CHAPTER 4

Cross-Cultural Transfer of Management Theories

Introduction

Most of the research activities conducted in the field of comparative management studies have focused on identifying and explaining similarities and differences among various management systems. In addition, this field includes the pursuit of universally, or at least broadly, applicable management systems, philosophies, values, and practices that can be transferred effectively across cultures with predictable and desired results. The transfer is a complex process involving not only the technical aspects of a particular management system but also verification that the application of the principles associated with that system is having the desired behavioral impact in the specific cultural and environmental context in which the transfer is occurring. Given that much of the early research relating to issues addressed under the umbrella of management studies was carried out in the United States and/or abroad by US-oriented scholars, it is not surprising that a good deal of controversy has surrounded the cross-cultural transfer of US management theories. Recently, however, debate and research regarding cross-cultural transfer of management theories, styles, and practices perceived to be successful in one country has expanded to include transfers from countries other than the United States. For example, the economic prowess of Japanese multinationals during the 1970s and 1980s led to the proliferation of prescriptions for their challenged competitors in the United States and elsewhere to seriously consider importing and adapting Japanese management practices. Another interesting development with respect to research regarding cross-cultural transfers of management styles and practice is that the United States is no longer always involved in the conversation, either as a transferor or a transferee. Kumar, for example, noted that India could expect a significant amount of investment from Japan, thus calling for an examination of how Japanese management practices would fare if they were applied in Indian subsidiaries.¹

Hofstede on Cross-Cultural Transfer of US Management Theories

Hofstede was one of the first to argue that the leadership and management theories and practices used in a particular country, and the efficacy of those theories and practices, were significantly influenced by the attributes of the societal culture in that country.² Hofstede recognized that many of his colleagues had devoted their time and effort to uncovering and popularizing “universal” management principles that could be applied in every country regardless of the cultural dimensions that dominate in that country; however, his understanding of cultural dimensions led him to pursue the question of “[t]o what extent do theories developed in one country and reflecting the cultural boundaries of that country apply to other countries?”³ Hofstede was quite clear about his belief that management theories reflect the cultural environmental in which they were written, whether the theories were developed in the United States or elsewhere, but given the dominance of US-oriented management theories at the time his model of cultural dimensions was first developed it was not surprising that Hofstede would turn his attention to whether certain well-known US theories of motivation, organizational structure, and managerial style (i.e., “management by objectives”) could be readily applied in other countries with different societal culture characteristics.⁴

Theories of motivation

For Hofstede, the key question with respect to motivation was: “Why do people behave as they do?” He took note of a number of theories of human motivation including the work of psychologists such as Sigmund Freud and US management theorists such as David McClelland, Abraham Maslow, Frederick Herzberg, and Victor Vroom.⁵ Each of those theories provide interesting, if not simplistic and vague, insights into what factors motivate people in the workplace and valuable information on what managers might focus upon in their efforts to control the activities of their subordinates in a way that is calculated to obtain the results thought to be necessary for the firm to be successful. Hofstede noted that acceptance of particular theories leads to specific assumptions about the role of managers. For example, Vroom’s expectancy theory implies, at least in part, that employees can be pulled to take certain actions by creating a reasonable expectancy of desired rewards from those actions and the job for managers therefore is to device systems that align performance with outcomes (“rewards”) that are valued by employees; however, Freud’s theories assumed that employees were being pushed by internal forces, often unconsciously, which were extremely difficult for managers to identify, understand, and overcome.⁶

Hofstede argued that the popularity and efficacy of theories of motivation in a particular country depends not only upon the cultural dimensions in that country but also the cultural dimensions in the country where the particular theory was first developed. He considered the question of why Freud’s theories have never been accepted as an integral part of US-developed management theories by analyzing the cultural profile of Austria, where Freud lived and worked as part of the middle class as his ideas about human motivation emerged, to demonstrate both why Freudian thinking was popular in Austria and out of step with the dominant cultural dimensions in the United States.⁷ Hofstede noted that Freud was a product of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, during which time he developed and refined most of his theories; however, Hofstede suggested that cultural patterns change relatively slowly and that it was likely that the fundamental aspects of the cultural dimensions of Austria at the time of the Hofstede survey were much the same as they had been 70 or 80 years before.⁸ He then compared and contrasted the United States and Austria on each of four cultural dimensions and found that power distance and individualism were both much lower in Austria while uncertainty avoidance and masculinity were both much higher in Austria. For Hofstede, one of the most compelling findings from his survey regarding Austria was the combination of high uncertainty avoidance with low power distance since, in general, countries with a strong aversion to risk tended to gravitate toward a high power distance and place their trust in strong superiors to take control and manage uncertainties for everyone by establishing formal rules and espousing absolute truths that were to be blindly followed.⁹ Hofstede argued that reference could be made to Freudian theories to explain how Austrians, as well people in other countries with the same combination of scores on these two cultural dimensions (e.g., Finland, Germany, Israel, and Switzerland), coped with their aversion to risk without a strong “external boss.” His view was that Austrians relied on what Freud referred to as the Superego to continuously monitor and evaluate the behavior of their Ego against an ideal standard thus, in effect, acting as their own superior.¹⁰ Hofstede also noted that Austrians, who scored low on individualism, had a strong sense of national identity, which drove them to work hard out of a strong feeling of obligation to their country and fellow citizens.¹¹

