Public Sector Capacity for Governance in the Caribbean
Indianna D. Minto-Coy and Evan M. Berman
Summary
Chapter 3 defines and provides a general framework for governance capacity, looks at historical challenges of governance capacity in the Caribbean suggesting some patterns, and assesses the past performance of the public sector in the Caribbean context. Taking into consideration vexing challenges, modern demands, and expectations associated with the Region’s developing states, the authors specify key areas for improving and strengthening their capacity for governance.
Introduction
Governance has become a fashionable term by which to describe the ability of countries and organizations to make decisions and address important challenges in effective ways. Economic development, public safety, social development, environmental sustainability, health, and education all require important policy choices. Caribbean countries face many challenges, indeed, and a long-standing concern is whether government jurisdictions in the Caribbean have adequate governance capacity, that is, whether they are up to the task of addressing challenges in the above and other areas. By example, while progress has been made in disaster responsiveness, it is clear that much more needs to be done in areas of prevention, transnational cooperation and resourcing. The same might be said of health care and economic development, too. It makes little sense to discuss sensible policies and reforms that countries are unable to adopt or implement in effective ways.
This chapter looks at the capacity for governance in the Caribbean. The first section defines and provides a general framework for governance capacity. The second section looks at historical challenges of governance capacity in the Caribbean suggesting some patterns. The third section examines some modern day issues around both policy and administration, allowing for conclusions about continuity and new issues in governance capacity. The empirical basis for the chapter rests in the many case studies presented in Minto-Coy and Berman (2016), and other studies. Along the way, we point to some successes in increasing governance capacity, as well. The latter is important given Grindle’s point on good enough governance as pointing not only to shortfalls but also understanding what is working (2004).
The term “governance” is of recent vintage and quite abstract. The term became fashionable in the 1990s, notably among economists, interested in studying how rules, authority, norms and decision-making processes affect institutions/organizations as they address market and nonmarket (e.g., common) issues. The World Bank Report on Governance and Development (1992) also contributed significant attention to the emergence and popularity of the term in the developing context. Definitions of governance vary, with some authors defining it broadly as “processes of social organization and coordination” (Bevir 2012), allowing for broad, theoretical inquiry, and others studying specific arenas such as public governance, corporate governance, global governance or internet governance, and environmental governance. Fukuyama (2013), for example, addresses the public sector and defines governance as “a government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services.” A key point for all authors is that ‘governance’ draws a distinction with ‘government’ in so far as issues involve multiple actors and, hence, a need for vertical and horizontal coordination (Hufty 2011). Also, while national and provincial governments continue to play important roles, issues are increasingly able to draw on increasingly capable private organizations and lower tier governments (cities, public authorities), hence, making it a timely concept. Governance also brings economists closer to disciplines such as public administration which studies authority, norms, and decision making.
Associated with governance is the normative term ‘good governance’ which, according to the World Bank (1994) is epitomized “by predictable, open and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law.” Other definitions also include good or equitable outcomes, and the UNDP (1997) notes that: “Good governance is, among other things, participatory, transparent and accountable. . . . and political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in decision making over the allocation of development resources.” The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project aims to measure good governance that uses six dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (World Bank 2015). While some critics suggest limits to the applicability of these “Western” notions (Bruhn 2009), concepts of integrity, equitability, and effectiveness have very broad appeal.
In short, governance has been an intellectual growth area during the past twenty years and is now part of accepted norm in academic and practice-based discourse. Studies in economics, public administration, public policy have increased awareness among policy makers that both “institutions matter” and “leadership matters,” as is now reflected in emphases on integrity, strategic leadership, inclusiveness, and organizational effectiveness, as well as increased attention to policy outcomes in areas of inequality, social capacity, and problems of the commons (e.g., environment). In short, the capacity to get things done affects what gets done.
Framework for Capacity
Governance capacity is generally defined or discussed as having conditions and a set of capabilities that are needed for effective governance. While the term “governance capacity” has come into use, it is not well defined and often varies based on subject matter, similar to the term “governance” itself (e.g., environmental governance). In the context of public sector in Caribbean island nations, we define governance capacity as having conditions for planning, decision making, and execution of policies and programs that in both process and outcome are adequate with regard to effectiveness and being equitable.
This definition draws attention to necessary elements of governance, as well as necessary criteria for their assessment. As to the latter, Grindle (2004, 2007) draws attention to “good governance” setting unrealistically high standards, and the need for “good enough” governance that provide sufficient conditions for programs to be effective, such as poverty alleviation which is her focus. Here, we distinguish between ‘good enough’ (say, adequate) public sector governance capacity which concern rather minimal capabilities that allows small island nations to achieve adequate outcomes in light of their current challenges, and greater (say, superior) governance capacity that may allow for even better outcomes. The task is to think about good enough governance capacity, before moving on to even higher levels of capacity that may be unrealistic or unattainable at present. As is colloquially said, “the best is the enemy of the good” (enough).
