CHAPTER 14 |
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On the Relationship between Social Ethics and Environmental Nanotechnology
Janne Nikkinen
Postdoctoral Researcher, Faculty of Theology, University of Helsinki, Finland
Contents
2.2. The Public and the Scientist
3.3. Commercial and Conflicting Interests
3.4. The Precautionary Principle
1. Introduction
During the last decade, billions of dollars have been invested in nanotechnology research. With a $1 trillion impact on the world economy, and the potential to employ two million workers of whom 50% would work in the United States [1], it is understandable that expectations are high for this “revolution” to enhance productivity and provide both public and individual profits. One commentator has noted that “[a]ccording to some of its proponents, nanotechnology will cure cancer and heart disease, reverse pollution, feed the world and provide cheap – even free – consumer goods … it sometimes seems as though there is almost nothing that it [nanotechnology] cannot do [2].” In addition, nanotechnology is said to be have “tremendous potential” for helping the global poor, especially those approximately 2.5 billion people living on less than $2 ppp per day (ppp = purchasing power parity, the long-term equilibrium exchange rate of two currencies to equalize their purchasing power) [3]. The list continues with claims that “[n]anomachines will repair damaged human cells on the molecular level, thus healing injury, curing disease, prolonging life, or perhaps annihilating death altogether [4].” With these and other grandiose promises, it is understandable that the public is anxious to see progress in this field.
There are obstacles, however, that may hinder the expected progress. So far, warnings of threats to public health have not included the hazards caused by nanotechnology. For example, the top 10 public health hazards published by the World Health Organization (WHO) in the World Health Report 2002 consist of being underweight, unsafe sex, high blood pressure, and similar issues, but not nanotechnology [5]. However, in a Global Risk Network Report published in early 2009, nanotechnology risks were included for the first time [6]. After the heated debate on genetically modified (GM) food during the 1990s, the general public views all new technologies with a certain amount of weariness. At best, the reaction to nanotechnology is somewhat mixed, perhaps, in part, because of its great promise and also because the public hopes that nanotechnologies may offer solutions to profound problems.
There are also differences in how the public understands the claims of nanotechnology researchers. Those working in the field may see their task as of one merely communicate empirical research results with education of the public a matter for the media and other interested parties. However, in a subconscious way, there are several quasi-ideological claims that are advanced within the scientific community. These include purely ideological beliefs, as well as the claims that may be true, but so far are without solid evidence. This chapter points out some problem areas in the current discussion, with remarks about furthering the discussion of how to combine ethical aspects with research. I hope thereby to advance discussion of the proper way to interact with the public and show whether there are grounds for further research in this area.
2. GENERAL OVERVIEW
2.1. The Issues
There are many unresolved issues within the scientific community concerning how nanotech research should be understood. The first major issue is the proper definition of nanotechnology. It is practically impossible to find a conference or a meeting with “nanotechnology” in its title, without also finding a discussion about defining the field. There is also the question about the proper identity of those who work with nanotechnologies. Many of these individuals identify themselves as chemists, physicists, or other types of specialists, but not as “nanotechnologists.” Further complicating the matter is that the field of nanotechnology combines researchers from different disciplines, different countries, and different personal ideologies and interests. Whether nanotechnology will radically alter life on earth as we know it or merely improve our daily living is also a matter of some disputes. Furthermore, philosophical disagreement exists over whether chemistry will be totally mechanized or whether molecules are to be controlled [7]. Some researchers have also pointed out that in chemistry, matter has been manipulated on an atomic scale for hundreds of years [8]. Thus, aside from new labels, there is nothing new under the sun.
I will not deal with all these aforementioned issues here, but defining nanotechnology is relevant for an ethical evaluation of nanotechnology. According to Joachim Schummer [9], a definition (or avoiding a clear definition) shapes one’s perception of issues in an ethical sense. Schummer states that the term nanotechnology in itself “does not denote an established research field but is rather a term used by governments to describe their research funding priorities, definitions may be tailored so as to cope with the ethical sensitivities of their publics […].” Furthermore, because nanotechnology has been hailed as the next industrial revolution, “any new technological product associated with nanotechnology may be supposed to bear new kinds of risks and to require new regimes of evaluation” [9]. In addition, to claim that “nanotechnology will be the next industrial revolution” is already a positive socioethical evaluation [10].
The origins of nanotechnology are also important to pin down in this context because they have at least some implicit influence on the identity of those who are considered nanotechnologists or who see themselves as working in this field. In the literature about nanotechnology, there are many references to an ambiguous dinner speech made by physicist Richard Feynman entitled “There Is Plenty of Room at the Bottom” in 1959 as the starting point for the field of nanotechnology. However, as Colin Milburn, Curys Mody, and Ed Regis [4, 11, 12] have noted on different occasions, Feynman apparently obtained at least some of the ideas expressed in his speech from Robert A. Heinlein’s short story Waldo, published in 1942. In that science fiction novella, Heinlein writes about microscopic surgery using microscopic machines. Although Feynman credited Al Hibbs with this idea, it seems that Feynman actually got his inspiration from the science fiction stories of the 1940s. It is certain that a professor from Tokyo Science University, Norio Taniguchi, used the term to describe the precision manufacture of materials with nanometer tolerances, but few would have known about Taniguchi without Eric Drexler’s reference to him in his book Engines of Creation in 1986 [13]. Science and science fiction therefore mix in the history of nanotechnology.
