8.1 Summary of the Book

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the world witnessed an unprecedented violation of the rules by the United States. Under the presidency of George W. Bush, America deviated from established laws and treaties, as the U.S. suspended international humanitarian regulations as part of its detention and interrogation policy during the ‘War on Terror’. This was symbolized by the extra-territorial detention center at Guantanamo Bay, a development that had not been anticipated and thus aroused worldwide indignation, particularly because the United States represented an ideal in terms of human rights – an image that America continues to believe in. This point is also reflected in the highly expected and much hailed announcement by Bush’s successor, President Barack Obama, that he would return to the rule of law. However, it makes it all the more astonishing that Obama was unable to fully implement this change in policy. These are the puzzles this book sought to investigate. How did rule breaking become possible in the first place? How did Obama try to return to due process, and why did he fail to succeed? In seeking answers to these questions, this study examined the security narratives of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. In particular, it traced how the presidents constituted meaning and in how far this meaning was translated into political practice. It scrutinized the presidents’ framings of identity and threat in order to show how this conditioned Guantanamo-related policies by legitimizing or delegitimizing particular practices. This was investigated in line with relevant audiences, mainly the public and the media, Congress, and the apparatus, which included the government and its staff, as well as the military and the secret services.

The first part of the book explained and discussed the study’s theoretical and methodological foundation and set out its analytical framework. Chapter 1 provided an introduction and overview of the study.

Chapter 2 defined the ontological and epistemological reasoning behind the study and the motivation behind its approach. It continued by highlighting the insights provided by constructivism, and then carved out the strengths of a ‘radical’ constructivist perspective in terms of a consideration that language is central in constructing the social world. According to this understanding, language does not just describe reality, it produces it. Language is viewed as constitutive of meaning and as such the main manner in which we access reality. In this sense, a distinction between the ideational and the material world is impossible as the material world does not speak for itself but has to be interpreted. This notion makes claims to truth impossible. ‘Radical’ constructivists thus argue from a post-positivist stance that attempts to understand the world in its constitution rather than to explain it in terms of causality. This implies the acknowledgement that findings are relative as they cannot be tested against an objective world but just against other interpretations. With regard to the constitutive role of language, Chapter 2 also laid out John Austin’s speech act theory as it inspired the ‘linguistic turn’ in IR. Speech act theory points to the performative quality of speech: speaking is doing; if certain conventions are met, speech creates something and has thus reality-making power. Moreover, it can affect the audience and mobilize for action. In this sense speech can be used strategically.

Chapter 3 put the power of speech in a larger perspective and located the ‘radical’ constructivist understanding in the realm of discourse theory. It introduced Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to the study, as it provides the basis for the discourse analysis conducted in this book. In CDA, discourse is understood as language use and social practice, and analyzing discourse means examining the link between the two: This relates discursive structures to larger social structures. With regard to politics, discourses shape our perception of legitimacy and thereby define the scope of accepted action. In this sense, the overall guiding question is: What kind of textual characteristics renders what kind of policies possible? Moreover, Chapter 3 discussed insights derived from postmodern theorizing related to CDA and the Copenhagen School including the exclusive nature of discourses as instruments of power. Taking the latter into account also means understanding who is able to contribute to the discourse under scrutiny and thus shape it.

Chapter 4 moved the focus to security discourse and presented the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitization, which, in dependence on Austin’s theory, conceptualizes security as a speech act. In securitization, issues or people become security problems when they are labeled as such and when this framing is accepted by the audience(s). When this occurs, it allows for rules to be broken and for a deviation from ‘normal’ proceedings. In general, securitization is a strong means of legitimizing political action, and it opens up new room for political maneuver. However, Chapter 4 also discussed the inconsistencies and shortcomings of the model, including the narrowness of the concept and the awkward role of the audience(s), which remains undertheorized. Nevertheless, the approach of the Copenhagen School is a powerful means of shedding light on how ‘speaking security’ creates political latitude. In this context, it is evident that a central part of securitization involves identity formation. Identity defines ‘security’ for the ‘self’ and positions the ‘other’ in relation to it; it thus provides the setting for foreign and security policy. If the ‘other’ is presented as posing a lethal threat, extraordinary means are legitimized in order to guarantee survival. This kind of ‘othering’ often builds on established stereotypes of the enemy.