While scholarship on public sector capacity is sparse, studies are plentiful on government and public sector effectiveness. Based on the latter, borrowing on public administration, other disciplines and notions of good (enough) governance, we provide the following framework for the governance capacity of nations (we call these as such, even though some Caribbean islands are dependent territories, of course):
A. Strategic Leadership that Serves All Population Groups
Nations must be able to make decisions that address their challenges. Public sector governance is distinguished by the need to make decisions that address both short- and longer-term time horizons, and which serve diverse populations (e.g., by income). In practice, these features are compromised by politics, forms of government and self-serving behavior of elite groups. First, many thousands of decisions are required, touching upon many different areas (public safety, health and education, labor and environmental regulation, economic development, etc.) and it is axiomatic that not all strategic decisions can come from political actors alone; senior bureaucrats must provide leadership, as well. Democracy is prone to legislative gridlock (e.g., U.S. Congress) and thus presidential orders and bureaucratic rule making are needed as forms of leadership, too. Good enough strategic leadership that means decisions and programs are developed for a nation’s key issues and also that all programs receive periodic strategic reviews and updates; cooperation is needed among bureaucratic and political leaders on these matters.
Second, leadership elites in politics and/or bureaucracies are prone to becoming self-serving and insufficiently advancing minority or poor groups or the public interest. While Colonial powers are typically insufficiently concerned with these matters as priorities, their extractive goals, national or indigenous elites are not necessarily better when they, too, are self-serving and lack resources; examples from African nations are clear. The capacity of decision making also requires the ability of elites to regulate their own interests in favor of public and minority interests and have capacity for making decisions with mid- and long-term horizons. Good enough strategic leadership means sufficiently advancing the public interest and a nation’s poor and minority populations. Good enough governance also requires decisions that are made in consultation and cooperation from other actors, including working with other nations and pursuing regional strategies where transnational issues and those of scope/scale require so. These are important features of governance capacity.
B. Resourcing
Governance requires money, and lots of it. Therefore, nations must be able to raise revenues in ways that requires taxation and reasonable borrowing practices. This requires tax collection, sound financial management, addressing tax avoidance, utilization of grants and international donor programs, and also economic management to ensure a future base. Insufficient resourcing will cause nations to be unable to pursue progress towards their key priorities; good enough reoccurring means that these key challenges can be met. It may also include ensuring that taxation burdens are perceived as being fairly distributed to further related purposes of social development and national cohesion.
Public bureaucracies must have the ability to achieve policy aims in effective, efficient and fair ways. This is not necessarily about using the latest technology and management fad, but rather about being not wasteful and reliably effective in securing achievement “wins.” Neither is it necessarily about size; the examples of Singapore, Hong Kong, New Zealand and Luxemburg all show that small states can be effective with small bureaucracies that are strategically focused and managed around highly capable civil servants providing superior performance. This is often achieved through rigorous and competitive selection, strong individual performance management, and the use of board and authorities that are run as much as possible on a business-like basis without undue personnel protections. It is also based on holding senior officials, appointed or not, accountable for the performance of their units.
Clearly, this is not always the practice in the Caribbean and elsewhere. At the other extreme are poorly managed public agencies that defer strategic decision making (perhaps to political institutions), lack technology and intelligence (data), appointees who are self-serving and lacking in commitment, and employees who lack motivation and compensation, and performance systems that are outdated and ineffective for the tasks. At issue here is defining “good enough” bureaucratic capability that ensures reasonably effective service. We think this may involve agencies that use performance strategies and technology that gets the job done, which are free of modest corruption (below), and having middle and senior managers who are amply imbued with public service ethos that make decisions which further public service with short- and long-term goals in mind. In today’s governance, they should have capacity and desire for cooperation with other jurisdictions and private organizations and also work with other nations on transnational issues. It should be noted that another societal contribution of public sector bureaucracies is that they are routes to advancement for minorities and women due to their relatively stable employment.
D. Accountability
Governance involves the exercise of authority and, as two sayings go, “mistakes happen” and “power corrupts.” Accountability (or rather, oversight) is needed to identify poor performance and abuse of power and ensure corrective actions for both. In short, nations need effective accountability processes and ensure that these processes or institutions have adequate independence and authority to do their job well. In this regard, a main critique is that some accountability institutions are de facto ‘toothless tigers’ or have become captured (corrupted) by those agencies or interests they are to oversee. Good enough accountability requires at least some capability for addressing the worst of abuses and for undertaking corrective action and ensuring minimal levels of acceptable performance from political and bureaucratic actors. Developing such systems has become among the challenging issues for democracies and one-party systems alike.
Anti-corruption emerged in recent years as a key priority in global agendas. Corruption is defined as the abuse of power or position to acquire a personal benefit or advantage. Public sector corruption includes corruption of the political process and of government agencies, not only affecting the allocation of public funds for contracts, grants, and hiring, but also strategic decision making, attention to public and minority needs, reducing tax compliance and burdens, increasing the cost of frontline services through petty bribes, advantages procured through revolving doors and more, in short, all of the above governance capacities. The opportunity for corruption and advantage exists at all levels—senior, middle, and lower levels, and nations with poor governance capacity often have a high incidence of corruption, as well. A critical governance capacity is having defined corruption broadly enough, and ensuring fair and effective anti-corruption investigation. It might be noted that Transparency International has done much to further awareness about corruption through its annual country reports, and also that e-government has done much in recent years to reduce corruption through accountability and transparency, which increases bureaucratic effectiveness and efficiency.
