What, historically, has been the purpose of family? Beyond perpetuation of the species, the answer is simple: money. The “family unit” has always been a convenient social structure for organizing and supporting economic activity. The traditional family as understood in the West today—a mom, a dad, and two or three kids—is merely a vestige of the agrarian economic structure of the Biological phase. As recently as one century ago, nearly all of the world’s population depended on family farming for economic survival, and billions in the developing world still do today.

Note

As Figure 7-1 notes, family life and the roles of women and children have shifted dramatically only in the last century. Family size largely declines with wealth creation, as societies enjoy greater control over their lives through greater economic and political rights, as well as emancipation from time-consuming chores and involuntary pregnancy via technology. Children, too, have evolved from farmhands to protected populations in modern life.

Figure 7-1. Family trends and GDP, 2000BCE–2000CE.

Both industrialization and wealth creation dramatically influence the form and purpose of families. The move from fields to factories and offices can produce massive social and economic dislocations, fundamentally redefining the meaning of home life. Moreover, with prosperity, a number of factors combine to revamp the gender roles that characterize the agrarian family, triggered largely by women’s gradual economic, political, and social enfranchisement.

In traditional agrarian societies of the past and present, the family is, first and foremost, a unit of economic production. These agrarian families also perform functions assumed by state and social institutions in more advanced economies: education of children, eldercare, transmission of functional and occupational skills, and religious instruction. Biological societies stress tradition, inherited status, and community needs, supported by absolute religious standards and rigid roles for men, women, and children.^[1] These roles were evident in pre-industrial America, where 95% of the population farmed, and still can be found today in many regions of the Biological world, including Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

These social and economic realities of farming are the basis for most familial relationships in Biological cultures. In this context, marriage is, in many ways, a business transaction with property and possessions trading hands—more like a corporate merger than a personal union of choice. In the 17^th and early 18^th Centuries, this concept was codified in the West: Laws of the time gave parents the power to “dispose” of their children in marriage, and it was expected that parents would take an active role overseeing their child’s choice of a spouse.^[2] Similar structures can be seen today in traditional societies, where parents arrange marriages for their children based on economic, social, and community convenience. Individual choice in marriage, for both men and women, based on a concept of romantic love, is a relatively newly accepted social norm in the West and still is by no means universal.

The agrarian family structure places particular hardships on women. While they are thankfully a thing of the past in post-Biological societies, these burdens remain the reality in many parts of the world. One of the most significant obstacles to women’s progress is early motherhood. Whereas many Material women have the choice to defer or forego marriage, and have personal control over the number of children they wish to have, women in Biological cultures often don’t have these options. In many developing countries, at least 20% of women—in some countries half—give birth to their first child before age 18. The religious, parental, and societal expectation is that women will marry young, produce a child as soon thereafter as possible, and continue bearing children for as long they can.^[3]

The agrarian way of life also gives “childhood” a different meaning in many Biological societies than it holds today in wealthier countries. Of course, most parents love their children and want the best for them regardless of economic status. But children in poorer agrarian households are, by necessity, considered “little adults,” and are expected to perform grown-up duties as soon as they are able, sometimes as early as age 10.^[4] The nature of agriculture requires a large number of these inexpensive farmhands, which, in conjunction with high rates of infant and child mortality, disease, malnutrition, and daily hazards, encouraged large families until the early 20^th Century in the West and in many countries today.

There is a direct link between fertility rates and economic growth; lower rates seem to go hand-in-hand with greater economic achievement. In 1790, the average size of a U.S. household was 5.8 people. In 1890, it was 4.9, 3.3 in 1960, and 2.6 by 1993. As noted in Figure 7-2, wealth rose sharply as family size decreased.^[5] This trend is now global, with many countries shifting toward smaller nuclear families. Even in countries where the fertility rate is high, women indicate they would like to have fewer children, but do not have the financial means or cultural freedom to access the medical technology they need (i.e., contraception or abortion). In Kenya, for example, the gap between desired and actual fertility is two children. Yet fertility has already fallen in Kenya, from a high of more than 8 children per woman in the 1970s to under 4.5 children in the second half of the 1990s.^[7]

