VII
(1891–1945)
NO BETTER EXEMPLAR of military leadership can be found than Erwin Rommel. As a lieutenant and captain in World War I, he led infantry on the Western and Italian fronts, in the latter often penetrating enemy lines and in the final days capturing thousands of prisoners. As a general and field marshal in World War II, Rommel made legend as the “Desert Fox” in North Africa at the head of his Afrika Korps. He was a “natural.” Major General von Mellenthin, a lieutenant colonel in Africa, wrote: “Between Rommel and his troops was that mutual understanding which cannot be explained and analyzed, but which is the gift of the gods. The Afrika Korps followed Rommel wherever he led, however hard he drove them . . . the men knew that Rommel was the last man to spare Rommel.”1
The son of a WÜrttemberg mathematics teacher, Rommel decided he wanted to be a soldier as a boy, although his family had no military tradition. At 18 he volunteered into the Imperial German Army as an officer-cadet, and was made a lieutenant in 1912. In World War I, he became one of Germany’s most highly decorated officers, winning the Iron Cross (2nd and 1st Class) on the Western front, and Pour le Mérite in 1917 on the Italian front.2 By that time, he had been wounded three times, and was relegated to staff duty for the rest of the war. Between campaigns he married Lucie-Maria Mollin, his “Dearest Lu,” to whom he wrote almost daily during both world wars.3
Rommel was physically ordinary—about 58 tall, slender, well muscled, with brown hair and eyes—but was a born leader, fearless and imaginative, with coup d’oeil or Fingerspitzengefü hl—the ability to size up a battlefield instantly and capitalize on it. In 1917 in Italy, “Detachment Rommel” repeatedly penetrated enemy lines, destroying positions and taking prisoners. At war’s end he was a captain, and served for nine years more without promotion.
After 1933,and in the early years of World War II, Hitler, who admired Rommel, promoted him rapidly.4 When the United States entered the war (December 1941), Rommel, at age 50,was already famous. He had commanded apanzer division in the blitzkrieg against France in 1940,bested British armies in North Africa in 1941–42,briefly invaded Egypt, and had risen to field marshal.5
Rommel was sent to “the desert” in February 1941 to help Germany’s Italian ally. Field Marshal Rodolfo Graziani had invaded Egypt; General A. P. Wavell, British Middle East commander, loosed Sir Richard O’Connor, with the Western Desert Force (soon renamed Eighth Army), which drove the Italians far into Libya, capturing 130,000 men. Rommel, with the Afrika Korps—initially fewer than 20,000 men—landed in Tripoli in February 1941.6Despite his small force, Rommel went on the attack on 24 March.7 By 15 June he had driven the British 500 miles east—to the border of Egypt—but had bypassed Tobruk. In July, General Claude Auchinleck replaced Wavell in the Middle East;8 Eighth Army was under Sir Alan Cunningham (later N. M. Ritchie). Cunningham was reinforced to about 750 tanks (vs. Rommel’s 400,half Italian) and in November relieved the Tobruk garrison and forced Rommel to retreat into western Libya.
Rommel’s Afrika Korps had become Panzer Gruppe Afrika and then Panzer Armee Afrika, with three German divisions (2 tank, 1 infantry), and two Italian Infantry corps. His tank strength was half that of the enemy, but he supplemented tanks with 88mm guns.9 In early 1942,Rommel advanced again, and in May, at Gazala, scored a spectacular victory. Leaving a holding force on the coast, he attacked from the south through the British rear, was trapped, but broke out and drove north to the sea. On 21 June, he took Tobruk, and was promoted to field marshal (General Feldmarschall).
Auchinleck took personal command of Eighth Army and on 28 June made a stand at Mersa Matruh—100 miles into Egypt—but again retreated. Rommel pressed forward to within 60 miles of Alexandria, but he was short of everything; half his troops rode in captured vehicles. Meanwhile Field Marshal Harold Alexander took command in the Middle East; General Bernard Montgomery took over Eighth Army. “Monty” had been monumentally reinforced with men and American tanks. During 31 August-7 September 1942,in a vicious battle at Alam Halfa, Montgomery stopped Rommel, who retreated to El Alamein and dug in. Hitler promised rockets and Tiger tanks (88mm guns), but none came.
