6 The dynamics of identity

Every individual has a sense of identity which serves as a nucleus for (inter-) action. Without notions of identity there would be no need for human interaction. However, identity is not a stable feature of the individual. It is not given (with the exception of an identity assigned by others), but is discursively constructed through interaction with others by using symbolic sign systems such as language. Notions of identity are only possible to develop and sustain in dialogue with others. Thus, identity is constantly under construction by the subject and relevant others; it is facilitated in the intersubjective space and temporarily adopted by the subject for certain purposes. Identity is afforded by particular resources and relationships, activated in particular contexts, and enacted in certain ways. Identity is not an internal state of the individual, but a discursive construct, characterized by dynamism and openness. The identity of the individual is interwoven with collective identities. It can only be stabilized in a cultural network of schemata of conceptualizations, emotions, attitudes, beliefs, behaviors, and Discourses which are constituted by linguistic and sociocultural categories. This fact underlines the close interrelation between language and constructs of identity in many dimensions, for instance, (1) language provides the subject with the semiotic tools for constructing a personal identity; (2) language facilitates the co-construction of a collective group identity; (3) language allows people to interact and test their constructs of identity; (4) language fosters modification of personal and social identities through interaction; (5) language (e.g., in the form of Discourses and genres) allows ways of performing and recognizing characteristic identities; (6) language use involves situated identities (in D/discourses, narratives, and genres); (7) language allows for a meta-perspective on one’s identity by integrating the reaction of others into the subjective constructs and performances of identity; (8) language, if it is at the core of personal and social constructs of identity, is also the nucleus for changing these constructs; (9) language provides elements for the construal of subjective and collective identities with the sites of resistance, discrimination, empowerment, and solidarity.

Subject positions are offered, contested, rejected, and accepted in discursive interaction with others. Learning a L2 and its sociocultural context therefore has the potential to affect constructs of identity in many aspects: (1) the engagement with the other language and its cultural conceptualizations makes L1-mediated constructs of subjective identity more explicit; (2) the encounter with different constructs of “reality” can have an expanding effect on constructs of identity; (3) the engagement with different Discourses, genres, and narratives present alternative ways of constructing subjective identity; (4) the (at least momentary) distancing from internalized L1-mediated cultural categories, norms, and traditions fosters the development of a desired identity which is (at least temporarily) freed from the restraints of the L1 and the underlying cultural patterns and values; (5) the ability to construct mental spaces on the basis of two (or more) languages and their inherent conceptualizations facilitates the development of an interculturally-based hybrid identity which is characterized by a high level of intercultural competence and openness in cognition, emotion, and behavior. Interculturally hybrid identities therefore have to rely on an understanding of the conflictual relationship between subjective and collective identities, based on the skill of empathy and the ability to judge and cooperate with cultural others. Learning a second language, therefore, has immediate and lasting effects on the constructs of identity for the L2 learner.

The metaphorical term identity (derived from Latin identitas: absolute sameness) expresses the sense of who a person is in two dimensions: firstly, it refers to the subjective constructs and embodied sense of identity, and secondly, it stands for the recognition and singularity of the individual, as perceived by others. The notion of identity facilitates, for the subject, the ability to experience his or her self as a unitary self-identical being across time and changing contexts. At the same time, he or she is perceived by others to be the identical person across time and space.

Personal identity is tightly interwoven with the social and cultural fabric of the life-practices in which the individual engages. Although reflections on identity can be traced back to Aristotle, the notion of identity has only become an issue in modern times. This is due to the fact that in traditional societies, identities are ascribed, even before the actual birth of a person; the notion of who someone is does not depend on the subjective aspirations, volition, or self-reflection, but on the socially projected and expected trajectory of someone’s being, for example, an aristocrat, priest, baker, farmer, or serf. In this static social framework, it is thus not necessary to problematize the notion of identity (cf. Taylor 1991: 58).

In (post-)modern times, however, this inflexibility of the social framework has been increasingly eradicated by processes of accelerated social change. The subject can now, to a large extent, select the relevant elements of his or her identity, be it profession, religion, political orientation, place of living, etc. These categories are no longer stable for (post-)modern life because one may have, in the course of one’s lifetime, several occupations, places of living, political, sexual, and religious orientations, and so on. Thus, many aspects of identity are temporary, flexible, and highly context-dependent. These contextual influences on constructs of identity are apparent when, for instance, the same person defines himself or herself in the night club as a raver, professionally as a teacher, at political demonstrations as a socialist, at home as a father or mother, at the tennis club as a tennis player, etc. Therefore, “the identity question ‘Who am I?’ no longer needs to originate from a notion of a unitary subject as the ground for its investigation. Rather, the agentive subject is the point of departure for its own empirical instantiation” (Butler 1995: 446). In the course of disintegrating stable contextual aspects of identity in postmodern societies, the consumptive aspects of identity have become more accentuated, for example, the style of clothing, perfumes, tastes in music, or the ownership of lifestyle products. Hence one can say that, whereas in traditional society identity is given to the individual, in postmodern society identity is chosen by the subject.55

Despite its increasing temporality, flexibility, and fragmentation, identity is an important concept for every individual, especially in the context of L2 learning, where it is particularly challenged (cf. Section 9.6). However, poststructuralists such as Foucault see the concept of identity as a “parody” (Foucault 1987: 86) because the many different, and at times conflicting, strands of identity cannot, in his opinion, be synthetically held together; rather they should be construed as unbridgeable discontinuities, for instance, as patchwork identities, or multiple selves. However, one can argue against this view that subjective and collective notions of identity lie at the heart of any communicative act, since the point of origin for interactive needs is the subject, as perceived and construed by him- or herself, and by others. Without any notions of self and identity56 and notions of others, there would be no need for language as an intersubjective semiotic tool and therefore no necessity to develop language, either in phylogenetic or in ontogenetic dimensions.

Expressions of notions of identity can be found in any human language, not least in indexical terms, such as personal pronouns. Although the grammatical categorization of three persons (I, you, he/she/it) in the singular and plural is characteristic of standard European languages and may be different for other languages, the notion of I and thus personal identity, can be found in all human languages due to the centrality of the agentive self engaging in (inter-)action, experiences, and remembering past events and experiences. Therefore, the construct of a subjective identity can be said to be a truly universal category, as Jerome Bruner (1995) suggests:

Cultures obviously have different ways of aiding their members toward the realization of meaning. But all cultures have one universal feature that is indisputable: they always respect the centrality of self in the meaning-making enterprise. All cultures take as the mark of having achieved meaning that the individual says an equivalent of “I understand”, that achieving meaning is marked by a unique subjective state that will be understood as such by others who share a culture. (Bruner 1995: 27; emphasis added)

In the ontogenetic dimension, initial notions of identity are developed by the infant during the early stages of socialization through the process of increasing differentiation from others. In the pre-linguistic phase, the infant begins to relate bodily feelings to an intuitive notion of self, and gradually develops the notion that there is something like an agentive I. This is due to the fact that the infant starts to act and perform in the given, albeit rather limited, social context of his or her primary socialization (for instance, family, significant others); thus, identity is fundamentally characterized by a performative aspect (cf. Chapter 2).

