4
Definitions and Characterizations of NEST as Construction of Meaning

Intensive debates have taken place and continue to do so over the characterization and definitions of all NEST developments. That they are linked to attributions of meaning is hardly astonishing. Rather surprising is, however, that these debates have hardly been studied systematically until now. This chapter is supposed to constitute a beginning by inquiring as to the connection between definition, characterization, meaning and responsibility.

4.1. Motivation and point of departure

The issues of how NEST are defined and characterized, of who the actors involved are and what can be said about their motivations and arguments, of how definitions and characterizations of NEST influence RRI debates and the public perception, and of how the meaning attached to NEST fields by definitions and characterizations may change over time have not yet been considered explicitly. However, we have been witnessing extensive and complex debates on the definition of nanotechnology [SCH 06], on the understanding of synthetic biology compared to established and emerging fields of biotechnology [PAD 14], about the meaning and definition of autonomy in “autonomous technologies”, and about the understanding of human enhancement [GRU 12b, Chapter 9]. Therefore, it seems worthwhile to look deeper into those issues and related questions concerning the meaning of NEST developments.

Although until now characterizations and definitions have both been mentioned in one breath, on closer examination clear differences become visible. Definitions have a certain claim to precision and to some extent are more technical tasks for scientists and science managers, such as to make it possible for funding agencies to adequately classify applications for research projects. Nonetheless, even definitions contain facets relevant to meaning, as a glance at several examples from NEST can demonstrate (section 4.2). Definitions of nanotechnology or synthetic biology have been the object of genuinely controversial arguments [SCH 06], in particular because definitions are decisive for determining what is new in NEST. This appears to constitute a groundbreaking determination for the NEST debates since it also heavily influences what is regarded as new in terms of the ethics of responsibility.

Characterizations can be considered to be commentaries on definitions, as descriptions of the properties of NEST. These descriptions are not subject to the high standards of precision that apply to definitions, but play a decisive role in interpreting what is meant and implied in definitions. Characterizations and descriptions are often closely tied to certain social perceptions. There is thus a continuum between clear definitions and narrative characterizations. In definitions, the scientific and technical aspects are in the forefront, while in characterizations it is rather the social attributions of meaning. The point of characterizations is often not what, for example, nanotechnology is and how it differs from other fields of research, but what it means – or can mean or could mean – for the future of humans and society (Chapter 5).

In this chapter, I will first illustrate the assessments I have suggested by referring to some observations of NEST developments (section 4.2), which in part is a brief anticipation of the case studies in the following chapters. This is followed by a reflection on definitions motivated by action theory (section 4.3): which purposes do they fulfill and which means are available to them to reach their goals? On this basis, I then develop a few tentative statements on the dimension of meanings in definitions in the area of NEST and consequently on the associated issues of responsibility (section 4.4).

4.2. Some observations from NEST debates

Now, I would like to give some illustrative evidence of the role of definitions and characterizations in NEST fields: brief looks at nanotechnology (4.2.1) and enhancement (4.2.3) as preparations for the in-depth case studies in Chapters 5 and 7, and a bit more detailed view on synthetic biology (4.2.2).

4.2.1. Nanotechnology

The debate on nanotechnology may be regarded as the prototype of NEST discussions [FIE 10, ZÜL 11, GRU 14a] where great effort was spent in providing an adequate definition (Chapter 5). Most definitions refer to the novelty of the functions and properties that are seen at the nanometer scale [SCH 06]. An influential example is:

“Nanotechnology is the understanding and control of matter at dimensions of roughly 1 to 100 nanometers, where unique phenomena enable novel applications. Encompassing nanoscale science, engineering and technology, nanotechnology involves imaging, measuring, modeling, and manipulating matter at this length scale. […] At the nanoscale, the physical, chemical, and biological properties of materials differ in fundamental and valuable ways from the properties of individual atoms and molecules or bulk matter. Nanotechnology R&D is directed toward understanding and creating improved materials, devices, and systems that exploit these new properties” [NNI 99].

