Organizations are goal-directed, purposive entities, and their effectiveness in pursuing goals influences the quality of our lives and even our ability to survive. All research and theory on management and organizations concerns, at least implicitly, how an organization and the people in it can perform well by pursuing goals. This chapter presents major issues about goals and addresses the challenges people in organizations face in linking goals to performance. The discussion then turns to diverse and conflicting performance criteria that all organizations must pursue, but especially public organizations. Then the chapter describes models that researchers have developed to assess the effectiveness of organizations and reviews an extensive body of literature on strategies and practices that managers use to achieve high levels of performance.

In recent decades elected officials and reformers in many nations have concentrated on improving government agencies' pursuit of goals. Governments around the world have invested heavily in reforms that require government agencies to state goals and performance measures. The Governmental Performance and Results Act (GPRA) in the United States in 1993 mandated that federal agencies publish strategic plans that include goals and performance measures; the legislation was renewed in 2010. Starting in the 1980s and continuing today, officials in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and many other nations adopted reforms in a movement called New Public Management (NPM) (Barzelay, 2001; Kettl, 2002; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Many NPM reforms required government agencies to specify goals and performance measures and to monitor performance against them. These efforts became so prevalent that scholars coined terms such as “performance regime” to capture “the embedded nature of these practices in almost all aspects of contemporary governance” (Moynihan, 2008; Moynihan et al., 2011, p.141). Others referred to “performance frameworks.” These observations emphasized the importance not just of goal statements, but also of the provisions for managing and using goals and performance measures to evaluate, improve, and reward performance. More generally, aside from reform initiatives, prominent authors call for more effective goal-setting in government activities and organizations (e.g., Metzenbaum, 1998).

These themes about public organizations' goals coincide with research and discussion in general management and organizational analysis. Chapter 10 will describe Edwin Locke's and Gary Latham's (1990a) theory of goal-setting. A survey of researchers on organizational behavior found that the survey respondents considered this theory the most successful ever developed about organizational behaviors (Miner, 2005). Researchers found again and again that when given clear, challenging, but acceptable goals, individuals and groups perform tasks more productively than when they do not have such goals. Similarly, numerous non-academic sources emphatically stress the importance of goal-setting. Doerr's (2018) best selling book, Measure What Matters, extols the goal-setting system of specifying “Objectives and Key Results” that Doerr describes as having led to success at many corporations. A search on the web for “goal-setting” leads to many sources offering consultation and training in how to set “SMART” goals. SMART goals are specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and timely. These and many other sources of ideas and advice about goal-setting apply to all organizations.

Advocates for goal-setting contend that organizations perform better if the people in them clarify goals and measure progress toward them. Advocates for goal-setting in government often link this assumption to the claim that government agencies need to perform a lot better. They can do so by becoming more like business firms, which the reformers assume to have clearer goals and performance measures. Many analysts of such reforms, however, agree that these initiatives have produced mixed results (e.g., Radin, 2006; Moynihan, 2008; Heinrich, 2012; Thompson, 2006). Many approaches to goal-setting, such as the Locke-Latham theory and the calls for SMART goals, apply to individual and group goals for specific tasks. Goals for complex organizations raise more challenges for goal-setters. Organizational sociologist W. Richard Scott (Scott and Davis, 2003, p. 183) declares that “the concept of organizational goals is among the most slippery and treacherous of all those employed by organizational analysts.” Nevertheless, organizational analysts have developed valuable insights about organizational goals.

General Organizational Goals

An organizational goal is a condition that members of an organization seek to attain. Organizations state goals in mission statements, strategic plans, and in other ways because goals serve valuable functions. Goals communicate an organization's purpose and encourage recognition of the organization's legitimacy. Organizational goals can express the organization's values and identify the clientele whom the organization claims to serve. Goals can motivate individuals to participate in an organization's activities (Goodsell, 2011) and serve as premises that guide decisions (Simon, 1945, p. 151–152).

Concepts related to organizational purpose, however, such as goals, motives, incentives, vision, objectives, values, “metrics” and key performance indicators (KPI's), overlap in various ways. Some organizations publish statements of key values and also state goals, objectives, and performance indicators, making it difficult to identify the organization's priorities among these statements of purpose. Goals and similar concepts of purpose exist in hierarchies and chains in which we pursue a goal not as an end in itself, but because it leads to a later goal or a higher-level goal. For example, people may pursue one goal (increased efficiency in responding to client requests for services) in pursuit of another goal (enhancing the well-being of clients). Organizations have multiple authorities and stakeholders who can influence goals and who often disagree about them.

For such reasons, organizations pursue multiple goals (Rainey and Jung, 2015). Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon (1973) pointed out years ago that a goal almost always represents one of a set of multiple goals. Decision makers have to deal with balancing among the various goals in a goal set. This balance can be particularly challenging in public organizations. For example, advocacy groups press leaders in prison systems to emphasize rehabilitation of prisoners; other groups call for firm control and punitive measures for prisoners (Hargrove and Glidewell, 1990). As this chapter is written, nationwide strife embroils the United States over police killings of African-Americans during arrests. African-American leaders and demonstrators demand that police officials do more to prevent such deaths, and want the police to protect and respect them during peaceful protests. At the same time, governmental and police leaders also face pressure to prevent looting and property damage by some of the people involved in the demonstrations. Prison wardens and police chiefs have to deal with these pressures that represent conflicting goals. Other common examples include conflicts among goals for short-term and long-term profits and service performance, community and public relations, employee and management development, and social responsibility (such as compliance with affirmative action and environmental protection laws).

In spite of these complications, in one of the most influential books in the history of organizational analysis, Chester Barnard (1938, p. 21) pointed out that any formal system of cooperation requires objectives, purposes, and aims. Goals provide a unifying element and a vital aspect of an organization (p. 21). The importance of goals has led organizational analysts to develop insights about the types of goals and functions of goals as well as the challenges involved with setting goals. Organizational mission statements have become ubiquitous in recent decades; one has difficulty finding a large organization that does not publish a mission statement. The statements typically list very general goals that organization theorists call official goals (Perrow, 1961). Official goals express formal goals that present an organization's major values and purposes. For example, the Veteran's Administration (VA), a US federal agency, states that its mission is “to fulfill President Lincoln's promise [and] to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan” – by serving and honoring the men and women who are America's veterans. The mission of the Animal Welfare Institute, a Washington, DC–based nonprofit, is “to alleviate the suffering of animals caused by people.” Obviously, these organizations communicate their general purpose by stating these official goals in mission statements to enhance legitimacy, increase motivation, and guide their decisions. Goodsell (2011) provides evidence that the missions of government organizations can enhance motivation and engagement in the organization when people feel that they are contributing to a valuable public mission.