Hofstede also argued that his survey results with respect to the United States could explain why the other non-Freudian theories relating to motivation, which he referred to generally as “expectancy” theories, achieved a high level of recognition and acceptance in that country. The combination of weak uncertainty avoidance and strong masculinity was found exclusively in the United States, in other countries in the Anglo-American group and in some of their former colonies. Hofstede cited a strong relationship between the grouping of countries in this quadrant and countries found to evidence a high need for achievement by other researchers such as McClelland, who is one of the noted US management theorists in area of motivation.¹² Hofstede observed correlations between the beliefs that are most likely to be seen in weak uncertainty avoidance and strongly masculine societies and the writings of McClelland and US theorists on the motives behind the actions taken by persons in those societies. For example, Hofstede argued that McClelland’s “achievement motive”¹³ was only viable in a cultural context where persons were willing to accept at least a moderate level of risk and were also concerned about performance (i.e., weak uncertainty avoidance/masculine societies).¹⁴ The logical corollary to this argument is that management practices based on the assumption that people behave in accordance with the “achievement motive” would not be successful in countries where there is a great concern with security in life, competition is looked upon with disapproval, and motivation is provided by the desire to be of service rather by a need to attain greater levels of wealth and fame (i.e., countries appearing in the strong uncertainty avoidance/feminine quadrant). Care should be taken not to make assumptions based on observation of a single cultural element since a strong urge to work hard can be a sign of both a strong drive for achievement and an attempt to somehow manage and reduce risk and insecurity.

Hofstede also discussed how the information from his study might call into question the universality of the hierarchy of human needs proposed by Maslow.¹⁵ Hofstede focused on the four quadrants of the cultural map that had masculinity and uncertainty avoidance as its two dimensional axis and described what he believed was the correlation between each quadrant and the hierarchical levels of the Maslow model:

• The weak uncertainty avoidance/masculine quadrant, which was exclusively populated by the United States, other countries in the Anglo-American group and some of their former colonies, was consistent with Maslow’s fourth hierarchical level: esteem needs (i.e., self-esteem, confidence, performance, achievement and respect from others).
• The strong uncertainty avoidance/masculine quadrant includes countries that also value performance and hard work, as do those countries in the weak uncertainty avoidance/masculine quadrant; however, the primary objective of these behaviors in these countries is security (i.e., the ­management and reduction of risk), which is Maslow’s ­second ­hierarchical level.
• The two quadrants for which feminine values were higher each include countries in which quality of life and interpersonal relationships are more important than performance, money and collecting symbols of wealth and achievement. Although risk tolerance, measured by uncertainty avoidance, varied between these two quadrants, Hofstede argued that Maslow’s third hierarchical level, social needs (i.e., friendship, family, sexual intimacy, quality of life), were most important to all of these more feminine countries.

Hofstede, noting that Maslow placed esteem/achievement needs above social and security needs in his ideal hierarchical structure, argued that the Maslow model could not be a universally true description of the human motivation process in light of the information regarding cultural values previously outlined and was instead a description of the prevailing value system in Maslow’s home country (United States). Hofstede explained that continued reference to some of sort of hierarchy of human needs would only be meaningful if the levels were rearranged for countries in each of the quadrants to recognize their specific needs and cultural values. Therefore, for those countries in the strong uncertainty avoidance/masculine quadrant, such as Japan and Latin and Mediterranean countries such as Argentina, Columbia, Italy, Mexico, and Venezuela, security needs would be a higher priority; for those countries in the weak uncertainty/feminine quadrant, such as the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, social needs would rank at the top of the hierarchy; and for those countries in the strong uncertainty avoidance/feminine quadrant, a diverse geographically dispersed group including Brazil, France, Israel, Portugal, and Taiwan among others, both social and security (due to the high level of risk intolerance) needs would be the most important.¹⁶

