1    Walking the road of low diplomacy (1951–1979)

When Japan fully regained its political autonomy from the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) in 1952, the strategic and economic landscape of the world that it re-entered was considerably changed from the one that it had left. The transformation of mainland China – its former trading area – into a communist state and the success of the first Soviet nuclear test had led to radical differences. The US global policy of containment, based on the NSC-68, painted a new scenario of the Cold War that Japan also now had to face. Moreover, the American and Japanese release of the Yoshida letter on 16 January 1952, and the bilateral pact with Taiwan three months later, precluded Japan from recognizing China.

During the 1950s, Beijing and Tokyo were separated politically and economically because of structural limitations imposed by the bipolar system.¹ In those years, the positions of both countries in the international system were well defined: Japan was a US ally, totally dependent on the latter’s foreign strategies; China was a trustworthy friend of the USSR. In attempting to understand Japan–China relations within the Cold War context, one may start with a reinterpretation – from an international perspective – of the history of relations between the two countries, as it has been investigated so far. It is easily arguable that the orientation towards the ‘Separation of Politics and Economics’ (seikei bunri) as a way to justify trading with nearby communist countries, inaugurated by the Yoshida letter, is not simply the result of the constraints imposed by the bipolar system. Japan, embedded within the Western bloc, could never maintain official relations with a communist country and old friend of the Kremlin.

In order to survive within this new reality, Japan had to become closely integrated into the Western comity of nations. This meant that Japan’s attempts to forge greater diplomatic ties with the Western world were mixed and generally formed on an economic and commercial basis. This approach was particularly evident in its relations with the European Community (EC), which were dominated by misunderstanding and indifference until at least the mid-1980s. The diplomatic weight exerted by the US was instrumental in shaping this phenomenon, as both actors were focused on strengthening their relations with the American superpower, each obscuring the importance of the other. The global context dominated by the logic of bipolar confrontation certainly helps to explain the structural elements of this process.

1.1.  Two-faced Japan: US ally, Europe’s chagrin (the 1950s)

In his memoirs, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru commented:

These words remind us of the international political climate in which the Japan–US Security Treaty was signed in 1951, which implied the consequent inclusion of Japan under the American nuclear umbrella, allowing the international rehabilitation of the country both economically and politically. None the less, even after the end of the country’s occupation by the SCAP, Japan’s autonomy on the international stage remained limited, often conditioned by the influence exerted by Washington. The country was not yet a member of new international bodies, while its relations with the USSR, China and other Asian countries were minor. It should therefore come as no surprise that, for many years after the end of World War II, Japan and Europe were little occupied with their respective international agendas. The American incentive for supporting Japan’s ‘political modernization’ and economic development was perceived as a strategy aimed at adapting its international role to conform to the rigid confines of the alliance with the US. On the other hand, Japanese political circles did not reflect effectively on the possibility of developing and strengthening Japan’s diplomatic role in Europe.

The Japan–US Security Treaty fully reflected the asymmetry of the balance of power between the two countries in those years, as is clear if we consider the geostrategic changes that were taking place in their respective regions. The Moscow–Beijing axis constituted a serious threat to Japan’s security, as demonstrated by the outbreak of the Korean War.³ The presence of US military bases in the archipelago guaranteed national defence: it was quite clear that Japan – physically, legally and psychologically disarmed as it was – could not cope with the ‘communist threat’. In addition, a large part of the Japanese business and industry sectors would have directly paid the costs should Seoul have capitulated.⁴

The Korean War not only solidified the security structure in Northeast Asia, systematizing the containment lines within the regional sphere, but for Japan, it represented what the Marshall Plan was for Western Europe. The Keidanren – the most influential Japanese business association – and the Diet decided to work together with the White House for the importation and development of dual use technologies that were essential to the needs of American soldiers stationed in the country.⁵ The US restored the Japanese military industry, and Japan had no choice but to follow the conditions imposed on patents and technology. It was a ‘great overall boost [received] from the “special procurement” of the Korean War’ that most likely allowed the country to realize substantial savings, considering the cost Japan would have faced to provide its own rearmament.⁶ By extension, these savings even applied to large parts of the mechanical, chemical and electronics industries. The entire outstanding Japanese export-oriented economy would continue to benefit from this input for years to come: these were the foundations of the economic miracles that the country experienced during the 1960s especially. Between November 1954 and June 1957, the Japanese economy underwent a period of exceptional prosperity characterized by rapid growth, known as the ‘Jinmu boom’.⁷ This economic impetus led the country to resume its pre-war commercial leadership across Southeast Asia. The historical ties of the Japanese economic system had been overcome thanks to the strong boost given by the increase in exports within the global context in which Europe was already an important partner.

There followed a brief period of recession that lasted about a year, then the annual growth rate began to increase again beyond 10 per cent in real terms. This time, the new economic boom generated in June 1958 – remembered as the ‘Iwato boom’ – lasted 42 months, until December 1961. The Japan–US alliance had very particular implications in this process: the American protective umbrella offered Japan the opportunity to recover from World War II, and become a much richer nation than its neighbours.⁸ Going against the trend of the pre-war years, and thanks to the support of Washington, Tokyo built its economic hegemony in Asia primarily using international trade. Now that the country had officially entered the ‘free world’, it was essential for the US to strengthen the alliance with Japan, or at least not to undermine it. In the strategic perspective of the White House, a close relationship combining Japan’s economic strength and US military power would have guaranteed a solid and durable partnership between the two countries. Supporting the ambitions of Tokyo in the expansion of a free market economy in such difficult years would have favoured the containment of the impending Soviet and Chinese ‘danger’ in Asia.

Throughout the 1950s, the international situation remained marked by a high level of ideological tension. In the US, a great debate was in progress regarding the new ideology of national security, which did not lessen the worries of those who felt the need to ‘deter Soviets without turning the country into a garrison state’.⁹ The real spy alarm phobia following the denunciation of Senator Joseph McCarthy helped increase a dangerous sense of the ‘red threat’. American diplomacy began to be concerned not only over possible subversions by communist cells existing in Western countries, but also over fully democratic changes towards leftist political majorities. One effect derived from that political climate was precisely the extension of the ‘concept of one “free world” that stressed the primacy of economic interconnections above political forms and cultural norms’.¹⁰ In addition, the arms race triggered by the Korean War had generated a discussion on the ‘atomic condition’ that became an element of the political game. Stalin was not discouraged by the initial US nuclear primacy, and the successful test of the H-bomb in August 1953 seemed to fill the gap that existed between the two superpowers.¹¹

This helps us to understand that the main objective of the US was to make Japan an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’,¹² an ally in the containment action and a means of reassuring Asian neighbours against the onset of new pro-militarist tendencies. Although diplomatic contacts with various European states’ embassies were resumed, for most of the 1950s, relations with Europe were marked by a growing distrust of Japan, enhanced by its intensifying trade frictions with the US. It is important to remember that a long trip undertaken by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru in 1954 brought him to Europe earlier than to the US. According to Ferretti, after the San Francisco Peace Conference, he continued to cultivate political alignments with Europe (in particular with the UK, as well as with Italy) by focusing on the issues of both PRC recognition and trade with China.¹³ Many Japanese said that ‘this was Yoshida’s hanamichi, or “great departure”’.¹⁴ Notwithstanding, the National Security Council maintained that the US should ‘seek to prevent Japan from becoming dependent on China and other communist-dominated areas for essential food and raw materials supplies’.¹⁵

Some European countries, such as the UK, France, the Netherlands and Germany, were concerned about the threats that the Japanese textile industry could represent for their own industries. There was considerable resistance to its entry into the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT; 1955), although the Americans pushed for it. Nor did Tokyo not show any greater enthusiasm in 1957, when it welcomed the news that the treaty had been signed in Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC). If there were fears in Europe over the competition from Japanese products on the domestic market, Japan had strong concerns regarding the possible effects of the so-called ‘single tariff’ on its trade with the EEC.¹⁶ The fear of finding itself in front of a protectionist block – a trading club from which Tokyo could remain excluded – fuelled a kind of hysteria in diplomatic circles and in the local business community.

