Society, 8, 277–298.

Starr, P. (2004). The creation of the media: Political origins of modern communications. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Strasburger, V., Wilson, B. J., & Jordan, A. B. (2009). Children, adolescents and the media. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Sullivan, J. L., & Jordan, A. B. (1999). Playing by the rules: Impact and implementation of children's educational television regulations among local broadcasters. Communication Law and Policy, 4, 483–511.

Wartella, E. (2002). Communication research on children and public policy. In S. Braman (Ed.), Communication researchers and policy-making (pp. 359–373). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Wilson, B. J., Kunkel, D., & Drogos, K. L. (2008). Educationally/insufficient: An analysis of the availability and educational quality of children's E/I programming. Oakland, CA: Children Now.

Wyatt, E. (2010, July 13). FCC indecency policy rejected on appeal. New York Times. Retrieved December 10, 2010, from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/14/business/media/14indecent.html

FURTHER READING

Anderson, D. (1998). Educational television is not an oxymoron. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 557, 24–38.

Anderson, D., Huston, A., Schmitt, K., Linebarger, D., & Wright, J. (2001). Early childhood television viewing and adolescent behavior. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 66(1), 1–147.

Anderson, D., & Pempek, T. A. (2005). Television and very young children. American Behavioral Scientist, 48(5), 505–522.

Bloom, M. (2006). Pervasive new media: Indecency regulation and the end of the distinction between broadcast technology and subscription-based media. Yale Journal of Law and Technology, 9, 109.

Braman, S. (Ed.). (2002). Communication researchers and policy-making. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Carter, E. L., Hall, R. T., & Phillips, J. C. (2008). Broadcast profanity and the “right to be let alone”: Can the FCC regulate non-indecent fleeting expletives under a privacy model? Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal, 31, 1–46.

Carvin, A. (Ed.) (2000). The E-Rate in America: A tale of four cities. A Benton Foundation Report. Retrieved from http://www.benton.org/publibrary/e-rate/e-rate.4cities.pdf

Calvert, S., & Wilson, B. J. (2008). The handbook of children, media and development. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Children's Television Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101–437, 104 Stat. 996, codified at 47 USC, 303a–303b (2006).

Communications Decency Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 133, codified at 47 USC, 230, 560–61 (2000).

Comstock, G., & Scharrer, E. (2007). Media and the American child. New York, NY: Elsevier/Academic Press.

Fairlie, R. (2004). Race and the digital divide. Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy, 3, 15.

Federal Communications Commission. (1996). Policies and rules concerning children's television programming (Report & Order 11, FCCR 10660).

Federal Communications Commission (2004). Children's television obligations of digital television broadcasters (Report and Order and further Notice of Proposed Rule Making 19, FCCR 22943).

Federal Communications Commission. (2007). In the matter of amendment of Section 1.80(b) of the Commission's rules to increase of forfeiture maxima for obscene, indecent, and profane broadcasts to implement the Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005 (FCC 07–94).

Feshbach, N. D., Dillman, A. S., & Jordan, T. S. (1979). Children and television advertising: Some research and some perspectives. Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 8, 26–31.

Golding, P., & Murdock, G. (2001). Digital divides: Communications policy and its contradictions. New Economy, 8(2), 110–115.

Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). Comparing media systems: Three models of media and politics. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Huesmann, L. R., Moise-Titus, J., Podolski, C., & Eron, L. D. (2003). Longitudinal relations between children's exposure to TV violence and their aggressive and violent behavior in young adulthood: 1977–1997. Developmental Psychology, 39, 201–221.

Institute of Medicine (IOM) Committee on Food Marketing and the Diets of Children and Youth, and Food and Nutrition Board. (2006). Food marketing to children and youth: Threat or opportunity? Washington, DC: National Academies Press.

Jenkins, H. (2006). Convergence culture: Where old and new media collide. New York, NY: New York University Press.

Kelly, B., Halford, J. C. G., Boyland, E. J., Chapman, K., Castano-Bautista, I., Berg, C. et al. (2010). Television food advertising to children: A global perspective. American Journal of Public Health, 100(9), 1730–1736.

Kerkman, D., Kunkel, D., Huston, A., Wright, J., & Pinon, M. (1990). Children's television programming and the free market solution. Journalism Quarterly, 67, 147–156.

Krotoszynski, R. (1996). Into the woods: Broadcasters, bureaucrats, and children's television programming. Duke Law Journal, 45, 1242–43.

Lesser, G. (1974). Children and television: Lessons from Sesame Street. New York, NY: Random House.

Levi, L. (2010). A “pay or play” experiment to improve children's educational television. Federal Communications Law Journal, 62, 275–341.

Luke, C. (1990). Constructing the child viewer: A history of the American discourse on television and children, 1950–1980. New York, NY: Praeger.

McChesney, R. W. (2007). Communication revolution: Critical junctures and the future of media. New York, NY: New Press.

McLeod, D., Eveland, W., & Nathanson, A. (1997). Support for censorship of violent and misogynic rap lyrics. Communication Research, 24, 153–174.

Minnow, N. N., & LaMay, C. L. (1995). Abandoned in the wasteland: Children, television and the First Amendment. New York, NY: Hill & Wang.

Morrow, R. W. (2008). Sesame Street and the reform of children's television. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Ouellette, L., & Lewis, J. (2000). Moving beyond the “vast wasteland”: Cultural policy and television in the United States. Television and New Media, 1, 93–114.

Pecora, N. (2002). The business of children's entertainment. New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Pecora, N. A., Murray, J. P., Wartella, E. A. (Eds.) (2007). Children and television: Fifty years of research. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Pomeranz, J. L. (2010). Television food marketing to children revisited: The Federal Trade Commission has the constitutional and statutory authority to regulate. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 38(1), 98–116.

Rideout, V. (2007). Parents, children, and media (Publication no. 7638). Menlo Park, CA: Kaiser Family Foundation.

Roberts, D. F., Foehr, U. G., & Rideout, V. J. (2005, March). Generation M: Media in the lives of 8–18-year-olds. Palo Alto, CA: Kaiser Family Foundation.

Roberts, D. F., Foehr, U. G., Rideout, V. J., & Brodie, M. (1999). Kids and media at the new millennium: A comprehensive national analysis of children's media use. Menlo Park, CA: Kaiser Family Foundation.

Selwyn, N. (2004). Reconsidering political and popular understandings of the digital divide. New Media and Society, 6(3), 341–362.

Singer, D., & Singer, J. (Eds.). (2001). The handbook of children and media. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Walsh, D., & Gentile, D. (2001). A validity test of movie, television, and videogame ratings. Pediatrics, 107, 1302–1308.

Warren, R., Wicks, J., Wicks, R., Fosu, I., & Chung, D. (2007). Food and beverage advertising to children on US television: Did national food advertisers respond? Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 84, 795–810.

Warschauer, M. (2003). Technology and social inclusion: Rethinking the digital divide. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wartella, E., Wackman, D. B., & Ward, S. (1979). Children's consumer information processing: Representation of information from television advertisements. Advances in Consumer Research, 5, 535–539.

Wilcox, B. (2003). The research/policy nexus: The Children's Television Act as a case in point. Journal of Applied Developmental Communication, 24, 367–374.

..................Content has been hidden....................

You can't read the all page of ebook, please click here login for view all page.
Reset
18.191.174.111