In the course of further socialization, this early notion of identity is progressively confirmed and extended by constant semiotic negotiation between self and other(s) throughout primary and secondary socialization so that a concept of a specifically subjective identity in a more general social and cultural context stabilizes for the individual. From his or her perspective, this concept of subjective identity does not fundamentally change over the duration of his or her lifetime, since the biological self does not change (although it develops). This notion is the nucleus of the misconception that there is such a thing as a stable or essentialized identity. This misconception is, of course, supported by some forms of institutionalized Discourse. Block (2007: 1–2) demonstrates this mechanism with the example of the “identity theft,” of which financial institutions warn their customers. Identity theft means that the identity of a person in terms of bank account numbers, address, date and place of birth, PIN codes, passwords, and credit card numbers are stolen by criminals who then can use this information to withdraw funds from that person’s bank accounts. On the basis of these identity-markers, the criminals are in a position to assume, for the institution, the identity of the genuine customer.

In postmodern theory, this concept of a stable and contained identity, like that of a subject, is viewed very critically, as it seems to operate with essentialist and consequently reductive categories (cf. Foucault 1987: 86). Even in social contexts, identity is indeed frequently seen as something essential, something that is ascribed to a particular person or a group of people over a long period of time. Identity politics, for example, ascribes particular identity features to certain (usually historically disempowered) groups of people, and on that basis subsequently draws certain conclusions about the group in question. These can be very one-sided and are usually misrepresentations of certain alleged features of the group, for instance, members of certain races, nations, cultures, ethnic groups, or religions.

Constructionist approaches to a socially constituted “reality,” however, oppose essentialist notions of identity, be it on subjective or social (group) planes (cf. Harré and Gillet 1994; Gergen 1999; Shotter 1993). While postmodernist suspicions of concepts of identity are certainly justified with regard to social practices, it would be wrong to do away with concepts of identity completely, especially in the context of second language acquisition research, since

any study of language needs to take consideration of identity if it is to be full and rich and meaningful, because identity is itself at the very heart of what language is about, how it operates, why and how it came into existence and evolved as it did, how it is learned and how it is used, every day, by every user, every time it is used. It is because speakers and writers inherently know that both the form and the content of linguistic production are shaped, and frequently driven, by the imperatives of identity. (Joseph 2004: 224)

If language is at the core of subjective and social constructs of identity, then language must also be the nucleus for dynamic change of constructs of identity. Hence, membership in Discourses, narratives, and genres normally define the personal and social identities of a person to a greater degree than, for example, his or her biological heritage. Within the Discourses and genres available to the subject, he or she has to perform his or her identity and take up certain subject positions so that others can react to them (e.g., by assigning certain positionings to the subject). These enactments of identity, together with the integration of sociocultural macrostructures, systems, and relations, contribute to the identity assignments, affordances, and recognitions which are encoded into memories that constitute a “self.” These encodings develop through a history of participation (in terms of spaces, relationships, and histories in the production of knowledge structures), thus contributing to their constantly shifting and changing character.

In this context, learning a second language assumes potentially huge relevance for personal constructs of identity, because new concepts, Discourses, genres, courses of action, and cultural patterns become available to the subject. These have an impact on the learner’s stock of options for construal. Whereas the monolingual and monocultural individual typically never questions the taken-for-granted conceptualizations and constructs of his or her native culture (or questions them only at a superficial level when living in the majority culture of a multicultural society), in the process of learning a second language these constructs are increasingly shaken and qualified because the subject has access to a differential point of reference. This alerts the subject to the fact that individual and social life can be organized in different ways so that the subject can subsequently base his or her constructs on developing intercultural spaces, as Norton and Toohey explain with reference to Bourdieu’s (1997) concept of cultural capital.57

If learners “invest” in a second language, they do so with an understanding that they will acquire a wider range of symbolic and material resources, which will in turn increase the value of their cultural capital. As the value of their cultural capital increases, so learners’ sense of themselves and their desires for the future are reassessed. Hence the integral relationship between investment and identity. (Norton and Toohey 2002: 122)

This reassessment of learners’ sense of themselves can lead to questions about one’s identity. Here, identity becomes an issue, whereas the monolingual person does not necessarily encounter situations where he or she has to seriously think about his or her identity since his or her sense of self is not normally fundamentally challenged by interaction with members of the same speech community. Some academics (e.g., Doyé 2008: 29-31; Byram 2008: 29–30, 137) have convincingly pointed out that intensive second language learning can be likened to undergoing a tertiary socialization, which has a similar impact on the subject as primary and secondary socialization in terms of challenging the acquired stock of knowledge and subsequently restructuring and redefining ways of knowing, understanding, perceiving, and construing (cf. Section 9.6). This means that the multilingual subject undergoes three major stages of socialization, all of which have a transformative impact on his or her range of cognitive (and emotional) constructs. Under these circumstances, it is increasingly difficult for the subject to maintain a coherent sense of identity. By participating simultaneously in many different genres and Discourses across languages and cultures, the subjective concepts of identity can be differentiated, basically along the lines of personal and sociocultural identities; these, in turn, can be differentiated further.

6.1 Personal identity

Personal identity refers to the subjective constructs of an individual with regard to who he or she perceives himself or herself to be, based on the subjective construction of his or her unique personality, drives, motivations, desires, values, goals, and beliefs. Contrary to the implications of the term, personal identity is not, of course, completely personal in the sense of a monolithic and atomistic construct, but depends completely on the D/discursive negotiation of identity with others in the direction of a desired personal identity which is always socioculturally facilitated and restrained. Personal identity is a highly dynamic and porous construct that can easily change at the margins, depending on the reactions and responses of others. Personal identity is also interdependent with more stable or primary identity markers such as one’s culture, language, ethnicity, gender, family, and religion, all of which are social constructs and thus dependent on social fields (understood as dynamic configurations); however, they can assume a more lasting influence on one’s constructs of identity than secondary identities markers, such as role identity, relational identity, or facework identity (cf. Chapter 6).58

Selfhood, or personal identity, is “discursively produced for others by the use of the first person pronoun, and at the same time is discursively produced for ourselves. It reflects and in part engenders my sense of my own personal identity” (Harré and Gillet 1994:107). Thus, identity is to a large extent orientated, not only towards the aspirations of the subject, but also to the expectations of others (including expectations the person assumes others might have with regard to him or her). Since these constructs of identity are torn in different directions by the simultaneous membership of the subject in different Discourses and genres, identity is always an agentive, hybrid, and polyphonic construct. It is, ultimately, an illusion.

People are constantly giving off signals to others which for them define who they are. This image of a person is in turn modified and projected back onto him or her by the others and is taken in more or less an unchanged form by the subject as part of his or her personal identity (cf. Section 6.5: Mead’s concept of me). It serves for the subject as a unifying platform for conscious and predictable action in both personal and social dimensions; it enables the individual to act, react, and interact in a coherent manner over a period of time. Identity is therefore always tied up in participation in communities of practice; this could be colleagues at work, family, friends, or fellow members in a sports club.

Thus, personal identity is also to a large extent dependent on the groups in which the person moves and with which he or she identifies. Group identities are made up by different people identifying with the same values, heroes, ideals, patterns of action, goals, etc., bound together by a certain loyalty which guarantees a certain group consistency. Group identity, like personal identity, operates with processes of exclusion and inclusion. Whereas these processes occur on the personal level by using concepts of ego and alter ego, the social level operates with concepts of us and them. These processes operate mainly with two strategies, namely with policies of memory and stereotyping (cf. Schmidt 2003: 112) which define a group’s own membership by emphasizing its differences from others. As a group member, the person contributes to the group identity, but at the same time he or she also integrates parts of the group identity into his or her own construct of personal identity: “[W]e take steps to distinguish ourselves from those who belong to different groups. Our tastes and lifestyles have no intrinsic value but serve to maintain the coherence of the group to which we belong” (Robbins 1991: 174).

