CHAPTER TEN
Negotiation

IN THE SUMMER OF 1999 MY GOOD FRIEND JAN STEINBECK,¹ with whom I cofounded the Glocal Forum, invited me and my main Palestinian negotiating partner from the Oslo Accords, Abu Ala, to give a seminar on negotiations to approximately one hundred CEOs, mostly Americans, in Da Nang, Vietnam. The seminar was proof of the futility of conflict. Israeli and PLO officials deliberated negotiating tactics with the Americans and the Vietnamese. Hypothetically speaking, if a time machine could have taken us back forty years, hundreds of thousands of lives might have been spared.

I recall saying to Abu Ala, “It took three thousand hours to negotiate the existing Oslo agreements. It will take many more to negotiate the future ones. If we could theoretically create a piece of computer software that would tabulate the interests of both sides into perfect agreements in one day, would you do it?” Abu Ala answered with an emphatic no. He believed that one needs time for ideas to percolate, to adapt to compromises, to embrace all issues. Negotiation is a transitional period in conflict resolution, during which each side gets the chance to understand the other and itself. Those around the negotiating table can be role models for the rest of society by embodying the peaceful values of trust, openness, and mutual respect.

Negotiators fall under our new definition of peace leaders, which means they have the opportunity and the responsibility to infuse negotiations with the modern peace values of equality, dignity, and democratization. The role of negotiators is to represent the interests of their populations, which often means balancing immediate needs 104 with long-term regional goals. Achieving this balance requires several key qualities that, when present in negotiators, improve the chances of successfully negotiating a modern peace treaty.

The Characteristics of a Modern Negotiator

Some people are born negotiators; children are our best example —no one can be more adamant than a child, and among themselves they often compromise, too. But the choice of negotiators is important and should not depend on the shrewdness of the individual alone. Leaders have the chance to advance modern peace by identifying men and women who possess a strategic perspective on peacemaking, who are independent and active thinkers, who know how to listen and invoke trust. In addition, they must be deal makers, not merely people who are good at befriending. And yes, negotiators also must be tough—mentally and physically—to endure the test of lengthy negotiations.

It is important to choose negotiators who communicate well on an interpersonal basis, because informal talks are equal to more formal ones. Interpersonal relations create a valuable chemistry between teams. Negotiators should be blessed with a good sense of humor, which is a sign of perspective and self-criticism—two important traits during deliberations. Humor is a particular asset in the beginning of negotiations; it helps break the ice and create a common language where there is none. Finally, negotiators must know how to insist on the primary issues and to sophisticated-ly compromise on secondary issues. They must possess a strategy regarding the equations of interests between the parties.

The political leadership must build a team of individuals with these inherent qualities and with various other areas of expertise, placing the most suitable person at its helm. This person must have the full confidence of the leadership and also be a good team leader.

The preparation of the negotiation team is important—negotiations include both strategic and tactical aspects and it is important to prepare for both. Strategic aspects are linked to the vision 105 of peace and thus pertain to the preparation of strategic goals and their intersection with the perceived interests of the other side. Tactical aspects relate to the text, the “battle,” and the distribution of roles within the team.

It is absolutely critical that negotiators have a constant open line to decision makers and that the chief negotiator has the ear and trust of the head executive. With the decision makers, the negotiators must keep their eyes on the desired plan for peace, because during negotiations there is no issue too small to dwell on for weeks on end. A narrow focus can divert attention away from the goals, especially when the negotiations begin to look like a boxing match. Modernized peace necessitates joint strategizing based on mutual understanding, which can contribute to the sustainability of peace.

Shimon Peres was once asked whether he better understood the Palestinian people after hundreds of hours of negotiations. He replied, “I am not sure, but I definitely better understand human beings.” This insight into human relationships is a prerequisite for peace.

Modern Strategy

Negotiations will have the greatest chance of bringing about a modernized peace agreement if the teams are structured to focus specifically on the four pillars of modern peace. For example, one group could deal with the core political issues that are the stumbling blocks of conflict resolution—the issues that demand the most creative diplomacy. A second group could deal with peacebuilding, including economic and social issues, and outline in great detail the type and essence of peacebuilding projects. Group three could deal with the international system, representing the interests of both sides; this should include issues of aid, international peacekeepers, and international guarantees. Group four would concentrate on implementation and monitoring issues; detailed implementation across the board is the key to success. A fifth 106 group, advised by the heads of the delegation, could handle drafting, so that drafting does not become an issue that holds up the deliberative end of the negotiation. Group six would deal with the public relations that contribute to the cultivation of a peace ecology (this issue could be tackled in conjunction with the third group, so negotiations don’t degenerate into a media war). Finally, a seventh group could be created from among the heads of the delegation committee, who have a common handle on the negotiations and can assure the basic joint strategy. This group would resolve some of the more difficult issues. Messages could be passed to and from the political leaders, which would allow the chief negotiators to strategize together and make progress.

