Chapter 2

Duet With The Dragon

The Development of Sino—US Relations

The Chinese Angle

Liu Xuecheng

The world watched with great interest and much concern the US presidential campaign through the whole of 2004. Seen as the ‘election of the century’, it was not just about whether President Bush or Senator Kerry would lead the US for the next four years, but was seen as an event that would determine the orientation of US foreign and security policy.

As many had expected, President Bush was re-elected by 51 to 48 per cent of the votes, narrow in percentage terms, but considerable in raw numbers. He obtained 62 million votes, 3 million more than his Democratic challenger. Bush interprets his victory as an approval of his domestic and foreign policies of the last four years and as the American electorate’s mandate for his second term. The decisive victory of the Republican Party in this election has provided the second Bush Administration with favourable domestic political conditions for pushing forward the President’s conservative hard line on foreign policy and national security.

Bush’s re-election has given foreign and security policy analysts plenty to chew on. A recent survey by the Pew Research Center demonstrated that 76 per cent of Democrats and just 32 per cent of Republicans agree that good diplomacy is the best way to ensure peace, but 66 per cent of Republicans and 33 per cent of Democrats say they are willing to fight for the country, right or wrong.¹ The Pew report also showed that Bush won the election because American voters judged him the stronger leader for the defence of their homeland and the global anti-terror war. These numbers suggest that the ruling Republican Party will tend to use military force to pursue and defend US national and strategic security interests in the world in the years to come.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Sino–US relations have progressed steadily. Frequent exchanges of high-level visits have contributed greatly to mutual understanding and the essential improvement of Sino–US relations for the past four years.

It seems there will be more continuity than change in Bush’s policy toward China in the next four years. Fu Mengzi has pointed out, ‘as far as the Sino–US relationship is concerned, however, the existing policies, based on a consensus among Democrats and Republicans, are likely to remain unchanged.’²

China in the 2004 Campaign

In US presidential campaigns since the end of the Cold War, the challenger invariably played up the China issue and made it a hot topic in the presidential debates. China was usually singled out as a negative case for attacking the incumbent’s foreign policy. China thus became the scapegoat of partisan electoral politics.

In 2004, for the first time, China did not figure prominently in the election. This is a break from the past decade. In the campaign platforms of the two parties, remarks on China were made in a constructive and conciliatory tone. Engagement and cooperation with China constituted the principal aspect of the China policies of both candidates.

On October 7, 2004, when the US election campaign reached a critical phase, Chinese President Hu Jintao had a telephonic conversation with President Bush. This did not evoke any criticism from Bush’s Democratic challenger. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Colin Powell visited China and conducted a broad exchange of views with Chinese leaders on the Taiwan issue and the nuclear question on the Korean Peninsula. He remarked that US–China relations were at present the best obtained in the last three decades. In an interview at the Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV, he emphasised that Taiwan was not an independent sovereign state. The Democratic candidate did not challenge these remarks either.

In the 1992 campaign, Bill Clinton had challenged President George W Bush on his China policy by charging him with mollycoddling China. He had emphasised that if he won the election, he would adopt a hard line toward tyranny from Baghdad to Beijing and link human rights with bilateral trade to promote peaceful evolution from Communism to democracy. But, no later than in the second year of his first tenure, Clinton de-linked human rights from bilateral trade.

In his second term, President Clinton adopted a more positive and constructive China policy. The leaders of the two countries reached the consensus that they would be committed to establish a constructive strategic partnership oriented toward the 21st century. He announced his Taiwan policy as three No’s—gno support for Taiwanese independence, no support for ‘Two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’, and no support for Taiwan’s bid for memberships in international organisations, since only sovereign states had this privilege. Clinton’s China policy had shifted from seeking confrontation to promoting cooperation.

During the 2000 presidential campaign and the early months of the Bush Administration, his team tried to formulate a China policy different from Clinton’s. The Bush campaign team defined the US-China relationship as one of ‘strategic competitors’ rather than President Clinton’s ‘strategic partners’. Guarding against China was the principal aspect of Bush’s China policy. Such a policy was reflected in his remarks such as: defending Taiwan and the sales of advanced weapon systems to Taiwan, the possible rise of a military competitor in East Asia, and concerns about the threat to the US from the rise of China in the 21st century.

But the terrorist attacks of September 11 changed the strategic thinking of the administration. Since then, stable and healthy Sino–US relations have developed steadily.

US partisan politics and power shifts every four years have proved to be an unavoidable negative in the development of bilateral relations. If the incumbent is reelected, bilateral relations are relatively smooth and stable. Otherwise they can be stormy. The new administration usually undertakes the process of reviewing the China policy of the former administration with a negative and suspicious attitude. It always tries to work out a different policy. Of course the policy orientation does eventually go back to the previous track. But the process causes unnecessary instability and uncertainty in relations.