In reality, this phenomenon had loomed in Japanese eyes as an instrument that an increasingly protectionist Europe (united only in erecting barriers against Japanese economic penetration) exploited to control and restrain Japanese exports to European markets.¹⁷ These suspicions were heightened with the creation, on a more economic than political basis, of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which included the UK, Japan’s most important partner in Europe. It is certain that the Western European leaders still felt the echoes of the economic and commercial Japanese tactics practiced in the pre-war period (such as excessive dumping), which were objectively unfavourable for Europe and defined as unfair by many countries. The so-called ‘Noordwijk Agreement’, concluded on 9 May 1958 by the cotton trade associations of Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, France, Switzerland and Norway, ‘forbade the re-export to participating countries of grey cloth admitted temporarily on a duty-free basis into other countries for finishing’ and seemed to confirm this hypothesis.¹⁸ The agreement was specifically intended to impose restraints on Japan as well as other Asian countries.

As highlighted by Blokker, ‘within as well as outside the framework of GATT, selective restrictions were introduced against low-priced imports originating from newcomers in trade in cotton textiles’.¹⁹ Among the main objectives of these measures was the will to legalize the discriminatory practices in the context of discussions related to Japan’s accession to GATT.²⁰ A diplomatic mediation vis-à-vis its European partners could have mitigated the effects of such an alarming prospect. The official visit of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke to London, which took place between 12 and 16 July 1959, inaugurated an unexpected diplomatic mission, lasting about one month and involving other European capitals.²¹ During his visit, he ‘expressed his hope that through cooperation with the UK in the UN, Japan could contribute to a peaceful solution of a nationalist-inspired political instability in the Middle East and Africa’.²²

Meanwhile, in 1959 Japan’s ambassador to Belgium was accredited as Japan’s first representative to the three European communities. Kishi’s visit to London was, in reality, the result of a negotiation process that was launched one year earlier by the President of the Sumitomo Bank of Japan (thanks to which a sort of renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Trade Agreement was obtained) and the mediation of the new Japanese ambassador to the UK, Katsumi Ono. Equally fruitful was the meeting with German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (awarded the decoration of the Order of the Rising Sun in Tokyo at that time), which evidently served to reduce trade restrictions on Japan’s exports. Germany was, in fact, the first European country to sign a commercial treaty with Japan on 1 July 1960.

During Kishi’s term, the problems of international trade inevitably became intertwined with political and strategic issues. Kishi was the best figure the Americans could hope for to lead the Japanese government. The new premier’s economic vision, his hatred for the Soviets and (unlike Yoshida and Hatoyama) his fear of getting too close to the Chinese – not to mention his love of golf – made him most welcome to Eisenhower in Washington.²³ Because of his political history, Kishi did not deserve much sympathy in Japan, but this did not prevent him from having excellent personal relations with the White House. He was convinced that the rapprochement with Beijing was not a priority issue in Japan’s foreign politics, which he felt should focus on (non-communist) Southeast Asia and commit to making its economy more competitive.²⁴

In the late 1950s, therefore, a new international economic era began, characterized by the rapid growth of the Japanese and European poles. This phenomenon took shape in conjunction with the process of decolonization, and revealed the emergence of a slow structural change in the previous political-economic dynamics. It is of some importance to note that, although Kishi’s initiative was determined by the need to facilitate an easing of trade tensions between Japan and the nascent EEC, the official diplomatic agenda of these meetings focused explicitly on political issues (concerning, first, the containment of the Soviet threat), for which there was evidence of a substantial commonality of views.²⁵ A similar emphasis at the high political level was largely isolated within Japan-Europe relations in the postwar period, and continued at least until the 1980s, when relations between the two actors ceased to be dominated by purely mercantile interests.

1.2.  Walking the road of low diplomacy (the 1960s)

Although Europe and Japan were acquiring more and more relevance as political and economic actors, during the 1960s, their interaction was mainly confined to trade. On the other hand, it could be argued that, in those years, Japan tried to appear ‘more open’ to Europe. This occurred in part because the new Prime Minister, Ikeda Hayato (1960–64), put an end to a period that was marked by a series of social and political turbulences, the widespread popular protests that accompanied the ending of Kishi’s mandate and then the renewal of the Security Treaty with the US.²⁶ He was required to act as a ‘conciliator’ and shift public attention on to ambitious economic objectives. His Kokumin shotoku baizō keikaku (‘Plan for doubling the national income’) marked the passage from an ‘age of politics’ (dominated by the ‘community of repentance’, led by Maruyama Masao) to an ‘age of economy’. Ikeda’s term was notable for its successes in the national economy – the so-called ‘GNPism’ – that soon overtook the disputes regarding the military alliance with Washington.²⁷

However, despite the opportunities offered by the growing multipolarity that had taken root in the international political and economic system since the 1960s, the results achieved between Japan and Europe in this period in terms of political dialogue were not significant. Ikeda is credited with having tried to inaugurate a trilateral cooperation with the US and Europe (known as ‘three pillar theory’), an attempt that failed mainly because of the widespread European aversion towards Japanese business practices. The use of zenrin gaikō (‘friendly diplomacy’) was the instrument with which he intended to inaugurate a more ‘extended’ foreign policy than that of his predecessor: Japan now officially entered the three ‘in-groups’ (the international community, the ‘free world’ and Asia).²⁸

Even with China, things seemed as though they might take a new course. In July 1960 a Chinese delegation that included Liu Ningyi, chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, visited Japan to participate in the Sixth World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. This was the first official contact since 1958, when the so-called ‘Nagasaki incident’ caused the interruption of all contact between the two countries. A month later, Zhou Enlai met with Suzuki Kazuo, senior director of Japan–China Trade Promotion Council, to whom he announced the so-called ‘Three Principles of Trade’ (bōeki sangensoku) that should rule the commercial relations between the two, according to parameters such as: an agreement between the two governments; the conclusion of private contracts; and a case-by-case assessment. Both countries, despite their differences, were aware that extensive trade would bring enormous benefits, according to the known principle of seikei bunri. In this respect, it should be noted that, although China tried in every way to break down trade barriers and search for both commercial and diplomatic relations, Japan claimed that the principle of seikei bunri was one of the main pillars of Japanese foreign trade policy on which relations with China would be based.

Faced with Ikeda’s cautious attitude, Beijing did not remain impassive and found in the issue of the renewal of the Japan–US Security Treaty an opportunity to exert influence, albeit indirectly, on Japanese domestic political life.²⁹ China’s goals were basically to undermine the alliance between Tokyo and Washington and encourage the possibility of normalizing China-Japan relations. Beijing began a campaign of protests against Japan and the US, attempting to involve the Japanese people and create turmoil within the country.³⁰

By the early 1960s, some of the countries that had recently gained independence from the colonial powers began to press the UN, together with the non-aligned countries, so that they could extend their activities to the promotion of development among the poorer countries, while ensuring international economic equity. This position was formally expressed at the 1960 UN General Assembly, where more assistance was formally requested to developing countries (DCs) from the rich world. The success of the 1959 communist revolution in Cuba, the ongoing crisis in the Belgian Congo and the inauguration of international aid politics by communist China helped to increase Western awareness on the strategic relevance of international assistance. In 1961, following the inauguration of the programme known as a ‘Decade for Development’ (destined to become the ‘First Decade’), the industrialized countries were invited to devote 1 per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP) to official development assistance (ODA), in the forms of grant aid, soft loans and foreign direct investment (FDI).

