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Foreign Policies of Major Nations: India, The United States, China, Russia, Japan, England

PART I

India’s Foreign Policy

Origin and Philosophical Base

The foreign policy of any nation is the reflection of its tradition, cultural heritage and sociopolitical and economic conditions. Indian foreign policy is no exception. It draws inspiration from the age-old tradition of the land, its rich cultural heritage, as well as from the comparatively recent socio-political and economic experiences. India’s foreign policy is imbibed with ideas of peace, universal brotherhood, non-interference and non-violence. The philosophical basis of India’s foreign policy is rooted in its rich cultural heritage that rests on Buddha’s tolerance, Emperor Ashoka’s non-violence, Sri Chaitanya’s love for humanity and Kabir’s religious harmony. Moreover, Guru Nanak’s idea of ritual-free religion, Tagore’s internationalism, Gandhi’s faith in non-violence and Nehru’s socialist inclination also had profound impact on India’s foreign policy at its formative stage. Further, the tragic experience of the Second World War and the use of atom bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki led India to put its faith on non-violence and peace. The bloc politics of the post–Second World War period—characterized by the East–West divide, bi-polarity and the Cold War that led to continuous tension and war-like situations in the world—was deeply resented by India as it chose the path of non-alignment in its foreign policy. In recent times, India’s foreign policy has been influenced by globalization and the idea of free market. Earlier, it was also influenced by the ideas of socialism, democracy and liberalism. Thus the philosophical base of Indian foreign policy owed its origin to the cultural heritage, socio-political and religious views of different personalities, prevalent international and domestic ideologies, as well as internal and external socio-political and economic events.

As a nation-state, India emerged in 1947, after independence from colonial rule. Any analysis of India’s foreign policy begins from 15 August 1947, the day India became independent. But in effect, the origin of modern India’s foreign policy could be traced back to 1946, when the Interim Government was formed to oversee the process of gaining independence. Jawaharlal Nehru, the leader of the government, and later the first Prime Minister of India, had started envisioning the foreign policy of independent India in 1946. The Second World War had just ended, and the spectre of a Cold War was prominent by that time. With his socialist inclination and utmost resentment for bloc politics, Nehru was conceptualizing the ideas of non-alignment in 1946. In a radio address to the people in 1946 as leader of the Interim Government, Nehru espoused the idea of non-alignment. In his address he said: ‘We propose as far as possible to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disaster on an even vaster scale’. The policy of non-alignment was thus considered as a part of India’s foreign policy before independence.

The foreign policy of a state mainly has two sides to it—the first is the ‘policy side’, the second the ‘application side’. The policy side consists of the philosophical or theoretical base of foreign policy. Generally, this part remains unaltered. The philosophical or theoretical base of foreign policy is built upon the tradition, culture, social and political history, and political ideas of great personalities of the state. The application side, on the other hand, is developed on the basis of the changing contours of national and international politics. As such, it is more pragmatic and dynamic as it has to constantly adjust itself with the changing demands of the times and politics. The application side of a state’s foreign policy may not always reflect the ideologies contained in the policy side. For instance, one aspect of the theoretical base of India’s foreign policy is the policy of nonalignment. But in its application, India’s nonaligned policies were not beyond doubt during the Cold War period. Further, one theoretical premise of the US foreign policy is non-interference in the internal matters of sovereign independent states. But in the application of US foreign policy, one might also question if the Americans were true to this idea of non-interference during and after the Cold War. Actually, the theoretical side of a foreign policy relates to the ‘idealistic plane’, whereas the application side relates to the ‘realistic plane’. Keeping these distinctions in mind, we proceed to discuss the basic principles of India’s foreign policy.

Basic Principles of India’s Foreign Policy

The philosophical or theoretical base of India’s foreign policy relates to its basic principles. Here is a brief discussion of these principles.

  1. The architect of India’s foreign policy, Jawaharlal Nehru believed that wars had become irrelevant in an age of nuclear weapons because any war in future would be a nuclear war that could cause immense destruction in the world. So, every state should avoid war in the nuclear age, and follow the path of peace and friendship. India denounces war and calls for peace among nation-states of the world.
  2. Following the ideologies propounded by Lord Buddha, Asoka and Gandhi, India believes in practising non-violence in the world. It believes that violence can only increase violence in international politics. Two world wars and several regional wars are testimony to this belief. So, India calls for tolerance in international affairs and avoiding any form of violence in the international order.
  3. An integral part of India’s foreign policy is respect for and recognition of every state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Every state reserves the right to determine its own course of action without external interference. India strongly reaffirms its faith in this right and believes that sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state must be preserved at any cost.
  4. India believes in harmonious coexistence with all states, especially with neighbouring countries. It always put faith in the importance of maintaining friendly, cordial relations with its neighbours. Cooperation among states all over the world, and particularly in the neighbourhood, has become more of a necessity in an era of growing terrorism. So India wants to resolve its problems with its neighbours and also with other countries peacefully, through dialogues and negotiation, without external intervention. This is India’s stand with regard to its problems with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, and also other disturbing issues like abetting terrorism on Indian soil, drug-trafficking and ethnic issues. India firmly believes in peaceful resolution of differences among different states across the globe.
  5. Belief in peace in the neighbourhood is integrally associated with India’s faith in regional cooperation. India has always vowed for cooperation with its South Asian neighbours, and worked positively towards the creation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). It is sincerely committed towards the principle of regional peace and cooperation, and is very much interested in upholding and furthering the objectives of the SAARC.
  6. Likewise, India is committed to maintain and respect the purposes and principles, and abide by the decisions of the UNO and other world organizations. It believes that world bodies like the UNO are striving hard to maintain peace and security in the world, and every state must assist the UNO in this difficult task. World organizations also help states to sit and exchange their ideas on a common platform, and assist the developing countries to air their voices at the international forum. They also help poorer countries economically. This faith in world organizations has led India to join the Commonwealth of Nations and other intergovernmental organizations without surrendering its sovereignty.
  7. India also adheres to and upholds all international treaties, conventions, and statutes to which India is a party. As a responsible member of the international community, India considers it to be a duty to respect and follow international treaties and conventions. It also respects, as far as possible, other international treaties and arrangements to which it is not a party, for its desire to maintain international peace and security. However, India’s accountability to these treaties is limited and optional.
  8. Finally, the principle of nonalignment, as mentioned earlier, has remained a basic ingredient of India’s foreign policy from the very beginning. Nehru believed that bloc politics would only result in utmost rivalry and war-like situation in the world. It would also infringe upon the freedom of sovereign states to decide their individual courses of action, and lead them to become satellites of superpowers. Therefore, India preferred not to align with the prevalent blocs in world politics, a path it believed was the best for the newly independent developing countries. The country’s commitment to nonalignment did not wane a bit with the end of the Cold War, when the very survival of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was questioned. India believes that after the Cold War, the NAM can be effectively used to fight social and economic injustice, terrorist threats and environmental problems, and menaces like the digital divide. The NAM is still very significant in international affairs, and India continues to put its faith on nonalignment as an important principle of India’s foreign policy.

Evolution of India’s Foreign Policy: The Cold War Period

This section, as well as the next, contains analyses on the evolution of India’s foreign policy during the Cold War and thereafter, on the basis of the terms of different prime ministers of India since independence.

Jawaharlal Nehru (1947–64)

Since 1947, when independent India started its journey, India’s foreign policy had traversed a tumultuous path and remained a major area of academic interest. In this section the evolution of Indian foreign policy during the last six decades would be analyed according to the tenures of different Indian prime ministers. Jawaharlal Nehru, as Head of the Interim Government in 1946, and as Prime Minister thereafter for a long time, was the man who primarily shaped Indian foreign policy during its formative years. Nehru and his team provided the ideological base to India’s foreign policy and guided India’s international relations for a considerable period of time. The term of Nehru (1947–64) thus remained an important and crucial era in the history of India’s foreign policy. Nehru believed that wars had become redundant in the nuclear age, and peace and cooperation had become the key issues in international politics. Nehru wanted India to play a big role in this new peaceful international order. Friendly and cordial relations with neighbours were a priority area for him. He welcomed the creation of the Socialist People’s Republic of China in 1949, and extended an olive branch to the new republic. He believed that India and China, two big states in Asia, and two great civilizations, would be able to shape the destiny of modern Asia through their cooperation. With other neighbouring states like Nepal, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Burma (now Myanmar) and Afghanistan, he wanted to pursue friendly and peaceful relations based on mutual understanding. Although India and Pakistan had developed acrimonious relations over the issue of Kashmir, Nehru was in favour of maintaining tolerance with regard to Pakistan. He even developed friendly relations with Britain, putting aside colonial hangovers.

His unflinching quest for peace led Nehru to seek ‘political’ solutions to all problems rather than ‘military’ ones. He never wanted the military as a backup force to foreign policy. In fact, he was opposed to the idea of a strong defence policy for India, as he believed that the balance of power existing in international politics was a covert guarantee for India’s security.1 However, Nehru’s views were not always shared by other world leaders. His policy of nonalignment was viewed with suspicion initially by both the superpowers, and India was unable to develop close contacts with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Although for strategic reasons and Cold War political calculations, Soviet Union later came closer to India, that proximity mainly boomed during the post-Nehru period. Nehru’s friendly gestures towards China was also not met with equal reciprocity as China started accusing India of meddling in the Tibet issue, and ‘controlling’ what China described as large parts of ‘Chinese’ territory. Much to Nehru’s shock and bewilderment, China attacked India in 1962, and humiliated a militarily weak India. Nehru’s China policy, viewed from an impartial angle, failed. India’s defeat in the war of 1962 also put a question mark over Nehru’s defence policy. It revealed starkly that it was very difficult for a militarily weak and economically backward state to play the role of a global leader.

Nehru was a visionary and an ideologue. He preferred to see India assuming the position of a leader of the developing nonaligned states. He wanted India to lead the struggling people of the developing world. But during Nehru’s time, the country was not militarily and economically strong enough to assume such a role. Nehru was not much concerned about the big powers and their estranged relations with India; he wanted to place his country as the leader of the third world. So he wanted to endear China more than the United States, the Soviet Union or France. As a developing and a socialist state, China drew his attention more than the United States or the Soviet Union. So Nehru was very upset when China attacked and humiliated India.2 Among the major powers, Nehru’s India was able to develop cordial relations only with Britain, as India’s relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and France were distant; and with China, it was adversarial.

But at the same time, Nehru earned for India and for himself what was perhaps a very special position of ideological leadership, through the policies of nonalignment and peaceful tolerance. Nehru’s India was able to provide an alternative to bipolar politics to the vast majority of states in the developing world through the policies of nonalignment that gradually grew into a movement. Although nonalignment was questioned by the superpowers, it gave Nehru and India a preeminent position in international politics. Nehru would be acknowledged as an architect of India’s foreign policy, and a founder of the NAM. India’s foreign policy still follows the path shown by Jawaharlal Nehru in many respects.

Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964–66) and Indira Gandhi (1966–77 and 1979–84)

After Nehru’s death in 1964, Lal Bahadur Shastri became the Prime Minister of India. Unlike Nehru, Shastri was not a foreign policy person; he concentrated more on domestic affairs, his forte, leaving foreign issues to specialists and experts. Shastri’s government mainly followed the foreign policies pursued by the previous government of Nehru, albeit with an important departure: Shastri started military preparedness for India. India’s defeat in the war with China in 1962 was fresh in Shastri’s mind as he ordered military build-up for his country. The Indian military put up a reasonably satisfactory performance during India’s war with Pakistan in 1965 over the issue of Kashmir. Shastri did not have enough time to shape India’s foreign or domestic policies. At the behest of Soviet leaders, he had gone to Tashkent, Soviet Union, in 1966 for post-war talks with Pakistan. He died there prematurely.

Indira Gandhi, the daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru, was chosen the Prime Minister of India by the ruling Congress Party after the untimely death of Lal Bahadur Shastri. Indira’s premiership was divided into two parts—the first from 1966 to 1977 and the second from 1979 to 1984. She got plenty of time to guide and shape India’s foreign policy. She did not alter the theoretical base founded by her father, although she made important changes to the ‘application side’. For instance, it was Indira who made India a forceful regional power with a very strong military. If her father nurtured the vision of making India the ideological global leader, she wanted to see a militarily strong India ready to fulfill her national interests. In fact, she abandoned her father’s policy of equidistance from both the superpowers and gradually became close to the Soviet Union. Realizing that alienating both the superpowers would not help India’s national interests, she decided to move closer to one of them, although she continued to proclaim her faith in nonalignment. Indira Gandhi was the first Prime Minister of India to successfully separate the ‘application side’ from the more theoretical ‘policy side’ in India’s foreign policy.

Unlike her father who liked to pursue a ‘macro’ approach in foreign policy, Indira preferred a ‘micro’ approach as she wanted to visualize India as a regional power rather than as a spiritual world leader. To realize this vision, Indira concentrated on economic development and military build-up. The process of building a strong military for India, which started during Shastri’s tenure, got tremendous boost during Indira’s first tenure. India gradually became a regional power with a reasonably strong military during her time. India’s military might was demonstrated in the 1971 war with Pakistan, a war that India won convincingly for the first time. The moment of glory for Indira’s foreign policy also arrived in 1971, when the government was successful in achieving maximum international support for India’s position in the East Pakistan crisis. India’s military action against Pakistan in 1971 helped to form the state of Bangladesh, a step considered a diplomatic success for Indira Gandhi’s government. Three and a half months before the military involvement in East Pakistan, the government concluded a twenty-year ‘friendship treaty’ with the Soviet Union in August 1971, considered another landmark in Indira’s foreign policy, which in effect was a security guarantee for India from the superpower. Through this Treaty, Indira was successful in neutralizing the fear of American intervention in favour of Pakistan in the 1971 crisis.

Riding on her success in 1971, Indira Gandhi actually commanded the Simla Agreement of 1972 with a weak and vulnerable Pakistan. This agreement, which mainly provided for peaceful settlement of all unresolved problems between the two countries, was another ‘success’ for Gandhi’s foreign policy. Now she was in total command, as India was also on a high from a diplomatic point of view. A confident Mrs Gandhi, in her quest to see India as a permanently strong power in Asia, decided to conduct India’s first nuclear explosions in the deserts of Pokhran, Rajasthan, in May 1974. The Indian nuclear tests raised hue and cry, particularly from the American nonproliferation lobby, as India’s relations with the United States, already not much cordial, plummeted to a new low. Whether or not these nuclear tests of 1974 helped Indira Gandhi’s government remained a debatable issue; but there was little doubt that going nuclear was a very bold step for India at that point of time.

In her first tenure (1966–77), Indira Gandhi’s foreign policy was successful in achieving its goals. India was established as a strong regional power and Indira proved—as she had wanted—that only a strong state can fulfill its national interests. India’s diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan was tremendously successful in the war of 1971 and in the Simla Agreement of 1972. Although a little hesitant initially, Indira ultimately took the bold step of establishing close political and security relations with the superpower Soviet Union at the risk of getting flak from the opposition parties for deviating from the path of nonalignment. She wanted to be close to the Soviet Union to fulfill her foreign policy goals, although she alienated the United States in the process. During her first tenure, Indira angered the Americans for many reasons. First, the American position in the East Pakistan crisis of 1971 was markedly different from the Indian position. The United States did not want India to wage a war against Pakistan, an American ally in South Asia. Second, India’s friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, a Cold War adversary of the United States, did not go well with the Americans. Third, the Americans considered India’s nuclear tests of 1974 a violation of the international nonproliferation regime spearheaded by the United States, and opposed India’s efforts to earn the ‘nuclear weapons state’ status. India and the United States thus developed antipathy for each other during Indira Gandhi’s first tenure as the Prime Minister of India. At this point of time, Indira did not bother much about the United States as she deliberately went the Soviet way, realizing that one of the superpowers must be endeared to fulfill India’s national interests.

During her second tenure (1979–84), Indira improved relations with the United States, although her liking for the Soviet Union continued. One reason for India’s growing attention towards the United States was the presence of a strong community of Indian immigrants there, with over 3,00,000 people in 1981.3 They influenced the gradual change in India’s antipathy towards the United States. Although differences between the two countries over political, economic and security issues continued, a more matured Indira was now less hostile towards the United States as more and more young Indians were preferring the United States as their destination for a job or for higher education. The change in the Indian attitude about the Americans had actually started in the early 1980s, during Indira Gandhi’s second tenure. However, relations with Pakistan and China continued to be adversarial, as both were contenders to India’s regional power ambitions, and they were engaged in arms transfers and nuclear-power-related transfers to put India under pressure. With Britain and other Western powers, India’s relations were of a ‘not too close, not too far’ nature, because Indira, like her father, maintained close relations with the socialist East. She was nevertheless able to retain India’s leadership role in the NAM, despite India’s proximity to the Soviet Union. Mixing these two apparently opposing trends—closeness to a superpower and following nonalignment at the same time—was another diplomatic marvel during Indira’s tenures as the Prime Minister of India. In the overall analysis, Indira Gandhi was able to command respect for India from the international community by cementing India’s position as a strong regional power, and through forceful diplomacy that was successful in achieving India’s national interests.

Morarji Desai (1977–79) and Charan Singh (1979)

After the fall of the Indira Gandhi government in 1977, Morarji Desai of the Janata Party formed the first non-Congress, and the first coalition, government in India. Desai was known in the West as a person with soft attitude towards the United States and the Western world. This image of the Indian Prime Minister helped to bring the United States closer to India. Desai was also keen on breaking the perceived Soviet-tilt in India’s foreign policy. Encouraged by Desai’s policy stance, the United States also showed its interest in strengthening relations with India. US President Jimmy Carter paid an official visit to India in January 1978. He was the first American President to visit India in nineteen years, after President Eisenhower’s visit to New Delhi in December 1959. Desai and Carter signed the ‘Delhi Declaration’ on 3 January 1978, that called for, among other issues, improved cooperation between the two nations, speeding up the process of global disarmament, and the need to remove economic disparity among nations of the world. Desai paid a reciprocal visit to the United States in June 1978, signalling warmth in bilateral relationship. This was the first reciprocal visit of the leaders of the two nations in a single calendar year. The visit was indicative of an improved relationship between the United States and India. The United States became the largest trading partner of India, and Indo-US two-way trade registered impressive growth during the Desai premiership.

The Desai government also endeavoured to improve relations with China. In 1979, India’s Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee went to China on an official visit, the first high-level visit after the war of 1962. Vajpayee’s visit revived hopes that normalcy would prevail in India–China relations. Vajpayee met Deng Xiaoping, the supreme leader of China, who offered him a package solution for border disputes between the two states. This package included the proposal from Deng that China would accept the McMohan line in the Eastern sector, if India recognized ‘legitimate’ Chinese claims in the Western sector. Vajpayee told Deng that India would sincerely consider the proposal. With Pakistan, always a foreign policy challenge for India, the Desai government concluded the Sallal Dam Agreement in 1978 over the controversial issue of sharing of Chenab river waters. The conclusion of the agreement sent positive signals to Pakistan that India was willing to improve relations. The Janata government of Morarji Desai was indeed keen on improving relations with all of India’s neighbours in order to erase the label of a ‘big brother’, a label India’s neighbours preferred to bestow on India earlier. The Desai government was able, to some extent, to give the message to India’s neighbours that India was interested in maintaining a healthy relation with all its neighbours.

The Desai government fell in July 1979 due to internal feuds among coalition partners, and Charan Singh became the new Prime Minister of India. Charan Singh was in office only for six months. During this short span, it was not possible for him to determine the course of India’s foreign policy. So he decided to maintain the status quo. But his government had to face a diplomatic challenge when the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. The United States expected India to condemn what the Americans termed as Soviet ‘invasion’ of Afghanistan. But the Charan Singh government was late in its reactions. When it finally called the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan undesirable, the United States said that the Indian statement was too soft and evasive. With a fragile coalition and a resurgent Congress party waiting in the wings to assume power, Charan Singh was in dilemma to issue a forthright statement condemning Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

In January 1980, Indira Gandhi came back to power to assume premiership for a second tenure, with a comfortable win in the parliamentary elections. As mentioned earlier, she tried to improve relations with the United States during her second term. But her pro-Soviet image continued to prove a hindrance in her efforts. During this term, she was not able to make substantial changes to India’s foreign policy. She nurtured close relations with the Soviets, India’s biggest supplier of defence equipments and its security partner. India’s neighbours again developed doubts about India’s foreign policy, which they believed would rest on ‘big power’ ambitions under the guidance of Indira Gandhi.

Rajiv Gandhi (1984–89)

After the tragic assassination of Indira Gandhi in October 1984, her eldest son Rajiv Gandhi was chosen by the Congress Party as the Prime Minister of India. In the parliamentary elections of January 1985, Rajiv Gandhi won a landslide mandate to consolidate his position as the leader of the Congress Party, and of India. As the youngest Prime Minister, Rajiv wanted to see a technologically equipped and economically strong India. He visualized a modern India through the information technology revolution. He understood that India should cultivate better relations with the technologically advanced United States and the Western world. Although Rajiv did not deviate much from the foreign policy of his mother, he nevertheless tried to endear the United States, a trend that was manifest in India’s foreign policy during the second tenure of Indira Gandhi as the Prime Minister of India. The perceived Soviet-tilt in India’s foreign policy was also present during Rajiv’s tenure, as the young Indian Prime Minister paid his first official visit to the Soviet Union. But the Soviet visit was soon followed by a visit to the United States where Rajiv was able to establish very good personal relations with the American President Ronald Reagan. Rajiv’s personal chemistry with the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was also excellent. He was thus successful in improving relations with both the superpowers.

