Chapter 8

The Battle Lab Concept 1

8.1. Introduction

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact marked the end of a relatively clear, essentially bipolar geostrategic situation for the armed forces. Since 1989, the identification of future potential enemies has been much less certain, as is the form these enemies and threats may take. At the same time, military operations have become more complex (with asymmetric conflicts, rapid and extensive media coverage of combats, use of multi-national forces, and the war on terror). Combat systems have become more difficult to specify, design, and implement, particularly in the context of network-centric warfare (NCW). These factors oblige decision makers in Western defense organizations to reconsider, in depth, the format and the form of their armed forces and their manner of conducting operations. This evolution is expressed specifically through a “transformation” approach taken by the NATO and a number of individual countries, including France, with the aim of optimizing and improving the effectiveness of military operations.

Note that various civilian sectors are under the same brutal pressure to evolve in terms of operations and sizing as in military. Having faced with growing global criminal networks and the emergence of cybercrime, police forces also need to evolve, making use of information and communication technologies, working with an ever-increasing number of telecommunication service providers and legal specialists in the field of computing, multi-national cooperation, increased legal constraints, rapid media pressure, and so on. To give another example, the introduction of personal medical files (dossier médical personnel, DMP) in France, instituted by a law passed on August 13, 2004, necessitates the involvement of a very large number of individuals from different fields (doctors, pharmacists, social security, hospitals, computer scientists, politicians, and, of course, patients). The Airbus A380 program, carried out by a multi-national group, is another good example; its success depends on considerable joint efforts of people of different interests (constructors, equipment/tool manufacturers, aviation companies, airports, civil aviation authorities, and so on).

It is easy to think, after all, that if we managed to send men to the Moon or to the plan operation Overlord (dispatching 156,000 men and 20,000 vehicles to the beaches of Normandy on June 6, 1944, with aerial support, logistics, and reinforcements), then it should be easy to organize the rollout of a project such as the DMP or develop a means of tracking the Taliban. Theoretically, this is true, but in practice the available human resources, demands, and constraints involved (and consequently the complexity of the operation) are not the same today. Let us consider, for example, the human cost of these activities. The Second Battle of the Aisne, in World War I, resulted in 200,000 allied casualties and produced inconclusive results. The Operation Overlord was success, but it costs around 150,000 allied lives, something which was relatively well accepted at the time. The Vietnam War caused, in 12 years, the deaths of less than 60,000 US soldiers, which provoked considerable emotion in the country. The recent war in Iraq has triggered strong reactions among the populations of the US and its allies; the allied casualty level for this war was less than one-tenth of that in Vietnam. It is clear that considerations and scales have changed: operations must be carried out at much lower human cost, with mitigation of collateral damage, attention to the media, and respect of a number of international rules and conventions.

Nowadays, then, we need means and methods to deal with complex capacitive-type problems, with high levels of constraints and multiple actors from different fields. This complexity is clearly visible in the increase in the cost of systems and the considerable increase in acquisition delays: for example, 15 years went between the beginning of construction on the first demonstration model of a Rafale aircraft and the delivery of the first mass-made airplane. The French Leclerc tank was developed in the period. In the civilian sphere, the first Airbus jumbo jet was launched in 2007, 12 years after the decision was made to build one (in 1995).

Thankfully, means and methods have evolved to overcome these difficulties. Information and communications technologies in particular provide a range of tools to store, visualize and analyze information, share information over long distances, and to facilitate collaborative working. Simulation has also been enriched in terms of capacity for distribution, human behavior models, 3D visualization modules, analytical tools, and so on. These technological developments provide the bases for a new approach to capacitive problems.

The battle lab concept first appeared in the United States in the early 1990s, rapidly spreading to allied powers. The first battle labs aimed to evaluate concepts and construct capacities, paying particular attention to technological advances very early in the program and doctrines of the US Army, thus maintaining the technological superiority of the American armed forces [WIL 96], notably in the domain of NCW, that is, warfare using the capacities of modern networks and information systems. Although most tools used in battle labs were not (at least at first) new, this fresh approach constituted a revolution in acquisition methods, with more global reflections, massive use of simulation for virtual evaluation of systems and systems of systems, and rationalization of the acquisition process.

