Chapter 4
Analytical Framework of Central Bank Balance Sheets

4.1Structure of Central Bank Balance Sheets

Analyzing the evolution of the central bank’s balance sheet has important practical applications when evaluating the performance of the central bank in meeting policy goals. The structure of central bank balance sheets differs from those of private sector firms. A simplified structure of central bank balance sheet is portrayed in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: A simplified structure of central bank balance sheets

As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the foreign assets category covers assets denominated in foreign currency and assets issued by foreign counterparties, as well as central bank holdings of precious commodities like gold. Domestic assets cover domestic public sector debt (G) that take the form of collateralized lending or repurchase agreements, and domestic private sector debt (P), which is defined as loans to or debt securities issued by banks and other financial intermediaries. For the classification of central bank liabilities, the balance sheet delineates between base money, that is, banknotes in circulation (N) and reserve balances from commercial banks, and non-monetary liabilities. From a practical perspective, the definition of what is covered in base money in addition to banknotes significantly differs across central banks. For instance, most central banks issue debt certificates to sterilize the impacts of asset purchases on the formal definition of base money, but the Bank of Indonesia regards its debt instruments as secondary reserves and includes them in the formal definition of base money.

Similarly, the problem also arises in dealing with how to classify term deposits issued by central banks. Borio and Disyatat (2010) suggest that what is entailed in base money in practice is largely a matter of semantics, with different outcomes across times and regions.

This book adopts a Bank for International System (BIS) approach to address the practical issues in relation to the theoretical differentiation between monetary and non-monetary liabilities. The nonbanknote central bank liabilities are given separate classifications as liabilities to banks (LB) that cover term deposit and debt certificates, as distinct from liabilities to the government (LG). The distinction between monetary and non-monetary liabilities plays a role in the development of monetary policy frameworks.

4.2Balance Sheet Indicators

To explain the nature of central bank balance sheets in relation to its components, this subsection presents different indicators used to understand this pattern. These indicators are generally utilized to discuss the central banking system.

4.2.1Computation of Indicators

Based on BIS (2016), it is possible to compute four balance sheet indicators, of which two pertain to the asset side, and the remaining two to the liability side. These indicators jointly reflect the central bank balance sheet structure.

For the asset side, the relative distribution between foreign assets and domestic assets is derived as follows:

Domestic asset (DA) = domestic government debt (DGD) + domestic private sector debt (DPD) Domestic assets in terms of foreign assets = DA/FA where FA denotes foreign assets

=(DGD+DPD)FA

The decision as to whether a central bank’s domestic asset portfolio assigns more weight to domestic government debt or domestic private sector debt depends on the actual data computation. A similar decision is applied to the composition of central bank liabilities.

On the liability side, the relative distribution between banknotes in circulation and total non-banknote liabilities is specified as:

(LG+LB)N

Where LG is liabilities to government, LP represents liabilities to banks, and N denotes banknotes in circulation.

In addition, a decision is taken whether a central bank’s deposit liabilities are geared more toward the banking sector or the domestic government by calculating LG in terms of LB.

Quick question: Compute these indicators using central bank balance sheets of your country or your region.

4.2.2Significance of these Indicators

The indicators explained above provide concise information on balance sheet composition with the aid of a limited number of parameters. In addition, it will provide a guide in designing taxonomies of central banks based on balance sheet structure (see Table 3.2). Quantitative assessment on the dynamic nature of balance sheet composition is done using these indicators, as well as the relative differences among central banks.

4.2.3Underlying Assumptions of Four Indicators

The derivations of these indicators require a set of basic assumptions. Therefore, the fundamental assumptions related to the indicators are as follows:

  1. There is no correlation among the four indicators.
  2. A central bank does not face any constraints in deciding the size of any of the four indicators, regardless of the effect on the other three.

Example 4.1

Consider a case in which the central bank intends to raise its public debt holding by purchasing government bonds from the banking sector. This situation would affect all four indicators, holding all other things constant. DGD enters in both asset-side indicators, while the Ls record in both liability-side indicators.