Motivation in the workplace is obviously a complex topic and there have been a number of ideas about how firms can improve attitudes of workers and thus motivate to engage in the behaviors desired by the management. Hofstede referred to two proposals, which he placed under the general umbrella of “humanization of work” that were becoming quite popular at the time that Hofstede began publishing on the results of his initial survey: job enrichment, which has been credited to Herzberg and seeks to motivate employees by allowing them to have more responsibility and variety in their jobs¹⁷ and the formation of autonomous work groups (“teams”) with almost complete autonomy to decide upon the best way to achieve specific goals assigned to the team by senior management. ­Hofstede speculated that the origin of these proposals reflected the cultural values of their chief proponents and that the efficacy of the proposals would be determined by how well they fit with societal beliefs about just what made a particular job “human.” As for job enrichment, Hofstede felt that it would take flight more easily in more masculine countries such as the United States since individual performance was more important in those societies.¹⁸ In contrast, teams seemed to be a better fit for feminine societies where humanization was realized through creating more opportunities for wholesome interpersonal relationships while downplaying competition among individuals in the workplace.¹⁹ In fact, one of the first companies to experiment with the use of autonomous work teams was Volvo in Sweden, which had the highest femininity score in the survey group, where teams had the right to determine all of the key aspects associated with the activities of the team and particular job responsibilities including work assignments, schedules, and quality control procedures. Many teams functioned without formal supervisors and decision were to be made democratically with each team member shouldering leadership of the group and providing input on decisions about strategies and allocations of resources.²⁰

Theories of Organization

Two of the fundamental issues relating to organizational structure are the degree to which authority for decisions can be comfortably delegated to lower levels within the hierarchy—centralization versus decentralization—and the level of reliance on formal rules and specialization. Hofstede argued that the position of a country on his power distance/uncertainty avoidance cultural map could provide important clues as to what type of organizational structure would be most effective in that country. He asserted that, in general, managers and subordinates in larger power distance countries preferred and expected that responsibility for launching new initiatives and making decisions would be centralized and placed near the top of the organizational hierarchy²¹ while persons in small power distance countries, both managers and subordinates, would be more comfortable with decentralization.²² With regard to formalities and rulemaking, Hofstede believed that the stronger the level of uncertainty avoidance the more likely it would be that one would find highly formalized systems since rules and procedures are seen as appropriate tools to manage uncertainty and alleviate stress and anxiety.²³

Hofstede cited a then unpublished work of one of his colleagues as a source of interesting insight on how a country’s placement along the dimensions of power distance and uncertainty avoidance might predict the preferences of firms from those countries with respect to the centralization and formality in their organizational structures and, in turn, the processes used by those firms to identify and resolve problems that might arise during day-to-day operations. His colleague surveyed ­graduate ­business students from three different European countries—France, ­Germany, and Great Britain—and asked them for ideas about how to deal with issues in a case study that involved a conflict between the product development and sales departments at a hypothetical firm. Interestingly, most of the students from France advised that resolution of the conflict required attention and intervention from the highest level of the organizational hierarchy (i.e., the president); however, the Germans and British had other ideas about the reasons for the problem and the suggested solution—the Germans pointed to a lack of written policies to guide each of the departments and recommended that such policies be drafted while the British felt that the conflict was a product of poor interpersonal communication that required more training for the parties involved.²⁴

Based on these results, Hofstede’s colleague proposed “implicit models” of organization for the three countries and other countries that occupied the same quadrant with them on the cultural map that had uncertainty avoidance and power distance as its two-dimensional axis. For French firms (large power distance/strong uncertainty avoidance), the preferred organizational structure resembled a pyramid and responsibility and authority for making decisions was centralized, and the rules of operation were formalized. German firms (small power distance/strong uncertainty avoidance) strived for a “well-oiled machine” efficiently directed by formal procedures although not necessarily centralized. Hofstede noted that this was consistent with the views of the well-known German management theorist Max Weber, whose theory of bureaucracy included a high level of formalization in management systems but with rules that were intended to protect persons at lower levels in the hierarchical structure from attempts by their superior to abuse their power.²⁵ British firms (small power distance/weak uncertainty avoidance) tended to opt for what was referred to as a “village market” that was neither formalized nor centralized. As for the four Asian countries—Hong Kong, India, the Philippines, and Singapore—in the remaining quadrant of the cultural map (large power distance/weak uncertainty avoidance), Hofstede suggested that the appropriate implicit model of organization should be the “family,” which he described as centralized with respect to how and by whom decisions are made and formalized with respect to relationships among persons within the hierarchy (large power distance) but not overly formalized as to the rulemaking on how the day-to-day workflow is conducted (weak uncertainty avoidance).²⁶

