6.2.1 The Evil Other

In the days and weeks after 9/11, George W. Bush enduringly referred to the enemy as ‘evil’ and strongly engaged in “(e)vilification” (Lazar/Lazar 2004). By demonizing the ‘other’, he constituted it as “absolutely-not-self” (Abdel-Nour 2004). In Bush’s framing, the terrorists “represent evil” (Bush 2001/09/17b); they are “flat evil,” and “all they can think about, is evil” (Bush 2001/09/25). They were “so evil and so dark and so negative” (Bush 2001/10/24) that they verified “that evil is real” (Bush 2001/10/08). Consequently, in speeches and statements, Bush addressed the terrorists as “evil ones” (Bush 2001/10/09, 2001/10/10, 2001/10/17a, 2001/10/17b, 2001/10/23, 2001/10/26, 2001/10/29, 2001/11/21, 2001/11/29, 2001/12/04, 2002/01/14) and “evil-doers”92 (Bush 2001/09/16, 2001/09/17a, 2001/09/19b, 2001/09/25, 2001/09/26a, 2001/09/27, 2001/10/04, 2001/10/08, 2001/10/09, 2001/10/10, 2001/10/11a, 2001/10/17a, 2001/10/17b, 2001/10/23, 2001/10/24). The ‘other’ was understood as the personification of evil or at least as the “willing servant” of evil (Bush 2001/10/11a, cf. 2001/10/17b). In Bush’s narrative, the terrorists were stripped of their humanity, of all history and values and even of religious motives (see section 6.2.4). The driving force that was left constituted “a cult of evil” (Bush 2001/10/11a). It is obvious that Bush treated evil as “an innate human characteristic that was a cause rather than an effect” (Bostdorff 2003: 303). This meant that it was unnecessary to consider the circumstances or conditions that might have led the terrorists to conduct acts of evil, because, put simply, these individuals were evil.

In general, the American people are familiar with this kind of ‘evil talk’. What has been discussed with regard to Bush’s use of ‘freedom’ is also true for ‘evil’: the term is commonly used by the White House to vindicate certain policies. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the range and frequency with which Bush employed it surpassed that of all other U.S. presidents from the recent past (Bostdorff 2003: 303; Singer 2004: 2). Since the dualism of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ had been used in the United States during previous wars, it is easy for American presidents to revive it. Doing so places people who oppose ‘evil’ on the good side of history, if not on God’s side. As mentioned earlier, ‘evil’ invokes strong religious connotations. The dichotomy of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’ has a theological origin and stems from a deeply rooted Christian-religious discourse. However, in Bush’s case, the ideograph of ‘evil’ was not only powerful to distance the ‘self’ from the ‘other’, but was also helpful in addressing an enemy that was neither a particular state nor a regime and thus difficult to grasp. The term ‘evil’ simply worked to homogenize a largely unspecified out-group. In order to stress the extent of the enemy’s evilness and the tremendous gap between ‘us’ and ‘them’, Bush remarked that Americans “cannot fully understand the designs and power of evil” (Bush 2001/10/11a) and that it was hard to imagine how evil these people were (Bush 2001/10/23, cf. 2001/10/25). In contrast to the loving and caring character of the American people, the evil-doers were “motivated by hate” (Bush 2001/10/17b) and “defined by their hatred” (Bush 2001/12/11). Overall, Bush emphasized that the United States was “facing a new kind of enemy” (Bush 2001/09/16, cf. 2001/09/12c, 2001/09/17a, 2001/09/27) and thereby “a new kind of evil” (Bush 2001/09/16). He constructed the struggle as representing a new dimension in which the United States faced a new degree of combined evilness and determination, one that “we’ve never seen […] before” (Bush 2001/09/16). In this framing, the terrorists’ ambition was said to be total: they aimed to “kill all Americans, kill all Jews, and kill all Christians” (Bush 2001/11/08). By using this hyperbole Bush clearly dramatized the situation – as grave as it was – and escalated the threat scenario.

6.2.2 The Barbaric Other

In Bush’s framing, the ‘other’ was the epitome of barbarism. In conjunction with attempts to demonize the enemy, Bush also stripped it of its civilization. Although the enemy was human, it represented “the very worst of human nature” (Bush 2001/09/11b). The terrorists were merciless “killers” (Bush 2002/01/28, cf. 2002/02/21, 2002/03/08, 2002/03/15, 2002/03/30b, 2002/04/17), and “barbaric” (Bush 2001/09/16, 2001/09/17a, 2001/10/07). Bush pointed to the terrorists’ “cult of evil” that “thrives on human suffering,” and reasoned that “theirs is the worst kind of cruelty, the cruelty that is fed, not weakened, by tears” (Bush 2001/10/11a). This cruelty was also displayed by tactics: “Our enemy prefers to attack the helpless” (Bush 2001/10/13) and “preys on […] unsuspecting people” (Bush 2001/09/12c). In sum, the terrorists were constituted as unimaginably ruthless, and as showing “no respect for human life” (Bush 2001/11/19b) or “human rights” (Bush 2001/12/09) as they had “no conscience,” “no mercy” (Bush 2001/11/21), and “recognize no barrier of morality” (Bush 2001/10/26). Whereas America valued life, the terrorists “celebrate death, making a mission of murder and a sacrament of suicide” (Bush 2001/12/07, cf. 2002/01/29). This is another strong example of the power of Bush’s rhetoric and the extent to which he used and combined rhetorical devices. ‘Mission of murder’ and ‘sacrament of suicide’ are not only alliterations but strong metaphors expressed in religious terms. ‘Mission’ and ‘sacrament’ usually denote something holy, but the enemy had now turned these into the very opposite. These metaphors were yet another means of presenting America’s cause as just. As Robert Ivie (1990b: 119) asserts, “Americans traditionally have exonerated themselves of any guilt for war, hot or cold, by decivilizing the image of their adversaries.”

Again, in this narrative, the ‘other’ is all that the ‘self’ is not; the barbaric enemy is the total opposite of the American ‘self’ that Bush constructed. This fundamental dualism was termed as the “great divide […] between civilization and barbarism” (Bush 2001/12/07). Bush’s demand to “stand with the civilized world, or stand with the terrorists” (Bush 2001/10/06) made it unmistakable how the terrorists should be interpreted. The terrorists had attacked “civilization itself” (Bush 2001/12/09), and they made “war against civilization” (Bush 2002/09/11). Through their being and bearing they had “divorced themselves from the values that define civilization” (Bush 2001/10/20). They were unmasked by their actions since they “murder innocent people for the sake of murder” (Bush 2002/02/16). The attacks of 9/11, Bush pointed out, had shown the “true nature” of the terrorists: “they kill thousands of innocent people and then rejoice about it. They kill fellow Muslims […] and then they gloat” (Bush 2001/11/06, cf. 2001/11/08, 2002/01/29, 2002/03/11). These “murderers” (Bush 2001/09/20) killed all victims, “including Muslims […] with equal indifference and equal satisfaction” (Bush 2001/11/10b) and afterwards “they laugh about the loss of innocent life” (Bush 2002/01/29). The fact that Muslims were also mentioned here, constructed the ‘other’ as belonging to this same group, but as having betrayed Muslims and Islam. It made the enemy appear even more down-and-dirty, as it was even ready to turn against its own – and this helped Bush argue that Muslims in general would side with the United States (see section 6.2.4).