The identity of those working in the field of nanotechnology also relates to other dimensions besides the question of whether nanotechnology can be traced back to Feynman, Taniguchi, or Drexler or its researchers’ occupational titles. The role of nationality is one such dimension. What is in the interest of countries may not be the interest of individuals. In nanotechnology publications, it is often suggested that there is “a competition” in investments between countries or even regions, such as between the United States and the European Union. It is unlikely that many researchers will see the situation as so competitive, partly, because the role of nation-states is diminishing in the current political climate and, partly, because many Europeans do not consider themselves supervisors of the interests of other nations located on the same continent. Those involved in academic research often move from one institution to another based on factors related to the academic working environment, without paying much attention to the true or expected increase in competition that nanotechnology research gives their host countries. Individual profit and personal research interests may have significant roles in such personal decisions than those what governments regard as important.
Furthermore, in the debate about the social and ethical impact of nanotechnology, one hope consistently expressed by scientists has been “educating the public to understand nanotechnology” [10]. Although this may important, it is worth discussing of those challenges that researchers in this field face when interacting with each other in the scientific community, and only then turn the relations with the public. There are only rare occasions when those involved in basic nanotechnology research work engage with the public. There have been some experiments in the field of bionanotechnology or nanomedicine (the molecular-level manipulation of human biosystems), but perhaps less in other sectors in involving the public [14]. The assumption in this context is that with adequate information and accurate reporting, the public will comprehend the issue of nanotechnology and skeptics will eventually be convinced about the benefits of the technologies and their applications developed in this context.
The problem with this approach is that scientific reports produced from the different fields of nanotechnology are generally tedious to read and accessible only to experts working within the same area of research. The media often present research results in a way that is not scientific in nature. Newspapers, radio, and TV stations have to work according to commercial interests, and science education is not their primary concern. They are primarily interested in “breakthroughs,” but real breakthroughs are quite rare in any field of science. The media also have a tendency to focus on colorful personalities and individual researchers (such as Nobel laureates including late Richard Feynman). In the field of nanotechnology, research is often done in teams that may consist of dozens of individuals. For example, microchip design teams often comprise 250–300 individuals [15]. It may not be possible to attribute the merit for a particular innovation to individuals or even small groups.
Besides, in the debate about science and technology, there are relatively few forums in a modern society where experts and laypeople may interact in a fruitful way or get together for meaningful debate. One commentator has even stated:
Contemporary technological discussion is shameful. Leaders who wish to recommend options and sometimes policy call upon the experts. Heavily biased by personal and professional interests, experts craft their messages so they are resistant to most counterclaims. … by using excessively technical vocabulary, their arguments become arguments from authority. … As a result, citizen-consumers are frozen out of depthful discussions involving science and technology, especially those related to decision-making. When an occasional miscreant speaks out, he is derided, labelled, or patronizingly dismissed. Unsurprisingly, when citizen-consumers are involved in science and technology decision-making, it is usually during the post-decision implementation phase [16].
Although this view is rather drastic, it indicates something of the difficulties that modern scientific discussion faces today. Communication between interested parties could at least be enhanced. The discussion about social, legal, and ethical implications of nanotechnology is also quite undefined in scope, further complicating the dialogue. The participants are often even unaware of what the subject entails. For example, nanoethics has been defined as “a shorthand turn of phrase that encompasses the development, study, practice, and enforcement of a set of culturally accepted beliefs, mores, guidelines, standards, regulations, and even laws for governing rapidly advancing nanotechnologies across multiple economic sectors” [9]. This kind of broad definition may be adequate to define the purview of nanoethics, but many commentators have also cast doubt on whether this kind of specific branch of ethics even exists in the first place [17]. In their view, there are no novel questions raised that could not be answered by conventional ethics.
Even if one accepts this viewpoint, however, there are profound reasons to suggest that the implications of nanotechnology will be to raise issues that demand serious ethical attention. The question is more of how to understand the relevance of the issues to one’s own research and work context. Perhaps the most important thing is to have an outsider’s view of the work that is conducted and to understand why some people regard such research not only as beneficial but also potentially dangerous. It is clear that simple creation of material of an artificial kind cannot be the reason for the objections and sometimes the opposition by environmentalists, owing to the fact that synthetic chemists produce approximately 900,000 new chemical substances globally per annum [18].
Here, I follow a somewhat looser definition, in which nanoethics addresses the ethical, social, and policy issues, including legal ones, associated with nanoscience and nanotechnology [19]. Because the domain of ethical discussion in nanotechnology is somewhat fragmented, it is useful to define at least a few of the relevant problem areas. Norbert Jömann and Johann S. Ach have identified the relevant ethical concerns in this context as anthropological, biomedical (i.e., nanomedicine), socioethical, and environmental [20]. Although, as Jömann and Ach also readily admit, this division is not without problems, it indicates how the issues at hand might be classified. Because the focus of this publication is on the environmental aspects of nanotechnology, I will not deal much with the first two categories, although I will use some examples related to molecular biology and nanomedicine to illustrate certain ethical questions relevant to the last two categories.
