CHAPTER TWO

Internal
Combustion

Making internal changes at IATA

Blowing away cobwebs

I arrived at IATA’s Executive Office in Geneva as IATA Director General and CEO designate on 15 May 2002. Preparations for the June AGM in Shanghai, where my position would be formally approved, were in full swing. I paid great attention to what was going on, the role of the various committees and the general atmosphere.

Pierre Jeanniot briefed me, detailing his frustration with the more complex aspects of IATA’s responsibilities. I patiently took note and refrained from making comment. I also began a series of interviews with the top managers, looking in vain for a rationale behind the current system. If there was any logic at all, it appeared to be “stop change at all costs!”

Although I expected that attitude in Geneva, I was still shocked by the Shanghai AGM itself. I knew the association had been gathering dust but things were far worse than I anticipated. IATA was enveloped in a thick smog of inaction. There was nothing new at the AGM—the single most important event in IATA’s calendar. Its structure hadn’t seen the light of day for a long time. It was long, bureaucratic and totally prescribed with no room for debate of the major issues of the day.

Remember, airlines were collapsing under the effects of 9/11. Many had already gone bust, many were about to go bust, and much of the remainder was desperate for government aid. The Shanghai meeting barely acknowledged this incredible situation. In my acceptance speech, I made it clear that quiet diplomacy would not get air transport out of this mess. “The challenges must be communicated strongly, clearly and effectively in order to influence the wider political and economic community,” I said. “We in IATA must have the courage to use all our strengths, our passion and our global reputation to make things happen. And happen quickly. We must use our skills, authority and breadth of access to present viable and sustainable options to governments and international organizations in the most compelling way.”

The day after the Shanghai AGM, I flew to Singapore for my first official meeting as Director General of IATA. There was a different atmosphere in the office there. Singapore is an entrepreneurial city; you can breathe the innovation just walking down the street. And aviation in Asia-Pacific was about to start moving at a different pace. I think the Singapore office understood that and was excited by the prospect.

Unfortunately, IATA’s decision-making process wasn’t in Singapore. It was in Geneva and Montreal. The raison d’être of the main offices was clearly to maintain the status quo: “Why change? We are IATA, an association. We are not an airline, we are not running a business and we were not hit by the crisis.”

So I knew where to start.

Ending the committee excuse

Returning to Geneva, I resumed my one-to-one interviews with all the IATA managers. My day started at 8am and ended at 10pm. There was no deputy to assist me—it would have to be all my own work. I had to act fast but I also wanted to give everyone a chance to present me with their suggestions. I explained to them that IATA needed speed, passion and commitment. Give me that and they could be part of the new team.

Too often, though, I heard the same arguments. A not-for-profit organization must not make money, an association must follow and not lead. These arguments, I was told, had their roots in discussions with the airline members and IATA’s mind-boggling array of committees.

The committee concept wasn’t wrong as such. Once, these committees, which covered a variety of aviation topics, had provided an effective link between IATA and the airlines, especially for safety and operational discussions. But time moves on. Rather than an open forum the committees had become closed shops. Although it was a tough challenge, moving against this committee structure was unavoidable if there was to be any sort of progress at IATA.

At the following Board meeting I told the members we needed to review the situation immediately. Kevin Dobby, the brilliant IATA Corporate Secretary, was asked to provide the full, sorry picture on my behalf. An incredible patchwork of more than 150 committees, special conferences and working groups came to light, most of them with no real input into the industry. All they did was give their members a chance to chat with old colleagues in various wonderful locations around the world. I have no idea what the Time Limit Working Group discussed or the Global Consultative Committee or the Flight Interruption Manifest Work Group. There were around 25 committees and working groups in cargo alone.

The committees were supposed to discuss policy issues but they also had to approve targets for related divisions and organize a schedule of country/airline visits. They were micro-managing the whole industry.