Obviously, the official goals do not specify how the organization will achieve the ideal-sounding purposes. Operative goals provide more specific objectives that an organization seeks through actual operations and procedures. For example, the statutory role of New Zealand's State Services Commission (SSC) is to provide leadership and oversight of state services to government agencies. Part of the SSC's mission is “to unleash the service potential of New Zealand.” The agency's operative goals – how the agency plans to achieve its broad mission – can be found by searching deeper into the agency website, where one finds plans to eliminate the gender pay gap, among other efforts. The SSC example is typical of how agencies seek to link broad statements of purpose in mission statements to operative goals. Yet this example also underscores the challenge of clearly linking the more general goals to more specific operative goals. What priority should this goal receive in relation to other operative goals? What metrics will be used to measure agency progress in reducing the gap?

Goals of Public Organizations

While all organizations face the challenges of stating and analyzing organizational goals, prominent political scientists and economists have asserted that public organizations and public policies have distinctively multiple, vague, and conflicting goals.¹ The list of authors expressing such observations includes major scholars from decades past (e.g., Allison, 1983; Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Downs, 1967; Drucker, 1980; Lipsky, 1980; Lowi, 1979; Lynn, 1981; Wildavsky, 1979; Wilson, 1989) and more recently (e.g., Heinrich, 1999; Lewis, 2008; Moynihan, 2008, 142–45).

As discussed in the preceding chapters, in the US and other nations, characteristics of government systems influence the formulation of goals in public organizations to make them distinctive. Authorizing legislation often assigns vague missions to government agencies and provides vague guidance for public programs (Meier and Bothe, 2006; Seidman and Gilmour, 1986). The need for compromise leads to vague statutory language because more precise statements of goals can intensify disagreements among factions whose votes are needed to pass the legislation (Lowi, 1979). In sharp contrast to the recent reforms that emphasize goal-setting, major experts on public policy and governmental systems have advised that public officials need to avoid specifying agency goals and policy goals to avoid controversies over them (Lindblom, 1959; Wildavsky, 1988). Vague mandates provide agency personnel with the flexibility to define how to carry out the mandate; this can occur when elected officials and their staff members do not have the expert knowledge to do so. For example, in various nations, laws authorize their environmental protection agencies to control human and environmental exposures to hazardous substances. However, people in the legislative branch do not have the expert knowledge to identify and control such substances. As the subsequent discussion of goal clarity and ambiguity explains, the legislative branch often provides a very general mandate. The agency spells out the details in regulations. In addition, the formal rulemaking process entails hearing from stakeholder groups with varied and often competing interests (Chun and Rainey, 2006; Rainey and Jung, 2015). Consequently, agency managers feel pressured to balance conflicting, idealized goals.

Many observers assert that these goal complexities have major implications for public organizations and their management. Boyatzis (1982), in a study of the competencies of a broad sample of managers, found that public managers displayed weaker “goal and action” competencies – those concerned with formulating and emphasizing means and ends. He concluded that the difference must result from the absence in the public sector of clear goals and performance measures such as sales and profits (c.f. Buchanan, 1974, 1975). Blumenthal (1983), reflecting on his experiences as a top federal and business executive, began his account of the differences between these roles with an often-repeated observation that there is “no bottom line” (i.e., no profit information) to clarify performance measurement in government. Allison (1983) provided an account of the similar observations of experienced public officials about the absence of a bottom line and of accepted and readily measurable performance indicators in public agencies. Parhizagari and Gilbert (2004) identify statistically significant differences in the performance measures used in public and private organizations and in employees' ratings of organizational performance.

Others contend that public organizations' vague goals, coupled with external pressures for accountability, can lead to performance evaluation on the basis of adherence to proper procedure and compliance with rules (Barton, 1980; Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Lynn, 1981; Meyer, 1979). The absence of clear, measurable, well-accepted performance criteria thus induces a vicious cycle of “inevitable bureaucracy” (Lynn, 1981), in which the demand for increased accountability increases the emphasis on rule adherence and hierarchical control. Similarly, in an important book about an unsuccessful organization change initiative in the US Department of State, Warwick (1975, p. 85; also quoted in Jung, 2018, p. 27) wrote:

Goal ambiguity and the absence of firm performance criteria favor the development of rules and fixed operating procedures … compliance with rules remains the most direct and reassuring sign of a job well done.

Behavioral Theories of Organizational Decision Making: Changing Perspectives on Organizational Goals

While all organizations must pursue multiple, conflicting, and ambiguous goals to some degree, public and nonprofit organizations often face particularly high levels of goal multiplicity, conflict, and ambiguity. Nevertheless, what we have called the “generic” approach to the study of management provides insights applicable to challenges in goal-setting and performance assessment in public and nonprofit organizations.

A major book by organizational analysts presented important insights about decision-making and the pursuit of goals in organizations that have had a lasting influence. Developments in research and theory leading to and following from a book entitled A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Cyert and March, 1963) led prominent organizational theorists to refer to the book as one of the most significant management books of all time (Argote and Greve, 2007; Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, and Ocasio, 2012). The book exerted a major influence on how organizational researchers analyze decision processes in organizations, including pursuit of goals. Many economists and other analysts assumed that decision makers proceed rationally in seeking to maximize important goals such as making profit. A simple version of such rationality assumptions holds that decision makers know the goals they are pursuing and can place a value on them. Then they consistently review a large set of alternatives for achieving those goals and consistently choose the alternative that will maximize achievement of the goals at the least expenditure of resources.