As discussed before, ‘othering’ leads to a homogenization of the out-group. There were instances, though, where Bush sought to differentiate between the leader and other members of the group in order to picture the leadership as even more barbaric. This led him to present terrorist leaders as inhumane strategists who exploited their own people. They were prepared to send other people to die, whereas they would “run into caves to save their own hides” (Bush 2001/12/07, cf. 2002/01/14, 2002/01/25, 2002/02/16). More sharply, Bush stated that terrorist leaders “send other people’s children” on suicide missions to sacrifice these children’s lives while “running for their own” (Bush 2002/01/29). This wording further aggravated the impression of the leaders’ dastardly behavior. In March 2002, while resolutely arguing in favor of the military mission in Afghanistan, Bush resorted to sarcasm to demonstrate the ‘other’s’ cowardice and depravity: “You know, they have got these leaders that are so bold that they are willing to send youngsters to their suicide while they try to hide in deep caves” (Bush 2002/03/15, cf. 2001/12/07, 2002/03/08). In addition to the enemy’s evilness, its other main characteristics were barbarism and cowardice. Immediately after the attacks of 9/11, Bush called the terrorists “faceless cowards” (Bush 2001/09/12a). This tied in with both the depersonalization of the enemy and the images of terrorists hiding and operating in the dark (Bush 2001/09/20, cf. 2001/09/27). Hence, this statement underscored the ‘other’s’ furtiveness and its bestial characteristics (see section 6.2.5).

6.2.3 The Fanatic Other

Bush ascribed a further feature to the enemy: the ruthless ‘other’ was also unreckonable. In line with this, the terrorists were not only “bands of murderers” (Bush 2001/12/11, cf. 2001/10/17b), but “history’s latest gang of fanatics” (Bush 2002/09/11, cf. 2001/11/21). In this framing, Bush clearly attributed a form of irrationality to the terrorists. If the ‘other’ had been viewed as a rational actor with self-serving interests, the United States would have had to answer questions about its own foreign policy. Declaring the ‘other’ as irrational, however, bypassed the need for such critical self-inspection (Chernus 2006: 2). Ostensibly, in contrast to other human beings, terrorists did not base their actions on rationality. Moreover, “they recognize no barrier of morality,” “they have no conscience,” and therefore, “terrorists cannot be reasoned with” (Bush 2001/10/26). At the same time, these people were “the most committed, the most dangerous, the least likely so surrender” (Bush 2002/03/11, cf. 2002/03/15). Their aim was “to murder their way to power” (Bush 2002/09/11), “to dominate” (Bush 2001/11/10b), and “to dictate how to think” (Bush 2001/11/08). Their goal was universal as they were portrayed as wanting to impose their “radical beliefs on people everywhere” (Bush 2001/09/20) and “to force every life into grim and joyless conformity” (Bush 2001/12/07). In a nutshell, they wanted to “rid the world of freedom” (Bush 2001/09/26a). Bush underscored this claim by pointing to the past, thereby addressing America’s collective memory about previous (hot and cold) wars. As “heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century,” he declared, “they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism” (Bush 2001/09/20) and “have the same will to power, the same disdain for the individual, the same mad global ambitions” (Bush 2001/12/07, cf. 2001/11/06). In sum, the ‘other’ was constructed as a fanatical enemy with which one could not argue. Therefore, in an expression of this logic, Bush stated that “the terrorists cannot be appeased; they must be defeated” (Bush 2001/12/07, cf. 2001/11/08, 2001/11/10b).

6.2.4 The Outcast Other

Bush constructed the terrorists as an isolated group totally outside of society. He argued that they did not “represent a legitimate political group of people” (Bush 2001/09/25) nor did they belong to “a known military” (Bush 2002/01/28). In negating all of the rules of society, despising “every limit of law, morality, and religion,” the terrorists “have no true home in any country, or culture, or faith” but “dwell in dark corners of earth” (Bush 2001/10/11a, cf. 2001/11/10b, 2002/03/11). The uncivilized, barbaric evil-doers were homeless; they had been suspended from the global social community:

People of all cultures wish to live in safety and dignity. The hope of justice and mercy and better lives are common to all humanity. Our enemies reject these values – and by doing so, they set themselves not against the West, but against the entire world. (Bush 2001/12/07)

The ‘other’ was conceptualized as standing alone in its extremism and hatred, whereas the civilized world rallied to the side of the United States. This was another way in which Bush constituted America’s strength and righteousness. However, the terrorists were not only constructed as isolated and homeless, but as godless: “Terrorists have no home in any faith,” and “evil has no holy days” (Bush 2001/11/19a). Depicted as thoroughly evil, it was inherent to Bush’s logic that God could not be with the ‘other’, although the enemy dared to “claim the authority of God” (Bush 2001/10/11a). Although the enemy was clearly associated with Islam, rhetorically, Bush denied the terrorists access to true faith and to the comfort and hope of religious belief. Instead, he argued that they instrumentalized Islam for their own vicious interests. He accused them of “distorting and betraying a great religion” (Bush 2001/10/17a, cf. 2001/10/10) and of trying “to hijack a peaceful religion” (Bush 2001/11/21, cf. 2001/10/17b, 2002/02/16) in order to justify their murder. In similar statements, Bush maintained that the ‘evil-doers’ would “profane a great religion by committing murder in its name” (Bush 2001/10/07) and that they were ready “to hide behind a peaceful faith” (Bush 2001/11/08, cf. 2001/11/10b). At this point, probably due to his Christian beliefs, Bush even spoke about dogmatics in a categorical modality:

The terrorists are violating the tenets of every religion, including the one they invoke […]. The terrorists call their cause holy, yet, they fund it with drug dealing; they encourage murder and suicide in the name of a great faith that forbids both. They dare to ask God’s blessing as they set out to kill innocent men, women and children. But the God of Isaac and Ishmael would never answer such a prayer. And a murderer is not a martyr; he is just a murderer. (Bush 2001/11/10b)

