10Beyond Wishful Thinking
While Camp David significantly altered the political, military, and strategic situation in the Middle East, the Carter Administration did not relegate its national interests to the status of mere wishful thinking. Despite the Administration’s optimistic outlook toward the Arab–Israeli conflict, regional security concerns endured. The Camp David Summit epitomized the Administration’s original emphasis on preventive diplomacy and nonmilitary solutions to sources of conflict. It sought to defuse the sources of the Middle East conflict by engaging the regional stakeholders in celebrating a comprehensive settlement. Ultimately, it removed Egypt from the Arab equation, significantly reducing the likelihood a new Arab–Israeli war. However, several challenges and threats to US national interests remained.
Many of these threats were identified during the early months of the Carter Administration. In his early review of US national strategy, Carter signed PRM-10 on 18 February, 1977, with the purpose of initiating a comprehensive assessment of the overall American national strategy and US capabilities. The review was to consist of two distinct studies. The first, to be conducted by the PRC and chaired by the Secretary of Defense, was a Military Force Posture Review, which would delineate a broad assortment of alternative military strategies and develop the alternative military force postures and programs that best sustained each of the military strategies. Among other issues, this review was to consider:
military force levels; technological developments with regard to new weaponry; alternatives to our reliance on foreign bases; deterrence at reciprocally lowered strategic levels; viability and desirability of the “triad” posture. This portion should also evaluate the relative ability of the US and its allies to achieve US objectives in specified military contingencies. It will identify the key issues for Presidential decisions, including the budgetary implications of each of these postures. (PRM-10: 1)
The second study commissioned was a Comprehensive Net Assessment (CNA) to be conducted by the SCC under the chairmanship of the APNSA. This study would consist of a review and comparison of the overarching developments in capabilities – that is, political, diplomatic, economic, technological, and military – between the US, its allies, and its adversaries, particularly the USSR.
In June 1977, the Secretary of Defense submitted the Final Report of the Military Force Posture Review. The review was designed to solicit Presidential policy guidance on issues dealing with US military strategy essentially by developing an assortment of substrategies for creating Alternative Integrated Military Strategies (AIMS). In order to identify the possible policy options available to the Administration, the substrategies were divided into five analytical areas or conflict categories (PRM-10, Annex):
1.NATO-Warsaw Pact (WP) conflict in Europe (including the NATO flanks and the North Atlantic);
2.Operations outside Europe during a NATO- Warsaw Pact war;
4.Peacekeeping activities and potential local wars;
5.US–USSR nuclear conflict.
In order to develop the various substrategies for guiding US strategy toward the multiple potential threats, the major issues in each analytical area were isolated and an assortment of building blocks were posited. Subsequently, after excluding the unworkable combinations of substrategies, a group of eight AIMS was devised assessing the major military issues facing the US:
AIMS E – based on the premise that the US objectives can be achieved with somewhat reduced reliance on military force, but the US still would retain the capability to wage a major conventional war of short duration with the USSR. US strategic nuclear capabilities would be somewhat reduced; not all US advantages would be maintained, nor would an extensive, efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued. The nuclear threshold would be about the same as it is currently. In conjunction with NATO allies, the US would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days. (A defense which stabilizes along the Weser-Lech line yields to Pact forces about a quarter to a third of the FGR territory east of the Rhine River). In addition, the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of a European War. A reduced presence in East Asia (no US forces in Korea or the Philippines) would reduce the potential for certain regional involvements and would reduce, but not negate, the US ability to influence great power relationships there. Other global interests would be advanced primarily by diplomatic and economic efforts, and any limited military intervention would require drawing down forces dedicated to other purposes.
AIMS F – based on the premise that US objectives can be met through a strategy achievable by approximately the current US military forces, but with a capability for sustained combat comparable to that of our NATO Allies. US nuclear capabilities would be somewhat enhanced; all present US advantages in strategic nuclear force balance indices would be retained, with the expectation of a hard-target kill capability against all Soviet silos. The nuclear threshold would be about the same as it is currently. As in AIMS E, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days, thus involving loss of NATO territory. In addition, the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of a European war. In contrast to AIMS E, the current programmed military deployments in East Asia, less land forces in Korea, would be retained. Other global interests would be advanced by a moderate capability for unilateral military action without drawing on forces dedicated to other purposes.