The subject is normally a member of many groups, and he or she partakes in many different Discourses, thereby combining their clusters of significations with his or her own views. All available Discourses and group members contribute to the subject’s uniquely mediated constructs of personal identity and self, and simultaneously the subject contributes to the social group interaction and thereby to the structure and coherence of the Discourses. Since normally no particular type of Discourse or group membership holds univocal sway over the identity of the subject, he or she must continuously negotiate, balance, and correct features of different, sometimes even conflicting identity traits (cf. Harré and Gillet 1994: 25). Thus, the individual has to integrate many facets and voices that arise from the intersection of different influences, and carve out a coherent personal construct of identity, or a viable subject position, for himself or herself with a certain longitudinal integrity. In postmodern times, although there are many aspects of identity on offer from which the individual can choose, the individual is not completely free to select his or her identity. As Friedman argues: “Individual identity is neither carried by the subject nor can it be chosen freely. This is because it is primarily positional. Identity is determined by one’s place in a larger network of relations” (Friedman 1994: 36). In this sense, the unique place of positioning (actively and passively, cf. Section 4.5) in the social network also contributes to the construction of an image of personal identity for the others, that is, for all participants in this larger network of relations.

Personal identity also refers to one’s sense of being located at certain coordinates of space and time and having a position in the moral order of the groups with which one interacts and in which one has established a social identity that is continuously in the process of negotiation and re-negotiation, both from the subject’s and from the group members’ perspective. Therefore, it is obvious that, “Identities are not just given and chosen, they have to be enacted, but this means that they have to enter into negotiation with the situation in which they are performed or otherwise acted upon” (During 2005:150–151). This kind of pragmatic negotiation with the immediate situation can be done on many levels, for instance, affective, cognitive, or sensory-motor levels, but the major dimension of engagement is semiotic, and the most important semiotic instrument is language: “Language features are the link which binds individual and social identities together. Language offers both the means of creating the link and that of expressing it” (Tabouret-Keller 1997: 317). Everyday interaction, D/discourses, genres, and narratives are important tools for constructing a personal identity, especially in (post-)modern times when our sense of self, or identity, is shifting because, as Urry (1990: 224) suggests, we are far less rooted in time and space than our ancestors. Daily access to visual media, such as TV or the Internet, and the ease and affordability of travel in contemporary society means that many people now know about many different representations of diverse cultures and places (albeit usually transmitted through translations into the dominant language – with all the imperialistic connotations that will be discussed in Section 8.4). Urry (1990) suggests that this displacement contributes to a loss of sense of self and an increasing importance of playful involvement with different images and different experiences for the construction of selfhood and a personal identity.

By contrast to visual media, such as TV, which are merely passively consumed by the viewer, the L2 classroom offers a forum for contesting linguistically mediated constructs of identity which are performed in the community of practice of the L2 classroom. The direct interaction with the L2 and its sociocultural context facilitates a playful engagement in constructing and performing different subject positions, and in constructing alternative identities with alternative means, the L2 and its sociocultural context provides new perspectives and potentials for the self. Some L2 teaching methodologies make explicit use of this acting out of alternative identities, for instance, suggestopedia. In this approach, the L2 learner assumes an imagined identity in the other socioculture (including another name, profession, family, etc.) which he or she acts out over the whole duration of learning the L2 because his or her L2 identity is maintained for the whole L2 course (cf. Larsen-Freeman 2000: 84). This method is supposed to help learners to develop for themselves a clear separation of the two respective languages (L1 and L2) and related identities.

6.2 Discursive negotiation of identity

Rather than seeing identity as a stable and essentialized construct, it is important to conceptualize it in a non-essentialist manner and to define it as a dynamic, multi-dimensional, and variable concept that is tied in many ways to the intersection of the categories of the subject, social environment, society, culture, narrative, genre, and Discourse. Hence, constructionist theoreticians who have not discarded the notion of identity altogether, emphasize the fact that the dynamic, multilayered, and variable concept of identity is linked to D/discourses, genres, and narratives that are prevalent within cultural spheres. The individual (and the group) negotiates and experiences his or her own individuality by inhabiting a number of discursive subject positionings that are pre-constructed to a certain degree by established Discourses – for instance, those of class, gender, race, nation, ethnicity, age, family, profession, or religion. From the point of view of others, the social identity-indexes of a person are cued not only by his or her participation in certain genres and Discourses, but also by the language he or she is using (and sometimes both are difficult to differentiate, cf. Section 4.5), the dress he or she is wearing, the perfume he or she wears, and his or her body language. The key for displaying an identity is recognition; if “others recognize you as a particular type of who (identity) engaged in a particular type of what (activity)” (Gee 2005: 27), you have successfully enacted your “identity” in a particular Discourse. Membership in many different Discourses, however, means a pluralization of identities, as every Discourse emphasizes particular aspects of the identity of the same person.

Thus, identities are constantly constructed, maintained, deconstructed, and reconstructed in everyday interactions between people, a process in which certain constructs tend to stabilize for some time and form the perceived core of an identity of a subject (or a group). Subjects actively position themselves in discursive processes such as conversations or narratives, but they are at the same time positioned by others in the process (cf. Section 4.5). The positioning markers are, from a subjective point of view, the subject’s sense of a coherent narrative for a particular activity in a particular place at a particular time. From the point of view of others, the person’s position in the D/discourse is ascribed according to this narrative and other relevant semiotic markers (such as dress, politeness, directness, tone, etc.).

The ethnolinguist Elinor Ochs (1996: 410) suggests that this “indexicality principle” is part of every communicative act: when people are communicating, they are at the same time establishing the others’ social identities (for example, group membership, rank, roles) and their epistemic stances (for example, sources and scope of knowledge, competence of proposition). When little is known about the other’s biographical identity, interlocutors must provide, consciously or not, in the immediate interaction certain communicative symbols by which they will be classified and assessed as persons. In addition, referring to Bakhtin’s concept of heteroglossia (cf. Section 4.1), competent interlocutors are constantly trying to establish with which other voices the counterpart(s) are talking, from what subject positions, and with what intentions. Identities are constantly and actively produced in interaction with others, be it through deliberate, strategic manipulation, or through subconscious practices which emphasize both the agency of interlocutors and the property of language as social action. The notion of a stable and unified identity of an individual is torn apart by membership in different ongoing Discourses and genres based on cultural schemata and patterns, which in turn are influenced and constantly changed by social practices (and vice versa).

However, the term identity contains a paradox: every subject constantly strives for an identificatory unity of self, yet this unity remains principally unachievable. People are never identical with themselves in the trivial sense that the term implies, namely that someone or something is identical or equal with someone or something else. People are constantly negotiating for identity in D/discourses. Thus, identity is an imagined construct that serves as an aspirational focal point for the social praxis of the individual, in that it contributes to the potential for (inter-)action and motivates the subject to pursue certain forms of action which are located in the present but are at the same time directed towards the future in the sense of an aspired identity (for instance, embodied in a role model such as a rock star or an actress). Seen this way, identity can be understood as a normative and social aspiration or demand that people make on their selves with the premonition that it can never be fulfilled. Personal identity hence constantly tries to attain a balance between continuity and change on the one hand, and coherence and flexibility on the other. If continuity and coherence are accentuated too much, then rigidity and fixity could be the result; if, however, flexibility is accentuated, diffusion of identity and loss of orientation might be the consequence (cf. Rosa 2007: 49).

