Memorial: Pakistan V. United States of America in relations to drone attacks

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

CASE CONCERNING

THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PAKISTAN AND THE JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN RELATION TO DRONE ATTACKS ALONG THE BORDER SHARED BY PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN

(PAKISTAN v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

MEMORIAL

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8TH, 2013

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Beginning in 2004 under the Bush Administration, the United States of America began a campaign using UAV’s (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) also known as drones to patrol the tribal region of Pakistan along the shared border of Pakistan and Afghanistan. These attacks, perpetrated under the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States of America, hereby referred to as the CIA, increased tenfold following the inauguration of President Obama in 2008 (Woodward, 2010). The attacks increased from ten strikes during the Bush Administration (2004–07), to a total of 33 in 2008, 54 in 2009, 131 in 2010, and 22 by April of 2011 (Plaw, 2012). By 2012, there were a reported 48 strikes and exactly one week before this case is presented to the court there were a reported 19 strikes (New America Foundation, 2013).

According to the United States government policy standards and procedures for the use of force in counter terrorism operations outside of its borders, the United States will ‘use all available tools of national power to protect the American people from the terrorist threat posed by al-Qaida and its associated forces… approving operations to capture or employ lethal force against terrorist targets,’ including but not limited to capture or use of lethal force( US Press Secretary, 2013). This use of lethal force in drone strikes has led to the recorded fatalities of 166 between 2004 and 2007, 290 in 2008, 582 in 2009, an all-time high of 860 in 2010, and 133 by April of 2011 (Plaw, id.). By 2012 the fatalities totalled 306 and by this date the fatalities this year total 124. Within these fatalities, the total number of civilian casualties is between 258 and 307, whereas the total number of targets killed is around 1606–2757 (New America Foundation, id.).

ISSUES

The state of Pakistan feels that the use of force in these attacks upon its own citizens violates the sovereignty of the nation, as the force used is excessive. Pakistan holds the United States of America accountable for this reckless and negligent use of force, supported by Article 1 of the United Nations international legal commission regarding state responsibility:

(1) The principle that any conduct of a State which international law characterises as a wrongful act entails the responsibility of that state in international law is one of the principles most strongly upheld by state practice and judicial decisions and most deeply rooted in the doctrine of international law.(International Law Commission, 1997).

Pakistan believes that the drone mission conducted by the America government has reached the point where it has surpassed its intended goal of eliminating active terrorist groups and transformed into a kill-switch operated by the US as a way to easily eliminate possible terrorists they deem a ‘threat.’ Again, Pakistan condemns the following drone missions on the basis of obsessive force and encroachment on sovereignty by the jeopardizing of social cohesion and fortification of anti-government sentiments through such attacks.

‘Sovereignty’ is defined as the idea of freedom from external forces, a characteristic the Pakistan government has slowly been losing grip with due to a drone mission conducted by secrecy through the CIA. Through this, Pakistan, as a sovereign nation feels that it is the responsibility of the state to hold the United States of America accountable for the needless destruction of persons and their property, as well as the lack of transparency of their actions. The use of drones in Pakistani territory shall be upheld should the United States of America agree and commit too transparency and willingness to accept Pakistan regulation in their actions within the sovereign states’ borders.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

The ICJ must, ‘decide, in accordance with international law, disputes of a legal nature that are submitted to it by States.’ These disputes are defined as, ‘a disagreement on a question of law or fact, a conflict, a clash of legal views or of interests’. Thus, since we as representatives of Pakistan have clearly shown a difference in views on the true success of the Drone missions and a disagreement on the conduction of drone missile attacks implemented by the US government, we establish that the ICJ has clear jurisdiction on the matter.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Under the United Nations treaty Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts the following criteria is outlined:

‘There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when:

(a) Conduct consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the State under international law; and

(b) That conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State’ (Crawford, 2012, s.p.).

The conduct of the United States constitutes a breach of their policy standard regarding international counter terrorism, which states:

‘The following criteria must be met before lethal action may be taken:

Near certainty that the terrorist target is present;

Near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed;

An assessment that capture is not feasible at the time of the operation;

An assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to US persons; and

An assessment that no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively address the threat to US persons’ (US Press Secretary, 2012, s.p.).

Furthermore, the United States government also has an additional statement within their policy standard:

‘United States uses force in foreign territories, international legal principles, including respect for sovereignty and the law of armed conflict imposes important constraints on the ability of the United States to act unilaterally – and on the way in which the United States can use force. The United States respects national sovereignty and international law’ (Ibid).