In his book Administrative Behavior (Simon, 1947) and later work (March and Simon, 1958), Herbert Simon, who would later win the Nobel Prize in economics, wrote that decision makers seek to proceed rationally. Often, however, they must make decisions under conditions of “bounded rationality.” They often face limits on time, resources, information, and analytical capacity to review many alternatives. They have difficulty specifying goals and how to achieve goals. Instead of rationally maximizing goal accomplishment, Simon wrote, decision makers often engage in “satisficing” behavior (Simon, 1947, p. 47). They make the most satisfactory decision they can make within the limits on their ability to decide rationally. Colin Powell, who served as US Secretary of State after a career as the highest-ranking military officer in the nation, provided an example of such a decision process when he described his “70% rule.” He would select an alternative when he felt 70% sure that it was the best choice.

Simon's colleagues, Richard Cyert and James March (1963), conducted a study of decision makers in business firms and found that they displayed satisficing behaviors. The satisficing behaviors influenced the establishment of goals and assessments of their achievement. For example, decision makers may establish a benchmark for performance based on an “aspiration level” rather than on conclusive evidence about the performance that the firm could achieve. They might base the aspiration level (“increase profits by 5%”) on the organization's past performance (“we have increased profit by nearly that much for the past several years, so 5% is a reasonable goal”) (Greve, 2003).

Cyert and March observed, even in these profit-oriented private firms, political processes in which competing coalitions disagree about goals. A “winning coalition” may exert the most influence on decisions.

Decision makers may also engage in “quasi-resolution of conflict.” Resolving conflicts can require high costs and time. Coalitions negotiate and compromise to resolve conflicts well enough so that decision making can proceed.

Decision makers may also employ a “problemistic search” process. Rather than searching through an elaborate set of alternatives, the decision makers may focus on a problem, such as a gap between the aspiration level and actual performance. Focusing on a problem such as a performance deficit, and on alternatives available in the vicinity of the problem, reduces the costs of a more elaborate search for alternatives. An example from government occurs when decision makers in a state agency respond to a problem by examining how similar agencies in other states have dealt with the problem.

Decision makers may also practice “uncertainty avoidance” by relying on standard operating procedures, routines, and short-term decision rules rather than long-term rules. These procedures reduce the costs of searching and reduce the complexities of decisions. At the same time, Cyert and March observed that organizations engaged in “organizational learning” processes to reduce uncertainty.

These observations about how people actually behave in making decisions in business firms had major influences on how many organizational analysts study organizations (Greve, 2017, p. 2). Theorists and researchers advanced analysis of organizational learning processes. Others study “institutional” processes in which organizations may, e.g., make decisions by doing what other similar organizations are doing, or by doing what a regulatory authority requires them to do. That is, the decision makers avoid extensive searches among alternatives by adopting alternatives from available sources.

March and other colleagues would later develop a “garbage can model” of decision making that they described as particularly applicable to public organizations (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972). According to this perspective, many important decisions, especially in public organizations, involve substantial uncertainty. These decisions do not proceed in well-planned, systematic patterns. The decisions become like garbage cans, where various factors come into the decision process in unplanned ways. Streams of problems move through time, as do streams of alternatives that might apply to solving the problems. Participants move in and out of the decision process. Some major decisions occur when a certain alternative comes together in a situation where a particular set of participants attach it to a problem that they are trying to solve. Chapter Seven will further explain this perspective. As this perspective shows, analysts of decision making in organizations increasingly recognized the importance of processes that do not involve rational, systematic pursuit of clear goals.

Adding to this perspective on decisions and goals, researchers studying human judgment and decision making advanced understanding of how individuals interpret information. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1980) developed “prospect theory” that ultimately led to a Nobel Prize for Kahneman. (Tversky had passed away before he was selected.) This research also draws on Herbert Simon's ideas about bounded rationality (Simon, 1947). Descriptions of prospect theory emphasize that it, too, challenged “expected utility theory” that was widely accepted among economists. Expected utility theory depicts decision makers as consistently pursuing goals by choosing the alternative that leads to maximizing “utility” or the desirable aspects of the goal.

Khaneman's and Tversky's research led them to conclude that decisions often depend on how individuals assess the potential outcomes of a decision. Decision makers often assess the prospects of a decision by referring to their own subjective perception of possible results. These perceptions are influenced by the way information is presented, or “framed.” For example, if information emphasizes possible losses, this can frame the decision differently from information that emphasizes gains. Then, decision makers interpret the information on the basis of their subjective attitudes toward the outcomes presented, such as different reactions to the prospects of gains versus losses. Kahneman and Tversky found that most people tend to be loss-averse. They are more concerned about a loss than a gain.

These ideas have major implications for goals and performance of all organizations, but especially to public and nonprofit activities. Prospect theory helps to explain a process of “surrogation” in performance measurement. Surrogation refers to the tendency for performance measures to take the place of the actual goal that managers intended to pursue (Harris and Tayler, 2019). For example, teachers may receive higher rewards when their students score higher on standardized achievement tests and lose rewards for lower scores. The teachers may then focus on test scores as a primary goal. They may spend more time teaching students how to do well on a test rather than helping students actually learn.

The “theory of attribute substitution” can explain why such surrogation occurs. According to the theory, individuals rely on a mental shortcut when making a judgment about complex, intangible goals that are difficult to access. They may focus on an attribute or target that represents a more general goal, but is more easily accessible. This leads to a focus on “making the metrics” and not on the end goal. This tendency can occur where first, the target attribute is relatively abstract or inaccessible. Second, a related, available “shortcut” attribute is concrete or highly accessible. Third, individuals substitute the shortcut attribute for the target attribute (Harris and Tayler, 2019; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002).

Surrogation and attribute substitution are similar to the concept of “goal displacement” that the major sociologist Robert Merton (1940; March and Simon, 1958, p. 57) advanced many decades ago. One pattern of goal displacement occurs when employees adhere to organizational rules as ends in themselves. Ideally, the rules in an organization represent means to achieve the overall goals of the organization. Where there is heavy emphasis on rule adherence, individuals in organizations may concentrate on following a rule because it supposedly represents an organizational goal, even when it is a very incomplete representation of the goal. Following the rule provides the individual with guidance about what to do, but may lead to behaviors that do not achieve organizational goals and may be detrimental to them.

