China’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War

China maintained its spectacular economic growth after the Cold War and continued to use economic diplomacy as its major thrust in international relations. Although an ageing Deng Xiao Ping resigned from all official posts in 1991, he remained as the central figure in Chinese politics, and virtually controlled the party and the state in China till his death in 1997. The SME brought economic gains for China, which subsequently helped China in conducting international diplomacy more effectively. After the Cold War, the United States remained the only superpower in an altered international order. Deng’s pragmatic China wanted to be close to the world’s only remaining superpower. The United States also wanted to forge strong economic relations with China because of its emerging market. Mutual interests brought these two countries close after the Cold War. In 1994, the United States granted the ‘Most Favoured Nation (MFN) in Trade’ status to China. Despite persistent criticism in the US Congress about human rights violations in China, the United States did not hesitate to grant MFN status to China for trade and economic interests. By 1998–99, China became the fourth largest trading partner of the United States with bilateral trade reaching US $94.9 billion at the end of 1999. Sino-US two-way trade was only US $2.4 billion in 1979.

In 2001, China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO), backed heavily by the United States. Since then, it has become a major player in the WTO, supporting interests of the developing states. Sino-US trade continued to escalate in the new century as well. Two-way trade reached a substantial US $409.2 billion in 2008.¹³ The United States emerged as the top trading partner of China in 2008 and 2009, with Japan emerging as the second largest trading partner in 2009. These data revealed how China had used its economic diplomacy after the Cold War to bring former adversaries close towards China. Despite occasional American concern for an authoritarian political system, and violation of democratic and human rights in China, the US–China economic relations remained very strong after the Cold War, and these would continue to remain strong in the future for mutual trade and business interests. Strengthened economic relations also helped Sino-American political relations to improve after the Cold War. Top-level mutual visits by the leaders of the two nations continued after the war. American President Barack Obama visited China in November 2009. The US–China joint statement issued during Obama’s visit acknowledged China’s leading role in world politics, and particularly in Asia. The statement, which raised eyebrows in India, clearly indicated that China occupied a dominant role in Asia. It appeared to highlight the new Democratic Administration’s preference for China. This preference may also strengthen US–China political relations in future.

With Gorbachev becoming the President of the Soviet Union, Sino-Soviet relations began to improve. China’s relations with the new Russian Federation continued to grow after the Cold War. In 1991, the Sino-Russian Border Agreement was signed apportioning territory that became controversial during the Sino-Soviet border conflict during the Cold War period. In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited China, and signed economic and defence agreements with China. After Gorbachev’s visit to China in 1989, leaders of the two states continued to pay mutual visits. These top-level visits helped to normalize relations between the two countries. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited China in 2000, and signed three important economic and trade agreements with China. In 2001, Russia emerged as the top supplier of defence equipments to China. Also in 2001, the close relations between the two countries were formalized with the ‘Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation’, a twenty-year strategic, economic and arguably, an implicit military, treaty. Before this treaty was signed, the two countries joined Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to form the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a multilateral forum for economic and strategic cooperation.

The Russian government also agreed to transfer Tarabarov Island as well as one half of Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island to China in 2004, ending a long-standing border dispute between the two countries. The transfer had been ratified by both the Chinese and the Russian parliaments. The official transfer ceremony was held on 14 October 2008. This event was a big leap forward in bilateral relationship between China and Russia, and could act as a confidence-building measure in the future. Two-way trade between the two countries also registered significant growth in recent times. Sino-Russian trade volume was US $33.4 billion in 2006. It reached a healthy US $56.8 billion in 2008. During his visit to Russia in 2007, Chinese President Hu Jin Tao told Russian journalists that he was very optimistic about bilateral trade reaching US $80 billion by 2010.¹⁴ Russian President Dimitry Medvedev also expressed similar hopes during his state visit to China in 2008.¹⁵ Although the total volume of present China–Russia trade is not as large as the volume of Sino-American trade, it is encouraging to note that China–Russia two-way trade has gained momentum after the Cold War. It appears from the analyses made here that both countries are now eager to forge strong economic and political relations in a changed international order after the Cold War.

China also improved its relations with Japan, a close neighbour and an economic giant, after the Cold War. Under the SME, China allowed Japanese companies to do business in the country. This Chinese gesture helped to ease tensions between the two Asian neighbours. In 1992, Japanese Emperor Akihito visited China. This was the first visit to China by any Japanese Emperor after the Second World War. Naturally, this visit aroused great interests in the two countries and helped to improve relations. In 1993, Japan’s erstwhile Prime Minister Hosokawa expressed regrets on behalf of his people for Japan’s aggression over China during the Second World War. His regrets softened Chinese sentiments towards Japan. The two states are now politically and economically very close. Top-level mutual visits by the leaders of the two states are taking place regularly. In 2006, Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, visited China. During his talks with the Chinese leaders, Abe stressed on cooperation in bilateral trade and investment. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan in 2007 and held talks on various areas of cooperation between the two states. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi visited Japan in November 2009 and met Japanese leaders. Japan’s Foreign Minister Okada welcomed Yang on his official visit to Japan, and stated that Japan and China had engaged in dialogues on a variety of issues between their counterparts and that he would like to further promote active cooperation not only in bilateral relationship but also in regional and global issues. As mentioned earlier, Japan had emerged as the second largest trade partner of China in 2008 with a total trade volume of US $266.8 billion.¹⁶ Clearly, mutual economic interests had paid dividends in Sino-Japanese bilateral relations which improved significantly after the Cold War.

China also endeavoured to improve its relations with the ASEAN, the regional organization with strong economic credentials. China is an important part of the ASEAN + 3 mechanism that also includes Japan and South Korea as non-members of the ASEAN. China and the ASEAN now hold regular summits, also known as the 10 + 1 mechanism. On 24 October 2009, the Twelfth China–ASEAN Summit (10 + 1) was held in Hua Hin, Thailand. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and the leaders of ASEAN-countries attended the summit. The two sides reviewed the joint efforts to tackle the international financial crisis and other challenges faced by the two sides over the past one year, expressed their will to forge cooperation and seek common development, and reached broad consensus on deepening comprehensive cooperation. The China–ASEAN Free Trade Area (FTA), to be completed by 2010, would become another important milestone in the history of relations between the two sides. The current relationship between China and the ASEAN is featured by stronger mutual trust, closer ties in different areas, and the will to work for peace and security in the Asia Pacific region. China has also enhanced its cooperation with the EU. China’s relations with EU were established in 1975, and are currently guided by the 1985 EU–China Trade and Cooperation Agreement. At present, apart from regular political, trade and economic dialogue meetings between China and the EU, there are over twenty-four sectoral dialogues and agreements, ranging from environmental protection to industrial policy, to education and culture. The Twelfth EU–China Summit took place in Nanjing, China, on 30 November 2009. The joint statement issued after the summit acknowledged the role played by EU and China in fostering peace and harmony in the world, and called for increasing cooperation between the EU and China in the areas of trade, security, environment, education and culture. As a group, the EU emerged as the largest trade partner of China in 2008. China’s relations with the developing nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America also improved after the Cold War in an atmosphere of free market economy and changed political calculations. China is helping many developing states to improve their industrial and social infrastructure through economic and technological assistance. On the whole, an economically resurgent China is now playing the role of an important actor in world politics after the Cold War.

China–India Relations After the Cold War

Two years after India gained independence in 1947, the People’s Republic of China emerged as a new socialist country in Asia. Therefore, the modern Indian state and the new socialist state in China began their journey almost simultaneously. Initially, the two big Asian neighbours shared a cordial relationship among themselves. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, welcomed the creation of a socialist China as a victory in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism. Nehru’s socialist leanings encouraged him to establish close connections with China. China reciprocated by sending its leader Zhou Enlai to India, and the two countries declared that their friendship would be guided by the ‘Panchsheel’ (five principles) which essentially called for mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and the policy of non-interference. In 1955, China joined the conference of Afro-Asian states in Bandung, and supported the endeavour of these states to remain non-aligned in a sharply divided bipolar world perpetuated by the Cold War. India hailed the Chinese stance in Bandung.

The bonhomie, however, did not last long. By the late 1950s, differences over border issues and Tibet’s accession to China emerged between the two states. Both China and India accused each other of illegal occupation of territory. China further alleged that India was instigating the separatist Tibetans by giving shelter to the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan religious leader. From 1957, border skirmishes between the armies of the two states began. The two states went to war in 1962, in which China won convincingly. China’s victory in this war with India helped to fulfill, to some extent, a few political designs of China. These were: (1) to teach India a lesson on the issue of Tibet; (2) to nullify the Indian position on the border issue; (3) to scuttle India’s desire for leadership of the third world and (4) to harm Nehru’s image as a global leader. After the 1962 war, diplomatic relations were cut off, and the two states distanced themselves from each other. As a consequence, during the 1960s and the 1970s, Sino-Indian relations remained very low. Ambassadorial relations between them were restored in 1979, after the visit of the Indian Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to China that year; but bilateral relations did not improve much after the visit, the first top-level visit by any leader of the two countries since the war of 1962.

In 1981, China’s Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited India. It was decided during Hua’s visit that China and India would resume talks to resolve border problems. Accordingly, seven rounds of talks were held between the two countries from 1981 to 1987 in New Delhi and Beijing. But due to the inflexible attitude of both states, the talks failed. Sino-Indian relations did not improve till the late 1980s. With Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988, bilateral relations started getting back to normalcy. It was decided during this visit that the two states would form JWGs to continue dialogues to resolve outstanding border issues. The annual meeting of the groups would take place alternately in the capital cities of the two states. These groups were successful in reducing tension in the border areas. For instance, after an agreement reached in the JWG meeting in 1993, the two states reduced troops in the border areas. As a result, tensions subsided along the 4,000 km border between the two countries. After the JWG meeting in 1996, China and India announced a series of confidence-building measures to restore peace in border areas. Further, in the eleventh meeting of the JWGs in 1999, the two states agreed to work for regional peace and security and reduction of nuclear weapons, alongside border problems. Till 2002, the JWG met fourteen times in Beijing and New Delhi, and proved to be a very useful and successful mechanism for bilateral talks. Apart from the creation of the JWG, the two states also signed important agreements on cooperation in civil aviation, exchange of technology and cultural delegations. Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China helped to normalize relations between the two Asian neighbours. It also paved the way for further top-level reciprocal visits by the leaders of the two states.

Chinese Premier Li Peng visited New Delhi in December 1991. Peng was the first Chinese Prime Minister to visit India in thirty-seven years after Zhou Enlai visited India in 1954. It was also the first top-level visit from China after the Cold War. Three important agreements were signed during Peng’s visit: resuming border trade; cooperation in space research and opening of consulate offices in Mumbai and Shanghai. Peng’s visit was hailed as a success by the media in the two countries. Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited China in 1993. During his visit, Rao and the Chinese leaders agreed to reduce tension and restore peace along the LAC. An Expert Committee comprising diplomats and military personnel from the two countries was also formed to assist the JWG in bilateral talks. In 1992, President of India R. Venkataraman visited China, while Indian Vice President K. R. Narayanan paid an official visit to China in 1994. From the Chinese side, Li Ruihan, a top leader of the CCP, visited India in 1993, and the Chairman of the National Peoples’ Congress (NPC) Qiao Shi visited India in 1995. Since high-level visits are always important in bilateral relations, these reciprocal visits helped to improve Sino-Indian relations after the Cold War.

Chinese President Jiang Zemin paid a very successful visit to India in 1996. His was the firstever visit to India by a Chinese President. Four important agreements were signed between the two countries during his visit. These were: (1) agreement on confidence-building measures in the military along the LAC; (2) agreement concerning the maintenance of the consulate office of India in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the PRC; (3) agreement on coopeartion for combating illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and other crimes and (4) agreement between the two countries on maritime support. The visit initiated a process of cooperation between the two countries in new and newer areas. In April 1998, General Fu Quanyon, Chief of the Chinese Army, came to India and met senior Indian leaders, including Prime Minister Vajpayee, to discuss defence and security issues concerning the two states. India’s Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh visited China in June 1999 to discuss bilateral issues. So there was a spurt of high-level visits between India and China throughout the 1990s. The two neighbours shed many of their differences in this decade, and endeavoured to forge an amicable relationship between them. The effort continued into the new century with Indian President K. R. Narayanan’s official visit to China in May 2000, and the visit of Li Peng, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, to India in January 2001.