US Drone missiles within Pakistan borders breaches international law when concerning the death of citizens impacted by drone strikes:

The following under Chapter 20 of International Humanitarian law must be understood for all participants in these drone strikes and must be upheld with the highest importance:

Protocol I prohibits the use of weapons which are ‘of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction’ Several States argued that a weapon is indiscriminate if it has uncontrollable effects or if the damage would be extensive and may be expected to cause incidental civilian losses which would be excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated. The use of means and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited (Ibid). International Court of Justice defined unnecessary suffering as harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives’(Ibid).

Under the ICRC, drones are not specifically mentioned in any chapters or weapon treaties. None the less, drones are still considered a weapon, and such uses to eliminate combatants are subjected to the rule of international humanitarian law. Therefore, every attack conducted with the use of drone missiles must be closely analysed under the laws of proportionality and distinction between not only civilians and active combatants but civilian buildings and combatant objects (Maurer, 2013, s.p.).

JUDGEMENT REQUESTED

To conclude, the state of Pakistan requests confirmation and willingness of the US government to disclose documents specific to drone attacks conducted within its borders. The state believes that the US drone program has fervently pursued its enemies with little regard for the lives of those not directly participating in illegal terrorist activity. The state does not ask for complete seizure of all drone missions but simply heightened regulations agreed on by both parties and a willingness of the US government to provide communication and respect for any Pakistan request of overseeing any potential drone strike. We are bringing this issue to the International Court of Justice not only to protect our citizens from the fear and destruction the drone missions deliver but also in an effort to stabilise the world by aiding in the elimination of terrorist organisations.

Respectfully submitted,

State of Pakistan

Resource 3.2: Judgment, Pakistan V. United States of America In relations to drone attacks

15 OCTOBER 2013

ORDER

JUDGEMENT CONCERNING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’S USE OF DRONE ATTACKS IN PAKISTAN AND ITS EFFECT ON PAKISTAN’S SOVEREIGNTY

(PAKISTAN v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

JUGEMENT SUR LES ÉTATS-UNIS D’AMÉRIQUE DE L’UTILISATION PAR DES ATTAQUES DE DRONES AU PAKISTAN ET SON EFFECT SUR LA SOUVERAINETÉ DU PAKISTAN

(PAKISTAN c. ÉTATS-UNIS D’AMÉRIQUE)

15 OCTOBRE 2013

ORDONNANCE

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 2013

15 October

General List

No. 002

15 October 2013

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’S USE OF DRONE ATTACKS IN PAKISTAN AND ITS AFFECT ON PAKISTAN’S SOVEREIGNTY

(PAKISTAN v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

ORDER

Present: Judges

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,

After deliberation,

Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to Article 44 of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the Application filed in the Registry of the Court on 3 October 2013, whereby the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (hereinafter referred to as Pakistan) instituted proceedings against the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the US) in regards to a dispute concerning the ‘sovereignty of Pakistan and the jurisdiction of the United States of America in relation to drone attacks along the border shared by Pakistan and Afghanistan’,

Having regard to the Memorial and the Counter-Memorial duly filed by the Parties within the time-limits thus fixed,

Having regard to Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations;

Whereas permission has previously been granted by Pakistan to the US to carry out aerial drone strikes where there is perceived to be peoples of threat to international peace and security,

Whereas the attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. on 11 September 2001, in the opinion of the Court, provide reasonable grounds for the use of military force as means of self-defence by the US against al-Qaeda and the Taliban,

Whereas Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (hereinafter referred to as UAVs) have proven to be effective in regards to the goal of the US to quash any threat of further terrorist attack against its people, Whereas in its application, Pakistan makes the claim of superfluous injury, suffering, and death amongst civilian casualties despite evidence suggesting that comparatively, civilian-combatant casualties ratios are significantly fewer than compared to previous wars;

For these reasons,

THE COURT,

By majority vote,

Finds that in regard to the concern over the ‘sovereignty of Pakistan and the jurisdiction of the United States of America in relation to drone attacks along the border shared by Pakistan and Afghanistan’ that sovereignty has yet to be breached, and should Pakistan choose to recede the US’s permission to enter Pakistan’s airspace and carry out said drone strikes, under international law, the US would have to comply. Therefore it is the opinion of the court that while we have the capability to hear the case, we find that there is in fact no issue, as presented in the Memorials submitted by both Pakistan and the US

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fifteenth day of October two thousand and thirteen, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Government of the United States, respectively.

