5 Case Studies in International Relations

It is also possible the use the worksheet method with case studies in International Relations, and this possibility greatly expands the range of application of the worksheet method in political science. The present chapter gives some case studies which can be used as illustration or exercise in various fields of political science. These are historical, i.e. they only use information available at the time decisions were made, without the benefit of hindsight. These are the 1999–2003 Bush doctrine and the 1994–2007 North Korean nuclear standoff.

5.1 Bush Administration’s New Doctrine and Iraq

When, in March 1999, George W. Bush was considering running for President, his tutors included both neo-conservative hawks, such as Paul Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld, and pragmatic realists, including Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice.2 During the campaign, neither side knew where it stood with the candidate. In the new Bush administration, however, both camps were represented. The neo-conservatives numbered Vice-President Dick Cheney, Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defence, and Wolfowitz as his Deputy Secretary. The pragmatic realists numbered Powell as Secretary of State, a formidable counterweight. The two groups expressed varying views on how to deal with Saddam Hussein. The hawks developed a military option and push for increased aid to the Iraqi opposition. Powell advocated more targeted sanctions that would allow more humanitarian goods into Iraq, while tightening controls on items that could have military applications.

In summary, the new national security strategy stated that the United States possessed unprecedented strength and influence in the world. Ostensibly building on the principles of freedom and the value of a free society, this position also came with responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity. The strength of the nation was to be used to promote a balance of power that favoured freedom.

To achieve these goals, the United States would:

• –   champion aspirations for human dignity;
• –   strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;
• –   work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
• –   prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction;
• –   ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade.

Following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on World Trade Towers, US President Bush declared a War on Terror, targeting Iraq as a major player in an ‘Axis of Evil’. Evidence for Iraqi involvement in the attacks was sketchy, but included a probable contact between hijacker Mohamed Atta and an Iraq official in Czechoslovakia, as well as evidence of defectors that prospective hijackers were trained at Salman Pak base.

From March to May 2002, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was unable to persuade Iraqi representatives to allow inspectors return. A second attempt at talks in Vienna with Iraq’s foreign minister, Naji Sabri, also failed – Sabri said any agreement should have included route towards lifting sanctions, ending threats of regime change, and ending no-flight zones. In August 2002, Iraq invited chief weapons inspector to Baghdad for talks on resuming inspections. In September 2002, US President George W. Bush addressed a special session of the UN, and called for multilateral action against Iraq. Iraq responded by announcing it would allow inspections unconditionally, but quickly retracted the offer, making it conditional on no new US resolutions. British Prime Minister Tony Blair released a dossier showing Iraq has significant WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) capabilities, in an effort to gain support for British role in projected US invasion. On November 8, 2002, UN Security Council Resolution 1441 called on Iraq to cooperate with UN inspection teams and not to obstruct UN forces. Iraq should declare all weapons of mass destruction in its possession by December 8, 2002. UNMOVIC inspection teams began inspecting sites in Iraq.

On December 7, 2002, Iraq submitted documentation as required by UN Security Council Resolution 1441 that details the disposal of weapons of mass destruction. The document claimed that Iraq has disposed of all such weapons. Shortly thereafter, US experts examining the documentation claimed it was neither complete nor convincing. On January 27, 2003, reports by UNMOVIC inspector Hans Blix and International Atomic Energy Commission head Mohamed El-Baradei were submitted.

On February 19, 2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation agreed to begin implementation of plans to provide military aid to Turkey. AWACS radar aircrafts, Patriot missile systems and special units to combat biochemical weapons were to be sent to the only NATO member country which shared borders with Iraq. The decision was taken by the Defence Planning Committee to approve the start of military planning to defend Turkey if it came under attack. The Alliance also decided to form a senior civil planning committee (SCPC) to provide civil emergency support to Turkey. NATO has 17 AWACS in Germany and operated by 12 out of 19 Alliance member states. The Patriot anti-missile batteries were shipped to Turkey from the Netherlands.

A second resolution was tabled at the UN on February 24, 2003, sponsored by the US, the UK, and Spain. It was short and general, asserting that Iraq has failed to comply with Resolution 1441, and re-stating its obligation to rid itself of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The 15-member Security Council was composed at the time of the five permanent members (the US, France, the UK, China, and Russia) and the elected members (Bulgaria, Cameroon, Guinea, Mexico, Syria, Germany, Spain, Pakistan, Chile and Angola), with Germany then Guinea holding the Presidency.