Two-way high-level visits continued, showing improvements in bilateral relations, and the Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji came to India in January 2002. Agreements on trade, science and technology, and environment were signed during Rongji’s visit. In June 2003, Atal Behari Vajpayee visited China again, this time as the Prime Minister of India. Vajpayee met President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and other Chinese leaders during his stay in China. The two states agreed to strengthen mechanisms for bilateral cooperation, and decided to create Joint Study Groups (JSGs) consisting of experts from the two nations to explore trade and business opportunities. It was also decided during Vajpayee’s visit that the defence ministers of China and India would exchange regular visits to monitor security issues, including border problems.

Wen Jiabao paid a reciprocal visit to India in April 2005 and met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and other Indian leaders. During his visit, the two sides issued a joint statement, establishing a ‘Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’. Chinese President Hu Jintao visited India in November 2006. India and China issued a joint declaration, outlining a ten-point strategy to intensify cooperation in all areas and to give greater strength to strategic and cooperative partnership between India and China. Manmohan Singh visited China in January 2008. A joint document entitled ‘A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China’ was issued during the visit, highlighting common positions on various international and bilateral issues. Prime Minister Singh visited China again in October 2008 to participate in the Seventh Asia–Europe Summit held in Beijing on 24–25 October. India and China have stepped up functional cooperation in all areas. The two foreign ministries have instituted dialogue mechanisms on issues relating to counter-terrorism, policy planning and security, besides strategic dialogue and regular consultations. There are also close cooperation in areas as diverse as water resources, judiciary, science and technology, audit, personnel, finance, and labour.¹⁷ India and China are now also parts of important multilateral groupings like the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) which try to protect the interests of group members in other international political, economic, environmental or trade forums. This reflects the desire of the two states to work more closely in bilateral and multilateral mechanisms.

A major area of satisfaction in bilateral relations is the increasing trade volume between the two countries. China–India trade, which totalled US $13.6 billion in 2004, rose to US $51.8 billion in 2008.¹⁸ China is already a leading trade partner of India. But there is ample scope for radical improvement in bilateral trade. In 2008, the total volume of China–India trade constituted less than 2 per cent of total Chinese trade, and less than 6 per cent of total Indian trade. This grey area in bilateral trade requires attention, because these two Asian neighbours are the most developing economies in the world today. They must pay more attention to each other in terms of trade. However, the pace of growth in bilateral trade since 2004 may be viewed with optimism.

Despite noteworthy improvement in China–India relations during the post–Cold War period, it would not be wrong to mention that the relationship suffers from lack of trust. Border problems are persistent irritants in bilateral relations, with occasional claims on each other’s territories. The Tibet issue often comes back to affect the relationship. For instance, the visit of Dalai Lama to India in November 2009 drew Chinese criticisms about India’s ‘designs’. Moreover, India fears that a militarily and economically strong China might prove to be a security threat for it. India cited the presence of a nuclear neighbour (China) as a security threat and as the justification for Pokhran II in May 1998. Chinese security-related supplies to Pakistan further exacerbate Indian schism.

The President of India Pratibha Patil paid an official visit to China from 26 to 31 May 2010. In Beijing, she held talks with Chinese President Hu Jintao and met with NPC Chairman Wu Bangguo and Premier Wen Jiabao. The Indian President attended the reception to mark the sixtieth anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two nations. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India from 15 to 17 December 2010. During his visit, Premier Wen met with President Patil, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Vice President Hamid Ansari, UPA Chairperson Sonia Gandhi and the leader of the opposition, Sushma Swaraj. Six agreements were signed during Wen Jiabao’s visit. These agreements covered areas such as green technologies, media exchanges, hydrological data, cultural exchange and banking. During the visit, a bilateral trade target of US $100 billion was set to be achieved by 2015. A Strategic Economic Dialogue and a CEO Forum were also established and the year 2011 was declared as ‘Year of India–China exchange’. The establishment of hotline between the Indian Prime Minister and the Chinese Premier, a mechanism of annual Foreign Ministers Meeting and a regular high-level exchange mechanism were also announced. Considering all these agreements and setting up of institutional mechanisms for closer cooperation, Wen’s visit to India was eventful.

Bilateral relations continued to be steady in 2011. This was manifested through several toplevel visits by leaders of the two countries. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Sanya in Southeast China from April 12 to 15 to participate in the BRICS summit. On the sidelines, he also had a bilateral meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao. In the same year, chief ministers of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat also visited China in June, September and November, respectively. Similarly, the Chairman of Xinjiang Autonomous Region and Party Secretary of Gansu also visited India as part of the MEA-ILD exchange and Distinguished Visitors Programme of the MEA. One of the highlights of the ‘Year of Exchanges’ was the visit of a youth delegation to China. Premier Wen Jiabao met and addressed the Indian youth. Several ministerial and official visits to China were made to participate in BRICS activities. For the first time, India–China Consultations on United Nations Security Council issues were held in March 2011. Leaders of the two countries have maintained regular contacts and have met frequently during international gatherings and meetings of multilateral forums in the recent past.¹⁹

The year 2012 was declared as the ‘Year of India–China Friendship and Cooperation’. In this year, high-level official visits between the countries continued unabated. In early February 2012, the Indian Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid visited China. He met with important Chinese leaders and discussed bilateral issues. About his trip, Khurshid told the media:

On the bilateral front, we have discussed our growing trade relationship. We are confident in our reaching the goal of US$ 100 billion by 2015. I have highlighted the need for initiating measures to balance our trade relations … Specifically, we have agreed that the newly established working mechanism for consultation and coordination in border affairs will have its first meeting at an early date.²⁰

Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi visited New Delhi in late February 2012 on an official trip and met with top Indian leaders. After his talks with the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Jiechi informed the media:

Under the current international and regional situation, China and India enjoy broad prospects for growth of bilateral ties. 2012 is an important year for the two countries to build on the past progress and usher in a better future. The two sides have agreed on programs of exchanges and cooperation, which will increase friendship between the two peoples, advance exchanges and cooperation in various fields and send a positive signal about the growth of the relationship.²¹

Chinese President Hu Jintao visited New Delhi for the BRICS summit in late March 2012. On the sidelines of the BRICS summit, the Chinese President met with senior Indian leaders and discussed bilateral issues. During his meeting with the Indian Prime Minister, the two leaders talked about enhancing economic, cultural and people-to-people exchanges.

Chinese Defence Minister and a member of the Central Military Commission General Liang Guanglie visited India during 2–6 September 2012. It was the first visit of a Chinese military general to India in eight years. General Liang Guanglie called on the Indian Prime Minister and the Defence Minister. The Indian and Chinese Defence Ministers had an extensive exchange of views on defence and military exchanges and cooperation between the two nations. They also discussed the regional security situation and international issues of common interest and concern. The two defence ministers agreed to work together to enhance mutual trust in the security field and continue to maintain peace and tranquillity in the India–China border areas.²² A series of other important high-level visits took place between the two countries in 2012. All these visits manifested the fact that India and China were eager to maintain close contacts at the political level and wanted to engage each other in different areas of bilateral cooperation. India–China political relations also got enhanced and strengthened by various mechanisms.

A change of government in India in the year 2014 did not alter efforts for close connection between the two neighbours. However, a few intriguing issues bothered bilateral relations when the new government, under the leadership of Narendra Modi, assumed office. The new Indian Prime Minister paid a three-day official visit to China from 14 to 16 May 2015. The visit was undertaken at a time when India–China relationship assumed a ‘complex’ character with the two Asian giants viewing each other with schism. A few key irritants affecting ties were a decadesold unresolved border problem and a mounting trade deficit that threatened to cross US $40 billion in 2015. Added to this was China’s announcement of US $46 billion in investments in an economic corridor through Pakistan and a section of disputed Kashmir areas, which fuelled Indian suspicion. In the backdrop of these issues, Modi’s visit aroused considerable diplomatic and academic interests. During the visit, the two sides have come up with some noncontroversial, yet important pacts to boost bilateral relations. These agreements covered areas from business to security, to the issue of trade deficit and e-visa.

During Indian Prime Minister’s visit, Chinese and Indian firms signed agreements worth more than US $22 billion in deals on 16 May 2015. The two nations signed twenty-one deals in areas ranging from telecom, steel, solar energy and films. India and China also decided to set up a hotline between the military headquarters of the two countries. It was decided that to build trust between the two militaries, China’s Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission will visit India and India’s Defence Minister will go to China regularly. There will also be an increase in the number of meetings between border personnel and commanders at all sectors of the India–China border areas. Joint counter-terrorism activities involving two naval forces and militaries were also proposed. It was also agreed that a ‘task force’ will look at ways to reduce the trade deficit that was US $38 billion in 2013–14 and expected to be in the range of US $ 40–45 billion in FY 2014–15. The task force was also supposed to examine India’s complaints regarding problems faced by Indian IT and pharmaceutical companies to enter the Chinese market. It will also look into complaints about problems faced by Chinese firms to invest in India. In a bid to boost tourism and advance people-to-people ties, Modi announced electronic visa on arrival facility to Chinese nationals. The announcement was expected to increase two-way flow of people as the years 2015 and 2016 have been designated ‘Visit India’ and ‘Visit China’ years, respectively.

Despite such laudable efforts at improving bilateral relations, the year 2017 saw renewed tensions between the two neighbours over the area of Doklam—a disputed border land between China and Bhutan, which is closer to India. Both China and Bhutan claim the ownership of Doklam, but India supports Bhutanese claim. On 16 June 2017, Chinese troops and engineers arrived in Doklam for constructing a road very close to Indian borders. Two days later, on 18 June, nearly 300 Indian troops arrived in the area. The two sides continuously issued diplomatic statements justifying their respective positions in Doklam. Bhutan also stated that the disputed territory belonged to Bhutan, and any Chinese construction in the area would be uncalled for. Indian and Chinese troops continued to stay in the area as tension escalated. Finally, troops were withdrawn in late August. Peace was restored, not only in Doklam, but also in India–China relations. On 5 September 2017, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping held hour-long discussions on the sidelines of the ninth BRICS summit that took place in Xiamen City, China. The two leaders agreed on a ‘forward looking’ approach to see that Doklam-like stand offs did not occur again. Both Modi and Jinping reiterated that maintaining peace in border areas was a prerequisite for cordial bilateral relations. Border tensions and trade deficit (from the Indian point of view) are the two areas of concern at this point of time (i.e., in 2018) in the relationship between the two Asian powers.

PART IV

Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation

The Post–Cold War Dilemma

The Russian Federation, the largest country in the contemporary world, emerged after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. It is one of the fifteen independent countries created from the former Soviet Union. Today’s Russian Federation (henceforth, only Russia) is twice as big as the United States and China, and six times bigger than India. Russia has retained permanent seat in the UN Security Council, and inherited a large portion of nuclear arsenals from the Soviet Union. Russia is now an emergent economy, a multiparty democracy and very rich in energy resources. So it is believed to have all the capabilities of emerging as an important power in world politics. The present foreign policy of Russia is geared to take up the ‘big power’ role in international politics. After the end of the Cold War, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia entered the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) along with eleven other former Soviet republics. However, immediately after the Cold War, it was struggling to find its proper role in world politics. During this period (1991–99), it concentrated more on domestic political and economic reconstruction, and pursued a modest, not-too-ambitious foreign policy, unlike the former Soviet Union.

The Yeltsin Period: An Incoherent Beginning

Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin was the first post–Cold War President of Russia. The Yeltsin administration had to give more time to build the ‘new look’ Russian Federation, which was passing through a transitional phase after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin tried to give a new dimension to Russian foreign policy as he made major departures from the preceding Gorbachev era. In early 1992, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev announced that Russian foreign policy would differ from foreign policy under Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ because now democratic principles would drive it instead of the earlier ‘socialist’ principles. These new democratic principles would give Russia the opportunity to engage itself in the global peace process in a new international order after the Cold War. Kozyrev also emphasized that the basis for the new foreign policy would be Russia’s national interests rather than the so-called class interests of the workers of the world that theoretically dominated Soviet foreign policy for a long time. For two years (1992–93), Russian foreign policy was generally low key and conciliatory towards the West with endorsement of many Western positions in world politics. Pressing domestic problems faced by the Yeltsin government were determining factors behind this ‘low key’ foreign policy.