After Bush’s re-election, during her Senate confirmation hearing as the new Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice reaffirmed the China policy formulated in the first term. She emphasized the continuity of Bush’s China policy by stating that the administration was building a candid, constructive, and cooperative relationship with China.³ Bush’s re-election and the bipartisan consensus on China have shaken off the past ‘irrational circle of election’.⁴

China’s Dual Status in US National Security Strategy

The attacks of September 11 started a new era of the US National Security Strategy. The core element of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, published in September 2002 (NSS-2002), lies in its definitive statement that ‘the crossroads of radicalism and technology’ was the gravest threat to the United States, and the global campaign against international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction its primary goal. The Bush foreign and security policy team has also recognised that ‘we will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers’.⁵ Such judgments and assessments of security threats and big power relationships have paved the way for reshaping China’s image and role in international and regional affairs.

In late August 2004, the national conference of the Republican Party adopted its campaign platform titled ‘A Safer World and a More Hopeful America’ (Platform-2004), almost copying from the NSS-2002. This platform comprehensively addresses current US domestic and foreign policies and draws the agenda for the second Bush Administration.

The consistency of the China policy described in these two historic documents indicates the continuity of Bush’s China policy in the coming four years. In these two documents, the term ‘strategic competitor’ does not appear again with reference to China. The Republican Party emphasises, ‘the United States has sought a constructive relationship with a changing China’. It welcomes ‘the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China’. It believes that the US–China relationship is ‘an important part of our strategy to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia–Pacific region’.

Sneider has remarked in one of his commentaries: ‘US–China relations under Bush had a rocky start four years ago when Chinese aircraft forced the landing of an American spy plane. But those tensions have largely faded in favour of partnership on a range of issues, from terrorism to North Korea’s nuclear programme.’ A senior Asian diplomat told him, ‘Beijing feels comfortable with the Bush team.’⁶

While Platform-2004 highlights good cooperation between the two countries ‘where our common interests overlap’, it also makes clear existing differences on global and regional issues, including human rights and proliferation commitments. It stresses US concerns about China’s military development by highlighting its pursuit of ‘advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbours in the Asia-Pacific region’ and ‘America’s commitment to the self-defence of Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act’.⁷ All these statements suggest that it will not always be sunshine in the sky of Sino–US relations.

China’s Status in the Global Power Structure

The events of 9/11 substantially changed US strategic thinking of relationships with other major powers in the world, particularly China. While fighting terrorism and preventing the proliferation of WMD in cooperation with other major powers, the Bush Administration has not stopped strengthening its deterrence against potential or perceived adversaries in the world. The NSS-2002 highlights US efforts to maintain its capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy to impose its will upon the United States. It even points out that ‘our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States’.⁸ This administration has combined, not replaced, the deterrence strategy against other major powers with the preemption strategy against international terrorism.

For the Bush Administration, ideology is the defining factor that differentiates the global powers. Sustained by faith in the principle of liberty and the value of a free society, the US will use its unequalled strength and influence to promote a balance of power that favours freedom. Secretary of State Rice follows the same line and stated at her swearing-in ceremony on January 28, 2005, that ‘our nation should pursue a foreign policy that is grounded in democratic principles and aligns itself with the efforts of all those around the globe who share our love of liberty’.⁹ In the NSS-2002, the Bush Administration divides countries of the world into two categories, democratic and non-democratic, from its ideological perspective.

Among China, India, and Russia, India is regarded as the largest democracy in the world and a growing global power with which the US has common strategic interests. The US–India relationship is characterised as a ‘strong partnership’ and now, even as a ‘strategic partnership’. With reference to Russia, the NSS-2002 says Washington and Moscow are no longer ‘strategic adversaries’ and characterises their relations as a ‘strategic partnership’. The US has committed itself to integrating Russia in the Euro-Atlantic community.

As far as China is concerned, neither the NSS-2002 nor the Platform-2004 mentions China as a ‘strategic competitor’ or ‘strategic partner’. Both documents ‘welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China’ and say the US seeks a constructive relationship with a changing China. The two documents also warn that growing Chinese military capabilities would constitute a threat to its neighbours.

In terms of the nature of its relations with other countries, the US has divided the world into three categories. The first category includes the allies and friendly nations. They are the forces the US will rely on in pushing forward its global security strategy. The second includes countries in transition. These are neither allies nor enemies of the United States, with an uncertain future in their political and economic development. The US has adopted a strategy of engagement with and deterrence against these countries.