The above provides a framework for public sector governance capacity. No doubt, additional factors might be mentioned. Some of these might be viewed as societal conditions or even as preconditions that further public sector governance. Whether these are viewed as a fifth category (E) or as precondition is not a matter we wish to pursue here. One such factor is having adequate subnational governments and private sector organizations that can contribute to service delivery and problem-solving, hence reducing the demands on national governments. Another factor is sufficiently diversified and competitive private sector that supports economic growth and government resourcing. A third condition is having populations that are predisposed to demanding public ethos and leadership from their governments. A fourth factor is respect and abidance for the rule of law and democratic principles in the general populations; some populations and government actors appear to define themselves more by their extractive successes than their societal contributions. These and other societal conditions may affect governance capacity, as well. Though these factors are largely beyond the grasp of governance in the short-run, they should be the target of state sector policies and programs for increasing in the mid- to long-run. The overarching framework presented above also echoes Capano, Howlett and Ramesh’s (2015) approach which takes in the policy and political aspects of governance capacity.
The Legacy of Governance Capacity in the Caribbean
Studies of the history of Caribbean island show a pattern of governance and governance capacity that have sometimes left a legacy which persists through the present. The harsh truth is that independence has not always brought good enough governance. This is not the place to review major histories of Caribbean islands, but rather to present analysis of them as regarding the above concepts.
Historical Overview of Governance Capacity in the Commonwealth Governance
Studies of the Commonwealth show that the organization of the public sectors in these countries was largely informed by the demands of the British and that economy (Minto-Coy 2016a; Wallace 1977). Whereas the region occupied a central place in British economy, focus was less on establishing stable societies beyond the dictates for stable plantation labor. As such, the organization was mainly top down, with emphasis on maintaining law and order. An efficient public service in this context was dictated by efficient cost-reduction to the Crown and for neat integration into the British Empire. Thus, whereas the region represented the frontier in which the British forged their global and economic dominance and as its importance waned with the abolition of slavery and the emancipation of the slaves, the value of the region also waned. In such a context the development of the local environment or policies geared to improving the livelihoods of the local population were not the main prerogative.
For sure, the organization of the public sector in the immediate post-independence years allowed for many of the brightest locals to enter the public service. Nonetheless, the top-down nature of the bureaucracy has been noted as having led to practices of exclusion in the practice of governance, a tendency towards secrecy around decisions and processes, risk-aversion and an unwillingness to break with norms and traditions. Indeed, where governance was preferences on the existence of a mass of population who lacked the experience, information or right mix of qualities to facilitate their engagement in the decision-making process then power and policy making becomes the task of a centralized and small group of elites. In such a context, the search for and implementation of better ways of governing in the independence years has not always been genuine, has been more ad hoc in contemplation and implementation. Attempts of reform have nonetheless, been hampered by poor planning and a failure to implement and evaluate. As such, opportunities for learning have been lost, a reality that has been compounded by the slow pace in moving towards evidence-based research.
Arguably one of the most defining features of the colonial legacy has been the Westminster Whitehall system of governance which purports the existence of an anonymous, neutral and impartial civil service tasked with the implementation of policies. In societies fraught with contentions over the distribution of scarce benefits and spoils, nepotism, clientelism, an early focus on years of service as opposed to merit for promotion, as in cases of ethnically-based grievances in places such as Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago, these goals have rarely been realized. Indeed, the sometimes combative relationship between political leaders and the bureaucracy has seen politics triumphing over bureaucracy and by extension sound advice and reason. To this end, appointments in the public sector sometimes take on a political undertone to the extent where it may be seen as reward for party political support as opposed to merit, with consequences for professionalism and actions in the public interest as opposed to those of the appointee.
This is an important consideration given the reality that the public interest is not to be taken naturally as being synonymous with the government’s or Minister’s interest. This is important with Ministers often more preoccupied with the rigors of the electoral cycle than in planning and staying the course of long-term development plans. Such is the case, for instance in the change of policies adopted by one political regime at the change of administration upon elevation. The desire not to be seen to be authenticating an opponent’s policies has seen waste, duplication, implementation deficits, and problems in policy coordination even after money (including aid) has been exhausted on that project (Minto-Coy 2016a; Jones 1992). Indeed, even where civil servants have sought to adhere to the WW principles, they have not operated in environments in which such principles can thrive. So even without making normative judgements on the ability of such a civil servant to exist or whether good enough governance really calls for the existence of such characters, the reality is that these principles were not realized in the Caribbean then, neither can they be said to be pervading the same today. Indeed, perhaps an early realization of the challenges in meeting such ideals may have meant attention to engineering locally informed procedures for governance that would have in essence aimed at reducing the effects of some of the most pernicious features of government in the Commonwealth Caribbean.