AIMS F Variant – is based on the premise that US objectives can be met by a modest increase in US military capability and a substantial increase in sustainability in our NATO allies. This strategy is identical to AIMS F except that in a European war, sustainability is commensurate with that currently programmed for US forces, with a requisite increase in sustainability by our NATO allies. In conjunction with the NATO Allies, the US would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 90 days, still involving loss of NATO territory. Both sides are assumed to have the capability to employ additional forces in Central Europe beyond the first months of the conflict, so this AIMS requires more forces than AIMS F. AIMS F Variant requires forces at least comparable to those in the current US Five Year Defense Program, but in excess of those currently programmed by the NATO Allies.
AIMS G – based on the premise that achievement of US objectives both inside and outside Europe would be enhanced by a stronger conventional military capability outside Europe. US strategic nuclear capabilities would be somewhat reduced; not all US advantages would be maintained, nor would an extensive, efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued. The nuclear threshold in Europe, however, might be raised because of the enhanced conventional capabilities outside Europe. As in AIMS E and F, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw PACT conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days, thus involving loss of NATO territory. Contrary to previous AIMS, however, the US would maintain naval and air forces capable of taking conventional initiatives outside of Europe against the USSR. In East Asia, approximately the current programmed military deployments – less land forces in Korea – would be retained. Other global interests would be secured by a significant capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes. This intervention capability would be capable of direct confrontation with Soviet forces if necessary.
AIMS H – is based on the premise that support of US objectives requires a raising of the NATO nuclear threshold through a stronger conventional defense, while reduced reliance on military force is possible elsewhere. This raised threshold is assumed to permit a slight reduction of US nuclear capabilities; not all US advantages would be maintained, nor would an extensive, efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued. In Europe, and in conjunction with NATO Allies, the US would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days. In addition, the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of a European war. A reduced presence in East Asia (no US forces in Korea or the Philippines) would reduce the potential for certain regional involvements and would reduce, but not negate, the US ability to influence great power relationships there. Other global interests would be advanced primarily by diplomatic and economic efforts, and any limited military intervention would require drawing down forces dedicated to other purposes.
AIMS I – based on the premise that support of US objectives requires a raising of the NATO nuclear threshold through a stronger conventional defense, while maintaining approximately current capabilities outside Europe. The raised nuclear threshold would be accompanied by a slight increase in the current strategic nuclear levels. All present US strategic advantages would be retained, with assurance of a hard-target kill capability against all Soviet silos. As in AIMS H, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack in Europe and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days. (Two excursions, to size US war reserve stocks for 180 days and for an indefinite time, but without change to combat forces during those periods, were evaluated). In addition, the US would maintain limited air and naval capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of a European war. In contrast to AIMS H, essentially the current programmed military deployments in East Asia – less land forces in Korea – would be retained. Other global interests would be advanced by a moderate capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes.
AIMS J – is based on the premise that decreased levels of strategic nuclear forces are desirable. A significant and sustainable conventional military capability permits such decreased nuclear dependence. Thus, US nuclear capabilities would be reduced to the level of assured retaliation only – the capability to substantially destroy Soviet economic and leadership resources – and minimal counter-military capability would be provided, with no attempt made to match or offset strategic force asymmetries in the Soviets’ favor. As in AIMS H and I, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack in Europe and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days. US war reserve stocks, however, would be sized to provide for indefinite combat to avoid NATO’s having to resort to nuclear weapons should the Pact be able to sustain the conflict beyond 90 days. Contrary to AIMS H and I, the US would maintain naval and air forces capable of taking conventional initiatives outside Europe against the USSR which would further enhance deterrence in Europe. In East Asia, approximately the current programmed military deployments – less land forces in Korea – would be retained. Other global interests would be advanced by a significant capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes. This intervention capability would be capable of direct confrontation with Soviet forces if necessary.