Battle labs rapidly became important elements in the process of transformation of the armed forces in a post-Cold War context. The NATO’s Concept Development & Experimentation (CD&E) approach is the archetype of this evolution. The CD&E consists of applying methods and structures taken from the experimental sciences to the development of military capacities (i.e. force systems). The CD&E process allows the development and evaluation of new concepts to refine and validate them before heavy investment in their on-the-ground implementation. Concepts are thus evaluated not only on a technical level (what equipment/tool should be used and/or developed?) but also on an operational level: what will the doctrine be? What organizational framework will be required? What formation will the troops involved take, and what training will they require? One particularly interesting characteristic of the CD&E approach is that it encourages the use of different sources of ideas: not only the usual think tanks of the general staff and various ministries (which have a broad, sometimes too broad, vision of the issue), but also industrial contractors (who are generally well placed to know what can be done, but are also there to make money), the armed forces in the field (who know how materials and doctrines are really used in practice, but often have a rather narrow vision of the issue), and academic researchers (who have significant capacities for imagining the future and high levels of creativity, but are often somewhat detached from present realities). The meeting of these different sensitivities and approaches, when it is well led and well structured, facilitates the production of viable, suitable, and innovative concepts, which may be evaluated at reduced cost within an experimental framework (using real on-the-ground experiments and/or virtual experiments through simulation).

Battle labs, then, do not constitute a major leap forward in terms of technology, but represent a conceptual and organizational revolution, a new way of using current means in the best possible way to serve a capacitive approach. From their beginning as assemblies of means in an integrated process, battle labs have rapidly evolved towards a pooling of resources between different organizations, a board-based approach to working and partnerships between industry and defense organizations. The French and British battle labs (LTO and Niteworks, respectively) provide a particularly good illustration of this approach, and we shall present them in detail in the following sections.

8.2. France: Laboratoire Technico-Opérationnel (LTO)

8.2.1. Historical overview

The French Ministry of Defense began considering collective working in simulation for the specification and development of force systems (then systems of systems) very early on. The first draft of a project for a distributed simulation system for study purposes was written in 1994. This project became a reality in 1998 with the RICOS preliminary studies program. The basic principle of RICOS was to use a network and its services to create capacities for distributed simulation between the Air Force, Navy, Army and DGA simulation and study centers, thus creating the possibility of shared and collaborative work between engineers and operators within pluridisciplinary teams. In the event, the project did not go further than the prototype stage, but it may be considered as a primitive battle lab, which laid down certain bases and technical limitations of the concept.

At the beginning of the new millennium, several new elements were added to the reflection within the French Ministry of Defense:

– the growing capacities of information and communications technology, enabling systems for collaborative working between geographically widespread teams;

– a certain “maturing” of the bases of distributed simulation (the high-level architecture (HLA) standard);

– architectural convergence actions within entities and even nations (as seen in the ARCOSIM-ITCS project, which led to the definition of a common technical infrastructure for simulation for acquisition within the French Ministry of Defense);

– increasing complexity of systems and the switch to capacitive logic;

– the generalization of NCW, which created (de facto) numerous systems of systems with associated engineering problems (e.g. in the SCORPION terrestrial combat system);

– the development of the battle lab concept, essentially in the US;

– NATO’s development of the CD&E process; and

– the desire within the Ministry of Defense to integrate different actors in the acquisition process (operators, state engineers, industrialists, and so on) within a board framework.

To create a coherent battle lab approach in France and to federate efforts, the laboratoire technico-opérationnel (LTO) project was launched. Its first client and promoter was the Bulle Opérationnelle Aéroterrestre (BOA, Aeroterrestrial Operational Bubble), an ambitious project to create a system-of-systems demonstrator for NCW, preparing the ground for the SCORPION acquisition program, similar to the American Future Combat System (FCS) program and the British Future Rapid Effect System (FRES).

Co-managed by the armed forces general staff and the Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA), the LTO was inaugurated in October 2006 at the Fort of Montrouge.

8.2.2. Aims of the LTO

The LTO aims to fulfill three main objectives in improving current approaches:

– promote cooperation between operators and engineers (multi-disciplinary group work);

– promote the practice of systems engineering;

– allow the development of scenarios for use by actors via simulations and experiments.