Bush denied the terrorists any reward for their actions, including the supposed heavenly reward they had believed in, that is, their future status as a martyr. Rather, he emphasized that “they died in vain” (Bush 2001/10/11a, cf. 2001/10/17b). In his statements, the ‘evil ones’ simply “defiled” (Bush 2002/03/11) their own religion. These statements enabled Bush to define authentic Islam. In his remarks at the Islamic Center in Washington, Bush explained that the “acts of violence against innocents violate the fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith” (Bush 2001/09/17b). He continued by quoting from the Koran: “In the long run, evil in the extreme will be the end of those who do evil. For that they rejected the signs of Allah and held them up to ridicule” (Bush 2001/09/17b). Here, Bush attempted to demonstrate that even Islam supported his war against ‘evil’. Again, the abstract term of ‘evil’ was a helpful means of generalizing, and it supported Bush’s argumentation. In corroborating his interpretation, Bush declared that the attackers’ extremism had “been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics” as a “fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam” (Bush 2001/09/20). Moreover, Bush emphasized the consensus of the great world religions and conceptualized their believers as a value-sharing community that excluded the terrorists. In the United States, Bush stated, “Christian, Jew and Muslim, alike” were praying to “an almighty and merciful God” (Bush 2001/09/27). He pointed to the commonality that “helping people in great need is a central part of the Jewish, Christian and Islamic traditions” (Bush 2001/10/06, cf. 2001/11/08). In this line, he claimed that the terrorists confronted these religions, because terrorists “hate progress, and freedom, and choice, and culture, and music, and laughter, and women, and Christians, and Jews, and all Muslims who reject their distorted doctrines” (Bush 2001/12/11). As Ira Chernus notes, this “ecumenical rhetoric” enabled Bush “to place the enemy, who spoke the language of Islam and presented themselves as pious defenders of the faith, outside the pale of true faith and religion” (Chernus 2006: 126). The bottom line of these statements was always the same: it signified that ‘all that is God’ was on the side of America and its allies, whereas the terrorists lacked any religious authority or good spiritual succor. The terrorists were external to religion’s virtue and to the community of believers and civilized people: they were constructed as isolated and as facing total exclusion.

6.2.5 The Bestial Other

Besides demonizing and decivilizing the ‘other’, Bush dehumanized it. Whereas in the case of the barbaric and fanatic ‘other’ the enemy was still human – albeit ‘the very worst kind of human’ – even this status was doubtful with regard to the ‘other’ viewed as the personification of evil. By constituting the enemy as a beast, however, Bush completely denied its humanness. Bush generally used strong metaphors, and he also did so in this context. He directly called the ‘other’ a “parasite” (Bush 2001/10/17a, cf. 2001/11/10b, 2002/01/28) – a word with a highly negative connotation. In an increased diction, he also used the term “terrorist parasite” (Bush 2002/01/29, cf. 2002/03/11). These ‘terrorist parasites’ were said to engross countries, “weaken them, and eventually consume them” (Bush 2001/11/10b). In this case, the ‘other’ was constructed as a vermin that posed a fundamental existential threat. As Bush made clear, this was a vermin that not only impaired its host, but the whole system, as the terrorists “threaten their own countries and peace of the world” (Bush 2002/03/11).

The second way in which Bush deprived the ‘other’ of human characteristics was by placing it even more directly in the realm of wildlife. As mentioned earlier, shortly after the attacks of 9/11 he spoke of the ‘other’ as an enemy that “preys on innocent and unsuspecting people” (Bush 2001/09/12c). However, Bush used this metaphor in two ways. If in the citation above the enemy had been represented as the hunter, it now became the hunted prey. Its low status was thereby communicated through the fact that terrorists “burrow” (Bush 2001/09/17a, 2001/09/26b); they “burrow […] into caves” (Bush 2001/10/07) where they try to hide (Bush 2001/09/16, 2001/09/17a, 2001/11/06, 2001/11/07). This image was evocative of animals digging dens and tunnels beneath the ground. It complements the picture of terrorists as “shadowy, entrenched” (Bush 2001/12/11) figures who “operate in the shadows” (Bush 2001/10/10). They literally lived in the underground (Ferrari 2007: 393). Hence, the United States was going to “rout them out” (Bush 2002/01/25, cf. 2002/02/21) and “smoke them out” (Bush 2001/09/17a, cf. 2001/09/19a, 2001/09/25) of “their holes” (Bush 2001/09/16). The reasoning was clear: “Once we get them running we have got a good chance of getting them” (Bush 2001/09/17a). This prospect gave the impression of a more aggressive form of a hunt, that is, of a battue. It was supported by the word pair ‘run and hide’ (Bush 2001/11/19b, 2001/11/29, 2001/12/04). The terrorists ran and hid with America “in pursuit” (Bush 2001/11/19b). As Bush stated, “now we are on the hunt. And we are chasing” (Bush 2001/12/21). In typical declarative sentences, Bush once again conveyed certainty about the end of this task when he announced that America would “hunt them down” (Bush 2001/09/16, cf. 2001/09/17a, 2001/09/25, 2001/11/19b, 2001/11/21, 2002/01/14, 2002/01/25, 2002/03/15, 2002/04/17). This phrase was used over and over again within and across texts. Exemplary for Bush’s strong inclination to repetition was the speech he held on November 8, 2001, when he delivered four variants of the phrase within a few moments:

I have called our military into action to hunt down the members of the al Qaeda organization who murdered innocent Americans […].

We are deliberately and systematically hunting down these murderers […].

Our great nation – national challenge is to hunt down the terrorists […].

Our government has a responsibility to hunt down our enemies – and we will. (Bush 2001/11/08)

Finally, there were also instances where Bush combined the different features he ascribed to the ‘other’; for example, he decried the “barbaric behavior” of the terrorists before shortly afterwards announcing his intentions to “smoke them out” (Bush 2001/09/17a).