IN FAVOUR:

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Counter-Memorial: LIBYA v. UNITED KINGDOM and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Pan Am Flight 103, Lockerbie

CASE CONCERNING

THE APPLICATION BY LIBYA FOR AN APPEAL OF THE

INDICTMENT AND EXTRADITION OF LIBYAN NATIONALS

IN RELATION TO THE TERRORIST ATTACK OF PAN AM FLIGHT 103; LOCKERBIE

(LIBYA v. UNITED KINGDOM)

(LIBYA v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25TH, 2013

STATEMENTS OF FACTS

On December 21, 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 departed from London Heathrow Airport in London, England with destination to New York, USA. Sadly, it did not reach its destination. All 243 passengers aboard, as well as all 16 crew members and 11 victims on the ground died when a bomb exploded on Flight 103 causing it to crash down in Lockerbie, Scotland (Andrews, 2004).

When this case first came before this court, the United Kingdom had taken as many necessary steps as possible to insure a fair trial for both the victims and the accused. During the investigation into the bombing, the United Kingdom not only used Scottish investigators but was also insistent upon bringing in other forces to help investigate this bombing. During the investigation, officials conducted over 15,000 interviews within 20 countries, took 35,000 photos, and obtained over 180,000 pieces of evidence in an effort to thoroughly investigate the crime and ensure a fair trial. Ultimately this case was one of the most thorough investigations to take place to date (Andrews, 2004).

During this three-year investigation, the investigators looked into several possible suspects as well as examining the bag that contained the bomb and how it made its way on to the plane and who is belonged to. Investigators were able to connect the bag to Adbdelbaset Ali Mohamed Al-Megrahi, who was the head of security for the state-owned Libyan Arab Airlines, as well a member of the Jamahiriya Security Organisation, Libya’s intelligence agency. Ultimately, it was determined that the bag was placed on Pan Am Flight 103 in Malta, by the co-accused Lamin Hkalifah Fhimah (Ushynskyi, 2009). Eventually, investigators obtained a witness who was placed in the Witness Protection Program, known only as ‘Puzzle Piece’. This witness gave authorities important information, which eventually leads to the arrest of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi for the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing. Ultimately, the witness was revealed to be Abdul Majid, a member of the Jamahiriya Security Organisation, the same organisation that the accused belonged to.

ISSUES

In Libya’s memorial, the State of Libya stated they felt they had an unfair trial against the State of the UK due to a biased investigation involving coercion and false testimonies, pressure from the United States and the United Nations, as well as a trial in a biased court. The State of the UK feels that these ‘facts’ are not true, and that the United Kingdom acted in the most fair and equal way possible towards Libya and all other parties.

The United Kingdom ensured that there was a very extensive investigation in which not only the Scottish police took part, but also the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency, and the Federal Criminal Police Office from Germany (Miller, 2011). During the investigation several terrorist organisations were inquired about, and initially the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was our main suspect and remained our main suspect for much of the investigation. It was not until the investigators discovered the fragment of clothing, which was exclusively manufactured by the Yorkie Clothing Brand in Malta that they moved on to investigation the convicted. Fortunately, the fragment of clothing had the number 1705 stamped on it, which turned out to be a specific order number to a retailer in Malta. This number led our investigators to the shop owner, whose testimony pointed them in the direction of Mr. Mehgri. Ultimately, it was determined that the PFLP were not the perpetrators. Charges were laid once the investigators felt there was enough hard evidence and facts against Abdelbaset Ali Mohamed Al-Megrahi and Al-Amin Khalifa Fhima.

With regards to Libya’s claim about the court being biased against the two Libyan nationals, this is simply not the case. In fact, it was Libya who requested that the trial take place in The Hague, and even insisted that the two accused be tried before a Scottish Court, under Scottish law as long as they sat in The Hague. The United Kingdom took steps to further ensure that a fair trial took place by removing the conventional method of using a jury and instead empowered three Lord Advocates and one alternate to adjudicate to the trial. Lastly, throughout the investigation the FBI held the identity of a key witness by the name of Abdul Majid Giaka, who was a member of the very same intelligence agency that Mehgri belonged to. Giaka’s testimony was highly incriminating against the two accused, and the court’s rejection of this testimony truly exemplified the Lord Advocates’ impartiality towards this particular case.