This definition refers to an order of magnitude (nanometer) and to scientific and technological access (i.e. understanding and control), emphasizes that which is new (e.g. novel applications), explains that which is scientifically unusual (i.e. differs in fundamental ways, etc.) and points in a positive manner (improved) to areas of application. From this perspective, this approach consists of an attempt to create both a definition (e.g. matter at dimensions of roughly 1–100 nm) and a substantive characterization as well as references to what is new and the areas of application. What this definition and the characterizations mean has been the subject of intensive discussion for years, initially among experts but then also beyond this group [SCH 06].

The intensity of the debate and the absence of a consensus led to an entirely different consideration [NOR 07b] focusing on nanotechnology as a specific sociopolitical construct:

“It could be said, based on Bruno Latour, the philosopher of science, that nanotechnology corresponds to a functioning coalition of molecules, probe microscopes, (ex-)chemists, visionaries, (nervous) investors, and even ethicists and philosophers of science” [NOR 07b, p. 216].

Far from all attempts at defining nanotechnology in a scientific or technical sense (see section 5.2), this consideration relates the notion of nanotechnology with public perception, the self-understanding of nanotechnology scientists, the many images created by nanotechnology [LÖS 06] and with the fact that many borders can be crossed by nanotechnology [KUR 10]. This approach does not aim at defining nanotechnology in a technical sense but at understanding from a broader perspective what nanotechnology means in the eyes of the actors, how this notion was constructed and what meaning was attached to it (see Chapter 5 for an in-depth discussion).

At this level of characterization, it was possible to observe a shift in meaning over time. This had less to do with the definitions but was strongly tied to the meanings transported by prospective narratives. While at the beginning of the public debates, approximately in the early 1990s, nanotechnology was considered a synonym for something radically new, something visionary and something entirely different from established technology, since about 2006 there has been a defuturization [LÖS 10]. Nanotechnology has been increasingly seen as an advanced form of research in materials science and has thus also been reinterpreted to a more or less normal line of technology research [GRU 10b]. The characterizations have shifted accordingly, and thus the social meaning has also changed. Since then, the social meaning has been largely limited to the issue of toxicity and to the assessment of the risks posed by nanomaterials, in other words very similar to the treatment of new chemicals, while the utopian-visionary debate that was initially predominant has practically disappeared.

4.2.2. Synthetic biology

Synthetic biology as another example draws from newly established interfaces between traditional biology as a natural science and the engineering and technical sciences. It is a consequence of convergences in science made feasible through technologies at the nanoscale [ROC 02]. Synthetic biology is repeatedly named in philosophy of science as a perfect example for technoscience [LAT 87]. It breaks down the traditional borders between (knowledge-oriented) natural science and (application-oriented) technical science and puts the fundamental research of natural science ab initio within the context of exploitation and application.

Synthetic biology arrived at the level of a broader RRI debate around the years 2004–2006, in particular following an international conference where a manifesto on the responsibility of synthetic biologists was discussed [MAU 06]. Various suggestions have been made for defining synthetic biology, all of which point in the same direction despite some differences in nuances [DEV 06, p. 13ff.]. Some of the definitions proposed early in synthetic biology include:

“[…] the engineering of biological components and systems that do not exist in nature and the re-engineering of existing biological elements; it is determined by the intentional design of artificial biological systems, rather than by the understanding of natural biology” [SYN 05, p. 3].

“The design and construction of biological parts, devices, and systems, and the redesign of existing, natural biological systems for useful purposes” [LBN 06].

“The design and synthesis of artificial genes and complete biological systems, and the modification of existing organisms, aimed at acquiring useful functions” [COG 06].