Figure 7-2. Rising wealth, shrinking families in the U.S.^[6]

A 2000 UN global study on women noted that smaller families are also linked to more favorable conditions for children’s education and nutrition, better health for all family members, and improved opportunities for women to expand their role in society.^[8] It makes economic sense: With fewer children, there are more resources available per child (see Figure 7-3). By decreasing the number of dependents, parents can provide more for the mouths they do have to feed. It is a virtuous cycle of family planning: Smaller families promote greater economic opportunity per capita, and greater opportunity encourages education and social investment, which lead to smaller families. The very process of industrialization, de facto, promotes smaller families: People move to cities and have less space and less need for children to help in the fields.

Figure 7-3. Wealth and family size globally, year 2000.

As agrarian life has waned around the world since the 1970s, fertility rates have declined globally as well. Not surprisingly, regions that reduced their fertility rates were among the most economically dynamic. East Asia, for example, slowed its rate from more than 5% to less than 2% (comparable to U.S., Japan, and West Europe rates) in 32 years—the world’s fastest reduction—while its economy grew the fastest. In historical perspective, it took Great Britain almost 100 years, beginning in the 19^th Century, to lower its fertility rate by this amount.^[9]

Unfortunately, the reverse cycle is often apparent in Biological societies where poor access to healthcare and family planning and the low social status of women continue to drive high rates of population growth and large family sizes. This is particularly evident in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and parts of South Asia. As Figure 7-4 illustrates, the poorest countries continue to have the highest fertility rates, almost 7% on average versus less than 2% in industrialized countries.^[10]

Source: World Bank

Figure 7-4. Fertility rates, 1970–1992.

Family life has also been affected by shifting dwelling patterns. At the beginning of the 20^th Century, only 10% of the world’s population lived in cities and towns; today, half do.^[11] The urbanization that enveloped the world with industrialization has pushed people from farm to factory, encouraged by industrial jobs and higher incomes and better access to services and education. Figure 7-5 illustrates this trend.

Figure 7-5. Total urban and rural populations, 1550–2030^[12] (est).

This movement has had a profound impact on the extended family. Whereas Biological home life includes extended relationships and overlapping kinship systems, the urban, Material family tends to be separated geographically from relatives. In rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa, for example, urbanization has led to long distances between young people and their parents and grandparents, who previously played a special role in traditional education and socialization. In the Middle East, traditional extended families are gradually withering; in Egypt, for example, only 16% of all households support extended families versus more than half in the mid-20^th Century.^[13] Urbanization has also had an impact on the nuclear family. Urban society requires greater autonomy and responsibility from each of its members: greater autonomy, because family proximity is no longer a permanent feature that helps solve problems that arise; greater responsibility, because family stability demands more resolve amid the frictions and aggravations of urban life.

Urbanization has been most pronounced in the U.S. and western Europe. In 1800, only 5% of the U.S. population lived in urban areas. A result of economic opportunity, this number rose to 50% by 1920. Today, in both the U.S. and western Europe, the urban population stands at 70%.^[14] The move to urban areas is now accelerating in developing countries as well. In 1950, only 17.8% of their populations was considered urban. The Population Council estimates that by 2030, this number will approach 60%.^[15] This process is occurring most rapidly in Material countries, where economic opportunity is pulling people toward cities. For example, Mexico’s urban population grew from nearly half in 1960 to almost 80% in 2000 and Turkey’s rose from 30–75% during the same period.^[16]