Problems due to bounded rationality, satisficing behaviors, and surrogation do not negate the value of goal-setting in organizations. These topics, however, show why it is vital to recognize the potential pitfalls of stating goals and selecting performance measures. Performance measures can have unintended, undesirable consequences for behavior. Economists, psychologists, and others still differ over the role of rationality in human decision making (Krause, 1999), with some still adhering to a “theory of rational expectations” instead of theoretical perspectives that emphasize bounded rationality or prospect theory. The theory of rational expectations, however, can also predict substitution of rules or subgoals for goals. When individuals become aware of a system of rewards and punishments, they will behave consistently with that system. For example, an employee rewarded for the number of persons trained may aim to optimize efforts with respect to the measure – train more people – whether or not the training achieves its intended effect.

Psychologist and research methodologist Donald Campbell (1979) explains the phenomenon: “The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor.” This adage, which has been coined “Campbell's law,” reflects a significant problem with measuring performance. Campbell's law can explain “the cobra effect,” an unintended consequence that occurs when the attempted solution makes the problem worse. The cobra effect gets its name from an effort in India to reduce the number of cobras in the nation. Officials offered financial incentives based on the number of cobras eliminated. Later they found that the incentives were leading enterprising citizens to breed more cobras so that they could eliminate them and get paid for it.

The problems discussed here can occur in all kinds of organizations. The United Nations (UN) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change set goals aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In 2005, the UN decided to issue carbon credits to reward organizations that reduced dangerous pollutants. A company received credits that allowed it to produce a certain amount of a pollutant; companies producing more of a pollutant would receive more credits to produce it. The credits could be bought and sold. The idea was that companies producing more of a pollutant would receive more credits for producing it but could sell the credits if they reduced production of the pollutant. If a company reduced its pollution, it could sell credits to another company that needed to buy credits to avoid a government fine for producing more pollution than allowed by the credits it had. The value of the credits was determined by the seriousness of the pollutant. The chemical HFC-23, a byproduct of a common coolant used in air conditioners, topped the list of damaging pollutants. Credits for producing it were very valuable. This meant that organizations that produced more HFC-23 would receive more credits for producing it, which they could sell if they reduced production of it. Some companies would increase production of HFC-23 to get more credits for producing it, and then reduce production so that they could sell credits to companies that needed them. On balance, this led to increased production of the pollutant. The European Union eventually realized the problem and suspended the program of awarding credits.

These problems may be more likely in public and nonprofit organizations, but the private sector is also vulnerable to the problem of perverse incentives. Harris and Tayler (2019) recount the problems that led Wells Fargo Bank into a widely publicized and very expensive scandal. Bank executives established incentive systems that rewarded employees for increasing the types of accounts an individual customer had with the bank – checking accounts, saving accounts, loans, and others. More accounts made more money for the bank and rewarded employees for adding customer accounts. In addition, bank leaders assigned employees with quotas for the addition of new accounts. This led many employees to create fake accounts. To meet their quotas and to get financial rewards, bank employees would create new accounts for customers without telling the customers. Employees ultimately created millions of such accounts. The new account sales quota created a perverse incentive and ultimately cost Wells Fargo, the nations' fourth-largest bank, a fine of $3 billion and damaging loss of reputation. Harris and Tayler trace the problem to the “surrogation” processes previously described.

Toward Diverse, Conflicting Criteria

Considering the complications and challenges in setting goals, managers often use multiple criteria or measures of performance to determine whether organizations are effective at achieving their objectives. Campbell (1977) and his colleagues, e.g., reviewed various approaches to organizational effectiveness and developed a comprehensive list of criteria (see Table 6.1). People in all organizations face similar challenges of multiple and sometimes conflicting goals.

Cameron (1978) illustrated this point in his study of educational institutions. He drew on a variety of criteria, both objective and perceptual, including student, faculty, and administrator satisfaction; student and faculty development; and organizational criteria like openness, ability to acquire resources, and health. Cameron developed profiles of different educational institutions according to the nine general criteria and found them to be diverse. One institution scored high on student academic and personal development but quite low on student career development. Another had the opposite profile – low on the first two criteria, high on the third. One institution scored high on community involvement; the others scored relatively low. These variations show that even organizations in the same industry or service sector often follow different patterns of effectiveness. They may choose different strategies, involving somewhat different clients, approaches, and products or services. In addition, these differences show that effectiveness criteria can weigh against one another. A university aiming at distinction in faculty research may pay less attention to the personal development of undergraduates than a liberal arts college more devoted to educating undergraduates.

Research by public management scholars has also shed light on the variety of criteria that public managers use to assess the effectiveness of their organizations. One common set of criteria includes economy, or the cost of obtaining inputs; efficiency, or the cost per unit of output; effectiveness, referring to the achievement of formal objectives; responsiveness, denoting customer and employee satisfaction; and democratic outcomes like probity and accountability (Boyne, 2002). Walker and Andrews (2015) undertook a comprehensive analysis of empirical studies of the relationship between management and performance. Their review of nearly 90 studies identified eight types of performance measures representing various performance criteria: cost effectiveness, effectiveness, efficiency, equity, quality, quantity, user or customer satisfaction, and aggregated performance indexes. They found that indicators of effectiveness are by far the most commonly used performance measures in public management research, with nearly 46% of tests using effectiveness measures as the dependent variable, followed by measures of equity (15%), aggregated performance indices (13%), efficiency (8%), service quality (7%), customer or user satisfaction (6%), cost effectiveness (3%), and output quantity (2%) (See Table 6.1.).

The foregoing discussion supports two broad conclusions. First, organizational effectiveness is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon, requiring the use of diverse criteria and measures to describe it. As the following discussion of approaches to organizational effectiveness will reveal, managers often combine various performance criteria and corresponding measures to obtain a more holistic picture of how well an organization is performing. Second, consideration of diverse performance measures can result in conflict and trade-offs between two or more criteria as organizations try to satisfy or reconcile the diverging expectations of external stakeholders, prompting managers to make choices when rank ordering or prioritizing competing criteria (Cameron, 1978; Radin, 2006; Andersen et al., 2016).

Approaches to Organizational Effectiveness

While the preceding discussion focused on how to set goals and what criteria to use to assess the effectiveness of organizations, other scholars have tried to develop a more systematic approach to dealing with the issue of organizational effectiveness, referring to the extent to which the organization achieves its goals (Cameron and Whetten, 1983). Over the years, they have developed various approaches or models aimed at defining organizational effectiveness and analyzing if organizations are achieving their objectives. Experts have failed to reach consensus, and as a result, we are left with a variety of approaches and models that provide unique insight into organizational effectiveness and that can be useful under different circumstances (Daft, 2020; Tolbert and Hall, 2009) (see Table 6.2). Because of the importance of assessing performance in the public sector, many public sector reforms of the last few decades are a reflection of some of these approaches to organizational effectiveness.