L2 acquisition can lead to diffusion of identity because the internalized basis of the L1-mediated constructs of identity may be challenged by the constructs of the L2. However, these can only be transient phases in the process of developing constructs of identity which are blended in the intercultural third spaces and which ideally lead to interculturally-based hybrid forms of identity. L2 learning is also tied in with aspirational goals, as people typically learn a L2 in order to increase their cultural capital. They may even look forward to reconceptualizing their identities in the L2 as a means of escaping the dreary world of the L1 speech community.

6.3 Narrative identity

One way of achieving and maintaining a balance between continuity and change in construals of identity is to fabricate an autobiographical narrative. Interaction with others in communities of practice is a necessary precondition for offering certain role models of action and behavior which can then be copied, criticized, modified, or rejected by the subject. We can see examples of this kind of positioning every day in public debates between politicians on TV, but it also takes place, albeit usually not so explicitly, in our everyday lives, for instance, by presenting oneself as a caring neighbor, or a loving parent. These complex processes are an important stimulant for the subjectively evolving notion of a coherent and balanced personal identity which a person can psychologically maintain over time and space, and which serves as a basis for social action and cognitive-emotional construction. Autobiographical narration does not only serve the purpose of defining one’s identity for self and for others, but is also a mechanism of weaving one’s narrative threat into the social fabric of the community.

Narrative identity has become more relevant in recent times of migration and displacement by offering ways of resolving the tensions between fragmented, de-centered, and shifting identities. Seen in this light, “Identity narratives offer a unique means of resolving this tension, (re-)constructing the links between past, present, and future, and imposing coherence where there was none” (Pavlenko and Blackledge 2004:18). Thus, for the subject, but also for his or her social environment, a coherent identity is constructed and offered through autobiographical narration. This process enables credible positionings in D/discourses of which the subject is, or wants to become, a member.

From a subjective point of view, identity is an imagined configuration that provides a temporary orientation for coping with the requirements of everyday life on the one hand and for social positioning on the other. Seen in this way, notions of personal identity are transient in their constitution and in their enactment. However, the subject psychologically glues together the many different and temporary strands and stages of his or her life in his or her autobiography in the sense of constructing a dynamic identity, mainly by means of personal narratives relating to experiences and events (but also to people and locations). These narratives serve to integrate the heterogeneous aspects of identity by combining different, even conflicting, actions, experiences, memories, and events into a coherent autobiographical story. This is achieved through the technique of telling stories about oneself in the first person. Since the subject is telling these stories from different subject positions which are influenced by the interaction with others, the stories are dialogically intertwined and reveal the plural and dynamic aspects of identity. For instance, the moral-collective voice of a person can have pity with another individual, but the professional voice of this person (e.g., as a policeman) can still urge him to arrest the individual. The subject combines different experiences, voices, memories, desires, ambitions, and events in particular ways into a more or less continuous and coherent life story which is orientated towards an ideal form of an aspirational construct of self (cf. Daiute 2004). Celebrities even employ professional ghost writers to fabricate a fabulous “autobiography” which typically glosses over the more controversial aspects of that person’s life.

Autobiographical narratives create a coherent sense of a past identity, not only for the individual, but also for those who know him or her. Autobiographical narration is about negotiating new subject positions and aspects of identity at the intersection of the past, present, and future. Autobiographical narration, therefore, can be seen as the “quintessential identity medium” (Daiute 2004: 114). In this sense, identity has been created in the past, and has to be sustained in the present and remade in the future (cf. Baldwin et al. 2004:142). Narrative accounts of identity are tested by telling first-person stories to others and assessing the responses they provoke, be it consciously or not. The constant remaking of aspects of identity reveals the fact that the sense of self is to some extent an illusion, or a fiction. This becomes evident when this form of narrative identity is likened to the specific story of a particular figure in literary fiction. Like the literary protagonist, the subject is located at the center of his or her virtual world, i.e., the world that he or she constructs and experiences as “reality.” He or she is the indexical center of this world which he or she, in contrast to a literary figure, actively creates and experiences at first hand; the subject not only narrates a story but has a story.

The subject does not create his or her narrative autobiographical identity completely on his or her own account; it is also orientated towards the expectations raised by the structure and storyline of these narratives, and towards the expectations and reactions of the recipients (real or imagined). Narration is always dependent on the audience because the narrative is directed to them, and therefore certain aspects of one’s life story may be deliberately excluded, or emphasized. The narrative is not primarily concerned with revealing the “real” self of the narrator but rather with the construction of a plausible identity between the narrator and the audience. Narrative identity does not only change over time, but also with the (real or imagined) audience. In correlation to the narrative, the identity of the subject unfolds in a dialectical manner; on the one hand, there is the ordering principle of concordance that mediates the singular temporal unity of his or her life; on the other, there is the principle of discordance, containing the necessity to respond immediately to unforeseen strokes of fate in an unscripted manner. These sociobiographical activities allow people to perform, contest, and center their – to a large extent subconscious – constructs of identity. These activities consist of diverse social interactions. Whereas the activity of performing self is creating a particular social context by reproducing social context values (as mirrored by others), the activity of contesting self is tuned more to subjective values, in that it expresses “ambivalence in the narrator’s stance towards social pressures, acknowledging them in a self-interested way by justifying, defending, or aggrandizing a personal perspective that seems at odds with the context values” (Daiute 2004: 119).

The activity of centering self is even more tuned towards personal notions of identity – derived from the sociobiographical activities of performing and contesting self – as it refers to the activities of trying to construct a unitary identity for, and of, self in the long run, in the sense of striking a balance between continuity and coherence. These discursive results of socially constructing and performing a personal identity are always preliminary and transient; they can even be changed retrospectively if the social context implies or requires different constructs. Thus, another level of flexibility is added to the notion of narrative identity: “Narrative identity, being at the same time fictitious and real, leaves room for variations on the past – a ‘plot’ can always be revisited – and also for initiatives in the future. It is an open-ended identity which gives meaning to one’s practice, which makes any one act meaningful” (Martin 1995: 8). In narrative constructs of identity, the notion of identity is to a large extent derived from the plot of the story. One reveals to others one’s own personal construct of narrative identity, and in the discursive process one interprets and arranges, re-interprets and re-arranges this narrative. Narrative identity principally includes the Other in a double sense because firstly, it is directed towards an Other, and secondly, the dominant narrative of identity builds on the internalized values, attitudes, orientations, interpretations, and patterns of action of significant others. Internalization of this kind is one of the focal intersections where social identities gain entry to personal constructs of identity. The stories which the individual construes on the basis of his or her past experiences and those which others have told him or her provide some concrete aid for the individual to choose a particular course of action (and not others) in certain circumstances. Thus, these narratives provide the guidelines for general and specific social action.