Libya argued that we essentially bullied them into extraditing the two accused individuals, but this completely untrue. We did not bully, we did not harass, and we simply requested that the two accused be extradited to us. In fact, we asked twice, and after receiving no response both times we decided it was necessary to impose economic sanctions and trade embargoes.

We believed that it was essential that the trial be held in Scotland or at the very least a neutral site, because having the trial in Libya would not result in justice regardless of the evidence presented in court. Furthermore, we argue that the likelihood of justice being achieved had the trial been in Libya was non-existent because of the type of regime that Libya was under at the time of the incident. Libya was being led by Muammar Gaddafi, one of the most corrupt dictators of his time, who had absolutely no regard for the rule of law, and no regard for human life. Given this fact, we believe it was reasonable for us to assume that a trial involving a member of Gaddafi’s intelligence agency, accused of mass murder, would likely result in an acquittal regardless of the evidence because of the reflection that a guilty verdict would have on Muammar Gaddafi himself (Emerson, 2004). Ultimately, we contend that the political pressure and economic sanctions imposed on the state of Libya were necessary in order for justice to be achieved.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

The United Kingdom feels that this court has no jurisdiction under article 60 of the Statue of the International Court of Justice. Article 60 states that ‘the judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party’. The Courts decision was that of a final decision determined by proper trial proceedings.

There is was no wrongful acts committed against Libya within this trial only wrong doings committed by Libya against the United Kingdom, which resulted in the court’s previous decision to convict Mr. Mehgri.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

First, the State of the UK would like to dispute Libya’s claim of legal principles they presented, because they are, for the most part, inconsistent with the argument they presented to court.

Although they have some relevance, the principles that they suggest all revolve around extradition, yet very little of their argument or was concerned with the issue of extradition. Their argument was mostly based on the investigation and trial of Mr. Mehgri, and how they believed that both were biased against the Libyan national. Ultimately, Libya was contending for an absolute overturning of the guilty verdict, not an extradition matter. In light of this, it is clear that the legal principles presented by Libya have absolutely nothing to do with the investigation into the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, or the trial of Mr. Mehgri.

One legal principle that the State of the UK find to be fairly significant is Article 4 Section (1) of the Rules of the Court of the International Court of Justices, which states, ‘The declaration to be made by every Member of the Court in accordance with Article 20 of the Statute shall be as follows: ‘I solemnly declare that I will perform my duties and exercise my powers as judge honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously’. This is significant because it speaks to the initial decision of the court and its impartiality, to overturn a decision in which it has already made, would essentially mean that it violated this statute.

Another legal principle that is fairly significant is the finality of a decision made by the ICJ is once again Article 60.

Judgment Requested

In conclusion, we request that the court dismiss this case once and for all. We believe that we have proven that the International Court of Justice has no jurisdiction over the matter because all decisions made under its jurisdiction are final. Furthermore, we argue that even if the Court decides it has jurisdiction, we believe we have presented enough factual evidence to withhold the initial verdict.

The court has already used its time and resources to the Lockerbie case and should not to need another time.

Respectfully Submitted,

Agent of the People of United Kingdom,

State of United Kingdom

Works cited by the memorials or judgments:

Andrews, D.R. (2004). A Thorn on the Tulip – A Scottish Trial in the Netherlands: The Story Behind the Lockerbie Trial. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 36, no. 2/3, 307–318. British Library Document Supply Centre inside Serials & Conference Proceedings, EBSCOhost.

Article 4. International Court of Justice, Rules of the Court. (http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=3&p3=0)

Article 60. International Court of Justice, Rules of the Court. (‘http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0.)

Black, R. (2004). Lockerbie: A Satisfactory Process But A Flawed Result. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 36, no. 2/3: 443–451. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost. Counter-Memorial for the United Kingdom. International Court of Justice, ‘Case Concerning Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie. (http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/88/13633.pdf).

Emerson, S. (2004). The Lockerbie Terrorist Attack And Libya: A Retrospective Analysis. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 36, no. 2/3, 487–490. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost.

Miller, D. (2011). Who Knows About This? Western Policy towards Iran: The Lockerbie Case. Defence & Security Analysis 27, no. 4, 295–309. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost.

Ushynskyi, S. (2009). Pan Am Flight 103 Investigation And Lessons Learned. Aviation (1648–7788) 13, no. 3, 78–86. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed 24 September 2013).