Hofstede noted that the United States could be found in the middle of the uncertainty avoidance/power distance cultural map and suggested that this provided an explanation as to why US firms doing business outside their domestic borders could readily adapt to each of the “implicit models” described earlier. For example, when operating in France a local subsidiary of a US company operating with local manages and personnel might use the pyramid model and formulate more formal rules and procedures than would be the case in the United States. This approach would be followed not because hierarchies and rules are goals in and of themselves, as might be the case with a truly French firm, but as a means for accomplishing the business and strategic objective of establishing an efficient and productive subsidiary in France using local human resources.²⁷ Hofstede also suggested that the preferred implicit model for a particular country could predict the likelihood that firms and managers from those countries would experiment with various temporary and flexible organizational structures such as the “matrix.” For example, the relatively pragmatic attitudes of US firms toward the value and use of hierarchical structures and bureaucratic processes could explain why they were more likely to implement matrix organizational structures while French and German managers could be expected to be uncomfortable with the matrix based on what they perceive to be a lack of a clear chain of command and organizational clarity.²⁸

At least two studies appear to confirm the assumptions made by Hofstede with respect to the relationship between power distance and reliance upon formal rules and procedures to provide guidance on carrying out day-to-day activities.²⁹ In both cases, the researchers found that managers in large power distance countries were more likely than their colleagues in small power distance countries to use formal rules and procedures that were established at the top of the organizational hierarchy to direct subordinates and that those managers were also more likely to rely on their own experiences when making decisions about everyday activities and issues without seeking and considering the views and opinions of their subordinates.

Another interesting finding with regard to power distance is the impact that it appears to have on how organizational support for innovation is pursued. One group of researchers has found evidence that people working within organizations in large power distance countries prefer that persons looking to gain support for a new product or idea, the so-called innovation champions, go first to those in authority for review and approval as opposed to trying to build a groundswell of support from the “bottom-up” by eliciting interest and excitement from members working at lower levels in the hierarchical structure of the organization. As power distance gets smaller, however, there is greater acceptance and tolerance of proactive innovation efforts by persons at any level in the hierarchy.³⁰

Management by Objectives

Hofstede also commented on how well one might expect Drucker’s well-known management by objectives (MBO) to be accepted in cultural environments other than the United States.³¹ In brief, MBO, which was first introduced by Drucker in the 1950s and was much discussed during the time that Hofstede first released his survey results, is based on the principle that individual efforts must be put together to achieve a common goal known to, and accepted by, everyone in the organization and required the completion of the following steps: organizational objectives must be defined at the very top of the hierarchy, such as the board level; management roles and activities should be analyzed to that duties and responsibilities relating to achievement of the objectives can be properly allocated among the individual managers; performance standards should be established; managers and subordinates should agree upon and define specific objectives for the activities of the subordinates; the targets set for each subordinate should be aligned with the larger objectives of the organization; and management information systems should be created to monitor performance and the actual relationship of individual achievement to organizational objectives.

Hofstede argued that, not surprisingly, several of the assumptions underlying MBO could be traced to cultural dimensions that were comfortable for the United States. First of all, MBO, which contemplates a good deal of dialogue between organizational units, and managers and subordinates, regarding objectives, targets, and standards assumes that subordinates have sufficient independence and confidence to engage in meaningful negotiations with persons higher in the organizational hierarchy (i.e., small or medium power distance). Second, MBO assumes that everyone in the organization, subordinates and their managers, is willing to take risks (i.e., weak uncertainty avoidance). Finally, MBO assumes that subordinates and managers all believe that performance, as measured by achievement of organizational goals and related individual targets, is important (i.e., high masculinity). He then discussed how well MBO might be received in countries with a different cultural profile. In Germany, for example, Hofstede noted that its small power distance should support and welcome dialogue within the organization regarding goals and objectives, but that problems might arise with respect to acceptance of risk given that Germany is a much stronger uncertainty avoidance society.³² Attempts to implement MBO in France were a failure in Hofstede’s view because France is a large power distance society in which managers are uncomfortable with decentralizing authority and subordinates do not expect managers to delegate authority and, in fact, prefer that managers provide direction through a hierarchical structure that reduces stress and anxiety by its very predictability.³³

Harris and Moran

The ability of a manager to communicate and direct effectively in another country depends in large part on the manager’s understanding of the local societal culture and the way that it influences expectations regarding the relationship between managers and subordinates in the workplace. It is generally understood and explained that societal culture depends on economic, legal, and political factors as well as sociocultural factors including religion and language. Harris and Moran were more specific when they identified eight categories or subsystems of variables that they argued should be analyzed in order to develop a comprehensive profile of a ­particular societal culture³⁴:

• Kinship—guides family relationships
• Education—formal or informal education of workers affects workplace expectations
• Economy—means of production and distribution in a society influences all aspects of the resource allocation
• Politics—system of government imposes varying constraints on an organization
• Religion—spiritual beliefs of a society are so powerful that they overpower all other cultural aspects
• Associations—the formal and informal groups that make up a society
• Health—system of health care affects employee productivity
• Recreation—the use, attitude, and choice of how to use leisure time