Chapter 5 set out the book’s analytical framework. It linked the book’s theory and methodology to the research question and described the mode of conduct. It demonstrated that Critical Discourse Analysis is a suitable approach for investigating the links between language use and politics. CDA, it noted, conflates well with the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitization: both consider discourse as powerful and constitutive, and they also take the agency of willful actors into account. CDA and the CS also correspond in their normative aim to raise critical awareness about language use: language is not innocent, it is effective and it generates consequences. The normative aim of these approaches, in fact, is understood as a central value, and it verifies the relevance of the study at hand. Moreover, Chapter 5 set out the reasons behind the choice of the actors under study in terms of securitizers and audiences, and clarified data selection. It explained why a focus was placed on presidential speeches in investigating governmental security discourse and defined the target groups that make up a main part of what the Copenhagen School calls the ‘relevant’ audience. In addition, it presented the guiding questions for the investigation. Finally, the chapter discussed the matter of validity and pointed to the limits of this study.

With Chapter 6, the book turned to empiricism and illuminated President George W. Bush’s security narrative in line with both the detention and interrogation policies he enacted and his audiences’ stance(s). It started out with a detailed examination of Bush’s identity framing and revealed how he constituted the American ‘self’ and the evil ‘other’ in ultimate terms. Whereas the ‘self’ was mitigated, Bush barred the enemy from having even the lowest level of humanity. In his Manichean worldview, Bush framed ‘us’ versus ‘them’ in terms of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’. He reproduced the American myth and constituted an innocent, great and resolute America. In presenting the nation as ‘freedom’s defender’, he nurtured the sense of an exceptional ‘self’ that was just and that had been called to a higher mission. The ‘other’, in comparison, was presented as fanatical in its determination to attack America and the ‘civilized world’. In this light of an imminent and global threat, emergency action was imperative for the sake of survival. One of the keys to security was learning about the terrorists’ plans for future attacks, and in Bush’s narrative the detained terrorist suspects were constituted as indeed having this kind of knowledge. Following this reasoning, Bush was able to break free of the rules and conduct actions that went beyond (inter-)national laws and treaties. Both the alleged inhumanness of the ‘other’ and the constituted imperative to gather information paved the way for the torture and mistreatment of terrorist suspects as this was seen as serving a higher good. Consequently, the Bush government permitted ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, and deprived the detainees of their human and legal rights.

With regard to the audiences’ reception, Bush’s narrative was sweeping. It was extensively reproduced by the public and the media, whereas alternative framings were hardly voiced; if they were voiced, they were either ignored or silenced. Torture became a popular sight on TV shows and in movies – at least torture that enabled American heroes to save the nation. This was probably both an effect of Bush’s narrative and a substantiation of it. In any case, it nurtured the impression that torture was socially acceptable. Overall, Bush’s conceptualization was hardly challenged and the public accepted his policies in reaction to 9/11, including his policy on the treatment of prisoners. Congress either supported his course outright or at least refrained from controlling and confining the administration’s actions. Even when members of Congress learned about the application of torture, they neither stopped nor investigated it. Within the apparatus, objection was mainly voiced by members of the military, but these concerns were overruled. Finally, the judiciary forced the administration to change course. After years had gone by, the Supreme Court finally declared parts of Bush’s policies unlawful. However, with the help of Congress, the administration managed to continue its policies, at least to some extent. In sum, Chapter 6 argues that Bush’s narrative embodied a case in point of securitization. The evil ‘other’ was constituted as a lethal threat, and this led to a matter of survival. Since the audiences accepted and reproduced this framing, it allowed basic rules to be broken. Rendition, indefinite detention, and ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ were constituted as necessary to keep the American people safe, and because of that, these practices seemed to be legitimate.