Memorandum of Financial and Economic Policies

Argentina’s history is full of economic and political instability. In the beginning of the 1990s Argentina entered a period of drastic change and reform. There were major structural changes in tax policies, privatisation, trade liberalisation, and monetary policy. These changes brought about a period of prosperity for Argentina, including low inflation and low interest rates. This reform attracted much foreign investment, and spurred economic growth. However, in this period government spending was much higher than its revenue, and this was financed through accumulating massive foreign debt (CRS 20030605).

As debt accumulated, foreign investors lost confidence in Argentina’s economy, resulting in massive out flows of capital. Argentina’s consumers soon followed suit, and begun withdrawing large sums of money. This situation escalated into the crisis of 2001. In December of that year, Argentina defaulted on its foreign debt, the largest default in history. The economy bottomed out in 2002, leaving 60% of the population living under the poverty line (CIA, 2012). Riots and violent clashes with police ensued, and at least 25 people were killed. It was a common job for people to rummage through trash bins looking for cardboard which could then be sold to recycling companies. These people would make roughly $15 US a week (CNN, 2012). In this period unemployment soared to 23% (BBC, 2012). Argentina’s economy began to recover by 2003. Since then GDP has risen at an average of 8.8% annually. Investment has raised an average of 25% annually, and unemployment has dropped to 7.7%. The country has managed to run budget surpluses enabling it to pay off its debt (IMF, 2012).

All in all, Argentina’s economy was well on its way to recovery prior to the financial crisis in the United States of this year. Since the financial crisis in the United States the Argentine peso has begun a downward slide. It has now hit a six year low. The central bank tried selling large amounts of dollars for pesos in an attempt to stop the downward slide, in fear of another crisis like that at the turn century (Bloomberg, 2012). The government has also made plans to nationalise the country’s 10 private pension funds. In doing so they hope to acquire the money needed to meet financing needs. The intent is that the nationalisation will make people more willing to own Argentine bonds than they were in the past, and this in turn should slow the fall of the value of the peso, and possibly start bringing it back up. If there is no outside help there is a threat that Argentina could default on its sovereign debt. If loans are made to Argentina now, it is possible to avert the imminent crisis, and continue with growth as it has been since 2003. Should this be the case, Argentina would continue to run surpluses allowing repayment of its sovereign debt as well as the debt that will be owed to the Fund.

Letter of Intent

Tuesday, November 3, 2008

Dominique Strauss-Kahn,

Managing Director

International Monetary Fund

The Government of Argentina is requesting a loan from the International Monetary Fund of 3.2 billion dollars, with the hope that we will be paid half (1.6 billion) immediately, and the other half in two separate payments, 800 million after 6 months, and again after a year. It should be noted that our country is not in immediate despair as it was in 2001, as Argentina’s economy has been on a strong and steady growth for the last five years. But the rapid shifting of the US dollar in recent months has had drastic effects upon the economy, causing the market to dip by up to 12% in October. The exchange-rate value of the Argentine peso has also dropped rapidly, to its lowest value in six years, which may be the precursor to an economic upheaval that would place us in another depression. By receiving a large sum of money immediately, we wish to repurchase a great deal of our own national currency, driving its value back up. Along with this, we plan to use part of the loan in an effort to nationalise Argentina’s 10 private pension plans, acquiring enough money to begin paying back our debt to the IMF immediately. By nationalizing these pension plans, Argentines will be more likely to invest in them, driving the value of the peso back up as well.

With the loan of 3.2 billion, we are requesting a payment plan extending over the next three years with an interest rate of 2.99%, with payments to be made to the IMF on a quarterly basis. This would mean that there would be 12 payments of $300 million to be paid each six months over the next three years, the first payment starting six months after the initial loan of $1.6 billion is received. In accordance with our plan, we want to use this loan from the IMF in order to halt the economic downfall we are currently experiencing before it becomes a desperate situation, in which Argentina would be more likely to default on a loan.

A similar situation was decided on by the IMF regarding Honduras, in which the loan was deemed a precautionary measure in order to ‘sustain growth and enrich stability’ (IMF, 2012). In addition, we would request that the loan be relatively free of the conditions or remedies often demanded by the IMF in exchange for loans. The Government of Argentina has experienced unfortunate situations that come with such conditions, such as a severe violation of national sovereignty, violent riots, unstable government, and a shift in public policy that is detrimental to the overall quality of life of Argentina’s citizenry. In the economic downfall of 2001, Argentina was suffering from such a major depression that such changes from external sources like the IMF were necessary, in the end. Argentina has currently been on a steady economic growth and only recently suffered hardship because of the instability of the US dollar. To demand such conditions on the loan is bound to cause civil unrest, as it has in the past, which does not help to stabilise Argentina’s economy and makes a fast, easy repayment of the loan become less and less likely (Rourke, 2001).