At the first UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD I), held in Geneva in 1964, which was attended by 77 DCs (‘The Group of 77’), Japan participated as a member of the ‘rich countries’ (Group B). Having now reached the status of an industrially advanced country, it assumed on this occasion its first official engagement in the context of ODA, pledging to programmatically devote to foreign aid resources equivalent to 1 per cent of GDP. The Pearson Report, commissioned by the World Bank (WB) and published in 1969 by an international team led by Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson, was probably the strategy paper that best represented the political spirit characterizing the ‘Decade for Development’. The report indicated the need for the advanced countries to achieve the goal of allocating 1 per cent of gross national product (GNP – of which a minimum rate of 0.7 per cent should be in the form of ODA) to the South of the world by 1975.

The delicate fiscal and monetary problems that the US faced during the 1960s led Washington to shift part of the burden concerning financial aid to the other members of the ‘club of rich countries’. The extraordinary economic growth that Japan was experiencing at that time did not permit it to escape from this commitment.³¹ Thus, Japan started up a policy of intense aid flows destined for countries such as Taiwan, South Korea and Indonesia. With its accession to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1964 as an official member of the Development Aid Committee (DAC), Japan was subjected to a sort of gaiatsu (‘external pressure’) in order for it to abide by the standards of the donor countries’ community. Compared with the period 1961–1964, in fact, in the years between 1965 and 1970, average Japanese ODA increased threefold – from a total of US$112 million to US$361 million on a yearly basis – even surpassing the assistance levels of France, the UK and Germany, and becoming second only to the US.³²

In 1966, Japan began to provide loans for commodities aimed to help countries in crisis with their balance of payments, through loans in yen that would allow them to import basic goods without having to draw down their financial reserves. Three years later, the Japan Overseas Volunteer Corps (JOVC) started promoting an impressive assistance programme for technical projects. To meet American requests, moreover, Japan intensified its assistance to some Asian countries that had priority from a strategic perspective. Only seven of the 30 projects based on grant aid, covering the period 1969–1973, were addressed to countries other than Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand.³³ Another effect of the gaiatsu exerted on Japan was highlighted by the active role the country played in certain programmes of regional cooperation, such as the establishment of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1965, the organization since 1966 of an annual Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia in Tokyo and its growing contribution to the implementation of projects designed within the Mekong Committee.

Japan’s politico-strategic reorientation for the second half of the 1960s also produced permanent changes in the geographical distribution of aid. Between l961 and 1964, in fact, the country signed nine agreements on soft loans, eight of which were destined for Southeast Asian countries.³⁴ Japanese financial support was becoming of paramount importance for the countries in this area, but there was also a common feeling that Tokyo was offering less favourable terms than other advanced countries, and that its assistance was aimed exclusively to favour the interests of the Japanese private sector.³⁵ On the other hand, Japan’s dependence on a number of countries in importing oil and mineral products was significantly enhanced along with serious deterioration of its environmental conditions caused by the rapid process of national industrialization. This implied a renewal of the national policy guidelines: reshaping the country’s foreign aid policy, while coping with the gaiatsu, would also have allowed the country to solve problems like these. The strategy of kaihatsu yunyū (‘Development-cum-Import’) was thus aiming to ensure adequate raw materials for the country, combating environmental pollution and reducing excessive internal imbalances in international trade that were damaging Japan’s partners. Most of the cooperation projects were conceived according to these three purposes, even if priority continued to be given to those programmes that favoured the procurement of raw materials and energy sources. This was particularly evident in the loans accorded by the Export–Import Bank of Japan (EIB), and it is not without significance that the main projects carried out within the kaihatsu yunyū strategy were aimed at importing uranium and oil.

The peace agreements signed between 1954 and 1959 already allowed Tokyo to build fairly extensive trade relations with most countries in the region, but this process was fully accomplished only in these years. This neo-mercantilist approach was the result of a precise national strategy, whose goal was not the achievement of political and military power, but achieving economic development (the economy’s primacy over politics).³⁶ While the US, entangled in Vietnam, was working hard to encourage the creation of a broad united front in the anti-communist countries – such as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand – Japan sought to create benevolent conditions for its own economic interests.³⁷ Moreover, the economic policy promoted during the 1960s produced impressive results, and Japan ‘was already the fifth-largest economy in the world’.³⁸

In fact, the US-Japan alliance greatly exceeded the boundaries of political and military partnership. It created a mechanism for increasing economic interdependence that transformed the nature of the relations between the two countries. The new architecture of Japan–US economic and commercial exchanges certainly helped to overcome the unpopularity of the military alliance in Japan. Without underestimating the profound implications that caused the special relationship with Washington, it is undeniable that Europeans perceived Japan as a ‘peril’: ‘a threatening presence to the economic vitality of individual European states and to the unity of Europe’.³⁹ The strong competition caused by Japanese multinationals in European markets was compounded by their tendency to create tensions between the various member states. As also noted by Dent, the Japanese were convinced that ‘the country’s interests would be best served by exploiting European disunity and challenging the rationale of Europe’s discriminatory trade policies’.⁴⁰

The 1962 ‘diplomatic and trade offensive’ in Europe initiated by Ikeda, together with the most important representatives of the Keidanren, was conceived in these terms. However, Tokyo did not underestimate the importance of the political and strategic implications that could be generated through cooperation with Europe, and tried to encourage it in the name of the shared values of democracy and free trade. The stability of the Middle East and energy security issues were of utmost importance for Japan as well as for Europe, while the successful containment of the Soviet Union would certainly produce a political impact on the trans-Pacific axis. It was from this perspective that, in 1963, Tokyo intended to inaugurate bilateral foreign ministerial meetings with the UK, France, West Germany and – two years later – Italy. Europe could not ignore the increasingly important role that Japan was playing internationally on diplomatic and economic levels, and its admission to the OECD in April 1964 confirmed this trend. Moreover, the economic policy promoted by the new government produced impressive results: by 1960, Japan ‘was already the fifth-largest economy in the world’.⁴¹ This new phase coincided with – and, at the same time, produced – a new course in its political relations with the West. By now, Japan was, alongside the US and Western Europe, one of the ‘three pillars of the free world’.⁴² Ikeda was aware that, in order to stabilize the domestic political situation, by putting down the turmoil of the Leftist forces and reducing the country’s dependence on Washington, Tokyo must continue to pursue a line of close cooperation and friendly diplomacy with both the US and Europe.⁴³ However, at that time, this vision was not shared by either the White House or the European powers. It was an impossible project to achieve as, understandably, Washington would not favour a process that allowed Japan to break away from the exclusive US strategic orbit. According to Ming Wan, Japan ‘would change its approach corresponding to changing US priorities’.⁴⁴ The EC, for its part, was too bent on problems regarding its internal cohesion, as evidenced by the tensions that emerged between France and the UK, leaving little room for dialogue with Japan.⁴⁵

Meanwhile, China successfully carried out its first atomic test on 16 October 1963. Its code name, ‘59–6’, was a provocative allusion to the year and the month in which Khrushchev suspended the ‘New Defence Technology Pact’, a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement that Mao signed in Moscow on 15 October 1957 and with which the Kremlin promised ‘to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture’.⁴⁶ A few weeks later, failing health forced Ikeda to resign. The new cabinet, led by Satō Eisaku (Kishi’s brother), inaugurated a new course in Japanese foreign policy. Satō’s political style was defined by many as ‘cautious and discreet’.⁴⁷ His term was the longest that the country had experienced until then, and was marked by new high economic growth remembered as the ‘Izanagi boom’, the most prolonged period of economic growth enjoyed by Japan in the post-war years.

If the domestic policy focused on upholding peace and prosperity, the international political agenda was characterized by the adoption of ‘omnidirectional diplomacy’ (zenhōi gaikō), striving towards a ‘friendly approach’ to all countries.⁴⁸ Satō was faced with a new international scenario. The world order was no longer merely a reflection of a flexible bipolarism. The emergence of new conflicts that were not necessarily global but linked to local antagonisms, produced by ideological issues and imbalances in regional arrangements, determined new strategic scenarios. Although the multipolarization process was still under development, it suggested that the stability of the international system could no longer depend solely on the peaceful coexistence of the two blocks.⁴⁹ Satō was aware that the emergence of this first, and increasingly pervasive, form of economic interdependence was inaugurating a real ‘age of internationalization’ (kokusaika jidai).⁵⁰ As a result, together with several other countries, Japan was beginning to suffer the effects of exogenous factors.