During his official visit to the United States in June 1985, Rajiv persuaded the Americans to sell Cray XMP-24 supercomputers to India, a feat considered as a diplomatic ‘success’. The Americans did not usually give these supercomputers, important for meteorological research, to countries outside the US lobby. Further, Rajiv was invited to address a joint session of the US Congress, an honour not accorded to his mother or grandfather during their official visits to the United States. This showed that the Americans gave him importance. India, under Rajiv Gandhi, also extended friendly warmth to China. Rajiv personally visited China in 1988; he was the first Indian Prime Minister to visit the country after Jawaharlal Nehru. His visit did help to ease relations with China. The most significant outcome of the visit was the decision to set up a Joint Working Group (JWG) to study border problems. It was decided that the JWG would meet every year, alternately in Beijing and New Delhi. India would be led by the Foreign Secretary in the JWG, while China would be led by its Vice Foreign Minister. The JWG met several times since 1988, and was instrumental in suggesting various measures to diffuse border problems between two states. The creation of the JWG was a major achievement of Rajiv’s visit to China. During his stay there, the two governments also concluded a few agreements on cooperation in civil aviation, science and technology, and cultural exchange programmes. This visit initiated a whole new process of top-level official visits between the two countries.

Despite many successes, there was a grey area in Rajiv’s foreign policy. His government decided to send the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka, as per the provisions of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord that Rajiv had signed with J. R. Jayawardene, the Sri Lankan President. The IPKF was sent to Sri Lanka to maintain peace and normalcy in the strife-torn island, ravaged by the ethnic Tamil problem. But the IPKF experience was horrific for India as thousands of Indian military personnel died or was injured in clashes with Tamil insurgent groups. Such casualties demoralized the military. Moreover, the expenses to maintain the IPKF in Sri Lanka cost the Indian exchequer heavily. The IPKF experience in Sri Lanka proved that it was difficult for an external army to control ethnic violence in an alien territory. The IPKF had to be eventually withdrawn from Sri Lanka in late 1989, with its mission remaining unaccomplished. The IPKF episode put India in a spot, as other neighbours smelt in it a hegemonic attitude shown by the ‘big brother’ of South Asia. It also remained as a negative chapter in an otherwise successful foreign policy pursued by the government of Rajiv Gandhi.

V. P. Singh (1989–90) and Chandra Sekhar (1990–91)

After the parliamentary elections of December 1989, the National Front—a coalition of several parties—formed the government with external support from the Left parties and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Vishwanath Pratap Singh, who was chosen as the leader of the National Front, became the Prime Minister of India. As he was more comfortable with domestic politics, his Foreign Minister I. K. Gujral mainly steered his government’s foreign policy. Gujral believed that it was important for India to maintain very cordial relations with its South Asian neighbours. The V. P. Singh government decided to withdraw the IPKF from Sri Lanka, to send a message to all South Asian countries that India was not interested in playing the role of the ‘big brother’ in the neighbourhood. The Sri Lankan government welcomed this decision, as India’s image as an ‘equal partner’ improved among South Asian states.

However, Foreign Minister I. K. Gujral’s sincere efforts notwithstanding, relations with Pakistan did not improve much during the premiership of V. P. Singh. One reason for the deterioration of relations with Pakistan was enhanced terrorist activities in the Kashmir valley which, the Singh government alleged, had Pakistan’s active support. The terrorists abducted the daughter of the Home Minister in the Singh Cabinet, and demanded release of some of their colleagues locked in different jails, in exchange of her release. The Singh government had to yield to this demand.Further, tension between India and Pakistan reached a great height as both the states increased the number of troops along the border, as reports of conflicts in the border areas poured in. Tension at the border led to a war-like situation. In an effort to diffuse tension, an anxious US President sent his special envoy Robert Gates to both India and Pakistan. China and the Soviet Union also appealed to the leaders of both the states to reduce troops along the border. Finally, both the states reduced troops along their border under international pressure, but relations between them continued to suffer.

In August 1990, Iraq attacked Kuwait with a view to capture Kuwait, and international politics heated up over the issue. V. P. Singh sent his Foreign Minister to Iraq to ensure the safety of Indian nationals living in the Persian Gulf region. Gujral met the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to discuss possible evacuation of Indian citizens from the Gulf region, and also other issues. The United States expressed its displeasure with the Gujral–Saddam meeting, although this did not cast a shadow on India–US relations. In September–October 1990, the V. P. Singh government allowed American fighter planes to refuel in India on their way to the Gulf. This decision of the Singh government created domestic political turmoil. Probably the V.P. Singh government realized the importance of the United States in the backdrop of a changing international order with the Cold War nearing an end. This might have prompted it to take sensitive decisions like allowing US mediation over Kashmir (through Robert Gates) and refuelling facilities for American fighter planes.

In November 1990, the V. P. Singh government fell due to internal political crises. An eager Chandra Sekhar assumed premiership with the support of the Congress (I) Party led by Rajiv Gandhi. The Chandra Sekhar government remained in office only for six months (till May 1991), including two months as caretaker government (from March 1991). So, it was not possible for Chandra Sekhar to take new initiatives with regard to India’s foreign policy. In fact, the minority Chandra Sekhar government, with the support of only fifty Members of Parliament, had to constantly work under the threat of being toppled over by Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress (I) Party that was waiting in the wings to take over power. It had neither the time nor the desire to experiment with India’s foreign policy. It followed the policies of the former Singh government in external affairs. Chandra Sekhar’s government also allowed refuelling facilities for American fighter jets. Rajiv Gandhi threatened to withdraw support from the government over this decision. This government also supported the controversial resolution of the UN Security Council that wanted to impose very rigid economic sanctions on Iraq. However, the Chandra Sekhar government, dependent on support from the Congress (I) Party for its survival, could not last long, as the minority government fell in March 1991. Chandra Sekhar’s government was the last Cold War-period government in India.

India’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War

Narasimha Rao (1991–96): The First Indian Prime Minister After the Cold War

In the parliamentary elections of 1991, the Congress (I) won a thumping majority and formed the government. Its supreme leader Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated during an election campaign, and the huge sympathy wave among the electorate brought back the Congress (I) to power. P. V. Narasimha Rao was designated as the Prime Minister by the party. He became the first post–Cold War Prime Minister of India. The end of the Cold War brought several important changes to the international order. To begin with, the end of the Cold War signalled the end of the bipolar nature of world politics that existed for forty-five years, and also the era of bloc politics in international relations. Second, with the disintegration of Soviet Union, the United States remained the only superpower in international politics. Third, the impact of globalization on international economy and politics became more pronounced than it was during the Cold War. Fourth, every state, now exposed to a new international order, started the process of redesigning its foreign policy with a view to adjust with the new international system. The Rao government in India also faced the challenge to suitably reshape India’s foreign policy to make it more timeworthy. The new government appeared ready to face the challenge.

Within two months of assuming power, the Rao government took a very bold step to reform India’s economy. The government, possibly under the pervasive impact of the process of globalization, decided to go for liberalization of the Indian economy. Rao’s Finance Minister Manmohan Singh announced on 24 July 1991 that India’s economy would be liberalized from unnecessary bureaucratic control and red tapes to make it more dynamic and competitive. He declared that foreign direct investments (FDI) would henceforth be encouraged; and the licensing system in industries, considered by many as the real obstacle to growth of the economy, would be abolished. The Rao government primarily identified ninety industries for each of which upto 51 per cent of shares would be sold to foreign investors. Manmohan Singh also announced that the Rao government would modernize, and if necessary privatize, weak public sector enterprises to make them more competitive and profit-oriented. This economic liberalization programme, launched by the Rao government, aimed—for the first time since India’s independence—at opening up the Indian economy to the international market and removing protectionist policies for industries. It was a significant departure from the so-called ‘mixed economy’ model introduced by Nehru and followed by India for more than four decades.

Although the economic reform programme of Narasimha Rao’s government was very much a part of the new government’s domestic policies, it proved to be significant for India’s foreign policy as well. The United States and other industrialized nations of the world welcomed India’s economic liberalization and hinted at more investments in the Indian market. In fact, data showed that FDI in India increased significantly within two years of India’s economic reforms. In 1990, total American investment in India was US $20 million. It rose to US $110 million in 1993.4 The industrialized nations of the world began to express their interests in the Indian market for the first time since India’s independence.

The Rao government realized that in the new international order after the Cold War, economics would be the determining factor for political equations. Moreover, to draw the United States—the only remaining superpower—closer to India, economy would be the best instrument. During the Cold War, due to India’s Soviet-tilt, the United States and other industrialized nations of the West Bloc did not develop noteworthy trade relations with India. Now in a changed international order, the Rao government decided to go for a market economy that could attract American and other foreign investors to India. This policy was successful, as the United States, encouraged by India’s economic reforms, constituted the US-India Commercial Alliance (USICA) in 1995 and declared India as the ‘big emerging market’ the same year. There could be no denying the fact that India’s economic reforms, launched by the Rao government, brought the United States and other industrialized nations closer to India after the Cold War.

The government, under Narasimha Rao, also strived hard to improve relations with India’s neighbours. The Prime Minister made an official visit to China in 1993. During this visit, the two sides discussed important bilateral issues like the determination of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and reduction of troops along the border. Rao’s visit helped to alleviate some of the bitterness existing in India–China relations. Government of India signed the important Mahakali Treaty with Nepal, facilitating generation of hydro-electricity and its export to India. This treaty helped to reaffirm Nepal’s faith in India. In 1995, Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao signed the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) along with other Heads of Government of the SAARC states, to boost the idea of free trade within the SAARC. The government also engaged itself in economic diplomacy with Sri Lanka. In late 1994, India and Sri Lanka announced the plan for setting up of thirty joint venture industries in both the countries. By 1995, thirteen joint venture initiatives started in Sri Lanka, and another seventeen were ready to be launched in the two countries. Through such economic diplomacy, the government was able to break the ice in its relation with Sri Lanka that had deteriorated after the sending of the IPKF to the island-state.

The Rao government tried to bolster India’s security and strategic programmes. It launched an ambitious ballistic missile technology programme and tested successfully the Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV) and the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) in 1992. In 1994, India tested ‘Prithvi’, a short-range ballistic missile that was subsequently developed into an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). An indigenously-built IRBM ‘Agni’ was also successfully launched in 1994 for India’s security purposes. Although India’s ballistic missile programme angered the United States, which was proclaiming nonproliferation as one of its foreign policy agenda, it did not affect the relations much due to improved trade and economic relations between the two countries. Overall, the Rao government was successful in meeting the challenges posed to India’s foreign policy by the altered international order after the Cold War. The Rao government could be credited with the introduction of a new trend of economic diplomacy in India’s foreign policy.

