Within the diplomatic history of Japanese–European relations – as regards the period analysed in this work – three areas, or three elements, may be identified that have substantially affected its own path: the structure of the international system; pragmatic nationalism; and identity discourse. Depending on the historical–political moments and on single cases, this triadic dimension exerted an influence by leveraging its various aspects, alternately or together.
During the Cold War years, the bipolar system that resulted in the Japanese- European response (the ‘dependent variable’) was definitely the systemic variable (the ‘independent variable’). In the pure realist anarchy, especially related to the first bipolar phase, the transpacific axis became, in fact, the expression of a bilateralism within which high political issues were gradually adding to those of low politics. The bilateralism and the economism of the Yoshida doctrine inevitably affected the quality of Japan–EU diplomatic relations, which were often sacrificed to overcome trade issues. Nevertheless, in the long-term perspective, Japan successfully dealt with a series of questions concerning its relations with Europe thanks to its low-profile approach and its pragmatic nationalism – a combination of ethical relativism and cultural particularism – which is a distinctive feature of Japanese foreign policy. It prevented Tokyo from relying on a set of fixed principles, inducing it to pursue national interests opportunistically, conforming to the international conditions of the moment.1
This pragmatic nationalism is an intrinsic cultural element and may therefore be considered a constant factor. Japan was often criticized for its exponential economic growth, for which it seemed willing to act unscrupulously. In 1960 Charles De Gaulle supposedly dismissed Ikeda as a mere ‘transistor salesman’, scandalizing the Japanese. By the 1970s, however, Brussels made some tepid attempts to consider, to some extent, the possibility of cooperating with Tokyo in managing an ever more interdependent economy on the world stage. Then, during the 1980s, Japan and Europe were much closer to becoming partners on a political and partly strategic level. As is evident, the weight of the structure of the international system was particularly significant in the lack of a diplomatic dialogue, but the various recorded attempts at diplomatic dialogue generated a new way of understanding. Japan–EU relations clearly demonstrated that the two actors had been conditioned by mutual perceptions that, in addition to the constraints caused by the Yoshida doctrine, considerably reduced their diplomatic space.
Furthermore, the two constructed their interaction upon their own identities and interests. The strengthening of this bilateralism, in fact, proceeded hand in hand with the political dialogue institutionalization process that is built through ‘modes of understanding, accepted responses and channels for communications’.2 In other words, the interaction opportunities provided by ‘a single moment’ encouraged the creation of what Gilson defined as ‘the habit of interaction’ between the two parts, which was gradually formalized into a regular channel for dialogue. This process took place within specific ‘international regimes’ (in Krasner’s argument).3 This occurred, specifically, within an approach tending to subordinate the structures to the processes, emphasizing the role of decision-making procedures and of the expectations of the actors involved in a given area of international relations. As such, the identity discourse is also a constant element, but it was probably more clearly imposed by the New Millennium international agenda, which saw Japan face the evolving challenges generated by globalization, as well as its emergence as a global civilian power.
As the highest expression of the inter-regionalism in EU–Asia relations in general, and in Japan–EU dialogue in particular, ASEM became an important policy tool for strengthening the multilateral framework of international relations between the two parts. The rapprochement of two of the three major world regional blocs gives it a potentially global significance, in that the forum also promotes the development of Asian regionalism despite the importance of its economic pillar.
From a constructivist perspective, although it mirrors diplomacies, the interaction that takes place within ASEM is strongly linked to the identity construction process: this concerns the Japanese case in particular. Although each state participates in ASEM individually, the performance of the member states is often based on identity discourse. For instance, this helped to build the notion of an ‘East Asian region’ through a series coordination mechanisms, and this was also because the Asian countries found themselves confronted with ‘the most accomplished regional entity’, like the EU.4 Furthermore, ‘ASEM serves to reinforce the EU’s social identity in Asia’, and Japan.5
The EU has also concluded three important strategic partnership agreements that fit within the framework of relations with East Asia. These policy initiatives, driven by the European Council in cooperation with the European Commission, are based on shared action plans and institutionalize what are perceived in Brussels as key bilateral relations. The first to be concluded, as we have seen, regarded the EU and Japan, followed by similar agreements with China and India. The Japan–EU partnership has been improved through a series of bilateral agreements and joint initiatives, such as the 2001 Action Plan, identifying more than 100 areas in which forms of bilateral cooperation are to be enhanced. However, what seemed in theory to be an ambitious project in the field of economic, political and security cooperation has not always had an effective outcome in terms of implementation. A decade later, the absence of a concrete opening up of the EU towards a more effective political dialogue with Japan is indeed still noticeable. This is largely the result of both a lack of expectations in Japan towards the EU as a global player, and the prevalence of a hard security dimension at the regional level in which Washington remains the privileged interlocutor, despite the decline in its soft power.