When Satō ran for the LDP leadership, he understood that a new era in Japan–China relations was possible: he stressed urgency for Japan to pursue a policy independent from the US and to re-establish contact with Beijing. In April 1964 the Prime Minister met Nan Hänchen, head of the Chinese Committee for Trade Promotion, and assumed an entirely positive and favourable attitude towards China, even daring to declare that the seikei bunri policy no longer fitted the rule of trade relations between the two countries.⁵¹ Nan was especially surprised by Satō’s words, and believed that, under his leadership, Japan would favour the détente between Tokyo and Beijing. This and many other good intentions allowed Satō (1964–1972) to succeed Ikeda as Prime Minister in November 1964.

However, expectations vanished just a few days after the establishment of the new cabinet. On 21 November 1964, in fact, the Japanese government refused Peng Zhen, the mayor of Beijing, entry to Japan to attend the Ninth General Conference of the JCP. Beijing’s reaction was immediate and, on 25 November, Renmin Ribao published an article containing harsh criticism towards the new government, warning on the question of Japanese rearmament and on its opposition to PRC entry into the UN. Moreover, China suspended all negotiations and all scheduled visits to Japan.⁵²

It would seem appropriate to ask why Satō did not satisfy China’s expectations, and why he allowed the incident with the diplomat Peng Zhen to occur. Matsumura and Satō, during their meeting, claimed that it was necessary to ‘freeze’ any contact between the two countries.⁵³ The reasons that led to this decision are likely to point to Japan’s concerns with the UN. In fact, Minister of Foreign Affairs Shiina Etsusaburō admitted publicly that Japan would continue to support the formula of ‘relevant issues’ referring to the Chinese problem.

Tokyo’s attitude towards the UN since Ikeda shows that Japanese policy was ambiguous on the China issue: along with other Western countries, it supported Taiwan by counteracting the recognition of the PRC; but if the UN had voted in favour of the latter, Japan would not have hindered it. This shows that Tokyo, although it harboured an interest in officially recognizing Beijing, was unwilling to take the risk and fight at the forefront for its own interests, instead preferring to bandwagon with Washington’s decisions. In addition to the reasons discussed above, Japanese political relations with the USSR were making the PRC even more hostile towards Japan. They were developed at a time when relations between Moscow and Beijing began to decline. China, in fact, looked with apprehension at Shiina’s visit to the USSR in January 1966 to promote business ties between the two countries. Beijing called this approach ‘a conspiracy against China’.⁵⁴

Furthermore, Japan–South Korea rapprochement aroused additional concerns, as Beijing considered it a step towards the creation of a Northeast Asia settlement under the auspices of the US, aimed at extending US military plans to both China and Korea. Moreover, the way Satō acted between 1964 and 1965 left no doubt among the Chinese leaders that Japan was going to solidify its ties with Taiwan and the US instead of improving relations with the PRC. In December 1964, in fact, Ishii Mitsujirō and Kishi went to Taipei to attend a meeting of the Japan–Taiwan Committee for Cooperation, delivering an official letter to Chang Kai-shek from the Japanese cabinet to establish stronger relationships with Taipei. Then, in January 1965, Satō visited the US for the first time as Prime Minister. What infuriated Chinese leaders were the words spoken at a meeting of the American–Japanese Society in New York. The Japanese Prime Minister, instead of following a more moderate tone, said that Japan was ‘even more concerned than the United States about the aggressive tendencies of Communist China’. However, that wasn’t all: the secret Japanese military contingency plan, nicknamed ‘Three Arrow Study’, was made known by intelligence services, and revealed that Japanese armed forces, in the event of another war in Asia, would have an indirect role (such as reserve forces) against China and North Korea, led by the US, South Korea and Taiwan.

Moreover, the 1965 Vietnam quagmire fuelled a climate of contention between Beijing and Tokyo. The pro-communist insurgent forces, fighting against the pro-American government in South Vietnam, dragged Northeast Asia into a global conflict. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which a US destroyer on a mission was torpedoed by North Vietnamese ships in August 1964, prompted US President Lyndon Johnson to get America involved in the conflict definitively. Chinese and Japanese reactions, predictably, were different. Mao actually did not expect the US to attack North Vietnam so suddenly. China’s decision to help Hanoi was mainly for two reasons: Mao’s insecurity in the face of the US threat, and his interest in the national liberation movements. Regarding the first, it must be observed that, between 1964 and 1965, the PRC was extremely concerned about the growing involvement of the US in Vietnam, and considered it a threat to its own security. In Mao’s opinion, US involvement in Vietnam was nothing more than yet another hegemonic plan conceived for the Asian region. He believed the US had dragged Taiwan, Korea and South Vietnam, as well as militarily occupied Japan, into a ‘colonial empire’. The intervention in Vietnam was simply the final step to close the circle around China, trapping it.

It was precisely for this reason that Mao decided to intervene directly; if he managed to repel American troops using pro-communist forces, the Chinese borders would remain inviolate. Mao’s struggle against American imperialism did not save Japan. Although the latter was again accused of having supported US imperialism and undermining the balance in the Far East, one cannot but underline the success of Prime Minister Satō during the Vietnam conflict. He had to face the unpopularity that was causing Japan to be in conflict with Indochina. Nevertheless, Satō could not hold back in supporting engagement in Vietnam, and Washington used the Security Treaty to justify Japanese assistance. The Premier’s tactic of ‘victimizing’ Japan somehow managed to convince people who believed that, under these conditions, Japan had no choice but to cooperate.

In the late 1960s a number of events produced profound changes in the international framework. We need only recall the link between the Prague Spring and the wave of global youth protest to understand how, on that occasion, for the first time the interiorization of the Cold War system materialized in the minds of various cultures and peoples. It was probably symptomatic of a deeper change that resulted from unexpected economic development that made it harder for the states to control their societies. The linear phase of hegemonic control exerted by the two superpowers could be considered to have come to a conclusion at this point.⁵⁵

For Japan, the second half of the 1960s was characterized by a marked evolution of its relations with Southeast Asia. The peace agreements concluded between 1954 and 1959 allowed Tokyo to build an extensive network of trade relations with most countries in the region. This neo-mercantilist approach was the result of a precise national strategy, the goal of which was not to achieve political and military power, but rather economic development (the economy’s primacy over politics).⁵⁶ Although the US, entangled in Vietnam, was working hard to encourage the anti-communist countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand to create a broad united front, Japan sought to establish benevolent conditions for its own economic interests.⁵⁷ Moreover, Washington had repeatedly urged Japan to abandon its attitude towards the ‘Ajia no hi-seijika’ (‘de-politicization of Asia’)⁵⁸ and to do more in supporting anti-communist forces in the region.

With regard to relations with Europe, the EEC only became Japan’s first trade partner in 1968, when its deficit began to soar, going from US$78 to 1,344 million in just four years.⁵⁹ These data are even more alarming when one considers that, at the same time, the European trade balance was in surplus in relation to all other third-party countries. Analysts attributed this phenomenon primarily to the unwillingness (or perhaps the slowness) shown by the EEC in formulating a common trade policy towards Japan. Notwithstanding, the situation changed in July 1968, when it was officially decided that the EC member states would apply a Common External Tariff on imports from third-party countries. The European Commission was able to replace its members in part when formulating the international trade policies from January 1970 onwards, and Japan was the first country with which they attempted trade negotiations.⁶⁰ This is an important aspect to take into consideration, as it would perhaps be unthinkable to assume that the two actors could have improved the quality of their political dialogue at that time. A mercantilist Japan – to which Europe was still peripheral within its US-centred world view – and a Europe undermined by its frantic search for a common economic identity: by their very nature, these two entities could not initiate any meaningful dialogue on security matters, but only walk the road of low diplomacy.