The draft United Nations Security Council resolution on Iraq presented to the Council on February 24, 2003, was proposed by the United States and Britain and cosponsored by Spain. Its key points stated that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded it in Resolution 1441. On March 7, Blix gave an oral report to the Security Council. On March 19, 2003, US defence officials said the air strikes so far had been of limited scope, and were designed to prepare the field for more intense operations. US President George W Bush addressed the nation, saying that coalition forces had begun striking targets of military importance in Iraq.

On March 17, France said President Bush’s ultimatum to Saddam Hussein is ‘contrary to the will of the UN Security Council. The US increased its terrorism alert to orange, the second highest level. President Bush delivered a live television address, saying Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours or face military conflict. The former foreign secretary, Robin Cook, resigned, saying he could not support a war without international agreement or domestic support. The UK advised all its citizens, except diplomatic staff, to leave Kuwait. Reports emerge that UN observers stationed along Kuwait’s border with Iraq have ceased all operations. The US ordered non-essential diplomats to leave Israel, Syria and Kuwait.

On March 18 2003, The Pentagon confirmed new air strikes by the US and British planes against what it says are surface-to-surface missiles and artillery in the no-flyzone in south-eastern Iraq. The US said 17 Iraqi soldiers surrendered to American forces on the Kuwaiti border. The Iraqi leadership rejected the US ultimatum for President Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave the country. The UK House of Commons voted on Iraq. French President Jacques Chirac denounced impending US invasion as bound to undermine future efforts at peaceful disarmament. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder said there was no justification for war against Iraq and no reason to end the weapons inspections.

The Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, had stressed speed and decisiveness, the aim being to knock the Iraqi regime off-balance and to keep it there. The three elements of the campaign were: an air campaign of great intensity; a psychological warfare assault to convince the Iraqi military that resistance was pointless; and a ground operation to encircle Baghdad. The hope was that there would be only limited resistance from demoralised and isolated units. Those that did fight would face the full force of American combat power. It was hoped the Iraqi regime would collapse.

Unlike 1991, the air and ground phases of the plan were less distinct. There was to be movement on the ground quite early in this campaign, and if resistance was light, American and British forces were encouraged to continue advancing. It began with air attacks against radars, surface-to-air missile systems and command and control centres. New, so-called E-bombs could be used to destroy electrical circuitry. The aim was to isolate Saddam Hussein and his senior commanders. There were fewer targets than in 1991, but the attacks – especially in the Baghdad area – were to be much more intensive and concentrated into a much shorter time period. Attacks would be carried out with cheaper, and hence more numerous, more accurate satellite-guided weapons. The aim of the US and British was to reduce these to a minimum and to reduce damage to the civilian infrastructure to a minimum as well. They were likely to be clearing up the mess afterwards and responsible for restoring essential services.

The psychological campaign, using leaflets and broadcasts, would only be proven effective when war actually broke out. Within days – some people believed hours US and British ground forces moved into Iraq. Some airmobile units might have leap-frogged deep into the country. The bulk of the heavy US and British armour concentrated on the southern front where a number of water obstacles might pose challenges. If the advance was rapid then a key problem would be maintaining their lines of supply. The US also wanted to get significant forces on the ground in northern Iraq as quickly as possible to secure oilfields and to maintain order in Kurdish areas.

Some former US military officers worried the US had gathered insufficient forces for a full-scale invasion of Iraq. In the military world, it is not so much the numbers of troops or tanks that matter, but the way units and weapons systems combine to provide combat power. The US and British deployment in the Gulf was actually rather small. Some 250,000 soldiers – half the number assembled for the 1991 Gulf War – actually provided about 150,000 US and British combat troops.

The outcome of this conflict was not in doubt. How long it was to take and the level of casualties would depend upon the degree of Iraqi resistance. But the imbalance between the two sides was stark. Urban warfare, in Baghdad for example, enabled the Iraqis to inflict significant casualties on the Americans, but risked a terrible price in civilian loss of life. Equally the use of chemical weapons could have caused some problems for advancing American and British forces, but they were well-equipped and trained. Civilian casualties, on the other hand, could be serious if the weapons were used near inhabited areas.