The ‘Axis of Evil’ states belong to the third category. These countries are US adversaries and targets of American military strikes and ‘regime change’ strategies.

The ‘changing China’ is neither an enemy nor an ally of the United States. According to the two documents in question, China is a country in transformation and its future remains unpredictable. The general US strategy toward China is to ensure its peaceful development and deter its intentions and efforts that are supposed to challenge US interests.

China’s Place in the Asia–Pacific Power Structure

In both the NSS-2002 and Platform-2004, the Bush Administration sees China as an important part of the American strategy to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region, and welcomes the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China. But it also sees China’s advanced military capabilities as a threat to neighbouring countries. The QDR Report published on September 30, 2001, highlights that ‘along a broad area of instability that stretches from the Middle East to Northeast Asia, the region contains a volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers,’ and the possibility exists that ‘a military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge in the region’.¹⁰ ‘A military competitor with a formidable resource base’ is a euphemism for China.

As far as Bush’s security strategy for East Asia is concerned, US military alliances with Japan and Australia have been its core. China is seen as a cooperative partner in the economic and trade field, but as a competitor in the political and security fields. In his remarks on President Bush’s inaugural address, Robert Kagan believes that in Asia, ‘we may be on the threshold of strategic reevaluation that places democratic allies, not China, at the core of American strategy.’¹¹

In December 2004, Japan adopted a new defence policy outline that names China and North Korea as possible threats to its security. The Koizumi Cabinet also decided to relax Japan’s arms exports ban to enable it to develop a missile defence system in cooperation with the US. It is reported that the US has requested Japan to boost the monitoring of Chinese naval activities in the Pacific Ocean.¹² The two countries have decided to revise the Japan–US Joint Declaration on Security, strengthening joint US–Japanese deterrence against possible Chinese military operations in the Taiwan Straits.

Though the United States and China have worked together on the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, nonproliferation, counter-terrorism, and other security issues of mutual concern, the US has not forgotten to work with Japan in deterring the perceived Chinese threat in the region. Though the Bush Administration no longer talks of China as a strategic competitor, it is hardly willing to accept China as a strategic partner. Diplomatic coordination between the countries has not been able to remove mutual suspicion and distrust. It is an urgent task for the two powers to establish a mechanism to promote mutual strategic trust in maintaining peace and stability and furthering prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.

Three Hotspots Challenging Future Sino–US Relations

The Bush Administration defines countries as enemies or friends by their attitudes toward terrorism and proliferation. Accordingly, the Bush Administration labelled Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as the ‘Axis of Evil’ and regarded them as adversaries of the United States.

Now that the US has overthrown the Saddam regime and Iraq is under US military occupation, Iran and the DPRK remain military targets of the US regime change strategy if diplomatic efforts fail. But Iran and the DPRK have good relations with Russia, China, and India. The US has pressured the three countries to take its side in its confrontation with Iran and the DPRK. In addition, Taiwan is the most sensitive and important issue in the relations between China and the US These three simmering hotspots will constitute grave challenges to the development of Sino–US relations in the next four years.

The Taiwan Issue

China has always said that the Taiwan issue is at the core of relations with the US. Recently, former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage identified Taiwan as the ‘biggest landmine’ in Sino–US relations. He also stated in December 2004 that the US is not required to come to Taiwan’s defence if a war is caused by Taiwan’s campaign for independence. He pointed out that ‘as for Taiwan, it is still a part of China’.¹³

In October 2004, Colin Powell, Secretary of State in Bush’s first term, also pointed out in an interview with the Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV that Taiwan is not an independent state enjoying sovereignty. Shortly after his re-election last November, President Bush met Chinese President Hu Jintao during the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Chile, reaffirmed America’s commitment to the one-China policy, and promised not to send contradictory signals to the forces working for Taiwanese independence.

These remarks have not only constrained Taiwan’s unilateral provocative actions but also showed that the US would be reluctant to get involved in a military crisis in the Taiwan Straits.

Since the DPP became Taiwan’s ruling party in 2000, pro-independence forces have become increasingly assertive. Chen Shuibian, leader of the Taiwanese authorities, has even designed a roadmap for independence. A new constitution for Taiwan’s independence is to be promulgated in 2006 and put into effect in 2008.

The Taiwan independence campaign constitutes a destabilising and destructive factor in the Asia–Pacific region. The US has realised that the issue is a double-edged sword that will be a barrier in the improvement and development of relations with China. In fact, the efforts of the Taiwan pro-independence forces to intensify cross-straits tensions would not only undermine China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity but also threaten US strategic interests in the region.