In terms of narrative constructions of identities, we participate in a storied world which can be massively expanded by learning a second language, because the L2 culture provides narratives that are different in content and in structure. The norms of these narratives may be different, for example, regarding centrality of the self which is typical in Western cultures but may be less typical for Asian cultures where the group or collective may carry more emphasis. Thus, the L2 provides access to differential forms of autobiographical narration and also offers different stories which can influence the L2 learners’ narrative identity. The advanced L2 learner may even be looking forward to repackaging his or her autobiographical account in the concepts, structures, and patterns of the L2 and its sociocultural context. Narrative constructions of identity have nothing to do with essentializing and stabilizing notions of identity; on the contrary, the concept of narrative identity includes principally the multifaceted and open-ended, always revisable and even reversible, nature of identity based on membership in many different discourses and groups (even across languages and cultures), all of which have a unique identity.

6.4 Social and cultural identity

An early sense of identity, or self, is instilled in the infant by interacting with others. However, even in the pre-linguistic stages, the infant has bodily feelings which he or she relates to an intuitive notion of self; but this can only be raised to consciousness by a symbolic medium which will facilitate abstract thought – language. Language pre-exists the individual human being, and therefore the infant has to appropriate language to become aware of his or her own needs, first intuitively, then ever more consciously. Thus, language is also a social instrument for facilitating a sense of identity: “Although there is no one-to-one relationship between one’s language and his or her identity, language is the most sensitive indicator of the relationship between an individual and a given social group” (Kramsch 1998: 77; emphasis in the original).

The infant, and later the child and adult, experiences his or her identity as something that increasingly gains a reality of its own. This can be seen to be the basis of the common misconception that there is something like an essential and unitary identity which does not change for the subject over the course of his or her biological life. However, identity is not biologically given but semiotically negotiated. Since language, as the major tool for identity-construction, is an instrument inscribed with a social and cultural heritage, the subjective (and collective) construction of identity is ultimately a sociocultural process. The initial exchanges with significant others during infancy and childhood develop into interactions with others in subsequent (secondary and tertiary) socialization processes which are channeled not only by the language and culture of the interactants per se, but also by the increasing amount of largely pre-structured discursive patterns and macro-structures, such as Discourses, narratives, and genres into which the person grows and, in the process, makes them his or her own. Thus, constructs of identity can differ significantly between members of different cultures and D/discourses. Kramsch (2003: 131) refers to this phenomenon as different “identity types” that are facilitated by certain historical, regional, Discursive, and social configurations: “In this sense one may assert that an American has a different identity from a French person, a New Yorker from a Midwesterner, a teacher from a corporate executive” (Kramsch 2003: 131). Constructs of identity are always embodied and socially, culturally, and linguistically situated. Therefore, they are shaped by the dialectic of socioculturally available structure and subjectively negotiated agency.

Social identity focuses on the relationship between group membership and personal identity. Tajfel (1978: 63; emphasis in the original) defines social identity as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.” People are conscious of themselves as group members, and by perceiving the groups they belong to in a positive fashion (also by processes of negatively contrasting them to other groups in a stereotypical manner), they are able to enhance their social identity, as well as the identity of the given group. Social identity “encompasses all dimensions of social personae, including roles (e.g. speaker, overhearer, master of ceremonies, doctor, teacher, coach), relationships (e.g. kinship, occupational, friendship, recreational relations), group identity (e.g. gender, generation, class, ethnic, religious, educational group membership), and rank (e.g. titled and untitled persons, employer and employee), among other properties” (Ochs 1996: 410). Consequently, the process of social categorization, combined with the desire for a positive social identity, leads to in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination. In this process, the in-group members develop stereotypical views of the out-group members which tend to be negative because of the ambition to maintain a relatively high social identity for oneself and the group one identifies with; this crude and reductive process of ascribing an imagined superior identity to the in-group and an imagined inferior identity to the out-group is captured in the neologisms of “othering” (Berg and Fuchs 1993: 13) and “otherization” (Kumaravadivelu 2008: 16). Social identity is thus tied to a positive self-image of both the group and its individual members in the context of competition of identities between groups. This competition, however, presupposes a shared value system as the basis for comparison and differentiation.

Thus, on the one hand, the group has a decisive and forceful influence on the collective and individual construal of identity, and also on the individual’s actions and behavior, as Kristiansen (2008) elaborates: “Acting almost as a kind of hidden hand that guides individual action, the group creates and maintains the social norms that govern so much of our behaviour. It defines the individual’s place in society, acts as a polarizer of attitudes and judgements and intervenes in processes of causal attribution of events” (Kristiansen 2008: 427). This observation also extends to the identity-constructs of the subject, which are completely reliant on the language, culture, and social norms of others. We only appreciate constructs made available to us on that basis and accommodate them to our needs and aspirations. Sometimes, however, the hypothesized link between the individual and the group identities is construed by researchers as too stable and reductive. When, for instance, a link is established between a specific regional or social group and a specific language-variety, this essentialized link can “obscure the fact that individuals may also construct particular identities through linguistic resources of groups to which they do not straightforwardly belong” (Pavlenko and Blackledge 2004: 9). This observation emphasizes again the creative potential of the self which conforms to a certain degree with group expectations but can also deviate from it to some extent. The collective constructs of identity are internalized by the subject through constant dialogue with others, but this dialogue contains and legitimizes the voice of the subject, too.

Gumperz (1982) emphasizes a facet of group identity, where the dominant and minority groups develop different codes to reassert their identities in bilingual communities: “The tendency is for the ethnically specific, minority language to be regarded as the ‘we-code’ and become associated with in-group and informal activities, and for the majority language to serve as the ‘they-code’ associated with the more formal, stiffer, less personal out-group relations” (Gumperz 1982: 66). There seems to be a clear and direct association between communicative style and group identity, although it is symbolic and does not directly predict actual language usage (cf. Gumperz 1982: 66). This means that identities can be used by linguistically construing and performing them specifically for others to react. An example of this mechanism is the use of an immediately recognizable sociolect of German used by young people of Turkish descent living in Germany; this language has become known as “Turkspeak” (Türkendeutsch, Kiezdeutsch, or Kanak Sprak), and its speakers use it to flag their pronounced Turkish-German blended identity (cf. Keim 2002). This language serves to express their hybrid cultural identity since their national identity has, for them, been diluted; many young Turkish-Germans hold a German passport. Although this particular slang of Turkish-German has in recent years increasingly been used by Turkish-German comedians for the purpose of cheap ethno-gags in their shows (aimed at a German audience), the 24 Turkish-German youths who were “given” a voice in the book Kanak Sprak (Zaimoğlu 2001)59 use this subversive sociolect to pronounce their Turkish identity in their home country, Germany. The term Kanake is a pejorative German word for Gastarbeiter, or guest worker (migrants of mainly Turkish, southern European, and sometimes Arab origin), and is used in a similar function and connotation to the English (British) expression wog. It flags their perceived status at the fringes of German society and their intention to reclaim the pejorative term and use it as a space of resistance. Some call themselves “nigger” (Zaimoğlu 2001: 9), hinting at their self-perceived similarities to the status of Afro-Americans in U.S. society. And similar to the tone of some Black Panther statements, Turkspeak is used in order to create distance, not only from the German language, but from German society in general: “Ich ruf den brüdern zu: bildet ne stramme einheit, und haltet euch fern von psychogemetzeln, die da in alemania toben. Verderben ist der stammname des blonden teufels. [I call on you, brothers: form a strong unit and keep out of psycho wars that are rampaging in Germany. Everything that involves the blond devil leads to ruin]” (Zaimoğlu 2001: 86; my translation, A.W.). The terminology of the blond devil, brothers, and psycho wars seems to be used as a conscious allusion to the struggle of the Black Panther movement. It should be said, however, that this politically loaded form of Turkspeak (which intentionally violates orthographic, grammatical, and syntactical norms of standard German) is particular to some young Turkish Germans; the vast majority of Turkish Germans try to construe their blended Turkish-German identity in a less confrontational manner, as expressed, for example, in the text Zungenentfernung [Tongue Removal] (Şenocak 2001) or the collection of short stories Der Hof im Spiegel [The Courtyard in the Mirror] (Özdamar 2001). Turkspeak in its many manifestations can be seen as a deliberate attempt to linguistically express a blended Turkish-German identity which intentionally positions the speaker of this language variety in a space between the two languages and cultures (typically, the speaker also has competence in Turkish and German).