But this departure from the traditional socialist policies, and conciliatory attitude of the Yeltsin government towards the West, raised severe public debates. Ultranationalists and communists criticized the new foreign policy as detrimental to Russian national interests. Some of them argued that Russia should not follow a low-key foreign policy with a ‘soft’ attitude towards the West. Foreign policy issues, along with other pressing domestic problems, were troubling the Yeltsin government immediately after the end of the Cold War. In response, the Yeltsin government came up with a comprehensive foreign policy document in 1993 to allay criticisms that the government’s initial foreign policy measures were sketchy and lacked imagination. This document, approved by the Russian Parliament in April 1993 and named as the ‘Foreign Policy Concept’, was the first major official foreign policy document of the Russian Federation.

The 1993 Foreign Policy Concept (FPC) declared Russia as a great power with several foreign policy priorities. These priorities were: (1) protecting the sovereignty and unity of the state, with special emphasis on border stability; (2) ensuring national security through diplomacy; (3) providing favourable external conditions for democratic reforms in Russia; (4) mobilizing international assistance for the establishment of a Russian market economy and assisting Russian exporters; (5) protecting the rights of Russians abroad; (6) furthering integration of the CIS and pursuing friendly relations with other neighbouring and nearby states, including those in Central Europe; (7) continuing to build friendly relations with all other countries and (8) ensuring Russia an active role as a great power. The FPC also called for enhanced ties with Asia-Pacific countries to balance relations with the West. Through the FPC, the Yeltsin government placed greater emphasis on the protection of Russia’s vital interests. The FPC of 1993 was Yeltsin’s answer to his critics and an attempt to place Russia as a great power in the new international order. It also refrained from pursuing open pro-Western policies.

Yeltsin was President of Russia for two terms: the first from 1991 to 1996; and the second from 1996 to 1999. During his first term in office, Yeltsin was rather unsure about the role Russia would take in international politics. He began in 1991 with a conciliatory foreign policy that manifested a soft attitude towards the United States and the West; but soon changed his position—as the FPC of 1993 makes evident—under increasing criticism from his rivals in Russian politics. From 1993–94, he started to espouse Russian nationalism and began to talk in terms of Russia as a great power. In his first State of the Federation Address to the Russian Parliament in February 1994, Yeltsin noted that as a great country, Russia was capable of preventing any global war, cold or hot, and Russia would also prevent the proliferation of WMDs. What is worth notable here is Yeltsin’s emphasis on Russia as the single main actor to prevent future global wars. Through his reference to the possibility of global war, Yeltsin tried to appease the Russian military and other conservatives within Russia that the United States and the West still remained a threat. He also opposed the expansion of the NATO to include Central European states leaving out Russia. He put emphasis on making the CIS an economic union with a common market and a common security system with guarantees on human rights. He warned that Russia would not tolerate any harm to its national interests.

The nationalist rhetoric of 1993–94 mellowed down in favour of conciliatory policies again in 1995–96. In his State of the Federation Address of February 1995, Yeltsin highlighted a cooperative and conciliatory foreign policy for Russia. He outlined Russia’s cooperation with the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized states, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the UN and the NATO. He announced Russia’s sincere intention to adhere to arms control agreements and hinted at possible reductions in Russian armed forces. Yeltsin, however, continued with Russia’s objection to the enlargement of the NATO and called it a threat to European security. He also announced that in 1995–96 Russian foreign policy would be peaceful and committed to the principle of ‘real partnership in all directions’ with the United States, Europe, China, India, Japan and Latin America. Russian foreign policy, Yeltsin declared in his address, would be guided by a ‘balance of interests’ with respect to the CIS and the Western world including the United States.

During his second term in office, Yeltsin was troubled by recurring health problems, domestic political turmoil, more intense separatist movements in Chechnya and a weak economy. As a result, he had to continue with conciliatory policies towards the West with occasional outbursts of Russian nationalism. For instance, during the 1999 Kosovo war, he strongly opposed NATO military operations and warned of possible Russian intervention and a resumption of the Cold War, if NATO deployed ground troops to Kosovo. He also had differences of opinion with the American President Bill Clinton over Moscow’s military intervention in Chechnya which, according to the American President, resulted in huge civilian casualties. Clinton requested him to stop military operations in Chechnya, which he refused. But at the same time Yeltsin relied heavily on the Americans and US-supported financial organizations for the reconstruction of the Russian economy. He sought help from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and from the US Treasury Department for Russia’s economic revival. During his presidency, Russia received more than US $40 billion from international financial organizations. His government was also accused of embezzling these funds, and other financial corruptions.

Yeltsin’s foreign policy, like his domestic policies, was marked by inconsistency and incoherence. Russia was searching for its proper identity and place in world politics during the Yeltsin presidency. Although it inherited the legacy of the former Soviet Union, Russia was unsure of its status in the new international order. It wished to bask in the superpower glory, and wanted to play a big-power role in international politics. However, the world at large, and Russia itself, was sceptic about its big-power status in international politics. With a struggling economy, a nascent and weak democracy, pressing domestic problems and an ailing but obstinate President, Russia’s transition from a socialist political system to a liberal democracy was arduous. It had to take conciliatory policies towards the West, yet wanted to pursue big-power ambitions. These incoherent policies did not help Russia to assume the leading role that it wished to follow in international politics during the Yeltsin period.

The Putin Presidency: A Resurgent Russia

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin assumed Russian Presidency in 2000, and served two tenures; first during 2000–04, and second, during 2004–08, lasting till May 2008. Putin was a more assertive leader than Yeltsin. This observation could be substantiated by the progress of the Russian economy, considerable domestic political stability, and a more focused and assertive foreign policy. During Putin’s eight years as the President, Russian economy grew at an average 7 per cent, making Russia the seventh largest economy in the world in terms of purchasing power. The country’s GDP (Gross Domestic Product) increased six-fold between 2000 and 2008, and the poverty level (people living below the poverty line) decreased from 30 per cent in 2000 to 14 per cent in 2008. Putin enjoyed a very high approval rating from the Russians, an average of 65 per cent during his presidency, the highest enjoyed by any leader in the world (as per public opinion surveys), because he was credited with bringing political stability to the country and restoring rule of law. In international affairs, Putin firmly placed Russia as a leading state and earned respect for it; a dream that his predecessor Yeltsin nurtured, but failed to achieve. This was possible through an assertive foreign policy backed by a resurgent economy. During his presidency, Russia emerged as an able competitor to the United States and Europe.

The theoretical foundation of Putin’s foreign policy was laid in the ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’ (FPCRF), approved and issued by the President on 28 June 2000. This sixteen-page document clearly stated the foreign policy objectives of the Putin government, and Russia’s priorities in the new international order in the twenty-first century. Section 2 of the FPCRF, entitled ‘The Modern World and the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation’, stated:

There is a growing trend towards the establishment of a unipolar structure of the world with the economic and power domination of the United States. In solving principal questions of international security, the stakes are being placed on western institutions and forums of limited composition, and on weakening the role of the U.N. Security Council. The strategy of unilateral actions can destabilize the international situation, provoke tensions and the arms race, aggravate interstate contradictions, national and religious strife… . Russia shall seek to achieve a multi-polar system of international relations that really reflects the diversity of the modem world with its great variety of interests.

Clearly, the pronouncements are assertive. By naming the United States as the power wishing to perpetuate its dominance in international affairs, Putin’s FPCRF denounced such tendencies and said that Russia was in favour of a multipolar world. These pronouncements sounded like resumption of the Cold War by the Putin administration, although it was proved later on that Putin was not interested in another Cold War; rather he wanted Russia to be strong and resilient, both in economic and security terms.

Putin’s foreign policy was forthright, yet moderate. Russia conveyed its opinions clearly without antagonizing other important powers. For instance, Putin condemned American attacks on Iraq in 2003 and called for removing economic sanctions from Iraq. But his views did not affect US–Russia relations. The Russian President had very good personal equations with George W. Bush (Jr). In fact, Bush waived economic sanctions on Iraq after the war was over in 2003. Before the Iraq war, Putin allowed coalition military bases in Central Asia during the US-led military operations in Afghanistan in 2001, despite objections from the ultranationalists in Russia. This instance showed that Putin’s opposition to the United States was issue-based, and not chronic. He signed the very important ‘Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty’ (SORT; also known as the ‘Moscow Treaty’) with Bush in Moscow on 26 May 2002. According to the treaty, both the United States and Russia would reduce 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed nuclear warheads each. The SORT, a significant step towards nonproliferation, would expire on 31 December 2012.

The moderate but assertive foreign policy pursued by the Putin government earned respect for Russia from the international community. Putin objected to Kosovo’s plan for separation from Serbia, and warned the United States and European powers not to encourage Kosovo’s cessation. At the same time, he was credited with improving Russia’s relations with the EU. He opposed NATO’s expansion programme, but also formed the NATO–Russia Council. These instances revealed stark pragmatism in Putin’s foreign policy. He understood correctly that Russia would require economic help from the United States and other European powers. Therefore, he did not blindly oppose these nations to appease Russian nationalists. Yet he never missed any chance to condemn American ‘dominance’ in international politics, and projected the image of a constructive critique of the United States in international relations. This moderate foreign policy yielded tremendous results for Russia.

During his eight years as the President of Russia, Putin’s foreign policy achievements were significant. Russia regained its status as a leading global power during the presidency of Putin. Sustained economic growth, coupled with assertive domestic and foreign policies, led to Russia’s enhanced international prestige and acceptance. It had emerged as the world’s biggest energy base, producing more oil than Saudi Arabia. Almost the whole of Europe is dependent on the export of natural gas from Russia. The growing arms and commodity items exports have made Russia the third largest reserve of foreign exchange in the world. Russia is now included in the group of the most rapidly developing emerging economies, the BRIC. Russia under Putin formed several multilateral forums like the Sanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), NATO–Russia Council, Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Quartet on the Middle East (QME) and the EU–Russia Common Spaces, to increase its presence and importance in international politics. It also continued with its strong presence in other important international forums like the UNO, CIS, WTO, G-8, OSCE and the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation). Russia’s active involvement in all these forums indicated Putin’s desire to achieve a big-power role for his country.

Vladimir Putin faced foreign policy challenges as well. Anti-Russian regimes in neighbouring states like Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Ukraine emerged for some time to threaten Russia’s security and its foreign policy initiatives in neighbouring countries. But Putin successfully met these challenges and made Russian position secure in Central Asia and East Europe. A failed ‘tulip revolution’ initiated by anti-Russian groups in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 turned into a nightmare for the local population. The failure, accompanied by killings and chaos in the capital and other cities, frightened the local elites and population; but at the same time it strengthened Russia’s position in Central Asia. Earlier, the much publicized ‘rose revolution’ in Georgia in 2003, and the ‘orange revolution’ in Ukraine in 2004–05 (these were also known as ‘colour revolutions’) that destabilized Russia-friendly governments in these countries, lost their sheen and gradually the political elite close to Russia came to power in Georgia and Ukraine. These failed revolutions in effect ensured the success of Putin’s foreign policy in neighbouring states. Putin warned the United States and West European powers not to meddle in Georgia and Ukraine, and the situation never went out of Russia’s control. The Americans, with limited strategic interests in Georgia and Ukraine, also restrained themselves because they did not wish to antagonize Putin due to increased American political and business interests in Russia. Putin and his Russia commanded more respect from the international community compared to Yeltsin and his Russia of the 1990s.

The foreign policy of Putin had its shortcomings as well. Russia, despite strong economic growth, failed to emerge as a major trade partner for many of its important neighbours like China, Japan and Kazakhstan. With industrial nations like Germany, Italy, England and Canada, Russian trade remained insignificant during the Putin period. Further, Russia’s trade volume with important regional organizations like the EU and the ASEAN did not assume significant proportions during the Putin presidency. Russia in 2009–10—when Putin was the Prime Minister and a main figure in the Medvedev government—seemed to have lost its earlier political influence in many neighbouring states, especially in Georgia and Ukraine, with the proliferation of anti-Russian forces in these states. However, negative points in Putin’s foreign policy are outweighed by the positive points. Without reviving the Cold War and significantly antagonizing the West, Putin was very successful in establishing Russia as an important actor in international politics.