For example, there is a vast amount of nanoethical literature discussing possible developments (at the moment highly unlikely) that may lead to certain undesirable consequences in the endeavor to enhance human nature. Usually, the concern is related to issues of privacy, such as the loss of personal privacy or the possibility that nanotechnology may lead to an ability to read minds. In neuroethics, the discussion relates to developing methods to tell when someone is lying through neuroimaging, which is a theme that nanotechnology shares with neuroscience [19]. This technological advancement would in turn, according to some doomsday scenarios, lead to authoritarian rule and, in an unforeseen way, enable a police state to be put into place.
Even if we accept that there are consequences to realizing human capacities, it is not plausible that this scenario will ever materialize, owing to the functionality of the brain and other limiting factors. There are profound reasons, therefore, why this approach has been labeled “speculative” nanoethics, and it is not the kind of debate worth analyzing here in detail. The second issue, that is, biomedical research in relation to nanotechnology, is more difficult to combine with environmental and ethical aspects. The sectors of nanomedicine as given by NanoBio-RAISE (a subprogram of the previous 6th Framework Programme Science and Society Co-ordination Action funded by the European Commission) are drug delivery, biomaterials, in-vivo imaging and in-vitro diagnostics, active implants, and therapy. Progress in this field leads to questions of medical ethics, such as whether information stored by implanted devices developed for medical purposes may be given to a employer or to insurance companies.
It should be noted, however, that in most nanotechnologies, the research does not directly affect the environment, so environmental harm, bodily exposure, or other health hazards are not relevant concerns. The case is remarkably different with bionanotechnology or nanomedicine [10]. Since the issues raised in the context of bionanotechnology are often connected to (human) health hazards, it is possible to combine them with a more general discussion dealing with environmental and socio-ethical matters. For example, the medicalization of society is a wide phenomenon that manifests itself in many areas, and it is not caused by research in nanotechnology alone. However, research in bionanotechnology has the ability to expedite this process too, unless ethical attention is drawn to the applications that are launched for consumers and customers.
2.2. The Public and the Scientist
Curiously, scientists worry more about the health risks than does the general public, but such seems to be the case in this context. According to Dietram Scheufele and colleagues, as a research field, nanotechnology may be the first emerging technology for which scientists may have to explain to the public why people should be more concerned rather than less about the potential health and environmental risks involved [21]. The public seems more concerned about issues related to privacy; in one survey, the difference was nearly one of two members of the public (45%) shared such a concern compared with fewer than one-third (30%) of nanoscientists [22]. Studies in general show that most of the members of the general public know little or nothing about nanotechnology. Still, they are confident that its future benefits will outweigh its risks [23]. However, the public is quite concerned that those doing commercial research would not be in position to control the safety of their work. In a survey carried out in 2006, only 12% of US respondents expressed the opinion that companies should be responsible of regulatory safety of nanomaterials. Instead, universities and the government should be in charge of nanomaterial safety. However, most government funding is spent on developing new products instead of on toxicology and other health-related research [24].
Kerstin Schrader-Frechette [24] has noted that there are clear examples of a conflict of interest in this context. In 2000, the independent Science Advisory Board of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) studied all available health and safety research provided by American pesticide manufacturers to see whether they are accurately researched and statistically sound. The conclusion was that all studies conducted with humans were “scientifically invalid.” The basic shortcoming was the use of small sample sizes, from 7 to 50 subjects, when at least 2500 subjects would have been needed for each and every group to draw the conclusions claimed in these studies about the health impacts of the pesticides. According to Kerstin Schrader-Frechette, “[t]hey [i.e., the pesticide studies] were predetermined to generate false-negative conclusions, false conclusions that the pesticides were not harmful. … Because virtually all nanotechnology research is done by those who expect profit from it, mostly chemical companies, there are few grounds for believing that this research, done with a clear conflict of interest, is likely to produce results that are any more reliable than the pesticide studies evaluated by the EPA Science Advisory Board in 2000” [24].
The interface between the public (often taxpayers who in many countries fund the research and also consumers who use the products of private companies doing research in this area) and those who do the research is especially difficult. In an explanation of one survey conducted in the United States in 2005 about the opposition to nanotechnology, those who oppose where characterized as having “strong religious beliefs, lower educational attainment, and a general mistrust of institutions” [25]. This is perhaps not the population group to which most scientists feel a sense of belonging. However, as Ronald Sandler has pointed out in the context of the Woodrow Wilson Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies, even concerns that are not scientific should be taken into account. Sandler states:
Among the fundamental principles of a liberal democratic society such as the United States is that ideas not be excluded from social and political domains on the basis of the worldviews from which they emerge. … That some worldviews are not ‘scientifically informed,’ as commonly understood in science and technology communities, is not justification for their being marginalized in public policy and regulatory discussion, even regarding science and technology [3].
Besides criticism of a religious nature, Schummer has pointed out that there are differences in understanding concepts that have ethical significance, such as human dignity and integrity. Thus, the perceptions of discussion participants have on nanotechnology also differ. For example, developing artificial intelligence and enhancing human brain operations through nanotechnology are considered more problematic in the United States than in Europe, where operational capacities are seen more as instrumental. Privacy concerns are also more prevalent in the United States than in the United Kingdom, where surveillance with cameras in public areas is accepted. Schummer notes, however, that there is a difference between Europeans in this sense; when different continents are compared, more examples of cultural variables may stand out, variables that also influence perceptions of nanotechnology [9]. The difference between the public and experts is that, as social studies have shown, experts in any field tend to express perceived risks in quantitative terms, whereas the public uses terms of a more qualitative nature [26].