AIMS M – is based on the premise that significant, sustainable conventional power capable of responding to any Soviet conventional attack combined with clear US nuclear superiority is required to support achievement of US objectives. US nuclear capabilities and threshold would be raised to near maximum levels; US strategic capabilities would exceed that of the Soviets and in all significant indices – forces, modernization, and options for major active defenses. Such a nuclear posture would be designed to deter Soviet first use and provide political leverage. Should Warsaw Pact aggression occur in Europe, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would defend in Central Europe while the US would initiate and attack against less heavily defended Warsaw Pact territory on the flanks to secure negotiating leverage. Major conventional capability is also maintained elsewhere to assure fulfilment of US global interests with a high probability of success. This would call for an increased military presence in East Asia and major intervention capability in other regions. (PRM-10: 3–5)
The study rested on an assortment of deep-seated assumptions (PRM-10). To begin with, it was believed that the Soviets would continue to pose the main threat to US interests and American security at home and abroad. The second major postulate was that European security would continue to be vital to the US and America would maintain its commitment to actively defend NATO against aggression by the Warsaw Pact. Equally, aggression against Japan was also deemed a threat to US vital interests. A further assumption was that any conciliation between the Soviets and Chinese would not be sufficient to warrant a significant decline in the military forces facing each other. Therefore, continued Sino-Soviet hostility implied that the US would not need to secure specific conventional forces in order to counter a potential Chinese military threat. Finally, the study assumed that due to the interdependent international environment, the US would continue to have major interests worldwide.
The Military Force Posture Review also assessed the capabilities of the American force structure (PRM-10, Annex). Consequently, it concluded that if war with the Soviets erupted at that time there was only a remote chance that NATO could stop a Warsaw Pact attack in Central Europe. While defeat of NATO forces in Central Europe and penetration toward the French border and North Sea Coast was deemed unlikely, the study considered implausible that NATO forces could quickly recover the lost territory. It was also assumed that NATO could defend its flanks, particularly in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean. A US–Soviet confrontation outside Europe revealed uncertainty as to an Allied victory. Moreover, a nuclear confrontation between the US and the Soviets would result in a high degree of devastation to both parties and deny victory to either.
While analyzing lower level contingencies, the study found that the US would prevail against the Soviets in a one-on-one confrontation in the Middle East. Furthermore, the US would have considerable advantage over the Soviets in deploying combat forces in sub-Saharan Africa. In the Korean peninsula, it was presumed that a North Korean surprise attack could temporarily lead to the capture of Seoul. However, with US assistance, it was judged that the Republic of Korea would eventually prevail against its northern neighbor.
Additionally, the study presented six interrelated key questions for the President to consider before rendering a final judgment on US strategy (PRM-10):
1.How should the US deal with the threat of Soviet aggression? In particular, what should be the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces for deterrence and defense? If deterrence fails, to what extent should the US rely on the early use of nuclear weapons?
2.To what extent should the US, for political or military purposes, state objectives or fund programs for security in Europe which are inconsistent with the interpretation or implementation of NATO strategy by other members of the Alliance?
3.To what extent should the US acquire military capabilities, above those required for the European theater, to undertake military operations (either offensive or defensive) against the Soviets in a US–USSR war?
4.To what extent should the US plan to have military forces (or supplies) available for crisis management or intervention in local wars? To what extent should these forces (or supplies) be available without drawing from those required for a major US–USSR war?
5.What should be the US military strategy in East Asia? Should the US maintain the current military presence or include additional adjustments in US forces in Korea and the Philippines?
6.What constitutes an adequate strategic force posture?
The study put forward a broad array of considerations in relation to each specific question – it did not, however, provide answers. The answer to these questions would determine the appropriate strategy for the new Administration to apply and would ultimately result from a political decision.
Nevertheless, the PRM-10 study did divulge several interesting assumptions about US–Soviet competition and US military capabilities, particularly regarding the Middle East. To begin with, it emphasized the strategic importance of the region for the US and its Allies. The need to safeguard access to the regions’ natural resources created the potential need for American intervention:
The continued flow of Persian Gulf and North African oil is crucial to the war capability of the NATO Alliance. Consequently neither the Soviets nor ourselves could ignore the importance of these resources, and US forces could be called on to counter Soviet attempts to interdict oil SLOC’s or take over the oil fields themselves. (PRM-10, Annex: 22)
Moreover, while competition with the Soviets was considered the highest threat and priority for developing US strategy, the study foresaw the importance of local conflicts, namely in the Third World. Continued international crises and local wars warranting US involvement were judged very likely over the coming decade. US action could vary from crisis management or peacekeeping activities to direct military intervention. The response varied according to each particular circumstance, allowing for a large measure of flexibility in choosing the appropriate course of action. Nevertheless, the study upheld that the “significance of interests in some regions, such as the Middle East, may justify a degree of military involvement under any circumstances” (PRM-10, Annex: 24).