1.3.  The Nixonian transition and Japan’s shock (the 1970s)

A totally unexpected disruption to the international geopolitical balance soon absorbed much of Japanese diplomatic attention. In accordance with Gaddis’s wide-ranging work, while relations between Japan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries ‘had been allowed to deteriorate, more from inattention than from deliberate design’, the Nixon administration inadvertently delivered two sharp blows to the country ‘by failing to warn Tokyo in advance’.⁶¹ On 16 July 1971 the US suddenly announced that Henry Kissinger was in talks with the Chinese and that Richard Nixon would make a state visit to Beijing by the end of May of the following year. The news struck like a thunderclap. The unilateral decision by the White House was a shock to the Japanese and the administration put Satō in a very difficult situation.⁶² The nightmare of many Japanese diplomats of a secret US démarche to communist China (that was in fact destined to go down in history as the ‘Nixon shock’) had become a reality. In the days immediately following the sensational announcement, the government, the press and the population fell silent. The panic created a sudden feeling of distrust towards its erstwhile powerful ally and reference model.⁶³ For years, Japan aspired towards normalizing its relations with China, but heavy pressure from Washington had stifled any attempt at rapprochement and now, unbelievably, the US was to take the initiative without informing its ally.⁶⁴ In June Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers tried to reassure Satō , who flew to Washington, of their willingness to cooperate to solve the problems regarding Tokyo–Beijing relations.⁶⁵ For Japan, this was good news. Now the announcement of 16 July took the Japanese off guard and forced them to revise their policy from top to bottom.

During the preliminary talks held in Beijing on 29 July 1971, Zhou told Kissinger the following:

Kissinger replied as follows:

Kissinger’s words could lead us to suppose that he tried to appease the Chinese. In reality, he described the US–Japan alliance as the best deterrent against any form of Japan’s hard power development, as its purpose was only to preserve US military bases in the archipelago, which were essential to contain the Soviet threat. According to Mann, for years, the Chinese communists had vehemently opposed the American presence in Japan, and the US were now paradoxically trying to get their acceptance.⁶⁸

The Sino-American reconciliation process continued with the second Kissinger diplomatic mission to Beijing, which took place in October 1971 and culminated with Nixon’s trip in February 1972.⁶⁹ What the Americans called the ‘greatest threat’ was transformed into a new friendship. The Japanese were not the only ones to be surprised and distressed. As pointed out by Mackerras, ‘the North Vietnamese were secretly furious to see one of their two main allies and supporters welcoming their worst enemy so warmly’.⁷⁰ Similarly, for Kim Il-song’s North Korea, the new regional political configuration, designed primarily to contain the Soviet Union, contravened the line of confrontation formed by US imperialism and Japanese militarism, against which both the Kimilsungist ideology and the public consensus in the DPRK had been constructed. On the other hand, as Kissinger himself recognized – being fully aware of what American diplomacy was risking – the US opening up to China might: ‘panic the Soviet Union into sharp hostility. It could shake Japan loose from its heavily American moorings. It will cause a violent upheaval in Taiwan … It will increase the already substantial hostility [to the US] in India’.⁷¹ However, in some ways, the situation was even more complicated for the Japanese. The Shanghai Communiqué, signed on 28 February 1972, revealed not only the extent of the Sino-American detente, but also the serious delays in Japanese diplomacy. That same day, in a parliamentary debate prompted by the opposition, the Japanese Prime Minister stated his intention to recognize ‘One China’. Japan had no choice but to initiate the process of normalizing its political relations with Beijing immediately.⁷²

In 1972 Satō came to the end of his third institutional term, leaving behind the satisfaction of having achieved diplomatic success with the reacquisition of Okinawa. On 7 July Tanaka Kakuei was elected to lead the country. In his campaign for LDP leadership, Tanaka kept his distance from his unpopular predecessor, although, like Satō, he positioned the maintenance of peace at the top of the country’s political agenda. The new Premier seemed more aware than his predecessor of the need for Japan to assume greater responsibility in terms of its security, which meant increasing its military potential for defensive purposes. The country had to change from the old role of ‘benefactor of peace’ to ‘creator of peace’, transforming its alleged passivity in foreign policy into a new assertiveness.

On 20 July first contacts were broached with China and, 13 days later, in a toast to Tanaka at a state dinner, Nixon declared complacently: ‘We have spent our time and will spend our time in building a better world’.⁷³ Tanaka flew to Beijing in September of that year. The outcome of the meetings with Zhou Enlai and Mao meant that Tokyo (aware that Taiwan had to be sacrificed for the sake of the ‘Sino-American honeymoon’) had to acknowledge that Soviet hegemony was a threat. Japan also implied that, in view of the normalization of Japan–China relations, the treaty signed in 1952 between Tokyo and Taipei would henceforth be considered invalid (even if the rupture of diplomatic relations with Taiwan would not have figured in the document made public at the end of the talks).⁷⁴ The joint statement, consisting of nine articles, which was to constitute the framework of diplomatic relations between the two countries for the following six years (and with which China gave up its claims to the potential benefits of war), paved the way for a series of agreements over trade, fishing, maritime and air transport.⁷⁵ Japan and Taiwan closed the diplomatic missions in their respective capitals, while trade relations remained virtually unchanged.

As expected, Japan’s rapprochement with China had immediate repercussions for Tokyo–Moscow relations. It was evident to the Chinese that Japan could not have anticipated the possibility of a resumption of relations in any Japan–USSR trade agreement. Japan, which was concerned with satisfying national demand, still needed Sakhalin’s oil and the Siberian mining and forestry reserves but, after the opening up of Japanese diplomacy with Beijing, the Siberian issue proved difficult to resolve and the 1973 oil crisis was decisive. Left with no viable alternative, Tanaka came to accept the ‘counter-hegemonic discourse’ and to conclude an important trade agreement with China.⁷⁶

The 1973 oil crisis forced Japan to strengthen its access roads to oil and its derivatives. To do this, Tokyo adopted two different but complementary strategies. On the one hand, it increased its ODA policies towards the countries holding energy reserves (in this context, particular attention was paid to the Near and Middle East). On the other hand, it abandoned the markedly pro-Israel position followed in the past and began to support the Arab cause, recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the representative Palestinian body and organizing an important diplomatic mission in the Middle East and North Africa to improve its image and its market.⁷⁷ This reorientation of foreign policy was the synthesis of its traditional strategic pragmatism and the recent tendency to achieve greater independence from the US.⁷⁸

On 9 August 1974 Nixon resigned after the Watergate scandal, while in Japan the economic crisis was seriously undermining the political stability. Beijing, on the other hand, was concerned that Fukuda could be elected as the new head of government in Japan, as his faction was traditionally a supporter of Taiwan’s cause. On 12 November of that year, in order to safeguard the agreement reached, Nianlong Han, deputy Chinese foreign minister, was sent to Japan to undertake preliminary talks for the conclusion of a peace treaty. The meeting with his Japanese counterpart, Tōgō Fumihiko, did not produce conclusive results, but allowed Tokyo to express its concerns about the anti-hegemony clause (which was requested by the Chinese and conceived against the Soviets). The new Prime Minister Miki, who took office in December, weakened by an increasingly unstable domestic political climate, could not lead the country towards a normalization agreement with Beijing. However, the negotiations were not abandoned.

On 16 January1975, Tōgō met Chinese emissary Chen Chu, while Miyazawa Kiichi, the new Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, was in discussions at the Kremlin about the diplomatic terms of a possible peace treaty with the Soviets. The conclusion of a peace treaty with the USSR was one of the main aims of Japanese post-war foreign policy. Moreover, Japan could not ignore the pressure exercised by Moscow, worried about the idea that a possible alliance between Japan and China might turn against the USSR.⁷⁹

In the climate of increasing internal tension generated by the possibility (widespread in the press) that Miki could sign a peace treaty with China that included an anti-Soviet clause, the government had to act decisively. Miyazawa, while attending the UN General Assembly in New York in 1975, met Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Qiao Guanhua and tried to overcome this diplomatic impasse.⁸⁰ The so-called ‘Miyazawa’s Four Principles’, known as ‘Basic Posture on Japan–China Relations’, pointed out that any form of hegemony had to be resisted not only in Asia but all over the world, and that an anti-hegemony clause could not be designed against specific third parties.⁸¹ This angered the leaders in Beijing and a long silence followed on the Chinese side.