I asked Board members Jürgen Weber of Lufthansa and CK Cheong of Singapore Airlines, two strong agents of change, to assist me. I proposed to cut the number of committees as well as limit the number of participants to 12 per committee, with the exception of the Operations Committee with 20 members. Most of the airlines didn’t agree with the cuts, no doubt influenced by those who no longer had free trips overseas. And of course the structure had been in place for decades. The mindset was well established and not easy to change. I sensed the objections were a momentary sulk, however. Nobody seriously doubted the logic of the move.

BA’s Rod Eddington helped gain Board support for the next step even though he had to fight his own internal battle in BA. Plenty of its staff didn’t want IATA to change its way. The airlines were invited to put forward candidates for the committees and I would pick the most suitable combination. I wanted to ensure the committees we allowed to survive would actually have some purpose and challenge IATA to move forward. It may sound arrogant but these were early days and I had to show we were going to be a different association. No longer would IATA be hostage to the committees.

Strangely, some airlines have recently asked for a return to the past using transparency as a code word for the micro-management of an industry through endless committees. I hope IATA is strong enough in the future to support only those changes that help the association deliver positive results. Industry politics and a place on the IATA Board should not be a key priority for anybody.

A strange animal

Dealing with the committees was a start but it was just that: a start. Much more was needed. But how do you articulate a vision and strategy for an association? IATA was, and still is, a unique animal.

Normally the role of an association in a business environment is linked to its influence on decision-makers. Ideally, it should facilitate the development of the industry that it represents. The associations of the car industry, the banking sector and so on are essentially lobby groups that interface with governments, lawmakers and consumer associations. The industry tells the association what it needs and then its association gets to work.

IATA is different. It has a far more comprehensive role and is truly entwined with the aviation industry, heavily involved in the distribution and financial settlement of the product. It handles more than $300 billion every year on behalf of the airlines and is among the largest private clients in the banking sector. This peculiarity stems from IATA’s history. The first IATA was established in 1919 and was essentially about improving safety levels. Aviation had few constraints at that time. There were no bilateral agreements, no ownership rules. Europeans could own US carriers, for example—something just not possible today.

In 1944, the Chicago Convention prescribed new rules, heavily influenced by events in the Second World War. At the same time, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) became a specialized United Nations agency. A revamped version of IATA was inaugurated in Havana, Cuba a year later to facilitate the new set-up.

Safety was, is and always will be the most important priority. When IATA began in 1945, the airlines carried 9 million passengers and there were fatalities. In 2011, 2.3 billion passengers took to the skies and there were 486 fatalities. The Western-built jet hull loss rate for 2012 was at a record low of 0.20 per million flights (or one hull loss for every 5 million flights). Flying is the safest way to travel and we’ve made it even safer.

Originally, though, this laudable emphasis on safety had some bizarre side effects. Because governments didn’t want competition to unduly affect cooperative efforts to make the skies safer, IATA was charged with establishing a whole series of protocols, standards and tariffs to govern the industry. Special inspectors flew anonymously to check the prices, meals and services provided were in accordance with IATA regulations. When on board they had to show their IATA credentials and there was panic among the crews as everything from the pitch of the seat to the size of the cushions and food portions was checked. It led to some farcical confrontations, the most famous—or should that be infamous—of which was the Great Sandwich War of 1958, when TWA and Pan Am took exception to the better fillings offered by a few European carriers. The comedy continued with a two-day IATA conference in London that deemed that member airlines’ economy class sandwiches must be cold and free of garnishes or fancy ingredients. Some might say airline food is still far from fancy but at least they are now free to make their own decisions about their meals. IATA wasn’t too upset by these schoolboy rows. It got to fine the airlines every time they sidestepped the rules and that’s how the association made its money.

IATA’s first DG was Sir Hildred William, the former British representative at the Chicago Convention, but it was under the leadership of the second DG, Knut Hammarsjöld, that IATA started to expand its activities. The most important development was probably the IATA Clearing House, which revolutionized distribution. Any passenger in the world, through the 70,000 or so IATA-accredited agents, could buy an IATA airline ticket in their local currency and have it accepted by IATA members. And if the airline went bankrupt, IATA would reimburse the passenger.