Chapter 7 examined President Obama’s security narrative. In terms of identity-framing, Obama strongly emphasized America’s moral responsibility and legal obligations. Although, in principle, he reproduced the American ‘self’ as exceptional, he also pointed to its current flaws. At this point, Obama’s framing clearly differed from Bush’s who had unrestrictedly inflated American greatness. In contrast, Obama reiterated that by violating the rule of law the American people were corrupting their identity, disuniting the nation, weakening the country’s role as world leader, and in the end, endangering themselves. In this respect, America bore responsibility for the threat it faced. According to Obama’s narrative, Guantanamo had come to epitomize America’s arbitrariness and inflated the enemy’s hate; and it was being used by terrorists around the world as a recruitment tool to arm against the United States. Moreover, it alienated international partners which the U.S. needed in the fight against terrorism. Consequently, closing Guantanamo and ending ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ was imperative for security reasons. It was necessary to denude the enemy of a means for propaganda, to restore America’s image in the world, and to rebuild alliances that had been impaired through America’s conduct in the ‘War on Terror’. Thus, recapturing the moral high ground was a means to be true to the ‘self’ and of lessening the threat America faced through its own bearing. As expected, though, the original threat emanated from the ‘other’, and Obama did not question the general need to fight it. In a manner that was similar to Bush’s framing, he presented the threat as imminent and global, with the enemy seeking weapons of mass destruction and lurking to strike on a large scale. Mostly, however, Obama avoided ‘evil talk’ and did not dehumanize the enemy. These differences were meant to enable America to return to established rules by treating terrorist suspects as humans and granting them human rights. As is known, immediately after taking office Obama ordered the closure of Guantanamo within one year, terminated CIA black sites, prohibited ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, declared the validity of the Geneva Conventions, and restored human and legal rights to the captives held in U.S. custody. Yet, Obama was unable to restore these rights in full. His plans to close Guantanamo, transfer captives to the United States and to try them in civil courts were thwarted. In line with the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitization, this study suggests that Obama failed to fully implement his policies because he lacked the support of his main audiences. Even his administration and apparatus disputed what had to be done in order to recapture the moral high ground and which steps were feasible and prudent. Obama’s narrative was permanently contested in the public realm and he was charged with weakness. Obama’s logic, according to which the return to due process was imperative for security reasons, never became dominant. Instead, Bush’s logic proved to be strong and was reproduced throughout 2009. In this account, following the rule of law hampered security rather than warranting it. The image of the evil ‘other’ prevailed, and this meant that the enemy did not deserve due process. In line with this, the American people were particularly unwilling to spend any (more) money on detainees’ trials in the United States. Overall, the main position seemed to be that Bush’s approach to fighting terrorism had been appropriate as the majority of the American people rejected the closure of Guantanamo as well as the prosecution of Bush and his officials for their approval of torture. In sum, Chapter 7 argued that Obama’s threat formation differed from Bush’s in that the threat emanated not only from the ‘other’ but also from the ‘self’. Obama securitized America’s rule breaking to mobilize support for a return to the rule of law, yet he never gained acceptance from the majority for this framing. Therefore, Obama was only partly able to implement his policy changes.

8.2 The Bottom Line

In comparing the security narratives of President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama, it is striking that although both presidents sought to guarantee the security of the American people, their concepts were antithetic: whereas Bush’s narrative pushed limits and allowed for actions that went beyond the law, Obama’s narrative constrained the scope of actions to legal limits. In Bush’s construction, the operation of Guantanamo including the mistreatment of captives and their deprivation of rights appeared to be justified as it was constituted as destroying the power of the enemy and protecting the ‘self’. It thus enhanced America’s security. In Obama’s construction, Guantanamo achieved the opposite: it strengthened the power of the enemy and destroyed the ‘self’. It thus impaired America’s security. According to Obama’s framing, for the sake of security a reversal was imperative which implied abandoning a logic that permitted all means.

The respective policies of Bush and Obama corresponded with their identity formation and reveal the link between identity and policy. President Bush and President Obama both constituted the ‘other’ as a highly dangerous enemy that had to be defeated. With regard to ‘who we are’, Bush constituted the ‘self’ as per se in the right; in defending freedom, America’s course was just – no matter what it looked like. Obama, on the contrary, stressed that the justness of America’s course was not given and had to be demonstrated; he emphasized that the nation had gone astray and argued that America had to comply with the rule of law. Despite these differences, the presidents defended their approaches in a similar manner: both used securitization to justify their course. Yet, whereas Bush solely securitized the ‘other’, Obama also securitized the ‘other’s’ mistreatment and thus the conduct of the American ‘self’. He securitized America’s violation of law which, however, was not done to break free of the rules – as the Copenhagen School would suggest – but to gain acceptance for a return to the rules. Obama used his securitization to justify a reversion to legal limits as stipulated in the U.S. constitution and international treaties. He thus securitized away from rule violations, which is a case apt to broaden the Copenhagen School’s concept. Despite the critical stance of the CS towards securitization, Obama’s case demonstrates that it can be used to reach goals that the Copenhagen School would probably endorse.