All these factors and variables combine and work together to provide the context for the emergence of a societal culture that consists of a set of beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions that are shared by a significant number of people. These elements of societal culture are important determinants of the basic attitudes and orientations of people in the society, including managers and employees, toward work, time, materialism, individualism, and change and these attitudes must be understood by managers so they can take into account the expectations of employees and develop managerial styles and practices that will motivate employees to perform their jobs in ways that achieve the outcomes desired by the managers and the entire organization.³⁵

Harris and Moran set out to illustrate some of the potential difficulties that US-centric managers might have when attempting to perform various managerial functions and roles in a different cultural environment and/or simply engaging in “arms-length” business relationships with their counterparts from other countries.³⁶ They began by providing the following list of various aspects of US culture (i.e., beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions that were shared by a significant number of people):

• The individual can influence the future (“where there is a will there is a way”).
• The individual can change and improve the environment; an individual should be realistic in his or her aspirations.
• We must work hard to accomplish our objectives (the “­Puritan work ethic”).
• Commitments should be honored and people should/will do what they say they will do.
• One should effectively use one’s time (“time is money” and thus can be saved or wasted).
• A primary obligation of an employee is to his or her ­organization.
• The employer or the employee can terminate the employment relationship.
• The best-qualified people should be given the available ­positions.

Harris and Moran also summarized key elements or characteristics of US culture that profiled Americans as goal and achievement oriented, highly organized and institutionally minded, freedom-loving and self-reliant, work oriented and efficient, friendly and informal, competitive and aggressive, and generous.

Harris and Moran then suggested the following list of alternative views to certain aspects of traditional US cultural beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions:

• Life follows a preordained course and human action is ­determined by the will of God.
• People are intended to adjust to the physical environment rather than alter it.
• Ideals are to be pursued regardless of what is “reasonable.”
• Hard work is not the only prerequisite for success; wisdom, luck and time are also required.
• A commitment can be superseded by a conflict request, or an agreement may only signify intention and have little or no relationship to the capacity for performance.
• Schedules are important but only in relation to other ­priorities.
• The individual employee has a primary obligation to his or her family and friends.
• Employment is for a lifetime.
• Family, friendship, and other considerations should determine employment practices.

Having laid out two contrasting cultural visions of the world, ­Harris and Moran provided a few illustrations of potential problems for US managers operating abroad:

Planning: US managers are likely to rely heavily on scheduling and developing and implementing short- and long-term plans due to their belief that individuals can influence the future and that time is a scarce resource that is valued and thus needs to be carefully managed to avoid waste. In contrast, however, people from other cultures may avoid planning and/or routinely ignore schedules because the fundamentally believe that the future is out of their hands, thus making planning a meaningless exercise, and that schedules are always subject to change if other priorities demand.

Motivation and Reward Systems: US managers are likely to bring an egalitarian perspective to motivational strategies and decisions regarding rewards in the relationship due to the influence of the Puritan work ethic, the belief that rewards should be given to the employees with the best qualifications and performance record, and the understanding that disenchanted employees are free to terminate the relationship at any time. People in other cultures, however, may have very different ideas about reward systems in the workplace and may place greater value on things other than hard work and productivity including wisdom, longevity, and familial/friendship relations.

Control: US managers are used to working in situations where their ability to control activities within their department or larger business unit is grounded in the fundamental expectation that employees will be honest and realistic in making their commitments to the organization; commitments, once made, will be honored; and employees will make their commitments to the organization a priority in their lives since a primary obligation of an employee is to his or her organization. However, people operating under alternative cultural values may cause frustrations to US managers because they tend to be more idealistic than realistic in making their commitments, thus setting the stage for failure, and are more prone than US persons to allowing commitments to be superseded by conflicting requests and to allowing obligations to family and friends to get in the way of their duties to their organization.

Transfer of Japanese Management Theories to the United States

While much of the debate among scholars of management studies has focused on the transferability of US management theories to other countries with different societal cultures, it has become clear that the United States does not have a monopoly on management ideas. It is well known that the success of Japanese firms in the United States and other Western markets during the 1980s and early 1990s led to a great deal of interest in examining whether Western companies could and should adopt certain managerial practices that appeared to be responsible for the growth and profitability of their Japanese competitors.³⁷ Conclusions among the experts have been mixed: some argue that Japanese managerial techniques are not transferable because they are based on unique cultural elements found only in Japan while others have claimed that these techniques can indeed be transferred and provided illustrations of how companies in the United States and Europe have successfully integrated strategies borrowed from Japan such as “quality circles” and “just-in-time” management.³⁸

Linowes identified and described a “cultural divide” between the United States and Japan that would likely cause difficulties for ­Japanese managers attempting to operate and oversee subordinates in the United States.³⁹ Linowes suggested three points of differentiation. First, the ­Japanese managers tended toward patience and caution while action, risk-taking and bold initiatives were expected in the United States. ­Second, harmony, consensus building, conformity, and group convention were fundamental principles for the Japanese while those in the United States valued freedom, individuality, “being heard,” and operating within a sort of “chaotic anarchy.” Finally, while hierarchy based on loyalty and rewarding seniority was a long-standing tenant of Japanese organizational design and culture, persons in the United States had grown to expect equality in the workplace, which included broad opportunities for training and advancement, a “level-playing field” and reward systems based on performance.