The use of language for indicating preferred cultural identities is not normally stable; on the contrary, they can be invoked and rejected in the same interaction, just as the person can perceive his or her construction of identity as momentarily advantageous. This is the case because: “Social identities are made manifest through talk, not just through the actual language or ‘code’ used but also through the content and context” (Seeba and Wootton 1998: 284). In bilingual societies (for instance, in Canada, Ireland, or Wales) there is a stronger need than in monolingual societies to flag the idea of belonging to one speech community rather than another, be it through language, ways of talking, music, or dress. Among these identity markers, language is the by far the most effective as it is not constrained to the present but ties in with the sociocultural context in a historical dimension.

6.5 Ascribed identities, role, and voice

While some aspects of identity are inherited (for example, gender, or ethnicity), many others are ascribed to us from our membership to particular social groups, genres and Discourses. However, the ascription process is usually not only mediated, but also activated by language, as Joseph (2004) explains:

“Language” in the sense of what a particular person says or writes, considered from the point of view of both form and content, is central to individual identity. It inscribes the person within national and other corporate identities, including establishing a person’s “rank” within the identity. It constitutes a text, not just of what the person says, but of the person, from which others will read and interpret the person’s identity in the richest and most complex ways. Indeed, the over-readings they produce will be richer than the text itself can sustain. (Joseph 2004: 225; emphasis in the original)

These ascribed identities are difficult to escape and can have considerable consequences for the standing of a person in a wider social context. For instance, it can be very difficult for a person with a North Dublin accent to find employment in Ireland because potential employers identify this person with socially induced personality traits derived from a socially disadvantaged background, such as poor education, or a poor work ethic, even though these ascribed stereotypes might not be true for the particular person in question. The opposite would be true for a person from South Dublin with a Dublin 4 accent (so called after the postal code of one of Dublin’s most affluent neighborhoods). A possible escape from this kind of stereotypical identity ascription, for the disadvantaged person, would be the acquisition of the socially required and personally advantageous accent and register. This, however, may be difficult to achieve because language and accent are not chosen and are not malleable through discourse.

This kind of identity ascription has, of course, more fundamental consequences than possible repercussions on the employment process (which is serious enough). We internalize aspects of our identity which are ascribed to us by others as part of our own identity in an identification process. George Herbert Mead defined these mutual social-constructive processes as early as the 1930s.60 The self is, according to Mead (1967: 135), “not initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and activity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within that process.” This process of internalizing the attitudes and roles of others is initially facilitated in child’s play where he or she playfully assumes the roles of others (for instance, cowboy, policeman, mother, etc.). Another step in this process is participation in games where the child “must know what everyone else is going to do in order to carry out his own play. He has to take on all of these roles” (Mead 1967: 151; emphasis added) in order to appropriately respond to the moves of the other players and initiate his own strategic moves within the rules of the game. This organized community of players “may be called ‘the generalized other’” (Mead 1967: 154). The generalized other can assign a variety of roles to the individual, indicating what he or she has to do. By internalizing this generalized other, the subject is able to develop agency within the rules of the game because he or she knows what activities are expected of him or her at particular phases of the game.

Mead thus suggests that the self is a social product. He elaborates further on this aspect of identity, as he suggests that the attitudes of others provoke an agentive I which develops dialectically with the more reflective me (i.e., the social aspect of identity, or the internalized generalized other). “The attitudes of others constitute the organized ‘me’, and then one reacts towards that as an ‘I”’ (Mead 1967: 175). However, the generalized other is not a stable entity or even an agentive aspect of identity that can act autonomously.61 “The ‘I’ is the response of the individual to the attitudes of the community as it appears in his own experience. His response to that organized attitude in turn changes it” (Mead 1967:196). If the individual takes on the attitudes of the other – be it in the form of specific others (family or friends) or in that of the generalized other – towards his or her own self, he or she is able to see himself or herself in an objectified and distanced manner. “We cannot realize ourselves except in so far as we can recognize the other in his relationship to us. It is as he takes the attitude of the other that the individual is able to realize himself as a self” (Mead 1967: 194). It is through this ability to take on the attitude or the role of the other and to look at the I from that perspective, that the individual is able to become an object to himself or herself. This object, however, exists only through and in the relationship with others; the self-image is not passively taken over from others, but actively constructed against the background of the attitude of the other and the subjective attitude, intentions, and desires. Furthermore, the agentive I can only be grasped in retrospect, after the act of acting when it is already moving to the me. Since the reflective I is always moving into the past, it is restructuring the me so that the I of any present moment is also reconfiguring itself in responding to the me; there is a continual dialectic in the relation of the I and the me.

By taking on the role of the other, as he or she responds to the actions of others, the subject comes to understand who and what he or she is. The process of role-taking is a prerequisite for that of role-making, which requires a distance both from the self and from the sociocultural code of roles; the tensions within the socialized me have to be balanced in the predicative I. But it is not sufficient to take on the role just for others as a kind of one-dimensional outward performance. In order to fill the role from within, one has to be initiated into, and be competent in, the given discourse, genre, and the patterns of sociocultural construction.62

However, in social contexts the same person can take on several roles or identities (e.g., friend, boss, neighbor, man, professional, father, etc.). The sociological concept of role has been derived from the Discourse of the theatre. A good actress brings a part of her personality into the role without giving herself up as a person or losing herself in the role; after the performance she is once again her “original” self. The script determines how she has to act in her role and how the others will act; mutual expectations are not disappointed because the action is a priori regulated by the script of the play. In a similar manner, it is expected of the carrier of a social (including professional) role that he or she fulfills the requirements of that particular role; should he or she not do so, his or her prestige is lowered, and sanctions may be used to enforce role-compliant behavior. Therefore, roles exist independent of the carriers or actors, and the content of the role is determined by society or, more precisely, by the particular Discourse. These roles imply dramaturgical positionings which are not freely chosen by the subject but are required by the trappings of a particular role. However, dramaturgical positioning can limit the choice available to individuals in the manner and scope through which they play a particular role (cf. Davies and Harré 1990). People take up certain subject-positions in social interaction which allows them to position themselves based on the requirements of the role, but with a degree of independence. A person usually takes up various subject-positions according to the D/discourses in which they engage.