The Medvedev Presidency

Dimtry Anatolyevich Medvedev took over as the Russian President on 7 May 2008, after Putin finished his two terms in presidency, the maximum allowed at a stretch by the Russian Constitution. He was appointed as the Prime Minister in the new government. Medvedev was widely known as the person groomed by Putin to take over the mantle after him. He continued with Putin’s policies in domestic and foreign affairs, although he often showed sparkles of his individuality in dealing with internal and external issues. Unlike Putin, Medvedev was not known in Russian politics as a person comfortable with foreign policy; he was more a ‘domestic’ politician. He was largely dependent on Putin and the Russian foreign ministry for external affairs. But he gradually attained control in foreign policy matters as well.

Like his predecessors, Medvedev also issued a Foreign Policy Concept (FPC) on 31 July 2008, that outlined foreign policy priorities of his government. It contained six priority areas that Russia wished to follow in international relations. These were: (1) the emergence of a new world order where Russia would work for a multipolar world instead of a unipolar world; (2) the primacy of law in international relations; (3) strengthening international security; (4) international economic and environmental cooperation; (5) international humanitarian cooperation and protection of human rights and (6) information support for foreign policy activities, by which Russia would demand correct and accurate information on foreign policy activities pursued by different states in the world. The FPC of 2008 contained nothing unique as compared to the FPCRF issued by the Putin government in 2000. The former also opposed the expansion of the NATO and called for equitable relationship between Russia and the NATO in the Russia–NATO Council. It objected to the inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine in the NATO and the projected expansion till the borders of Russia. The FPC stated that ‘Russia calls for building a truly unified Europe without divisive lines through equal interaction between Russia, the EU and the United States. This would strengthen the positions of the Euro-Atlantic States in global competition’. It also stressed on increasing cooperation with the CIS, the EU, Japan, China, the two Koreas, the ASEAN, and several West European, African and Latin American states.

Medvedev met US President Barack Obama in April 2009 during the Group of 20 (G-20) Leaders’ Summit in London. The two presidents issued a joint statement after their bilateral meeting which was cordial and positive. Medvedev and Obama agreed to pursue verifiable reductions in their huge nuclear arsenals. By agreeing to verifiable reductions, Medvedev made a departure from the earlier Putin administration, which did not go for the verifiable reduction clause after the SORT, signed in 2002. Both Medvedev and Obama reiterated their commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world, and vowed to work together to achieve the goal. They underscored the need for enhanced cooperation between their nations to meet the demands of the new international order. The statement noted: ‘We, the leaders of Russia and the United States, are ready to move beyond Cold War mentalities and chart a fresh start in relations between our two countries … Now it is time to get down to business and translate our warm words into actual achievements …’ The tone of the statement was very positive and underlined the desire of the Medvedev government to improve relations with the United States.

Medvedev, like Putin, continued the policy of economic diplomacy for Russia. He also used the resurgent Russian economy and strong energy resources to establish Russia’s position in international politics. Russia under Medvedev continued as the largest arms and energy exporter in the world. But Medvedev gradually came out of the shadow of Putin in foreign and domestic policy matters, and put the stamp of his own personality in these areas. For instance, Medvedev wanted the dismantling of a moribund OSCE in favour of more active security and cooperation mechanisms for Europe, and proposed a European Security Treaty. He established a Customs Union with Belarus, and proposed similar unions with other CIS-countries. Medvedev is no longer another Putin in a different garb; he is a different mind as well. Time is not yet ripe to scrutinize the success or failure of Medvedev’s foreign policy, because he has been in office for nearly two years (as of March 2010). But Russia under Medvedev is doing well in economic development and international affairs, although the process of building a democratic Russia is far from over.

Vladimir Putin again became President of the Russian Federation on 7 May 2012 for a sixyear term, as the tenure of Russian Presidency was extended from four to six years. Putin’s foreign policy was not much different from his earlier term. He nurtured cordial relations with India and China, but proved a hardliner in former Soviet states of Georgia and Ukraine. Russia also intervened in the Syrian civil war in September 2015, following a request by the Syrian government. It is believed that the Russian President shares a good rapport with the new US President Donald Trump, although the United States supported sanctions against Russia in recent times. Russia under Putin is trying to regain its important place in global politics and economy. Russia joined the WTO in August 2012, after Putin assumed presidency for a third term. However, Russian economy faced a crisis from the later part of 2014, when rouble collapsed due to a decline in the international price of oil, and some Western sanctions against Russia. The country is trying to come out of its present economic impasse, as Putin has imposed internal economic restrictions through several presidential decrees. On the international front, Russia is focusing more on South-East Asian countries for increased trade and business, rather than depending on the west. Politically, many European countries have condemned US-backed sanctions against Russia in recent times.

Russia–India Relations After the Cold War

India had strong and friendly bilateral relations with the former Soviet Union. The Russian Federation, since its formation in 1991, also developed cordial relations with India. After the end of the Cold War, the two countries began to think afresh about forging a close relationship in the backdrop of a new international order. During the first term of Boris Yeltsin as President of Russia, the relationship started to take a new shape. It took a while to consolidate bilateral relations as both Russia and India were new to the post–Cold War situations. However, the two sides began working sincerely on bilateral relations from 1992–93. During the January 1993 visit of Yeltsin to India, the two countries signed agreements that promised to herald new economic and defence cooperation between the two states.

A new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which replaced the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1971, was signed during Yeltsin’s visit. The new treaty dropped security clauses present in the 1971 treaty because both India and Russia felt that they were not necessary in the changed international order. Yeltsin announced that Russia would provide cryogenic engines for India’s space programme under a US $350 million deal between the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the Russian space agency, Glavkosmos. The Russian President expressed strong support for India’s position on Kashmir. A defense cooperation agreement aimed at ensuring the continued supply of Russian arms and spare parts for India’s military, and at promoting the joint production of defence equipment, was also signed during Yeltsin’s visit. Prime Minister of India Narasimha Rao and the Russian President agreed that bilateral trade, which had fallen drastically during 1991–92, would get a boost following the resolution of the dispute over India’s debt to Russia. Earlier in May 1992, the two countries decided to abandon the 1978 rupee-rouble trade agreement in favour of the use of hard currency. Although the cryogenic engine deal did not materialize, the visit of Yeltsin helped indeed to set the ball rolling, as it ushered in a new era of close relationship between India and Russia.

Narasimha Rao visited Russia in July 1994. He and Yeltsin signed declarations to continue close bilateral cooperation, and supply of Russian arms and military equipment exports to India. His visit yielded positive results for India. Apart from ensuring the continuation of Russian defence-related exports to India, he was able to restore the sale of cryogenic engines to India, which was seen as a diplomatic victory in Indian foreign policy circles. In December 1994, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin visited New Delhi to discuss bilateral issues with Indian leaders. Eight agreements were signed between the two countries during his visit. These agreements covered military and technical cooperation from 1995 to 2000, trade, merchant shipping, promotion and mutual protection of investments, and cooperation in outer space. The success of Chernomyrdin’s visit was hailed by the Indian and the Russian media as a return to warmer ties between the two countries. Regular top-level visits and close cooperation in different areas of bilateral interest have been continuing since Chernomyrdin’s visit to India.

The two countries inched closer and enhanced their cooperation at the turn of the new century. In October 2000, President Valdimir Putin of Russia visited India. India and Russia signed ten agreements in all during his visit. The most important agreement signed personally by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and the Russian President was the declaration on strategic partnership between the two countries. This declaration was very significant for the two countries as New Delhi and Moscow instituted an inter-governmental commission for military-technical cooperation under the co-chairmanship of the two defence ministers. Both sides have committed themselves not to participate in any military, political or other arrangements or armed conflicts threatening either side. Under the strategic partnership, long-term and diversified Indo-Russian cooperation would be organised in the sphere of metallurgy, fuel and energy, information technology and communications. Defence and military-technical cooperation arrangements would be put in place in a long-term perspective with special emphasis on cooperation between defence forces of the two countries. India and Russia would cooperate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and outer space. Putin assured the Indian leaders that Russia was willing to share cuttingedge defence technologies with India—an unprecedented commitment that went a long way to cement security partnership between the two states. The other agreements related to increased cooperation across the spectrum of political, economic, defence, technological and cultural spheres.

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee paid an official visit to Russia in November 2003. A joint declaration was issued during the visit and the Indian Prime Minister signed several agreements on bilateral cooperation with the Russian President in Moscow on 12 November. The agreements covered the spheres of science and technology, space, earthquake research, expansion of bilateral trade and defence supplies. The declaration referred to an agreement between the two countries on war against terrorism. Both Vajpayee and Putin affirmed a consistent and uncompromising approach on tackling terrorist threat. Russia endorsed the Indian position on resuming a dialogue with Pakistan, agreeing that an end to cross-border terrorism was necessary to initiate a purposeful dialogue. The declaration recommended a concrete and time-bound action plan under the aegis of the UN for the earliest restoration of democracy and sovereignty in Iraq. Both leaders also agreed that the role of the UN should be restored in dealing with problems of peace and security in the global context. They also agreed, as per the joint declaration, that all support should be given to the transitional government in Afghanistan to enable it to emerge as a stable country free from external interference. India and Russia further agreed that the future international order should be based on multi-polarity, and must be determined by collective and multilateral processes rather than unilateral initiatives. The declaration also reiterated that closer India–Russia cooperation in the fields of defence, space, and science and technology would be intensified and expanded in the near future.

With the Congress Party assuming power in New Delhi in 2004, it was hoped that India–Russia relations would get another fillip, considering Congress Party’s traditional preference for Moscow. Regular top-level visits continued after 2004, along with closer bilateral cooperation in different areas. The new Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, visited Russia in the first week of December 2005 for the annual summit meeting with the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. During Singh’s visit, India and Russia signed some important agreements. These were: (1) agreement on reciprocal protection of intellectual property rights in military technical cooperation; (2) space exploration cooperation agreement; (3) agreement on cooperation in the field of solar physics and solar terrestrial relationships; (4) agreement on implementation of programme for military and technical cooperation till 2010. However, contrary to expectations, the visit was low-key and yielded little significant results; and compared to Manmohan’s highly successful visit to the United States in July 2005, when India and the United States planned the civil nuclear agreement, his December 2005 visit to Moscow appeared to be just another routine diplomatic exercise.

The visit of Dmitry Medvedev, the new Russian President, to India in December 2008 yielded more positive results. He was the first world leader to visit India after the 26/11 terrorist attack on Mumbai. Obviously, terrorism was pushed to the top of the agenda. The joint declaration, signed by the Russian President and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, urged the international community to provide all assistance to India to bring to justice the terrorists who executed attacks on Mumbai. One of the major achievements of the visit was the new thrust on the proposed Indo-Russian peaceful nuclear cooperation. Apart from signing an agreement for construction of four more reactors at the Kudankulam plant in Tamil Nadu, where Russia was in the final stages of building two reactors, both sides expressed their desire to build additional reactors there, as well as to go for new nuclear plants elsewhere in India. During Medvedev’s visit, India and Russia also signed a deal totalling US $700 million for Russian nuclear fuel supply to India. The joint declaration further appealed to the international community to resolve the Iran issue through peaceful means, dialogue and negotiations. While requesting all sides for demonstrating flexibility and restraint, Russia and India upheld Iran’s right to conduct research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the terms of the NPT and its other international obligations. The Medvedev visit of December 2008 would be remembered for preparing the groundwork for the Indo-Russian Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, signed next year, and also for strengthening defence ties between the two countries.