One strategic part of negotiation is tone. Modern negotiations include the opportunity to engage in both formal and informal, open dialogue about the strategic goals of the negotiation. This dialogue can be framed in terms of creative diplomacy, focusing on the fact that the negotiations are working toward an agreement that will benefit both sides—a balance of interests and not a balance of forces. Open discussion of the regional strategic reality in the aftermath of the agreement will be crucial to acknowledging the practical difficulties facing negotiators and the challenges of implementing a peace agreement. Defining the role of the key international players also will help pave the way for smoother, more effective implementation. In addition, frank and open discussions regarding the predicaments of each side in relation to internal politics and public opinion will help define the contours of a feasible strategic agreement, including diplomatic, peacebuilding, and peace ecology elements.

Modern peace relies on mutual trust and understanding—two important components that can be reflected in negotiations. During the negotiating process, there is much bluffing, especially regarding the deadlines of negotiations. Concessions are “sold” at a higher price than their real value. This is a normal and legitimate part of a negotiation game. But trust must prevail between partners at 107 critical moments in the negotiations—particularly when it comes to making decisions about critical issues in the final stages. Modern peace must be built on modern values.

Toward the final stages of negotiations on Oslo II, late in the summer of 1995, for instance, my mother had just passed away. Abu Ala came to visit my parents’ home—a moving gesture in the midst of heavy negotiations. I showed him my late father’s library and presented him with an old Koran with a red cover that my father had bought in Cairo in the 1940s.

When we met again in Eilat, Israel, we decided to finalize with Ambassador Dennis Ross a deadline that would be acceptable to President Clinton. It was critical that Abu Ala and I trust each other if we were to resolve the outstanding issues before the deadline was up. Throughout the negotiations, I had been meeting with him every night at midnight in his small suite. His table was always filled with piles of papers from the many working committees we had established.

One night, after the deadline was set, I again entered his room at midnight. The living room was empty. His messy table was cleared of all papers and covered with a white cloth. On it he had placed the red Koran of my father. Then he entered the room, dressed in a traditional white jalabya. He sat opposite me and said in a serious voice, “Now we can finish our business.” He had given me the sign that I could trust him and that he trusted me. That night we resolved thirty of the forty outstanding issues in the negotiations. Our trust and faith guided us toward an agreement that would bring the fruits of peace to both sides in equal measure.

Another critical issue that can be reframed in terms of modern peace involves the future relationship between the parties. Instead of only solving problems of the past, negotiations have the opportunity to build bridges to the future. By coming to a mutual understanding about the long-term relationship between the two parties, partners can focus on the topics that need to be resolved and structured to reach that cooperative vision. 108

Also important is the presence or absence of mediators. In my experience and studies, bilateral negotiations offer the best opportunity for former enemies to hammer out compromises and engage in cooperative peacebuilding. A process that includes a third party induces the two interlocutors to try to convince the mediator and not each other. On the other hand, the difficulty and frustration of working directly with the other side is a fundamental part of turning enemies into partners.

Tactics

This is one of the few areas that requires little change from the methods of traditional peace processes. First and foremost, participants on both sides must be good, professional negotiators or an unequal agreement may come about. Participants must be tough and must be good team players, capable of discreet brainstorming. People who cannot be totally discreet should not even be considered for negotiations.

It also is important to keep the contents of negotiations themselves confidential until agreement. If compromises are leaked before agreement, without quid pro quo, they will become virtually impossible to achieve. Discretion does not necessarily mean a closed-door approach; it simply means knowing which elements of negotiation are best shared with the media, to contribute to positive coverage, and which elements are best kept close until a final agreement has been reached.