The third DG, Günther Eser, launched training and consulting activities and greatly expanded membership while my immediate predecessor, Pierre Jeanniot, was able to take charge of the industry settlement system that was initially handled by local carriers in IATA’s name.

Step by step, the association had moved serenely forward, broadening its role, setting technical standards and publishing enormous amounts of information on all things aviation.

Why become relevant?

For all their efforts though, previous IATA DGs had found their hands tied by the nature of the association. IATA was intrinsic to the industry itself and any change was hard won. My situation was different in that the status quo could no longer be maintained. Something, somewhere was going to snap under the pressure of a wave of global crises and new market dynamics.

If I was to fulfill Leo Mullin’s original brief to be relevant to a modern industry, the old dog that was IATA had to be taught new tricks.

Assisting the airlines in improving their business brought to mind three crucial goals for IATA:

• Increase safety levels and help the industry aim for zero fatalities.

• Help airlines reduce their costs by setting up new processes and standards and negotiating better deals with airports and air navigation service providers.

• Make governments understand that healthy competition would be the most effective means of governing the industry.

It wasn’t easy, partly due to the stubbornness of those defending the status quo and partly because there were some complex problems. The depth of sandwich fillings was the least of my problems. I had to turn IATA into an association capable of supporting my change agenda.

The right tools for the job

IATA had to make a difference. But if you want to change an industry, the minimum needed is the right set of tools. The IATA I inherited reflected the bureaucracy of the last 50 years and the state of the industry at large. It was stuffy, outdated, inefficient and highly insular. IATA typified airline thinking that this was an industry comprehensible only to insiders. But the world had changed and aviation had to change with it if it was to continue facilitating stronger cultural and social ties and encourage economic growth.

IATA employees were generally ex-airline staff, many of whom were simply marking time before retirement in the risk-free arena of a trade association. This was especially true of senior management. Having missed out on the top rung of the ladder at a major airline they had shuffled sideways for a cozy life. Worse, they had brought major airline thinking with them. Shrinking this narrow thinking even further was the fact that Board members overwhelmingly represented the biggest airlines.

The IATA cultural make-up was equally limited. When I arrived well over 60% of staff were British, American or Canadian. This was hardly the staff of a global association—and I knew it would not fly in a world spinning towards globalization.

Cultural diversity and cultural knowledge are essential to effective business on a global scale. It is easier said than done, of course. Different attitudes and practices have to be blended into a coherent whole and initially there is bound to be resistance. And resistance was exactly what I encountered when I arrived at IATA.

IATA is a small organization in terms of staff numbers—just 1,500 to 2,000. But it operates approximately 80 offices worldwide. Its job is to represent airlines in every corner of the globe, small carriers as well as big. It is the only non-political organization in the world—including the United Nations—that has members in the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan.

To fulfill its mission, IATA has to defend its members under any circumstances, without fear or favour. Afrique Airways, Syrian Air and Iran Air all suffered when sanctions were imposed on their home states by the international community. We had to insist on access to spare aircraft parts to ensure safety, which under the ICAO Convention cannot have boundaries or political limitations. I personally explained this crucial clause and the industry’s safety priority to the US State Department and the European Commission on several occasions. We were successful in getting spare parts to Afrique Airways in Libya and to Syrian Air but failed to help Iran Air in 2010 after a congressional vote ensured the sanctions remained in place. We had to suspend the airline from the industry systems.

When I joined IATA, however, I felt the association’s ability to represent the industry was severely limited. Incredibly, IATA had done its best to pretend that the winds of change would blow themselves out. Nearly all IATA staff, it seemed, still did not appreciate that the time had come to change their skills, their processes, in fact their entire cultural approach. For them, it was simply a matter of biding time until “business as usual” could be resumed.

I realized I had to hit where it really hurt.