Manmoham Singh paid an official visit to Russia in December 2009 for the annual summit meeting with the Russian President. The landmark civil nuclear cooperation agreement between India and Russia was signed on 7 December 2009, after talks between Singh and Medvedev in Moscow. The two leaders, in their joint statement, described the agreement as ‘pathbreaking’ and expressed hope that the agreement would deepen and strengthen the already existing nuclear cooperation between the two countries. By the terms of the agreement, the Russians would build twelve to fourteen nuclear reactors in India. The agreement with Russia was believed to be much more advantageous to India than the 123 agreements India signed with the United States, especially because the new agreement contained assurances on uninterrupted supplies of uranium to India for the atomic reactors and on transfer of nuclear technology. The two sides also signed agreements on extending their long-term military cooperation programme for another ten years, till 2020. Singh and Medvedev also discussed regional issues, including the situation in Afghanistan, in which both the countries have a stake and favoured a ‘stable and prosperous’ Afghanistan. This visit of Manmohan Singh was highly successful, considering the positive outcome that the visit yielded for India.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Russia again in December 2011, to participate in the twelfth Annual Bilateral Summit. Five agreements were signed during the visit. These agreements included two protocols, two memoranda of understanding and one pact related to exchange in education. One agreement between the two countries related to an intergovernmental initiative on the production of forty-two more Sukhoi-MKI 30 jets by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. The Department of Science and Technology, government of India, and the Interregional Association Siberian Federal District, Russian Federation, signed a protocol of intentions aimed at facilitating development and application of technologies for the utilization and safe management of fly-ash in the Siberian Federal District; experience sharing; investment projects and mutual exchange of scientific personnel. Another fifth agreement signed during Manmohan’s visit was an educational exchange programme between the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Human Resource Development of India. The purpose of this agreement was to boost cooperation in the field of education via inter-institutional arrangements. Russia also supported India’s bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council as well as its intentions to join the SCO. India also welcomed Russia’s entry to the WTO.

President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation visited India on 24 December 2012 for the thirteenth Annual India–Russia Summit. He held discussions with the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Pranab Mukherjee. The leader of the opposition in the Lok Sabha, Sushma Swaraj, and Sonia Gandhi, Chairperson of UPA, also called on the Russian President. The year 2012 marked sixty-five years of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Russia (earlier Soviet Union). To commemorate the occasion, ten bilateral documents were signed during Putin’s visit. These included a joint venture to set up a modern industrial facility to manufacture Russian helicopters in India to promote the development of a high technology-based domestic aerospace industry, a joint collaboration to manufacture pharmaceuticals in Russia and an IT agreement for developing software, systems integration and emergency response systems to help in producing niche products. The two nations also entered into contracts for the supply of seventy-one Mi-17 helicopters and forty-two Sukhoi-30 MKI fighter jets worth US $3.5 to US $4 billion.

The new Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Moscow from 23 to 24 December 2015 for the sixteenth Annual Summit. During Modi’s visit, seventeen new documents covering a wide range of cooperation in civil nuclear energy, defence, hydrocarbons, satellite navigation, railways, solar energy, visa simplification, Ayurveda and media were signed by the two countries. Prime Minister Modi and President Putin also adopted a joint statement entitled ‘Shared Trust, New Horizons’ during this visit. Besides the annual summit meeting in December 2015, the Indian Prime Minister met the Russian President on the sidelines of the SCO Summit in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) on 24 June 2016. The Prime Minister of India visited Ufa in Russia to participate in the seventh BRICS summit on 8–9 July 2015. On 15 February 2016, India assumed the presidency of BRICS. The summits of this group provide a forum for regular interaction between the heads of governments of India and Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited India in October 2016 for the seventeenth Annual Summit between the two nations. The Russian President met the Indian prime minister in Goa (also the venue of the eighth BRICS summit). The two leaders discussed extensively on different issues and areas of bilateral cooperation. The joint statement issued during the visit noted that the two leaders reviewed the Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership between India and Russia. They pledged to pursue new opportunities in economic ties, achieve sustainable development, promote peace and security, strengthen inclusive and transparent global governance and provide global leadership on issues of mutual interest. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Russia again in June 2017 during his four-nation trip to Europe. The eighteenth Annual Summit meeting between India and Russia was held in St. Petersburg where Modi and Putin talked extensively about the special strategic partnership between the two nations. Modi’s visit also marked the seventy years of partnership between the two nations. Five agreements, including a crucial pact on setting up two more atomic power plants at Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu, were signed during Modi’s visit. A joint statement reiterating the need for closer cooperation in different areas, including global security, was also issued during the visit.

India and Russia have established IRIGC or the India–Russia Inter-Governmental Commission. One of the two IRIGCs is on trade, economic, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation, and the other is on military technical cooperation. Both the IRIGCs meet annually. In addition to the IRIGC, there are other bodies that conduct economic relations between the two countries. These include the Indo–Russian Forum on Trade and Investment, the India–Russia Business Council, the India–Russia Trade, Investment and Technology Promotion Council and the India–Russia Chamber of Commerce. All these mechanisms are aimed at strengthening bilateral relations between the two traditional friends.

PART V

Foreign Policy of Japan After the Cold War

Japan enjoyed a big-power status in the world from the middle of the nineteenth century till the Second World War. After its victory in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, Japan came to be recognized as a major power, and remained as an important international actor ever since. Following its defeat in the Second World War, it lost its status as a great power in military terms, but regained the status of an economic great power since the 1960s. Today, Japan is restricted by the provisions of its constitution to develop its military force; although Japan is a very strong economy—the second largest in the world after the United States in terms of nominal GDP—and a very active member of the G-8 industrial nations. In 1947, devastated by the Second World War, Japan adopted a new pacifist constitution which proclaimed liberal democratic policies. Article 9 of the constitution of 1947 forbids the use of force as a means to settle international disputes. This article also prohibits Japan from maintaining an army, navy or air force. The Japan Self Defence Forces (JSDF), assigned to maintain security of the country, is an extension of the police force, and do not strictly fall into the category of an organized military. This unique position of Japan, a very strong economy but without any substantially recognized military, makes Japan an ‘unbalanced’ major power in the present international order.

Japan became an American ally after the Second World War. Its close strategic connection with the United States remained a significant issue in its foreign policy since the war. A Japan–US Security Treaty was signed in 1951 at the end of occupation of Japan by the Allied Forces. This treaty made Japan dependent on the United States for the maintenance of its security. This treaty was replaced by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States, signed in 1960. Under the treaty, both parties assumed an obligation to maintain and develop their capacities to resist armed attack and to assist each other in case of armed attack on territories under Japanese administration. Article 6 of the treaty contained a ‘status of forces agreement’ on the stationing of American forces in Japan. The Agreed Minutes to the treaty noted that the Japanese government must be consulted before any major changes in deployment of US forces in Japan or before the use of Japanese bases for combat operations other than in defence of Japan itself. The 1960 US–Japan Security Treaty not only provided a security cover for Japan, but proved very important to maintenance of peace and stability in East Asia. This treaty also helped Japan to develop a very close relationship with the United States, which continues till today. All post-War Japanese governments relied on a close relationship with the United States as the foundation of their foreign policy and depended on the mutual security treaty for strategic protection. Today, Japan and the United States share strong political, economic and security relations, and act as close allies in international affairs.

Japan has not remained dependent on the United States alone, but successfully diversified its foreign relations to develop close connections with many other states, especially the important ones. For instance, Japan developed friendly relations with its neighbours. It signed a peace and friendship treaty with the People’s Republic of China in 1978. Bilateral relations between the two neighbours developed rapidly after the treaty was signed. The Japanese extended significant economic assistance to China in various modernization projects. Japan has maintained close economic—but not diplomatic—relations with Taiwan. Today, a substantially strong bilateral trade relationship exists between the two states. This policy of strong trade relations, without diplomatic ties, with Taiwan has in fact helped Japan to build good relations with China, an important neighbour, and a major power in the world today. Since 2000, China has emerged as a significant import and export destination of Japan. With South Korea, Japan shares strong strategic and economic interests. The ties between them improved continuously since an exchange of visits by their political leaders in the mid-1980s. As an American strategic ally, Japan supports the US and South Korean positions on containing nuclear activities of North Korea. Japan, the United States and South Korea coordinate closely and consult trilaterally on policies towards North Korea. Japan strongly supports the American position that North Korea should sign the NPT, and abide by the rules of the IAEA. It also supports, along with South Korea, American policies to freeze North Korean nuclear programme. Japan’s relationship is stronger with South Korea than with North Korea. Today Japan has limited commercial and political ties with North Korea. Due to the North Korean nuclear programme which Japan sees as a threat to peace and security in the region, Japan’s normalization of relations with North Korea received a jolt in the mid-1990s.

Japan’s relationship with the ASEAN is very cordial now. After initial schism about each other, Japan and the ASEAN established informal dialogue relations in 1973, which were later formalised in March 1977 with the convening of the ASEAN-Japan Forum. Since then Japan-ASEAN relations have been growing to cover economic, strategic, political, cultural and educational, and science- and technology-related areas. After the Cold War, relations between Japan and the ASEAN have been further strengthened by the signing of the ‘Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring ASEAN-Japan Partnership in the New Millennium’, along with the ‘ASEAN-Japan Plan of Action’, at the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit held in December 2003 in Tokyo, Japan. The ASEAN and Japan are also closely involved in different cooperation frameworks such as the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). Japan acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia in July 2004 in Jakarta, Indonesia. This gave impetus to the promotion of peace and stability in the region. Trade relations between the ASEAN and Japan have continued to grow and strengthen. The total volume of trade between the two grew from US $173.1 billion in 2007 to US $211.4 billion in 2008, an increase of 22.1 per cent. ASEAN exports to Japan increased by 22.8 per cent from US $85.1 billion in 2007 to US $104.5 billion in 2008. ASEAN imports from Japan for the same period also grew from US $87.9 billion to US $106.8 billion, that is, by 21.5 per cent. At present, Japan is the largest trading partner of the ASEAN with a share of 12.4 per cent of the total trade of the association.

Japan’s relations with Russia are carrying the hangover of the Cold War times. Relations are not very cordial due to the inability of both states to resolve their territorial disputes over four islands in the Pacific. These islands, known as the Southern Kuriles in Russia and the Northern Territories in Japan, were seized by the Soviet Union after it declared war on Japan on 8 August 1945, forcing about 17,000 Japanese residents to flee. Japan wants to get back the islands—a demand that the Russians are not going to meet easily—due to the proximity of these islands to Russian oil regions. The stalemate prevented conclusion of a peace treaty after the Second World War, and continued to affect bilateral relations since that time. The United States supports Japan on the issue of the Northern Territories and recognizes Japanese sovereignty over the islands. However, Japan and Russia have made some progress in developing other aspects of the relationship. For instance, commercial relations between Japan and Russia have been growing over the years. Trade between the two states increased from US $5 billion in 2000 to US $20 billion in 2007, and is expected to reach US $40 billion by the end of 2010. But the two countries would need to resolve their territorial disputes to achieve a stronger relationship.

Beyond its immediate neighbours, Japan has pursued a more active foreign policy in recent years, recognizing the responsibility that accompanies its economic strength. It has been successful in strengthening ties with the Middle East, which provides most of its oil. Japan is also active in Africa and Latin America and has extended significant support to development projects in these regions. It is strongly in favour of UN reforms, and a major contender for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. For this purpose, Japan is actively working in tandem with Germany, India and Brazil, the other aspirants for a permanent seat. Since its joining the UN in 1956, it has remained intimately involved in UN activities. Japan contributes 11 per cent of the total UN budget, the second largest contribution after that of the United States. Its relations with the EU is very strong. The EU–Japan annual summit meetings (ASM) constitute elaborate framework for close cooperation, and cover important areas like foreign policy, economy, environment, culture, and science and technology. The eighteenth ASM was held in May 2009 in Prague where the two sides discussed important bilateral issues like trade and environmental cooperation. The EU ranks second in Japanese exports, and third in Japanese imports. Among the twenty-seven members of the EU, Germany, France and the United Kingdom are the top three trading partners of Japan. In 2016, EU–Japan trade reached €124.6 billion.

After the Cold War, internal political debates over Article 9 of the constitution of 1947 and Japan’s role in international affairs have been continuing. The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) are in favour of scrapping Article 9, and a more independent role of Japan in international relations. They believe that the JSDF is unconstitutional and should be dismantled. However, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) think that Article 9 of the Constitution of 1947 ensures that Japan plays a peaceful role in international politics under the security cover of the United States. This peaceful foreign policy has yielded good results for Japan since the Second World War and should be continued. Throughout the post–Second World War period, Japan concentrated on economic growth while generally taking a passive, low-profile role in world affairs. This policy was highly successful and allowed Japan to grow as an economic power. Although Japan is capable to present a strong military backed by nuclear weapons, it is restricted from doing so by the provisions of Article 9. There is no indication that Japan might violate Article 9 and emerge as a military power, because as a strong economic power, it enjoys great attention in international affairs.