H. D. Deve Gowda (1996–97) and I. K. Gujral (1997–98)

After the parliamentary elections of May 1996, the BJP emerged as the single largest party with 160 seats. Its leader Atal Behari Vajpayee was invited by the President of India to form the government. But Vajpayee could stay in office only for thirteen days, as he resigned during discussions on a vote of confidence in the Parliament. The President then invited the National Front–Left Front coalition to form the government. After long deliberations, the coalition nominated H. D. Deve Gowda, a former Chief Minister of Karnataka, as the new Prime Minister of India. He took charge on 1 June 1996. He selected an experienced I. K. Gujral as the Foreign Minister in his cabinet.

The Deve Gowda government put maximum emphasis on better relations with India’s neighbours. During its short tenure, India’s relations with neighbours like Bangladesh and China improved significantly. On 29 November 1996, India and China signed a very important agreement on Confidence Building Measures (CBM) in New Delhi during the visit of the Chinese President Jiang Zemin to India. Zemin’s visit was the first ever official visit by a Chinese President to India. Article 1 of the agreement on CBM declared that neither India nor China would use military power against the other. Deployment of minimum force in border areas was also proposed in the CBM. During this historic visit of Zemin, the two countries also signed three more agreements: (1) agreement to cooperate in prevention of drug trafficking and related crimes; (2) agreement to maintain the Indian Consulate in Hong Kong and (3) agreement to use sea routes between the two countries for trade and communication. A high-level delegation also accompanied President Zemin to explore close cooperation in areas like culture, science and technology, trade and commerce.

India’s bilateral relations with Bangladesh, the Eastern neighbour, also showed marked improvement during the tenure of Deve Gowda. The Prime Minister requested Jyoti Basu, the veteran communist leader and Chief Minister of West Bengal, to visit Bangladesh and discuss the controversial issue of sharing of the water of the Ganga river. Basu’s able diplomacy and the positive attitude shown by the two governments led to another historic agreement between India and Bangladesh. This agreement, ‘the Ganga Water Accord, 1996’, was signed on 12 December 1996 by Deve Gowda and his Bangladeshi counterpart, Sheikh Hasina Wajed. This important agreement helped the two nations to settle an age-old controversial issue between them. Deve Gowda and Gujral also extended their cooperation to Pakistan. But their efforts failed because of the internal political crisis in Pakistan with the removal of the Benazir Bhutto government in November 1996. India’s economic relations with the United States, the only superpower, improved during the premiership of Deve Gowda, although differences over security-related issues like the CTBT persisted.

In the Deve Gowda cabinet, foreign policy was mainly steered by I. K. Gujral, the experienced Minister for External Affairs. Gujral always put emphasis on improving relations with India’s neighbours. In order to achieve better relations among neighbours, and to secure peace in South Asia, he formulated a set of policies that later came to be known as the ‘Gujral doctrine’. These were the main principles of the Gujral doctrine: (1) as the largest nation in South Asia, India must show a big heart. With neighbours, India must not ask for reciprocity, but should give all that it can in good faith and trust; (2) no South Asian country would allow its territory to be used against the interest of another country; (3) no country would interfere in the internal affairs of another and (4) countries of South Asia must settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations. Gujral analysed in detail these policies, which he believed would help to build peace in South Asia, in a speech he delivered in London in August 1996. The Gujral doctrine remains a significant contribution of the Deve Gowda government to India’s foreign policy in recent times.

Due to internal political crises, and pressures from the Congress Party, Deve Gowda was replaced by Gujral as the leader of the ruling coalition in April 1997. The latter took over as the new Prime Minister of India on 21 April 1997. External affairs is an area Gujral was comfortable with; and as Prime Minister he kept the Ministry under him. Since he was the commander in Deve Gowda’s foreign policy matters, it was important for him to continue the previous government’s policies in external affairs. So, after taking over charge as the Prime Minister, Gujral continued his efforts to improve relations with neighbours with a view to promote peace and security in South Asia. He attended the Ninth SAARC Summit in Male, Maldives, where he also had a special meeting with his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif. The two leaders discussed ways of settling outstanding problems between the two countries. In June 1997, India and Pakistan met again in Islamabad, this time at the Foreign Secretary level. The ‘Joint Statement’ issued after the meeting contained some definite proposals for solving the Kashmir dispute. It was decided at the Foreign Secretary level meeting that the two sides would form JWG to discuss outstanding problems in Kashmir, and take necessary steps to resolve them. The issues to be discussed by the JWG were also highlighted by the joint statement. These were: (1) peace and security; (2) Jammu and Kashmir; (3) Siachen Glacier; (4) Wulgur Dam, and the Tulbul Project; (5) ‘Sir Creek’ area; (6) terrorism; (7) drug trafficking; (8) trade and commerce and (9) cooperation in other areas. Through this joint statement of 1997, both India and Pakistan showed genuine and sincere efforts to solve the Kashmir problem for the first time since the Simla Agreement of 1972. The Gujral doctrine was India’s source of inspiration behind this statement.

The Gujral government also wanted to improve relations with the United States. In September 1997, the Indian Prime Minister went to New York to address the session of the General Assembly at the UNO. He also met the US President Bill Clinton to discuss bilateral issues. Clinton assured Gujral that the United States had no intention to mediate in the Kashmir problem, as reported by a section of the media, without India’s approval. This assurance by the US President helped to clear India’s doubts about the United States and brought back faith, an important element in bilateral relations. During Gujral’s premiership, three high-level visits to India by American dignitaries took place. The US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Commerce Secretary William Daley and Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering paid official visits to India from October to December 1997. The visits of these three top-level American dignitaries within a short span of time brought out the fact that the United States was considering India with importance. In fact research showed that during Gujral’s short tenure as the Prime Minister (from 21 April 1997 to 18 March 1998), India’s relations with the United States improved significantly.5 The Gujral government was able to improve India’s relations with Pakistan and the United States, two of the difficult terrains in India’s foreign policy.

Atal Behari Vajpayee (1998–99 and 1999–2004)

After the twelfth parliamentary elections in India, held in February–March 1998, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a coalition of several parties, came to power. The biggest coalition partner (in terms of number of seats), the BJP nominated its leader Atal Behari Vajpayee as the Prime Minister of India. Vajpayee took over charge on 19 March 1998. The BJP, in its Election Manifesto, promised that the party would reconsider India’s nuclear options if it came to power. In order to fulfill this promise in its Election Manifesto, the Vajpayee government tested nuclear bombs in the deserts of Pokhran on 11 and 13 May 1998. Pokhran was also the site of India’s first nuclear tests in 1974. So, the May 1998 tests came to be known as Pokhran II. Tension mounted in the South Asian region after these tests. Pakistan declared that India’s nuclear tests were dangerous for Pakistani security and that they would also conduct similar tests to ensure their security. At the end of May 1998, Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in the Chagai Hills region of Balochistan province. The nuclear tests by two arch rivals of South Asia not only escalated tension in the region, it also created unprecedented concerns all over the world. The nuclear nonproliferation regime, so enthusiastically championed by the United States and other western powers, was put to a real test. India’s Prime Minister Vajpayee announced that India’s nuclear tests were conducted only for deterrence, and India sincerely believed in the policy of ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons.

The May 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan had very adverse effects on bilateral relations between the two neighbours. The peace process initiated by the previous Gujral government got a jolt due to the nuclear tests. India’s relations with the United States also suffered due to Pokhran II. President Bill Clinton condemned India’s nuclear tests and imposed economic sanctions on India under the US Nuclear Nonproliferation Laws of 1994. The Clinton administration was very annoyed both with India and Pakistan as their nuclear tests challenged the nonproliferation efforts of the American government. President Clinton’s nonproliferation policies were questioned by the US Congress and the media. India’s nuclear tests and subsequent American sanctions on India took bilateral relations to a very low. Under the sanctions, economic aids to India from the United States and other financial institutions were stopped, and severe restrictions were put on military sales and exchanges to India. The Vajpayee government called the sanctions unfortunate, but at the same time reiterated that Indian economy was resilient enough to tide over the crisis. On the whole, India–US bilateral relations suffered tremendously after Pokhran II in an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion, reminiscent of the Cold War times.

But doors of diplomacy were kept open both by India and the United States after Pokhran II. Within a month of India’s nuclear tests, the two sides began top-level official discussions with a view to reduce tension and ensure security in South Asia. From 11 June 1998, India and the United States were engaged in diplomatic talks that ultimately led to the longest-ever diplomatic dialogues between the two nations spanning almost three years. In these diplomatic talks, the Indian side was led by Jaswant Singh, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, and later the Foreign Minister of India; while the American side was led by Strobe Talbott, the US Deputy Secretary of State. Singh and Talbott met in different parts of the world like New Delhi, Washington DC, Rome and Frankfurt, to participate in a total of twelve rounds of negotiations from June 1998 to February 2001. These diplomatic negotiations helped immensely to normalize relations between India and the United States. Under American persuasion, India and Pakistan also agreed to resume talks in order to reduce tension in South Asia. In February 1999, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee took a bus to Lahore (in Pakistan) to meet his Pakistani counterpart. The two leaders signed the Lahore Declaration on 21 February 1999. This declaration proposed several measures to restore confidence and normalize relations between the two nations.

The peace process initiated by the Lahore Declaration, however, did not last long as tension mounted again over the issue of intrusion of Pakistani troops in the Kargil region of Kashmir in India in May 1999. Relations between the two neighbours deteriorated again over exchange of fire between troops of the two countries in the Kargil region. The Kargil conflict virtually led to an ‘undeclared war’ between India and Pakistan. The world, and especially the nonproliferation lobby, became very worried about the Kargil conflict because it could get transformed into a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. As a consequence, the G-8 nations quickly condemned Pakistani intrusion into the Kargil areas and identified Pakistan as the aggressor. The Clinton administration in the United States also condemned the presence of Pakistani forces in Kargil and requested Nawaz Shariff, the Pakistani Prime Minister who was summoned to Washington DC, to withdraw troops from the region. For the first time since the Second World War, the United States showed its preference for India over Pakistan on the Kargil issue. Under US pressure, and also due to the valiant efforts of the Indian military, Pakistani troops had to finally depart from the Kargil region in July 1999.