A bomb in the church

If IATA and the airlines it represented were not completely divorced then certainly it was a marriage on the rocks. I wanted a sense of urgency, a wake-up call that was brutally effective. Speed wasn’t just a Giovanni trademark. It was absolutely essential to survival. If we hadn’t started to make a difference within the first year then the association, and perhaps even the industry, would be on their last legs, awaiting the knockout blow.

In terms of internal reorganization, that meant targeting both the staff and the structure. I needed to expose the senior management to a new corporate culture and make them understand that the world had changed. There is only one way to deal with people who think their job is not at risk: put their job at risk. I was going to change IATA, and change it quickly. If staff couldn’t accept that then there would be no place for them in the association.

I made my first management presentation in July 2002, one month after I took office. It contained the following key points:

• Speed, passion and commitment would be essential.

• Teamwork, change and communication would lead to a new management style.

• Real targets would make IATA a results-focused association.

• Management would face a tough and fast assessment.

• Anybody left behind would be lost to the association.

It was a terrible shock to the system of some, I’m sure. At the time, I think I only had three true believers: Tom Windmuller, a brilliant young manager who would rise to become Corporate Secretary; my first PA, Conchita Greiner; and Dominique Durand, who went on to work for me throughout my time at IATA and who provided tireless, intelligent support.

I sensed that most were thinking this was just another episode that could be ridden out. I had clear ideas about how to change that mindset but it never hurts to get a second opinion. I turned again to Jack Welch. GE is a great organization and its leadership programs have always been at the vanguard of any change process. The management style implemented by Jack is by far the most effective, anywhere. Management and corporate culture programs were so important to Jack that he personally attended training on a frequent basis. Every month he would spend at least a day or two at GE’s legendary business school in Crotonville, New York. Sessions there are tough; it’s not about making, or politely listening to, a presentation. Managers are put into a boxing ring and taught how to fight in a discussion. Their future depends on how they perform.

The ringmaster at Crotonville is Noel Tichy, Dean of the GE Business School, and the most prominent professor at the Ann Arbor University Business School in Michigan. I wanted Noel to put IATA management on the ropes but I wasn’t sure a crusty association held any interest for him. And I also needed to justify the cost to a board that wasn’t authorizing more than $1,000 a year on management programs.

I called Jack. I explained the situation was more or less what I had anticipated when we had met in New York. Jack noted that the strength of the GE management program was a major factor in the company’s powerful performance across all their activities. Whether this would translate to an association was another matter, he added.

I insisted. I had to take the risk. I had to try to succeed where the world-shaping events of the early 21st century had failed.

Jack was a great help to me. He met with Noel Tichy and managed to persuade him to begin a very different type of adventure with IATA. I explained my ideas to Xavier de Irala, who had taken over from Leo Mullin as IATA’s Chairman and was, coincidentally, a former GE manager. He knew Noel and had survived the tough challenges at Crotonville. After I told him that Noel was coming, he reflected silently for a couple of minutes and then said: “I hope it works.” I smiled back: “It will be like putting a bomb in a church.”

There was a real chance that the plan could derail and simply collapse the association entirely. But if IATA didn’t change that was its eventual fate anyway, so this adrenalin injection was worth a shot.

Leaders developing leaders

Through the Executive Management Group (EMG), I implemented the Senior Team Alignment Process (STAP). We would work around the key themes of our people, our members and our organization. I also added a magical new word to the IATA lexicon. From now on we wouldn’t just represent and serve. We would “represent, lead and serve”. The Board accepted this change quietly but underestimated what the concept of leadership would mean. And they certainly underestimated how I would use it.

At our second STAP workshop, the EMG identified 47 participants for what we termed the IATA Change Leadership (ICL) program. This program would be facilitated by Noel’s Brimstone team. It was not just current senior staff taking part. We took pains to include the leaders of tomorrow as well. The idea was simple: get a small group of strong personnel that fully embraced the changes to influence a large middle group of employees who were still unsure about the transformation before finally battling the small group at the other extreme who were actively opposed.