The real answer regarding transferability of Japanese management techniques to the United States probably lies somewhere in the middle and recognizes that the content and utility of management techniques are always bound by cultural conditions to some extent and that some techniques simply cannot be transferred from culture to culture unless there is a conductive cultural environment in the society where the techniques are being introduced. For example, Culpan and Kucukemiroglu predicted that the Japanese ringi system and the paternalistic orientation found in Japanese companies would not transfer well to a country such as the United States where individualism and privacy are highly valued.⁴⁰ However, they speculated that “a paternalistic approach, if modified to accommodate American cultural values, can be used by American managers to enhance employee commitment and involvement” and noted that the “open communication” techniques used in Japanese companies would be welcomed in the United States as a means of encouraged the increased sense of involvement craved by most US employees.⁴¹

¹ Kumar, R. n.d. “Comparative Research on Indian and Japanese Management Styles: Bridging Strategies to Bring them Closer.” http://scribd.com/doc/29728070/Comparative-study-on-Indian-and-Japanese-management-style (accessed December 31, 2018) The paper also includes a review of the literature relating to both Japanese and Indian management styles and a comparison between them based on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions.

² Hofstede, G. 1980. “Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do American Theories Apply Abroad.” Organization Dynamics 9, no. 1, pp. 42–63, 49 and 50.

³ Id. at 50.

⁴ Hofstede also discussed and critiqued the applicability of several of the most well-known US-originated “participative leadership” theories such as McGregor’s Theory X and Theory Y, Likert’s System Four management model and Blake and Mouton’s Managerial Grid.

⁵ Hofstede, G. 1980. “Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do American Theories Apply Abroad.” Organization Dynamics 9, no. 1, pp. 42–53. Adler also examined the same US-based motivation theories in her research regarding cross-cultural differences in managerial practices with respect to motivation. See Adler, N. 1991. International Dimensions of Organizational Behavior, 14–178, 2nd ed. Boston: PWS-Kent Publishing Co.

⁶ Hofstede, G. 1980. “Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do American Theories Apply Abroad.” Organization Dynamics 9, no. 1, pp. 42–63, 53.

⁷ Id.

⁸ Hofstede’s view is that cultural change that is significant enough to invalidate his country dimension index rankings will take a significant period of time, such as 50 to 100 years, or the occurrence of a dramatic outside event of epic proportions and he believes that cultural differences between countries identified in the IBM studies could already be observed from information about conditions and values in those countries hundreds of years before. See Hofstede, G. 2006. “Dimensionalizing Cultures: The Hofstede Model in Context.” In Online Readings in Psychology and Culture, Unit 2: Conceptual, Methodological and Ethical Issues in Psychology and Culture, eds. W.J. Lonner, D.L. Dinnel, S.A. Hayes, and D.N. Sattler. Bellingham, WA: Center for Cross Cultural Research.

⁹ Japan as well as all of the Latin and Mediterranean countries in the Hofstede survey fell into the large power distance/strong uncertainty avoidance quadrant. Hofstede, G. 1980. “Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do American Theories Apply Abroad.” Organization Dynamics 9, no. 1, pp. 42–63, 51 and 53.

¹⁰ According to Freud, human behavior is influenced by the “Id,” “Ego,” and “Superego”: the Id includes unconscious forces within each person that drive them to act in a certain way; the Ego is a person’s conscious conception of himself or herself that is constantly struggling to control the Id; and the Superego is an unconscious “internal pilot” developed through early socialization mainly through one’s parents that criticizes the thoughts and actions of the Ego and produces guilt and anxiety whenever the Ego appears to be giving in to the Id. Freud’s theory is quite complex and this description is necessarily simplistic. For an introduction to the details, see Freud, S. 1990. The Ego and the Id (The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud). New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company.

¹¹ Hofstede, G. 1980. “Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do American Theories Apply Abroad.” Organization Dynamics 9, no. 1, pp. 42–63, 51 and 53.