The main problem with this contingency was US force projection into the region. While the US currently had the capability to respond to these situations, planning was necessary in order to guarantee their appropriate application, namely guaranteeing their deterrent function:
A de facto capability to deal with crises and local wars would exist even if forces were acquired only to deal with a major US-USSR war. However, in the absence of an independent decision establishing planning guidance for local wars, drawing on these sizable forces might not provide a satisfactory capability for crisis management or intervention. For example, to make sure that these major war forces were in Europe when needed, significant portions of the force and its equipment might be forward deployed with the remainder tied to strict, time-phased mobilization and deployment schedules. If it were subsequently decided to employ these forces in a crisis or local war, the capability to make initial, forcible entry, such as that possessed by airborne and amphibious forces, might be lacking. Appropriate basing and rights of passage might be unavailable. Additionally, the strategic lift available might be inappropriate to deploy the “European” forces and equipment in a timely manner. Their training and equipment might be unsuitable for a non-European environment, and they might have inadequate logistic support to accomplish the local war mission. (PRM-10, Annex: 24–25)
To meet operational demands, the study indicated that decision makers could choose between two main options: procure additional resources or draw down from existing capabilities.139 In the case, the US did not want to draw down on existing forces, the study recommended securing additional land combat forces and tactical air forces. Supplementary naval forces and strategic mobility forces, along with airborne and amphibious forces, depended on the level of intervention selected in each particular moment. If, however, the option was to draw down, a certain number of caveats were presented, namely concerning the mix of forces, deployments, and operational requirements. In particular, PRM-10 argued that the chronological relationship between local and global conflicts would highly influence the operational availability and effectiveness of the forces:
If US intervention in a local war occurred prior to an outbreak of a war with the USSR, some intervention forces would not be available rapidly for employment against the Soviets in Europe or elsewhere. If the intervention forces are additive, no adverse impact would occur in the US-USSR war. If the intervention forces are inclusive, there would be a reduction in US forces available for the US-USSR war. The effect might be to limit US capability in the critical early days of the major war. On the other hand, if the US-USSR war started before the local war, the US would have already committed inclusive forces to the US-USSR conflict and presumably would not want to take an intervention. In this situation, any additive intervention forces would be available as a central reserve to be employed in Europe or elsewhere to influence the war outcome. (PRM-10, Annex: 27)
PRM-10 reflected the general belief, principally within the Administration, that the US lacked the military capability necessary to deal with the multiple potential security threats in the Middle East. Several events contributed to this shared outlook (Palmer, 1999). The first was the British decision to withdraw from the Middle East. Traditionally, the US had relied on Great Britain to guarantee regional security. For instance, Great Britain intervened to impede an Iraqi invasion of the newly independent Kuwait in 1961 and British military forces stemmed radical insurrection in Aden and the Yemens. However, in January 1968 Great Britain announced it would pull out from east of the Suez – a retraction completed in 1971.140 Besides losing access to vital military intelligence due to the British pull out, the US faced a political and military void in the region, which could be exploited by the Soviets. In fact, as the British pulled out the Soviet Navy began consolidating its presence in the Indian Ocean. According to Palmer (1999: 86), “by the end of the year [1971], Soviet men-of-war had spent more time in the Indian Ocean than those of the US Navy.”
Moreover, as American involvement in Vietnam intensified under the Johnson Administration, the Middle East was increasingly ignored. While previous Administrations had attributed a more vital role to Middle Eastern security, Johnson’s concentration on East Asia, particularly Indochina, “led him to reverse the trend of the late-1950s and early 1960s toward a deeper American political and military involvement in the Middle East” (Palmer, 1999: 85). In addition, the Vietnam War also diminished domestic tolerance for foreign interventions. As a result, the Nixon Administration adopted a policy which emphasized a greater role for local actors in resolving endogenous problems, that is, the Nixon Doctrine. In the Middle East, the Nixon Administration favored a twin pillar strategy structured around Iran and Saudi Arabia.141 With time, the Administration increasingly came to rely on Iran to safeguard its regional interests and uphold regional stability. As a result, the Nixon Administration increased US support and aid to Iran and boosted its military capabilities (Alvandi, 2012; Kupchan, 1987; Palmer, 1999).