A characteristic feature of this definition is the turn to artificial forms of life – whether they are newly constructed or produced via the redesign of existing life – each of which is associated with an expectation of a specific utility: life by intentional design. Living systems are examined within the context of their technical function and cells are interpreted as machines consisting of components. A “modularization of life” is thereby made, as well as an attempt to identify and standardize the individual components of life processes. As in the tradition of mechanical and electrical engineering, the components are put together according to a building plan in order to obtain a functioning and living whole. Some scientists believe it will be possible to design biological components and complex biological systems in a manner similar to the design of chips, transistors and electronic circuits [DEV 06, p. 18]. Viewed in this light, synthetic biology is epistemologically bound to a technical view of the world including life and technical intervention. The definitions given above, as well as others, thus describe a far-reaching reinterpretation of biology:

“Although it can be argued that synthetic biology is nothing more than a logical extension of the reductionist approach that dominated biology during the second half of the twentieth century, the use of engineering language, and the practical approach of creating standardised cells and components like in an electrical circuitry suggests a paradigm shift. Biology is no longer considered ‘nature at work’, but becomes an engineering discipline” [DEV 06, p. 26].

This reinterpretation also casts a new look at our understanding of life. Neologisms such as “engineering life”, the name of a corresponding RRI project [ALB 13], express this new understanding of life as something that can be made by technology. This is obviously linked to a far-reaching shift in meaning of historically and culturally molded conceptions of life (see Chapter 7) [GRU 12b].

This assignment of meaning to synthetic biology concerns the relationship between man and nature, the self-image of man and man’s view of life. It is one of the visions of synthetic biology to become technically able to design and construct life according to human purposes and ends [PAD 14]. While this objective is widely agreed upon, there are diverging understandings of what this would mean, covered by two grand narratives trying to fully understand the meaning of synthetic biology [GRU 16a]:

  1. 1) humans regard nature as a model and choose technologies following this model expecting an alliance of technology, humans and nature [BLO 34];
  2. 2) humans take full control over nature following the Baconian idea [SCH 93a].

Taking nature as a model means to learn from nature in order to solve technical problems [VON 07]. The major promise is, in the eyes of the protagonists, that this “bionic” approach will make it possible to achieve a technology that is more natural or better adapted to nature than is possible with traditional technology. Examples of desired properties that could be achieved include adaptation to natural cycles, low levels of risk, fault tolerance and environmental compatibility.

In grounding such expectations, advocates refer to the problem-solving properties of natural living systems, such as optimization according to multiple criteria under variable boundary conditions in the course of evolution, and the use of available or closed materials cycles [VON 07, p. 30ff.]. According to these expectations, the targeted exploitation of physical principles, the possibilities for chemical synthesis and the functional properties of biological nanostructures are supposed to enable synthetic biology to achieve new technical features in hitherto unachieved complexity, with nature ultimately serving as the model.

These ideas refer to traditional bionics which aims at learning from nature at a macroscopic level. Transferred to the micro- or even nanolevel of the “bricks” of life, it obtains an even more utopian character. Philosophically, this resembles the idea of the German philosopher Ernst Bloch [BLO 34] who proposed an “alliance technology” (Allianztechnik) in order to reconcile nature and technology. While in the traditional way of designing technology nature is regarded as a kind of “enemy” which must either be excluded or brought under control by technology, Bloch proposes to develop future technology in accordance with nature in order to arrive at a status of peaceful coexistence of humans and the natural environment.

However, taking naturalness as a guarantee against danger is a naturalistic fallacy [HAN 16]. Indeed, it is easily possible to tell a grand narrative of synthetic biology also in the opposite direction. Based on the completely different philosophical background of traditional Baconism [SCH 93a], synthetic biology could be regarded as the fulminant triumph of Bacon’s “dominion over nature” utopia. Living systems are examined within the context of their technical function and cells are interpreted as machines. Examples of such uses of language refer to hemoglobin as a vehicle, to adenosine triphosphate synthase as a generator, to nucleosomes as digital data storage units, to polymerase as a copier and to membranes as electrical fences. Nature is seen as technology, both in its individual components and also as a whole:

“This is where a natural scientific reductionist view of the world is linked to a mechanistic technical one, according to which nature is consequently also just an engineer […]. Since we can allegedly make its construction principles into our own, we can only see machines wherever we look – in human cells just as in the products of nanotechnology” [NOR 07b, p. 221].