¹² Id. at 55. McClelland identified “need for achievement scores” in a number of countries based on survey data collected for both 1925 and 1950. McClelland, D.C. 1961. The Achieving Society. Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand. Hofstede noted that the countries in the weak uncertainty avoidance/masculine quadrant received mostly high achievement need scores while countries in the strong uncertainty avoidance/feminine quadrant scored on at the lower end of the range in the McClelland survey. Hofstede also observed that the very word “achievement” is difficult to translate into any language other than English and that he could not use the word in the questionnaire relied upon in his own research because it could not be readily understood in many of the countries in his survey group. The English-speaking countries in the Hofstede survey all appeared in the weak uncertainty avoidance/masculine quadrant. Hofstede, G. 1980. “Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do American Theories Apply Abroad.” Organization Dynamics 9, no. 1, pp. 42–63, 55.

¹³ McClelland claimed that humans act out of a need to achieve, which he referred to as the “achievement motive.” See McClelland, D.C. 1953. The Achievement Motive. New York, NY: Appleton-Century. Crofts, and Power. 1975. The Inner Experience, New York, NY: Irvington, and 1987. Human Motivation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁴ Hofstede, G. 1980. “Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do ­American Theories Apply Abroad.” Organization Dynamics 9, no. 1, pp. 42–63, 55. In ­countries where uncertainty avoidance is weak, there is more willingness within society to take risks in life. In strongly masculine societies, performance is what counts, money and things are important and are to be pursued, the drive for work and success is fueled by ambition, and those who achieve success are admired and praised.

¹⁵ Id. at 55–56. Under Maslow’s famous hierarchy of human needs persons behave in a rational fashion to satisfy five levels of needs running from “basic” to “higher” in the following successive fashion—psychological needs; safety or security needs; social needs; esteem needs; and self-actualization needs. A higher need will not be an active concern for a person until he or she has sufficiently satisfied each of the lower needs. See Maslow, A.H. 1943. “A Theory of Human ­Motivation.” Psychological Review 50, no. 4, 370–96. See also Maslow, A.H. 1943. ­Motivation and Personality. New York, NY: Harper, and Maslow, A.H. 1998. Maslow on Management. New York, NY Wiley.

¹⁶ Hofstede, G. 1980. “Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do American Theories Apply Abroad.” Organization Dynamics 9, no. 1, pp. 42–63, 55–56.

¹⁷ Herzberg distinguished between motivator and hygienic factors. His motivator factors are similar to Maslow’s “higher” esteem and self-actualization needs and include achievement, recognition, responsibility, promotion, growth, and fulfilling work activities. His hygienic factors are similar to Maslow’s three lowest/most basic levels—psychological, safety, and social—and include pay and benefits, personal life, work conditions, job security, status, relations with coworkers, and supervisors and company policies and administrative procedures. See ­Herzberg, F. 1959. The Motivation to Work. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. Job enrichment was one of the strategies that hopefully would serve as a motivator by allowing workers to find more satisfaction, and increase their motivation to perform, by introducing skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy, and feedback.

¹⁸ While job enrichment would appear, on the face of it, to be a positive initiative in a cultural environment such as the United States it is not necessarily the best approach in all instances. As one commentator noted: “... [j]ob enrichment doesn’t work for everyone. Some people are very resistant to more responsibility or to opportunities for personal growth, but…researchers report that some people they expected to resist, seized the opportunity. Enriching jobs is a particularly effective way to develop employees provided the jobs are truly enriched, not just more work for them to do.” See Brown, R. April 22, 2010. “Design Jobs that Motivate and Develop People.” http://media-associates.co.nz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=26:design-jobs-that-motivate-and-develop-people&catid=4:free&Itemid=21

¹⁹ Hofstede, G. 1980. “Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do American Theories Apply Abroad.” Organization Dynamics 9, no. 1, pp. 42–63, 56.

²⁰ Encyclopedia of Business, 2d—Teams. April 22, 2010. http://referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/Str-The/Teams.html

²¹ Hofstede provided an example of country differences based on power distance by contrasting what he referred to as the standard practice among medium power distance US multinationals of having salary increase proposals initiated by the direct superior of the impacted employee to the process followed in French firms of requiring that such proposals must be initiated by superiors several levels removed and above the impacted employee after information is delivered upward through the appropriate channels. Hofstede explained that in large power distance countries such as France, even superiors are strongly dependent on their own superiors and thus middle managers are more comfortable referring decisions upward and, in fact, employees in those countries expect that this will be the process that is followed and generally do not object. See Hofstede, G. 1980. “Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do American Theories Apply Abroad?” Organization Dynamics 9, no. 1, p. 42–63, 59–60.