It is also uncertain how the public will deal with information expressed in quantitative terms. For example, it is well-known that approximately 50% of tobacco smokers will eventually die as a result of some tobacco-related illness, resulting in a 50% risk of death due to smoking. By comparison, the probability in winning a common form of lottery, a draw of 6/49, may be remarkably low, requiring the purchase of 7-million lottery tickets to have a similar probability of winning a first prize. Nevertheless, most smokers think that they will belong to the 50% who will not be affected by tobacco-related illness, and those buying a lottery ticket imagine that they will win with a single ticket. Thus, the ability of an individual to evaluate personal risks and benefits in the real world is quite limited in scope (I thank Professor Jaana Hallamaa from the University of Helsinki for pointing this out for me). In nanotechnology, as Tsjalling Swierstra and Arie Rip have pointed out, a further problem is that risks and possible harms are in many cases speculative, concerning yet unidentifiable individuals and stakeholders of a collective nature. Therefore, Swierstra and Rip note that “[t]he asymmetry of benefits and harms is almost unavoidable, structures not just argumentation but also action, and has given rise to increasing recognition of the need for early warning” [26]. This need for early warning combined with lack of scientific data regarding emerging technologies and their applications leave much room for speculation and misinterpretation when weighing the possible risks. It is thus necessary to discuss the societal context of health and environmental risks and the overall impact of nanotechnology on society as a whole.
3. ANALYSIS
In terms of the relationship between nanotechnology and environment, societal aspects are by far the widest implications. The environmental impact of those materials and products developed through research in nanotechnology may be divided into positive and negative. A positive evaluation demands that the end product truly assist in making our lives easier and our ecosystems cleaner. If nanotechnology increases pollution and creates health hazards, then risk assessment is usually taken into account. This is an oversimplified description, but one that it is often used. There are consequences both from doing and from not doing something. Thus, the argument goes, developing a specific nanotechnology application is in a sense imperative because it may enhance productivity and serve the greater human good. Or at least, the amount of good it produces should overcome the negative side effects that different technologies may have. At least, the development should create new knowledge, thus advancing science. It seems, however, that bionanotechnology especially creates moral and legal controversies that are not easily solved. They may also serve as a point of comparison of the nature of controversies that all nanotechnologies could be accounted for. Toxicity is a common theme, but there are also certain legal and other perspectives.
3.1. Legal Perspectives
Perhaps the clearest example of the legal issues that nanotechnology raises is the one of patenting. Here, the discussion focuses mostly on the United Kingdom and the United States, with whose practices readers of this book are most familiar. There are notable court cases that deal with patents in the context of GM microorganisms, such as Diamond vs. Shakrabarty (447 US 303 1980, a US Supreme Court case, dealing with the question whether GM microorganisms can be patented at all). It was decided that a live, man-made microorganism is a patentable subject. At the heart of all patent systems (to this day), there is a basic agreement between inventors and governments. However, what was effective in the past may not be effective today. Technologies are changing, the context of technology is different, and, most important, certain technologies are viewed as so fundamental to human existence that governments view those technologies with suspicion or even with distaste (as in the case with cloning, for example).
For these reasons, governments are constantly revising the specifics of the patent system in this field of inquiry. In Europe, governments have concluded that methods of treating living bodies are so fundamental to health that patent applications covering them are often declined. In the United States, the tendency is to move in a direction where patents may be granted. The reasoning is that there is otherwise a danger that research methods might be suppressed and concealed by inventors if they are not rewarded for their disclosure. This is also the reasoning behind the practice of some countries to refuse patents for organisms created in laboratory, whereas other countries have taken the opposite stance. The case of the OncoMouse (or the Harvard mouse), the mouse that was genetically modified by researchers Philip Leder and Timothy Stewart at Harvard Medical School in the early 1980s, was a watershed in the debate over whether it is possible to patent animals or animal variations. It is worthwhile asking, as Patrick M. Boucher [27] has, whether society “is better off,” after few decades of this legal permission, “by having allowed Philip Leder to patent the oncomouse.” To certain extent, the answer is yes (although actually the patent belongs to Harvard College). The OncoMouse enabled researchers to acquire a better understanding of cancer without having to gather data from years or even decades of human suffering. What might be a moral issue here is the suffering caused to the transgenic animal. From a legal perspective, the basic idea of patenting is not to assure the inventor of an unfettered right to produce, market and sell the invention, in the official parlance, and the right to practice the innovation [27].
Although the general public often has the commercial view, such a view is mistaken. What the patent rights grant is the ability to prevent others from engaging in these same activities, and thus, patenting an organic matter is a highly problematic issue for a society. In addition, there is a question of who has the moral right to pursue this kind of research. The scope of nanotechnology in which matter is transformed into living creatures poses a different problem from ordinary human enhancement, namely, whether it is morally right to produce creatures that do not inherently belong to the human species but are a mixture of human, animal, or machine (or a mix of all the aforementioned three) that do not exist in the current ecosystem. Leaving this decision to the self-regulation of researchers may be questionable ethically because not all are willing to accept limitations on their work. In addition, in the competition for research grants and funding, extraordinary claims and controversial research may sometimes be advantageous. There are almost no self-imposed limits on when a researcher of nanotechnology (or any other researcher) would give up his research.