While Iran was entrusted with regional stability, the Nixon Administration still sought to maintain military assets in the region. Taking into consideration the domestic distaste for the commitment of troops on the ground, the Administration increasingly relied on naval forces (Palmer, 1999). As a result, in 1970 the NSC recommended and the President approved the maintenance of the US Navy’s Middle East Force in Bahrain.142 Additionally, the US continued to develop its base on Diego Garcia, guaranteeing continued US naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
However, the Yom Kippur War (1973) jeopardized American military capabilities in the Middle East. Active American support of the Israelis led Bahrain to unilaterally terminate the lease agreement. While the US was able to renegotiate the agreement by amending several provisions, the US could no longer officially base the Middle East Force in Bahrain – although it did retain access to the base facilities. Several other regional ports were also closed off to American warships. In all, by mid-1974, 28 ports in eleven countries denied access to the US navy: “Only Manama (Bahrain), Port Louis (Mauritius), Karachi (Pakistan), Colombo (Sri Lanka), and the ‘dependable’ Iranian ports of Bandar Abbas and Bandar Shahpur continued to supply US navy ships” (Palmer, 1999: 99).
Moreover, as previously mentioned, the political consequences of the Yom Kippur War – that is, the oil embargo – placed a newfound relevance on the Middle East region. The possibility of the US being denied access to the region’s natural resources led American officials to assess the possible military options – ranging from increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean to direct amphibious assault (Palmer, 1999). Hence, guaranteeing US military access and force projection into the Middle East region acquired a renewed relevance.
In truth, in this period, the US already had the capacity to guard the Gulf. The Middle East Force was on hand and if strengthened it could patrol the regional waterways and take action regarding minor contingencies in the region. While the US had the capabilities to intervene in the Middle East with sea-based and airborne forces, it had serious difficulties in rapidly deploying land combat forces. Consequently, for more demanding military initiatives, such as fighting Iranian or Soviet forces in the Middle East, the US was seriously ill-equipped.143 As Kupchan (1987: 50) has clarified, “it was only the Soviets, because of their proximity to the region, that could credibly threaten to introduce substantial ground forces.” Besides the enormous effort required in transporting men and equipment over large distances, the Middle East presented additional operational constraints for the US. The lack of an adequate military infrastructure, coupled with a harsh physical environment, further deteriorated US military power. Furthermore, due to several of the previously mentioned constraints, American military operations would always be dependent on the willingness of the local regimes to cooperate with the US. These multiple constraints limited rapid American intervention in the region and hampered US chances of success.
Among other findings, PRM-10 emphasized the need to face up to America’s strategic limitations in the Middle East. It highlighted the vital importance of the region for the US and its allies. It also cautioned decision makers about the limits of US power to enforce its national interests in more critical scenarios. For that reason, it provided several different options for guaranteeing the security of American interests.
However, the interagency debate over PRM-10 revealed different perspectives within the Administration on how to deal with the multiple challenges confronting American security. The PRC discussed PRM-10 during two sessions held during the first 2 weeks of July 1977. The first meeting took place on 8 July and dealt with the initial five questions presented in the Military Force Posture Review. The second meeting was held on 13 July and sought to deal with the last question, that is, the issue concerning strategic forces.
During the 8 July PRC meeting, Brzezinski argued that, taking into consideration the current political environment in the US and Europe, it would be impossible to muster support for the procurement of the conventional forces essential to preserve European territorial integrity in case of a Warsaw Pact attack (PRC, 08/07/1977). In order to deter the Soviets, Brzezinski proposed the adoption of a “stalemate” strategy in which NATO would fall back, tying down the Soviets and leaving them with the political burdens of their aggression. General George Brown of the Joints Chiefs of Staff countered, arguing that territorial loss could be avoided if NATO maintained the 3 % per year growth in defense spending agreed on at the NATO Defense Ministerial meeting held in May 1977.
Regardless of these differences, all the participants agreed that while NATO must rely on a combination of means to deter the Warsaw Pact – that is, strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional forces – the primary concern was in improving conventional forces. What’s more, the group also shared the conviction that a distinction between declaratory strategy and actual capability was indispensable.
On the issue of operations outside Europe during a NATO–Warsaw Pact war, there was a general consensus that there were important positive consequences in taking initiatives against the USSR, specifically against Soviet territory. However, Secretary Brown argued that there were few opportunities, which would trouble the Soviets enough to affect the war effort in Europe. Likewise, David Aaron recommended that, rather than try to take initiatives against the Soviets, the US should secure access to the Persian Gulf.
As for East Asia, there was an agreement that, for the present time, the US should not make any additional changes to its military posture in the Far East beyond the withdrawal of the ground forces in Korea. Some members did defend a small increase in US presence in the region in order to reinforce the image of American commitment to the Far East.