²² Id. at 59. Related to the decision regarding the appropriate degree of decentralization is the number of hierarchical levels in the organizational structure—organizations with more levels are referred to as “tall’ while organizations with fewer levels are referred to as “flat” and are inclined to accept and embrace decentralization since power distances are, by definition, smaller. It would be expected that organizations in large power distance cultures would be taller with more layers (i.e., more hierarchical) and that the chain of command would be a more important element of the decision-making processes in those organizations. See also Schwartz, S.H. 1999. “A Theory of Cultural Values and Some Implications for Work.” Applied Psychology: An International Review 48, no. 1, pp. 23–47 (distinguishing cultures on a continuum between hierarchical and egalitarian and noting importance of hierarchical organizational structures and chain of authority in hierarchical cultures).

²³ Hofstede, G. 1980. “Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do American Theories Apply Abroad?” Organization Dynamics 9, no. 1, pp. 42–63, 60.

²⁴ Hofstede was referring to the work of O.J. Stevens at INSTEAD. Id. at 60.

²⁵ According to Weber’s theory of bureaucracy, persons in a position of authority within the organizational structure did not have power in their own right but could give directions that were consistent with the authority vested in their position in the formal written rules and procedures that described the approved management systems for the firm. In short, as Hofstede said, “the power is in the role, not in the person (small Power Distance)”. Id.

²⁶ Id.

²⁷ Id.

²⁸ Id. at 60–61. Hofstede noted, however, that there were instances of French and German firms where the matrix structure had been used successfully and argued that cultural barriers and skepticism could be overcome by careful planning and implementation such as working to ensure that the organizational role of each person is unambiguously defined and formal procedures are put in place at the beginning to resolve conflicts that may arise in the matrix structure due to the dual reporting relationships that will exist.

²⁹ Smith, P.B., M.F. Peterson, and S.H. Schwarz. 2002. “Cultural Values, Sources of Guidance, and their Relevance to Managerial Behavior—A 47-Nation Study.” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 33, no. 2, pp. 188–208; Smith, P., M. ­Peterson, and J. Misumi. 1994. “Event Management and Work Team Effectiveness in Japan, Britain and the USA.” Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology 67, no. 1, pp. 33–43.

³⁰ Shane, S., S. Venkataraman and I. MacMillan. 1995. “Cultural Differences in Innovation Championing Roles.” Journal of Management 21, no. 5, pp. 931–52.

³¹ Drucker, P. 1954. The Practice of Management. New York, NY Harper & Row.

³² Hofstede, G. 1980. “Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do ­American Theories Apply Abroad.” Organization Dynamics 9, no. 1, pp. 42–63, 58. ­Hofstede does point out that MBO can fit well with German small power distance/strong uncertainty avoidance to the extent that mutually agreed upon objectives provide subordinates with direction that alleviates stress while also removing the threat of arbitrary authority exercised by superiors. Hofstede cites studies of the use of MBO in German-speaking countries that illustrate a preference for the elaborate formal information systems suggested by Drucker and an emphasis on group objectives that is consistent with the low individualism values in these ­countries. Id.

³³ Id. at 58–59. Initially it was thought that MBO might be a means for implementing what some believed was a long overdue democratization of management processes within French organizations; however, the cultural aversion to participatory management practices, shared by persons at all levels of the organizational hierarchy, proved too difficult to overcome in most instances and Hofstede reported that the French version of MBO—referred to as DPPO (Direction Participative par Objectifs)—had largely been discredited by the time that he first published his survey results at the end of the 1970s. Id.

³⁴ The list and description of Harris and Moran’s eight categories or subsystems of variables is adapted from Blanchard, K., and A. Abdullah. 2006. “Chapter 3: Understanding the Role of Culture, Power Point Presentation, Prentice Hall, Classes.” uleth.ca/200802/mgt3650n/CHAP03PP.PPT

³⁵ Id.

³⁶ The following discussion of the ideas of Harris and Moran is adapted from Harris, P., and R. Moran. 2000. Managing Cultural Differences, 5th ed. Houston TX: Gulf Publishing Company.

³⁷ See, e.g., Schein, E. 1981. “Does Japanese Management Style Have a Message for American Managers?” Sloan Management Review 23, no. 1, pp. 55–67.

³⁸ C. Johnson, “Japanese-Style Management in America.” California Management Review 30, no. 4, pp. 34–45.

³⁹ Linowes, R.G. “The Japanese Manager’s Traumatic Entry into the United States: Understanding the American–Japanese Cultural Divide.” The Academy of Management Executive 7, no. 4, p. 24.

⁴⁰ Culpan, R., and O. Kucukemiroglu. 1993. “A Comparison of US and ­Japanese Management Styles and Unit Effectiveness.” Management International Review 33, 27–42.

⁴¹ Id. See also Cool, K., and C. Lengnick-Hall. January 1985. “Second Thoughts on the Transferability of the Japanese Management Style.” Organization Studies 6, pp. 1–22.