India’s foreign policy faced severe challenges during the first tenure of Vajpayee as the Prime Minister of India (excluding an earlier stint for thirteen days in 1996) due to Pokhran II and the Kargil crisis. But there were some rays of hope in an otherwise critical situation that India’s foreign policy faced during this period. The Lahore Declaration with Pakistan and the American support to India during the Kargil crisis could be identified as positive gains for India’s diplomacy. The Vajpayee government resigned in the wake of a vote of confidence in the Indian Parliament in April 1999 and faced the 13th parliamentary elections in September–October 1999. The NDA coalition was voted back to power by the Indian electorate, and Vajpayee took charge as the Prime Minister for a second tenure (excluding the thirteen-day stint) on 11 October 1999.

The foreign policy pursued by the Vajpayee government during its second tenure became more matured and sharp. This government was able to significantly improve relations with the United States, Russia, Pakistan, the ASEAN, the EU, Nepal and Iran. It also reestablished diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, that were cut off during Taliban rule in that country. In March 2000, the US President Bill Clinton paid an official visit to India for five days. Clinton was the first American President in twenty-two years to visit India, after President Carter’s visit in 1978. Vajpayee and Clinton signed a very comprehensive and futuristic bilateral agreement, the ‘US–India Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century’ on 21 March 2000 in New Delhi. This agreement came to be known as the ‘Vision Document’ in diplomatic circles. It outlined in detail, the scheme of close cooperation between the two countries in political, economic and security spheres. It was declared that the Heads of Government of the two nations would meet at least once a year to discuss bilateral matters and to sort out differences. Further, an Annual Foreign Policy Dialogue under the leadership of two foreign ministers would take place alternately in New Delhi and Washington DC. The document also contained an elaborate scheme to institutionalize close cooperation between the two largest democracies. Some of the important institutions created by it were: (1) US–India Financial and Economic Forum; (2) US–India Commercial Dialogue; (3) US–India Working Group on Trade and (4) US–India Science and Technology Forum. The Vision Document signed by Vajpayee and Clinton remained the most comprehensive agreement ever in the bilateral diplomatic history. It contributed immensely towards the development of India-US relations during the Vajpayee tenure, and also thereafter. For instance, high-level official visits and dialogues started regularly between the two countries after the signing of the Vision Document. Vajpayee paid a reciprocal official visit to the United States in September 2000, the first reciprocal visit in a single calendar year after twenty-two years. Other top-level dignitaries started visiting each other’s nation regularly, and the institutions created by the Vision Document met as per schedule after 2000. It could thus be observed that the ‘Vision Document’ contributed to a great extent towards the improvement of India–US relations.

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited India in October 2000. During his visit, Russia and India signed defence cooperation agreements through which Russia promised to supply important arms and aircrafts to India. This visit by the Russian President helped the two countries to revive close cooperation in security affairs, observed during the Soviet era. Putin and Vajpayee emphasized the creation of a multipolar world after the end of the Cold War. In November 2001, Vajpayee visited Russia. During his visit, Vajpayee and Putin signed the Moscow Declaration to start close cooperation in trade, security and political spheres. The declaration also urged the international community to strengthen the UN system to fight new challenges like terrorism and environmental degradation. Vajpayee also visited England the same month to renew friendship and cooperation between the two countries. In July 2001, President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf visited India with a view to normalize relations between the two neighbours. Vajpayee and the Pakistani President had a summit meeting in Agra to discuss bilateral issues. But the summit did not yield any positive result due to Musharraf’s uncompromising attitude on the issue of Kashmir. However, the Agra Summit did manifest the intentions of the two nations to improve relations.

In order to pursue India’s ‘Look East’ policy, launched in the early 1990s with sincerity and vigour, Vajpayee visited Vietnam and Indonesia. There he signed trade and commercial agreements with both the states, giving boost to government and private investments to and from these countries. As part of the Look East policy, the Vajpayee government established close trade and political relations with the ASEAN. India had very little connection with the ASEAN earlier; but this government was able to strengthen them, with its renewed emphasis on this policy. The Vajpayee government was also the first to establish very close relations with the EU. In June 2000, the first India–EU summit took place in Lisbon, the capital city of Portugal. Since then regular summits have been taking place between the two. At present, India’s trade with the EU covers nearly 25 per cent of total Indian trade; but initiatives for better relations with the EU started during Vajpayee’s second tenure as the Prime Minister of India. So it could be observed that Vajpayee was able to pursue a more matured and focused foreign policy in his second term, because several new and unexplored areas in India’s foreign policy, as discussed here, were cultivated with good results during this period.

Manmohan Singh (2004–09 and 2009–14)

In the fourteenth parliamentary elections of India, no political party got a majority mandate, with the Congress Party emerging as the single largest party in the Parliament. The United Progressive Alliance (UPA), led by the Congress, formed the government with external support from the Left parties. The Congress party nominated veteran Manmohan Singh to head the UPA government. He took over as the Prime Minister of India on 22 May 2004. Natwar Singh assumed charge as the Foreign Minister in the Singh cabinet, but was later replaced by Pranab Mukherjee, another senior leader of the party. The first Manmohan-government was in office from May 2004 to May 2009. A few bold and novel initiatives in foreign policy matters were taken during this period. One of such initiatives was the plan made by India and the United States in a joint statement issued on 18 July 2005, during Manmohan’s official visit to the United States, to enter into cooperation in the area of civil nuclear energy. (This plan is hereafter referred to as CNEC: civil nuclear energy cooperation.) The CNEC proposed to make the two countries true partners in nuclear cooperation, rather than adversaries. The United States promised that through the CNEC, the Bush (Jr) administration would seek agreement from the US Congress to adjust American laws and policies with a view to implement the CNEC. It also promised to work with friends and allies to convince international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India. The Indian government on its part agreed, among other issues, to identify and separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes, and place India’s civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards voluntarily; and continue with India’s unilateral moratorium—declared after Pokhran II—on nuclear testing. The CNEC was a very bold initiative undertaken by India and the United States in the background of India’s refusal to sign the NPT and the CTBT, and India’s nuclear tests only seven years ago, in 1998. The Manmohan government believed that the CNEC would help India to join the international nuclear mainstream, from which India had remained officially cut-off due to India’s refusal to sign the NPT and the CTBT.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President George W. Bush (Jr) formally signed the CNEC Agreement on 2 March 2006, during Bush’s official visit to India from 1 to 3 March 2006. As per the agreement, India would open up fourteen of its twenty-two (65 per cent) nuclear reactors to IAEA safeguards. By 2014, India would also separate all civilian reactors from military reactors, and place them under IAEA safeguards. In return, India would be given recognition as a de facto nuclear-weapons state; and nuclear-related supplies to and from India would be accepted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The CNEC Agreement created a storm in domestic politics and landed the Manmohan government in trouble with the ultimate withdrawal of support from the Left parties. However, the government survived with support from the Samajwadi Party, and the CNEC Agreement was finally put into effect from October 2008. It was a major achievement of the first Manmohan government, because India–US strategic partnership, heralded by the earlier Vajpayee governments, was cemented through this agreement. Further, India could join the international nuclear mainstream for the first time through the agreement, and the country would be able to harness the potential of vital nuclear energy, required for a developing nation like India.

During his first tenure as the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh also put emphasis on improving relations with India’s neighbours, other important powers and regional organizations. The Manmohan government entered into a trilateral agreement with the governments of Bangladesh, India and Myanmar in January 2005 in Yangon. By this agreement, India wanted to pursue both trilateral and bilateral cooperation to promote, develop and implement projects and forums to augment the utilization and development of energy resources and related infrastructure in the region. The President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, visited India from 16 to 18 April 2005 to discuss bilateral issues. He and Manmohan made a positive assessment of the progress that had been made so far through confidence-building measures, people-to-people contacts, and enhancing areas of interaction; and they agreed to build on the momentum already achieved in bilateral relations. The two leaders also addressed the issue of Jammu and Kashmir and agreed to continue these discussions in a sincere and purposeful manner to achieve a final settlement. They agreed to pursue further measures to enhance interaction and cooperation across the LoC, including agreed meeting points for divided families, trade, pilgrimages and cultural interaction. Unlike his last Agra Summit with Prime Minister Vajpayee, the Pakistani President was more flexible this time, and a bit mellowed, probably due to domestic political crisis, and discussed on a wide range of bilateral issues. India and Pakistan continued their bilateral negotiations at different levels throughout the major part of Manmohan’s first tenure.

Hu Jintao, the President of the People’s Republic of China, paid an official visit to India from 20 to 23 November 2006. During his visit, the Chinese President met several Indian leaders and had important talks with the Indian Prime Minister Singh on bilateral issues. A Joint Declaration, issued in New Delhi on the occasion of Hu’s visit, identified a ‘ten-pronged’ strategy to improve relations between the two big neighbours. This ten-pronged strategy referred to the following:

  1. ensuring comprehensive development of bilateral relations;
  2. strengthening institutional linkages and dialogue mechanisms;
  3. consolidating commercial and economic exchanges;
  4. expanding all-round mutually beneficial cooperation;
  5. instilling mutual trust and confidence through defence cooperation;
  6. seeking early settlement of outstanding issues;
  7. promoting trans-border connectivity and cooperation;
  8. boosting cooperation in science and technology;
  9. revitalizing cultural ties and nurturing people-to-people exchanges; and
  10. expanding cooperation both at the regional and the international front.

As many as thirteen agreements were signed by the two countries in different areas. President Hu Jintao’s visit was said to be successful in the joint declaration. Although this official claim was not beyond debate, it was nevertheless true that the visit of the Chinese President helped to chart a new futuristic course in India–China bilateral relations.

The foreign ministers of India, China and Russia met at Harbin, China, on 24 October 2007 to discuss trilateral cooperation and global political and economic issues. This was only the third stand-alone trilateral meeting of foreign ministers, the first one having taken place in Vladivostok in June 2005, and the second in New Delhi in February 2007. Although these countries have been meeting regularly since 2002, most of the meetings have been held on the sidelines of multilateral gatherings. In the Harbin meeting, the three foreign ministers reiterated that the economic development of China, India and Russia made a major contribution to maintenance of peace and development of the region and the world, and proved beneficial to the process of multipolarity in the international order. The ‘joint communiqué’ issued after the meeting observed that with their continuous development and growing role in international affairs, China, India and Russia would further contribute to world peace, security, stability and prosperity. This trilateral-meeting mechanism among the three important states in international politics gathered momentum during the first tenure of Manmohan Singh as the Prime Minister of India.

The Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited India in December 2008. This visit was in conformity with a series of top-level visits by the leaders of the two countries. As Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh visited Russia in December 2005; the India–Russia JWG to Combat Terrorism met in October 2006; and the former Russian President Vladimir Putin visited New Delhi in December 2007. These top-level visits and cooperation between the two countries strengthened bilateral relations between India and the Russian Federation. In 2006, the Manmohan government established a strategic and global partnership with Japan to harness the full potential of the age-old India–Japan relations. As part of this policy, an annual India-Japan summit between the Heads of Government was planned. Accordingly, Manmohan Singh and Taro Aso, Prime Minister of Japan, met in Tokyo on 22 October 2008 for the India-Japan Annual Summit. They held the view that both the countries, as major countries of Asia with common values and interests, must strengthen bilateral cooperation as well as cooperation in regional and multilateral areas with the objective of promoting peace, stability and prosperity in Asia and the world. They also expressed satisfaction at the growth of bilateral trade which was projected to reach US $20 billion by 2010. The two leaders welcomed the satisfactory progress achieved in case of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). They expressed hope that the agreements would be mutually beneficial and contribute to harness the true potential of economic partnership. Further, the two prime ministers shared the opinion that nuclear energy could play an important role as a safe, sustainable and nonpolluting source of energy in meeting the rising global energy demands; and expressed the view that international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts must be reinforced. They also reiterated the importance of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. The ‘India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership’ was another major foreign policy initiative of the Manmohan Singh government.

An India–UK strategic partnership was also launched in 2004, and the Manmohan government worked hard to strengthen this partnership. The Annual India–UK Summit was held in New Delhi in January 2008 between Manmohan Singh and Gordon Brown, Prime Minister of United Kingdom. Brown supported, on behalf of his people, the India–US Civil Nuclear Agreement, and reaffirmed his country’s commitment to help India to join the international nuclear mainstream. He wished to establish close strategic links with India, as well cooperation in the areas of nuclear energy. The two leaders expressed satisfaction at the growing cooperation between India and United Kingdom in economic, educational, scientific and defence areas. Nicolas Sarkozy, the President of France, visited India in January 2008 and discussed strategic and economic partnership with India. Singh and Sarkozy announced an ambitious plan to achieve bilateral trade of a total of Euro 12 billion by 2012. Sarkozy also expressed satisfaction at the growing India–EU trade relations, and expressed hope that this relation would grow further during the French Presidency of the EU from July 2008. In this context, it must be noted that India-EU relations achieved significant growth during the first tenure of Manmohan Singh as the Prime Minister of India. For instance, India–EU trade has doubled just in four years, from Euro 28.6 billion in 2003 to over Euro 55 billion in 2007.6 India and the EU are also cooperating in areas like defence and strategy, climate change, education and culture, and health, and contemplating to have a Free Trade Agreement between them.

A proper scrutiny of India’s foreign policy during the first tenure of Manmohan Singh (2004–09) revealed that the Singh government was successful in establishing close relations with the United States, the sole superpower in today’s world, and with all major states and regional organizations that are important in the international order of the times. The Singh government established close strategic and political partnership with Japan, United Kingdom, France and Russia as the preceding analysis noted. With important regional organizations like the ASEAN and the EU, the Singh government was able to strengthen economic and political connections. India’s relations with neighbours like China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka also improved during this period. Therefore, it could be observed that India’s foreign policy passed through a brighter phase during the first tenure of Manmohan Singh as the Prime Minister of India.

The second tenure of the Manmohan Singh government began in May 2009. During this phase, the government continued with the good work it had done earlier to bolster India’s foreign relations. The annual meeting of the foreign ministers of India, Russia and China took place in Bengaluru, India, on 27 October 2009. In this meeting, the three ministers expressed satisfaction at the growing cooperation among the three countries in different spheres, and resolved to further strengthen the trilateral cooperation in economic, strategic, environmental and energyrelated areas. The tenth India-EU summit took place in New Delhi on 6 November 2009, and the Indian side was led by Manmohan Singh. At the summit, the leaders discussed regional and global issues, and the means to strengthen India-EU relations. The leaders expressed satisfaction over the rapid expansion of the relationship between India and EU, including very strong trade relations, and hoped that it would grow to be deeper and stronger, founded on a global, strategic and mutually beneficial partnership. On 16 June 2009, leaders of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) met in Yekaterinburg, Russia, to further their cooperation. The four countries reiterated their resolve to continue close cooperation in economic, energy-related, and environmental issues, and to maintain peace and stability in the world. BRIC is a very important forum of four growing economies of the world, and their cooperation is necessary for a better world of tomorrow.

The US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited India in July 2009. After her meeting with the new Indian Foreign Minister, S. M. Krishna, a Joint Statement was issued in New Delhi on 20 July 2009. The statement noted:

[Both Clinton and Krishna] agreed to strengthen the existing bilateral relationships and mechanisms for cooperation between the Government of Republic of India and the Government of the United States of America, while leveraging the strong foundation of economic and social linkages between our respective people, private sectors, and institutions. Recognizing the new heights achieved in the India–U.S. relationship over the last two Indian and U.S. Administrations, they committed to pursuing a third and transformative phase of the relationship that will enhance global prosperity and stability in the 21st century.7

The two countries resolved to further strengthen their cooperation in defence, civil nuclear energy, education, science and technology, economy and climate change. The leaders of the Group of Five (G-5), that includes India, China, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, met in L’Aquila, Italy, on 8 July 2009, and separately issued ‘political’ and ‘trade’ declarations after the meeting. The political declaration noted:

[T]he global economic crisis in its multiple dimensions, including social, employment and food and energy security risks, non traditional threats to security such as diseases and epidemics, as well as the challenges posed by climate change, underscore our fundamental interdependence and the imperative of enhancing cooperation to achieve equitable and sustainable development for all.8

The G-5 was a notable initiative of the Manmohan government during its second tenure, which was commonly referred to as the UPA II government (2009–14). However, during its second term in office, the Manmohan government’s performance in foreign affairs was not as bright as its first term. The government was more preoccupied with domestic political crises, spearheaded by corruption charges levelled against members of the cabinet. But a trilateral security arrangement among the United States, Japan and India, which began at the end of 2011, provided a silver lining in an otherwise lacklustre foreign policy initiative. This security arrangement manifested India’s willingness to augment its presence in multilateral forums. The effort also signalled India’s wish to have more cooperation with Japan, a major Asian economy. The UPA II government could not also give a final shape to the much hyped India—US Nuclear Agreement. This created some irritants in bilateral relations. With neighbours and other major powers such as China, Russia, Britain and EU, no significant improvement in relations took place during the second tenure of the Manmohan Singh government.

Narendra Modi (2014–)

Narendra Damodardas Modi, a BJP leader, assumed office of the Prime Minister of India in May 2014. Modi headed the NDA coalition, although BJP on its own got majority in the 2014 Indian Parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Modi, unlike some of his predecessors, had a special liking in foreign policy matters; and his foreign policy initiatives began next door, with efforts to improve relations with India’s neighbours. He invited Heads of Governments of SAARC nations to New Delhi for his swearing-in ceremony, with a view to send messages to neighbours that India was willing to have closer links with them. Modi’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy was successful in generating positive vibes in South Asia. Relations with Bangladesh witnessed an upswing with ratification by India of the Land Boundary Agreement that had been pending for forty years. Ties with Sri Lanka also got a boost, largely due to a change in domestic leadership in that country with Maithripala Sirisena replacing Mahinda Rajapaksa as President. The Indian Prime Minister wasted no time in improving relations with Sri Lanka, by paying an official visit to that country in March 2015, the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to the island nation in thirty years. With Afghanistan, relations remained friendly. In June 2016, Modi visited Afghanistan where he was conferred with the country’s highest civilian award. Prime Minister Modi assured the Afghan people and their leadership that India would always stand by the nation in times of any crisis. The Afghan President Ashraf Ghani had also visited India in April 2015 and again in September 2016. These visits amply manifested cordial relations between the two neighbours.

However, relations with Pakistan did not witness any major change due to continuing mistrust and schism. Cross-border terrorist activities continued unabated. Further, flash strikes by security forces of both nations along the Line of Control (LoC) escalated tension between the two. As a consequence, bilateral relations suffered. India’s relations with Nepal did not improve much during Narendra Modi’s first four years in office (2014–18), partly because India got entangled in domestic politics of these countries. India needed to follow a more cautious approach during the adoption of Nepal’s new constitution. In contrast, with Bhutan, Modi continued to pursue friendly relations. He preferred Bhutan as the country for his first foreign visit as Indian Prime Minister, which was never done in seventy years of India’s diplomatic history. This visit in June 2014 also manifested the fact that India was taking Bhutan as a serious partner in its quest for a peaceful South Asia. Modi’s visit was also a tribute to the country’s continued support to India in all aspects of foreign relations, including counter-terrorism initiatives.

Prime Minister Modi’s foreign policy proved to be more effective with major powers during 2014–18. The new Indian Prime Minister worked hard to strengthen relations with the United States. He has visited America five times till 2017 and established close personal rapport with Barack Obama and the US Administration. Obama also became the first US President to visit India twice during his tenure, which includes his presence in India’s Republic Day Celebrations (the first US President to do so) in 2015 as the Chief Guest. These visits by the two Heads of Governments were indicators of improved relationship between India and the United States. Donald John Trump assumed office as the forty-fifth American President on January 2017. During his election campaigns, Trump called himself a ‘big fan of India’ and praised Modi as a decisive leader, raising hopes of closer cooperation between the two countries. The Indian Prime Minister paid an official visit to the United States in June 2017 when he met the new American President and discussed bilateral and global issues. The two leaders resolved their commitment to deepen the strategic partnership between the countries and advance common objectives. With growing trade relations and increasing impact of the Indian diaspora in the United States, India–US relations will continue to expand during the remaining period of Modi’s premiership.

India’s relations with Japan continued to be cordial during Modi’s tenure. The signing of the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Japan in November 2016, a pending issue for a long time, was a notable achievement. The Indian Prime Minister also established good personal rapport with Shinzo Abe, the Japanese Prime Minister. During Abe’s visit to India in 2015, Japan promised to support India with US $15 billion for constructing high-speed railway system in the country. The Modi government has been instrumental in building India’s ties with Japan into a strategic partnership. Further, Modi’s ‘Act East Policy’ helped to strengthen India’s relations with the ASEAN and East Asia. ASEAN–India trade had grown nearly ten times from FY 2001–02 to FY 2015–16. ASEAN nations’ renewed focus on India could be viewed as a positive impact of the ‘Act East Policy’.

India’s bilateral relations with Russia also improved during Modi’s first four years in office. He visited Moscow on 23–24 December 2015 for the sixteenth Annual Summit meeting between the heads of governments of the two nations. Seventeen new documents covering a wide range of cooperation were signed by the two countries during Modi’s visit to Russia. Prime Minister Modi and President Putin also adopted a joint statement entitled ‘Shared Trust, New Horizons’ during this visit. The Russian President also travelled to India in October 2016 for the seventeenth Annual Summit meeting. During this meet, the Indian Prime Minister reiterated that Russia would remain India’s major defence and strategic partner. President Putin reaffirmed Russia’s continued commitment to the Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership with India. Under the Modi government, India’s relations with Russia were further energized. Prime Minister Modi visited Russia again in June 2017 during his four-nation trip to Europe. The eighteenth Annual Summit meeting between India and Russia was held in St. Petersburg where Modi and Putin talked extensively about the special strategic partnership between the two nations. Five agreements, including a crucial pact on setting up two more atomic power plants at Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu, were signed during Modi’s visit. A joint statement issued during the visit observed that India and Russia complemented each other in the energy sector and both countries will strive to build an ‘energy bridge’. It also noted that the future of Indian–Russian cooperation holds great promise across a wide spectrum covering nuclear power, nuclear science and technology.