Kramsch (2003: 133-4) suggests that the concepts of identity and role have to be complemented by that of voice which includes “all dimensions of style, such as point of view and modality in written narratives (...) and stance and subjectivity in spoken exchanges” (Kramsch 2003 :133). It is through our voice that we can consciously and appropriately choose our identity and our role for certain situations, and perform them for others in D/discourses and activities. Kramsch (2003) emphasizes the notion of voice and its ability to explain the dialectical relationship between the body of knowledge encapsulated in Discourses and the constructs of identity and of role, i.e., “to capture the idea that utterances reproduce, subvert or create institutional roles and identities through the discursive choices they make” (Kramsch 2003: 133). One could, in parallel to Mead’s notion of the generalized other, even see the point of view of the group as a collective voice which is internalized by the subject as a basis for constructing his or her own voice. This voice integrates the expectations of the group towards the subject and the creative potential of the subject’s constructs of identity. The voice is being constituted by constant dialogue between the group (or community) and the subject; the group’s positioning is represented in the subject’s positioning, albeit in a subjectively refined manner. Due to membership in several groups, the subject’s voice is structurally plural; with reference to Bakhtin (cf. Section 4.1) one can speak of a polyphonic self in which the collective and subjective processes of identity-formation are mutually intertwined and dialogically developing in the direction of a coherent identity which is always plural and transient.

Whereas the concepts of identity and role are derived from sociology and psychology respectively, the notion of voice originates from literary studies and has subsequently been adapted by linguists. It refers to the active element of constructing meaning in given situations, including choosing which role to take on and which aspects of identity to display in particular interactions and situations. Like Mead’s symbolic interactionism, it pays more attention to the social side of identity-construction, compared to narrative accounts of identity. Therefore, it contributes to the maintenance of D/discourses but, of course, is also influenced by being situated within D/discourses: “In fact, if, as Bakhtin argues, the self exists only on the boundary between self and other, it can only develop a voice by positioning itself with respect to other voices and stances that others have taken. Personal voice must be ‘wrought’ from the institutionalized discourses in the environment” (Kramsch 2003: 133–4).

Thus, the individual voice is derived from and performed in the language, culture, Discourses, and social practices of others. It has to be filled by the individual according to his or her particular understandings and aspirations in certain situations, vis-à-vis others. Filling the subjective voice means displaying and performing one’s identity for others. This provokes reactions of others to one’s performance which are then used by the individual to refine his or her identity, as displayed to others (cf. Mead’s generalized other). Speaking with a different voice in early L2 learning can mean taking on aspects of another identity which, with progressing L2 acquisition, blends with the L1 identity into a hybrid identity, located on a continuum between the languages and cultures involved. The initial decentering of one’s L1 identity can only be superficial, as the subject does not yet have sufficient access to the different linguistic system and its underlying cultural frame of reference. However, in the course of learning the L2, the subject will increasingly be enabled to access the differential cultural and discursive frame of reference and use it for constructing his or her identity and voice by drawing on two (or more) cultural worldviews.

6.6 Hybrid identities

Concepts of identity, as analyzed in this chapter, have been criticized because, for all their openness, they remain based upon the logic of opposition in which identities are construed as distinct from one another and as deterministic of social action. These characteristics of identity seem to be at loggerheads with postmodern and poststructuralist notions of anti-essentialism. But some theoreticians question whether it is really possible to disregard any notions of essentialism in the project of construing and analyzing identity:

[T]he analyst who refuses to any tuck with essentialism risks missing a factor of the highest importance in the identity’s construction. In other words, essentialism versus constructionism is not as mutually exclusive a distinction as it is normally taken to be, when what is being constructed is, in effect, an essentialising myth. (...) [T]here must remain space for essentialism in our epistemology, or we can never comprehend the whole point for which identities are constructed. (Joseph 2004: 90)

With this criticism, Joseph echoes the paradox of the concept of poststructuralist notions of intersubjectivity, namely that, contrary to their anti-essentializing intentions, subjects and subjectivities are implied in the very term itself (cf. Section 4.6). The concept of identity is not dissimilar to those of intersubjectivity, interculturalism, hybridity, and third spaces (cf. Chapter 8) in that it is not an essential, stable, or monolithic construct, but a highly dynamic, porous, and flexible concept. It is neither the one nor the other, but constitutes an intermediary space spread out between people, Discourses, genres, cultural frames of reference, social practices, and linguistic conceptualizations. It is also important to stress that identity is not predominantly understood as an internal state, but rather as a discursive construct that is facilitated – and restricted – by the Discourses, narratives, genres, cultural patterns, and practices available to the individual, the group, and the community.

If one does not reject the notion of identity altogether as an outdated and obsolete construct of reductive and false essentializations of persons, groups, cultures, and communities, identity has to be conceptualized as a hybrid, multilayered, dynamic, and polyphonic narrative construct that is mediated and maintained by socioculturally generated semiotic systems and by patterns of action. The concept of identity is subjectively and socially relevant because it provides the potential for establishing and maintaining relational frames for the subjective notion of an autonomous self that can consciously act in different social contexts in a coherent manner. This function is a precondition for leading a self-determined life (at least from a subjective perspective) and understanding oneself to be the indexical center of action. As shown in this chapter, identities are neither merely inherited nor freely chosen, but have to be wrought from linguistic and cultural concepts, categories, and frames, and from the genres, narratives, and D/discourses available to the subject; at the same time, they have to be enacted, contested, and performed by the individual and, where appropriate, by the social group.

Subjective notions of personal identity are also influenced by aspirations of what one wants to be; these aspirations are, in turn, a product of the sociocultural practices of others, as selected and emphasized by the individual, be it consciously or not. If there is a stable element inherent in the notion of identity it is, apart from a person’s DNA, the stability of constant change as aspects of identity continuously have to be constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed, even if these complex processes remain largely on a subconscious level. Young (1995) even suggests that the fluid and constantly changing character of identity is a sign of a newly found stability for people in (post-)modern times: “Today’s self-proclaimed mobile and multiple identities may be a marker not of contemporary social fluidity and dispossessions but of a new stability, self-assurance and quietism. Fixity of identity is only sought in situations of instability and disruption, of conflict and change” (Young 1995: 4).

The concept of identity, understood as multi-layered and dynamic, is relevant for the individual’s sense of personal identity, but is also important for others when interacting with people as they try to establish the social identity of the interlocutor, and the underlying voices and the related positions of power. As Tajfel (1978: 61) points out, one of the major tools which people use to define themselves in the social world in which they live is social categorization, that is, “the ordering of social environment in terms of groupings of persons in a manner which makes sense to the individual.” Once people become aware of belonging to particular social groups, their social identities begin to form, based to a large extent on cultural patterns of interpretation, contained in and mediated through language (but to a lesser degree also mediated through other semiotic tools, for instance, clothes, ways of talking, behavior, etc.). Thus, subjects who are stakeholders in different Discourses must be open to code-switching, tolerance of ambiguity, and polyphonic identity-construction.

These notions are nicely captured in the following reflections on the question Who am I?, written by a young Turkish Kurd who was born in Berlin and grew up in Germany:

Birkan Düz: Ich bin Birkan
Ich bin in Berlin geboren und bin 16 Jahre alt.
Manchmal bin ich Deutscher.
Manchmal bin ich Türke.
Manchmal bin ich Kurde.
Manchmal bin ich Alevite.
Manchmal bin ich Zaza.