Instead of eliciting a more natural technology per se as promised by the bionic understanding of synthetic biology (see above), this diagnosis signifies a far-reaching technicalization of what is natural. This divergence between bionic characterization and the technicalization actually going on makes it clear that this route cannot provide any orientation for understanding and dealing with synthetic biology. Instead, the object can only be to better understand the diverging characterizations and narratives (and certainly others as well), including their prerequisites and implications. It would not make any sense to bring about a decision among the grand narratives as to which one is the “best” or “right” narrative. The tension built up between them serves instead to help us systematically reflect upon the further path in the future of synthetic biology.

In order for hermeneutic analysis to support this reflection, it must address the tools that are employed in the RRI debates about synthetic biology. These include first of all the texts in which the characterizing narratives and their references to synthetic biology are described. Then, there are the diagrams and images in scientific publications. The large field of artistic encounters in NEST, especially in synthetic biology, also holds promise in this regard. Above all, in the realm of film, there are works rich in associations which in turn open new perspectives [SCH 16].

4.2.3. Enhancement

As a third example, I would like to mention human enhancement (handled in detail in Chapter 7). A number of core properties must be defined or characterized here, all of which are concealed behind the following questions:

  1. – how can “enhance” be defined and distinguished from related concepts such as perfect and optimize?
  2. – where is the boundary between medically established healing or the restoration of bodily functions and enhancement, which possibly or even probably would have to enter ethical uncharted territory?
  3. – how does human enhancement differ from established approaches of using technical means to expand man’s capabilities? In this context, a question that sounds trivial but is not trivial is, e.g., that of the general difference between drinking coffee as a stimulant and the use of performance-enhancing medication.

The issue here is the clarification of concepts for the purpose of determining what is new in human enhancement. Making this determination is important, however, because RRI debates are supposed to cover precisely that which is new for it is this that could lead to new questions of responsibility. It is for this reason that definitions and characterizations have taken up so much room in the previous debate on human enhancement (Chapter 7).

An interim result is that definitions and characterizations are very different paths for attributing meaning. Nonetheless, both raise far-reaching questions about their argumentative basis, on the one hand, and about their consequences for the RRI debates on the other. Precisely for definitions, it is conspicuous that as a rule they are tied to complex and also controversial debates. This supports the thesis, and this is the second point, that definitions and characterizations not only cover technical details but are also correlated with attributions of meaning to NEST. It is precisely these that motivate the RRI debates.

As texts, characterizations and descriptions are an object of hermeneutic analysis, a series of such characterizations and descriptions are reconstructed in the case studies (Chapters 5–8) and examined with regard to their meaning. In addition, the field of definitions offers deep glimpses in the sense of language pragmatics. In the following section, therefore, definitions are to be examined more closely in their pragmatic context.

4.3. The pragmatic character of definitions1

A definition is a statement of the meaning of a term such as “nanotechnology” or “autonomous robot”. Definitions can be intensional, trying to give the essence of a term, and extensional, listing the objects that a term describes. Defining something relates specific notions to other notions and happens within language. A definition consists of relating a term to be defined (definiendum) to a subject area by describing the specific properties of elements from the subject area which are essential for subsuming them under the definiendum. This relation is called the definiens. The definition will allow a replacement of the new term by terms already known without loss or gain of information.

Definitions allow drawing distinctions, e.g. to allow deciding whether something is nanotechnology or not. The definiens consists of the description of a border which separates the elements belonging to nanotechnology and those which are outside of nanotechnology [SCH 06]. The ideal situation is that the definition allows for each element of the subject area a clear classification of whether it belongs to the specific subset due to the definition or not – showing the validity of the tertium non datur [HUR 06]. There are some basic requirements for definitions. A definition should (extending Schmid et al. [SCH 06]):

  1. – only use terms that are already known or that have already been defined. If, in contrast, the definiens contains the definiendum, the definition is said to be circular, a situation that must be avoided;
  2. – lead to clear-cut decisions for each element of the subject area, whether it belongs to the subset given by the definiens or not (tertium non datur) – there is no third choice in between;
  3. – not contain exceptions but should apply generally to the field under consideration;
  4. – be as simple as possible and unambiguous;
  5. – not include elements expected to come into reality in the future. As a bad example in this respect, consider the definition of bionics given by Nachtigall [NAC 02]:

“Bionics means learning from constructions processes and principles of development realized in nature for a better relation between humans, the natural environment, and technology” [NAC 02] (translation A.G).