To present a concrete example from this kind of pursuit of research in morally questionable areas, in the United Kingdom, there is a Chair of Professor of Cybernetics, located in the University of Reading in South East England. The current holder of the chair carries out research in artificial intelligence, control, robotics, and biomedical engineering. He also claims to be “the world’s first human cyborg (an organism that has both natural and artificial systems),” owing to several chips and other implants that he has (and his wife also has had at his insistence). Without judging whether the professor in question is truly the cyborg he claims to be, I would like to mention one interesting experiment he has been conducting: an experiment with brain cells dissolved from the brain of a fetal rat. The free-floating brain cells (or neurons) are transferred into an electroderinged Petri dish. The cells quickly re-associate with each other and begin randomly sending out electrical signals. The justification is that this kind of research has implications for certain neurodegenerative diseases. It may also assist in the creation of neural interfaces, thus assisting the severely impaired in improved communication.
In the long run, however, this kind of research may also develop hybrid life forms, especially if human stem cell research acquired from human embryos is permitted. There have been applications for research funding in the United Kingdom that raise this possibility, but so far research with human embryonic stem cells has not been permitted. However, after public consultation, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority permitted research on cytoplasmic hybrids (a type of research in which human DNA is inserted into animal eggs). Other chimera research has so far not been authorized [28]. Other European nations have taken a mixed approach to such research. In Switzerland, the law recognizes that an aborted fetus may still be alive at the time of tissue removal and acknowledges the difficulties that may arise when the status of the fetus is reduced to a supplier of raw material for research purposes [29]. In the Netherlands, a remarkable proportion of the population opposes the creation of embryos solely for research purposes. However, although this practice is prohibited by Section 24 of the Dutch Embryo Act, Section 33.2 states that the prohibition will be assessed every five years to determinate whether the moral attitude of population has changed [26].
With this kind of variation in legislation, the question of whether to allow human stem cells to be used in any kind of research in which hybrid life forms may be created advisedly cannot be adequately answered. One might, however, reflect a question of what could be regarded as a possible harm. If stem cell research using cells obtained from human embryos is permitted, then it is difficult to determine exactly when the possible harm takes place. Such research is grounded in advancing the human good in the sense that those suffering from devastating diseases might be helped, and sensible persons would not object to that. Creation of hybrid life forms or even nanomachines, including human nuclei, would not then be problematic at all.
Even if such an approach were to be accepted, it would still remain uncertain what exactly creates a nanomachine. Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent has noted that “[a]lthough biologists generally agree that living systems are the product of evolution rather than of design, they describe them as devices designed for specific tasks [30].” Living cell is a minifactory, “full with numerous bionanomachines in action [30].” According to Bensaude-Vincent, the machine has become an all-pervading metaphor, not only in biology but also in chemistry and materials science. In this view, it is easy to understand why those developing hybrid life forms from living matter and machines understand their work as advancing the process of evolution. The idea is that advancement will benefit all mankind and provide a greater good for everyone. There is the question, however, of what constitutes a beneficial increase in the good of a modern society. Something that increases the individual happiness of one person may not have the same effect on another. There is a broad consensus that hunger and sickness are social ills that should be addressed by responsible societies. Nanotechnology is often combined with the aspirations to reduce hunger and improve the economic situation in developing countries [26]. In a similar way, examining risk-free organic matter detached from the human body is presented as straightforward research.
3.2. The Definition of Harm
The wider issue relevant to our discussion here would be more of what constitutes harm in the context of research in nanotechnology. Is there a line across which research in this field becomes morally blameworthy? One might question whether combining the organic matter with synthetic one has always, of necessity, only positive results. Are the life forms that are created from human stem cells still machines that can be destroyed at will? If these life forms develop higher functions, should they be assigned legal rights and protection? What if they develop to a stage in which they express their own desires and wishes? There have been predictions that by 2050, it might be possible to develop a robot that could be very human-like. Robots might be able even to marry humans, or so artificial intelligence researcher David Levy at the University of Maastricht in the Netherlands stated in an interview with LiveScience on 12 October, 2007 (Levy has also predicted that the state of Massachusetts in the United States will be the first jurisdiction to legalize marriage with robots, given its liberal approach to other similar issues) [31].
It is understandable that researchers in molecular biology or in materials science would not readily accept limitations on their work. If the main objective of nanotechnology is to create applications and solutions that accomplish future tasks better than with conventional machines, then one would have to accept the idea that research should be as unregulated as possible. The underlying ideology is that knowledge is good for its own sake, even though there might be risk involved in using the knowledge acquired. Certain inventions thus become inevitable, most notoriously, nuclear weapons (although nuclear technology has its peacetime applications as well). It is widely accepted that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction are contrary to the good of mankind. Nevertheless, many people would be reluctant to blame those involved in research and development of such weaponry. Blame would bring into question the freedom of scientific inquiry and the role of science in conducting wars. The Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies (ISN) at MIT has the mission of increasing the survivability of the US soldiers, with no mention of decreasing the capability of those on the opposing side to survive. In fact, the public mission statement of the ISN is to investigate “how technology can make soldiers less vulnerable to enemy and environmental threats” [32].