Japan–India Relations After the Cold War

Historically, Japan and India shared a close relationship for a long time. With the introduction of Buddhism in Japan in the sixth century, exchanges were believed to have started between the two. Buddhism brought with it shades of Indian culture to Japan and the process of cultural interactions began. After the Second World War, the two countries signed a peace treaty and established diplomatic relations in April 1952. This treaty was one of the first peace treaties that Japan signed after the war. For some time in the post-war period, raw materials from India—coal and iron ore in particular—helped Japan in its industrialization programme, and in its recovery from the devastation of the war. After Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi’s visit to India in 1957, Japan started providing aid loans to India in 1958, as the first yen aid extended by the Japanese government. Since 1986, Japan has remained the largest aid donor of India.

The Japanese Constitution of 1947, known also as the ‘pacifist constitution’, discouraged Japan from playing an interventionist role in international politics. Playing a politically passive role during the Cold War, it was possible for Japan to develop cordial relations with many states, including India. During this period, India–Japan relations were cordial, and the latter was the largest aid donor to India. Japan was one of the few countries in the world to initiate economic diplomacy as a potential tool in international relations. The two countries continued to enjoy a cordial relationship even after the Cold War. But the nuclear tests carried out in India in 1998 elicited very strong reactions from Japan, leading it to cancel any kind of economic, strategic or technological assistance to India for some time. With its horrific experience of nuclear bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War, Japan had been strongly advocating a nuclear-weapons-free world. In this background, these tests did not go well with the Japanese political elite; Japan imposed economic sanctions on India in May 1998. However, with continued dialogues and diplomatic negotiations between the two countries, economic sanctions were waived and normalcy was restored in mutual relations in 2000. Barring this nuclear hiccup, Japan–India relations remained cordial after the Cold War.

In August 2000, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori’s visit to India laid the foundation for closer Japan–India relations in the new century. The two states signed the ‘Global Partnership between Japan and India in the 21st Century’ during Mori’s visit. This agreement called for better exchange and cooperation in economic fields between the two countries, including information technology (IT). Tokyo and New Delhi further agreed to facilitate comprehensive dialogue and wider cooperation by way of increasing regular bilateral visits of important ministers and leaders of the two states. Since Mori’s visit, annual meetings of top leaders of the two states have been taking place regularly. India’s Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Japan in December 2001. This was the first visit to Japan by an Indian Prime Minister after nine and a half years, during which both countries agreed to cooperate on a variety of issues such as terrorism, Afghanistan, and disarmament and non-proliferation, both from regional and global perspectives. After the summit meeting between the two prime ministers, the ‘Japan-India Joint Declaration’ was announced as a guideline for future partnership between these two states of Asian. In July 2002, Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes visited Japan. 2002 also marked fifty years of political relations between India and Japan. Ways of strengthening military and political ties, and improving cooperation on bilateral issues and border problems between India and Pakistan, were discussed during Fernandes’ visit to Japan. The Indian Defence Minister held discussions on bilateral cooperation with his Japanese counterpart General Nakatani, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi.

Top-level visits, considered as important instruments of bilateral diplomacy, continued between India and Japan. In April 2005, Koizumi visited India as Prime Minister of Japan; and Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh paid a reciprocal visit to Japan in December 2006. During this visit, Japan agreed to engage in discussions with India on civilian nuclear cooperation under ‘appropriate’ international safeguards. Although Japan stopped short of any direct support to the landmark Indo-US nuclear deal, it said that international civilian nuclear energy cooperation should be enhanced through ‘constructive approches’ under appropriate IAEA safeguards. Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe visited India in August 2007. During his visit, Abe and Manmohan Singh agreed to take forward the growing relationship between the two countries. They agreed that Japan and India shared universal values of democracy, open society, human rights, rule of law and market economy, and that the two states also shared common interests in promoting peace, stability and prosperity in Asia and the world. Based on this recognition, the two leaders reaffirmed that the Japan–India partnership is a bilateral relationship with the largest potential for growth. Following Singh’s visit to Japan in October 2008, Japan and India signed the ‘Joint Statement on the Advancement of the Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan and India’. This statement aimed at promoting cooperation in a wide range of fields such as politics, economy, environmental protection, energy security and climate change. The ‘Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India’ was also signed during the visit to strengthen security cooperation between the two countries.

Prime Minister of Japan Yukio Hatoyama visited India in December 2009 as part of the annual bilateral summit meetings. The joint statement issued after the summit between Hatoyama and Manmohan Singh focussed on different areas of bilateral cooperation. According to the statement, the two prime ministers took note of the status of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)/Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) negotiations, with a view to conclude a mutually beneficial agreement at the earliest. They hoped that economic relations between India and Japan would develop further after the conclusion of the EPA/CEPA. They shared the view that Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) would continue to play a significant role in alleviation of India’s poverty, economic and social infrastructure development, and human resource development. The two prime ministers reaffirmed their commitment to realize a comprehensive reform of the UN Security Council, and vowed to continue with their cooperation with the G-4 and other like-minded countries in this regard. The two prime ministers reaffirmed their resolve to work together in the framework of regional cooperation, and the Indian Prime Minister lauded the sincere initiative taken by Prime Minister Hatoyama for an East Asian community.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh paid an official visit to Tokyo from 24 to 26 October 2010 for the Annual Bilateral Summit. According to the Indian MEA, ‘This landmark visit has imparted a further momentum and continuity to the India–Japan Strategic and Global Partnership’.²³ He also held extensive talks with his Japanese counterpart. Naoto Kan, who is Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan, also met the Indian prime minister. Opposition Leaders from Liberal Democratic Party, New Komeito Party and Your Party also called on Manmohan Singh. In December 2011, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda paid a three-day official visit to India. The two prime ministers signed a joint statement entitled ‘Vision for the Enhancement of Japan–India Strategic and Global Partnership upon Entering the Year of the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations’ between the two nations. This statement declared,

In the context of the two countries commemorating the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations in 2012, the two Prime Ministers reaffirmed that Japan and India enjoy deep mutual understanding and vibrant people-to-people contact as the relationship is based on universal values such as democracy, human rights and rule of law, as well as wide-ranging strategic and economic interests. They stressed the need to enhance the Strategic and Global Partnership for peace and prosperity.²⁴

They also expressed satisfaction at ministerial-level and other policy dialogues such as those between foreign ministers and defence ministers of Japan and India. The two prime ministers welcomed the entry into force of Japan–India CEPA on 1 August 2011. Asserting that CEPA is an important milestone in the trade and economic relations between the two countries, they expressed hope that CEPA will further strengthen their economic engagement in terms of trade in goods, services, investment and contribute immensely to mutual prosperity.²⁵

Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh visited Japan again in May 2013 for the Annual Bilateral Summit. During the visit from 27 to 30 May, a joint statement signed by Manmohan Singh and the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was issued in Tokyo. The joint statement entitled, ‘Strengthening the Strategic and Global Partnership between India and Japan Beyond the 60th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations’ expressed satisfaction at the steady growth of political exchanges, dialogue and policy coordination between the two countries. The joint statement reaffirmed the importance of civil nuclear cooperation between the two authorities in the governments to work towards its early entry into force. The joint statement reaffirmed the importance of civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries, while recognizing that nuclear safety is a priority for both the governments. In the joint statement, the two nations vowed to accelerate the negotiations of an Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy towards an early conclusion.²⁶ The two prime ministers welcomed the signing of the memorandum between the Department of Atomic Energy of India and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan on cooperation in rare earths industry in India.

The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Japan from 30 August to 3 September 2014 for the ninth Annual Summit Meeting with his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe. During the visit, the two sides decided to upgrade the relationship to a ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership’ and launched an India–Japan Investment Promotion Partnership under which Japan announced its intention to invest in India approximately US $35 billion over the next five years. The following agreements were signed during the visit: (i) Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges between the Indian Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Defence of Japan; (ii) Memorandum of Cooperation between the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare of the Republic of India and the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan in the Field of Healthcare; (iii) Memorandum of Cooperation in the Field of Women and Child Development between the Ministry of Women and Child Development of the Republic of India and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; (iv) Framework of Cooperation between Ministry of Road Transport and Highways Government of India and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism of Japan in the Roads and Road Transportation Sector; (v) Memorandum of Understanding between Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Government of India, and Japan Bank of International Cooperation and (vi) Confirmation of the intention regarding the Partner City Affiliation between City of Varanasi and City of Kyoto.²⁷ The foreign minister level eighth Strategic Dialogue was held in New Delhi on 17 January 2015. The two foreign ministers reviewed all aspects of the bilateral Strategic and Global Partnership and discussed regional and international issues of mutual interest. Bilateral Foreign Office Consolation was also held between Japan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Shinsuke Sugiyama and Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar in New Delhi on 6 April 2015.

A historic India–Japan Civil Nuclear Agreement (CNA) was signed in Tokyo on 11 November 2016 during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s three-day trip to Japan. This agreement was a pending issue for many years. The CNA will allow the two countries to engage in exchange of nuclear-related technology. This deal makes India the first non-NPT signatory to enter into a nuclear agreement with Japan. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited India during 13–14 September 2017 and held fruitful discussion with his Indian counterpart. A joint statement welcoming the significant deepening of bilateral relations in the past three years in political, economic and strategic areas was also released. The two nations have developed firm foundation of common values and traditions as well as have an emerging consensus on contemporary issues of peace, security and development.

In fact, India–Japan relations have attained maturity over the years. The two countries have developed several important mechanisms to boost bilateral relations. The Annual Bilateral Summits between the prime ministers, and other institutional mechanisms for dialogues and cooperation such as the Annual Strategic Dialogues, Annual Defence Dialogues, Two plus Two Dialogues and exchange visits by parliamentarians and leaders indicate healthy and satisfactory political relations between the two significant Asian countries in the new century. After the initiation of these institutional mechanisms, Japan and India have engaged each other more in recent times. As observed, both nations try continuously to explore new areas of cooperation through these dialogue mechanisms. However, one area that needs special attention is trade between two countries. Indo-Japan trade relations have not achieved its true potential till date. Total volume of two-way trade between the two nations was US $18.5 billion in FY 2012–13 and has dropped down to US $13.5 in FY 2016–17. This was due to a significant fall in Indian exports to Japan in FY 2016–17. In FY 2012–13, Indian exports to Japan stood at US $6.1 billion. In contrast, this came down to US $3.8 billion in FY 2016–17.²⁸ Historically, Indian imports from Japan have remained behind Indian exports to Japan. As a consequence, trade deficit (from the Indian context) continued during the last five financial years (i.e., FY 2011–12 to FY 2016–17) between India and Japan. The two countries must pay more attention to this area to sustain an otherwise bright India–Japan relations.

PART VI

Foreign Policy of England After the Cold War

England enjoyed great-power status in international politics for a long time, from the early sixteenth century to the end of the Second World War. After the war, England’s powers were diminished because its economy was hit hard due to the war; and its colonies all over the world became free of British control, depriving it of essential resources to sustain its economy. In comparison, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as strong economic and military superpowers after the Second World War, relegating England to a lesser-power status in international politics. British economy and foreign policy became largely dependent on the United States, its ally before and after the war. This dependence continued during the Cold War and also thereafter. All the important bases of British power for centuries actually started eroding before the Second World War, leaving Britain to remain satisfied with a medium-power status today.

Britain rose to great-power status from the early sixteenth century due to its five strengths: geography, sea power, trade, imperial interests and balance of power. For a long time, British diplomacy depended heavily on these factors to establish Britain’s supremacy in world politics. Of these five ‘strengths’, imperial interests and balance of power ended with the Second World War. The vast British empire, in the form of colonies in almost every part of the world, went out of British control after the war. For almost three and a half centuries Britain did not allow any other power to dominate in Europe, and maintained a balance of power in the continent through its command as holder of the balance. But the system of balance of power also came to an end after the Second World War with the rise of two superpowers possessing nuclear weapons. The end of the balance of power system also marked the end of British political command in the world. With unprecedented development in the field of science and technology from the early twentieth century, several European states—such as Italy, Germany, France, Portugal and Spain—started competing with England as important sea powers and trading states. So Britain’s dominance as a sea power and a trading state faced challenges before the Second World War. The advantage of the British geography—its ‘insularity’ from the rest of the European continent—remains valid till today; although in an age of spectacular progress in military technology, such insularity is not enough to gurantee total security for Britain. British economy, traditionally dependent on sea power and trade, found many competitors after the Second World War—such as Japan, the United States, Italy and the USSR—and lost grounds. All these factors led to Britain’s ‘fall from grace’ as a great power in world politics.