Obama’s framing is also of particular interest as it shows that a concurrence of securitization and politicization is possible on the same issue. Whereas Obama securitized America’s rule breaking, he tried to repoliticize the treatment of the ‘other’ in U.S. custody. Obama sought to retrieve the whole issue of the captives’ handling and prosecution, place it in the realm of ‘normal politics’ and deal with it according to established rules and laws. To this end, he deliberately abandoned certain elements of Bush’s wording and demonstrated that alternative framings were possible; this corroborates the point that framings are not inevitable, they involve political choices. However, as this book argues, Obama partly failed in his attempt to implement a policy change and did so because he lacked moral and formal support. This confirms that it is extremely difficult if not impossible to implement major (security) policies without an appealing, dominant narrative in place that makes these policies seem appropriate, necessary and legitimate to relevant audiences. In this case, the ‘relevant’ audiences did not adopt Obama’s framing that a reversal of policy was imperative for security reasons, and they did not accept the repoliticization of detainee treatment, which would have allowed for a return to the rule of law. Although Obama’s narrative provided the logic for his political course and increased the likeliness of public acceptance, this is not an automatism. Instead, Obama experienced that “presidents – no matter how rhetorically skilled they might be – do not possess the power to command the public to attend to their appeals or support their construction of reality” (King 2014: 4; cf. Edwards III 2003, 2009: ch. 3, 2012: ch. 1–3).149

Probably, there are several reasons for Obama’s inability to dominate public discourse with his security narrative. First of all, it was a matter of context. This aspect is only touched on in this book and clearly needs further investigation as suggested below (see section 8.3). Whereas Bush’s narrative had been magnified by the exceptional character of 9/11, Obama’s narrative lacked this kind of aggrandizement. In this sense, the issues at the time were not critical enough for successful securitization (Balzacq 2005: 182). Accordingly, Obama had greater difficulty convincingly framing the threat as a matter of survival, which would have granted particular vigor to his argument. Besides that, his deliberate change of wording reduced the dramatic feature of the topic. As pointed out, Obama omitted the use of Manichean, catchy dichotomies. In contrast, Bush’s dualism of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’ put America in a position to claim a divine mission against God’s enemies; in Obama’s framing America was, overall, a more grounded nation with flaws. This hints at two further aspects, namely that Obama’s rhetoric was less emotional than Bush’s and that Obama did not only reassure the American ‘self’ but also criticized it. The former might have limited the immediate impact of his narrative, the latter its acceptance. It is evident – but not at all specifically American – that people are more ready to accept praise and confirmation than criticism and correction. Moreover, as the overview of the audiences’ stance suggests, Bush’s narrative and security logic was kept alive during 2009, and it seems to have been reinforced by the incidents at Ford Hood and Detroit in the fall of that year. However, as the discourse of fear continued it was difficult for Obama to end the politics of fear. His administration was constantly confronted with Bush’s security logic, which was reiterated in Congress and the public sphere. Apparently, the prevalent opinion was that sticking to the rules would further threaten America’s national security. Assuming that extreme enemy images, once established, become stable in that they enduringly structure our perception and cannot easily be overridden (Finlay et al. 1967: 15; Jervis 1976: 187; Nicklas 1985: 103f; Lippert/Wachtler 1988: 79f; Flohr 1991: ch. 3; Lilli 1992: 21; Weller 2001: 20), Bush’s discourse and its effects indeed constrained Obama’s agency. After all, Bush’s narrative had largely closed off alternatives that would look reasonable in the ‘War on Terror’. With the dichotomy of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’, many political options were excluded from the outset. Bush’s classical threat scenario required relentlessness not forbearance; the ‘ticking time bomb’ scenario with consequences as horrific as the holocaust called for decisive action. Within this framing, the only plausible maxim was ‘security first’ and it had to be warranted by all means possible – not only to save the American people but all ‘freedom-loving people’. A consequence of this framing is that the use of force trumps international (humanitarian) law because in the face of existential threat only the former is believed to be effective. Again, this characterizes security narratives and securitizations in particular as discourses of exclusion (Lock 2008: 75, 78). Moreover, if the ‘other’ is thoroughly demonized and dehumanized, there is “little possibility of anything but annihilation” (Jackson 2005: 91). Against this background, Obama’s intent to provide fair trials and to grant captives constitutional rights appeared inacceptable, as did the prospects of the further costs and the inconveniences that these plans would have caused. In this respect Bush’s discourse continued to largely dominate public thinking and its established views and concepts demonstrate great sustainability.