One of the effects of public governance in such a context has been corruption. Indeed, it has been noted that corruption is largely an independence phenomenon (Mills 1997) while others have suggested its existence (as well as nepotism) during the colonial period and prior to independence. Perhaps the distinctive feature for the post-independence period is the extent of occurrence. That is, the incidence of corruption has increased as resources have become scarcer in economies that have not yet delivered the levels of growth and formal opportunities for enrichment envisioned prior to independence.1
Historical Overview of Governance Capacity in the French Antilles
One of the guiding themes in the public administration history of the French Caribbean2 is the fact of an underdeveloped bureaucracy. A large contributing factor here has been the insertion of the region into the central administrative apparatus of the French government, to the extent that little power, participation, and ownership has been realized at the local level. There has been little opportunity for the contextualization of public governance, the development of internally informed management and leadership capacity. This practice has been embodied in the principles of assimilation, centralization, uniformity, and universalism which featured in the conferring of the status of overseas departments (Departements d’outre mer—DOM). As such, the organization of public governance was not based on local context with France maintaining close control over public policies, and the very social and economic organization of the Caribbean.
Insertion into the French administrative system has had significant implications including the stifling of local innovation and policy making capacity. Attempts to raise standard of living to the level of France has led to frustrated ambitions locally particularly where citizens in the Caribbean are not viewed as equal to those in France. Emphasis on cultural inclusion and raising living standards has not been matched by similar attention to assisting the islands to becoming internally sustainable and hence stronger, more economically independent units within the French empire. As such, the DOMs remain some of the most economically deprived in the EU and reliant on the mainland for their very survival.
Historical Overview of Governance Capacity in the Dutch Antilles
One of the evolving themes in the history of the Caribbean is the ongoing struggle to re-define its relationship with former colonial powers and the tensions inherent in such a struggle. In the case of the Dutch territories, the initial focus on Dutchinalizing the region saw the intentional introduction of a Dutch system of public governance in key areas such as the civil service and education. Under such a system the emphasis of the civil service was more on file keeping and little about the development of local economies. Indeed, this theme has followed most of the Dutch region throughout the transition to the different levels of association between the mainland and the territories over the years including independence (Suriname in 1975, and Aruba in 1986). The most recent transition in 2010 has seen the Netherlands Antilles transitioning to various levels of association with islands such as Curacao becoming autonomous partners and others (e.g., Saba) municipalities.
The different sentiments and associations as it relates to association with the Netherlands underlines a lack of collaboration and identification with each other and more towards the mainland. Indeed, throughout the wider Caribbean, the institutionalization of the cultural and governance institutions of the colonial powers has been the successful theme stymying meaningful partnering across islands with collaboration across historical colonial boundaries.
Key public posts as in the French Caribbean and colonial days of the Commonwealth region were occupied by civil servants directly coming from the mainland or light-skinned locals. Frustrated desires and exclusion in the colonial periods have evolved into corruption and inefficient public governance in more recent times of greater self-rule and independence. These developments have surfaced in the politicization of the civil service and its use as a tool for distributing political patronage and reward. The result has been an oversized public sector which is hierarchical and sometimes not fit for purpose (i.e., skills, training and organization). Tensions between the political and administrative machinery have also stymied efforts at developing the capacity and ability of the latter to deliver quality service with politicians shying away from granting too much power to their counterparts.
The economic (aid and loans) support from the mainland, as in the case of the French Caribbean has had the effect of stifling local economic growth and debt in still dependent territories. Additionally, periods of economic support did not entail the need to develop local economies. Furthermore, spending has not been tempered by the actual income but has continued as in periods where the Netherlands was fully responsible for the region. Efforts to temper high public debt and the conflated public service have seen more recent attempts to restrict spending and hiring in the public sector. The emerging concern now surrounds the aging of the public sector.
Governance Capacity in Other Caribbean Territories
Many of the experiences surrounding the development and demonstration of governance capacity above has played out in various forms in the remainder of the region. In the case of territories such as Cuba and Haiti, their particular histories have seen periods of isolation from their other Caribbean neighbors and the world. To this end, they have been denied support for the development of sound governance institutions. The impact in both cases has diverged significantly with important implications for governance capacity and experiences in these two countries.
Whereas Cuba was to receive some support from the former USSR, Cuba has devised local capacities and creative governance. Evidence is seen in the quality of the education and health systems, in indigenously derived science and technology (e.g., pharmaceuticals) and related social indicators that rival those of many developed countries. These achievements have been accomplished amidst a longstanding U.S. embargo that has since 2014 appeared to be nearing its end. Importantly, Haiti’s exclusion arguably appeared to have been more complete and longstanding (given the extended period of Haiti’s independence and the very way in which that country secured its independence) (Minto-Coy and Berman 2016). In Haiti’s case, the result has been a failing economy, ongoing weaknesses in public sector capacity and organization as seen in informality, corruption, enduring poverty and the sustained failure of governments to organize or function effectively. To be sure, one defining features of governance has been the absence of a well-intentioned elite in Haiti and arguably, its presence in Cuba in so far as there was willingness to govern beyond self and family interests for a perceived wider good.