I made it my mission to attend all the ICL workshops but this was a concept that thrived on its own merits. We were offering a chance for staff to increase their skillset, their earning power and their career potential. It was also an “all-in” program, where staff of all levels mixed and worked together. It was a great experience for everybody though initially it may have been a touch uncomfortable for the senior Chinese Director challenged by an outspoken young Canadian Assistant Manager. They were playing a management game, where you give directions to somebody to guide them along a course. The Chinese Director was blindfolded but was still trying to direct operations much to the Canadian’s dismay. She was making it quite clear where the power now lay: with her! He insisted he was told her name and that he would report the case. To him, this was an insult and we had to talk him down from a very high horse.

The program was shocking for some. But while there were several cases of emotional tension, no participant left before the end of the program. The Chinese office still has its own identity but is fully aligned with the IATA culture and the Chinese Director, Baojian Zhang, has done a great job. He is now a Regional Vice President.

ICL developed many new ideas for IATA. Teams presented viable, real world projects and the Executive Management decided which ones would be retained. The projects automatically became a priority for the responsible departments. Some of the most important work we have done for the industry—Simplifying the Business and the IATA Operational Safety Audit, for example—were fleshed out in ICL sessions.

Performance assessment

Our people-first strategy was a real about-turn for IATA. The previous system of performance analysis (PA) was quite literally pointless because staff scores were completely ignored. They had no bearing on pay, bonuses or potential terminations. Divisions even had different versions of the PA form and less than half of the employees had fully completed forms in their personnel files.

To create a successful IATA, the focus needed to shift from processes to results. Managers needed to be decisive and clearly distinguish between strong and weak performers in their teams.

We adapted the classic GE approach. Those marked A were the star performers, B staff could do better but deserved our perseverance, while members of the C group probably had no further part to play in IATA’s future. It was the leadership quality that we required of every employee that proved to be the real game-changer. With so many new commercial services in the pipeline as well as our new philosophy, staff had to operate from the front. They had to lead the way in a brave new world.

A different organization

The training sessions with Noel Tichy and his Brimstone team helped align senior managers with the many challenges we faced. It allowed us to revise the IATA mission, vision and values. But there was always more to be done. We had to make sure the structure was efficient enough to bring a different business approach in the quickest possible time. IATA was now going to lead the industry and I had to translate that concept into reality.

I flattened the structure considerably, from an average near nine layers per division down to less than six, and I moved Human Resources to a direct report to me. The move was crucial because I flattened a lot of staff too. This was part of the structural shift. I needed to realign some divisions and ensure staff had enough experience and gravitas to give IATA the impetus for change at industry level.

Reforming HR into a key agent of change required a head of department with skills in change management and international experience. I discussed this with the existing HR Director and explained the role both he and his department would need to play in implementing IATA’s new management style. He listened carefully and then suggested I should rethink the strategy. He was convinced this wouldn’t work in an association and wouldn’t be understood by our member airlines. I appreciated his honesty but it was obvious that I had met my first hurdle. I fired him with immediate effect. “From tomorrow, you are out,” I said. “The legal department will handle the follow-up.” I brought in Guido Gianasso, who had experience in international organizations, most recently with Credit Suisse. He has made a significant contribution to the new-look IATA.

A strong signal, such as the dismissal of a “blocker”, can be worth a thousand meetings. I always try to work with the existing staff but if change doesn’t come quickly enough, I’m prepared to move up a gear.

The new structure also had to overcome boundaries. There were two types of recalcitrant staff when I joined IATA that I called silo experts and club meds. Silo experts were more common. They would sit in their office, confident they couldn’t be touched because of their specialized knowledge. This singular intelligence meant communicating with colleagues was pointless or beneath them. Our financial services division was particularly resplendent with silo experts. It was their indifference to the team ethic that held back our global network and the support needed in regional offices.