There are four categories in which the expectation gap between Japan and the EU could be framed. The first two are classified according to the origin of the deficit, and relate to Japan’s internal factors (the limited resources that the country had to devote to its external relations, its focus on the US and its Asian neighbours) and the external elements concerning the EU’s identity (Japan is led by its nature to preserve bilateral relations with other states, whereas the EU’s role in key foreign and security policy issues is not yet fully understood). The other two, expressed in terms of low expectations, concern the limited mutual expectations of the EU and Japan in general, on the one hand, as there is currently a sort of mutual indifference that is partly the legacy of stereotypical perceptions from the past. On the other, it addresses the EU’s role as an international actor, caused by European countries’ difficulty in establishing common positions, as well as the complexity of the EU political system, which resulted in lower expectations for the strengthening of Japanese political and security cooperation between the two parties.
Unlike the identity constructed by the EU, which relies more on theoretical elements such as values, the US constructed a more practical social identity in relation to East Asia, tending to focus primarily on a ‘productive partnership’. This prompted Japan to accept US involvement in regional hard issues, given that the inclusion of another representative of Western values, such as the EU, was quite unnecessary. After all, the Americans do not seem to have interpreted the creation of ASEM as a threat to their global leadership. Indeed, it could be argued that Washington paid little attention to the development of the forum. Although official speeches and the political rhetoric seem to indicate the opposite, the real data would suggest that Japan institutionalized the notion that the EU’s role in regional hard issues must not exceed the threshold of dialogue.
The image that a state builds of another state, or of a group of states, and according to which they act, is dependent on the social identities constructed by them, and the level at which they are perceived. Besides this, the set of values, norms and ideas at the basis of the European cultural substratum cannot be transferred, or simply ‘spread’, in a regional context marked by such deep cultural differences. Regardless of the idea of a world government, the emphasis on the EU’s projection as a model of regional integration is potentially counterproductive. The fact that EU policy in Japan lacks consistency means it would be awkward to use it as a model to be followed. Priority should probably be given to contributing to the resolution and prevention of conflicts in the East Asia region rather than to attempting to encourage a process of integration. In the end, it could be argued that the role that ASEM can play in furthering the dialogue between the two actors actively contributes to the enhancement of mutual understanding among the many different members of the forum. In the security field, despite the inherent limitations of a soft partnership, significant opportunities are afforded by EU–Japan cooperation, especially in the field of conflict prevention and mainly based on soft power levers, which are specifically designed in terms of human security concerns.
The role played by mutual perceptions and misperceptions turned out to be an aspect that only concerned the framing of the matter. The core issue of this argument is two-fold, as it regards both identity (specifically, the perception of European actorness in Japan) and geopolitical matters (in so far as it concerns the EU’s reluctance to get involved in regional security issues). According to Pacheco Pardo, the EU constructed a triple identity towards East Asia, especially through ASEM and the two main regional powers, Japan and China. As the identity that an actor builds while interacting with another actor, as well as the perception of the latter, is what essentially determines the relationship between the two, the EU’s collective and social identity would have prevented it from getting involved in the management of East Asian hard political issues. This is because the EU not only identifies itself as a model of democracy and human rights through its corporate identity, but also proposes itself as a power capable of taking a leading role in countering non-military threats through multilateral measures.
The three ‘images’ suggested by Hughes are actually a result of the concurrence of events and of structuring factors that denoted trade problems on the surface, or dysfunctions generated by the systemic variable, but were fundamentally based on a much more complex and inherent divergence of two universes of values and different political cultures. Zhao’s theory on ‘relation rationality’ and the Japanese ethical notion of ‘relational coexistence’ may help to inscribe and construct modern historical relations between Japan and Europe into a narrative, in the words of Gluck, by bringing ‘the outside in’.6
1 F. Mazzei, ‘Il Ruolo Internazionale del Giappone Prima e Dopo l’11 Settembre’, Politica Internazionale, Roma: IPALMO, 2002, p. 30.
2 J. Gilson, Japan and the European Union: A Partnership for the 21st Century?, London and New York: Macmillan, 2000, p. 168.
3 S.D. Krasner, ‘Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables’, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, 1982, pp. 497–510.
4 A. Acharya, ‘An Asian Perspective. Regional Security Arrangements in a Multipolar World: the EU’s Contribution’, in M. Ortega (ed.), Global Views on the European Union, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, November 2004, p. 99.
5 R.P. Pardo, ‘The Political Weakness of the EU in East Asia: A Constructivist Approach’, Asia-Europe Journal, vol. 10, no. 35, 2009, p. 271.
6 C. Gluck, ‘Patterns of the Past: Themes in Japanese History’, in C. Gluck and A.T. Embree (eds), Asia in Western and World History, New York: East Gate Books, 1997, p. 759.