During the Cold War, Britain wished to play the role of an important actor in international politics, and succeeded to some extent, with the help of the United States. With common bonds of heritage, language and culture, Britain and the United States remained strong allies before and after the Second World War. Like the United States, Britain’s post-war foreign policy was preoccupied with the task of thwarting the ‘advancement’ of communism and the Soviet Union in the world. Britain was an active member of the West Bloc and the NATO, and formed an anti-Soviet group with the United States and other West European countries during the Cold War. For this reason, Britain’s relations with the socialist countries of East Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America were distant, and sometimes antagonistic. But it must be pointed out at this point that Britain did not always support the United States blindly during the Cold War. It expressed its reservations about the American policy on China, and put forward the view, as early as in 1950, that trade with China must be augmented. With impressive and increasing volumes of Sino-American and Sino-British trade today, Britain’s views proved right in the long run. Britain also opposed American policies during the Suez Canal Crisis and the Vietnam War. Moreover, Britain tried to expand its sphere of influence in the world, independent of the United States, through the Commonwealth. Britain was able to establish close political, economic and cultural links with more than a hundred states in the world through the commonwealth system. Although the commonwealth is a much heterogeneous movement now, with lesser British control, it nevertheless helps British foreign policy to cultivate closer ties with many states, and has proved to be beneficial for British diplomacy for a long time. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Britain played a very important role in international affairs during the Cold War. In 1979, during the premiership of Margaret Thatcher, Britain successfully resolved the Rhodesian crisis leading to the establishment of Zimbabwe. Thatcher, the last Prime Minister of Britain (1979–90) during the Cold War, also won the Falklands War against Argentina in 1982 to re-establish British control over the Falkland islands that Argentina had captured for a brief period. British victory in the Falklands War reminded the world that Britain was not a spent force and could preserve its national interests effectively.

John Major of the Conservative Party was the first post–Cold War Prime Minister (1990–97) of England. The Major government pursued a moderate foreign policy for Britain, perhaps appropriate with the changing international order. Major and his team did not seek a very proactive role for Britain in the new world order immediately after the Cold War. However, the first Gulf War in 1991 and the Masstricht Treaty for a revamped EU were tough foreign policy challenges for the Major government. The Major administration attempted to ratify the treaty with stiff opposition from the Labour Party, and a section of his own Conservative Party. A nationalistic Major ultimately showed his disinterest in the policy of a single European currency, opting to retian the ‘pound sterling’ for Britain. But the Masstricht Treaty and the issue of a united Europe raised political storms in Britain, bringing out the shaky position of the Major government on foreign policy matters. However, Major showed some determination during the first Gulf War by sending British troops to defend Kuwait, and by persuading the American President Geoge Bush (Sr) to support ‘no-fly zones’ in Northern Iraq with a view to prevent Iraqi aircrafts from flying over the area to attack rival aircrafts. This policy proved very effective during the first Gulf War. Major also initiated the Northern Ireland peace process by opening talks with the provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 1993. He paved the way for the Belfast Agreement, also known as the ‘Good Friday Agreement’, between Britain and Northern Ireland which sought to end London’s direct control over Northern Ireland. The agreement was finally signed in 1998 after John Major left office.

Anthony Charles Lynton Blair, popularly known as Tony Blair, of the Labour Party served as British Prime Minister from 1997 to 2007. Unlike John Major, Blair was more assertive in foreign policy matters. Under him, Britain preferred an ‘interventionist’ role in international politics. During his two terms in office (1997–2002 and 2002–07), Blair mainly pursued a threepronged foreign policy: assertive interventionism; close ties with the United States and placing of Britain at the helm of European affairs. The Blair government’s interventionist preferences could be ascertained from Britain’s active involvement in NATO attacks on Kosovo and Serbia in 1999 in the wake of ethnic conflicts in these regions. Blair persuaded the US government of Bill Clinton to attack Kosovo and Serbia with a view to contain Slobodan Milosevic and his Serbian forces. The Blair administration also made England an active player in the ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003. The British military joined hands, mainly with its American counterparts, to launch massive attacks on disruptive forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. In all these operations—Kosovo, Serbia, Afghanistan and Iraq—the Blair government cooperated closely with the United States to achieve its foreign policy goals of making Britain a principal actor in international politics again. Blair was an ardent advocate of US–UK partnership to secure and promote Britain’s national interests. Immediately after taking over as Prime Minister, Blair declared in a ‘Foreign Policy Speech’ in November 1997: ‘our aim should be to deepen our relationship with the U.S. at all levels. We are the bridge between the United States and Europe. Let us use it’.²⁹ After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the Blair government began to work in close partnership with the United States in counter-terrorism activities. This cooperation became stronger after suicide bombers attacked civilians in London in 2005. During his two terms in office, Blair used the policy of maintaining close rapport with the Americans, the sole superpower in the world, and engaging them in all major areas of bilateral diplomacy.

The Blair government, with a view to securing a prominent role for Britain in European affairs, took active interest in matters related to the EU. Britain worked hard towards achieving a European Monetary Union, and the Blair government asked the British Treasury to assess the possibility of adopting the euro. After careful assessment, the government decided to defer the adoption of euro for Britain when the single currency was introduced in many countries of Europe in 2002. But it hoped that the currency would be introduced in Britain in future. The Labour government also endorsed the Nice Treaty in 2002 which sought to strengthen the EU by revamping its internal structure. Further, it signed the Brussels Reform Treaty in 2007 that wanted to extend the powers of the union. The Belfast Agreement was initiated by the former John Major government to bring peace to Northern Ireland. After assuming office, the Blair government signed this treaty in 1998. This agreement formed a part of Blair’s policy to brighten England’s image in Europe. In deference to the Belfast agreement, the Tony Blair government helped to restore the ‘Stormont’, the Northern Ireland Parliament, in 2007. During his two tenures, Blair visited almost every part of Europe—including several areas in East and Central Europe—to restore Britain’s close ties with these countries which were affected in many cases by Cold War politics. Blair’s euro-centric policies helped in many ways to reestablish Britain at the helm of European politics after the Cold War.

James Gordon Brown of the Labour Party assumed charge as the Prime Minister of England in June 2007, after Tony Blair resigned from office. Brown continued with the foreign policy priorities of the Blair government, seeking closer ties with the United States and an active role in European and international politics. Although Brown was committed to the Iraq War, he ordered withdrawal of British combat troops from Iraq in 2008. Wanting to improve relations with China, he paid an official visit to the country in July 2008. There he expressed hope that England–China economic relations would continue to be strong, and the volume of bilateral trade would touch US $60 billion by the end of 2010. Although British sympathisers of the Tibetan unrest in 2008 wanted Brown to send a strong message to China, he could not satisfy them fully as he attended the closing ceremony of the summer Olympics of 2008 in Beijing on 24 August 2008. Brown was in favour of building closer ties with China, a booming economy and an important power in today’s world politics.

British relations with Russia suffered a setback when the Brown government expressed support to the people of Georgia during the South Ossetia War of 2008 between Russia and Georgia. The British Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, visited the Georgian capital Tbilisi to meet the Georgian President and said that the British government and people stood in solidarity with the Georgian people. The opposition party in Britain accused the Brown government in October 2009, during a Westminster Hall debate on a ‘frozen relationship’ with Russia that was reminiscent of the Cold War disengagement between the two countries. Although Brown met with his Russian counterpart Medvedev twice in 2009, the relationship appeared far from cordial. With Japan, the Brown government nurtured a traditionally close relationship, and further strengthened it. It signed the Lisbon Treaty in December 2007, which sought to reform the EU by amending the earlier Masstricht Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty aroused severe political controversies in Britain, and the opposition Conservative Party was against signing it. However, the treaty was ratified by the British Parliament in July 2008, signalling an important foreign policy victory for the Brown government. However, in the May 2010 General Elections, the Labour Party did not fare well and Brown resigned. Davis William Donald Cameron, the leader of the Conservative Party, became the new Prime Minister of Britain on the basis of a new coalition between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democratic Party. The Cameron government became the first coalition government in the United Kingdom since the Second World War.

David Cameron served as the Prime Minister of a coalition government in Britain from 2010 to 2015. Following a victory of the Conservative Party in the 2015 parliamentary elections, Cameron continued as Prime Minister, this time of a single Conservative Party government. During his tenures, Cameron had to face the legacy of financial crisis of the early 2000s, and his government had to take several austerity measures in domestic politics. Internationally, his government introduced a referendum for Britain’s continued association with the EU, and intervened in the Libyan civil war. Britain participated in the UN-backed military action in Libya, but his government could not intervene in the Syrian civil war. He was the first British Prime Minister to lose a foreign policy vote on a proposed British military action against Syria.

Over the question of Britain’s continuity as a member of the EU, the referendum introduced by the Cameron government supported the country’s exit. David Cameron, who supported Britain’s continuity as a member of the EU, resigned as leader of the Conservative Party, and as the Prime Minister of Britain after the referendum verdict favoured an exit. Cameron was Britain’s Prime Minister in two terms from 11 May 2010 to 13 July 2016.

Theresa Mary May of the Conservative Party assumed office of the Prime Minister of Britain on 13 July 2016. May, considered as a hardliner, became only the country’s second woman Prime Minister after Margaret Thatcher. Within a year of assuming office, Theresa May called for a parliamentary election in Britain which was held in June 2017. The election produced a hung Parliament, but May survived as the Prime Minister with the support of the Democratic Unionist Party of Northern Ireland. May established good political relations with the United States, and she went slow on Brexit (Britain’s exit from the EU). Her government supported Saudi intervention in Yemen and rationalized arms sales to Saudi Arabia. She also condemned the action of Myanmar military against the Rohingyas, describing it as ‘ethnic cleansing’. May did not support easing of visa restrictions for Indian students and professionals, an issue raised by India for some time.

British foreign policy in the post–Cold War period suffered from a major dilemma, caused by its close links with the United States. Criticism arose within and outside England that British foreign policy was nothing but another face of American foreign policy. To remove this ‘American’ tag, policy planners in Britain had been searching for a ‘British’ identity in their foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. But due to several reasons, their policy could not come out of the American sphere of influence. Demands of ‘realpolitik’, alliance sentiments, advantages of partnership and Britain’s incapacity to carry on its international ambitions alone are some of the reasons for Britain’s dependence on the United States in foreign policy matters. The reliance of three successive Labour governments (Blair and Brown periods) on the United States bears testimony to such observations. The Blair government faced intense domestic criticism for its role in Afghanistan and Iraq, for its failure to check human massacre in Rwanda, Bosnia and Serbia. The opposition Conservative Party and the media accused it of earning a bad name for Britain by aligning with the United States in military operations across the world. This criticism forced the Brown government to withdraw combat troops from Iraq; but due to Britain’s economic and strategic interests, it also remained heavily dependent on the United States. British foreign policy thus often suffers from an identity crisis, and it would continue to haunt policy makers in Britain in future.

England–India Relations After the Cold War

For over six decades since India’s independence in 1947, relations between India and England have remained reasonably strong. History, democracy and shared values have contributed to the uniqueness of these relations. Much of Indian public life has been structured around British laws, ideas and values. This includes the field of education, industry and the media. Indian political and legal institutions, constitutional government, free press, civil service, modern universities and research laboratories have all been fashioned through British influence. Britain contributed at various levels in India’s developmental projects after the country gained independence. But by the late 1980s, India and Britain began viewing each other as genuine partners, free from the hangover of the colonial experience. After the Cold War, the relationship moved beyond culture, curry and cricket, as Britain became India’s foremost trading partner. In the twenty-first century, Britain and India are engaged in a meaningful bilateral relationship mutually beneficial for both states.