Naturally, many other fields of science serve the interests of the military: nanotechnology alone cannot be blamed for this. For example, Richard Feynman, represented as an initiator of nanotechnology research, was involved in the Manhattan Project in the early stages of his career. Later, for moral reasons, he moved into genetics, along with several other colleagues. There are possible environmental pollutions and health hazards that may result from military uses of nanotechnology, but the Military interest is currently focused on those who use the applications and their immediate surroundings. If, for example, nanomaterials used in future uniforms were to disseminate nanoparticles, then the channels of exposure are quite foreseeable. However, it is a different thing to evaluate whether weapons developed in the future with the assistance of nanotechnology have a different ecological impact than earlier weapons. For example, during the Vietnam War, the goal of the so-called Agent Orange campaign was the destruction of the mangrove forests and the long-term poisoning of the soil and crops. This kind of warfare could be enhanced with nanotechnology and lead to increased environmental pollution. Although the political climate does not support the use of nanotechnology in such manner, in western democratic nations, there may be other regimes in the world that have an interest in developing this kind of weaponry. There have been calls for a moratorium on developing independently active micronanosystems for future battlefields [33, 26].
Even though there may not be any major military involvement in this area of research, it may justifiably be asked whether nanotechnology has the capability to advance the good of mankind on a global scale. There is a strong possibility that nanotechnology will, at least in the short term, benefit those who have assets and are already in a privileged position. It is also noteworthy that possibly toxic substances that are banned in western countries are recommended for use in developing countries. The use of dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) is regulated by an international agreement known as the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, but in 2006, the WHO decided to back away from its position of three decades and recommend the use of DDT to prevent malaria, a recommendation based on lack of other cost-effective insecticides [34]. Naturally, the WHO simultaneously urged the need to develop effective insecticide alternatives. But since the problem is mainly in Third World countries, it remains to be seen whether the response to calls by the WHO is as effective as when the lives of citizens in western countries are at risk.
These specific examples do not, however, give a clear answer on what exactly is ethically problematic in nanotechnology research in relation to environmental nanotechnology, so closer scrutiny is needed. In the context of the relationship between nanotechnology and the environment, it seems that ethical issues are not specific to case of environmental nanotechnology. The issues are more general ones, relating to all research on emerging technologies. This is visible in one of the most influential documents in this regard was a publication by the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering in the United Kingdom, which concluded among other things that “most nanotechnologies pose no new risks, but highlight uncertainties about the potential effects on human health and the environment of manufactured ‘nanoparticles’ and ‘nanotubes’ if they are released” [35, 36]. The only difference that nanotechnology makes in this context is that with the change in size, nanoparticles have novel properties in the physical or chemical sense. These changes occur in relation to such things as electrical conductivity, magnetism, or catalysis, among others. The positive or negative effects that altered properties have on humans or animals or the whole ecosystem are a matter for some discussion [37].
On the one hand, to associate ethical issues in relation to environment only with this domain is clearly too narrow a viewpoint. Ethical debate about nanotechnology cannot be something that risk analysis or safety research is capable of doing by the steps of hazard identification, exposure, or dose-response assessment and risk characterization. On the other hand, science does not occur in a vacuum, as implied when the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) in the United States expression “societal and ethical implications” of nanotechnology is used. Bruce Lewenstein has pointed out that a perspective in which science and technology come first and “implications” to follow is not plausible perspective if the history of science is taken into account [38].
There are, however, certain ethically relevant issues in nanotechnology that are common to all scientific inquiry and which may culminate in this kind of high-profile branch of inquiry such as nanotechnology, with high public expectations. The political and economic consequences of possible breakthroughs create an atmosphere that adds challenges to nanoscience and to development of sustainable technologies. In particular, the interface between the general public, their values, and scientific community is important to guarantee interaction. This interface is also the place where moral and ethical values contrast and may affect decision making. In this area, special attention should be paid to research ethics so that the information that the public obtains is as accurate as possible. There have been widely publicized issues of misconduct in research that may create suspicion about any new field of technology.
3.3. Commercial and Conflicting Interests
The research results are increasingly used for commercial purposes, instead of dissemination of ideas, or they are presented in a manner that serves certain research agenda. As an example of the former, Bruce Lewenstein has pointed to the US Bayh-Doyle Act (or the University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, as it is also called) from the year 1980, which was intended to motivate the US universities to make patent applications on the basis of their research. Studies of the effect of the Bayh-Doyle Act have noted that there have been some regrettable consequences for research. Nanotechnology has the ability to create intellectual property deemed valuable in modern society, and its free dissemination for general public is not as interesting as it used to be for many of those operating in the area of research. According to Lewenstein, the negative consequences of the Bayh-Doyle Act include “restricted dissemination of faculty research, delays in publication, deleted information, and – most ominous to those who believe academic research should be ‘pure’ in its motivations – a change in direction of faculty research toward projects with commercial potential [38].”