Modi also took initiative to improve relations with Britain. He visited Britain between 12 and 14 November 2015. During the visit, the Indian Prime Minister and his counterpart signed a ‘Vision Statement’ which contained fundamental principles on which UK–India partnership would be built and also outlined a roadmap for deepening cooperation. British Prime Minister Theresa May travelled to India in November 2016. This was her first trip outside Europe as Prime Minister of Britain. She was accompanied by a large trade delegation. During May’s meeting with Modi, the two leaders emphasized on strengthening trade and business relations. However, provisions for easing of British visa restrictions for Indian professionals and students were not sorted out during May’s visit. The British Prime Minister attended the India–UK Technology Summit and assured more cooperation in the sphere of science and technology between the two nations. May also labelled India as a ‘closest friend of Britain’ during the trip.

But China remained a tough challenge for Indian foreign policy during this period. China’s increasing military and economic prowess made it politically more assertive in global politics. As a consequence, China tried to thwart India’s efforts to impact international politics. China’s refusal to allow India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group could be cited as a case in point. Moreover, China’s proximity with Pakistan made Indo-China relations somewhat difficult. Beijing’s active support for Pakistan, notably with the US $46-billion China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that crossed territories claimed by India, led to further stress in bilateral relations. The recent One Belt One Road (OBOR) policy, undertaken by the Chinese government, raised apprehensions in India. OBOR aimed to build roads (by China) along the sensitive Indian border areas. This did not go down well with the Indian administration. Chinese and Indian national interests contradicted many a times during 2014–18. Despite growing trade relations, and bilateral visits and exchanges, China–India ties could not be free from misgivings and apprehensions.

Modi’s foreign policy initiatives, therefore, yielded mixed results during this period, as the preceding analysis indicates. However, there was little doubt that Indian foreign policy became more assertive under the premiership of Narendra Modi.

PART II

Foreign Policy of the United States of America

Origin and Evolution

The United States, the only remaining superpower after the Cold War, has a long political history. The territory, known as the United States today, was discovered in the early sixteenth century by John Cabot, an Englishman by birth. Cabot reached the East coast of America and established a settlement in Maryland, Virginia. Before Cabot, another sailor, Christopher Columbus, reached the nearby islands of West Indies in 1492. So it was Cabot and not Columbus who discovered America. As Cabot was a British, he ultimately handed over the power to rule Virginia to the British monarch Henry VII, and a British colony, the first foreign colony in America, was set up in Virginia. Gradually other foreign powers reached different parts of America and set up their colonies. In the Southwest, near the present Florida, Spain established its rule. The French people occupied Novo-Scotia, the Dutch-captured areas around the Hudson Valley, while the Swedish set up their colony in Delaware. The first official colony in America was set up in 1607 at James Town. By 1732, the number of formal official colonies rose to thirteen, all ruled by European powers. In 1664, the British defeated the Dutch and captured the Dutch-ruled areas. Similarly, they also captured the Spanish colonies and established British rule over a vast area of America. Finally, the Englishmen defeated the French in the Anglo-French war of 1763, and established their sovereignty over the whole of America.

Anger and frustration over British rule began to be noticed in all thirteen colonies, and protest movements started all over America. The dissident leaders in all colonies gradually established close links among themselves bypassing political differences. They also set up a combined armed force to fight the British rulers. On 4 July 1776, leaders of the thirteen colonies signed a declaration proclaiming independence from British rule. This day (July 4) is now treated as Independence Day in the United States. Although America got freedom from British rule in 1776, it took eleven more years to start the constitutional process in the territory. In 1787, the constitution was adopted and the United States of America, consisting of thirteen former colonies, was officially formed. The constitution became effective from 4 March 1789. The two Houses of the American Parliament (Congress), the House of Representatives and the Senate met separately for the first time in April 1789. On 30 April 1789, George Washington took charge as the first President of the United States, and John Adams assumed office as the first Vice President of the country. Gradually, states were reorganized in the United States and today, the US Federation consists of fifty states. An abundance of natural resources, spectacular development of agriculture and industry, science and technology, and above all, human endeavour, have made the United States the only economic, political, military and technical superpower in the world.

The political history of the United States is, therefore, more than 230 years old (from 1776), and its constitutional history is more than 220 years old (from 1787). But in its long constitutional history, the US foreign policy mainly followed a policy of isolationism—willful abstinence from the main currents of international politics. From 1789 to 1940, the United States never involved itself actively in international politics, although it maintained diplomatic ties with several countries. For more than 150 years, US foreign policy had an ‘isolationist phase’, with much less active involvement in international politics outside the continent. It was not before the Second World War that the United States took active interest in international politics. It wanted to follow the policy of non-involvement in the Second World War as well. Franklin D. Roosevelt, who became the US President in 1933, announced on 5 September 1939—two days after the Second World War started—that the United States would remain neutral in the war. However, the United States changed its decision later and joined the war. Hitler and Mussolini declared war on the United States on 11 December 1941, after the Japanese military bombed Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. All these events compelled the United States to break its isolationism and join the war. From 1941, the United States got involved with the main currents of international politics.

The Second World War ended in 1945. The same year, Harry S. Truman became the American President after the death of Roosevelt. Remarkable changes took place in international politics after the Second World War. The erstwhile major powers of Europe were hit hard by the war and their economies were devastated. As a consequence, they could not retain their supremacy in international politics, and Europe, long considered as a centre of power in international relations, failed to sustain its preeminent position. Instead, two non-European powers, with nuclear arms and strong industrial and military bases, emerged as new superpowers in international politics. The United States, along with the Soviet Union (not strictly a European power with vast territories in Asia), were the two new superpowers in the world and they emerged as the controllers of international politics after the Second World War. President Truman and his administration were new to a superpower status for America, but adjusted well to play the leading role in world politics. Truman and his Secretary of State, George Marshall, declared grandiose plans to ‘revamp’ the economy of West European states, many of which were American allies during the war and American supporters after it. Overtly, the ‘Truman Doctrine’ and the ‘Marshall Plan’ were American policies to help its friends, but the Soviet Union saw in them clandestine designs to spread American influence in Europe, and efforts to thwart the ‘march’ of communism in the continent. These two policies of the United States, and the issue of the division of Germany earlier, were believed to be among the reasons for a Cold War between the two superpowers, which the United States had to sustain for four and a half decades after the Second World War. American foreign policy was very much influenced, directly or indirectly, by the events of the Cold War that existed from 1945 to 1990.

It would not be untrue to state that the foreign policy of the United States (and also of the Soviet Union) was centered on Cold War issues for four and a half decades. All American Presidents during the Cold War period, from Truman to George Bush (Sr), framed their foreign policies to counter the Soviet Union and its possible ‘advantage’ over the United States in world politics. The creation of the NATO, the American positions over the Korean War, the Suez crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Hungarian uprising, the Czechoslovak uprising, the Vietnam War, and the ‘Star Wars’ programme could be cited as some of the instances of how Cold War political and strategic calculations dominated American foreign policy for more than four decades. Many writers like Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay believe that the US foreign policy suffered from a Soviet obsession during the Cold War. America’s (and Soviet Union’s) relations with other countries outside the two ‘blocs’ (West and East) were also influenced by Cold War rivalry. For instance, America’s relations with states ‘A’ or ‘B’ were termed as a counter-Soviet alliance, and Soviet Union’s ties with states ‘C’ or ‘D’ were seen as anti-American lobby. America, for instance, viewed India—not belonging to any bloc—with suspicion during the Cold War period due to India’s proximity to the Soviet Union. Sometimes non-political exchanges related to culture, sports, science and education were viewed in political light and categorized as anti-American (or anti-Soviet) activities. It would not be an overstatement to say that American foreign policy largely suffered from a kind of fixity during the Cold War period; it used to view the shadows of the Soviet Union everywhere, and tried to frame America’s policies to counter this ubiquitous presence of its rival.

US Foreign Policy After the Cold War

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War brought new challenges for American foreign policy. The Soviet-obsession, found largely in this policy during the Cold War, had to be changed; and at the same time, the policy had the responsibility to sustain the new-found role for the United States (the only remaining superpower) in the world. A new international order after the Cold War also necessitated changes in this policy. The immediate post–Cold War world order was mainly based on the following conditions: (1) the emergence of the United States as the only superpower; (2) end of bipolarity and bloc politics; (3) end of American and Western fear about the spread of socialism and (4) an apparent end to military rivalry with the decline of bipolarity and bloc politics. US foreign policy was new to such conditions and it had the responsibility to adjust itself and protect American interests in this new international order.

Foreign policy planners in the United States were ready to take up the challenges posed by the post–Cold War international order. In a new altered scenario, American foreign policy placed emphasis on the following issues: (1) nonproliferation of the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in the world; (2) protection of human rights; (3) economic diplomacy; (4) counterterrorism and (5) security assistance programme (SAP). But it should be remembered at this point that these issues were not refreshingly new in American foreign policy. They were also given importance in US foreign policy during the Cold War period. For instance, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were parts of economic diplomacy during the Cold War. The SAP also featured in the US foreign policy during that period. Some of these old issues were taken up and given new looks in the American foreign policy after the Cold War. As such, no radical changes were introduced in the foreign policy of the United States after the Cold War; the new policy continued to work through the amalgamation of some old and some new issues. In fact, in the absence of the ‘Soviet-factor’, foreign policy planners in the United States were trying to adopt some issues which would give American foreign policy a global acceptance after the Cold War. Their objectives were fulfilled to some extent by the adaptation of these issues in American foreign policy after the war. Consequently, these issues were highlighted in the post–Cold War US foreign policy.

At the time of the end of the Cold War, George W. Bush (Sr) was the American President. The Bush administration zealously pursued nonproliferation policies. The US Foreign Policy Department worked hard to contain the spread of the WMDs. After Bush (Sr), Bill Clinton took office as the US President. Clinton served two terms in office, from 1993 to 2000. His administration was the first significant American foreign policy planner after the Cold War. During his presidency, nonproliferation of WMDs became an important element of American foreign policy. The Clinton administration declared different countries of the world as nuclear ‘rogues’ and ‘threshold’ states. For instance, North Korea and Iraq were declared as nuclear rogue states. India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, Brazil and Argentina were termed as nuclear ‘threshold’ states. The United States also identified South Asia as a ‘nuclear hot spot’, along with North Korea and Iraq, and engaged in diplomatic talks with India and Pakistan—North Korea and Iraq did not respond to such talks—to encourage nonproliferation in these countries. It was believed that the Clinton administration was successful in persuading the Narasimha Rao government to abandon its nuclear testing programme in 1994–95 (although specific evidences were not available). The United States also engaged itself in diplomatic dialogues with other nuclear ‘threshold’ states to prevent proliferation of WMDs.