Internationally, the stakes were high. The Administration hoped that victory in Iraq would spread democracy in the Middle East, deter other dictators and vindicate its policy of pre-emptive action. Bush was very explicit about the need for regime change in Baghdad, and appealed directly to the Iraqi people in his speech, saying the US would liberate them from an oppressive dictator.

Worksheet 5.1.1: Strategy

Worksheet 5.1.2: Key Actors

Worksheet 5.1.3: An Actor’s Actions and Tactics

Worksheet 5.1.5: Key Rules

Worksheet 5.1.6: Factors Outside Anyone’s Control

Worksheet 5.1.7: Do-or-Die Moments

Steps to Goal	Problem 1	Problem 2
Approves new doctrine
Visits schools in Florida
Declares war on terror
Addresses the UN General Assembly
Gives Axis of Evil State of the Union address
	Delivers ultimatum to Hussein
	Announces beginning of air strikes in address to the nation

Use as many columns or rows as necessary. When the task is completed, bold or circle each do-or-die moment.

Worksheet 5.1.8: Tactics, Countervailing Tactics

5.2 The North Korean Nuclear Stand-Off

On a visit to Pyongyang in October 2002, US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly pressed the North on suspicions that it was continuing to pursue a nuclear energy and missiles program, citing evidence of a secret uranium-enriching program carried out in defiance of the 1994 Agreed Framework.3 Under this deal, North Korea agreed to forsake nuclear ambitions in return for the construction of two safer light water nuclear power reactors and oil shipments from the US. Later that month, the US announced that North Korea had admitted in their talks to a secret nuclear arms program. Initially the North appeared conciliatory. Kim Jong-Il said he would allow international weapons inspectors to check that nuclear facilities are out of use.

The North-South Korea talks in Pyongyang were undermined by the North’s nuclear program ‘admission’. US Secretary of State Colin Powell then said further US aid to North Korea was now in doubt. The same month, five Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea 25 years before were allowed a brief visit home. But they ended up staying, thereby provoking more tension in the region.

The North adopted a mercurial stance, one moment defiantly defending its right to weapons development, offering to halt nuclear programs in return for aid and the signing of a non-aggression pact with the US the next. It argued that the US had not kept to its side of the Agreed Framework, as the construction of the light water reactors – due to be completed in 2003 – was now years behind schedule. US President George W. Bush declared that the November oil shipments to the North would be the last if the North does not agree to put a halt to its weapons ambitions.

In December 2002, North Korean-made Scud missiles were found aboard a ship bound for Yemen, provoking American outrage. The US detained the ship, but released it, conceding that neither country has broken any law. The North threatened to reactivate nuclear facilities for energy generation, saying the Americans’ decision to halt oil shipments left it with no choice, blaming the US again for wrecking the 1994 pact.

On December 13, North Korea asked the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to remove seals and surveillance equipment from its Yongbyon power plant, then removed them itself. North-South Korea talks over reopening road and rail border links stalled. North Korea began shipping fuel rods to the Yongbyon plant which could be used to produce plutonium. The IAEA expressed concern and the two IAEA nuclear inspectors were expelled from the country. North Korea also said it was planning to reopen a reprocessing plant, which could start producing weapons-grade plutonium within months.

In January 2003, the IAEA passed a resolution demanding that North Korea readmit UN inspectors and abandon its secret nuclear weapons program. The US said it was willing to talk to North Korea about how it met its obligations, but would not provide goods to North Korea in exchange. North Korea then announced it would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. US satellites tracked movement at the Yongbyon plant throughout January.

In February 2003, North Korea said it had reactivated its nuclear facilities. The IAEA found North Korea in breach of nuclear safeguards and referred the matter to the UN Security Council. On February 24, 2003, North Korea fired a missile into the sea between South Korea and Japan, firing a second one in March. On March 2, North Korean fighter jets intercepted a US reconnaissance plane in international air space and shadowed it for 22 minutes.

On April 1, the US announced that stealth fighters sent to South Korea for training would stay on. The UN Security Council expressed concern about North Korea’s nuclear program. North Korea announced that it was willing to negotiate, having started to reprocess its spent fuel rods. Talks did begin in Beijing, led by the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian affairs, James Kelly, and the deputy Director General of North Korea’s American Affairs Bureau, Li Gun. Nonetheless, in May, North Korea scrapped a 1992 agreement with the South to keep the peninsula free from nuclear weapons, its last remaining international agreement on non-proliferation.