Montgomery won the Battle of El Alamein (23 October-4 November 1942); he had 195,000 troops and 1,000 tanks against Rommel’s 50,000 Germans, 54,000 Italians, and 510 tanks (300 Italian). Moreover, the RAF controlled the air. After nine days of pounding, Rommel retreated—eventually into Tunisia. Monty was on his heels and Americans and more British had landed in Morocco and Algeria—threatening from the west. Rommel could only delay the Allies; he was replaced before the Germans surrendered in May 1943.
Rommel had routine assignments until 1944,when an allied invasion of Europe loomed. He was then sent to shore up Hitler’s “Atlantic Wall,” then given command of one of two army groups under Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, charged with defeating the Allied invasion force. Rundstedt wanted to keep the panzers back from the coast, ready to strike wherever the Allies landed. Rommel insisted they should be concentrated near the coast, since Allied airpower would prevent their moving in daylight. Privately, he felt that if the Allies got ashore, the war was lost. Hitler, who had taken over command of German forces, ordered a compromise, dooming his own defense.
After the D-Day landings (6 June 1944), Rommel fought hard, despite premonitions of defeat. En route home for his wife’s birthday on 17 July 1944,his staff car was strafed by a British fighter and he was severely wounded. Before he recovered, he was arrested for implication in the bomb plot of 20 July that almost killed Hitler. (Apparently he knew of it, but was not involved.) Offered the choice of suicide or public disgrace and destitution, he took the poison offered—for the sake of his family.
Rommel reached his greatest fame in 1942,in North Africa. Yet he commanded only a few divisions. Other field marshals, such as Erich von Manstein in Russia, had army groups of up to 130 divisions. Rommel’s notoriety was based primarily on his mastery of desert war and his victories against great odds. However, it was also a product of German propaganda (though he was never a Nazi) and partly of the publicity of his enemies, who lauded his humanity and chivalry.10
Rommel is the best remembered of the German generals, and deservedly so. He was a man of character, a general both feared and respected by his enemies, and revered by his troops.
Rommel’s Infantrie greift an (my translation) will get short shrift below. Based on his experiences in the Great War, it is largely a “how to” book for small-unit infantry. Most of the material quoted is from B. H. Liddell Hart’s Rommel Papers, with clarifications from his major source, Rommel’s Krieg ohne Hass (1950), edited by his wife, Lucie, and General Fritz Bayerlein, his chief of staff in North Africa. The British translation of the Rommel Papers has not been “Americanized,” by changing petrol to gasoline, and the like.
Retrospective Views and Observations on Actions
[From Infantrie greift an (Infantry Attacks).]
Digging In
[France, Doulcon Woods, September 1914.]
In view of the power of today’s weapons, troops must be dispersed and each man must dig himself in. Dig in before the first enemy shells fall! Better too much spadework than too little. Such work saves blood. [Diese Arbeit spart Blut.] . . . In the attack, there should be as many machine guns up front as possible. [Men should be ready] to fire MG while in motion if there are collisions with the enemy and in the final assault [beim Zusammenschloss und Sturm am Platz].
[France, Defuy Woods, September 1914.]
Stone-hard ground in [our] battalion area made digging in very difficult. The officers and NCOs of all grades—by command, harassment, and personal example—had to make tired and hungry men dig [until our position was secure].
Duties of Officers and NCOs
[France, Defuy Woods, September 1914.]
Believing the enemy was beaten, we brought up the reserves and machine guns [from lines behind the front]. . . . They were very quickly hit by devastating “revenge” fire from the enemy. In such situations men often lose their nerve and run for cover. Leaders of all grades (officers and NCOs) must confront them with stubborn force, and use weapons if necessary [to make them fight]. . . .