6.3.1 The (Un-)Certainty About Future Attacks

In the body of texts under investigation, there are only a very few instances where Bush spoke of future attacks as a possibility, as something that could happen. In his remarks to employees at FBI Headquarters on September 25, 2001, he stated that “the people who did this act on America […] may be planning further acts” and that the FBI was preparing “to disrupt any action that may be being planned” (Bush 2001/09/25, my emphasis). Similarly, on October 29, 2001, Bush described the government’s job as to “disrupt anybody who might have designs on […] further hurting Americans” (Bush 2001/10/29, my emphasis, cf. 2001/12/04). This statement, however, could also be understood as an announcement of pre-emptive action. Be that as it may, on nearly all other occasions, Bush treated the risk of further attacks not as a possibility but as a certainty. Accordingly, the first priority was to protect the country from “another”/“further”/“future” attack (Bush 2001/09/11b, cf. 2001/11/08, 2001/12/04, 2001/12/21, 2002/01/25, 2002/01/29, 2002/03/11, 2002/06/06) since “our enemies seek every chance and every means to do harm to our country” (Bush 2001/12/11, cf. 2002/06/01). Due to the “continuing threat” (Bush 2001/09/20, cf. 2001/11/08) posed by “evil folks” who “still lurk out there” (Bush 2001/09/16), “hoping to strike again” (Bush 2002/03/11, cf. 2002/03/15), the U.S. administration was “on alert” (Bush 2001/09/19b, cf. 2001/09/16, 2001/10/29, 2002/01/25). The terrorists with their “evil plans” (Bush 2001/10/07, cf. 2001/09/29), had “threatened other acts of terror” (Bush 2001/11/08) and were “plotting further destruction” (Bush 2002/09/11). They were “active” (Bush 2001/10/29) and were “planning more murder” (Bush 2001/11/10b, cf. 2001/11/21). As Bush stated in his declarative manner, “they have killed thousands of our citizens, and seek to kill many more” (Bush 2001/11/21). This illustrates that the constituted context within which political actions were embedded was one of imminent danger: America was said to be “still under attack as we speak” (Bush 2001/10/24) and “still under threat” (Bush 2002/02/13). Although these statements were already representing the possibility of an attack as a certainty, there were some notions that still more strongly emphasized the certainty of the terrorists’ intentions: “There is no question that evildoers are continuing to try to harm America and Americans” (Bush 2001/10/23) or, in a more personal fashion that underlined the notion with presidential knowledge and authority, “I do know the enemy wants to hit us again” (Bush 2002/02/16, my emphasis, cf. 2002/01/25). Bush also used the inclusive ‘we’ to establish a broader base for his propositions in phrases like “we now know that thousands of trained killers are plotting to attack us” (Bush 2002/06/06). This rhetoric was clearly capable of arousing fear since it strongly conveyed urgency. When stressing that “America is not waiting for terrorists to try to strike us again” (Bush 2001/11/21, cf. 2001/11/06) the impression of imminence became palpable.

Overall, the American people were confronted with a situation constructed in terms of peril and assault. This “new”, “dark” threat (Bush 2001/09/20, 2001/10/07, 2001/11/21, 2002/06/01) was “like no other our nation has ever faced” (Bush 2001/10/26). Furthermore, this threat was not only framed as endangering the United States; rather, “every other country is a potential target” (Bush 2001/11/10b). In this perspective, every city in the world represented a “potential killing field” (Bush 2001/11/10b) since the “enemy knows no border” (Bush 2001/09/17a, cf. 2001/09/19a, 2001/10/17b). The ‘evil-ones’ were viewed as widespread and prepared to threaten the United States “from anywhere in the world” (Bush 2002/03/11) and Americans and other citizens “anywhere in the world” (Bush 2002/03/15). Thus, the threat was omnipresent. The construction of the terrorists as enemies with a vast ambition who wanted to “remake” the world “in their own brutal images” (Bush 2001/12/07, cf. 2001/09/20, 2001/11/06) corresponds well with the framing of a “threat of global terrorism” (Bush 2002/02/16, cf. 2002/02/21, 2002/03/15, 2002/04/17).

Nevertheless, the dimension of the threat was actually constructed in even greater terms. The ‘ruthless enemies’ were not only lurking everywhere but “determined to expand the scale and scope of their murder” (Bush 2002/03/11). The construction of threat was tremendously aggravated by the notion that the terrorists would strive for weapons of mass destruction (Bush 2001/11/06, 2001/11/10b, 2001/11/21, 2001/12/11, 2002/01/29, 2002/03/15, 2002/06/01, 2002/09/11) and hence for the “ultimate instruments of death” (Bush 2002/03/11). According to Bush, the terrorists were pursuing this aim, after all “they have been caught seeking these terrible weapons” (Bush 2002/06/01).93 For the president, the “gravest danger to freedom” lay “at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology” (Bush 2002/06/01). Certainly, this line of argumentation was geared towards the Iraq War that the Bush administration started in spring 2003; nevertheless these formulations often addressed ‘the terrorists’ in a manner that Bush began using after 9/11.94 If the terrorists were to succeed in getting hold of these weapons, Bush reasoned, this would “multiply their murders” and enable them “to kill on a scale equal to their hatred” (Bush 2001/12/11). Again, the president demonstrated absolute certainty about the terrorists’ aim by stating, “we know they have this mad intent” (Bush 2001/12/11). Yet, at the same time, uncertainty was displayed about how the terrorists would exactly strike, and because there were so many opportunities, the United States had to “prepare for every possibility” (Bush 2001/12/11). In this setting, the task was not just to prevent a further attack but “mass terror” (Bush 2001/12/11). The prospect was “terror on a catastrophic scale” (Bush 2002/03/11, cf. 2002/03/15) or, as Bush also put it in even more horrific terms, another holocaust:

All the world faces the most horrifying prospect of all: These same terrorists are searching for weapons of mass destruction, the tools to turn their hatred into holocaust. They can be expected to use chemical, biological and nuclear weapons the moment they are capable of doing so. No hint of conscience would prevent it […]. This threat cannot be appeased. (Bush 2001/11/10b)

Bush’s deployment of historicity framed the situation in highly dramatic terms: it is hardly possible to use more dramatic language than the meanings associated with the holocaust. The term describes mass murder and the highest disrespect for human dignity; from the position of the victim, it implies being confronted by a thoroughly vicious power. On another occasion, Bush precisely described how he assumed atrocities might occur. In his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, he specified the threat faced by the American people. It is therefore worth quoting at length:

The civilized world faces unprecedented dangers […]. We have found diagrams of American nuclear power plants and public water facilities, detailed instructions for making chemical weapons, surveillance maps of American cities, and thorough description of landmarks in America and throughout the world. What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning. Most of the 19 men who hijacked planes on September the 11th were trained in Afghanistan’s camps, and so were tens of thousands of others. Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder […] are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning […]. Tens of thousands of trained terrorists are still at large. These enemies view the entire world as a battlefield. (Bush 2002/01/29)

This section clearly demonstrates that Bush presented himself as possessing authoritative knowledge about the scope and characteristics of the threat being posed. In terms of relevant security information, the president was above the audience and thus privileged to define the situation and the appropriate reaction to it. Since the audience could not verify the president’s information, Bush’s explanations were apt to corroborate the fear that 9/11 had caused.95 The reference to nuclear power plants and the ‘tens of thousands of trained terrorists’ certainly worked in this manner. Moreover, the metaphor of the ‘ticking time bomb’ was extraordinarily powerful. It indicated that time was running out for the American and other ‘civilized’ people and that it was only a matter of time before the next catastrophe happened.96 Again, this scenario was escalated to the utmost as the threat was constructed as worldwide and omnipresent, yet unseizable in terms of place or time. This imagery matched the framing of “modern terrorists” (Bush 2001/10/26). While Bush mostly constructed the ‘evil-ones’ as uncivilized, irrational and hiding in caves, there were instances when he portrayed a different image. These ‘modern terrorists’ were “very sophisticated” (Bush 2001/09/25) and were operating “by highly sophisticated methods and technologies” (Bush 2001/10/26). As pointed out earlier, the homogenization of an out-group often leads to an inflation of the ‘other’s’ strength. This can be seen by constructing the enemy as “resourceful” (Bush 2001/11/29, 2002/06/01), “united”, “determined” (Bush 2001/10/08), and as “well-organized” (Bush 2001/09/26b). All of these ostensibly positive attributes further increased the perception of being at risk from the ‘other’.