At this point, it is easy to imagine how, in this new decade, Japan–Europe relations continued to be dominated by trade disputes. On the other hand, at this historical moment, even the US decided to accord secondary importance to Europe. During a visit to China in February 1973, Kissinger told Zhou and Mao that the Europeans: ‘cannot do anything anyway. They are basically irrelevant’.⁸² About a month later, Nixon told Kissinger that he did not see the economic or political unity of Europe as the centre of US interests. As early as 15 February, when Nixon met NATO chief General Andrew Goodpaster, he noted with disappointment that ‘except for the British, Greeks, and Turks, our allies had been very critical of us during the recent bombing, pandering to their leftist constituencies’.⁸³ For the White House, Europeans were becoming enemies rather than friends, and Nixon wished to build a new coalition made up of the US, Japan and the Third World. However, the two Nixon shocks somehow created a shift between Tokyo and Washington, and Japan began to consider its relationship with Brussels more seriously.

In May 1973, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ōhira Masayoshi held talks with the President of the European Commission, François-Xavier Ortoli, which led to an agreement establishing a biennial high-level consultation on trade and economic issues. Despite this, the general atmosphere remained cool: Europe displayed a vigilant attitude and continued to be cautious and suspicious towards Japan.⁸⁴ As stated by McAllister, ‘in the Commission’s own account of 1974, the tone is of a mild irritant soon to be eradicated’: it was noted simply that ‘Japan still has a surplus on trade with the Community’.⁸⁵ This can be partly explained if we consider that Tanaka was the first of the leaders of the industrial Western democracies to support Kissinger’s idea of a ‘new Atlantic Charter’, in which Japan would be placed within the pentagonal system dominated by the world’s five greatest economic powers, a world that included Western Europe, China and Japan in addition to the US and the Soviet Union. As observed by Cleva, ‘such a pentagonal balance produces the maximum amount of diplomatic flexibility, because every issue does not involve the survival of the other powers’.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, European and especially French leaders showed a great reluctance to accept the Kissinger scheme: they questioned whether the common interest in the security of the Western world ‘was served by substituting a new overall relationship in the place of the existing web of defence and economic relations which had been developed separately in the Atlantic and in the Pacific’.⁸⁷

On 26 September, Tanaka began a lengthy trip to Europe that took him to Paris, Bonn and London, the first time for a Japanese official since Ikeda in 1962.⁸⁸ Meanwhile, Ōhira visited Italy from 27 to 29 September, and attended a periodic Japan–Italy consultation meeting between the foreign ministers. Before leaving Japan, Tanaka had announced that a major goal of his trip was to develop a ‘balanced triangle’ of political and economic relations between the trilateral areas. As stated in Japan’s 1973 Diplomatic Bluebook:

Essentially, the concept of a ‘balanced triangle’ did not differ substantially from Ikeda’s ‘three pillars’, but Tanaka’s visit to Europe did differ from Ikeda’s diplomatic mission, when the Japanese prime minister was cynically described as a ‘transistor radio salesman’. Japan had become a true economic power that Europe could not afford to alienate this time. As clearly acknowledged by the 1974 European Yearbook:

The first settlement of an EC delegation in Tokyo came only in 1974,⁹¹ and not without embarrassment on the part of those Japanese who had to interact with this diplomatic hybrid. In fact, the Japanese were slow to recognize the idea of European unity that the Commission wished to express. Japan’s reluctance to acknowledge the EC as the leading European player is also demonstrated by the delay with which it established its delegation in Brussels, which took place five years later. Not even the scheduling of annual meetings between Japan and the European Parliament, beginning in 1978, helped to soothe the feelings of distrust towards the EC. Japanese politicians seemed to show a certain carelessness in relation to their counterparts, and were mainly concerned with reconstructing their diplomatic and commercial relations with China and the countries of Southeast Asia. On the other hand, ‘Europe perceived Japan as arrogant citing its protectionism and reluctance to respond to European complaints’.⁹² In Edström’s words: ‘despite the Tanaka government’s interests in establishing close ties with Western Europe, there was something of a gap between the rhetoric of cooperating with Europe and the actual policy pursued by the government’.⁹³

The distance that still existed between the two actors at a diplomatic level was somewhat reduced by Japan’s involvement in the Group of Seven (G-7) for the first time, when the summit was held in Rambouillet in November 1975.⁹⁴ The new Prime Minister Miki Takeo’s participation in the meeting has been regarded as one of his greatest diplomatic highlights and proudest moments, and simultaneously ‘one more diplomatic means of supplementing an overly bilateral foreign policy, and also a source of prestige and recognition of its standing in international society’.⁹⁵

Fukuda Takeo, who was appointed Prime Minister in December 1976 following Miki’s resignation, was able to foresee the disastrous effects of a ‘wait-and-see policy’ towards Beijing, and he soon commissioned a team of experts to investigate a new diplomatic course. While waiting for negotiations with China to go ahead, he worked towards adding new perspectives to Japanese political development in Asia. The statement made in Manila on 18 August 1977 (later known as the ‘Fukuda doctrine’) outlining its guiding principles facilitated the acquisition of stronger relations with the countries in the area, the leaders of which, in some cases, had already availed themselves of the opportunity to forge personal relationships with the Japanese Prime Minister.⁹⁶ The three principles underlying Fukuda’s policy were the promise that Japan would not rise to the rank of military power, the pursuit of a new ‘heart-to-heart’ political understanding with Southeast Asian countries and the building of a full partnership with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries.⁹⁷

The gradual disengagement of the US in Asia following the defeat in Vietnam – an expression of a global trend towards multipolarity – and the emergence of three communist states in Indochina concurred during the launch of Japan’s ‘new course policy’ in Southeast Asia.⁹⁸ Japan’s official renunciation of military ambitions showed the will to contribute to the development of peace and prosperity in the region, as well as its determination not only to be engaged at an economic and political-diplomatic level, but also to build good relationships in social and cultural fields. The first ASEAN Summit, held in Bali on 23 and 24 February 1976, had indicated that it was no longer possible to postpone a new policy for Southeast Asia. Fukuda’s state visits that took place in August 1977 to five ASEAN countries plus Burma demonstrated Japan’s reorientation.⁹⁹ For some of those states, it was the first official visit made by a Japanese Prime Minister in the post-war years, the last official occasion of meeting at the intergovernmental level dating back to 5 and 6 November 1943, in the notorious political context of the Dai tō-A kaigi or ‘Greater East Asia Conference’ (also known as the ‘Tokyo Conference’).

As commented by Takashi:

Initially founded on the mere primacy of the economy and, subsequently, on a combination of economics and politics, it marked the high point of Japanese political and diplomatic strategy. It was by means of this strategy that Japan aimed to become the central focus of a large area of economic development and political stability in Asia. At the same time, the Japan–China rapprochement and the normalization of US–China diplomatic relations announced in December of that year formed the cornerstone of a policy aimed at laying the foundations of Japan’s redemption in political terms and resolving the crucial security dilemma. In terms of security, this was the basis of the emerging geopolitical triangulation of the Asia Pacific, which included Japan, China and the US.¹⁰¹ Irreversibly, ‘their security would now hinge on the stability of that [triadic] structure’.¹⁰² No longer potential enemies, Japan and China became part of a new regional structure designed to last until the end of the bipolar era.