Most of the family’s change in form and function—not just size—is inextricably tied to women’s evolving roles in society. In many agrarian places today, women are limited to domestic roles, with rights granted only through their husbands. This is similar to conditions in the West in the 18^th Century. Back then, after a woman married, she was no longer allowed to own property, even if she had inherited it or brought it to the marriage. If a woman worked outside the home, all of her earnings belonged to her husband. Under English Common Law, a married woman did not possess rights of her own, because her rights were “covered” by those of her husband. The idea of “coverture”—that a man and woman are one person—was supported by the religious and philosophical ideas of the time. Socially, single women were ranked far below those who were married. Since women’s activities were essentially restricted to childrearing, church-going, and homemaking, a single woman had little, if any, social life. Additionally, supporting unmarried daughters placed an extra burden on parents, who could ill-afford an additional mouth to feed. Marriage, then, became a woman’s key means of survival as well as her only means of social interaction.^[17] Women were also barred from most forms of civil participation (from voting, to sitting on juries, to suing), were forbidden to speak publicly outside of church, and had few educational opportunities (the first college to admit women in the U.S. was Oberlin College in 1834, some 200 years after Harvard College opened its doors to men).^[18] These repressive social and domestic structures are still tolerated in many developing countries. Even if limitations on women’s rights are not legally codified as they were in the pre-industrial West, cultural and religious strictures remain powerful.

However, industrialization, prosperity, and the decline of religious authority have created greater opportunities for women in societies that have progressed out of the Biological stage. After centuries of social and economic subordination, women in the industrialized world have been gaining access to education, employment, and leadership opportunities. Many are postponing, or even rejecting entirely, the traditional roles of wife and mother, opting to pursue other goals instead.

The progress of women’s rights in the West can be linked to one key factor: wealth. It is greater prosperity that has encouraged better and more accessible education opportunities, undoubtedly vital to women’s economic enfranchisement. With women’s newfound ability to support themselves, the whole nature of why they marry and procreate takes on a new meaning with far-reaching social reverberations.

Since 1980, women’s economic activity rates, measured by formal employment, have increased almost everywhere except in sub-Saharan Africa, the transition economies of eastern Europe and central Asia, and Oceania. The largest increase occurred in South America, where female economic activity rates rose from 26 to 45% between 1980 and 1997. At the same time, women’s education (both primary and secondary levels) rose to 85%. The lowest rates were found in northern Africa and western Asia, where less than one-third of women were economically active^[19] and less than 50% were enrolled in primary and secondary education. It must be noted that measures of women’s economic activity generally do not include “domestic” or “household” activity. Indeed, the UN has estimated that women work, on average, more hours per week than men in most parts of the world, but are rarely compensated for this work. In Kenya, for example, while almost 80% of men’s work is income-earning, only 41% of women’s work is income-earning.^[20]

One major historic obstacle to women’s participation in the formal workforce has been strong cultural and practical restrictions on those with babies or young children working outside the home. In wealthier societies, as women are more integrated into the labor pool, these hurdles are shrinking. A November 2001 report from the U.S. Commerce Department’s Census Bureau shows major changes in maternity leave and employment patterns for new American mothers from 1960–1985. According to the study, women’s work schedules are less likely to be interrupted by the birth of their first child, and women today are making longer term commitments to working than in the 1960s.^[21] The number of U.S. women working during pregnancy before their first birth increased by 23% between 1961–65 and from 44–67% in the 1991–95 period. Also, whereas only 14% of mothers returned to work by the sixth month after the birth of their first child between 1961–65, 52% of mothers had returned to work by that point from 1991–95.^[22] The increased labor force participation of pregnant women and new mothers has resulted in a change in public policy and workplace regulations in the U.S. In 1991–95, 43% of women received paid leave before or after their first child’s birth, while only 16% did in 1961–65. While the U.S. is still behind many developed nations in regard to its maternity/paternity leave and childcare policies, the presence of new mothers in the workforce is effecting serious policy adjustments.^[23]

More women are also staying in the workforce during their reproductive years. In the 1970s, economic activity rates peaked for women in their early 20s in the West as well as in less-developed countries. Now, according to regional data for 1990, labor force participation rates globally are high for women in their 20s, rise through their 30s, and only decline after age 50. This trend is both cause and effect of smaller family size and increased employment opportunities.^[28]