Overall, Obama’s stance was difficult as he held what Forsythe (2011: 5) calls an “absolutist moral-legal position”. For security reasons, Obama sought to change America’s detention and interrogation policies in order to regain the moral high ground. However, acting on an ‘absolutist moral-legal position’ also meant rejecting some of the available means with which to fight terrorism (Forsythe 2011: 5). Whereas the Bush administration had been able to claim that it had done ‘everything’ to protect the nation, the Obama administration had to restrain itself and define limits. With this policy, Obama was easily accused by his critics of not doing everything that was possible to secure the American people, and opponents like Dick Cheney capitalized on this point. In the end, Obama’s course was understood as demonstrating a dangerous level of weakness, because large sections of the American people rejected Obama’s framing that observing the limits was key to keeping them secure. Instead, the public considered this policy as a matter of morality and not of survival. Morality, though, would have been a problematic topic by itself. Obviously, by 2009 there was a lack of understanding among the population that America’s conduct was actually unlawful. By regarding national security as preceding everything else, many things appeared acceptable – and had indeed been practiced for years. The very fact that these extraordinary measures had been applied for a long time, seemed to confirm their legitimacy. This, again, substantiates the constructivist understanding that discourse shapes action and action shapes discourse. Obviously, for many Americans, Bush’s emergency actions had reached a point of normalcy that made changes even more difficult. Eight years after the attacks, Guantanamo and the detention and interrogation practices there had become institutionalized.

The aim of this book has been to analyze the link between ‘speaking security’ and political practices and thus, in line with the intent of CDA and CS, to highlight the power of discourse and the importance of critical language awareness. Having scrutinized the discourse after 9/11, it must be acknowledged, though, that it is especially difficult to preserve a critical attitude in times of crisis when people are likely to be looking for reassurance and strong leadership. Under these circumstances, imbued with shock and fear, scrutinizing framings is certainly more difficult than during ‘normal’ times, since people are more willing to believe what is declared by the authorities. Besides that, in the realm of foreign and security policy, it is often difficult for audiences to verify what is posed by politicians since relevant information might not be accessible to them at the time. This was also true with regard to Bush’s claim that ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ would provide valuable intelligence and thus keep America safe. However, as the case demonstrates, times of crisis are apt for securitizations and it is therefore of essential importance to remain critical and discerning during crises. Bush’s case confirms that if securitizations are successful, established rules and laws no longer constrain policy, which is exactly what the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitization emphasizes. Therefore, politicians bear a particular responsibility for their framings as they construct political demands. With regard to foreign and security policy, it is largely politicians who construct the perception of what is necessary and morally sanctified, or even inevitable, in terms of political action. Taking into account that the military, the CIA and the FBI have since confirmed that the intelligence gathered through ‘enhanced interrogations’ after 9/11 was of little value, this is a case in point. This assessment, which was substantiated by a report by the U.S. Senate in December 2014, debilitated the justification for torture. Similar to the Copenhagen School’s assumption that securitization is not necessarily bound to ‘real’ threats, political action that follows from securitization is not necessarily bound to ‘real’ facts. The power of securitization is particularly displayed by the ability to make things up and thereby render certain extraordinary policies possible.

