Preface

What does the world expect of the second Bush Administration? The answer is complicated. The first Bush Administration created a series of tensions with the rest of the world. These were both in terms of bilateral relationships and also in terms of how the Bush Administration’s grand strategy was viewed. Several schisms between the United States and its allies had appeared—most notably the American decision to wage war in Iraq and the rejection of the Kyoto Treaty. The sense of disappointment with the Bush Administration led to discussions about the United States abandoning its role as a global hegemon—a role it had filled since the demise of the Soviet Union—to becoming an empire that pursued unilateral policies in international affairs and suffered from imperial hubris.

At the same time, the attacks of 9/11 created a recognition in many countries of the world that the problems of radicalism and terrorism were here to stay and that they were no longer immune to them. The bombings in Bali, Madrid, and London only reinforced this belief. Various national governments believed, as discussed in this volume, that the only way to deal with the problem was through international cooperation. The problem was that while some elements of cooperation were easy to put in place, for example, greater intelligence sharing between affected countries, there was no clear understanding of how to create a long term solution to tackling international terror. The fact that in a globalised world it meant placing restrictions on the free flow of labour was problematic. Equally problematic was the differing perceptions of what restraints could be placed on the civil liberties of citizens.

Further, there was a real belief, despite the efforts of the Bush Administration to state that its policies were not aimed against the broader Muslim world, that the war against Al-Qaeda and international terror would become a ‘clash of civilizations.’ European countries, with significant Muslim populations, were highly conscious of this constraint and it helped shape foreign policy perspectives—particularly on Iraq. The divergent views about Iraq on both sides of the Atlantic led to a serious rift between the nations of the West—with Donald Rumsfeld referring to France and Germany as ‘Old Europe’—and to a significant portion of Europeans hoping for a Kerry victory in the 2004 presidential elections. The disquiet over Iraq was equally strong in the non-western world: while some countries were not convinced by the Bush Administration’s case for invasion, others like India, subsequently stepped back from providing troops for the alliance.

While globally some countries were hoping for a regime change in Washington, once George Bush was reelected the emphasis was on trying to work with the Bush Administration for the second time. From Washington the initial signals were mixed. Paul Wolfowitz was shifted off to the World Bank, thus removing one of the more controversial and influential neo-conservatives from the administration. At the same time, mixed signals were sent by moving the edgy and combative John Bolton to the United Nations. Condoleeza Rice’s replacement of Colin Powell as Secretary of State was also perceived in some quarters as removing the one voice in the administration that was seen as the influence of restraint.

What this book looks at, therefore, is what the world wants from the second Bush Administration. How various countries feel they can work with the United States to not only advance their own interests but also to create a more secure international system. It also examines the perceptions that different countries have of United States foreign and security policies.

In the study certain common themes emerge. All nations recognise that the United States will be, in the near to medium term, the sole superpower in the international system and that we will thus remain in a unipolar international system. They also recognise the role that the United States plays in the maintenance of security and international order. At the same time, they would like a United States which is more open to their ideas and opinions and willing to carry out international relations within a multilateral context. In effect this means a United States’ that works through international institutions and becomes the signatory of international treaties like the Kyoto Treaty. Most importantly, there are serious questions raised about the doctrine of preemption that permits the United States to take military action against any potential threat without seeking permission from the international community.

The American Perspective

The perspective of the Bush Administration was, and remains, that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 had fundamentally changed the world and put Washington in the position that it had to be more proactive in dealing with the threat of international terrorism. This meant not only going after suprastate terrorists but also trying to prevent the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—hence the dubbing of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as the axis of evil.

The events of 9/11 also gave support to the neo-conservatives who believed that long term solution to the problems of the Middle East was to change the structure of society and government in those states. The subsequent invasion of Iraq split open the western alliance and a situation of ugly name calling on both sides of the Atlantic. Americans started calling French fries freedom fries, while many Europeans saw the Bush Administration as pursuing arrogant and aggressive policies. While nation-building in Iraq continues, and faces a significant insurgency, the rift between Europe and America has slowly begun to heal.

But the more fundamental questions remain. Will the rest of the world accept the American position of preemption, especially since the issue of Iran’s nuclear ambitions remains a concern to policy makers in Washington? How will the United States and Europe work to repair their fractured relationship? France and Germany were both critical of the US policy towards Iraq but at the same time know that they will have to repair the relationship with the remaining superpower.

Equally important is, how China and India, the two emerging major powers in the international system view their relationship with the United States. As seen in the chapters in this volume, both countries view the relationship with the United States as one of opportunities and challenges. The Indians see the technological, economic, and military advantages of the relationship with the United States. At the same time they remain concerned about whether the Untied States will facilitate India’s progress to major power status. China, similarly, recognises the advantages of the economic relationship with the United States but at the same time recognises the dangers of a confrontation over Taiwan and fears that the United States will not be able to adjust to China’s possible ascension to the status of number one power in the international system.

In essence the book debates the claims of multilateralism in a unipolar world. It also examines how the major actors in world politics are attempting to shape their policies to develop a constructive relationship with the United States.