As an example of the latter, Joseph Pitt [39] has noted that the pictures taken with one of the iconic tools of nanotechnology, namely the scanning tunneling (electronic) microscope (STM), are actually not images in the sense that they are portrayed. The invention of STM is considered an important step in the emergence of nanotechnology, and the letters “IBM” formed by IBM fellow Don Eigler in 1989 by positioning 35 xenon atoms on a surface is perhaps one of the most well-known images of nanotechnology research. Still, according to Pitt, most of the STM images are more of “imaginings.” In many cases, STM images are presented and interpreted in a way that supports the overall paradigm of nanotechnology to show the simple world that exists “in the bottom.” It is difficult to say that something occurs at the nanolevel and those images taken with STM show that something accurately. In fact, we do not know when the occurrences exactly take place in the molecular level, and thus, in most cases, it is impossible to present the pictures for general public as representative.
Even the pictures shown at scientific conferences are constructed with the assistance of a computer, enhanced with colors, and manipulated in other ways. In addition, scanning probe microscopics as a whole are known for their vulnerability to error and are dependent on accurate interpretation of the results [40]. For this reason, there is a line on one side of which it could be claimed that STM images describe reality and, on the other side of the images, serve the purposes of those advancing their own viewpoints. Furthermore, Jochen Henning has examined changes in the design of scanning tunneling microscopic images from 1980 to 1990; he notes that “[i]n their daily experiments, tunnelling microscopists deal with numerous images … it is also part of their daily practice to design these images in such a way that they conform to conventional expectations and nanotechnological utopias. … The status of the tunnelling microscope as one of the central instruments in nanotechnology rests on its areas of application and technical possibilities, but also in the power and effect of its images and an image design that emerged out of a dynamic process during the 1980s” [41].
It is understandable that in the area in which commercial interests are high, violations of research ethics violations and other types of misdemeanors increase. Although Pitt or Hennig do not claim that the tendency to present STM images in a certain way constitute any kind of serious transgression, it should be noted that the information the public has about science is limited. Therefore, extra attention should be paid in communicating the research results in such way that they are explained as accurately as possible for laypeople. If the interpretation of scientific results is left to journalists, even those working for the science magazines, then there is a strong possibility that scientific and technical information will not be accurately understood. There is also a tendency in the scientific community to claim credit for discoveries of a positive nature, including those that are widely seen as advancing the common good, and to avoid responsibility for the negative cases. Jerome Ravetz has noted that “[s]cience takes credit for penicillin, while society takes the blame for the [atomic] Bomb [42, 8].” Thus any manipulation of STM images should be done in a way that does not leave room for misunderstanding when the research described in pictures is evaluated.
3.4. The Precautionary Principle
One of the key principles of environmental law and its application to nanotechnology is thought to be the precautionary principle. There are many references to this principle and its moral and political significances. Originally, it emerged in Germany in the 1970s. One of its well-known formulations is the Principle 15 Rio Declaration from the year 1992, which stated that “[i]n order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation” [43]. The use of the precautionary principle, however, has been quite limited, mostly on certain types of cost-benefit analyses [44]. There is an application of the precautionary principle in French legislation. The French Barnier law, accepted in 1995 and named for the then – Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries, Michel Barnier, lists certain axiomatic principles for environmental jurisprudence in France. It states inter alia that “[t]he absence of certainties, given the current state of scientific and technological knowledge, must not delay the adoption of effective and proportionate preventive measures aimed at forestalling a risk of grave and irreversible damage to the environment at an economically calculable cost” [8].
Philosophically, this application of the precautionary principle to legislation is weakly grounded, especially in relation to the conceptual footing of the notion of “precaution,” as shown by Jean-Pierre Dupuy and Alexei Grinham, who write:
When the precautionary principle states that the ‘absence of certainties, given the current state of scientific and technical knowledge, must not delay etc.,’ it is clear that it places itself from the outset within the framework of epistemic uncertainty. The assumption is that we know that we are in a situation of uncertainty. It is an axiom of epistemic logic that if I do not know P, then I know that I do not know P. Yet, as soon as we depart from this framework, we must entertain the possibility that we do not know that we do not know something. In cases where uncertainty is such that it entails that uncertainty itself is uncertain, it is impossible to know whether or not the conditions for application of the precautionary principle have been met. If we apply the principle to itself, it will invalidate itself before our eyes [8].
It could be argued that, in specific cases, the precautionary principle has a certain practical value. The principle has been studied by Thomas Faunce and his colleagues, who have explored the principle in an Australian context, evaluating how health hazards of engineered nanoparticles in sunscreens containing titanium dioxide (TiO2) and zinc oxide (ZnO) have been addressed. In 2006, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) addressed the risks caused to humans and the environment with regard to different consumer products, such as sunscreens. After this, Faunce and his colleagues in Australia specifically evaluated whether the precautionary principle was utilized by the Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) regarding the permission to approve marketing of the sunscreens. The specific problem of the precautionary principle is that it is extremely difficult to assess what level of risk is acceptable. The principle is ambiguous, allowing random application and possibly preventing research and development that might be useful in alleviating the environmental harm it causes. Furthermore, Faunce and his coauthors note that “the precautionary principle, on any rational analysis, does not express some incontrovertible, monolithic regulatory truth, but rather sets framework within which precautionary measures practicably may be taken” [45].