It should also be noted that a stronger Argentine government may also have substantial benefits regarding interrelated matters of international importance. Human trafficking and the illegal sex trade have found a place of operation within Argentina, becoming a source, transit and destination for those victims of this horrible affair. While the government has openly declared its intention to wipe out this black market, it is on the local and municipal levels, where officials are very poorly paid and bribes are welcomed, that these acts are being allowed to carry on. By strengthening the economy, and in turn the government, we can make moves to ensure that these officials are either rooted out or forced to change their views and actions regarding such events (CIA, 2012).

Resources:

CRS Report for Congress, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS21072_20030605.pdf

CIA World FactBook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ar.html

CNN website, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/americas/03/26/argentina.train.reut/

BBC Website, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4534786.stm

IMF website, http://www.imf.org/External/AM/2008/imfc/statement/eng/arg.pdf

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aDDu7awY.Vb4

International Politics on the World Stage, Rourke and Boyer, pg. 314–315

STANAG No. _____6_________

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISZATION

STANDARD AGREEMENT

SUBJECT: Interoperability of small arms

Promulgated on: January 24, 2014

By ___Slovakia__________________

STANAG ___6_______

RECORD OF AMENDMENTS

EXPLANATORY NOTES

1. This NATO Standard Agreement (STANAG) is promulgated by Slovakia under the authority vested in him by the North Atlantic Treaty.
2. No departure may be made from the agreement without consultation with the tasking authority. Nations may propose changes at any time to the tasking authority where they will be processed in the same manner as the original agreement.
3. Ratifying nations have agreed that national orders, manuals and instructions implementing this STANAG will include a reference to the STANAG number for purposes of identification.

DEFINITIONS

1. Ratification is ‘In NATO Standard, the fulfilment by which a member nation formally accepts, with or without reservation, the content of a Standard Agreement’ (AAP-6).
2. Implementation is ‘In NATO Standard, the fulfilment by a member nation of its obligations as specified in a Standard Agreement’ (AAP-6). Reservation is ‘In NATO Standardisation, the stated qualification by a member nation that describes the part of a Standardisation Agreement that it will not implement or will implement only with limitations’ (AAP-6).
3. Interoperability means the capacity of the armed forces of member states to use each other’s equipment, as specified by agreement.
4. Small arms mean that the calibre of ordnance used is below 50 mm.

RELATED DOCUMENTS:

Others: ____AAP 6_________________

AIM

The aim of this agreement is to agree on the definition of small arms.

The aim of this agreement is to agree on the definition of interoperability.

The aim of this agreement is to agree on the interoperability of small arms of member states.

AGREEMENT

Participating nations agree to:

1. Work towards interoperability until the agreement comes into force.
2. Achieve interoperability by the deadline set above.
3. Pay for any expenditures out of their own budgets.

DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT

1. Participating nations undertake to achieve interoperability of small arms by the deadline outlines above.
2. Participating nations agree to share information and expertise regarding the achievement of interoperability by the deadline.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

This STANAG will be considered to have been implemented when:

Arms using ordnance below 50 mm in calibre are interoperable by all member states.

Resolution 1787 (2007)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5795th meeting, on 10 December 2007

The Security Council,

Recalling resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, resolution 1456 (2003) of 20 January 2003, resolution 1535 (2004) of 26 March 2004, resolution 1624 (2005) of 14 September 2005, as well as its other resolutions concerning threats to international peace and security caused by terrorism,

Reaffirming that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security, Welcoming the adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, A/60/288, and the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force to ensure overall coordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations,

Reminding States that they must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular, international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law, Commending Member States for their cooperation with the Counter-Terrorism Committee and calling upon all of them to continue to cooperate fully with the Committee,

1. DECIDES to extend the initial period referred to in paragraph 2 of resolution 1535 (2004) until 31 March 2008;
2. REQUESTS the Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution and in consultation with Council members, to recommend such changes as he deems appropriate to the organisational plan referred to in paragraph 4 of resolution 1535 (2004), and to submit them to the Counter-Terrorism Committee for its consideration and endorsement prior to the expiration of the period referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution;
3. DECIDES to remain actively seized of the matter.