As researchers began analyzing organizational effectiveness, the Goal Approach obviously offered a first place to start. It defines effectiveness as the extent to which the organization achieves its goals (Etzioni, 1964). The complications with organizational goals elaborated earlier – difficulties in specification and measurement, goal conflicts, multiple stakeholders with differing goals – made this a difficult and costly approach in many circumstances. Yet, as emphasized earlier, goals and assessment of their achievement remain very important, including in the public sector. Indeed, prominent public sector reforms throughout the world that have been inspired by the New Public Management have emphasized achievement of formal goals. In the US, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 mandated for the first time in the country's history that federal agencies formulate strategic plans and annual performance plans that outline performance goals and report performance information to Congress and the general public (US Congress, 1993). In 2010, GPRA was modernized and streamlined, compelling agencies to focus on a smaller number of high-priority goals and to analyze factors inhibiting achievement of goals (US Congress, 2010). A similar act was passed by the South African Parliament, the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) of 1999, to ensure and hold public officials accountable for efficient and effective management of all revenue, expenditure, assets, and liabilities of national departments. As a result of this act, national departments now produce annual performance plans with performance objectives and corresponding metrics for the coming year and data on performance objectives from the previous year. Both GPRA and PFMA allow public managers to set goals and develop performance measures that are suitable to the mission and function of their organizations.

Reacting in part to these concerns about the goal model, Yuchtman and Seashore (1967) proposed a Systems-Resource Approach. They defined effectiveness based on the ability of the organization to attract and maintain valued resources. In the midst of the national protests and demonstrations in 2020 that demanded reforms due to police killings of African-Americans, a former New York City police commissioner, the longest-serving person in that position, implicitly drew on this model (WSJ, 2020). He proposed attracting more highly educated police officers – with college degrees – as one way to improve police effectiveness.³ When college presidents point to the excellent records of the incoming class of freshmen, they implicitly apply this model. Analysts in public and nonprofit organizations can use this model in assessing their ability to attract human resources and other important resources.

The Participant Satisfaction Model focuses on the organization's multiple stakeholders and their satisfaction with the organization (Connolly, Conlon, and Deutsch's, 1980). Organizations of all types survey their stakeholders in various ways. Customer and client satisfaction surveys, employee surveys, and other assessments provide examples of this form of effectiveness evaluation. More elaborate applications can provide valuable information about an array of organizational stakeholders to evaluate the organization. Limitations of the model include the problem of how to evaluate overall organizational effectiveness when participants disagree in their evaluations and the fact that the model does not directly assess effectiveness in achieving various goals.

The Internal Process and Human Resource Models determine effectiveness by looking at whether the organization's processes function well and treat employees as a key component of effectiveness (Bennis, 1966; Likert, 1967). The internal process model assesses organizational effectiveness by referring to such factors as organizational capabilities and capacities, communication and information flow, leadership style, motivation, interpersonal trust, and other internal states assumed to be desirable. During the early 2000s, scholars in public administration and journalists participated in a Government Performance Project (GPP) that evaluated the effectiveness of government organizations at federal, state, and local levels (Ingraham, 2007). The project evaluated the management capacity of subsystems for financial, human resources, capital, and information technology, with leadership and information as integrating mechanisms. The model for this project thus represents an internal process model that focuses on how well internal activities and structures function. Analyses using this model can provide valuable information, but they do not directly assess achievement of organizational goals. In fact, the GPP analysts employed this model in part because across the various diverse government agencies in a nation, there are no standard performance measures like those found in private business firms, such as sales and profits. In a similar vein, the Management Performance Assessment Tool (MPAT) in South Africa assesses the management practices, processes, and capacity in national departments, focusing on four key performance areas: strategic management, governance and accountability, human resource and systems management, and financial management (Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, 2013). The MPAT, however, does not assess actual outcomes or results.

The human resource model resembles the internal process model, but concentrates on the evaluation of human and social experiences in the organization. The evaluations ask about such factors as the effectiveness of leadership and team processes, and individual perceptions about communication, work satisfaction, rewards and incentives, individual performance assessments, adequacy of resources, support, and training, and engagement with the organization. The human resource model, however, does not directly evaluate achievement of organizational goals. This model assumes that when employees report positive attitudes and perceptions about organizational processes, work conditions, and the quality of work life, the organization will function effectively.

In the United States, the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the US Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) for decades have conducted employee attitude surveys of very large samples of federal employees that ask about such conditions as those mentioned previously. OPM's Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) (previously known as the Federal Human Capital Survey) was introduced in 2002 to measure employee attitudes about their jobs, working conditions, organizational policies, coworkers, leaders, and performance. The survey is used to produce information that managers can use to improve managerial capacity and performance and increase recruitment and retention of talented managers and employees in government (Fernandez, Resh, Moldogaziev, and Oberfield, 2015). Recently, a report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2017) indicated that a large majority of member nations were using employee surveys like FEVS to assess organizational effectiveness. Finally, the Partnership for Public Service, a nonprofit organization devoted to enhancement and support for public service in the United States, draws from the federal survey results to designate some agencies as “best places to work” in the federal government. Agency leaders often post these results on agency websites, praise their employees for good results, and use the results for recruitment and retention purposes.

The Competing Values Approach (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983) is based on the idea that effective organizations must balance and manage four major aspects of organizational performance. Accordingly, the model combines and integrates elements of many of the approaches and models that were just described. The competing values model is based on two major dimensions of organizational effectiveness. The first is organizational focus, which ranges from an internal emphasis on the well-being of the organization's members to an external focus on the success of the entire organization. The second dimension is concerned with preference for structure and represents the contrast between control and flexibility. The dimensions combine to create four models of organizational effectiveness.