I had repeatedly stressed that change was urgent but one silo expert held firm. One day I called in Tom Murphy, the Senior Vice President of the division. “Your Director of IATA Settlement Systems (ISS) will be fired today,” I said. Tom was shocked. This director was considered a guru in his field and it was feared that losing him would create some kind of financial black hole. I didn’t alter my opinion and once he was gone, the restructuring of the ISS gathered the necessary pace.

Meanwhile, the club meds were having a wonderful life. These staff were travelling around the regions to remind people that IATA still existed but had no targets or strategy. So when Bob Hutt, the Chief Financial Officer, came to me with an urgent issue about the club meds, I grabbed the opportunity to rock their boat. Bob was concerned that they weren’t turning in their travel expenses on time. I was surprised this was deemed an urgent issue but offered a simple solution: immediately suspend the company credit card of anyone not following the proscribed reporting rules. It wasn’t my prime concern if people had to hitchhike home. The RVP of Africa had to pay for his own flight and then a train home, which can’t have been easy. Bob was amazed at such drastic action and some club meds were put out by having to find their own fare home, but the problem was remedied rather quickly.

Early on, I also got a new Head of Marketing and Commercial Services (MACS), employing Mark Hubble as a Senior Vice President. The previous occupant worked out of Montreal but had, for reasons beyond me, built up a large department in London, one of the most expensive cities in the world. The new appointment made structural changes much easier and MACS now touches on every division. Mark opened up new commercial opportunities for IATA and this has made a tremendous difference to our financial model. A matrix structure has enabled IATA to utilize the expertise embedded in its divisions and targets have made the department truly effective. From 2004–11 we doubled our commercial revenues.

In my first year in charge, 246 staff left IATA and 127 joined. I vetted all of the new staff to make sure they were agents of change. They were coming in from top organizations such as Barclays Bank, Credit Suisse, GE and IBM, so we were moving in the right direction. Coupled with the Brimstone training, it meant that by end 2003 my new management team was more or less complete. Only once did I not have the time to interview personally a candidate. I asked my management team which of the three candidates they preferred. They all looked blank. Kevin Dobby spoke up: “I’ve never been asked that before,” he said, surprised. “We usually just hire the cheapest!”

IATA was by no means alone in business in this policy. But it had to change. For IATA, its staff were its only asset. It was essential to pick the best. This wasn’t just a shock internally. Any headhunters we worked with also told me that IATA didn’t have a lot of sex appeal and “the best” would be hard to persuade. But gradually the tide turned. Word was spreading that a revolution in IATA had begun.

From 2003–07, some 20% of the staff changed on an annual basis— and this in an organization that had a long history of no firings and minimal staff turnover. Overall, during the same period, over 1,000 people joined us and nearly 1,200 left. Some were sacked, some resigned because this wasn’t the place for them. And quite a few were poached. We gave our people great training at places like Harvard and MIT and great experience in the global marketplace. This made them a desirable commodity. I don’t mind staff being poached. In fact, I’m quite proud when it happens because it shows I’m on the right track.

But the numbers don’t lie. Considering our total workforce of around 1,500, they show the bomb in the church had well and truly exploded.

Regional variations

It wasn’t just about change at Geneva and Montreal. From the start I was aware that the global aspect of our operation wasn’t strong enough. On my visits to the country offices—which, incidentally, were often the first by any IATA Director General—I had noticed that their role was limited to the handling of the settlement system. The heads of the offices were acting as accountants and staff were solely involved in settlement processes. We were barely scraping the surface in terms of their potential.

I started with the seven regional offices, ensuring they were true hubs for the country offices. As for the country offices themselves, their key priority became keeping in touch with member airlines, the regional offices and the main IATA offices in Montreal and Geneva. This would ensure a continuous two-way flow of information, anticipating and responding to needs as required. It led to the country offices having far more responsibility, as well as accountability, and they were soon in touch with the national governments and aviation authorities gathering vital information.