Not only is there greater occupational opportunity available to women in more advanced economies, but women are also starting to be valued more as employees. The discrepancy between women’s and men’s earnings in the manufacturing sector narrowed between 1990 and 1997 in 26 out of 36 countries surveyed by the UN.^[31] Indeed, according to a Gallup poll on gender and society (see Figure 7-6), the majority of people in the countries polled believed that the lives of women were getting better (though men were still better off).^[32]

Figure 7-6. Gallup poll: Have the lives of women gotten better or worse?^[33]

Marriage, for most women engaged in the wealth process, has evolved from a survival necessity into a matter of choice: Love and a relationship are now considered higher needs, which is a shift from the focus on procreation and security. In fact, many women are choosing not to marry at all. According to the 1998 U.S. census, 40% of adult women (18 and over) are single, versus 30% in 1968. The percentage age of unmarried women in the U.S. ages 25–29 and 30–34 tripled between 1970 and 1998,^[34] and the majority of one-person households in wealthy countries is now made up of women.^[35]

Women in industrial nations are also postponing marriage until much later in life, wanting, it seems, to pursue careers before having a family. People are opting to “find themselves,” to explore all of the options open to them, before settling into a binding relationship. Twenty-somethings, regardless of gender, in all advanced nations, have the economic ability to support themselves outside of the convention of marriage. Since 1980, the marriage age has risen everywhere. The greatest increase is in the wealthiest countries, with an average increase of 3–4 years for both men and women. There has also been an increase in southern Africa (3 years for women and 2 for men). In northern and eastern Africa, the marriage age of women has increased by a year. Not surprisingly, the youngest ages for marriage are in the poorest regions of southern Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, averaging 20 and 21 years, respectively, and reflecting the Biological, agrarian lifestyle that still dominates those regions.^[36]

As people become more concerned with their individual needs in Material and Experiential societies, there has been a major increase in divorce rates. The number of divorced or separated women aged 45–59 increased, on average, from 5% in 1980 to 9% in the 1990s in Europe, and from 9–14% in the developed countries outside of Europe. Even in Latin American and the Caribbean, the number of divorced women aged 45–59 increased from 7–10%. Countries like Belgium, Luxembourg, the Nordic countries, Switzerland, and the UK have divorce rates of 40 out of 100 marriages (about 51 in Sweden and the U.S.).^[37] As traditional roles have changed, people are not constrained by social or religious conformity and are free to pursue their individual fulfillment within or outside of marriage.

Wealth creation has not only affected the composition of the family, but also our perceptions of gender, sex, divorce, religion, and abortion, to name a few subjects. Once strictly defined, “family” in the wealthier world is a more flexible term, with many people hard-pressed to define it at all. In Material and Experiential strata, family now encompasses single-parent households, working mothers, same-sex relationships, and lifelong non-traditional unions.

There are significant statistics that reflect the increasing number of couples in the high-income world who cohabit without marrying.^[38] In six European countries, more than half of women aged 20–24 with partners live in unmarried unions; in Sweden, it is more than 75%. There has also been an increase in consensual unions in lower income countries. For example, in Botswana, the increase is thought to be due, at least in part, to the shift from a rural to a more modern cash economy.^[39]

Moving even further from the traditional family, in wealthier societies, same-sex couples are tying the knot. The Netherlands was the first nation to eliminate marriage as an institution limited to a man and a woman. Any pairing of humans can now qualify for a marriage license. The new law also grants divorce and adoption rights to atypical couples.^[40] While the Netherlands—a country with very Experiential values—is definitely on the vanguard of homosexual rights, similar movements are gaining attention and validity in most developed nations. In Germany—another Experiential-trending country—an August 2001 law took effect allowing gays and lesbians who register their relationship the same inheritance rights as heterosexual couples. They can also now share a surname and bring foreign partners to join them in Germany.^[41] In the U.S., although no state allows same-sex marriage, more states are granting same-sex couples many of the privileges of marriage.^[42] For example, in Massachusetts, a law was recently passed that extends many “domestic partner” benefits to all state employees, whether the “partner” is of the same or opposite sex.^[43] Of course, these trends are still not the norm. In many parts of the world—particularly in Biological and Material states—homosexuality is still condemned, if not outlawed, and in some extreme cases, individuals can be imprisoned for expressing their sexuality.