Perhaps the most important negotiation is between each team and its home base. Those who remain at home—often political leaders—see themselves as perfect negotiators, because they only negotiate with themselves and don’t have to confront the opposition. It is important that the negotiation team reports regularly and honestly about difficulties and does not portray itself as heroes. The political elite must be told candidly about the formal and informal deliberations and about the team’s assessment of the other side’s strategies and predicaments. The team, which spends 109 countless hours with its interlocutors, can contribute to the modern peace process by sharing with the political leadership the situation, motives, and strategies of the other side, as well as the possible outcomes, gains, and compromises of the negotiation.

Naturally, each side tries to sell concessions at the highest price. It is thus important to leave the real concessions to the end. At the beginning of a negotiation, parties must put on the table a good draft that can become the basis of discussion. Good drafters know the value of words and should be present until the endgame. Political decision makers can best contribute to the process toward the end of negotiations, when most outstanding issues have been resolved. By recognizing their unique roles and responsibilities, peace leaders—both political leaders and negotiators—can leave negotiating to negotiators and ultimate decision making to those who hold that power.

A further critical tactical issue is the definition of the negotiation’s deadline. The deadline operates most effectively if it is imposed by a third party, because intense negotiators tend to bluff about deadlines in order to force the other party to expose its most important concessions. Enforcement of a deadline is an excellent opportunity for the international community to support and encourage modern negotiations and thus to contribute to the cultivation of lasting peace between the two parties.

Reflection in the Media

Negotiators generally prefer to stay away from the media, and rightly so. However, avoidance of the press does not mean that negotiators should not play a role vis-à-vis the media or that the image of the negotiation is not important. The media is often used and misused by leaking information intended to influence the negotiation. The issues negotiators present to the media often emphasize the “red lines” or the concessions already received and boast about how staunchly the negotiators are defending the nation’s cause. 110

Although such self-congratulatory campaigning is somewhat unavoidable, it is mostly futile and unhelpful. Instead, the reflection of negotiations in the media should be seen as an integral part of the peacemaking. It can be a mechanism by which to pass messages and transmit values in relation to common strategic goals, and to emphasize the advantage of compromise for the good of both sides.

The media also is a tool by which the public can learn about the new partner, its society, its problems, and its leaders. Human-ization on the basis of equality is critical; the more equality can be brought into the hearts and minds of the constituencies, the more room the parties will have to maneuver.

The chief negotiators should issue very strict guidelines about dealing with the media in relation to the negotiations. My experience recommends that a very limited number of people can effectively liaise with the media about the negotiations, and maximum coordination between the two sides regarding the information presented will best contribute to creating lasting peace. Regular, joint communiqués about the negotiations should be succinct, encouraging the media to focus on stories that humanize the Other and that emphasize common strategic interests and the aim of reconciliation.

Media relations provide an occasion for each side to free itself from the unhelpful and untruthful monopoly on suffering, justice, and rights that each generally projects. To do so, the two sides can coordinate with their respective political superiors so that similar messages emanate from both sides of the table. They also can work together to speak to each other’s media; it often is easier to sway public opinion with assurances from the former enemy that changes and benefits are on the way. Above all, the chief negotiators should be unforgiving toward those in the delegations who are indiscreet and fail to adhere to the guidelines the teams have set for themselves; transgressors should be relieved of their duties.

Joint strategizing between negotiators greatly increases the potential for success. It does not detract from the agonizing and 111 manipulative battle of the core negotiation—after all, negotiations are intended to serve the interests of one’s nation. But when the aim of the negotiation is a sustainable treaty—as it should be in a modern peace process—nurturing common interests is a vital endeavor.

Given that the sustainability of peace is dependent on its widespread societal support, negotiations must pave the way for balanced, positive effects. Even if one side is coming to the table following a “victory,” it nonetheless is a grave mistake to take too much advantage of one’s opponent. Such overkill in a negotiation will undoubtedly backfire in time. Negotiations will be most conducive to peace if they aim to create a balance of interests and motivation and are established within a framework of mutual respect and dignity. Negotiators must create an emotional and practical bridge to the future; relinquish hostility, excessive suspicion, and spite; and delve deeply to find empathy with the former enemy. Only in this way can negotiators forge a peace based on equality between former enemies.

When I saw Abu Ala on the other side of the table during the Oslo negotiations, I often felt I was looking in a mirror. This recognition was vital to our relationship as negotiators and as partners. People tend to focus on their own suffering and to forgive themselves more readily than they do their enemy. We remain suspicious of the Other, vacillating between hope and despair. In contrast, the discovery of another individual’s identity engenders empathy—a recognition of commonality that must lie at the core of negotiations and peacemaking.