The central bank can increase the DGD/DPD by concomitantly increasing DGD and reducing L, keeping all other indicators constant. However, it is practically impossible to have an unconstrained central bank. Therefore, it faces a challenge in deciding the size of every balance sheet item; the central bank views many developments as exogenous shocks and responds to them by endogenously adjusting its balance sheet.

4.3Determinants of Central Bank Balance Sheet Composition

Structural and policy-related factors influence the composition of a central bank balance sheet (BIS, 2009). The structural factors include behavioral, operational, and institutional factors. These factors are regarded as autonomous liquidity factors, as suggested in Ho (2008) or ECB (2011). Examples of behavioral factors affecting central bank balance sheets may be associated with the supply of banknotes. A central bank has no control over the demand for banknotes but ensures that the implications of changes in demand are fully understood.

The payment systems of the central bank are an important determinant of its balance sheet and are considered as an example of an operational factor. Settling large value interbank payments on a day-to-day basis depends on bank deposits at the central bank (CPSS, 2003). This implies that interbank payments can be responsible for a large intraday volatility within the central bank balance sheet. In addition, the design of payment and settlement systems also influences the composition of central bank balance sheets. More intraday liquidity is needed if a central bank operates a real-time gross settlement system compared to a system of end-of-day netting (BIS, 2009).

Central bank operating frameworks influence the functioning of money markets and hence the level of liabilities. Central banks may also adjust their instruments to the money market configuration with the aim of achieving their effective policies.

In many economies, the central bank maintains the government’s main account. In this situation, incoming and outgoing payments from the government will also determine the composition of central bank liabilities.

Institutional factors, such as the prevailing exchange rate regime, influence central bank balance sheet composition. The well-known impossible trinity in international macroeconomics explains that in a fixed exchange rate regime with free capital mobility, autonomous monetary policy is no longer feasible (Obstfeld and Taylor, 1998). Owing to this, domestic monetary policy is subject to the monetary policy of the anchor currency within the exchange rate regime, both in terms of conventional (interest-rate setting) and unconventional (balance sheet) policies. With reference to balance sheet policies, the central bank may need to intervene in the foreign exchange market at specific predetermined levels of the exchange rate, making the balance sheet endogenous to capital flows. This is the reason behind the huge accumulation of foreign currencies by many EMEs (Obstfeld et al., 2010). To illustrate, the Swiss National Bank set a unilateral cap for the Swiss franc against the euro from September 2011 to January 2015, and decided to defend the cap by purchasing foreign exchange in unlimited amounts.

Aside from the aforementioned factors, monetary policy decisions, as well as financial stability intervention measures, will also influence the central bank balance sheet (BIS, 2009). For instance, monetary policy operations pertaining to the buying of either domestic or foreign currency assets or entering into repo agreements with banks may influence the asset side of a central bank balance sheet. Setting reserve requirements or issuing longer-term liabilities (including term deposits or central bank bills) are actions that can be explored by the central bank to manage commercial banking reserves; these policies invariably affect the liability side of the balance sheet.

Financial stability interventions can include extending short-term emergency facilities for distressed private sector financial institutions. Although this type of intervention is conducted with the aim of stabilizing conditions in the short term, these decisions might affect the central bank balance sheet composition more persistently, as showcased during the recent global financial crisis. It took until 2014 for the U.S. Treasury to sell all of its shares in U.S. companies, six years after the original bailout package was agreed to as part of the TARP program.

The end result of central bank decisions that affect (or utilize) its balance sheet may differ across different monetary authorities and is likely to be time-variant. These results may be moderated by factors such as monetary policy regime, the central bank’s mandate, the structure and maturity of the financial system, and financial market conditions.

4.4Classification of Central Bank Balance Sheet Components

Using the set of indicators described above as a guideline, the composition of central bank assets and liabilities is classified as per the underlying principles detailed in Table 4.1. Based on asset composition, a central bank may be categorized as a foreign exchange holder, treasury holder, or private sector lender. On the liability side, a central bank can be identified as a note issuer, government banker, or bankers’ banker. These definitions are for illustrative purposes only and will be decided by the actual data of balance sheet composition. The classification principles assume discrete thresholds to differentiate between types (see Figure 4.2).