Cooperation between operators and engineers is first established, at strategic level, by co-management of the LTO. This is a fundamental expectation of the LTO, as not only is it unthinkable today to run complex programs without good communications between those involved, but there is also a strong expectation from the armed forces of increased transparency in the way projects are run (i.e. earlier involvement of the client in making choices, both architectural and contractual) and an increased need for trust (which implies the creation of a structure where all involved can express themselves freely and without ambiguity in spite of inevitable differences in background). The current version of the LTO is run by the DGA (which orders the work) and the army general staff (the client). Moreover, there is a strong degree of willingness to share this tool with the industrial sector, although the potential for involvement of project owners in running the LTO is a sensitive point, particularly due to legal constraints on the public market. This particular point is the subject of current reflection, with attempts to find a legal structure to allow greater industrial involvement in orientation. This cooperation is also stimulated by the systematic creation of pluridisciplinary and multi-cultural teams for the LTO projects, bringing together industrial engineers, the DGA and operators. Cohesion is ensured by a shared working environment, with tools and methods which promote and channel creativity during scientific brainstorming sessions. Role-playing games and simulations are used to develop scenarios.

The practice of systems engineering is reinforced by the use of specialized methods and tools for modeling systems, organizations, and processes (such as MEGA, AGATE1, and KIMONO2). These tools also allow demands to be traced both through and outside of the LTO cycle; models may be reused during the development phase, if the decision to construct the capacity is taken. The urbanization of systems is also considered with the use of shared technical bases (shared technical simulation infrastructure, [KAM 02], common information and communications system base, and so on).

Finally, the placement of participants in the scenario is the subject of particular attention, with use of terrain simulations and experiments to illustrate new concepts and compare architectures. This placement of actors in the scenario is important, as it allows those involved in the LTO process (who, we must remember, generally do not have the same professional background) to develop a clear and common view of objectives and the means of implementing the capacity. All participants in this process may also be involved earlier in the process, crossing the usual cultural barriers between decision makers, users, backers, and project managers. The use of the Virtual Battle Space (VBS2) simulation in PHOENIX 2008 is typical of this approach: during the development of the experimental scenario, the fact of playing out the course of the scenario, as in a film, in front of the different participants in the process gave a level of comprehension and interactivity incommensurable with that which would have been provided using a textual tool. During the experiment, VBS2 was able to provide a video stream, based on virtual 3D images, to the regulatory information system. During debriefing, the simulation tool was used once again to produce animations, illustrating the implementation of concepts during the experiment in a clear and immersive fashion.

8.2.3. Principles of the LTO

The main aim of the LTO is to support system of systems, capacitive (force systems), and inter-weapons and Joint (approach promoted by the last White Paper [COM 08]) studies within the Ministry of Defense by providing methods for the resolution of complex problems and services (as opposed to methods) for concept evaluation, based on the use of local or distributed resources. The LTO is not, then, a means to an end, but rather a methodology with associated services. It constitutes an approach to defense system engineering, using modern collaborative working environments, simulation, and experiments.

The general principle of the LTO approach when constructing a capacity or a system of systems is illustrated in Figure 8.1, and the detailed sequence of events involved in a study is shown in Figure 8.2:

– A new capacity or system-of-systems concept is initiated by the general staff in very general terms (notably in terms of capacitive aims). At this level, LTO brainstorming sessions may be used to develop the concept.

– Meetings within the group work laboratory allow the concept to be refined and analyzed. Participants also evaluate the potential and limits of existing systems, construct scenarios for use, and make architectural proposals. Emphasis is placed on cooperation between industrial contractors, operators, and DGA engineers (in other words, all stakeholders: project managers, clients, and final users) to guarantee that the constraints, background, aims, and abilities of each are considered. Creativity is stimulated using tools and methods, which lead to production of a certain number of possible architectures (often between 20 and 30), sometimes very varied, some “traditional”, others “innovative”, if the first analysis establishes that the concept is feasible and viable. These architectures will be analyzed during later sessions and (for example) 4 or 5 of the most relevant possibilities will be retained. Thus, we have an architectural analysis and design process for systems of systems based essentially on channeled and stimulated reflection within a multi-disciplinary team.

– The architectures that pass the concept analysis stage will then be subjected to experimental verdicts. However, as these experimental processes are generally complicated, long and expensive to implement, the first experiments will be carried out virtually using simulations. At the end of this phase, only one or two architectures (or none, if none is deemed suitable) will be retained.

– Once attention has been focused onto one or two architectures and the necessary scenarios and metrics have been defined (Figure 8.2), these aspects may be subjected to field testing using experiments. The design process for these experiments may itself follow part of the LTO process, using brainstorming sessions within the work group to decide on objectives, experimental scenarios, and the organization of the experiments.