Personal Leadership
[Romania, Kurpenul village, 1917. The enemy, superior in numbers and well equipped with machine guns and mountain artillery, resisted to the maximum.]
The battle was won by committing every man at the enemy’s most vulnerable point. In such cases the leader must be very active. [Rommel knew where to commit his men, and led in person.]
[Romania near Ungureana Peak, 9 August 1917.]
By using the smallest irregularities in the terrain for cover [Rommel’s detach-ment] was able to get 1 Km. behind the enemy front, dig in on a ridge and fight off attacks. During the night the Romanians had to withdraw from their front opposite R.J.R. 18 [18th Reserve Infantry] and W.G.B. [Wü rttemberg Mountain Battalion].
Personal Reconnaissance
[Preparations for assault on Mt. Cosna, 11 August 1917.]
The attack plan [Angriffsplan] for 11 August was made on the basis of personal reconnaissance during the night [before] and the earliest morning hours. [Although Rommel was wounded, he followed the scouting party, led by a senior sergeant, which found positions for outflanking the enemy line. As a result, Mount Cosna was taken on 12 August.]
Care of Troops: Rommel Prepares While Men Rest
[Italy: Preparations for assault on Mt. Cragonza, 25–26 October 1917.]
While the exhausted troops rested, the officers worked ceaselessly to find out about the enemy and the terrain. At midnight they sent scouts toward Jevscek. In that way they laid the basis for a breakthrough in northwestern Jevscek and for storming Mount Cragonza.
[This was standard procedure in Rommel’s detachment (three companies—battalion size) and why Detachment Rommel led the way through the Alps into Italy. Once Germans entered the northern valleys, Italian troops, never enthusiastic over the war, surrendered in droves.]12
From the Rommel Papers and Krieg ohne Hass
Leadership “From the Front”
The duties of a commander are not limited to his work with his staff. He must also concern himself with details of command and should pay frequent visits to the fighting line, for the following reasons:
(a) Accurate execution of the plans of the commander and his staff is of the highest importance. It is a mistake to assume that every unit officer will make [the most] of his situation; most of them soon succumb to . . .inertia. Then it is simply reported that for some reason or another this or that cannot be done—reasons are always easy enough to think up. People of this kind must be made to feel the authority of the commander and be shaken out of their apathy. The commander must be the prime mover of the battle [Der Befehlshaber muß der Motor des Kampfes sein] and the troops must always have to reckon with his appearance in personal control.
(b) The commander must [constantly] keep his troops abreast of all the latest tactical experience and developments, and must insist on their practical application. He must see . . . that his subordinates are trained in accordance with the latest requirements. The best form of taking care of troops [truppenfu¨ rsorge] is first-class training, for this saves unnecessary casualties.
(c) It is also greatly in the commander’s own interest to have a personal picture of the front and a clear idea of the problems his subordinates are having to face. It is the only way in which he can keep his ideas permanently up to date and adapted to changing conditions. . . . Success comes most readily to the commander whose ideas have not been canalised into any one fixed channel, but can develop freely from the conditions around him.
(d) The commander must have contact with his men. He must be capable of feeling and thinking with them. The soldier must have confidence in him. There is one cardinal principle which must always be re-membered: one must never make a show of false emotions to one’s men. The . . . soldier has a surprisingly good nose for what is true and what false.
Troop Morale
There are always moments when the commander’s place is not back with his staff but up with the troops. It is sheer nonsense to say that maintenance of the men’s morale is the job of the battalion commander alone. The higher the rank, the greater the effect of the example. The men tend to feel no kind of contact with a commander who, they know, is sitting somewhere in headquarters. What they want is what might be termed a physical contact with him. In moments of panic, fatigue or disorganisation, or when something out of the ordinary has to be demanded from them, the personal example of the commander works wonders, especially if he has had the wit to create some sort of legend round himself.