This definition is not applicable because at the respective present time, no proof will be possible of whether the expected gain of a “better relation between humans, the natural environment, and technology” will be reached in the future.

Defining something is, in pragmatic terms, a specific type of action which will serve certain purposes. The success of this action is measured by analyzing whether the definition under consideration is really purposive in the intended sense. Definitions will constitute and regulate the use of a new term or notion by referring to already established notions. Thus, they cannot be false nor true but rather more or less fit for purpose.

Definitions are interventions into fields of action and communication. Consequently, definitions and classifications are not purely describing something but by applying a specific structure to a subject area they are also shaping that area. They are not only descriptive, but also constructive. This aspect illustrates that defining something is not a value-neutral endeavor. The respective definition includes the expectation that the definition in the way chosen should be better in some sense than possible alternatives. The underlying criteria of what is being understood as better relate the definition to the level of values.

Definitions and subsequent classifications are structuring a subject area in a certain way, which is not the only one possible. There are no straightforward and forcing logical arguments why a specific definition has to be made in a particular way and not in an alternative one. Though there is no logical reason for choosing a definition in a specific way, pragmatic reasons concerning the adequateness of a proposed definition to serve certain purposes help in selecting a specific definition among alternatives. Controversies about definitions are related to the question of which purposes should be fulfilled by the respective definition, and which possible definition would serve the respective purpose best. Definitions are means to specific ends and may be more or less purposive.

Consequently, the respective purposes of definitions are essential in debating about their appropriateness and adequateness. There is a general level of purposes which should be met by every definition, and there are specific purposes in the concrete case of defining NEST areas. Definitions should serve the following purposes [HUR 06, SCH 06], some of which are more general, and others specific to NEST:

  1. – Creation of order: drawing distinctions creates order. Defining something by distinguishing it from something else is the basic mode of mind and, simultaneously, its necessary precondition [SPE 79, MIT 74]. Creating order may be required for different reasons, depending on the respective context. In NEST, there might be, for instance, the necessity to create order for the organization of research funding or for regulative purposes;
  2. – Classification of knowledge: our knowledge is organized in systems and hierarchies of distinctions, reaching from basic distinctions to highly differentiated and specialized ones, depending on definitions. The world can be seen as the sum of all distinctions which have been made so far [MIT 74]. In NEST, definitions might help to classify and categorize the new knowledge which is available or expected;
  3. – Enabling intersubjective understanding and cooperative action: to work with common notions based on agreed definitions is a necessary precondition of intersubjective understanding and cooperative action [JAN 01]. This applies at different social levels, reaching from microgroups like families to large social communities, and also including science communities or subcommunities such as those involved in NEST research. A common understanding of basic notions is a prerequisite to mutual learning and progress;
  4. – Cognitive purposes: definitions of NEST areas should allow separating these areas from established fields of technology and from established disciplines. The character of a specific NEST as a newly emerging field of technology should become visible in the definition. This means the identification of the novelty of technological capabilities, knowledge and skills;
  5. – Interfaces to the established disciplines: NEST definitions should also be usable to characterize and describe the interfaces to established scientific and technological disciplines, especially to describe the use of scientific input from physics, chemistry, biology and engineering;
  6. – Contribution to the identity of the actors involved: the definition should contribute to the constitution and the identity of the emerging research community around the NEST field under consideration, e.g. by giving rise to new scientific journals, new university chairs and institutes;
  7. – Funding purposes: the NEST definition should allow establishing relations to funding programs in ministerial departments, funding agencies and authorities. Research needs public funding, and it is a trivial issue that funding is to a large part organized with respect to definitions (and characterizations) of new and promising fields of interest [VAN 93];
  8. – Regulatory purposes: in the course of RRI debates on NEST, frequently the question or even need for regulation of research is posed [GRU 12b, VON 07]. Any regulation needs, however, must be grounded on clear definitions of what should be regulated;
  9. – Public relations: in public debate, people obviously want to know what the respective NEST field is all about. In order to use the notion in public and political communication, the definition should be clear and as short as possible. This does not necessarily imply the need for an accurate definition but for a rather good characterization. In particular, in these debates, it will be essential to clearly identify the novelty of the NEST under consideration and its possible social impact.