The “Human Values Survey” suggests that, in the advanced nations of western Europe, North America, and East Asia, the form and function of families continues to evolve.^[44] The survey shows that from 1981–1990, views toward divorce became more lenient in 18 out of 20 societies, including the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, North Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Japan, and Argentina. The only hardening was found in Hungary and South Africa, two countries that were experiencing political and economic crises throughout the 1980s.^[45] This change is very telling. Marriage, the traditional foundation of the family, is no longer a sacred, unbreakable union. Stripped of its economic efficacy, marriage has become a voluntary (and sometimes temporary) social institution.

Similarly, 19 out of 20 societies became more permissive toward abortion: U.S., Canada, Mexico, Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, North Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Hungary, and Argentina. South Africa was the only exception.^[46] Like the changing attitudes toward divorce, the greater tolerance of abortion makes a strong statement about beliefs concerning family; procreation is no longer the primary purpose of a union.

With wealth creation in full motion, children in the Material world, and even many in progressive Biological societies, are no longer expected to “earn their keep” by working early in their lives. Instead, they are nurtured throughout ever-lengthening childhoods. They begin formal schooling earlier and generally continue, supported by their parents, until their late teen years, and often into their early 20s in Experiential-trending populations. Controlled fertility has allowed wealthier societies to invest more per capita in child development than ever before, seeding greater human capital for continued prosperity. To enforce this changing attitude toward children’s status, laws banning many forms of child labor and exploitation have been implemented in the last century, making children some of the most protected members of Material and Experiential-trending societies.^[50]

Even in the Biological world, children can no longer “be seen and not heard”; their sheer numbers dictate attention. The UN estimates that in 2000, there were 1.1 billion people between the ages of 15 and 24, representing an unprecedented 18% of the global population. Eight out of 10 members of this age group live in the developing world. Figure 7-7 illustrates global population composition by age.

Figure 7-7. Global population composition by age, 2000.^[49]

The size of this young population is the result of high fertility rates during the 1960s and 1970s, combined with declining mortality rates of children under five, particularly among infants. According to the UN, in the four decades from 1960 to 2000, infant mortality in the developing world fell from 141 to 63 deaths per 1,000 births.

Not only are there large youth pockets in Biological nations, but they represent a very large proportion of their respective populations. In both Asia and Latin America, nearly one-third of the populations are under age 15. Africa, with 43% of the population, or 338 million young people under the age of 15, continues to be the youngest region. Globally, by 2010, there will be 2.7 billion people between the ages of 10 and 34. Despite the drop in fertility that has occurred in many countries since 1970, the large numbers of children born to the preceding “high-fertility generation” ensure that the “youth bulge” will continue for several decades. This creates an extraordinary demand for social services, such as health and education, as well as for jobs in the developing world.

Compared to the robust population trends in Biological and early-Material countries, the wealthier industrialized nations present a striking contrast. People under the age of 15 average approximately 18% of late-stage Material and Experiential-trending populations, which is less than half of most developing countries. The U.S., with 21% under age 15, actually has one of the higher proportions of young people among advanced economies. The lowest proportion is 15%, found in Japan, Spain, and Greece.^[51]

This “graying” process, where a society’s average age increases with lower fertility and longer life expectancy, raises new challenges with regard to senior citizens. For example, the extended agrarian family often includes grandparents who live under the same roof with grandchildren. Indeed, in some traditional societies such as India and China, sons have often borne the traditional responsibility of taking care not only of their parents, but also of their wives’ parents. In this respect, sons have served as “social security,” or an “individual retirement account,” for parents and in-laws, one reason that male children are highly desirable in these societies.^[52] This system works well within the Biological demographic structure, with a relatively higher number of young people taking care of parents with shorter life expectancies.