The physical demands on the troops [in Egypt, 1942] approached the limits of endurance. This placed a particular duty on the officers to provide a continual example and model for their men.13
Tactical Boldness and Military Gambles
It is my experience that bold decisions give the best promise of success. But one must differentiate between strategical or tactical boldness and a military gamble. A bold operation is one in which success is not a certainty but which in case of failure leaves one with sufficient forces in hand to cope with whatever situation may arise. A gamble, on the other hand, is an operation which can lead either to victory or to the complete destruction of one’s force. Situations can arise where even a gamble may be justified—as, for instance, when in the normal course of events defeat is merely a matter of time, when the gaining of time is therefore pointless and the only chance lies in an operation of great risk.
Improvision
The only occasion when a commander can calculate the course of a battle in advance is when his forces are so superior that victory is a foregone conclusion; then the problem is no longer one of [with what, womit] but only of [how, wie]. But even in this situation, I still think it is better to [strike a killing blow] rather than to creep about the battlefield anxiously taking . . . security measures against every conceivable enemy move.
Normally, there is no ideal solution to military problems; every course has its advantages and disadvantages. One must select [what] seems best . . . pursue it resolutely and accept the consequences.14
Take Military Doctrine “with a Grain of Salt”
Prejudice against innovation is a typical characteristic of an Officer Corps which has grown up in a well-tried and proven system. Thus it was that the Prussian Army was defeated by Napoleon [Die preußische Armee unterlag aus diesem Grunde Napoleon]. This attitude was also evident during this war, in German as well as British officer circles, where, with their minds . . . on complicated theories, people [could not] come to terms with reality.15 A military doctrine had been worked out [in] detail and it was now regarded as the summit of all military wisdom. The only military thinking which was acceptable was that which followed their . . . rules. Everything outside the rules was regarded as a gamble; if it succeeded . . . it was the result of luck and accident. This [cast] of mind creates fixed preconceived ideas, the consequences of which are incalculable.
Take Advantage of Technical Advances
For even military rules are subject to technical progress. What was good for 1914 is only good to-day where the majority of the formations engaged on both sides, or at least on the side which is attacked, are made up of non-motorised infantry units. Where this is the case the armour still acts as the cavalry . . .outrunning and cutting off the infantry. But in a battle . . . between two fully-motorised [armies], quite different rules apply. I have dealt with this already.
However praiseworthy it may be to uphold tradition in . . . soldierly ethics, it is to be resisted in . . . military command. For to-day it is not only the business of commanders to think up new techniques which will destroy the value of the old: the potentialities of warfare are themselves being continually changed by technical advance. Thus the modern army commander must free himself from routine methods and show a comprehensive grasp of technical matters, for he must be in a position continually to adapt his ideas of warfare to the facts and possibilities of the moment. If [necessary], he must be able to turn the whole structure of his thinking inside out.16
Importance of Air Power
[Reference to the growing presence of the RAF before El Alamein.]
From the command point of view [the British] would gain the following advantages:
(a) Through total command of the air, he alone would have access to complete and unbroken reconnaissance reports.
(b) He would be able to operate more freely and boldly, since, if an emergency arose, he [could], by use of . . . air-power . . . break up the approach march and assembly and . . . every operation of his opponent, or . . . delay them until he had [taken] effective counter measures.
(c) . . . [A]ny slowing down of one’s own operations tends to increase the speed of the enemy’s. Since speed is . . . important . . . in motorised warfare, it is easy to see what effect this would have.17
Air Superiority before Ground Action
The first essential condition for an army to be able to stand [in] battle is an adequate stock of weapons, petrol and ammunition. . . . A second essential condition . . . is parity or . . . something approaching parity in the air. If the enemy has air supremacy and makes full use of it, then one’s own command [must] suffer the following limitations and disadvantages:
By using his strategic air force, the enemy can [drastically reduce] one’s supplies. . . .
The enemy can wage the battle of attrition from the air.
Intensive exploitation . . . of his air superiority [makes for] far-reaching tactical limitations (already described) for one’s . . . command.