– Once the concept has been evaluated experimentally, a decision is taken. If the concept is validated and will be taken further, we enter the construction and qualification phase, in which the LTO may again be involved in the specification of component systems of the capacity, the design of capacitive qualification tests, and so on, but the global process is no longer directly supported by the LTO: the “traditional” cycle of armament programs and operations is then used, as set out in instruction ([MIN 04]).

– Throughout the concept treatment process carried out by the LTO, effective knowledge management methods are applied to allow reuse of the reflections and results produced during later stages or in different projects.

8.2.4. Services of the LTO

The LTO constitutes a group of services, rather than tools: it acts as a host structure for studies and experiments rather than as a simple technical resource.

The work group laboratory structure permits directed brainstorming. For this, a leader is chosen, along with (typically) eight participants. The idea generation phase usually produces around 120 relevant ideas in an hour. Interactive grouping is carried out by thematic groups (producing around 120 ideas in 2 hours). Themes are classified by interest following several more detailed and reformulated lines of reflection to reach a consensus in less than 4 hours, allowing the process to be completed within one working day if the methodology is followed correctly.

Table-based or role-playing games allow a team to gain a clear understanding of a scenario; by critical analysis of the way this process unfolds, it is possible to evaluate and compare scenarios, methodologies, processes, and doctrines of use following the defined metrics. Role-playing and table-based games constitute an intermediate step between the workgroup and the simulation stages.

Architectural modeling services are based essentially on a set of methodology and tool, mostly commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), which offers the following functionalities:

– analysis of need and formalization of requirements;

– modeling of functional and organic architectures;

– modeling of usage scenarios;

– traceability of needs, requirements, architectures, and scenarios;

– simulation of usage scenarios;

– analysis of systems;

– configuration management;

– analysis of impact of modifications; and

– production of documentation.

Moreover, the teams involved in the LTO are trained in complex systems and systems-of-systems engineering; they can, therefore, provide lots of advice and assist in the implementation of the corresponding processes in other entities.

Simulations and “serious games” (where the principles of video games are used for professional applications – see Chapter 1) also have an important role to play in the LTO. They allow us to illustrate concepts and carry out “virtual experiments” to compare architectures at low cost. The LTO uses essentially technico-operational type simulations, both specialist, made-to-measure applications, and generic off-the-shelf products (e.g. Bohemia Interactive’s VBS2 or VR Forces, by MäK Technologies).

The LTO also has a technical base for simulations and experiments. In addition to the simulation and systems engineering tools already mentioned, the LTO uses the infrastructure technique commune de la simulation (ICTS), the DGA’s shared technical simulation infrastructure (Chapter 6), the DirectSim simulation environment developed by the Centre d’analyse de la defense (CAD), the DGA’s Defense Analysis Center and the French Navy, and the EXAC C3R experimental network, allowing links between national and international participants while respecting security and performance conditions compatible with the requirements of experiments. EXAC provides telecommunications services for the interoperation of constructive or piloted simulations, real platforms, and operational information systems during experiments. The LTO also possesses an information system, which enables collaborative working practices and the capitalization of knowledge. Finally, the LTO has various technical resources for experimental processes, based at their Arcueil site, such as a videoconferencing system and image walls.

Using its teams, the ITCS and the EXAC network, the LTO is also able to make use of the resources of the DGA’s technical centers, such as SISPEO (a piloted armored vehicle simulator used in ergonomic studies), IBEOs (illustrations of operational requirements, developed by the Technical Center for Naval Systems in Toulon to facilitate the specification of naval platforms), or operational tools used in experiments, for example, the live simulation resources of the French Army’s CENTAC (combat training center) or the CENZUB (training center for actions in urban environments). Industrial tools may also be used (such as emulators of tactical data links, integration platforms, battle labs, and so on).

8.2.5. Experimental process

The organization of experiments follows a process similar to the one shown in Figure 8.4. This process, taken from [GIL 08], represents a fairly traditional approach and bears some similarity to others seen in previous chapters of this book.

The first phase consists of defining the objectives of the experiment, that is, the questions being posed. A typical question would follow the format “if I do X, will I obtain Y?” where “X” is an organizational hypothesis, new equipment/tool, and so on and “Y” is a capacitive result. For example, we might find the following question: “If I use the new KY27 radar instead of the KY26, will I be able to detect a ballistic missile of SCUD-B type sufficiently early?” Experimental constraints must also be identified very early on to know what may reasonably be done.