Table 4.1: Framework for extracting data in standardized IFS reporting of central banks

Source: Excerpted from BIS (2017).

Figure 4.2: Categorizations of central bank sheets

4.5Theoretical Landscape: Quantity Theory of Money versus Quality Theory of Money

During the twentieth century, conventional monetary economics has dealt with the value of a monetary unit using the quantity theory.

4.5.1Quantity Theory of Money

Modern monetary economics focuses on the use of the quantity theory of exchange in establishing the purchasing power of money. The Fisherian equation of exchange is used to back this theory mathematically in a simple expression:

MV=PY

Where M represents the quantity of money, V is its velocity, that is, rate of circulation; Y denotes real output and P is the price index of this output.

V and Y are assumed to be constant in the long run, implying that the quantity of money directly influences money’s value (representing the inverse of the general price index). In this theory, qualitative measures are irrelevant.

Its disadvantage is the failure to address the real problem in relation to the value of and demand for the monetary unit. The importance attached to transaction is determined by the value of the monetary unit, while the demand for the monetary unit is a function of expected future prices used when making purchases (regression theorem of money1). Owing to the fact that future prices are driven by the interplay between the demand for money and its future supply, the analysis of the balance sheet can provide an insight into investors’ expectations of what the central bank’s target might be for the quantity of money.

4.5.2Quality Theory of Money

The quality theory of money identifies the significance of qualitative factors in the aspect of money demand. The famous proponents of the quality theory are Irving Fisher (1911) and Milton Friedman (1956).

According to the theory, quality of money refers to the ability of a currency to fulfill money’s three functions: as a medium of exchange, store of value, and unit of account. Quality is a subjective concept based on the fact that users assign different degrees of importance to the extent to which a good is able to fulfill these three functions. In the absence of changes in the money supply, the subjective valuation of money can vary. A shift in the demand for money can be responsible for the change in the purchasing power of money, but with the expectation of a constant money supply, the subjective valuation of money can even change. For instance, the currency support (i.e., central bank reserve) can change, and hence influence the subjective valuation of the currency by altering expectations regarding the future rate of inflation or changing perceptions regarding the ability of the central bank to act as a lender of last resort to the private banking system.

4.5.2.1Drivers of the Quality of Money as a Unit of Account and Medium of Exchange

Changes in the perceived quality of money arise from how well it is performing its three core roles. The unit of account role remains stable and reasonably predictable in a situation of low and stable inflation. However, this can change suddenly when an economy experiences hyperinflationary conditions, pushing users to commence recording the value of goods in an alternative manner that does not use the domestic currency. For example, during the mid-1920s, Germans calculated the value of goods using foreign currencies due to massive hyperinflation that resulted from flooding the economy with newly-printed domestic currency, exacerbated by a loss of productive capacity. In recent times, Zimbabwean hyperinflation reached a monthly inflation rate of 80 billion percent by November 2008, forcing suppliers to price goods in a more stable standard, that is, U.S. dollars or gold, at the expense of their devalued local currency. Furthermore, the domestic currency received from a sale at the start of the business day would be almost worthless by the close of business, which leads to the discussion of money’s value as a medium of exchange.

In terms of the medium of exchange function, the following necessary conditions are put forward by classical economists: lower transportation and storage costs, easier divisibility, greater recognizability, stronger durability, and superior homogeneity of the money units. Although historically many currencies were linked with a gold standard, modern economists argue that fiat money meets these conditions. Of course, as noted above with the Zimbabwe and Germany examples, money loses its value as a medium of exchange when it is thinly traded due to devaluation.

4.5.2.2Drivers of the Quality of Money as a Store of Value

Individuals keep their wealth in a way that is efficient, allowing them to defer future purchases of goods and services or obtain cash in order to facilitate current consumption. The better a good conserves its value, the better it will execute a role as currency, holding all other things constant. Even with wide demand, perishable goods like fish or potatoes perform poorly as store of value, as trading these items can only be completed in a limited timeframe before they lose all their value. With the recent advent of cryptocurrency, this might pose significant impacts on the potential store of value of these commodities.