However, for Material societies, where people are now living, on average, 20–30 years longer than those in Biological-dominant places, long-term eldercare has emerged as a serious social concern. Adding to the pressure is the physical mobility that comes with prosperity; children and parents are often separated now by great distances. To meet these concerns, in wealthier Material and Experiential-trending countries, a variety of public and private pension schemes have developed to allow workers to save and live independently for relatively long periods after retirement.

Furthermore, many private-sector alternatives for eldercare have emerged: full-time nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and in-home care services, among others. The options are many, but they are also costly. In the U.S., for example, public and private spending for long-term senior care services (including nursing homes) was estimated at more than $127 billion in 1998, and may top $340 billion by 2040.^[53] While sons and daughters may not be required to board older parents and in-laws as in the past, familial obligations still exist. American adult children still provide “informal” caregiving (such as supporting parents with food, transportation, and other assistance), which totals nearly $200 billion in value each year.^[54]

Wealth and longevity have converged to form the so-called “Sandwich Generation,” middle-aged parents who are caught in the bind of caring for children (many now in school until their 20s) as well as parents (many now surviving into their 80s). There has also been an emergence of four-generation “Club Sandwiches,” with those in their 50s or 60s feeling responsible for aging parents, adult children, and grandchildren, or those in their 30s and 40s caring for young children, aging parents, and grandparents.^[55]

In the past, taking care of parents with physical ailments was common. Now, while health and longevity have improved, the cognitive problems that accompany old age are becoming more prevalent. In 1998, the percentage of older Americans with moderate to severe memory impairment (including Alzheimer’s disease and other forms of dementia) ranged from approximately 4% among persons aged 65–69 to about 36% of those 85 or older.^[56] Why is this statistic important? Because in the U.S., Japan, and parts of Europe, individuals 85 years and older are among the fastest growing population segments. In the U.S. alone, there were 4 million people aged 85+ in 2000, and this is expected to rise to 18 million by 2050.^[57] Over the next two generations, therefore, there may be some 6+ million Americans with severe or moderate memory impairment.

As wealth has brought extended life, it has also brought the burdens of greater longevity. Government debates over pension and health policies have already begun, and the stress, both financial and emotional, that meeting the needs of the elderly places on families is evident. The Material and Experiential-trending world is only in the early stages of this trend, but dealing with a rapidly aging population will be a critical challenge in the coming decades.

The family may have been the most revered social institution to be transformed by the wealth creation process. In Material and Experiential societies, home, or “private,” life and work and “public” life are no longer integrated. Mothers work outside the home, leaving the care of children to schools, day-care centers, or nannies. Many retirees no longer have to depend exclusively on their children after their working years are finished; they use their own accumulated savings to live alone, with hired assistance or in eldercare institutions. Industrialization, urbanization, secularization, and women’s entry into the formal economy have combined to profoundly reshape the concepts of intimacy and family, as well as the roles of women and men, mothers and fathers, grandparents and children. Widespread wealth has allowed for more mutually agreeable, voluntary unions. Individualism, promoted by prosperity, has allowed men and women to make their own choices about intimate relationships, whether based on love, money, convenience, or lust; whether they are sanctified by a church or recognized by the state; whether they are long-term or short-term, many or few. Families are no longer formed solely for economic usefulness; having children is a personal choice for most, not a societal or religious imperative. Children are born to married couples, gay couples, single women and anonymous sperm donors, or surrogate mothers; they are adopted, sometimes from around the globe; they are created by the modern miracles of fertility drugs, in-vitro fertilization, and egg donation. In a very real sense, people now look toward the family they choose to create as their core reason for living, part of their self-actualization. Families in the wealthy world are the products of conscious choice. They are expressions of deep, heartfelt hopes and desires.

These dramatic changes in values and lifestyles have only been made possible through the economic and social transformations that have occurred during the last century, a relative blink in history. Many may bemoan these changes as a loss of tradition. But it is clear that wealth and freedom are connected, and the exercise of this freedom has created a more flexible, inclusive definition of “family” in the modern world. As long as the wealth process continues, we should continue to see greater variety in the form, function, and purpose of family. These are the “family values” of the wealthier world.