The second phase is the experimental specification phase. This specification contains several specific aspects, including the following:

– An operational scenario, containing the context and the cases of use, is to be considered. In the case of the LTO, this takes the form of a usage framework (operational mission and context) and “scenario miniatures”, a sort of operational sketch showing the framework of use, generally too large to be tested in its entirety without exceeding time and cost limits.

– Metrics are essential in enabling evaluation of the results of the experiment, for example, average delay between confirmation of detection of a missile and its impact on a target, proportion of missiles not detected more than 2 minutes before impact, or the workload of the radar operator.

– A model of the real system or system of systems to ensure clear knowledge and understanding of the system.

– A specification of the experimental equipment/tool: hardware, simulation platforms, tools, operators, and operational actors.

This second phase is particularly crucial and also highly sensitive, as it requires dialogue between individuals from different professional backgrounds (engineers, operators, and so on). A certain number of tools are used by the LTO to assist in this phase: creativity workshops, the use of role-play scenarios, and 3D visualization of the “scenario miniatures” mentioned above.

The next phase involves designing the experiment. During this phase, the experimental dispositive and the detailed experimental scenario are finalized, including details on materials and operators, interfaces between actors and flows, and the timing of events. This design must, of course, consider the results of previous experiments, results capitalized at the end of experimental processes for this reason.

If the experiment is not based entirely on pre-existing materials and software, a development phase may be required for the creation of new systems or interfaces, or for the adaptation of existing resources. This activity is external to the LTO, which is involved in the process only in specifying systems and not in development activity, which is left mostly to industrial actors.

The fifth phase involves the installation of the experiment: set-up and configuration of the experimental dispositive (operational materials, simulations, and so on) with assignment of operators, verification of the dispositive (as, during the operational phase, it would be out of the question to spend time “debugging” technical and organizational aspects to the detriment of operational objectives) and possible training of “players” in the use of new equipment/tool or a new interface.

The sixth phase involves the execution of the experiment itself, with the collection of data to establish metrics and a first evaluation of results. The course of the experiment is also analyzed to enrich the RETEX (retour d’experimentation, or feedback), which will be capitalized within the LTO’s information system.

The final phase is the synthesis phase, involving the creation of an experimental report and the presentation of results to the client who ordered the experiments. Results are also shown to participants, who need to be motivated and thanked for their work by the presentation of the fruits of their labors. The experimental report is, of course, published (if the information it contains is not classified) and capitalized within the LTO’s information systems.

Like any engineering process, the LTO’s experimental process includes frequent reviews to ensure that each step is finished and validated before moving on to the next phase, allowing each new phase of the process to start from solid foundations.

The following list shows the main experiments carried out by the LTO in the period 2006–2009 and gives a general idea of the diversity of subjects studied.

– Time Sensitive Targeting (2006): treatment of high-value targets revealed in short periods of time, which must therefore be dealt with very rapidly (Figure 8.3);

– XP-RIENCE 06 (2006): aero-naval tactical data links;

– XP-RIENCE 07 (2007): tactical inter-army situation monitoring;

– PHOENIX 2007 (2007): integration of robots and image analysis to assist in infantry combat (the 2008 version of PHOENIX will be presented in more detail);

– Blue Force Tracking (2008): situation monitoring for allied units (specifically to avoid damage from friendly fire);

– Time Sensitive Targeting 2 (2009): extension of TST at inter-army level;

– DAMB (2009): initial capacity for ballistic anti-missile defenses;

– SA2R (2009): surveillance, goal attainment, reconnaissance and information transmission, sensor maneuvers in Joint situations;

– Short loop tank/helicopter (2009): cooperative land–air engagements using armored vehicles and helicopters;

– XP-RIENCE 09 (2009): collective tactical situation monitoring for land, air, and sea forces; and

– ARTIST (2009): cooperation between armored vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles in NCW (a collaborative experiment by France and Germany).

8.2.6. Presentation of an experiment: PHOENIX 2008

The PHOENIX 2008 experiment centered on the management of fire power in the course of terrestrial maneuvers. It aimed, in particular, to evaluate two new tools that would be made available to unit commanders:

– An execution support cell (known as the Manoeuvre Management Cell (cellule de conduite de la manœuvre, CMM)), to provide services for the unit commander (captain) in assessing the terrain, preparing movements (friendly and enemy itineraries), non-line-of-sight firing (missiles and guns), and preparation of indirect fire.