Collectively, the historical development of the Caribbean’s public sector capacity therefore cannot be divorced from the legacies and emergence of the region as colonial outposts. The resulting impact on the capacity for public sector governance has been profound, ranging from the emergence of conflated and underdeveloped bureaucracies, financial mismanagement, corruption, absence of local concerns and context in the policy process, failure to effectively develop and manage human resources for development, to the development of rule and rote form of public governance that has reduced responsiveness and innovation. The public sector then, has not been seen enough as an active contributor and vital informant of the region’s growth and developmental potential. For instance, swelling the ranks of the civil service without consideration of the impact on national budgets, corruption, and the use of the public sector as a tool for dispensing rewards and punishments has compromised the ability to hire the best and efficient capacity management, while the mismanagement of public finances has contributed to debt and high balance of payments resulting in sustained inability to finance development interventions. This approach is also seen in the inability of the state to marshal different actors (e.g., business and society) behind the developmental agenda (some exceptions being seen in Barbados) and even in the conflict which sometimes typifies the politico-bureaucratic relationship. The inability to link the quality of the public administration apparatus to the imperative of raising incomes and economic growth have seen a divorce of thinking on the place of the public sector in growth. The relationship with the colonial powers did not entail an emphasis on the development of local (financial, institutional, organizational or human) capacity for governance, less good governance. For the most part, the black population across the region were largely kept out of governance institutions and mechanisms. From a state of exclusion and external orientation and without direct intent otherwise it would be difficult to derive public capacity that was sympathetic to the local needs. It is perhaps for this reason that inequality remains such a prevalent feature of many Caribbean societies today.
Public Sector Capacity in Modern Times
Much of the current reality of governance in the Caribbean can be traced back to the enduring colonial legacies and transplanted governance systems across the region. As will be shown here, however, many capacity gaps also have their basis in the independence or modern experiences forming a complex interplay between old and new. Before this however, it is important to note that there have been areas of success and definite steps towards addressing capacity gaps in select areas including efforts at institution building via public sector reform and modernization in public financial management (PFM). This section discusses some of these improvements. We also draw general conclusions about public sector capacity for governance in the Caribbean in the twenty-first century.
A. Capacity Development in Tourism and Telecommunications Policy
One of the more successful areas is demonstrated in the achievements in the tourism industry with the Caribbean being one of the more successful globally. While the industry largely emerged without much planning, governments have recognized the need for specific policy interventions in growing, diversifying, and protecting what remains the largest contributor to Caribbean economies. As such more precise steps have included the development of infrastructure and policy framework governing the sector (Clayton, Karagiannis, and Bailey 2016).
Elsewhere too, some governments have demonstrated a desire to move away from archaic regulations and legislation by introducing new practices and using policy to open up opportunities for business and citizens. Evidence can be seen in the areas of telecommunications where governments in the English-speaking territories have succeeded in removing monopoly arrangements in the telecommunications industry, many of which were vestiges of colonial ties. In reforming the structure and conduct of the communications sector in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the region has taken decisive steps towards breaking the close ties between the monopoly incumbent and policymakers and regulators in the sector (Minto-Coy 2016b, 2009a), though the challenges of regulatory capture reoccur from time to time.
The introduction of innovative regulatory models including the adoption of a regional approach to telecommunications regulation (and banking) in the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) has been noted for their innovativeness. The approach to a joint regulator (ECTEL) has been useful in addressing the shortage in regulatory expertise, while sharing the costs of sector regulation.
The steps being taken by policymakers in countries such as the Dominican Republic and Jamaica, have also seen some islands becoming important players in international discourse on emerging issues. Included here is the emerging open data and open data for development movements, the next evolution in the focus on e-government. These developments have been achieved through partnership with local research community and international allies demonstrating the benefits of cross-section and national partnerships. Early developments here act as indicators on how transformation in the regulations and structure of the telecommunications industry since the early 2000s can be extended to bring greater transparency, accountability and citizen engagement, as well as open opportunities for innovation and entrepreneurship.
B. Gains in PSR Reform & Public Financial Management
One of the lingering challenges in the region is the need for public sector reform (PSR) and the inability to manage public finances effectively. Individual territories such as the Cayman Islands have fared better than others, in its desire to maintain sound public financial management (PFM). As is clear from the previous section however, the issues around PSR and PFM affect the entire region and its ability to realize good enough governance.
To the Caribbean’s credit there has been recognition of the need for improvements in these areas, with positive advances particularly in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, towards achieving better financial governance. Measures include the move towards result-oriented budgeting, automation, and improvements in the legal framework around financial management. Emphasis has also been placed on debt restructuring and management, containing public spending and tax reform and administration. One of the main areas here is the need to contain spending overall but particularly on wages and pensions, a relevant issue given the role of governments as the main employer.
Deeply related to sound PFM is the issue of public sector reform. This is so given that the public sector is integrally involved in planning and executing national budgets and its size makes it a costly organ to finance. As it relates to public sector reform, much has been realized in raising the standard of public service in some countries, including among the UK-type executive agencies introduced in countries such as Belize, Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad & Tobago from the end of the 1990s (Minto-Coy 2016a & 2010; Bissessar 2002; Sutton 2008). Reforms include improvements in training, the introduction of performance management systems, and attempts at decentralization with public services once based in cities now being accessible in rural areas. Decentralization has been about extending access but also addressing another legacy issue, i.e., transforming the inherited hierarchical bureaucratic model to allow civil servants more ownership and voice in operations.