 

Wenn ich in der Türkei bin, sage ich den Menschen dort, dass ich ein Deutscher bin.
Wenn ich in Deutschland bin, sagen die Menschen zu mir, dass ich ein Türke bin.
Oder ich sage, dass ich ein Türke bin.
Unter kurdischen Freunden sage ich, dass ich ein Kurde bin.
Wenn ich unter Aleviten bin, sage ich, dass ich Alevite bin.
Wenn ich unter Zazas bin, sage ich, dass ich Zaza bin.

 

Wenn ich unter Deutschen bin, fühle ich mich anders.
Ich fühle mich als Türke dann.
Wenn ich unter Türken bin, fühle ich mich als Deutscher.
Wenn ich unter Kurden, Aleviten, Zazas bin, fühle ich mich gleich mit denen.
Wenn ich alleine bin, fühle ich mich als Alevite.
Wenn ich alleine bin, fühle ich mich als Birkan.
Wenn ich unter Deutschen, Türken, Kurden, Aleviten, Zazas bin, fühle ich mich wie ich.

 

Ich bin Birkan.

 

http://www.spiegel.de/schulspiegel/leben/0,1518,621642-2,00.html

(Accessed 28/04/2013)

 

 

[I am Birkan, by Birkan Düz

 

I was born in Berlin, and I am 16 years old.
Sometimes I am German.
Sometimes I am a Turk.
Sometimes I am a Kurd.
Sometimes I am an Alevi.
Sometimes I am a Zaza.

 

When I am in Turkey, I tell the people there that I am German.
When I am in Germany, people tell me that I am a Turk.
Or I say that I am a Turk.
Amongst Kurdish friends, I say that I am a Kurd.
When I am with Alevi people, I say that I am an Alevi.
When I am with Zaza people, I say that I am a Zaza.

 

When I am with Germans I feel different.
At these times, I feel like a Turk.
When I am with Turks, I feel German.
When I am with Kurds, Alevis, Zazas, I feel that I am just like them.
When I am alone, I feel like an Alevi.
When I am alone, I feel like Birkan.
When I am with Germans, Turks, Kurds, Alevis, and Zazas, I feel like me.

 

I am Birkan.

 

(My translation, A.W.)]

This text is only one of about 100 entries for an exhibition in 2009, written by young Berlin migrants, reflecting on their intercultural identities and positions as migrants in Berlin. In this text, Birkan tries to define his multiple and hybrid identities. He is a member of the ethnic groups of Zazas and Kurds, and the religious group of Alevis, all of which transgress national boundaries in that they are found in significant numbers not only in Turkey, but also in Syria and Iraq. However, due to his ancestry, Birkan is confronted with the national identity of Turkey, a country that contains these ethnic and religious groups, albeit in a very fractured relationship. The Turkish national identity clearly is an ascribed identity, ascribed by Germans in the country and city where he was born. Germans do not usually distinguish between ethnicities living in another country but simply label all people living in Turkey as Turks. Birkan, however, does not identify with this ascribed national Turkish identity because his Kurdish people have a long history of conflict with the Turks. Therefore, he identifies much more with Kurds, Alevis, and Zazas, and even here he prefers the Alevi religious identity, rather than an ethnically defined identity. However, having been born and raised in Germany (and most likely carrying a German passport), he also feels to have some sort of German national identity. This layer of his identity is emphasized whenever he visits Turkey because the people there ascribe this German identity to him (possibly due to his fragile Turkish language skills which position him in the passive), in a direct reversal of the typical German identity-ascription process of him being a Turk. Therefore, Birkan seems to base his ethnic constructs of identity on his Kurdish and Zaza identities, and not so much on the national Turkish and German identities. His primary source of constructs of identity, however, seems to relate to the religiously defined Alevi community. But since the national Turkish and German identities also play a role in the many layers of his ethnic identity (and we even have not mentioned other identities, such as an adolescent, pupil, [grand-]child, boyfriend, member of clubs, etc.), he feels that his subjective construals of personal identity seem best captured in his first name Birkan. Although this name was given to him by his parents, it seems, for him, to capture all the different layers of his identity in a comprehensive manner. The same may be true for his inner circle of friends and relatives who are responsible for his notions of primary me in Mead’s sense. The name of a person stays with him or her, while the social foundation of other aspects of identity (such as being a Kurd, Alevi, Zaza, etc.) means that they may be valid only for some period of time, and are hence exchangeable. However, the generalized other does not only include this closer circle of others but also people he meets just once in passing, be it in the shop, on the bus, in the street, etc. who see him as a Turk (in Germany), or as a German (in Turkey). Thus, his constructs of me also have to include these ascriptions of national identities.

Birkan’s reflections illuminate the processes of construing multiple identities, as triggered by intensive L2 acquisition. Hybrid, multilayered, and dynamic concepts of identity have the potential to undermine simple narratives of citizenship, operating with monolithic national identities which demand a sense of belonging. In some countries allegiance to patriotism is expected, particularly in times of terror, and the identification with other languages and their inherent cultural frames of mind may be considered unpatriotic. The demands of L2 learning introduce a completely new dimension into the complex process of constructing one’s identities, since identification with a specific group becomes less important and the subject might be more used to incorporating a wide variety of language usage, according to the range of different positionings he or she has taken on in various forms of L2 encounters. Thus, sustained L2 learning can have fundamental effects on the identity-constructs of the learner. On the one hand, it can be perceived as a threat to constructs of personal identity because the tacitly assumed and unquestioned “normality” of one’s constructs which rely on monolingual and monocultural categories might be undermined. Nationalists and patriots may even perceive the preparedness to adopt interculturally hybrid identities as an act of subversion which should be avoided. This perception may reduce, or even end, the preparedness to further engage with learning the second language as a form of critical distancing from one’s L1 and its cultural community, and cause the learner to withdraw to the perceived safeties of the first language and socioculture. On the other hand, the increasing availability of alternative categories of construction, inherent in the second language and its sociocultural context, can be used as an opportunity to broaden one’s constructs of identity along the lines of an aspired intercultural identity. Thus, learning a L2 provides the learner with new structures, patterns, media, and possible contents of autobiographical narration, necessitating the negotiation of new layers of identity and new subject positions. It also puts at the disposal of the L2 learner new categories for discursive negotiations of identities; these are first and foremost the conceptual blends, the Discursive structures, and cultural patterns of the L2 community, but can also affect elementary attitudinal constructs of identity. This process is exemplified in the attitude of a British learner of French who has come to see his national identity very critically, after having lived for some years in France and experienced Britishness through the lens of a different language and culture: “I see a sense of Britishness as being like a British bulldog or [... ] very nationalistic, very [... ] kind of – some thing [sic] that’s very powerful, but a very negative force, and therefore I choose not to identify with it” (Coffey 2010: 72; square brackets in the original). Here, the L2 learner has consciously distanced himself from the traditional conservative “bulldog” identity of Britain as a nation, which, according to conservative politicians and the British populist press, is still anchored in the tradition of Churchill’s bulldog spirit of standing up for Britain against Nazi Germany (concentrated in his famous lines of 1940: “We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender”). From a less British and more continental European Union (EU) perspective, these lines are no longer as valid as they were during Britain’s war efforts of the 1940s;63 therefore, they can no longer be a valid part of a British identity as a modern and open-minded people. Hybrid identities, therefore, have a crossculturally liberating effect on the mind and positioning of the subject, rather than subverting the patriotism of the individual, which conservatives (mis-)construe as one of imminent dangers of developing interculturally hybrid identities.

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