– An information support cell (Specialized Surveillance Cell (cellule de surveillance spécialisée), CSS), the need for which became apparent at the end of PHOENIX 2007, to facilitate information processing and to assist the unit commander by the centralization of images collected by both onboard and independent sensors (the Integrated Equipment and Communication Infantryman (Fantassin à Équipement et Liaisons Intégrés), FELIN) system, UAVs, and so on), and the selection of relevant information in these images. The CSS would then assist in decision making by providing the commander with the necessary elements.

PHOENIX 2008 also allowed the illustration of new capacities and optimizations of existing capacities:

– non-line-of-sight firing and indirect fire support, with a new concept of missiles fired by artillery units;

– sorting sensor images to assist the captain in decision-making; and

– coordination of collective actions (firing and mobility).

Finally, demonstration models and prototypes of hardware and software (sensors, tactical communications networks, simulations, and so on) were tested by industrial partners within the experimental framework.

The different actors in the experimental process (industrial partners, the DGA, and the operators) were motivated to provide support by the potential benefits of the results of this process. Thus, the French Army made its camp at Mourmelon available for the project, with a staff of 120 and 10 vehicles; in return, the Army obtained promising leads and information on potential improvements to operational capacities and doctrine. The DGA provided players and leaders alongside technical and methodological support, particularly during the preparation phase and in evaluation of the experimental process. These preliminary and post-experimental steps should not be neglected: the experiment itself only lasted 12 days, but required 8 months of preparation and 4 months of analysis after the event, in which the LTO was heavily involved.

The group work laboratory was used in identifying the technical and doctrinal aims of the experiment, alongside scenarios bringing together these objectives and the associated metrics (saved/correlated parameters, personnel and “observed” networks). This process was greatly assisted by the use of highly realistic 3D terrain models of the Mourmelon camp and simulations developed using an off-the-shelf simulation suite, VBS2, a professional product derived from video games technology (and therefore known as a serious game (Figure 8.5). These models and simulations were used to give those involved a clear idea of the environment and ambiance in which the experiment would take place. The exchange flows between actors were modeled using the MEGA engineering tool (Figure 8.3).

On the ground, the experiment was based on Army regiments, with technical support from the DGA and several industrial participants. These industrial participants used the opportunity to test equipment/tool prototypes: each participant, therefore, made significant gains from the process, in correspondence with the philosophy of the LTO. A number of ergonomists also participated in evaluating the work of operators. A specialized tool, MEEFISTO, can be used to capture and analyze of network exchanges: it is therefore possible to measure the effectiveness of every action of every operator very precisely, supplying precious information on the impact of new methods of organization, workload, and so on. Real-time video streams were sent to the regimental information system from an aerial vehicle (UAV) then from a simulation (VBS2).

Results are used “off-the-bat”, during daily debriefings, then several weeks later after deeper analysis of the data collected. This feedback process also makes use of the technical resources of the LTO. Simulations and videos are used to provide graphic replay or illustration of actions which took place during the experiment, furthering common understanding of the events of the experiment, without ambiguity, for all participants. The information extracted is particularly useful for all those who contributed to the process:

– several programs will benefit from evolutions of existing material, the need for which is identified during the experiment;

– on-the-ground evaluation of prototypes by industrial partners;

– identification of specific needs for evolution in land army doctrines (such as new distribution of functions).

– study of the way the experiment was carried out, including management of experimental logistics, methodology, and the integration of simulations, can be capitalized and considered during future LTO activities.

As for the main subject of the Phoenix 2008 project, the two new command assistance cells, the experiment showed that it would be difficult to manage two cells (the CSS and CMM) as demands in terms of resources would be too high, for coordination in particular. The functions themselves were validated, but require optimization by fusing the two cells to create a single entity.

8.2.7. Evaluation and future perspectives of the LTO

The LTO has been very active since its inauguration and has clearly demonstrated its capacities. The results produced by the work group laboratory (the laboratoire de travail en groupe, LTG) have proven particularly convincing, providing rapid responses to a wide range of questions with reduced financial outlay, thanks to the methodical use of pluridisciplinary teams of experts. Numerous groups, both at industry and government level, have integrated the LTO approach into their working methods and a certain maturity has been reached with the installation of the CD&E approach.

Nonetheless, there is still room for improvement on certain points, specifically connected to the fact that the LTO is state-run: although the Administration guarantees neutrality and the availability of methods and resources, this involvement creates certain hindrances. One example of this is the considerable preparation required (accompanied by significant delays) due to procuration within the framework of the Public Acquisition Rules (code des marchés publics), which regulates the attribution of contracts by public bodies. Another problem is the lack of flexibility in the domain of human resources, where the rapid adaptability required by different experiments in terms of dimensions and abilities poses certain difficulties.