The human relations model emphasizes flexibility in internal processes and improving cohesion and morale as a means of developing the people in an organization. The internal process model also has an internal focus, but it emphasizes control – through maintaining sound information, auditing, and review systems – as a means to achieving stability. At the external end, the open-systems model emphasizes responsiveness to the environment, with flexibility in structure and process as a means to achieving growth and acquiring resources. The rational goal model emphasizes careful planning to maximize efficiency. Importantly, which model an organization chooses, or how they combine them, depends on the personal values of managers and what aspects of organizational effectiveness they wish to emphasize.

Quinn and Rohrbaugh recognized the contradictions between the different models and values. They argued, however, that a comprehensive model must retain all of these contradictions because organizations constantly face such competition among values. Organizations have to stay open to external opportunities yet have sound internal controls. They must be ready to change but maintain reasonable stability. Hence, managers may develop an approach to organizational effectiveness that emphasizes internal factors more than external ones, or control more than flexibility. However, most approaches to organizational effectiveness reflect each of the four values, at least to some extent.

Like the Competing Values Model, the Balanced Scorecard requires managers to consider and balance multiple perspectives on organizational effectiveness. Kaplan and Norton (1996, 2000) developed this approach to prevent a narrow concentration on financial measures in business auditing and control systems. Devised for use by business firms, this model has been used by government organizations in innovative ways, including the cities of Sunnyvale, California and Charlotte, North Carolina; the Texas Office of the Auditor; and the US Internal Revenue Service.

The Balanced Scorecard requires an organization to develop goals, measures, and initiatives for four perspectives (Kaplan and Norton, 1996, p. 44):

• The financial perspective, in which typical measures include return on investment and economic value added
• The customer perspective, involving such measures as customer satisfaction and retention
• The internal perspective, involving measures of quality, response time, cost, and new product introductions
• The learning and growth perspective, in which goals and measures focus on such matters as employee satisfaction and information system availability

The Balanced Scorecard raises plenty of issues that can be debated. For example, an emphasis on serving “customers” has grown in the field of public administration over the past decade. This trend has sparked some debate and controversy over whether government employees should think of citizens and clients as customers or as owners. The Balanced Scorecard does, however, emphasize the important point that people in public organizations need to develop well-rounded and balanced measures of effectiveness that combine attention to results and impacts, internal capacity and development, and the perspectives of external stakeholders.

In an often-cited article appearing in Management Science, Kim Cameron (1986) reviewed the different models of effectiveness and discussed when each is most useful. In addition, Cameron adds three other models to the list above: the Legitimacy Model, which defines effectiveness as the extent to which the organization engages in legitimate activity by focusing on the survival or demise among a set of organizations; the Fault-Driven Model, which considers effectiveness as the absence of faults; and the High-Performing Systems Model, which judges excellence in relation to other similar organizations. In the article, Cameron (1986) suggests when a particular approach to organizational effectiveness may be most useful. The models and the conditions under which managers should consider adopting one of these approaches are summarize in Table 6.2.

Effectiveness in Organizational Networks

The transformation away from the direct provision of government services is well documented (Heinrich, Lynn, and Milward, 2010). Scholars have described this transformation with various phrases such as “new governance,” “hollowed-out government,” and “networked governance.” The general observation is that organizations are becoming more complex in their structure, and becoming more and more involved in “networks” that bring together sets of organizations. This new form often extends or even replaces centralized, unified authority with networks characterized by fragmented and dispersed control (Galbraith, 1967). Formal connections within a single organization, as between units or departments, are replaced by lateral, often loose connections among partner organizations. As for government more specifically, the evolution of more complex governance forms is often attributed to trends such as privatization and outsourcing of public services, greater involvement of the nonprofit sector in public service delivery, and the need to address complex problems that exceed the capacity of any one organization (O'Toole, 1997). In the public management literature, networks have been defined as “structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement” (O'Toole, 1997, p. 44). There is much to say about the varieties of networks, the key concepts in the literature on networks, and the state of the research on the topic. Here we will narrow the focus to implications for goals and performance.

Certain characteristics of networks have implications for organizational goals and performance. Networks incorporate affiliations with parties more diverse in interests and motives than those under a more traditional organizational setting. On the one hand, such diversity can stimulate innovation. On the other hand, goals are often the result of a negotiation process among competing groups (Cyert and March, 1963, pp. 27–32). As a result, it may be more difficult to reach an agreement on a broad mission or set of values, or on what goals to pursue, how to order goal priorities, and what actions should be undertaken to achieve those goals. The more diversity in motives, the more likely that the broader narrative of the organization is inconsistent with priorities of some of the alliance partners. It may then be harder to gain their cooperation. Free riding is always a concern in multi-party alliances but more so as the motives of individual partners diverge from the organizational-level goals.

As for network success, researchers have examined the role of trust in networks (O'Toole, 1997) and mechanisms of control, as well as the connection between locus of authority and the effectiveness of the overall network (Provan and Milward, 1995; Milward and Provan, 1998, 2000). Public management research on networks suggests that a degree of centralized authority can be a key factor for effectiveness. This finding runs counter to the organic–mechanistic distinction discussed in earlier chapters, which suggests that decentralized, highly flexible arrangements are most appropriate (Provan and Milward, 1995, pp. 25–26) but would not have surprised Herbert Simon (1952), who noted that complex architectures frequently take the form of hierarchies.

With regard to underperformance of networks, topics of concern include the general instability of collaboration networks (Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke, 2014; Das and Teng, 2000), the role of partner rivalries (Park and Ungson, 2001) and partners' reasons for friction and withdrawal (Greve, Baum, Mitsuhashi, and Rowley, 2010).

Managing for High Performance

In the last decades of the twentieth century, numerous organizational and management analysts began to approach the topic of organizational effectiveness and performance by studying organizations that displayed excellent performance (e.g., Peters and Waterman, 1982). The discussion in this chapter has emphasized the complexities of organizational goals and organizational effectiveness. This section turns to empirical research on characteristics of organizations and managerial processes that are related to high performance, a topic that has garnered a significant amount of interest in recent years.