It is necessary for China and the United States to jointly establish a crisis management mechanism, helping to increase coordination and avoiding an unexpected and unwanted military confrontation. As Sutter has observed, in the recent past the Bush Administration has come down hard on Taiwanese leaders, and the fear of alienating US support probably will be sufficient to curb possible Taiwanese actions that might provoke a harsh response from China.¹⁴ Actually, such a mechanism could also work to solve other security issues in the region within the framework of the Sino–US security partnership.

But neo-conservative hardliners constitute the core of the Bush foreign and security team. They still see China as the potential strategic competitor in the Asia-Pacific region. In the Platform-2004, the Bush Administration advocated that the US help Taiwan to defend itself. This administration continues to sell advanced weapon systems to Taiwan. Official exchanges between Taiwan and the US have been gradually elevated, and military relations are being escalated. These developments have actually conveyed the wrong message to Taiwan and emboldened the pro-independence forces.

These pro-independence forces have proved to be a destructive factor in relations between China and the US. The anti-China forces in the United States and the pro-independence forces in Taiwan have collaborated and made all efforts to hinder the normal development of relations between the countries. They believe that they can fish in troubled waters of Sino–US tensions.

Chinese leaders have said on many occasions that there is only one China in the world. Both the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan belong to that one China. China will never allow its sovereignty and territory to be divided. The Chinese Government will adhere to the one China principle and resolve the Taiwan issue within the framework of ‘one country, two systems’. It will try its best to resolve the issue peacefully and make every effort, including the use of force, to smash any attempt to split Taiwan from China.

The US and China cannot develop a sound, constructive and cooperative relationship unless the Taiwan issue is handled properly. However, the political situation in Taiwan evolves on the basic fact that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of it. This cannot be changed.

China appreciates President Bush’s oft-professed resolve to observe the one China policy, abide by the three joint communiqués, and not support Taiwanese independence. China has strongly urged the US to stop selling advanced weaponry to Taiwan and cut military links with Taipei, stop official exchanges with Taiwanese authorities, and stop supporting Taiwan’s bid to enter international organisations that only sovereign states are allowed to join. Only in this way can there be a stable development of Sino–US relations and peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits be guaranteed.

The Nuclear Issue on the Korean Peninsula

In its second term, the Bush Administration will continue to push for nonproliferation of WMD, especially nuclear weapons. In East Asia, the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula remains the most pressing issue straining the nerves of the United States. With the coordination and mediation of the Chinese Government, three rounds of six-party talks have been held over the past two years, and the mechanism for talks on settlement of the nuclear issue has already taken shape. Yet, no substantial progress has been made because the US and the DPRK, two key players in the issue, are divided on some concrete procedures and substantial details.

The US has reopened the ‘New York Channel’ by sending Joseph Detrani, special envoy for the Korean nuclear negotiation, to meet North Korea’s UN diplomats. Following recent visits to the DPRK by two US congressional delegations, new signs of compromise have emerged. The US reaffirmed that it has no intention of launching military strikes on the DPRK or overthrowing its government. President Bush has also claimed on occasions that his administration is committed to a peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue through the six-party talks, which include China, Russia, the Republic of Korea and Japan.

But hawkish hardliners in Washington have not given up their preemptive war and regime change strategy in dealing with the issue. Even new National Security Adviser Stephen Hardley warned that the US might take this issue to the United Nations Security Council, and ‘managed pressure’ is needed to end it. In her opening statement during her confirmation hearing, Dr Rice named North Korea as one of the six hotspots, or a source of security threat to the US. She sees North Korea as a ‘dangerous threat’ to the United States and its allies. The ‘hotspots’ naturally remind people of the ‘Axis of Evil’.

It is reported that the coalition of foreign policy hawks is pressing President Bush to adopt a more coercive policy toward the DPRK, despite strong opposition from China and South Korea. William Kristol, the Chair of the Project for the New American Century, issued a statement titled ‘Toward Regime Change in North Korea’.¹⁵

It is generally perceived that the Bush Administration will be more likely to increase pressure on North Korea. The recently passed North Korean Human Rights Act, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the IAEA involvement have constituted a three-pronged strategy for dismantling the North Korean nuclear weaponisation programme. The Japanese government has also threatened to impose an economic embargo on North Korea for its maltreatment of abducted Japanese. Therefore, it is predictable that pushing forward the agenda of the six-party talks will not be easy in Bush’s second term.

Iran’s Nuclear Programme

Since Iran’s Islamic Revolution in the 1970s, the US has regarded Tehran as an adversary in its Middle East strategy. Bush listed Iran in the ‘Axis of Evil’ and accused it of developing nuclear weapons secretly, under the cover of a peaceful nuclear programme. The Bush Administration has also accused Iran of supporting terrorist groups in the Middle East.