The LTO, however, is still in its infancy and will most probably undergo major evolutions in the near future, based on the results of previous studies and experiments. A greater level of industrial and civilian involvement is very likely when dealing with non-military issues. Note that certain industrial actors have begun to develop their own battle labs, each with a technical infrastructure (often derived from existing internal tools). Examples of this include the following:

– Thales’ BTC, with the Thales Integration Centre;

– EADS’ System Design Centre (SDC) with NetCOS;

– NFCC/Solaris at DCNS;

– CS’ Joint Battlelab;

– Dassault Aviation’s Atelier d’Emploi;

– in the UK, MBDA Bristol’s System Integration Facility, a complement to the Simulation Center outside Paris.

These tools are distinct and lack synergy. An important direction for efforts would be to make these resources converge, or at least interoperate, to produce a true partnership logic between clients, owners, and project managers.

8.3. United Kingdom: the Niteworks project

Niteworks (Network Integration Test and Experimentation Works) is a battle lab belonging to the British Ministry of Defence (the MoD). At the outset, in 2003, the aim was to create a structure to evaluate the capacities provided to the armed forces by information and communication technologies (Network Enabled Capability, NEC). Niteworks rapidly evolved to become a decision-assistance tool with far wider coverage, used in planning and acquisition of systems, systems of systems, and capacities.

Niteworks operates as a partnership between the MoD and the industry, and, like the LTO, involves collaboration between operators from the armed forces, experts, and industrialists. However, although the global aims and basic principles of Niteworks and the LTO are the same, there are significant differences between the two. First, Niteworks is somewhat older, with the benefits of age and considerable financial backing: the current contract, signed at the end of 2007 for a duration of 5 years, is worth £43 million in addition to the £47 million received for the previous contract, signed in 2003. Niteworks was designed and is managed as a partnership between the MoD and the industrialists, whereas, for the time being at least, the LTO is managed exclusively by the French Ministry of Defense. This partnership was set up with the aim of sharing information and in a spirit of openness, something of a cultural revolution, even for the UK; this necessitated the resolution of a number of intellectual property issues. Intellectual property is now shared, at a level dependent on the status of the company within the Niteworks structure. Several classes of actor can be identified:

– the MoD holds the copyright on everything produced by Niteworks;

– “partners” (a group of 10 large industrialists) who have the right to use the information produced by Niteworks (foreground information) freely for the benefit of the British government, and also have access to the information used by Niteworks in the course of its projects (background information), with certain exceptions;

– “associates” (several dozen companies, including a number of smaller businesses) with restricted access rights to information produced by activities in which they participated.

In the first five years of its existence, that is, the period covered by the first contract and including the creation and “breaking in” of the system, the financial benefit linked to the use of Niteworks has been estimated at £450 million, giving a return on investment of nine to one. To improve the yield still further in the second contract period, this contract only aims to partially finance the battle lab; the industrial partners involved will therefore need to find other clients (essentially from within the MoD) to generate profit.

Niteworks is therefore an apparent success, a success which is linked to a certain number of innovative aspects in its approach, including the partnership between government and industry. This means of operation is used from the very beginning of the systems acquisition cycle, allowing clear agreement between owners and project managers on choices, simplification of contracting issues, improved visibility, and reduction of risks. This may have a detrimental effect on competition, but the opening of the Niteworks partnership allows third party businesses to slot into the structure with ease. The simplification in intellectual property rights is also a factor, which promotes efficiency, avoiding long and delicate negotiations at the beginning of each new project.

8.4. Conclusion and perspectives

In this chapter, we could have provided a detailed overview of a number of different battle lab structures, in France and elsewhere, but this would not have been particularly valuable in furthering our understanding of the subject. Although there are differences in the tools used, in management and in the processes involved (the selection of themes, the way the theme is dealt with, capitalization of results, and so on), a certain number of aspects are invariably found in all structures of this type:

– integrated structure for collaborative working involving different actors (clients, users, experts, and industrial contractors) in all or part of the system acquisition cycle;

– contextualization of actors to facilitate reflection;

– development of capacitive concepts, then evaluation of these concepts through experiments (on the ground and/or through simulation).