When evaluating the strategy related to crisis management and local wars, there was broad agreement that “forces procured for this purpose should be added to those required for a NATO/Warsaw Pact war” (PRC, 08/07/1977: 2). The group considered the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Korea to be the most critical areas. Moreover, forces procured for this rationale could be used elsewhere if necessary. In order to secure this objective, Brzezinski proposed that creation of a highly responsive global strike force. The eventual use of the Second Division after its withdrawal from Korea was suggested.
In fact, the NSC staff had previously alerted Brzezinski to the possible necessity of supplementary forces for potential interventions in the Middle East. In a memo submitted to the APNSA, NSC staff members James Thomson and Victor Utgoff emphasized the critical need to address US strategy and capabilities in the region:
…the US is more likely to see a need to employ forces outside the NATO/Pact context than in it. The most obvious possibility is the Middle East: US interests there continue to grow as Western access to oil becomes more important; the possibility of conflict, potentially involving the USSR, remains higher there than in other parts of the world. The contingency assessment revealed that US capability to project power considerably exceeds that of the USSR in most areas of the world, including the Middle East, but that the US would face the greatest difficulty projecting power into the Middle East. (Thomson and Utgoff to Brzezinski, 06/07/1977: 9)
Hence, the analysis highlighted the limitations inherent in drawing forces from Europe for other theaters. While it stipulated that current capabilities were adequate for most contingencies, it stressed the need for the US to maintain “an independent land-force capability for forcible entry” (Thomson and Utgoff to Brzezinski, 06/07/1977: 10).
The debate over PRM-10 attests to the centrality of the Middle East in the Carter Administration’s geographic mental maps. The top foreign policy decision makers all shared the conviction of the region’s increasingly critical value. Yet, the interagency debate equally exposed the discrepancies within the Administration regarding overall policy orientation. In other words, while the Middle East was acknowledged by all as a vital region for US national interests, members diverged on how best to achieve the nation’s political objectives in the region. In accordance with Brzezinski (1983), two main groups with divergent perspectives emerged during the discussions. One group, composed of Secretary of State Vance and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Paul Warnke, favored a policy that limited US strategic forces to an assured destruction capability, while concurrently reducing American forces in Europe and Korea. This group sought to address the challenges pertaining to the Indian Ocean–Persian Gulf region through arms control initiatives negotiated with the Soviets, for example, the upcoming Indian Ocean demilitarization talks. The other group, which included Brzezinski and Secretary of Defense Brown, emphasized the growing momentum of the Soviet military and the vulnerability of the Persian Gulf region. They argued that the increased capability of the Soviets to project power into the Third World threatened US interests in these regions and required a more robust response.
Some of these disputes were settled with Carter’s signing of PD-18 on 24 August, 1977. PD-18 codified the Carter Administration’s US National Strategy and originated the interagency debate involving the assessment and evaluation provided by PRM-10. The directive focused essentially on the US–USSR relationship and acknowledged that the US continued to have several critical advantages over the Soviets. As a result, the US would harness its economic, technological, and political assets in order to (PD-18):
–Counterbalance, together with our allies and friends, by a combination of military forces, political efforts, and economic programs, Soviet military power and adverse influence in key areas, particularly Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia;
–Compete politically with the Soviet Union by pursuing the basic American commitment to human rights and national independence;
–Seek Soviet cooperation in resolving regional conflicts and reducing areas of tension that could lead to confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union;
–Advance American security interests through negotiations with the Soviet Union for adequately verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements that enhance stability and curb arms competition;
–Seek to involve the Soviet Union in global activities, such as economic and social developments and peaceful nonstrategic trade.
On the whole, PD-18 emphasized the Carter Administration’s notion of maintaining a relationship with the Soviets based on competition and cooperation. While the US would seek to contend with the Soviets for global political and military primacy, PD-18 also put emphasis on cooperating with the USSR in managing and resolving many pressing international issues. Therefore, the directive was aligned with the concept of détente that the Administration had fashioned upon coming into office (Westad, 1997).