This list of purposes shows that the definition of NEST fields is relevant for mostly social and political reasons. Scientific advance itself does not need a clear definition of NEST. It does not matter whether certain activities, for instance at the nanoscale, are being classified as nanotechnology, chemistry or mesoscale physics. However, there is an extra-scientific need for a clear definition in order to structure the communication with the outside world of science, with funding agencies, regulators and the public. History shows that such deep definitions have mostly been controversial: “… at least the framing definitions which determine the ongoing development of science were highly controversial due to science-political interests and its consequences” [MIT 97, p. 440] (translation A.G).

4.4. Defining and characterizing as meaning-giving activity

It appears trivial that definitions and characterizations are linked to the dimension of meaning. The description of something is in fact fundamentally tied to the attribution of meaning. According to Chapter 1, this is not sufficient to provide the ammunition for RRI debates. On the contrary, it is specifically about a social meaning. There would be no reason for an RRI debate if it were only about a purely inner-scientific meaning. Where can the social attributions of meaning be located? Here are several conjectures to generate questions for the following case studies (Chapters 5–8):

  1. – The newness of NEST: definitions in the area of NEST must say what is novel about the respective topic of NEST. The new feature is one of the decisive factors in determining what RRI debates can refer to and what the framework of the debates is. Whether, for example, the new factor synthetic biology is viewed as a future option for the production of artificial life, or as the further development of established procedures of biotechnology, raises other issues of responsibility, just as it results in other public perceptions;
  2. – Evolution versus revolution: definitions are one of the factors that determine whether the newness of a NEST development is interpreted as a revolutionary and disruptive jump or rather as a gradual evolutionary change. This difference in interpretation is decisive for RRI debates since in a gradual development, one can continue to refer to the established forms of technology and patterns of assessment, which only have to gradually adapt to the new demands. If disruptive developments are pending, however, there must also be a largely new pattern of assessment. The time required is also extremely different: revolutionary changes force an acceleration, while evolutionary NEST developments can be handled with changes in the criteria of assessment that are just as gradual;
  3. – Ethical challenges: in some cases, definitions have immediate consequences for the classification of NEST in ethical debates. Where, for example, the boundary is drawn between medical prosthetic and a technological enhancement of humans determines whether the established ethics of medicine is responsible or whether a new ethics of human enhancement must be developed (Chapter 7). Accordingly, for instance, the definition of autonomy in robotics exerts a direct influence on how the treatment of robots is ethically categorized (Chapter 6);
  4. – Social function: definitions include or exclude because they make distinctions and mark boundaries. They thus have consequences for which social group (especially of scientists) is classified within a certain field or excluded from it. This social dimension often leads to conflicts, for example research funding makes it appear attractive to work in a certain NEST field but definitions lead to permission being withheld;
  5. – The choice of concepts: finally, it is not only the characterizations and definitions that are important, but also the choice of basic concepts and notions. For example, for a long time, the prefix “nano” exerted considerable fascination. The choice of the attribute “synthetic” in synthetic biology, in contrast, was rather courageous because its role model, synthetic chemistry, by no means enjoys positive public appreciation.

Even this extremely hypothetical collection of issues, which by no means claims to be complete, makes it clear which great relevance NEST definitions and characterizations have with regard to the attribution of social meaning. By no means do the respective debates serve only as dry and perhaps technocratic means of achieving self-understanding in scientific communities. On the contrary, the meaning of these debates exerts a relevance for the RRI debates that goes far beyond technical issues.

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