There are five ways through which the quality of money can change in its effectiveness as a store of value. First, changes in the quantity of money substantially influence money’s quality. Quantities of issued fiat money (in the form of paper currencies) can be dramatically increased, if the central bank decides to run its printing presses. If the supply of goods remains the same, the prices of these goods would eventually increase to reflect the increased amount of cash circulating in the economy available for consumption (more money chasing the same amount of goods). The store of value function is affected by the present quantity of money and the quantity anticipated in the future. Expectations about the evolution of the quantity of money are not the only determinant of money’s store of value function.

Second, changes in the redemption ratio2 may determine the quality of money even when holding expectations about the future quantity of money constant. For example, a dollar bill can currently be converted to 1/20 of an ounce of gold and at a future date this redemption ratio may be altered to 1/35 of an ounce of gold, or 1/20 of an ounce of silver, or redemption may be suspended altogether. Under this situation, the quantity of money in circulation is the same, but money’s function as a store of value is adversely affected, as it can be used to obtain a smaller amount of valuable goods. Redemption changes may affect the valuation of the currency unit relative to other goods even if expectations about future quantity of money remain unchanged. The valuation of the currency unit in relation to other goods may not be as high as it might be with the change in the backing of the currency. Also, in an extreme case, a war can affect the value of a currency; if users expect that a government will fall and no longer be able to back the fiat currency, the currency will experience massive depreciation.

Third, the general condition of the banking system also determines the quality of currency as a store of value. For instance, an illiquid banking system triggers the risk of a bail-out that finally raises the quantity of money. Signs of an imperiled banking system can be noted on the central bank’s balance sheet through sharp rises in overnight lending or loan rates. This leads to a decrease in the quality of money, and creates expectation-based inflationary pressures.

Fourth, the configuration of the monetary authority is an important driver of the quality of money. A central bank that is not independent from the government is more likely to be inclined toward monetizing government debts. Attempts to influence the decision of an independent central bank may harm the quality of money, even in the absence of commensurate changes in the quantity of money in circulation, as individuals may become worried that monetary policy will be directed toward fulfilling certain political goals rather than improving the whole economy in an efficient manner.

Amendments to a central bank’s constitution in regard to its philosophy or doctrine may result in changes in the quality of money. For instance, if a central bank alters its stated target growth rate of the money supply from 5 to 10 percent, this announcement immediately changes the quality of money through increased inflationary expectations. Similarly, if a central bank terminates a rule-based monetary policy and switches to targeting asset prices, this action will instantly affect the quality of money as a store of value. Other policies supported by the central bank—such as full employment or financing educational expenditures—will also affect the quality of money. If the original constitutional objective is focused on price stability, and it is amended to entail other aims like achieving full employment, increasing asset prices, or maintaining a currency union (a pact among members of that union-countries to share a common currency and a single monetary policy and foreign exchange policy), this will influence the quality of money: the aim of price stability might be less of a priority relative to another goal. This leads to uncertainties among the business community as to what the dominant aim of the central bank will be.

The credentials, experience and ability of central bank employees is also an important driver of the quality of money. Chairmen of central banks set monetary policy based on building consensus, a role which directly influences the credibility of a proposed monetary policy. Particularly in an economy where the central bank lacks independence, a weak chairperson will be viewed as incapable of enacting efficient policies. The normative economic preferences of a chairperson can also affect the quality of money. Replacing a chairperson with a record of favoring conservative monetary policy with a new chairperson who is known to prefer expansionary monetary policy may decrease the quality of money on the day the replacement is announced, regardless of any changes in the money supply.

4.5.2.3The Quality of the Central Bank’s Balance Sheet as a Driver of the Quality of Money as a Store of Value

Changes to the reserves and assets of the central bank are another determinant of changes in the quality of money. In relation to the soft factors mentioned above, the assets of the central bank are objective variables that can be assessed directly in analyzing its balance sheet. For instance, the monetary base is directly observable as the central bank’s non-equity liabilities.