In a sense, this has meant a return to an earlier period in management, outlined in Chapter 2, when experts believed management mattered. During that time, experts like Towne (1905) urged combining the technical abilities of an engineer with the administrative abilities of a chief executive to achieve ultimate results, while Taylor (1911) and associates employed scientific methods to analyze a task and discover the most efficient way of performing it. Focusing more on organizational design, proponents of Administrative Management sought to develop principles for organizing that could be widely applied to all sorts of organizations to improve coordination and efficiency (Fayol, 1919; Gulick, 1937). By the 1970s, however, interest in management and performance began to wane among organization theorists. Many downplayed the role and impact of management on organizations (Donaldson, 1995). Many of the approaches discussed in the later sections of Chapter Two, such as institutional theory and population ecology, depicted organizations as shaped and directed by external forces, with little influence by the executives and managers in organizations. Scott and Davis (2007) explain that management experts became “dismayed to see American ‘anti-management’ theorists respond with paradigms,” viewing managers as “Machiavellian” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), “lemming-like” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), “perverse” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), or “unable to overcome inertia in order to make sensible organizational changes” (Hannan, and Freeman, 1977). During that time, attention shifted to the environment, its tremendous impact on managers and organizations, and even its power to make the difference between effective organizations and ineffective ones, including those that perish. Similarly, public management scholars such as Kaufman (1985) attributed the success and survival of organizations to factors over which managers had little or no influence. The groundbreaking book In Search of Excellence by Peters and Waterman (1982) stemmed the tide of “anti-management” thinking that was influential during the 1970s (Scott and Davis, 2007). The book introduced a new genre of management research that empirically identifies aspects of organizations and management that appear to lead to high performance and success.

Research on High Performance and Excellence of Public Organizations

Research on managing for high performance in the private sector appears to have sparked similar interest among public management researchers. Several lines of research emerged to analyze how managers can achieve high levels of performance in the public sector. This stream of research showed an interesting similarity to the developments in observations of private firms. The work on public organizations was influenced by In Search of Excellence, developments in Total Quality Management, and other general management research and activity. Importantly, it was also influenced by a very influential book of observations and descriptions of very successful practices in government, Osborne's and Gaebler's Reinventing Government. The book became a best seller during the early 1990s and influenced many government reforms in the US (Brudney and Wright, 2002; Brudney, Hebert, and Wright, 1999; Gore, 1993; Hennessey, 1998; Kearney, Feldman, and Scavo, 2000). Its approach and its success resembled those of In Search of Excellence, by providing ideas about achieving excellence in public management and government services. The authors began the book with the claim that government often fails, yet plays a crucial role and must be carried out well – hence, the need for reinvention. The authors wrote that an old-fashioned, centralized, bureaucratic model dominated government agencies and programs. They proposed more “entrepreneurial” activities to supplant that approach. To support this new approach in government, they described government practices that they observed around the country that were already quite effective. They proposed decentralizing government, encouraging privatization, encouraging control of programs at the community level, treating citizens as “customers” of government programs, finding ways for government to make money on its operations (“enterprising government”), and increasing competition among programs and between government and the private sector.

The book gained a wide readership among academics and government leaders and administrators, leading to a trend known as Reinventing Government (REGO). Governments throughout the US attempted reforms based on the book's ideas. The most significant initiative, the National Performance Review (NPR) during the Clinton Administration, included proposals influenced by the book. Vice President Al Gore served as the leader of the NPR, with a staff in the White House and from federal agencies. The NPR initiatives included the establishment of “reinvention labs” in federal agencies to develop innovative and more effective operating procedures. The initiatives sought to “cut red tape” by “streamlining” budgeting, procurement, and personnel procedures and empowering state and local governments. They proposed “putting customers first” by treating citizens as customers with choices among services, by making agencies compete against each other, and by using other market-like arrangements. The NPR sought to “empower employees to get results” by decentralizing decision making and holding employees accountable for results. These examples show the influence of REGO ideas about entrepreneurial, market-oriented, decentralized, results-oriented, and customer-oriented government.

Prominent experts in governmental administration characterized NPR as a highly significant, unprecedented reform initiative (Kettl, 1993). NPR leaders claimed significant results, including cost savings and improved administrative procedures. Analysts examining the REGO reforms around the nation found evidence of important effects (Thompson, 2000). Others found mixed evidence of results of the REGO reforms (Brudney and Wright, 2002; Brudney, Hebert, and Wright, 1999; Hennessey, 1998; Kearney, Feldman, and Scavo, 2000). Ultimately, when the Clinton Administration ended, the NPR disappeared, although some ideas from the reforms remained influential. The REGO and NPR stories illustrate points about government reforms, including the influence of business-oriented publications and ideas that influence government publications. These ideas in turn influence practical initiatives.

In the following section, we present the findings of three prominent streams of research focusing on managing for high performance in public organizations.

Galloping Elephants and the Quest for Effective Public Organizations. Rainey and Steinbauer bluntly asserted that public organizations can be very successful and effective, by reasonable standards, and as effective as business firms. They pointed to various examples of effective performance of government agencies, such as the low administrative expenses of the Social Security Administration (SSA), which represent only about 0.8% of the total benefits that the SSA disburses (Eisner, 1998).

Rainey and Steinbauer reviewed studies of high-performance and excellent government organizations to look for common patterns and generalizations (see Table 6.3). Based on their assessment of these studies, they developed propositions regarding effective public organizations. First, they assert that effective public organizations have supportive and favorable relationships with external stakeholders (e.g., oversight authorities, clients, and partners), who are a vital source of resources, support, and autonomy, the last of which is likely to relate to effectiveness in a curvilinear fashion. Effective public organizations also have high mission valence and a strong organizational culture to attract employees, motivate them to raise effort and performance, and increase their commitment to the organization to promote retention. Third, effective and stable leadership is essential for organizational success, especially leaders who are effective at shaping and demonstrating a strong commitment to the mission and culture of the organization, involving others in decision making, and overcoming political and administrative constraints. In addition, public managers should strive to design tasks that are intrinsically rewarding along with offering attractive extrinsic rewards, including pay, benefits, and promotions. Relatedly, effective public organizations effectively recruit and select employees and provide them with appropriate training and developmental opportunities. Finally, such organizations exhibit high levels of professionalism and the specialized knowledge and skills, training, and performance norms associated with it. Brewer and Selden's (2000) study of federal agencies tested many of Rainey and Steinbauer's propositions and found empirical support for most of them.