Within a year many of the country managers had been changed to reflect the offices’ new-found importance. I seized the opportunity to raise the bar in terms of the qualifications for the role. No longer accountants, they would need the interpersonal skills to liaise with industry stakeholders across the board. I was even tougher on the heads of the regional offices. They had to be former airline CEOs. I wanted to make sure IATA had the necessary gravitas and that any regional discussions would be conducted at the proper level. Patricio Sepulveda, the Regional Vice President (RVP) for Latin America, was the only one with the necessary leadership and background, having been a CEO of LAN and an IATA Board member. He has always been a strong influence in the region. But increasing the quality of the RVPs was the right thing to do. Our worldwide network took a quantum leap in performance and we finally formed close links with the industry.

The next step was the offices themselves. They were often located in the cheapest parts of town, far from the action and far from safe. Not the right image for an organization looking to negotiate with world leaders. Giving IATA the image I wanted was an expensive investment but I had to underline the agenda for change in every aspect of our operations. We needed offices that wouldn’t be an embarrassment to us when our aviation partners came calling. We needed offices that showed we meant business.

In Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the office moved away from a not particularly good—but wonderfully pungent—food market. In Kiev, Ukraine, we lost an unlit room in the backyard of an old building. We hired an architect to ensure all our new offices had the same feel and made sure every visitor was aware that IATA had changed. All around the world, IATA staff are now happy to arrange meetings at the association’s offices. The days of suggesting a coffee at a nearby hotel any time a member wanted to meet are finally over.

The value of leadership

Leadership makes all the difference to an organization. The goal is always sustainable growth and consistent profits. To achieve this I believe a good leader needs to motivate his team to achieve tough targets in the short term and to work toward a strategy and vision for the company in the long term.

Every organization is different, of course. At IATA, I had to take a prehistoric animal and adapt it to the modern world. But as I joined IATA at what was probably the lowest point in aviation history, I had a mandate for change. I applied some crucial leadership tips to three key areas: the internal structure and personnel; monopoly providers in the value chain; and governments.

Internally, as outlined earlier, I set tough targets and implemented a transparent performance assessment scheme. Just as importantly, I also embarked on a strategy of strong commercial growth. Although IATA is not-for-profit, I knew that my ability to transform the industry hinged on being able to take independent decisions. You can’t control your business if you’re always asking for money to implement a project.

In dealing with monopoly providers, it would sometimes seem that the target—most often driving down prices—was impossible to achieve. After all, how can you convince a third party to be cheaper when there are no alternatives? This is where a good leader has to step up and build the teamwork and commitment that keeps the organization driving forward. It makes the impossible, possible. The language you use can be very influential. I always tried to use the word “aspiration” rather than target when setting out my ideas. That gave me the time to build momentum before transforming that aspiration into a target. As I will explain later, this is exactly what I did when I presented the idea of making the industry carbon-neutral. I first won consensus that being carbon-neutral was a great aspiration. And then, with the aspiration established, I moved on to working out a path for that dream to become a reality, with targets along the way.

When it came to governments, I knew I had to move up the ladder and deal with the real decision-makers—Prime Ministers and Presidents rather than Ministers of Transport. It is becoming quite common for larger companies to have contact with governments, particularly those with worldwide networks. Big business is an important part of the global village. As with companies in other sectors, the destiny of an airline can depend on a political decision.

You need to be able to influence those decisions. My strategy was to talk first of related subjects where you know there is common ground. This establishes an understanding and makes an agreement at the end of the meeting more likely. And never close the door even if the meeting doesn’t end favorably. There is always the possibility of a second chance.

Only if all else fails do you prepare for battle. And even then a leader must first make sure the equation makes sense. The reward must make the risk worthwhile. Of course, being a leader is about taking risks. You won’t hit targets by standing still. The only time to be absolutely certain of the result is if it is your first battle in a new job. Then the leader must win, otherwise credibility becomes a real issue.

Ultimately, every leader develops a unique style. At IATA I soon became known for my “crazy ideas” and for “shouting politely”. But my ideas were never crazy—they were calculated risks. And for some, my politeness was not always evident.