In their conclusion, the authors note that assessing the legal framework with the precautionary principle presents challenges. It is practically impossible to evaluate what measures exist for legislators that could be based on the precautionary principle. In the case of introducing sunscreens with engineered nanoparticles to the consumer market, the alternatives are limited. It would be possible to introduce a total ban on the use of engineered nanoparticles or to introduce a requirement that engineered nanoparticles are considered new ingredients when sunscreens are evaluated. A third option would be to introduce labels that inform consumers to notice that engineered nanoparticles were used to develop the sunscreen. Finally, it would be possible to have a sort of panel or other bureaucratic institution to follow the marketing and sales of sunscreens that contain engineered nanoparticles, such as TiO2 and ZnO. However, none of these options could be considered very meaningful, according to Faunce and his coauthors. Thus, the precautionary principle lacks usability and is too vague for the purposes for which it was intended [45].
As to whether TiO2 is dangerous to human health, mixed results have been reported in the literature. In Nanotechnology: Health and Enviromental Risks, Jo Anne Shatkin concludes that “[t]he available data do not appear to be sufficient at present to derive quantitative hazard assessment for nano-TiO2 or for nanomaterials in general” [46]. Similarly, Deb Bennett-Woods notes in Nanotechnology: Ethics and Society that “… sunscreens using nanoparticles of titanium dioxide have been on the market for some time and there is evidence that particles cannot penetrate otherwise healthy skin to a depth that would allow absorption into the body” [25]. Nevertheless, both authors state the need for further research in this area. The problem with sunscreens is that they are not always used in ideal conditions, and taking this factor into account would affect the results of toxicity studies. For example, the users are not limited to healthy individuals, and sunscreens are often used on abnormal skin. In addition, Thomas Faunce and his colleagues note that when there is a lack of data, as well as evidence that is contradictory, there is a danger that the precautionary principle becomes only “a formula for doing nothing” [45]. Thus, from the perspective of environmental hazards and nanotechnology, there is strong need to develop other conceptual tools to assist in risk assessment and ethical evaluation in regulating the research and development of new consumer applications. With a different approach, say Faunce and his colleagues, TGA’s decision that those sunscreens including engineered nanoparticles such as TiO2 and ZnO do not require new testing because they are considered the equivalents of their counterparts might have had different results [45].
4. CONCLUSIONS
The discussion of social, ethical, and legal aspects of nanotechnology is a broad one, and it is not possible to deal with all the relevant issues in one article. For purposes of the present volume, however, I hope that I have shed some light on those issues that are currently among most debated. The difficulty of analyzing ethical discussions is that many nanoethics publications quote each other and are, therefore, repetitious. After proposals from the Human Genome Project (a 13-year project completed in 2003), one of was the suggestion by James Watson that 3–5% of research funds be devoted to research on socioethical aspects, it was perhaps understandable that those participating to involved in nanotechnology research would readily accept the idea that serious attention should also be paid to ethical concerns. Those in charge of steering the NNI in the United States have been especially vocal in their support of research into ethical questions with investigations of a more technical nature. In the NNI framework, close to 3% of funds have been allocated for ethical research.
With these things in mind, it may be that the demand for publications in nanoethics may have exceeded the capacity of researchers to produce new and relevant research results. Many publications that deal with ethical aspects include material that started as conference proceedings or has been published elsewhere. There is nothing inherently wrong with reprints of quality material, but it is difficult to advance scientific debate or to come up with new ideas if same publications are constantly being republished in various formats. Part of the difficulty might be the limited number of researchers working in this area but the situation also suggests that funding may be temporary or combined with some specific nanotechnology project that has ethical research attached. What are needed in this context are long-term research projects that could accumulate over the years and a widening of perspectives from an evaluation of NNI to international comparisons. This would enable clarification of what is already known and show where the attention should be aimed in future research.
There is a strong need to analyze and explicate the ideological content, which is often implicit, in nanotechnology research. The phrase “ideological content” refers to viewpoints and assumptions expressed in the debate about nanotechnology. These views may be widespread and accepted by researchers, even though the views lack support in the realm of science. From time to time, there are references to several problematic and scientifically largely unproven notions, such as visions of what nanotechnology could do in the future. For example, eliminating suffering and death might be laudable aims in any field of science, but these are not very likely scenarios in the real world.
When there is the possibility of science fiction scenarios, the best cure is to clarify what is actually known and what claims may be true, but still lack solid research evidence. It is understandable that in funding applications, a researcher has to have a positive view of the likely outcomes. It is another thing to write for publications of a scientific nature that require accurate research reports. Having many ideas for an application is not the same thing as producing safe and tested real-world solutions. Furthermore, it is known that negative research results (i.e., those that do not produce any significant or positive results) are in many cases published only after a delay or are not published at all. In addition (with a reference to pesticide studies) it seems that more attention should be paid to the statistical validity of research.
Nevertheless, the situation reflects a wider problem in current academic research, creating bias and complicating systematic reviews. Systematic analysis of the current status of nanotechnology research by evaluating all available data and information is fundamental to avoid mistaken conceptions and perhaps erroneous research priorities. Furthermore, the precautionary principle seems to continue its existence as a useful concept, at least on the basis of the frequency with which it is mentioned, but its shortcomings are now well documented. As the case study from Australia demonstrated, the precautionary principle is quite insufficient to guide environmental law and regulation of nanotechnology. There is a clear need for developing better tools and concepts to cope with the challenges that nanotechnology research creates.
Acknowledgment
This work has been supported by a grant from the Ella and Georg Ehrnrooth Foundation (Finland).
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