The experiences of Jamaica exemplify some of the perversions in public sector governance highlighted above, while the most recent reforms (post 2012) suggest the possibility for successful capacity enhancement. The former scenario has received much attention (including Minto-Coy 2011a; Harriott 2008; Blavy 2006; Sampson 1996; World Bank 2006; Gray 2004; Jones 1992) but it is to the more recent and still evolving reforms that we turn briefly. Undertaken mainly since 2012 and under the support and funding of the IMF, the country has within a short term introduced a number of reforms in PSR and PFM that have already begun to reap visible benefits, including improvement on the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness ranking from 107 in 2011 to 86 in 2016 (Trading Economics 2016). Among these is the early and simultaneous tabling of the Estimates of Expenditure and Revenues in 2015 which marked the first time that these were tabled together in the history of independent Jamaica (Jamaica Observer 2015). Rather than agree to specific demands for wage increases which in the past would have occurred specifically in an election period, the government refrained from doing so. Instead, allowances and benefits were granted, for example, funeral benefits and the establishment of an education fund in the form of grants to the children of public sector workers (Linton 2015) helping to deliver more modest wage increases and adhering to the intent to contain budget shortfalls. Other reforms include the removal of discretionary waivers above certain levels helping to reduce the abuses that have tended to accompany the system of waivers in Jamaica. The implementation of the reform program has been carefully monitored by the Economic Program Oversight Committee specifically created for this purpose. Membership represents some of the most successful business leaders and public sector representatives with information being released by the committee to assist the public in monitoring the country’s progress and achievements under the program. The country’s tackling of corruption has also improved moving from number 86 (of 175 countries) in 2011 to 69 in 2015 based on the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. In essence, there has been a coming together of an understanding of the role of PSR and sound PFM to the growth and sustainable advancement of that country. The developments since 2012 suggest that Caribbean leaders do have the ability and where there is sufficient desire, can make major transformations for the benefit of their citizens across the region.
C. Emergency Management
While much of the discussion on capacity has tended to focus on man-made or legacy issues, no discussion of public sector capacity in the Caribbean can go without mention of the impact of natural disasters as a major constraint on the ability of Caribbean governments to govern effectively. Its geographical location has made the Region prone to natural and climatic conditions whose impacts are far more pronounced due to small size and resources (Minto-Coy and Berman 2016: 21). The impact of hurricane Tomas on St Lucia in 2010 amounted to 43.4 percent of GDP (ibid).
The response, particularly of the English-speaking Caribbean demonstrates the inventiveness and ability to build resilience in the face of serious governance threats. Faced with this natural risk, the region has developed a sophisticated range of interventions to environmental and disaster risk management. Of note here is the evolution in programs and approach from a piecemeal one to focusing on all stages of a hazard including prevention and mitigation. The evolution in approaches and sustained capacity building is evidenced in the name change of the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA) established in 1990 to Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) in 2009 (Granvorka et al. 2016). The evolution of the region’s approach has been orchestrated at the national and regional levels with multisector involvement including international donors. Indeed, this has been one of the areas in which the Caribbean has made significant advancements, demonstrating some proclivity towards proactive action and strategic leadership which differs from the, lethargy or inertia which pervades other areas of governance.
D. Capacity in Education and Health
Education and health systems have evolved significantly moving from the elitism and preoccupation with the North which typified access and design under colonialism to ones based on inclusion and meeting the needs of local and regional populations. Of course, many gaps remain and are emerging in the provision of these services. This is likely to be so as governments face increasing challenges in meeting national budgets and islands such as Barbados reduced subventions to University students.
Nevertheless, the region has seen success in the development of human resources and the evolution in its educational system. Citizens are employable globally and regionally with the expansion in the number of training institutions and upgrading of facilities. The Region is not only a place for educating nationals but international students as well. This has been facilitated through the development of a number of schools (e.g., medical education in Grenada) targeting international students and attempts at internationalization (at the program level) at a number of other educational institutions across the region (e.g., the Mona School of Business and Management).
Expansion in provision has also been witnessed in the health sector. The focus has also evolved in response to recognized needs of the region at different phases of its evolution (Jules and Fryer 2016). Successes have come in addressing issues related to nutrition, water and sanitation. Nevertheless, capacity remains strained with increased challenges around funding and provision. Responses have included the introduction of user fees and a multisectoral and decentralized approach to planning and implementation. Indeed, while no region is arguably free of such challenges, new and emerging health risks associated with diseases such as chikungunya, Zika-virus have underscored capacity-gaps in terms of manpower, research capacity, technological and financial resources. HIV/AIDS-related deaths and infant mortality rates suggest further weaknesses in the health system. The tendency towards a regional response in the English-speaking region has also been compromised after the 2008 global financial crises with countries moving towards unilateral health sector governance. As new challenges emerge the health and education systems will continue to be tested further with sustained reliance on external sources for technical and financial support.
E. Lingering Issues in Caribbean Public Sector Capacity
The issues and themes raised in this section indicate advancement in governance capacity. Many of the areas discussed suggest success where efforts are made towards good enough governance or improvement within given constraints. The cases indicate that there is the ability to tackle pressing governance challenges across the region. Ultimately, the Caribbean has given rise to a variety of forms and quality of public governance with varying effects. The scattering of countries along the development spectrum (from Barbados to Haiti) underscores this point. Nevertheless, lingering concerns remain. As such, we draw some conclusions about capacity in the Caribbean.