In future the battle on the ground will be preceded by the battle in the air. This will determine which of the contestants has to suffer the operational and tactical disadvantages detailed above, and thus be forced, throughout the battle, into adopting compromise solutions.
Principles of Tank Warfare in the Desert (1941)
[From experience in motorized/ armored warfare in North Africa],
. . . principles were established [which are] fundamentally different from those applying [elsewhere]. These principles will become the standard [in] future, [when] fully-motorised [units] will be dominant.
Encirclement of the Enemy
The envelopment of a fully-motorised enemy in the flat and [easy-driving] terrain of the desert has the following results:
(a) For a fully-motorised formation, encirclement is the worst tactical situation imaginable, since hostile fire can be brought to bear on it from all sides; even envelopment on only three sides is a tactically untenable situation.
(b) The enemy [is] forced, because of the bad tactical situation [en-circlement], to evacuate the area [he holds].
The encirclement of the enemy and his subsequent destruction in the pocket can seldom be the direct aim of an operation; more often it is only indirect, for any fully-motorised force [which remains organized] will normally and in suitable country be able to break out . . . through an improvised . . . ring. Thanks to his motorisation, the commander of the encircled force [can] concentrate his weight unexpectedly against any likely point in the ring and burst through it. This fact was repeatedly demonstrated in the desert.
It follows therefore that an encircled enemy force can only be destroyed
(a) when it is non-motorised or has been rendered immobile by lack of petrol, or when it includes non-mobile elements . . . ;
(b) when it is badly led or its command has decided to sacrifice one formation in order to save another;
(c) when its fighting strength has already been broken. . . .
Except for cases (a) and (b), which occurred . . . frequently in other theatres of war, encirclement of the enemy and his . . . destruction . . . can only be attempted if he has first been so heavily battered in open battle that the . . .cohesion of his force has been destroyed.
Divide and Destroy
I shall term all actions which have as their aim the wearing down of the enemy’s power of resistance “battles of attrition.” In motorised warfare, material attrition and the destruction of the . . . cohesion of the opposing army must be the . . .aim of all planning.
Tactically, the battle of attrition is fought with the highest possible degree of mobility. The following points [demand] attention:
(a) The main endeavour should be to concentrate one’s own forces . . .while . . . seeking to split the enemy forces . . . and destroy them.
(b) Supply lines are particularly sensitive, since all petrol and ammunition . . . must pass along them. Hence, everything possible must be done to protect one’s own supply lines and to upset [or] cut the enemy’s. [Hit-ting] the enemy’s supply area will lead . . . to his breaking off the battle elsewhere, since . . . supplies are [essential to] battle and must be given priority of protection.
(c) Armour is the core of the motorised army. . . . [O]ther [arms] are . . . auxiliaries. The war of attrition against the enemy [tanks] must . . . be waged [if] possible by the tank destruction units. One’s . . . armour should . . . be used [for] the final blow.
(d) Reconnaissance reports must reach the commander in the shortest possible time; he must [make] decisions . . . and put them into effect as fast as he can. Speed of reaction decides the battle! Commanders of motorised forces must . . . operate as near as possible to their troops, and . . . have the [best] possible signal communication with them.
(e) Speed of movement and the organisational cohesion of one’s own forces are decisive. . . . Any [hitch] must be dealt with . . . quickly. . . .
(f) Concealment of intentions is of the utmost importance . . . to [achieve] surprise . . . and thus make it possible to exploit the time taken by the enemy command to react. Deception measures of all kinds should be encouraged, if only to make the enemy commander uncertain and . . .hesitate and hold back.
(g) Once the enemy has been [altogether beaten], success can be exploited by attempting to overrun and destroy major parts of his disorganised formations. Here again, speed is everything! The enemy must never be allowed time to reorganise. Lightning regrouping for the pursuit and [supplying of] the pursuing forces [is] essential.
Tanks, Artillery, and Infantry in Desert Warfare
Concerning the technical and organisational aspect of desert warfare, particular regard must be paid to the following points:
(a) The prime requirements in the tank are maneuverability, speed and a long-range gun . . . the side with the more powerful gun has the longer arm and can [hit first at] the enemy. Weight of armour cannot make up for lack of gun-power, as it can only be provided at the expense of maneuverability and speed. . . .