Therefore, indirect analysis of the quality of money can be investigated through the assets (domestic assets) that support the monetary base. The average-supporting asset of the monetary base is critical for the quality of money and is observable on the balance sheet. In a fractional-reserve banking system, the average backing of the currency in circulation can fall or rise based on changes in the monetary base. The average quality of the backing assets (domestic assets) rises when newly purchased assets are of a higher quality than the average of the existing assets. The average quality of the backing assets falls as newly purchased assets are of a lower quality than the average existing assets, a process known as “qualitative easing.” Quantitative changes to the monetary base affect the quality of money as its backing reserves may be diluted. On the other hand, the quality of assets of the central bank can deteriorate even with a constant money supply as the central bank replaces its high quality assets by buying lower quality assets.

Central bank assets are crucial because they act as collateral for its liabilities and “back” the currency. In almost every fiat money regime, no legal obligation is imposed to redeem the currency against the central bank’s assets. The central bank assets reflect the capacity of the central bank to safeguard the price of the currency domestically and globally in foreign-exchange markets. For instance, the central bank can utilize its reserves to back its currency through foreign-exchange interventions. It can also use its reserves as a de facto redemption tool; reserve assets are used to purchase currency and holders redeem their currency units against the reserves.

Furthermore, the central bank may utilize its assets to support the banking system by purchasing troubled assets from the banking system to restore confidence in the banking system’s solvency. This will only reassure investors if the central bank owns sufficient amounts of high quality assets that can be exchanged for the banking system’s troubled assets.

The quality of the central bank’s assets is significant for its ability to credibly assist a struggling banking system. In rare cases, its assets can be utilized for monetary reform (such reforms were noted in ex-Soviet bloc countries after 1992–1993, and in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1991). Higher asset quality indicates that a new currency will be stronger and less volatile (and individuals will be confident in its ability to fulfill the three aforementioned roles of money) (see Box 4.1).

The importance of the central bank’s assets becomes readily apparent when a currency collapses in value. The decomposition of the monetary system lessens the value of currency. Temporarily, its assets may retain value, and can be allocated to creditors and currency holders, or used in exchange for imports. Currency holders in a normal situation prefer a central bank that holds liquid assets (i.e., foreign exchange or gold) as its main reserves to a central bank that holds illiquid assets (i.e., subprime mortgages) in the case of a monetary breakdown.

Insolvency will happen only in rare situations; the domestic government or foreign creditors like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can be approached to recapitalize the central bank. The government recapitalizes the central bank through debt-finance funded monetary expansion. A fall in quality of the central bank’s assets triggers the danger of a recapitalization by monetary expansion. Hence, the quality of money decreases as a store of value as inflationary pressures ensue.

Box 4.1: Icelandic crisis

“The recent Icelandic crisis illustrates this point. The króna fell sharply even though the money supply did not increase correspondingly. It became apparent that the banking system´s liabilities were backed by low quality assets. Lacking a sufficient amount of quality assets, the central bank could not compensate the losses incurred by the banking system. The central bank was unable to be recapitalized by the Treasury as the creditworthiness of the Icelandic government was already negatively shaken. The market realized that the Icelandic króna was backed mainly by credits to an insolvent banking system and that the central bank and the banking system could not be saved by the domestic government. The króna collapsed and the inflation rate increased without a correspondent change in the quantity of money.” (Source: Yale Insights)

Expectations about the quality of currency’s backing are another important factor. Suppose that a central bank sells gold reserves to purchase mortgages of dubious quality; this leads to a change in the quality of money in the absence of concurrent change in its quantity. In this case, currency users will expect that central bank liabilities (mainly currency and member bank reserves) will be supported by assets of lesser average quality.

In summary, the relationship between central bank assets and the quality of money is crucial. While the quantity of money is naturally an important determinant of the usefulness of cash as a store of value, medium of exchange, and unit of accounting, we must not ignore the importance of qualitative factors, which can affect the ability of money to perform its three core roles, despite any changes to the money supply.

Questions

  1. What determines the composition of the central bank balance sheet?
  2. What is the concept of quantity theory of money?
  3. What are disadvantages of the quantity theory of money?
  4. What are the drivers of the quality of money as a medium of exchange and as a unit of account?
  5. How does the central bank balance sheet affect the quality of money?
..................Content has been hidden....................

You can't read the all page of ebook, please click here login for view all page.
Reset
18.224.44.108