Overall, the threat was presented as an absolute, impending danger. Bush spoke with great certainty about the ‘fact’ of an enduring threat; however, great uncertainty remained about the way the terrorists would strike.97 Yet, it was constructed as certain that if the threat materialized it would bring about new horror – a prospect which increased the sense of America’s vulnerability to the audience. Moreover, in this conceptualization, the terrorists were able to attack anybody in any location from wherever they chose; and the prospect of the terrorists having access to nuclear, biological or chemical weapons conferred the threat with an apocalyptical character. Accordingly, “the stakes could not be higher” (Bush 2001/11/08). In fact, what was at risk was nothing less than “the future of the world” (Bush 2001/10/17b) and “the peace of the planet” (Bush 2002/06/01). Bush proclaimed that “this is the world’s fight” (Bush 2001/09/20) but he also emphasized that this approach only belonged to ‘freedom-loving’ nations when adding that “this is civilization’s fight” (Bush 2001/09/20, cf. 2001/12/07, 2002/04/17). The task was to “save the world” (Bush 2001/10/04) – which meant to “save civilization, itself” (Bush 2001/11/08, cf. 2001/10/20, 2001/11/06, 2001/11/10b, 2002/02/21) and thus “our way of life” (Bush 2001/09/20, cf. 2001/10/23). On another occasion, Bush spoke of “our lives, our way of life, and our every hope for the world” (Bush 2001/12/11). In Bush’s perspective this included economic recovery and wealth (Bush 2001/12/04, 2002/01/14), “progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom” (Bush 2001/09/20), “creative societies and individual choice” (Bush 2001/12/07), “individual rights” (Bush 2001/12/09), “international human rights” (Bush 2001/12/09) and the “common security” (Bush 2002/03/11) of the civilized nations.

Sometimes, when Bush addressed the American people, his speeches carried a stronger emotional note: he referred to “your children and grandchildren” (Bush 2002/01/14) or, he included himself by referring to “our children” (Bush 2001/10/08, cf. 2001/12/07, 2001/12/11). Speaking of future generations, Bush called upon the nation to preserve a “peaceful and hopeful world” (Bush 2002/01/14) and to “save our children from a future of fear” (Bush 2001/12/11, cf. 2001/11/10b, 2001/11/21). At the same time, he emphasized that “the only path to safety is the path of action” (Bush 2002/06/01) and consequently, “inaction is not an option” (Bush 2002/03/15). In this conceptualization, as terrorists were seeking weapons of mass destruction, “there is no margin for error” and “no chance to learn from any mistake” (Bush 2002/03/15). This makes it clear that Bush constructed the situation as a matter of urgency and survival. Moreover, it is interesting to note that he attested knowledge to the audience that it probably did not have: according to the president, the American people ‘knew’ that the terrorists still had “more money and more men and more plans” (Bush 2002/06/01) to attack the United States. This claim enabled Bush to substantiate his argument and forestall approval. In his narrative, there was no alternative to waging war and no choice but to “win this battle against global terrorism” (Bush 2001/09/27).

6.3.2 The Imperative to Gather Information

President Bush left no doubt that he would meet the challenge of taking care of the nation. In terms of commitment and preference, he assured that his “most important job of all is to protect the American people from further attack” (Bush 2001/12/21, cf. 2001/12/04, 2002/01/14, 2002/02/13). Furthermore, he maintained that he was acting with discernment:

Protecting the innocent against violence is a solemn duty of this country. It is our most important responsibility now. And all of us in this room accept that responsibility. And we will tell the American people plainly, we will fulfill that responsibility. (Bush 2001/11/29)

In Bush’s words, this “awesome responsibility” meant “to do whatever we can to protect the American people” (Bush 2001/12/21). In fact, the president consistently affirmed that he would do everything possible to protect the United States:

America will do whatever it takes to strengthen our security here at home. (Bush 2001/10/17a)

We will do whatever it takes to protect our country, protect the good American families. (Bush 2001/10/17a)

Our government is doing everything we possibly can to protect the lives of our citizens – everything. (Bush 2001/10/23)

We have got to do everything we can to prevent the enemy from hitting us again. (Bush 2001/12/04)

I want to assure you we will do, within our power […] what it takes to defend the American people. (Bush 2002/02/13)

We will do whatever it takes to defend our freedoms […] The United States will do what it takes to defend our freedom. Make no mistake about it. (Bush 2002/02/16)

We will do everything in our power to defend freedom and the universal values that are so important to our nation […]. (Bush 2002/02/21)

Whatever it takes to defend the liberty of America, this administration will do. (Bush 2002/03/15)

This promise appeared to have no limits. ‘Everything’ and ‘whatever it takes’ are all-inclusive; it was the government’s responsibility to employ whichever means could be portrayed as necessary in order to protect America’s security. Obviously, Bush constructed the logic that “when faced with evil, […] we are allowed to use any possible means to help us prevail, including methods that would otherwise be forbidden” (Holmes 2006: 132). Therefore, if the torture of Guantanamo detainees were perceived as necessary in order to gather information, this rhetoric permitted torture as well.98

In fact, on several occasions Bush pointed out how important the work of the CIA was in gathering information that made America safe (Bush 2001/09/26a, cf. 2001/10/08, 2001/10/26, 2001/12/11). Information gathering had now moved to the center stage, as “in the war on terror, knowledge is power” (Bush 2001/10/08). Bush pointed out that “our security will require the best intelligence” (Bush 2002/06/01). Consequently, it was essential to question enemy detainees. The captives in Guantanamo and in similar detention facilities elsewhere were constituted as terrorist confidants and carriers of secret information, and were therefore viewed as possessing crucial data. Hence, interrogation was vital “to figure out […] their intentions” (Bush 2001/11/29). They had to be incarcerated in order “to question them, to find out what’s in their mind and what their future activities may be” (Bush 2001/10/04). Speaking of his morning intelligence briefings, Bush stated:

A President needs real and current knowledge and analysis of the plans, intentions, and capabilities of our enemies […]. The more we know, the more terrorist plans we can prevent and disrupt, and the better we’ll be able to protect the American people. (Bush 2001/12/11)

The task was as simple as it was crucial: the administration had “to know the plans of terrorists before they act” (Bush 2001/09/20), and Bush stressed that “we are in the business now of gathering as much information as we possibly can gather, and we are acting on that information” (Bush 2001/12/04). He left no doubt that the security of the United States was dependent on this data. In commenting on the arrest of eight terrorists in Spain, he said: “Hopefully they’ll give us some information […] to keep us all safe” (Bush 2001/11/29). Bush expressed his arguments in quite dense terms in a speech in 2006, and it is cited in the following as it complements the body of texts under investigation. Arguing for the creation of military commissions to try suspected terrorists, he stated:

In this new war, the most important source of information on where the terrorists are hiding and what they are planning is the terrorists, themselves. Captured terrorists have unique knowledge about how terrorist networks operate. They have knowledge of where their operatives are deployed, and knowledge about what plots are underway. This intelligence – this is intelligence that cannot be found any other place. And our security depends on getting this kind of information […]. The security of our nation and the lives of our citizens depend on our ability to learn what these terrorists know. (Bush 2006/09/06)

Over the years, Bush reiterated the imperative of gathering information through interrogation – and he implied that this process was effective. This was also suggested by declaring that some victories would “be won outside of public view, in tragedies avoided and threats eliminated” (Bush 2001/09/29). More immediately, the effectiveness of interrogation was confirmed by disclosing that one al Qaeda detainee had apparently revealed that “attacks were planned against financial institutions” (Bush 2002/06/06); in the same speech Bush referred to al Qaeda’s presumed chief of operations, Abu Zabedah, who had been arrested:

From him, and from hundreds of others, we are learning more about how the terrorists plan and operate; information crucial in anticipating and preventing future attacks. (Bush 2002/06/06)

Today, it is known that Abu Zabedah, among others, was tortured. However, in Bush’s framing, the end justified the means. If information gathering was an indispensable means of protecting the American people from catastrophe, the deployment of a suitable means to reach this goal appeared self-evident. In line with this argument, detention facilities like Guantanamo were presented as part of the American success story in the ‘War on Terror’:

He [Abu Zabedah] was spending a lot of time as one of the top operating officials of al Qaeda, plotting and planning murder. He’s not plotting and he’s not planning anymore. He’s under lock and key, and we’re going to give him some company. (Bush 2002/04/17)

A few months ago, al Qaeda and the terrorists occupied Afghanistan. Now some of them are in cells in Guantanamo Bay. (Bush 2002/02/21)

These statements provoked applause by the audience. Making the captives divulge their secrets was presented as a life-saving undertaking, and this was also the bottom line in Bush’s argumentation for the use of military tribunals at Guantanamo. “In a court of law,” he pointed out, “there would be all kinds of questions that might compromise our ability to gather incredibly important intelligence to prevent the next attack from happening to America” (Bush 2001/12/04). Therefore, Bush was authoritative on the question of whether this extraordinary means was necessary. As he made clear: “It’s our national security interests we have a military tribunal available” (Bush 2001/11/19b, cf. 2001/12/04).

6.5.1 Redefining the Rules

In line with Bush’s conceptualization of ‘self’, ‘other’, and ‘threat’, the administration redefined the rules. As pointed out above, Bush claimed that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 embodied a declaration of war. Yet, Bush also stressed that America was faced by a ‘new’ kind of enemy and a ‘new’ and ‘different’ kind of war (Bush 2001/09/15, 2001/09/16, 2001/09/19a, 2001/09/25, 2001/09/29, 2001/10/09, 2002/03/08) that required “new thinking in the law of war” (Bush 2002/02/07). In addition, Bush strongly reproduced the belief in America’s righteousness – and this belief was independent of the means used to tackle terrorism. As David Forsythe points out, “this exceptionalism led to exemptionalism, in that the United States was seen as too virtuous to be bound like ordinary nations under international law” (Forsythe 2011: 42f; cf. Ruggie 2006; Esch 2010). In this sense, America’s claimed goodness and its perception of having been ‘called’ by history and God, rendered it invulnerable in the fight against ‘evil’. In the context of this framing, the Bush administration abandoned or bypassed conventional statutory and constitutional protections such as the Geneva Conventions, habeas corpus rights, and the UN Convention Against Torture.

Based on the claim that this was a ‘new war’ and that the enemy was an ‘outcast other’ who was neither part of a state’s army nor a society, the Bush administration declared its captives to be ‘illegal’ or ‘unlawful enemy combatants’ (Bush 2001/11/29, 2002/01/28). This term does not exist in “any written international law or code” (Greenberg 2008: x).101 By labeling them in this manner, Bush declared the captives to be “more than criminal suspects” (Bush 2001/11/29); however, at the same time, they were “less than soldiers” (Feldman 2008: xix), which placed them in a legal loophole. Doing so enabled the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions, according to which captives would have had to be granted the status of ‘prisoners of war’ (POW), to be abandoned. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration decided that in the ‘new kind of war’ customary rules of war no longer applied. It argued that the laws of war only applied to state parties and that neither Afghanistan’s Taliban – defined as a militia of a ‘failed state’ – nor al Qaeda – identified as non-state actors – met this characteristic (DOJ 2002/01/09, 2002/01/22). Moreover, Bush explicitly repeated his framing of the ‘other’ set out above. When journalists asked why the detainees at Guantanamo were not being treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, Bush justified this by identifying the suspects as ‘killers’ who had occupied countries “like a parasite” (Bush 2002/01/28). Consequently, on February 7, 2002 Bush signed a memorandum stating that Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions – an article that sets out the standards for treating detainees and prohibits the abuse of prisoners – did not apply to the Taliban or al Qaeda.102 This led the U.S. to suspend its implementation of a treaty that has historically guarded the rights of detained combatants. As Karen Greenberg puts it: “With one fell swoop, the administration […] extricated the United States from the international obligations that have governed the treatment of prisoners in armed conflict since the middle of the nineteenth century” (Greenberg 2008: xi).