In spite of the ongoing preoccupation with PSR, the ailments continue. Indeed, if successful PSR globally have in the main been comprehensive in their focus and support (Minto-Coy 2011b), it is clear that the experiences of improving public sector capacity in the Caribbean have faltered given misleading and conflicting messages, failure to coalesce vital support (from society and public servants themselves) around reform. Some of the challenges here can be attributed to ineffective leadership and communication skills among leaders who have not yet fully welcomed nonstate actors including, the private sector and citizens as attractive governance partners. This has been levelled at the neo-liberal New Public Management model of reform adopted since the 1990s that has seen the introduction of a number of reform concepts that have not taken route locally (Sutton 2008).
For example, performance appraisals and management and performance based remuneration have been difficult to realize in the public sector with appraisals being delayed or having little relationship with salaries or promotion. As noted by Bissessar, promotion is still based on seniority rather than performance (2002). Furthermore, poor performance has not been met with any adverse action, which goes further to demotivate those public servants who would wish to go beyond the base level of service.
Ultimately, this speaks to insufficient levels of accountability, which is also deeply rooted in the lack of ownership of results and reform movements (good and bad). This is seen in the failure of politicians to take responsibility for failures within their ministries and refusing to step down from office where abuses are unearthed. The problem with corruption and lack of accountability not only features in independent states but also in dependent territories as seen in the postponement of self-rule by Turks and Caicos in 2009 amidst allegations of systemic abuses in government. The lack of accountability is also clear where senior and mid-level risk averse bureaucrats find themselves implementing policies they do not support, understand and did not inform. A related issue is the need to improve public service ethics, especially among reform-fatigued personnel who have also undergone successive waves of salary freezes. It is clear however, that in the current dispensation of cost savings, governments will find it hard to address this issue via wage increase. Perhaps the solution is for the adoption of creative measures such as those undertaken in Jamaica.
A major challenge has been the emergence of dual and conflicting systems and culture in the public sector. For instance, even as automation is being encouraged, there remains a tendency to maintain old forms of accounting (e.g., notebooks) which ultimately undermine efficiency gains and sunk investments in new technology. This is also seen in the introduction of new and improved administrative practices and organizational forms alongside archaic ones. Here efforts at PSR have tended to be piecemeal, unconnected, subject to the turns of the electoral wheel or political expedience. In the case of the creation of executive agencies in countries such as Trinidad & Tobago and Jamaica, there is now an appearance of two public services with improvements not progressing across the entire public sector. The result is the overlaying of old structures and practices with new. This is so even as challenges have emerged around sustaining momentum in reformed entities, including executive agencies. Some of the challenges experienced have come from the adoption of externally motivated policies without attempt to tailor reforms to the local context.
To this end too, it is difficult to speak about governance capacity and human resources in the Caribbean context without mentioning migration. This is so given that the region has been noted as having the highest rates of migration of its most educated and skilled persons than any other in the world (Foner 1998; Minto-Coy 2009b). Over time this has amounted to a significant leakage of capital and resources given public investments in education and training. This group has evolved to become major partners for the region, with their support surpassing annual contributions of traditional international development partners as indicated (Minto-Coy 2016c, 2012, 2010). Surely, in light of the tremendous amount of skills in this group, their proven capacity in helping to bolster state capacity in vital areas such as education, health and the economy (tourism, investments and remittances) in countries such as Haiti, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and Suriname (Minto-Coy 2016c, 2016d, 2010, 2009b; Seraphin 2015; Nurse 2004; Thomas-Hope 1998).
As noted earlier one of the important considerations in discussing public sector capacity is the extent to which the citizens are aware of shortfalls or demand more from their leaders. While it may be said that governance in the Caribbean has led to an expectation of poor performance among public sector leaders and underperformance in the public sector, the evidence still suggests desire among citizens for improvement. Certainly, the demonstrations in Guadeloupe and Martinique in 2009 were as much a result of the sense of exclusion of the black population from the governance of their own society as much as the resulting economic and social frustrations wrought by such exclusions (Minto-Coy and Berman 2016). Addressing these challenges will help to temper growing apathy, sustained migration of talent, crime, informality, and the lack of trust and support towards the state and its representatives.
Policy continuity and the willingness to work across party lines have been consistent themes, particularly in those independent territories. This has been fostered by the winner takes all political system and the battle over spoils and scarce benefits that typifies some resource weak setting. These remain worrying features particularly when an administration is changed. The FAO has for instance noted this as a lingering problem affecting trust and confidence in policies with emerging indications of a desire among some international partners to encourage local consensus on policies across political divides (Brown 2015). Again what becomes clear here is the major role that international development institutions have and can have in helping to improve the quality of governance in the Caribbean, a point supported more generally in the capacity development literature (Brusis 2003).
Conclusion: Good Enough Governance in Context
This chapter provides a framework for evaluating state sector capacity of nations. It defines this around four dimensions plus preconditions. These are accountability, a capable bureaucracy, resourcing and strategic leadership. For sure, the presence of other factors, termed societal factors, potentially constituting a fifth dimension has been acknowledged. The Caribbean has not been entirely successful or failing in these dimensions, a fact perhaps most illustrative in the region’s rating as a grouping of mainly middle-income countries. Thus public sector capacity for development has been middling with middling results, reflective of a complex mix of legacy and contemporary issues.