Meanwhile, Japanese relations with the US, which had already been damaged as a result of the two ‘Nixon shocks’, and the EC (which was ready to join the American recriminations on trade issues and fully engaged in the transatlantic strategic debate)¹⁰³ experienced a decline, falling to an endless series of exhausting trade conflicts along the 1970s. Japanese companies were accused of all kinds of illegal practices, from dumping technology to plagiarism. The US and the EC denounced the collusion of Japanese companies with the state bureaucracy and legal system, actions that would have prevented Western companies from ensuring their rights were protected in Japan. It was undeniable that the trade frictions between the two actors took on increasing political significance, and consequently affected the results obtained in the field of diplomatic relations. We could argue that an early expression of this problem fed into Hanabusa’s Japanese analysis in 1979.¹⁰⁴ As stressed by Cardwell, ‘for Japan, it was felt that Europe was finding a convenient scapegoat for its own economic and social problems’.¹⁰⁵

Notes

1  G. Hook, J. Gilson, C. Hughes, H. Dobson, Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, London andNew York: Routledge, 2005, p. 164.

2  S. Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973, p. 253.

3  M. Iokibe, Sengo Nihon gaikō-shi, Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 2006, pp. 66–67.

4  B. Cumings, ‘Japan in the World System’, in A. Gordon (ed.), Postwar Japan as History, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 51.

5  Iokibe, Sengo, op. cit., pp. 66–67.

6  E.F. Vogel, The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia, Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993, p. 85.

7  M. Sumiya, A History of Japanese Trade and Industry Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 389.

8  See A. Iriye, Nihon no gaikō, Tokyo: Chūkō Shinsho, 1966.

9  M. Hogan, A Cross of Iron. Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945–1954, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 24.

10  O. Handlin, The Distortion of America, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1996, p. 38.

11  D. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb. The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939–1956, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994.

12  R.J. Samuels, ‘Rich Nation, Strong Army’: National Security and Technological Transformation of Japan, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994, p. 132.

13  V. Ferretti, ‘In the Shadow of the San Francisco Settlement: Yoshida Shigeru’s Perception of Communist China and Anglo-Japanese Relations’, Japan Forum, vol. 15, no. 3, 2003, pp. 425–434.

14  K. Miyazawa and R.D. Eldridge, Secret Talks Between Tokyo and Washington: The Memoirs of Miyazawa Kiichi 1949–1954, Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2007, p. 134.

15  US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, 14 (II), 1985, pp. 1300–1308.

16  R. Strange, Japanese Manufacturing Investment in Europe: Its Impact on the UK Economy, New York: Routledge, 2003, p. 78.

17  K. Kiyoshi, Japan and A New World Economic Order, London: Routledge, 2011, p. 8.

18  V.K. Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985, p. 73.

19  N. Blokker, International Regulation of World Trade in Textiles: Lessons for Practice. A Contribution to Theory, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989, p. 97.

20  C.J. Cortés, GATT, WTO, and the Regulation of International Trade in Textiles, Boston, MA: Dartmouth, 1997, p. 64.

21  M. Iokibe, C. Rose, T. Junko and J. Weste (eds), Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration, London: Routledge, 2008, p. 69.

22  Iokibe, Rose, Junko and Weste, op. cit., p. 69.

23  W. LaFeber, The Clash. US–Japanese Relations Throughout History, New York and London: Norton & Company, 1997, pp. 296–324.

24  M. Takahashi, Kishi Nobusuke to Nichi-Bei kankei tsū-shi, Tokyo: Mikasa shobō, 2000, pp. 178–179.

25  See Iriye, op. cit.

26  Y. Iida, Rethinking Identity in Modern Japan. Nationalism as Aesthetics, London: Routledge, 2001, p. 69.

27  K. Pyle, The Making of Modern Japan, Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1996, p. 244.

28  B. Edström, Japan’s Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine (From Yoshida to Miyazawa), London: Macmillan Press, 1999, pp. 46–56.

29  A few days later, on 14 May 1960, Mao Zedong condemned the Japan–US alliance and supported Japanese popular protests, ensuring the help of the Chinese people. However, as Tokyo still considered its alliance with Washington essential, while it continued to be pressured by the US on its own foreign policy, China’s ‘wait and see’ policy abruptly ended by October 1960 (Lee, 1976: 42). It is from this moment that Beijing decided to take its most crucial steps. On 3 October, eight Chinese popular organizations and 20 Japanese delegations, composed of Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Japanese Communist Party (JCP) members, issued a joint statement in which the two sides, extremely critical of Ikeda’s government, pledged to fight against a government that they regarded as ‘reactionary’. The most serious charges made by Beijing consisted for Japan of having sent Matsuno Tsuruhei, speaker of the House of Councillors, to Taiwan in August, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kosaka Zentarō to Seoul in September, to create a further military alliance against the PRC; in having supported the moratorium proposed by the US on the Chinese issue, as well as introduced discussion on the Tibetan question within the UN, thus interfering in China’s internal affairs; and thus in having favoured, under American influence, the revival of militarism.

30  By analysing the actions taken by the Ikeda administration towards China, one cannot fail to notice the wavering and indecisive attitude of the Prime Minister, who switched from anti-Chinese positions to ones that were quite contrary. From this, one can infer that Japan was interested in diplomatic rapprochement with China but, at the same time, in order to avoid hostilities with the US and problems within the UN, it acted using extreme caution. In a meeting with US President John F. Kennedy held in the first half of 1961, the Japanese Prime Minister argued that Washington should reconsider its position towards Beijing as it was ‘unnatural’ to remove a country of 600 million inhabitants from the UN. However, Japan soon realized that the US would not have changed its position at all. Then, to align with US policy, Tokyo acted in a manner that clearly went against China. Meetings were held with Kennedy at the White House again on 20 and 21 June 1961 to discuss additional initiatives to strengthen the US–Japan security alliance. The reaction of leaders in Beijing was quite harsh. China interpreted the Ikeda–Kennedy meeting at the White House as aimed at increasing Japan’s hard power, and as designed to preserve American influence in Asia. Moreover, Tokyo was about to normalize its diplomatic relations with South Korea, and Beijing feared that its influence in Southeast Asia would be hampered by a kind of united front made up of Japan and the US along with India, Thailand, Malaysia and South Vietnam (all countries hostile to the PRC), as well as Burma, Laos and Cambodia for the export of capital and technology.

31  S. Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid. Policy and Practice, New York: Praeger, 1975, pp. 12–13.

32  OECD, Development Assistance Review, Paris: OECD, 1971, pp. 199–200.

33  OECD, op. cit., pp. 199–200.

34  Between 1965 and 1970, the number of similar projects was increased to 52, but this was accompanied by a significant change in geographical distribution. Countries such as Iran, Chile, Argentina, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Nigeria were among the new recipients of the Japanese ODA. However, some problems persisted. Between 1950 and 1972, Japan’s fast economic growth, based on the development of heavy industry, and the increasing level of national exports were causing a certain intolerance in most trading partners, especially in Asia. In the early 1970s, in East and Southeast Asian non-communist countries, Japanese goods were flooding the stores. The South Koreans feared that the foreign money could spread corruption in their country and that Japanese imperialism could take the place of old colonial rule. The Thai student associations organized boycott actions against goods imported from Tokyo, while the Indonesians protested against the exploitation of their forests and other natural resources by unscrupulous foreign businessmen.

35  The dimensions of the problem became alarmingly clear in January 1974, when Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei went to visit several countries in Southeast Asia, causing widespread protests and disturbances. The demonstrations turned against the ‘economic imperialism’ of Tokyo, but the discontent was also fuelled by the ostentation of the ‘Japanese abrasive manner and style of behavior’. See L.D. Hayes, Introduction to Japanese Politics, New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2005, p. 230.

36  F. Mazzei and V. Volpi, Asia al centro, Milano: EGEA – Università Bocconi Editore, 2006, p. 91.

37  M. Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 195.

38  A. Lyman and R. Wich, Becoming Asia. Change and Continuity in Asian International Relations Since World War II, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011, p. 63.

39  C.W. Hughes, ‘Japan in Europe’, in G.D. Hook and H. Hasegawa (eds), The Political Economy of Japanese Globalization, London: Routledge, 2001, pp. 56–69.