The battle lab concept is still in its infancy and has not yet reached its full potential. Nevertheless, the development of battle labs, both by governments and industrial project managers, and their durability shows that they are particularly a useful tool. Their capacity to deal with complex capacitive issues efficiently, effectively, and (often) at reduced cost makes battle labs an ideal tool for system-of-systems engineering. The availability of increasingly sophisticated generic off-the-shelf simulations, with ever-increasing interoperability capacities and openness, provides especially encouraging perspectives for the instrumentation of battle labs by simulation. Methods for collaborative working and the capitalization of knowledge have been available for some time. Everything leads us to believe, then, that the battle lab concept will continue to spread, particularly in the civilian sector, where capacitive and system-of-systems issues also exist (as we would do well to remember).

Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of the fact that the creation and management of a battle lab requires a rigorous and methodical approach, with the capacity to establish strong dialogue between those involved, who must “play along” for the concept to work without risk of failure. In this respect, Niteworks’ partnership logic would be a good example to follow.

8.5. Bibliography

[ALB 02] ALBERTS D.S., HAYES R.E., Code of Best Practice for Experimentation, CCRP, Washington D.C., 2002.

[ALB 05] ALBERTS D.S., HAYES R.E., Campaigns of Experimentation: Pathways to Innovation and Transformation, CCRP, Washington D.C., 2002.

[CAN 09] CANTOT P., Simulation-Based Acquisition: Systems of Systems Engineering, Cours, Master of Systems Engineering, ISAE, Toulouse, 2009.

[COM 08] COMMISSION SUR LE LIVRE BLANC (presided by J.-C. MALLET), Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale, Odile Jacob-Documentation Française, Paris, 2008.

[CON 06] CONAN E., Guide pour la mise en pratique du concept CD&E sur les projets pilotés par le CICDE, Centre Interarmées de Concepts, de Doctrines et d’Expérimentations, Paris, 2006.

[DOD 97] DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DoD Modeling and Simulation Glossary, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Washington D.C., 1997.

[GIL 08] GILBERT E., Etude Complémentaire 2 du LTO V0.1, Thales Communications, Massy, 2008.

[JON 08] JONES L., Niteworks: Establishing a UK Strategic Asset, RUSI Defence Systems, London, 2008.

[KAM 02] KAM L., LECINQ X., LUZEAUX D., CANTOT P., “ITCS: The technical M&S infrastructure for supporting the simulation-based acquisition process”, NATO Modeling and Simulation group Conference, Paris, 2002.

[LEC 06] LECINQ X., Le Laboratoire technico-opérationnel, DGA/SAIS, Arcueil, 2006.

[LUZ 10] LUZEAUX D., RUAULT J.-R., Systems of Systems, ISTE, London, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2010.

[MIN 04] MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE, Instruction générale n1514 du 7 mars 1988 sur le déroulement des opérations d’armement, 4th edition, 17th September 2004, Paris, 2004.

[MIN 99] MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE, Instruction n 800/DEF/EMA/PEE – 60800/DGA/DPM du 9 février 1994 sur la conduite des programmes d’armement, 2nd edition, 1st September 1999, Paris, 1999.

[MOK 05] MOKHTARI, M., BERNIER, F., COUTURE, M., DUSSAULT, G., LALANCETTE, C., LAM, S., LIZOTTE, M., “Modelling and simulation and capability engineering process”, RTOMP-MSG-0035 meeting proceedings, NATO/RTA, Neuilly, 2005.

[NOR 00] NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION, Report to the Military Committee on Concept Development and Experimentation as an Alliance Tool, NATO/SACLANT, Norfolk, 2000.

[NOR 98] NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION, NATO Modeling and Simulation Master Plan version 1.0., NATO AC/323 (SGMS) D/2, NATO/RTA, Neuilly, 1998.

[TEC 06] THE TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAM, Guide for Understanding and Implementing Defense Experimentation (GUIDEx), Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, Ottawa, 2006.

[WIL 96] WILSON J.R., “Battle Labs: what are they, where are they going, Acquisition Quarterly Review, Winter 1996, pp. 63–74, Washington D.C., 1996.

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1 Chapter written by Pascal CANTOT.

1 AGATE (atelier de gestion de l’architecture technique) is a software workshop dedicated to the development of different views of an information system.

2 KIMONO (kit de modélisation et de nouveaux outils) is a project run by the French Ministry of Defense with the aim of providing system architects and engineers with a tool to enable them to master systems-of-systems engineering.