The historical development shows a legacy of governance capacity that is weak in terms of its propensity to involve and seek consensus, that has fostered divisions between politics and bureaucracy, among different political groups, between government and the private sector, citizens and leaders, and finally along ethnic and class lines (IADB 2003). These have compromised the development and effect of public administration and policy across the region. Notwithstanding, the inherited institutions have helped to contribute to the region’s fairly stable democracies with these helping to check the extent to which governments stray into poor governance. Modern day issues show development and progress, including the evolution in education, public sector reform and public financial management, as well as environmental and disaster risk management. Nonetheless, a number of weaknesses have been raised in the chapter.
The concluding paragraphs brings the reader back to the notion of good enough governance and implications for future capacity development. The approach taken here embraces the focus on policy and politics, the former drawing attention to government’s performance in different policy areas and the latter to consensus and legitimacy (Capano, Howlett and Ramesh 2015). The concept also places context and institutional endowment in full view. Indeed, the call for good enough governance in this chapter does not suggest that better or best governance cannot be realized in the Caribbean. However, the preoccupation with the latter has been more in principle than reality.
The result has sometimes been precarious or unintended results (e.g., demoralization of the civil service), with policies being informed by external requirements, conditions, and models that have not taken contextual matters into account. Good enough governance means a conscious review of externally motivated reform agendas to see what aspects can be adopted and implemented over what period. Indeed, good enough governance also implies movement—improvement from one level of capacity to another. Within this is the notion of constant evolution and modification as informed by the previous achievements (and failures) as well as responsiveness to the changing dynamics and demands of the governance landscape (local, regional, and international, and citizen/clients). Good enough governance then, is a continuum en route to better governance with an understanding that governments (even the best) must continue to improve governance. This is important since the latter is not static and cannot be so in environments characterized by crises and change.
The term is also not in contention with the growing list of international indicators and best practice markers. Indeed, a focus on good enough governance within this perspective would force a more conscious consideration of the place of such international indicators in the local environment. GEG also suggests a more realistic assessment of where the Caribbean is in light of such indicators, the steps (immediate, long, and short-term) which need to be taken towards improvement and more realistic/honest markers and evaluations towards improved performance.
To this end, more flashes of public-spiritedness from leaders focused on improving their nations and willing to communicate across boundaries is critical. Likewise, the capacity-gaps in the public sector can be plugged by borrowing from other sectors (as seen in disaster management and the health sector). As such—and accepting that collaboration itself is not a cost-free policy approach—there is need for more engagement with the private sector, NGOs, and civil society in the delivery of public goods and services across the region. There is also a need to focus more on consistent and full implementation of reforms and the systematic collection and measurement of information on challenges and achievements of policy interventions. This will help to develop a local databank that can be drawn upon for more evidence-based policy making.
Indeed, there remains an urgency to mature governance across the Caribbean along the more realistic lines suggested by the GEG approach. In many ways, this is about achieving better governance and addressing some of the longstanding features of the public sector across the Caribbean. To this end, there remains a need for personnel management and organization practices to evolve to the demands of the Caribbean in the twenty-first century. Where reforms are being undertaken, there is need to understand what aspect of the public sector to reform and how remaining unchanged segments and culture can in fact stymy progress in the new. Ultimately, an understanding of what to reform is important but the governance of reform (i.e., the how) is just as important (Minto-Coy 2011b).
Strategic leadership at all levels of society (politics, bureaucracy, and private sector) will be important in advancing governance across the region in the ways suggested above. But so too is support from global development partners, willing to align influence and money with local leadership who take purposeful steps towards improving the public sector capacity. This latter point speaks directly to the reality of the region as a grouping of small developing states, highly linked and dependent on the international environment and funding support for achieving good enough governance. As noted earlier, governance costs and the need for international support will persist particularly given the interconnected and global nature of many emerging governance challenges (e.g., the Zika-virus). Having accepted this reality, the focus should be on determining what kind (e.g., technology, funds) and quantity of support is needed and in what policy areas so as to maximize the impact of such assistance.
As a vital member of the region’s international development partners, marshalling the region’s capacity for governance in the twenty-first century and beyond must mean the inclusion of its migrants and diaspora population—i.e., transnational Caribbean—as important stakeholders in regional and national development. Nevertheless, the aim remains to find the right balance in such relationships so as to prevent renewed dependencies and evolve sustainable governance regionally.
The evolution in the region’s disaster management framework discussed above is one poignant example of the approach of good enough governance espoused in this chapter. Hence, the approach has been influenced by context and policy leaders learning over time and adapting measures to do better as it relates to environmental and disaster risk management. This emphasis on doing better has evolved into recognition that the state cannot unilaterally respond but that the involvement of diverse groups and communities through partnerships and inclusion is necessary at all levels of the policy process. Indeed, there may be specific challenges in other policy areas but this example as well as the still emerging developments in the Jamaican case, suggest the capacity among Caribbean countries for good enough governance for a sustainable Caribbean in the twenty-first century.
1. For example, islands such as Jamaica were ahead of Singapore in the early independence years but have fallen drastically since (Williams & Morgan, 2012).
2. Used here to refer mainly to Martinique, Guadeloupe, and their dependencies.
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