As Njølstad (2004) has accurately recognized, PD-18 stressed two major and demanding priorities for US global strategy. The first was the reassertion of the US commitment to a forward defense strategy for NATO, emphasizing the continued priority of European defense and security.144 The second was the need to create the necessary conditions for the US to be able to act in urgent situations outside Europe, particularly in the Middle East. For that reason, PD-18 called for the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force with the purpose of responding quickly to out-of-area crises and threats:
…the United States will maintain a deployment force of light divisions with strategic mobility independent of overseas bases and logistical support, which includes moderate naval and tactical air forces, and limited land combat forces. These forces will be designed for use against both local forces and forces projected by the USSR based on analyses of requirements in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, or Korea, taking into account the contribution of our friends and allies in these regions. US planning should provide that these requirements may be met by a combination of the light deployment forces, supplemented by forces in the United States, primarily oriented toward NATO defense. (PD-18: 4–5)
The idea of a rapidly deployed force was not new to American strategic planning. During the 1950s, the US created organizational arrangements to deal with geographically peripheral operation needs. More specifically, in 1958 the Army established the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) with the purpose of providing a force with flexible strike capability that could be deployed globally on short notice (Olinger, 2005; Palmer, 1999). Other services, such as the Navy, also began analyzing the expansion of their presence in the Indian Ocean. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff studied the appropriate command structures for missions outside the existing unified commands. Moreover, with the arrival of the Kennedy Administration, the concept of flexible response acquired additional prominence. As a result, the Joint Chiefs were instructed to establish STRICOM in 1962, which would manage the Middle East Force during periods of crisis, and strategic air and sealift assets were increased (Palmer, 1999). Growing US involvement in Vietnam hindered further developments. In fact, in 1971 the Nixon Administration dissolved STRICOM and did not include the Middle East within the newly created Readiness Command. The responsibility for contingency operations was subsequently attributed to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).
The RDF also fit well with the Administration’s perception of Middle Eastern tolerance to the presence of American forces. Secretary Brown contrasted the circumstances in the region to that of Europe and East Asia:
Many in the [Middle East] region object to westernization and the role of the United States as Israel‘s guarantor. (...) Consequently, even if the resources were available for US military deployments or other military actions clearly sufficient to prevent Soviet political domination or military conquest, they would probably have to be scaled down and stretched out to avoid counterproductive political effects that would outweigh the direct and indirect benefits. (Brown, 1983a: 150)
However, as described in Chapter 3, the implementation of the RDF became mired within the bureaucratic apparatus (Bliddal, 2011; Kupchan, 1987; Odom, 2006). Several reasons contributed to the sluggish implementation of the RDF. First of all, additional financial resources were not allocated to this undertaking and existing resources were already committed to other missions and operational requirements. Turf wars also emerged among the services hindering organizational details and preparations. Moreover, some agencies, for instance in the State Department, believed the creation of the RDF to be counterproductive to improved cooperation with the Soviets and to local Arab regimes. However, the continued preponderance of Europe in American strategic considerations stalled additional progress. As Njølstad (2004: 19) has pointed out, “[w]ith such a demanding European agenda it was hardly surprising that, after the issuing of PD-18 in August 1977, very little was being done to transform the recommended Rapid Deployment Force from a nice planning concept to a real-life military force.”
Some authors tend to highlight the lack of political pressure in favor of the prompt implementation of the RDF (Bliddal, 2011; Odom, 2006). However, the top officials in the Administration asserted, privately and publicly, the pressing need for the RDF on numerous occasions. For example, President Carter reiterated his commitment to the RDF in his address at Wake Forest University on 17 March, 1978. While restating the American pledge to support peace and stability in the Middle East and acknowledging that the responsibility for achieving that aim depended primarily on the local regimes, Carter (1983d: 23) did assert that the US would maintain forces of its own to support shared defense initiatives: “The Secretary of Defense, at my direction, is improving and will maintain quickly deployable forces – air, land, and sea – to defend our interests throughout the world.”
This phenomenon effectively illustrates the discrepancies between the decision-making and policy implementation processes. PRM-10 had undoubtedly contributed to centering the Administration’s top foreign policy decision maker’s mental maps on the Middle East. It helped define and characterize the problems facing the American security abroad. As Brzezinski (1983: 004) acknowledged, PRM-10 “provided the intellectual underpinnings for my own predisposition in favor of an activist, assertive, and historically optimistic policy of détente.” However, since the different agencies and services were still very much focused on other issues and regions, they were more reluctant to press on with the RDF implementation. Nevertheless, events in the vicinity of the Middle East reinforced many Administration officials’ conviction of the need to strengthen US engagement in the region.