(b) The artillery must have great range and must, above all, [have] great mobility and [carry] ammunition in large quantities.
(c) The infantry serves only to occupy and hold positions designed either to prevent the enemy from particular operations, or to force him into other ones. [That] achieved, the infantry must be able to get away quickly for employment elsewhere. It must . . . be mobile and be equipped . . . rapidly to take up defence positions in the open at tactically important points on the battlefield.18
Rommel’s Use of Weapons
[The Afrika Korps, reinforced with their Italian allies, penetrated into Egypt (the Halfaya Pass) in early 1941,by dint of bypassing Tobruk. Leaving a holding force on the Egyptian border, Rommel concentrated on Tobruk, which he needed for proper supply by sea. Meanwhile the British built up to seven divisions, 700 tanks, and 1,000 aircraft. Rommel had three German and six Italian divisions; 414 tanks (157 Italian “self-propelled coffins”) and 320 aircraft (200 Italian). In late 1941 he was forced to retreat across Libya to Agedabia—but there he stopped a massive but uncoordinated British offensive. Faced with greater numbers of tanks and superior artillery, Rommel resorted to decoying enemy tanks into the field of fire of his 88mm antitank guns (actually anti-aircraft guns firing flat). He then withdrew to El Agheila to refit, and in January 1942 began a new offensive that netted him Tobruk and took him to within 60 miles of Alexandria.]
Against [British tanks and long range artillery] the Germans had in hand the 88mm Pak-Flak, a weapon of unmatched versatility and the envy [of the enemy].19
The three-day tank battle at Agedabia at year’s end 1941 was a model of mobile battle leadership and the mutual support of tanks and the [88mm] anti-aircraft gun [as a tank killer]. . . . The winter battle in Marmarica is of particular importance, because there the tactical plan of the desert war was born, consolidated, and proved. All [my] successes of the next battles were based on these experiences and finally led to the highlight in the summer offensive, where, in terms of tactics and troop leadership, [we] celebrated improbable triumphs.20
[The improbable triumphs turned into inevitable defeat, however, since the German High Command left him without sufficient armor or supplies. “In the summer of 1942,given six German mechanized divisions, we could have smashed the British so thoroughly that the threat from the south would have been eliminated for a long time to come, ” Rommel wrote.21
The Russian front was eating up weapons and supplies, and the Royal British Navy and RAF blocked much of what was sent to Rommel. On the Allied side Montgomery took over Eighth Army, and for the climactic Battle of El Alamein he had 195,000 troops and 1,000 tanks—two-thirds American Shermans with 75mm guns. Rommel had 50,000 German and 54,000 Italian troops. Of his 510 tanks, about 300 were Italian, and the German tanks were mostly older models with 37mm, 50mm, and low-velocity 75mm guns. Rommel fought hard all the same, but was forced into retreat, which led to German surrender (after Rommel had been relieved) in May 1943.]
Conclusions
Rommel was a thorough professional, but not one to speak of the “art of war” or the like. His emphasis, both in Infanterie greift an and Krieg ohne Hass, was on execution, not theory. In both—at the platoon and company or army level—he emphasized centralized command, massing forces, up-front personal leadership, speed, surprise, daring, and the calculated military “gamble.” Rommel knew his weapons as well, and compensated for his shortage of tanks by heavy use of the 88mm anti-aircraft gun as an anti-tank weapon—using his tanks to draw the British into the field of fire of the 88’s. He recognized that air power was vitally important, and believed the commander must continually adjust his thinking to the realities of his situation and new technology. He felt that both officers and soldiers should know how to improvise in unexpected situations.22
In his Storch light aircraft, Rommel continually observed the British positions and movements until the summer of 1942,when the RAF took control of the air, and then occasionally. He came closer than any commander in World War II to commanding from the air.