In June 2003, officials admitted to a visiting delegation of US congressmen that the country had nuclear weapons. North Korea said that it would build a nuclear deterrent, ‘unless the US gives up its hostile policy’. In August, it agreed to six-way talks on its nuclear program – the US, Japan, China and Russia and the two Koreas. The talks failed to bridge the gap.

In October, North Korea announced that it would display its nuclear deterrent, and it also agreed to resume talks on the nuclear crisis. In December, it offered to freeze its nuclear program in return for a list of concessions from the US. It warned that if the US did not agree, it would not take part in further talks. The US declined.

In January 2004, an unofficial US team visited Yongbyon and was shown what appeared to be weapons-grade plutonium, but no evidence of a nuclear bomb. In May, the UN atomic agency investigated allegations that North Korea secretly sent uranium to Libya. In June, a third round of six-nation talks was held in Beijing, with the US making a new offer to allow North Korea fuel aid if it froze then dismantled its nuclear programs. In July, US Secretary of State Colin Powell met the North Korean Foreign Minister, Paek Nam Sun. North Korea later described US President George W. Bush as an ‘imbecile’ and a ‘tyrant that puts Hitler in the shade’; in response to comments President Bush made describing the North’s Kim Jong-Il as a ‘tyrant’. Following that sparkling moment in diplomatic history, Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su-hon told the UN General Assembly that his country had turned plutonium from 8,000 spent fuel rods into nuclear weapons.

In January 2005, North Korea expressed willingness to restart stalled talks on its nuclear program. In February, North Korea suspended its participation in the talks over its nuclear program and repeated its assertion to have built nuclear weapons for self-defence. In April, South Korea noted that the Yongbyon reactor had been shut down, a move which could allow it to extract more fuel for nuclear weapons. On May 1, 2005, North Korea fired a short-range missile into the Sea of Japan. On May 11, it completed extraction of spent fuel rods from Yongbyon. On May 16, North and South Korea held their first talks in 10 months. The US suspended efforts to recover the remains of missing US servicemen in North Korea, saying restrictions placed on its work were too great. In June, North Korea requested more food aid from the South, and in July it said it would re-join nuclear talks.

In July, South Korea offered the North huge amounts of electricity as an incentive to end its nuclear weapons program. The fourth round of six-nation talks in Beijing, reached deadlock within two weeks, but after a month resumed. North Korea agreed to give up all its nuclear activities and re-join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The US said it had no intention of attacking. But on September 20, North Korea said it would not scrap its nuclear program until it is given a civilian nuclear reactor. In December, North Korea announced it intended to resume building nuclear reactors, because the US had pulled out of a key deal to build it two new reactors.

There the matter rested until April 2006, when a two-day meeting aimed at persuading North Korea to return to talks on its nuclear program failed. In July, Washington dismissed a threat by North Korea that it would launch a nuclear strike against the US in the event of an American attack as ‘deeply hypothetical’. North Korea test-fired at least six missiles. South Korea suspended food aid and the UN Security Council unanimously banned exports and imports of missile-related materials. In September, North Korea blamed the US financial sanctions for the deadlock in a speech to the UN General Assembly. It carried out a nuclear test on October 9. As a result, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to impose weapons and financial sanctions on North Korea. The six-nation talks resumed briefly in December in Beijing, but without progress.

In January 2007, the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, stated his country could not tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea and called for closer international co-operation to stop such an outcome. The six-nation nuclear talks then resumed, in Beijing.4

Worksheet 5.2.1: Strategy

Worksheet 5.2.2: Key Actors

Worksheet 5.2.3: An Actor’s Actions and Tactics

Worksheet 5.2.5: Key Rules

Worksheet 5.2.6: Factors Outside Anyone’s Control

Use as many columns or rows as necessary. When the task is completed, bold or circle each do-or-die moment.

Worksheet 5.2.8: Tactics, Countervailing Tactics

Other Applications

The worksheet method has been used successfully to analyse a wide range of situations in International Relations, including Dark Winter, a US preparedness exercise, Arctic sovereignty, and the Gulf War.

2 Sources include Keesing’s Record of World Events 2002, 2003, 2004, 2014.

3  Sources include BBC News, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2013; Keesing’s Record of World Events, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005.

4  BBC News. (2007) North Korea Nuclear Crisis. 8 February. (www.bbcnews.co.uk).