Meier's and O'Toole's Model of Public Management and Performance. A very interesting and original approach to analyzing public sector management and performance was developed by Kenneth Meier and Laurence O'Toole (O'Toole and Meier, 1999, 2011). One of their focal questions – namely, whether or not “management matters” – has garnered much attention over the years. O'Toole and Meier put forth the first explicit and formal model of the influence of public management, and they have tested it using data from Texas public school districts, among other sources. Although not easily summarized and possibly difficult for some readers, the model represents an unprecedented effort to develop such a model and test it with empirical evidence. This model needs attention from people seriously interested in public management.

The model employs concepts and initial assumptions about stabilizing factors and networks in the contexts of public managers:

• The authors posit the presence of stabilizing factors such as hierarchy and formal authority that provide stability and act as a buffer against external shocks and improve coordination.
• They also posit that public managers must deal with networks of other authorities and groups, particularly those in formation or in flux, which increase complexity and instability in the managerial environment.
• Management refers to “the set of conscious efforts to connect actors and resources to carry out established collective purposes” (O'Toole and Meier, 1999, p. 510). It involves motivating, coordinating, and providing stability, but also changing structure and exploiting opportunities in the environment in order to improve performance. Multiple actors can share the management task, so management includes the sum of all managerial efforts.

The authors then specify their model of management's impact on public sector performance. They begin with a basic system:

where current performance (O_t) is the result of past performance (Ot − 1) weighted by a rate of stability (β0) and a series of shocks to the system (ε). Shocks (ε) can come from either inside or outside the system. β0 can range from 0 to 1. A set of stabilizing features, S, such as hierarchical structure, can be distinguished from other sources of stability in B0, so that B0 becomes B1 and the equation becomes:

The authors also point out that a shock (symbolized by Xt) can get through the organization's buffering system:

Thus, the authors divide ε into some shock (Xt) that gets through the organization's buffering system with initial impact (β2) and a random component (εt).

They treat management as another input to the system:

with M representing management and β3 its impact. A management coefficient (β3) significantly greater than zero would indicate that management matters. In other words, organizational performance at a given time is a function of performance at an earlier point multiplied by a stability factor, plus a shock to the system multiplied by a factor representing its influence, plus management times its impact, plus the random set of shocks around the system.

O'Toole and Meier then elaborate the model in various ways. For example, management can adopt a strategy of buffering the system by adding to stabilizing features by setting goals, establishing incentives, buttressing the structure, and negotiating contributions from members. Management can also actively exploit the environment for the benefit of the system. If the decision is to buffer the system from the environment, management interacts with the buffering process so that

where M1 is a maintenance function of management, the manager's efforts to add to stabilizing factors, M2 is the management strategy for interacting with the environment, and S is the extent of hierarchical stability. Organizational performance depends on previous performance and the degree to which stabilizing factors such as hierarchy and the manager's maintenance behaviors affect performance.

Alternatively, if the manager's strategy is to exploit the environment (that is, not to buffer the system but to try to magnify some of the environmental influences), then

The first element in this equation, as in the previous one, means that as stabilizing features and the manager's system maintenance actions increase, organizational performance tends to be consistent over time. M2 is the management strategy for interacting with the environment. When M2 increases, the amount that is multiplied by the shock factor β2Xt increases, meaning that the manager's efforts to exploit the shock have increased its influence on organizational performance. So more stabilizing factors and more managerial efforts to maintain the system can enhance performance, and more managerial efforts to exploit an external shock to the system cause that shock to have increased impact on performance.

Studies using Meier's and O'Toole's model have demonstrated empirically the significance of management in the public sector, including management practices and approaches associated with high performance (O'Toole and Meier, 1999, 2011; Meier and O'Toole, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2007). Across multiple studies, Meier and O'Toole have found that managerial networking has a direct and positive effect on performance; it also interacts with other factors related to performance by enhancing the effects of financial resources and human capital and minimizing constraints. Managerial networking improves performance by buffering or protecting employees from shocks and other negative forces from the external environment, acting as a conduit for innovations, and generating support and autonomy for the organization (O'Toole and Meier, 2011).

In addition to managerial networking, Meier's and O'Toole's research also found that an increase in internal management leads to higher performance (O'Toole and Meier, 2011). Internal management entails an array of practices, and activities, including hiring, training, coordinating, and motivating employees. Their empirical research focused on several internal management functions and found that three, in particular, have positive direct impacts on performance. These include efforts by managers to promote internal stability (e.g., in personnel, mission, and operating procedures) in order to build commitment, reduce turnover, and foster improvements in work processes; personnel practices aimed at recruiting, training, and developing talented human capital; and effective decision making about the allocation of resources during times of scarcity and uncertainty.

Research on Management and Performance in Local Governments. As Richard Walker and Rhys Andrews (2015) note, over the last few decades many researchers have explored how management impacts the performance of local governments throughout the world. Quite a number of these studies were conducted by the authors along with George Boyne and associates at Cardiff University. Walker and Andrews set out to systematically analyze nearly ninety such studies, most examining American and British local governments, to assess the effects of various management practices and approaches on local government performance. Their analysis focused on seven management factors that have been widely studied, including organization size, strategy content, planning, managerial networking, staff quality, personnel stability, and representative bureaucracy. All of these factors, except organization size, are found to have moderate to strong positive effects on local government performance.

Many of the empirical studies focused on the effect of strategic management, including strategy content – the prospector, defender, and reactor strategic postures described by Miles and Snow (1978) – and processes. Walker and Andrews found that a prospector strategy characterized by proactive innovativeness seems to work well for improving performance. Rational planning involving environmental scanning, goal setting, and monitoring was positively related to local government performance. Like O'Toole and Meier, Walker and Andrews found that managerial networking leads to higher performance by enabling managers to secure vital resources, enhance legitimacy, gain knowledge and feedback from the external environment, and buffer the organization from external shocks. Their review also echoed previously cited research on managing for high performance in the public sector, concluding that efforts to recruit, select, and retain talent and reduce turnover are linked to high performance. Finally, Walker's and Andrews' analysis produced evidence of how having a workforce that is representative of the population improves responsiveness and performance. The empirical evidence regarding representative bureaucracy is presented in greater detail in Chapter 10.

Instructor's Guide Resources for Chapter Six

• Key terms
• Discussion questions
• Topics for writing assignments or reports
• Exercises
• Case Studies: See Something Say Something; Confusing Performance Metrics with Strategy

Available at www.wiley.com/go/college/rainey.