The new century heralded close cooperation between the two states as top-level bilateral visits continued facilitating a multi-faceted relationship. Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Britain in November 2001. At a joint press meet with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Vajpayee noted bilateral cooperation in the area of counter-terrorism. He observed that Britain was the first country to ban six terrorist groups operating in the subcontinent and thanked the British Prime Minister for this positive action. Vajpayee told the British press that both Britain and India have been familiar with the ugly face of terrorism for long before the incident of 9/11, and they must to go beyond Al-Qaeda in their global war against terrorism and target all its sponsors, who finance, train, equip and harbour terrorists. Blair paid a return official visit to India in January 2002. He was the first British Prime Minister in twelve years to visit India, although many important leaders from Britain came to India during this period. In New Delhi, Blair focussed on the importance of resumption of a ‘comprehensive’ dialogue between India and Pakistan. He opined that for talks to be meaningful, all terrorist activities should stop. ‘There are two sides to the equation. On the one hand, there has to be complete rejection of terrorism and an end to support to it in any form. And then meaningful dialogue can begin’, Blair told the media persons in New Delhi. Clearly counter-terrorism agenda got preference as an agenda in bilateral relations in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Britain in September 2004 and met his British counterpart and other leaders. During the visit, Blair and Singh signed a joint declaration entitled ‘India–UK: Towards a New and Dynamic Partnership’, which envisaged annual summits between prime ministers and meetings between foreign ministers of the two states. Since 2004, the prime ministers of Britain and India, as well as their foreign ministers have been meeting regularly, initiating new chapters in bilateral relationship. The declaration also outlined areas for future cooperation in civil nuclear energy, space, defence, counter-terrorism, economic ties, science and technology, education and culture. Blair mooted the idea of India joining G-8 discussions. At his invitation, Manmohan Singh visited England in July 2005 for the ‘G-8 plus 5’ Gleneagles Summit, where Heads of Government of five emerging economies (India, China, South Africa, Brazil and Mexico) were present along with G-8 leaders. This was a good opportunity for India to get entry in to the ‘rich industrial club’ of the world.

Tony Blair visited India in September 2005 in his capacity as the President of the EU, for the EU–India Summit on 7 September, and also for the second UK–India bilateral summit held on 8 September in Udaipur, Rajasthan. The two prime ministers focused on measures to be adopted in trade and investment exchanges, in the new and promising area of healthcare, and also in the area of services. They also agreed to intensify cooperation in areas of science and technology and the knowledge sector, in which both our countries have special strengths. Several memorandums of understanding (MOU) and agreements were finalized during the summit. These related to: (1) cooperation in the area of hydrocarbons, which is important for energy policies of the two states; (2) an MOU on sustainable development; (3) an agreement on intellectual property rights; (4) an agreement on co-production of films and (5) a new air services agreement. Blair reaffirmed his commitment to India’s candidature for the permanent membership of the expanded UN Security Council. Singh told him that the Government of India had decided to create a chair named after Jawaharlal Nehru at Cambridge University. He also welcomed Blair’s initiatives regarding education, that aimed at more student exchanges and better academic relationships between the two nations at the university level. Prime Minister Singh visited Britain again in October 2006 for the third UK–India annual summit.

The fourth UK–India annual summit was held in New Delhi in January 2008, during the visit of the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown. After the summit, the two sides issued a joint statement on India–UK Strategic Partnership. The two sides also agreed to cooperate in developing collaboration between small and medium enterprises, entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. It was agreed to establish an Education Forum to work towards an early conclusion of an educational partnership agreement and to enter into an MOU on an Indo-UK Higher Education Leadership Development Programme to develop leadership skills in higher education. The two prime ministers also agreed to promote cooperation in civil nuclear energy and would work towards a bilateral agreement for this purpose. Gordon Brown informed Manmohan Singh that Britain supports the India–US civil nuclear cooperation initiative.

British Foreign Minister David Miliband paid a three-day official visit to India in January 2009. His visit was marked by controversy as he linked terrorism to the ‘unresolved’ problem of Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian Foreign Ministry expressed its reservations over Miliband’s views and said that India did not need unsolicited advice on internal issues in India such as that of Jammu and Kashmir. The opposition in India, BJP, saw the visit as a disaster, while the Conservative Party, the opposition in Britain, called it as damaging for UK–India relations. However, Miliband’s views that were expressed in the British newspaper The Guardian (issue dated 15 January 2009) were said to be personal and unintended; they did not want to hurt Indian sentiments. Apart from this hiccup that did not affect bilateral ties, Britain–India relations remained cordial after the Cold War.

Economic relations between India and Britain have strengthened over the years through increased trade and investment flows. The volume of two-way bilateral trade was US $11 billion till February 2009, and is expected to cross US $15 billion by the end of 2011. Britain’s cumulative investment in India from April 2000 to March 2009 was nearly US $6 billion. In 2010, it is the fourth largest investor in India. India has emerged as the third largest foreign investor in Britain and the second largest overseas investor in London and Northern Ireland, in terms of number of acquisitions or investments. It is the second largest creator of jobs in Britain with over 500 Indian companies opening offices there. London Stock Exchange hosts fifty-two Indian companies, with a combined market capitalization of £9 billion. The strong Indian diaspora living in Britain acts as a catalyst for stronger bilateral ties. The population of Indians living in Britain is estimated to be 1.5 million, mostly engaged in ‘white collar’ jobs and business. The Indian community is now very active in British politics, and is capable of impacting the courses of bilateral relations.

During her visit to England in October 2009, President of India Pratibha Patil asserted that India and Britain have now emerged as ‘natural partners’ in the twenty-first century. At present, the two countries are negotiating a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, which will take a definite shape in the near future. This agreement would further boost relations between the two countries. Britain-India relations have immense potential for growth. For instance, trade relations between the two countries may scale new heights. Both Britain and India are focusing on this area, aiming at trade worth US $50 billion in the near future. Both Britain and India have a parliamentary democratic set up, with free society and media. Indian students join several British universities every year and act as cultural linkages between the two countries. The large English-speaking middle class in India would welcome stronger and more stable bilateral relations with one of the world’s oldest democracies.

British Prime Minister David Cameron visited India in July 2010. This prepared the ground for ‘Enhanced Partnership for the Future’, which was defined by a high-level economic and technological cooperation and closer coordination on many regional and global issues. The British prime minister was accompanied by the largest ever delegation to India since 1947. During the visit, the two governments announced a deal between BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce and India’s leading aerospace company Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to supply fifty-seven Hawk trainer aircraft to India. Cameron opined that the deal was a pointer to Britain’s new economic foreign policy in action, and he identified India as a leading partner in this policy.

High profile bilateral visits from India and Britain became a regular feature since 2010. Through these visits, the two countries demonstrated their intention to strengthen cooperation. Engagements between the two nations continued after the new government took office in India in May 2014. British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, and Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, jointly visited India during 7–8 July 2014. They held meetings with the new Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, and External Affairs Minister, Sushma Swaraj, to discuss political, strategic and economic issues as well as matters relating to Indian students in the United Kingdom and skill development.³⁰ The new Indian Prime Minister also met his counterpart David Cameron on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in November 2014 in Australia and discussed issues of mutual interests. Indian External Affairs Minister visited Britain during 16–17 October 2014 to inaugurate the Regional ‘Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas’ where she had bilateral meetings with the British deputy prime minister and foreign secretary. The Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, V. K. Singh, visited London from 3 to 4 December 2014 to attend the London Conference on Afghanistan.

Nirmala Sitharaman, Minister for Commerce and Industry in the Modi cabinet, visited London from 18 to 20 January 2015 for the tenth JETCO. Indian Finance Minister Arun Jaitley travelled to Britain from 13 to 14 March 2015 to unveil the statue of Mahatma Gandhi in British Parliament Square. British Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, came down to India from 12 to 13 March 2015 for bilateral consultations.

PM Narendra Modi went on a tour of Britain from 12 to 14 November 2015. During this visit, along with his British counterpart, he endorsed a VS setting out the fundamental principles on which UK–India partnership would be built on as well as outlined a road map for deepening cooperation. Indian Finance Minister Arun Jaitley visited the United Kingdom again in January 2016 to attend the eighth India–UK Economic and Financial Dialogue.

British Prime Minister Theresa May visited India in November 2016. This was her first trip outside Europe after assuming Prime Minister’s office. She was accompanied by a large trade delegation. During her meeting with Modi, the two leaders put emphasis on strengthening trade and business relations. However, provisions for easing of British visa restrictions for Indian professionals and students were not sorted out during this official visit. She also attended the India–UK Technology Summit and assured more cooperation in the sphere of science and technology between the two nations.

Over the years, the two countries have developed several mechanisms for closer cooperation. These are as follows:

1. Foreign Office Consultations (FOC), which are held annually between the foreign officials of the two nations;
2. Joint Working Group (JWG) on counter-terrorism and strategic dialogue;
3. India–UK Round Table where multi-faceted bilateral issues are discussed every year;
4. India–UK (JETCO);
5. India–UK financial dialogue;
6. India–UK investment summit;
7. India–UK education forum for forging closer partnership in the field of education; and
8. UK–India Education and Research Initiative (UKIERI).

Despite the existence of these mechanisms, bilateral trade and investment is not as bright as could be expected. The total volume of India–UK trade stood at US $14.33 billion in the FY 2014–15. In the preceding financial year (i.e., FY 2013–14), it was US $15.81 billion. In FY 2011–12, total volume of bilateral trade was US $15.71.³¹ These data show that there was a fall in bilateral trade volume during FY 2014–15. In fact, India–Britain trade volume remained lower than the actual potential of the two countries. It is high time that the two nations pay due attention to this area.

ENDNOTES

1. See, in this context, Harish Kapur, India’s Foreign Policy 1947–92: Shadows and Substance (New Delhi: Sage, 1994), 22.
2. See, in this context, Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies: India and the United States—1941–1991 (New Delhi: Sage, 1994), 208.
3. See, in this context, Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies, 381.
4. M. Granger Morgan, K. Subrahmanyam, K. Sundarji, and Robert M. White, ‘India and the United States’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18(2), Spring 1995, 161.
5. See, in this context, Aneek Chatterjee, ‘Beyond Expectations: Remarkable Development in India–U.S. Relations During the Gujral Premiership’, Jadavpur Journal of International Relations, Vols 11–12(2008), 25–46.
6. European Commission: Trade, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities /bilateral-relations/countries/india/.
7. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, http://www.meaindia.nic.in/.
8. Ibid.
9. US Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Service, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/.
10. Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.
11. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2016, ‘India–United States Relations’. Available at https://www.mea.gov.in. Accessed on 13 September 2016.
12. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Annual Report: 2014–15 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2015), 114.
13. For all Sino-US trade statistics, see http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/.
14. Xinhua, Chinese News Agency
15. Ibid.
16. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/.
17. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, http://www.meaindia.nic.in/.
18. Ibid.
19. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Govt. of India, India-China Bilateral Relations, http://www.mea.gov.in/. Retrieved on 3 May 2013.
20. MEA, Government of India, Opening Remarks by EAM at Media Interaction in Beijing, 9 February 2012, http://mea.gov.in/. Retrieved on 5 May 2013.
21. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples’ Republic of China, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh Meets with Visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, http://www.fmprc.gov. Retrieved on 5 May 2013.
22. Ibid.
23. Ministry of External Affairs, India, India–Japan Relations. Available at http://www.mea.gov.in/. Accessed on 2 November 2013.
24. MOFA, Japan, Vision for the Enhancement of Japan–India Strategic and Global Partnership upon Entering the Year of the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/. Accessed on 2 November 2013.
25. MOFA, Op.Cit.
26. MEA, India (2012), “Joint Statement on Prime Minister’s visit to Japan: Strengthening the Strategic and Global Partnership between India and Japan beyond the 60th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations”, [on line] http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/21755/Joint+Statement+on+Prime+Ministers+visit+to+Japan+Strengthening+the+Strategic+and+Global+Partnership+between+India+and+Japan+beyond+the+60th+Anniversary+of+Diplomatic+Relations; retrieved, December 12, 2013.
27. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Annual Report: 2014–15 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2015), 37.
28. Export–Import Data Bank, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.
29. ‘British Foreign Policy Since 1997’, Research Paper 08/56 (London: House of Commons Library, 2008).
30. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Annual Report: 2014–15 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2015), 104.
31. Export–Import Data Bank, Ministry of Commerce, Government of India.