At the same time, U.S. courts were said to have no jurisdiction over the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay and thus no possibility of reviewing the treatment of the captives held there. Obviously, Guantanamo Bay was chosen due to the possibilities it provided of circumventing judicial oversight.103 On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an order to set up military commissions to try non-Americans charged with terrorist crimes. “If I determine,” he said a few days later, “that it is in the national security interest of our great land to try by military commission those who make war on America, then we will do so” (Bush 2001/11/29). This statement is evocative of the Copenhagen School’s early theorizing according to which the elite decide when exceptions can be made. Bush’s military order excluded the possibility of a judicial review of the prisoner’s seizure, detention and status and banned captives from filing a case at any regular court, that is, “(i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal” (Bush 2001/11/13). The stated reasoning behind this decision, as mentioned above, was the imperative to extract information from alleged carriers of secret information. As Bush argued, trying suspects in regular courts of law would have hampered the ability of the United States “to gather incredibly important intelligence to prevent the next attack from happening to America” (Bush 2001/12/04).104 Due to the global scope of the ‘War on Terror’, the order not only applied to people captured on the battlefields in Afghanistan but also to people who had been arrested elsewhere in the world and who had then been sent to Guantanamo (Cole 2003: 42). There was no presumption of innocence for captives at Guantanamo. Therefore, these individuals were not treated as suspects, but as killers who were “devoted”, as Vice President Cheney stressed, “to killing millions of Americans, innocent Americans” (Seelye 2002; cf. Lelyveld 2002: 62). As there was no possibility to challenge the circumstances in which they were held, most of the detainees faced unlimited detention, the more so as in contrast to other wars, which have a discernible endpoint, the ‘War on Terror’ is characterized by indefiniteness. Moreover, captives in Guantanamo were held without charge, were not subject to trial, and had no right to legal representation. Contact to relatives was also prohibited (Cole 2003: ch. 2; Barry/Hirsh/Isikoff 2004; Lewis 2004, 2005; Paust 2007; Forsythe 2011; Donnelly 2013). Obviously, in the face of such a grave threat as constituted by Bush, compliance with the law and due process could easily be considered an impediment to America’s national security.105 At the same time, establishing military commissions put America truly in the position of ‘doing justice’ as it now acted as judge, jury and executioner all at once (Zarefsky 2004b: 145).

Overall, President Bush authorized an aggressive detention and interrogation policy which included forced disappearances and extraordinary renditions, i.e. kidnapping people anywhere in the world and transferring them to CIA prisons or countries known for torturous interrogation; the operation of so-called ‘black sites’, which were secret CIA prisons; the establishment of Guantanamo, Bagram and other confinement facilities controlled by the U.S. military that stood outside of U.S. legal jurisdiction; and the employment of coercive interrogation techniques that could amount to lethal abuse (Dratel 2008: xiv; Bassiouni 2010; Forsythe 2011). Although the Bush administration did not publicly affirm torture, it twisted its words with regard to the treatment of detainees in order to shift and narrow the definition of torture. Pursuant to the 1984 UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Part I, Article 2, Clause 2, states “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture” (UNHR 1984). This description appears to leave open no room for interpretation, and this also seems to be the case with the definition of torture. In the same document, Part 1, Article 1, Clause 1, torture is specified as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession” (UNHR 1984). The U.S. is a party to this convention, which it ratified in 1994, albeit with reservations. After 9/11, the Bush administration’s lawyers engaged in legal sophistry that led to a narrow definition of both the intentionality of causing pain and of what could be called ‘severe pain’. The government’s key legal papers said that torture only occurred when there was specific intent on the part of the interrogator to inflict severe mental and physical pain, “not when it occurred as a by-product of seeking information” (Forsythe 2011: 65; cf. Pious 2006: 182f).106 Moreover, the mistreatment of captives had to be more or less lethal in order to be considered torturous. One of these key legal papers prepared by the Justice Department was a memorandum that later came to be known as the ‘torture memo’. It was written on August 1, 2002 for the White House by Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee who was head of the department’s Office of Legal Counsel at the time. His memo states that for physical pain to be classified as torture it “must be of an intensity akin to that which accompanies serious physical injury such as death or organ failure” (DOJ 2002/08/01). Moreover, the definition of torture was made contingent on lasting and visible signs of physical damage. Therefore, officials were able to argue that techniques such as waterboarding did not constitute torture because they did not cause serious (external) injuries (Correa 2007: 21).

Although these interpretations clearly deviated from the spirit of the UN Convention Against Torture, they enabled the Bush administration to keep up appearances and assert that the United States did not undertake torture. Through this redefinition, the administration tried to shift proscribed practices into the realm of permissible emergency actions that were said to be indispensable for gathering life-saving intelligence. The wording that was used to do so was hallmarked by euphemisms.107 The measures that were being applied were known as ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, ‘counter-resistance strategies’, and ‘professional interrogation techniques’ with three grades of hardness (Lelyveld 2005). Later, Bush also spoke of “an alternative set of procedures” (Bush 2006/09/06). These technical terms sounded rather neutral and certainly appeared far less abusive than ‘torture’ would have. This also underpinned the assertion of legality and the claim that America’s cause was just.108

The Bush administration’s attempt to break free of the rules was accompanied by an expansion of its executive power (Daase 2002b: 132f). Bush’s officials claimed that the commander-in-chief was unconstrained by law as the presidential powers to wage war overrode international treaties and domestic laws. To defend their argument, some of Bush’s top legal advisors pointed to the past and asserted that during wars, U.S. presidents had always expanded their powers “without much attention to legal restraints” (Pfiffner 2010: 39; cf. Yoo 2005). As noted above, Bush’s repeated references to war President Franklin D. Roosevelt is in line with this argumentation. The intent of empowering the president to sidestep the law and permit ‘harsh interrogation techniques’ was clearly displayed in a Department of Justice memo, submitted on January 9, 2002. This document stated that it would be “constitutionally dubious” if Congress were to undertake the step of “restricting the President’s plenary power over military operations (including the treatment of prisoners).”109 This position was hardened later that year with the OLC memorandum by Jay S. Bybee in August 2002 mentioned above. The document emphasized the constitutional authority of the president as commander-in-chief to order interrogations since:

the information gained from interrogations may prevent future attacks by foreign enemies. Any effort to apply Section 2340A [i.e. the UN Torture Convention implemented in U.S. criminal law against torture] in a manner that interferes with the President’s direction of such core war matters as the detention and interrogation of enemy combatants thus would be unconstitutional. (DOJ 2002/08/01)

This view was further fleshed out in a memorandum by the Defense Department (DOD) in spring 2003, which incorporated verbatim a large part of the Bybee memo. This DOD working group report on interrogations stated that “any effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of unlawful combatants would violate the Constitution’s sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the President” (DOD 2003/03/06, 2003/04/04).110 This attitude not only implied the suspension of the Geneva Conventions and other treaties governing humanitarian law, but bypassing Congress as well. Moreover, with regard to jurisdiction, both documents detailed how to avoid torture charges or, respectively, how to proceed if lawsuits were filed; and they “provided interrogators with the authority to act with maximum impunity” (Luban 2007: 37). According to this reasoning, torture was viewed as a matter of national defense (Lewis 2004, 2005; Pious 2006: ch. 9; Luban 2007; Forsythe 2011; Donnelly 2013: 114–119; Parry 2013: ch. 7).