8.3 Topics of Further Research

In light of this critical discourse analysis and the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitization, there are two main aspects that need further investigation: first, more research is needed into the context in which the presidents’ security narratives were embedded; and second, the role of the audiences needs to be further examined. With regard to the former, it has been mentioned that the contexts differed considerably if one regards the aftermath of 9/11, and the year 2009. Although both periods in the United States were dominated by a feeling of crisis, the end of 2001 and the year 2002 were characterized by the shock and fear of the recent terror attacks; in contrast, in 2009, the nation was struggling with a recession. Obama’s narrative thus lacked the temporal proximity to the atrocities of 9/11 and the atmosphere of shock that Bush had been able to capitalize on. Assuming that the success of securitizations strongly relates to the context in which they are embedded and that times of crisis function as catalysts for political resolve (Balzacq 2005: 179), Bush had a clear advantage in terms of contextual features. In 2009, the American people did not come to believe that the danger emanating from Guantanamo in terms of terrorist propaganda and alienated partners was a matter of survival; instead, ‘security interests’ were more likely to refer to jobs, payments, and housing. One could suggest, therefore, that one of Obama’s main impediments to discursive dominance was that his security narrative, and, as such, his proposed policy change, was not embedded in a related crisis context. Certainly, the audiences’ “readiness to be convinced” (Balzacq 2005: 192) was considerably lower than in Bush’s case. Yet, the impact of the context on the acceptance and reproduction of Obama’s framings needs further consideration. Future studies could highlight, for instance, how the discourses of economic threat and of terrorist threat were positioned in public awareness and how the media stressed one or the other.

In general, a more exhaustive analysis of the media could be useful. In how far did it abet public bias in the security discourse and thus channel the mainstream? In Bush’s case the role of the media has been highly scrutinized; in Obama’s case there is more work to be done.150 Thus, a detailed examination needs to be undertaken of how and by whom Obama’s framings were reproduced, altered or rejected. This would shed further light on both the reach of Obama’s framing and the relation between the participating groups in this discourse (Schwab-Trapp 2010: 179). In general, with regard to the discourses of Bush and Obama, a closer investigation of the inner circle of the apparatus could be promising. As far as issues are dealt with in secret, the inner circle becomes both the securitizer and the most relevant audience for those who are involved in political decision-making. As indicated in Bush’s case, for example, military personnel appeared to be the most critical voices in reacting to Bush’s policies. Examining this in detail would further illuminate how things became possible and to what extent particular groups are vested with discursive power.

Overall, this study brings up the question of the kind of psychological effects that wordings and framings can have. As discussed, Bush strongly appealed to listeners’ emotions, whereas Obama was more sober and tended to address the audiences’ intellect. In how far could this have been a reason why Bush’s framings proved to be of particular strength and persistence and were more accepted than Obama’s? In this respect, it might be worth exploring the presidents’ speeches with a particular focus on their emotional and intellectual appeal. In this realm, the psychological effect of fear in politics is certainly of interest, i.e., in how far the endurance of Bush’s security logic was a matter of persistent fear that had been produced and substantiated during the Bush era. Evidently, fear has an impact on people’s reasoning and it is probably very difficult to override with rational arguments. All these aspects might have contributed to Obama’s shortfalls and their analysis would doubtlessly provide a valuable addition to the study at hand.

Finally, it must be left to other scholars to examine how the presidents’ discourses impacted on the international standing of human rights and the boundaries of the acceptable.151 The extent to which Bush’s discourse has impaired these issues and in how far Obama’s discourse was able to ameliorate the damage caused, are certainly research topics worth engaging in. This is also true for the question whether Obama has succeeded in restoring the image of the United States as a role model for human rights. Investigating these issues would require a long-term perspective. Moreover, this study poses the question of America’s stance on human rights in general. Clearly, there is a tension between America’s security needs and its obligations to universal human rights. As has been pointed out, Bush completely abandoned large parts of international law. In his threat scenario, America’s security needs easily trumped the human rights of the ‘other’. This represented the ‘lesser evil’ in comparison to what would otherwise have happened. In Obama’s case, linking national security to compliance with due process certainly lifted America’s morality and its sense for human rights, but it is plausible to suggest that the promotion of human rights law was not Obama’s primary concern. In fact, human rights organizations directly complained about this point (AI 2011). Obama presented moral commitment in terms of self-interest; in his narrative, morality was a matter of security. He rarely argued on behalf of human rights for their own sake. Therefore, the question remains in how far human rights are cherished as such by the United States, or whether they are only of value if constituted as essential for America’s security.