Iran claimed that it ‘has the right to enjoy the peaceful use of nuclear technology’.

US policy-makers believe that once Iran has nuclear weapons, US interests in the Middle East will be in great danger. Therefore, the Bush Administration will go on pressing Iran to give up its nuclear programs. Recently, Vice President Dick Cheney placed Iran first on the list of the world’s trouble spots and hinted that unless tougher measures are taken to curtail its nuclear programmes, Israel might launch its own preemptive air strikes. In early January 2005, Seymour Hersh reported in The New Yorker that secret reconnaissance operations have already begun inside Iran, as the Pentagon prepares target lists of nuclear sites that could be attacked from the air or by ground-based commando units.¹⁶

Though China has not participated in the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear programme, Iran is a friendly country for China and an important partner for energy cooperation in the Persian Gulf. China, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, will adhere to its stand for a diplomatic settlement of the Iranian nuclear programme and the principles of dealing with proliferation. China might have to face a possible confrontation between Iran and the US in Bush’s second term.

Sino–US Relations and Partnership

Sino–US relations remain the most important bilateral relationship in China’s overall diplomacy. The two countries have strengthened high-level contacts through hotlines and frequent meetings. The leaders of both countries have agreed that there are more opportunities for cooperation than challenges to be faced in their bilateral relations.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, China firmly and clearly lent support to the US anti-terror campaign. Beijing has repeatedly stated that the US and China are both victims of international terrorism, and China opposes terrorist activities in all forms. US officials have also opposed terrorist activities in Xinjiang and other parts of China. The US State Department officially defined the ETIM (East Turkistan Islamic Movement) as a terrorist organisation. The close coordination of the two countries in the anti-terror campaign has created favourable conditions for stabilising their bilateral relations.

Both countries have also found common ground for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The Chinese government has always opposed the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. China has seen such proliferation as a threat to international and regional peace. In this respect, China has supported the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) and worked with the US in coping with nuclear proliferation in South Asia and on the Korean Peninsula.

In August 2002, the Chinese government promulgated the Regulations on the Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies and the attached Control List. China has also strengthened control on the export of dual-use biological agents and related equipment and technologies as well as dual-use chemicals, equipment, and technologies. The Bush Administration has made positive remarks on the Chinese efforts in this respect.

As major trade partners, the US and China are closely interdependent in a global economy. The US is China’s second largest trade partner and China is America’s fourth largest trade partner. China is the largest developing country and the US is the largest developed country. The two largest economies in the world are highly supplementary. It is evident that economic and trade interests are the driving forces of improving relations.

Military ties constitute an important part of the two countries’ relationship. China has been active in furthering the military relationship and hopes for a healthy and stable development of ties between the two armies. Sino–US military exchanges have come back on track. In early 2005, the first defence policy dialogue between the US Defence Department and the Ministry of Defence of the PRC was held and produced satisfactory results. The American side conveyed the message that Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld would like to visit China this year.

The two-day closed-door talk was held in Beijing and touched upon the Taiwan issue, maritime military security and exchange programs in 2005. The Chinese side described the dialogue as ‘fruitful: and the American side said it was ‘pleasantly surprised and pleased’ with many issues being discussed and being ‘successful’ in some areas.¹⁷

Both sides agreed to promote military ties through pragmatic exchanges. Visits by top military leaders and exchange of military professionals and institutions have been put on the agenda. The establishment of a hotline between the two militaries and the initiation of a strategic dialogue are also being discussed.

As we look back on the ups and downs in relations between China and the US, we should remember that the road ahead would not be smooth. Several factors will affect the healthy development of these relations. There are two influential factions within the Bush Administration—one is the so-called moderate faction, the other is the so-called hawkish one. In dealing with the rise of China, the moderate approach is generally one of engagement while the hawkish approach is of containment. As a compromise, the general policy is a combination of engagement and containment. The Clinton Administration pursued this policy, and the Bush Administration has come back to the track. Whenever China–US relations develop smoothly, the hawkish faction tries to derail the process. That is why calm months will always be followed by stormy days in Sino–US relations.

The debates on China policy will probably continue in Bush’s second term. But the two governments have agreed that they should work together for a constructive and cooperative relationship. In the complicated and ever-changing international scenario, the two countries have many common interests. I believe that new common ground will emerge in their joint efforts to preserve global peace and strategic security and deal with tensions in the Asia-Pacific. If China and the US confront each other, there can be no winners; if they cooperate, there can be no losers.