6.5.2 Pre-emptive Interrogation

Following Bush’s security narrative, uncertainty about future attacks had to be reduced and new atrocities prevented, and countering this risk required pre-emptive action. With regard to America’s proceeding, it is certainly true what Daase (2010: 34) notes that “all proactive strategies to reduce international risks are much more active and offensive than traditional security policies aimed at averting threats or mitigating vulnerabilities.” Early on, U.S. officials mistreated detainees in the ‘War on Terror’, as witnessed, for example, by a Guantanamo prisoner in April 2002 (Jaffer/Singh 2007: A-228). Many captives experienced what Cofer Black, the head of the CIA Counterterrorist Center at the time, acknowledged at a joint hearing of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees on September 26, 2002, that is, that “after 9/11 the gloves came off” (Bowden 2003: 56). Officially approved in December 2002, and April 2003, ‘harsh interrogation techniques’ exceeded army regulations, and they provided a long list of possible methods. In sum, U.S. personnel – military and CIA – were allowed to apply the following means in various combinations and intensities: deprivation of food and sleep, deprivation of light for more than 30 days, hooding for days at a time, forced nakedness, isolation, naked isolation in the cold, subjection to extreme noises/lights/temperatures for hours, kept standing for hours, threatened by dogs; the exploitation of detainee phobias, stress positions, sexual humiliation, prolonged shackling, slamming against a wall, beating, electric shocks, being held in a coffin-like box, mock execution, and waterboarding. In Guantanamo, a 72–point matrix specified coercion measures and their levels of escalation, and this included the application of physically and psychologically aggressive techniques (Barry/Hirsh/Isikoff 2004: 32; Danner 2004; Olshansky 2007: 100–105; AI 2011; Parry 2013: 179). Interrogations could last for 20 hours a day. They certainly embodied Bush’s announcement that “there would be hell to pay for attacking America” (Bush 2001/12/04), and the International Committee of the Red Cross assessed these measures as “tantamount to torture.”111 Yet in the framework of Bush’s securitization, these routines were justified and necessary, and although the Bush administration did not openly advocate torture, it became largely viewed as a legitimate part of Bush’s policies (see section 6.6). Moreover, the portrayal of the ‘other’ as pure evil enabled doubts and mental stress to be avoided when applying torture; psychologically, it relieved those who approved and committed torture since “stereotypes that dehumanize out-groups alleviate guilt by legitimizing destructive and inhumane acts against them” (Janis 1982: 257). In the end, those who conducted torture were made to believe they were acting out of a patriotic duty to aid America’s security. This perception was underpinned by exempting interrogators who had tortured from criminal proceedings. Consequently, the opinion gained influence – here voiced by an U.S. official – that “if you don’t violate someone’s human rights some of the time, you probably aren’t doing your job” (Priest/Gellman 2002).

The construction of the ‘other’ as a ‘ticking time bomb’ facilitated the use of torture, as did the label of ‘illegal combatant’. The former underpinned the urgency of action, whereas the latter removed the protection of captives and the legal constraints placed on interrogators. Moreover, as demonstrated, Bush depersonalized, decivilized, demonized, and dehumanized the ‘other’. In this respect, the detention and interrogation policies of the Bush administration exemplified “the ease with which morality can be disengaged by the tactic of dehumanizing a potential victim” (Zimbardo 2008: 17). Dehumanization works in two ways: it permits torture to take place, and it “is confirmed through torture” (Hajjar 2002: 120, emphasis in original). In other words, those who are not human do not deserve to be treated humanely, and the fact that they can be treated inhumanely proves that they are not human. However, even beyond the torture cells, the non-humanness of the ‘other’ became somewhat visible in Guantanamo. Pictures of the prisoners held there seemed to demonstrate that Bush’s construction of the enemy had materialized. In accordance with the animal-like nature of the ‘other’, captives were kept in chain-link cages. They were prevented from seeing with blacked-out goggles; their mouths were covered with surgical masks, their ears with earmuffs, their heads with caps, their hands with gloves – despite the heat they were exposed to. They were bound and shackled, forced to kneel and thus totally immobilized. These measures utterly reduced their senses and left them with very little of their humanity. Moreover, this outward appearance emblematized the homogenization of the ‘other’, and this was strengthened by the uniform orange suits they were forced to wear. The detainees were thus stripped of any individual features, the more so, as they were kept nameless – the Bush administration refused to disclose the captives’ names. At the same time, however, it was clear that they were Muslims and detailed instructions existed in Guantanamo on how to respect the detainee’s religious practices (Parry 2013: 210). Therefore, even if Bush was careful not to verbally attack Islam, the enemy was nevertheless homogenized as the ‘Muslim other’, and this revived images from Orientalist discourse. In sum, the image constructed of the Guantanamo captives was that of evil Muslims with unitary identities that were now under the strict control of the U.S. forces. Pictures of captives kneeling before U.S. soldiers were powerful images as they publicized the punishment, and restored the self-conception of American superiority. The enemy could no longer harm the United States but it could be subjected to interrogation.

Guantanamo was just the beginning. The approval of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ paved the way for systematic abuse. What might have been intended as a limited exception actually escalated (Greenberg/Dratel 2005; Bassiouni 2010: 121–128; Pfiffner 2010; Forsythe 2011).112 U.S. forces “adopted a policy of physical coercion that applie[d] to large numbers of detainees who almost certainly lack[ed] specific knowledge of future attacks” (Parry 2004: 159). It is reasonable to suggest that the treatment of captives in other confinement facilities was similar if not worse to that in Guantanamo Bay. In the latter, torture took place even though the International Committee of the Red Cross was occasionally able to monitor the treatment and condition of the detainees (HRW 2002).113 In other U.S. detention facilities, this was impossible, and much less so in CIA ‘black sites’, that is, in overseas secret detention centers that had been established on a secret order made by President Bush soon after 9/11. In Guantanamo, as well as in these other sites, fatal abuses certainly took place. In August 2003, the Guantanamo commandant Major General Geoffrey D. Miller was sent to the Abu Ghraib detention center in Iraq to “Gitmo-ize” the site to make the interrogations more effective and the detainees talk.114 After Miller’s visit “a training team from Guantanamo spent two months there” (Parry 2013: 189). This transfer of personnel happened on a larger scale. In 2004, while investigating Bush’s detention policy, an independent panel concluded that “interrogators and lists of techniques circulated from Guantanamo and Afghanistan to Iraq” (The Schlesinger Report 2004: 911, 925). What happened in Iraq afterwards is well-known due to the photo scandal that occurred in 2004. As the Abu Ghraib prison guard SPC Sabrina Harman declared, her job, while handling the detainees, was to make their life “hell so they would talk” (Thomas 2004: 27).