40  C.M. Dent, The European Union and East Asia, London: Routledge, 1999, p. 87.

41  A. Lyman and R Wich, op. cit., p. 63.

42  Iokibe, Sengo, op. cit., pp. 116–117.

43  During this period, Japanese domestic politics were going through a critical phase, in part due to the 1960 general elections; this also affected the country’s relations with the PRC. First, one should take into account what was happening within the JSP, which had always encouraged rapprochement with Beijing. Eda Saburō, general secretary of the JSP, rejected what was stated in Asanuma’s 1958 declaration, declaring instead that Japan would continue to pursue a policy of close collaboration with the US. His words garnered Chinese hostility, and Sasaki Kōzō (a member of the extremist wing) was preferred to Eda. In January 1962 Suzuki Mosaburō, former President of the JSP, visited China to reaffirm Asanuma’s declaration, stating that the underlying cause of the absence of Japan–China official diplomatic relations was American imperialism as well as the Ikeda administration.

44  W. Ming, Japan Between Asia and the West. Economic Power and Strategic Balance, New York: East Gate Books, 2001, p. 23.

45  H. Parr, ‘Transformation and Tradition: Anglo-French Nuclear Cooperation and Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community, 1960–1974’, in M. Grant (ed.), The British Way in Cold Warfare. Intelligence, Diplomacy and the Bomb, 1945–1975, London: Continuum, 2009, pp. 87–88.

46  B. Gill and K. Taeho, China’s Arms Acquisition from Abroad. A Quest for ‘Superb and Secret Weapons’, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 29.

47  Sumiya, op. cit., p. 391.

48  Edström, op. cit., pp. 57–70.

49  E. Satō, Satō Eisaku nikki, vol. I, Tokyo: Asahi shibunsha, 1999.

50  Iokibe, Sengo, op. cit., p. 110.

51  A.D. Coox and H. Conroy, China and Japan: Search for the Balance since World War I. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 1978, p. 361.

52  J.K. Rajendra, China and Japan, 1949–1976. New Delhi: Humanities Press, 1977, p. 50.

53  S. Matsumoto, ‘Japan and China: Domestic and Foreign Influence on Japan’s Policy’, A.M. Halpern (ed.), Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, p. 146.

54  Rajendra, op. cit., p. 52.

55  A. Marwick, The Sixties. The Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy and the United States 1958–1974, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

56  F. Mazzei and V. Volpi, op. cit., p. 91.

57  M. Yahuda, op. cit., p. 195.

58  T. Miyagi, ‘Sengo Ajia no hen’yo to Nihon’, Gaikō Forum, no. 238, May 2008, pp. 50–53.

59  For a full review and detailed data on Japan–European trade, see Dent, op. cit., p. 89.

60  J. Gilson, ‘Europe in Japan. A Growing EU identity’, in G.D. Hook and H. Hasegawa (eds), The Political Economy of Japanese Globalization, London: Routledge, 2001, p. 67.

61  J.L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold war, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 329.

62  G. Itō, Dōmei no ninshiki to genjitsu. Detanto-ki no Nichi-Bei-Chū toraianguru, Tokyo: Yūshindō kōbunsha, 2002.

63  M. Sörderberg, The Business of Japanese Foreign Aid, London: Routledge, 1996, p. 34.

64  C. Hosoya, ‘From the Yoshida Letter to the Nixon Shock’, in A. Iriye and W.I. Cohen (eds), The United States and Japan in the Postwar World, Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1989, p. 26.

65  LaFeber, op. cit., pp. 354–355.

66  Memorandum for Henry A. Kissinger, p. 29 (29 July 1971). www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-34.pdf (accessed 13 June 2012).

67  Memorandum for Henry A. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 42 (29 July 1971).

68  J. Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton. New York: Vintage Books, 2000, p. 34.

69  The reports of Kissinger’s meetings with Zhou Enlai on 21 June 1972 are in J. Hanhimäki and O.A. Westad (eds), The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 231–233.

70  C. Mackerras, ‘From Imperialism to the End of the Cold War’, in A. McGrew and C. Brook (eds), Asia Pacific in the New World Order, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, p. 52.

71  Quoted in R. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger. Partners in Power, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 293.

72  J. Furukawa, Nicchū sengo kankei-shi, Tokyo: Harashobō, 1981, pp. 114–115.

73  Quoted in Dallek, op. cit., p. 501.

74  S. Ogata, Normalization with China: A Comparative Study of US and Japanese Processes, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988, p. 78.

75  C.-J. Lee, ‘The Making of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 52, no. 3, Fall 1979.

76  Q.K. Wang, Hegemonic Cooperation and Conflict: Postwar Japan’s China Policy and the United States, Abingdon: Greenwood Press, 2000, p. 191.

77  J. Morikawa, Japan and Africa: Big Business and Diplomacy, London: Hurst & Company, 1996, p. 69.

78  N. Kataoka, Tanaka kakuei tei shosei nikki, Tokyo: Nikkei BP kikaku, 2002, pp. 70–72.

79  Ogata, op. cit., p. 79.

80  K.W. Radtke, China’s Relations with Japan, 1945–83: The Role of Liao Chengzhi. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990, p. 225.

81  Wang, op. cit., p. 191.

82  Quoted in Dallek, op. cit., p. 466. See also H. Kissinger, White House Years, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011.

83  Dallek, op. cit., p. 466.

84  S. Saitō, Japan’s Role in the Western Alliance and Asian Pacific Cooperation, London: Routledge, 1990, p. 40.

85  R. McAllister, European Union. An Historical and Political Survey, London: Routledge, 2010, p. 106.

86  G.D. Cleva, Henry Kissinger and the American Approach to Foreign Policy, Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1989, p. 197.

87  Cleva, op. cit., p. 40.

88  A. Satō, Watashi no Tanaka Kakuei nikki, Tokyo: Shinchō bunko, 1994, p. 131.

89  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), Gaikō Seisho [Diplomatic Bluebook], Tokyo: Gaimushō [Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 1973.

90  Council of Europe, European Yearbook 1974, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, vol. XXII, p. 578.

91  Council of Europe, op. cit., p. 578.

92  W. Mendl, Western Europe & Japan Between the Superpowers, London: Croom Helm, 1986, p. 89.

93  B. Edström, The Japanese and Europe: Images and Perceptions, Richmond: Curzon, 2000, p. 219.

94  H. James, Rambouillet, 15 Novembre 1975. La Globalizzazione dell’Economia, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1999.

95  H. Dobson, Japan and the G7/8: 1975 to 2002, London: Routledge/Curzon, 2004, p. 177.

96  F. Joyaux, La Politique Extérieure du Japon, Paris: PUF, 1993.

97  S. Sudo, Evolution of ASEAN–Japan Relations, Singapore: ISEAS, 2005, pp. 11–16.

98  D.C. Hellmann, ‘The Confrontation with Realpolitik’, in J.W. Morley (ed.), Forecast for Japan: Security in the 1970s, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972, p. 142.

99  Iokibe, Sengo, op. cit., p. 178.

100  S. Takashi, ‘Japan and Southeast Asia’, in P.J. Katzenstein and S. Takashi (eds), Network Power: Japan and Asia, Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1997, pp. 185–186.

101  See E.F. Vogel, Y. Ming and A. Tanaka (eds), The Golden Age of US-China-Japan Triangle, 1972–1989, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002.

102  A. Iriye, ‘Chinese–Japanese Relations, 1945–1990’, in C. Howe (ed.), China and Japan. History, Trends, and Prospects, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 50.

103  L. Nuti, ‘The Origins of the 1979 Dual Track Decision – A Survey’, in L. Nuti (ed.), The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev 1975–1985, London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 60–61.

104  M. Hanabusa, Problems Between Japan and Western Europe, New York: Praeger, 1979.

105  P.J. Cardwell, ‘The EU–Japan Relationship: From Mutual Ignorance to Meaningful Partnership?’, Journal of European Affairs, vol. 2, no. 2, 2004, p. 2.