During its second term, the Clinton presidency also pursued vigorously the nonproliferation agenda. However, it failed to restrain both India and Pakistan from testing nuclear weapons in May 1998. An enraged American President imposed ‘economic sanctions’ on both India and Pakistan immediately after their nuclear tests under the ‘Arms Export Control Act’ (AECA) passed by the US Congress in 1994. American economic and military transfers to both India and Pakistan were prohibited under the AECA. President Clinton saw the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan as a challenge to his nonproliferation policies around the world, and therefore acted quickly to impose sanctions under the Act. The creation of the AECA in 1994 and its imposition on India and Pakistan for the first time in 1998, clearly indicated the Clinton administration’s emphasis on nonproliferation issues after the Cold War. The next American Presidents George Bush (Jr) and Barack Obama continued the American policy of nonproliferation of WMDs in the post–Cold War world order. In a speech in Prague on 5 April 2009, President Obama said: ‘We will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urge others to do the same. … To reduce our warheads and stockpiles, we will negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russians this year’. Clearly, the priority of the Obama administration is to secure nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the people around the world has found renewed importance in the American foreign policy after the Cold War. Concern for human rights is nothing new in this policy. For instance, the US State Department has been placing the Annual Human Rights Report (AHRR) before the American Congress since 1977 for discussions on human rights conditions around the world. The report contains human rights practices and abuses in every individual country. On the basis of this, the US Congress often decides American assistance to individual countries. The importance of this report has enhanced greatly after the Cold War because the label of ‘biased evaluation’, put on it during the Cold War by the non-Western bloc, has been removed. The AHRR is now considered as an important, mostly unbiased, document on human rights. The US Congress puts a bar on American financial and security assistance to those countries accused of human rights violations by this report. Sometimes, American diplomatic relations suffer with countries accused of human rights violations by the AHRR. Normally, the United States tries to avoid relations of economic, political or security-related significance with countries alleged by the AHRR of violation of human rights. But there are exceptions in case of important powers. For instance, China is almost regularly accused by the report of gross violations of human rights. Going by normal practices, the United States would need to ‘avoid’ any significant relationship with China. But after the Cold War, American economic and political ties with China have been growing significantly. US–China twoway trade is almost ten times more than US–India bilateral trade. Although the US Congress admonishes China almost regularly for human rights violations, the attraction of a huge market in China is impossible to ignore for the American private and government businesses. The market potentiality of China provides an explanation for the ‘soft’ American attitude towards China, although at the same time, the United States takes a very ‘hard’ stance in case of smaller countries (and markets) like North Korea, Libya, Sudan, Iraq, Iran, Serbia—all accused by the AHRR of human rights violations. This proves that for an economic and industrial giant like the United States, trade and business interests often score over human rights issues. However, American human rights policies have become much liberal after the Cold War, in the sense that human rights issues are used less for political purposes today than they used to be during Cold War times.

Another important feature of US foreign policy after the Cold War is the importance on economic diplomacy. Economic diplomacy is not new to this policy. But this issue has been given more weight by American foreign policy planners in the wake of globalization. Economic diplomacy places importance on trade and business, keeping aside political considerations. After the Cold War, the United States worked hard to pursue policies of economic diplomacy with different states. Enhancing trade and commercial relations with other countries, providing investment opportunities to American capital in different parts of the world, increasing American financial assistance for industrialization and developmental activities in other states, all these constitute integral elements of American economic diplomacy. With the onset of economic liberalization in many developing countries after the Cold War, economic diplomacy has proved to be a very useful tool for American foreign policy. Such liberalization has provided an unprecedented opportunity to American business to spread its wings in different parts of the world. The United States has strengthened its presence through capital investment, trade and commerce in many developing states, including China, India and the former Socialist bloc countries. Improved economic ties with many countries have helped the United States to erase political differences. For instance, a very strong US economic relationship with China helped both countries to overlook political differences. The United States also had political and strategic differences with India in the post–Cold War period over issues like the Indian nuclear tests and signing of the CTBT. But India–US relations have grown stronger after the Cold War, mainly due to strong economic ties between the two countries. In fact, all American administrations after the Cold War have successfully used economic diplomacy as an effective instrument of foreign policy to serve American national interests in different parts of the world.

Counter-terrorism constitutes another important aspect of US foreign policy after the Cold War. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States have strengthened American counter-terrorism policies. The Bush (Jr) administration declared a ‘war on terrorism’ after the 9/11 incidents and vowed to fight the menace throughout the world. Bush’s ‘war on terrorism’ contained four major policies: (1) no compromise with terrorism and terrorists, and no exchange or settlement with terrorists (like release of detained terrorists or economic exchanges); (2) judicial trial of terrorists for crime against humanity; (3) isolation of countries providing help to terrorists from the international community, and pressurizing these countries to abandon their harmful activities and (4) provision of all kinds of assistance to states engaged in the fight against terrorism. The Bush (Jr) administration also declared an ‘anti-terrorism assistance programme’ that contained, among other things, military training, exchange of information and security assistance to countries involved in the war on terrorism. Further, a ‘rewards for justice’ programme announced by the Bush Administration sought to exchange information about international terrorists with friendly states, and give rewards of upto US $25 million for information on international terrorists, and assistance to capture them. The Obama administration also stepped up American efforts on counter-terrorism. For instance, Obama’s ‘Af-Pak Policy’, announced in March 2009, sought to eliminate terrorist groups like the Al Qaeda and the Talibans from Afghanistan and Pakistan and provide massive economic and security assistance to these countries to eliminate terrorist activities from their soil.

SAP became an integral part of US foreign policy after the Second World War. Almost 50 per cent of American assistance to different countries during the Cold War period came under this programme, which was considered crucial for American strategic interests to counter Soviet influence. However, after the end of the Cold War, the future of the programme was hotly debated in the United States. In the absence of the Soviet Union, whether it would be wise for the United States to spend huge amounts on the SAP became a controversial issue. But all American Presidents after the Cold War preferred to continue with the programme, and the US Congress approved the budget on the SAP from time to time. The continuance of the programme by all American administrations during the post–Cold War period proved the importance of the SAP as an element of American foreign policy in recent years.

The SAP contains several programmes like Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Economic Support Fund (ESF), International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR). About 95 per cent of the SAP-money is spent on FMF and ESF. President George W. Bush (Sr), the first US President after the Cold War, lobbied hard to retain the SAP after the Cold War. Bush considered SAP as a very significant part of US defence strategy. He identified three areas in the American Defence Strategy which could be bolstered by the SAP. They were: (1) meeting crisis situations; (2) reorganization and (3) presence of US military in other countries as per requirements. He believed that the SAP would be very useful to protect vital American interests, mainly in these areas. After Bush (Sr), all post–Cold War American Presidents lent their support for the SAP and continued to consider it as an integral part of American security policy. After the Cold War, the SAP was used to strengthen democratic processes in East Europe, help counter-terrorism and anti-narcotic activities around the world, strengthen the maintenance of international peace and security, and above all, protect American national interests. The US Congress also allocated enough money to keep the SAP going during the post–Cold War period.

American foreign policy after the Cold War mainly rested on the five pillars, as mentioned in the second paragraph of this section. America’s foreign relations after the Cold War were largely guided by these five policies. For instance, US–China relations are dominated by economic diplomacy, whereas American diplomacy with Sudan, Libya and North Korea hinges on human rights issues. Further, American relations with many countries in the Middle East, Russia, Afghanistan and Pakistan are mainly guided by the SAP. But it should be remembered here that no country’s international relations are dependent on any particular foreign policy issue, and the United States is no exception in this regard. America’s international relations are also dependent on a combination of foreign policy issues. As such, nonproliferation issues, economic diplomacy and the SAP may be applied together for maintaining America’s relations with another country. Sometimes American foreign relations with a country may be guided by a combine of three, four, or all the five policies outlined here, depending on the time, the situation, and the US national interests.

US–India Relations After the Cold War

America and India did not have a close relation during the Cold War. Mutual disbelief and misunderstanding dominated bilateral relations from 1947 to 1990. The United States did not trust India or its policy of nonalignment due to India’s Soviet-tilt. It considered India as a Soviet ‘stooge’ during the Cold War. India, on the other hand, then viewed the United States as a neoimperialist and neo-colonial power with the ultimate motive to dominate the world. America’s ‘soft’ attitude towards Pakistan also alienated it from India. Such mutual disbelief and mistrust during the Cold War created differences between the two largest democracies. American diplomat Dennis Kux said US–India relations during the Cold War to be ‘estranged’. However, the end of the Cold War created new opportunities for both India and the United States to come closer and renew their relationship. There were several reasons for such opportunities: (1) the disintegration of the Soviet Union; (2) India’s economic liberalization; (3) the increasing economic and political clout of Indian Americans in the United States; (4) the emergence of the United States as the only superpower and (5) no special treatment of Pakistan by the United States due to the end of Cold War political calculations. It was believed by experts in both countries that the presence of these opportunities would help the two nations to forge a strong relationship after the war.

Some of the opportunities were used significantly after the Cold War by both governments to strengthen US–India relations. For instance, India’s economic liberalization in 1991 helped to initiate close economic ties between the two nations. The United States welcomed India’s economic reforms and American investment in the Indian market enhanced to a great extent. US–India two-way trade also registered significant growth. In 1991, the total volume of US–India bilateral trade was US $5,070 million. The volume of bilateral trade rose to US $14,353.80 million in the year 2000. This amount grew further to US $28,140.70 million in 2009 (till September 2009).9 In 1991, total American investment in India was US $97 million. It grew to US $900 million in 2000 and US $1,802.0 million in 2008–09 (April 2008–March 2009).10 These data indicate that India’s economic reforms gave a boost to US–India trade and American investment in India. In fact, India–US economic relations got significantly strengthened after India’s economic liberalization, and became the driving force behind an overall close relationship.

The emergence of the United States as the only superpower after the Cold War, along with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, also helped US–India relations. Foreign policy planners in India were quick to realize that it would not be prudent for India to continue its estrangement with the world’s only superpower. This realization led India to come closer to the United States. On the other hand, the absence of the Soviet-factor and Cold War political calculations led the United States to befriend India, an emerging market for American business, and a big power in Asia. Mutual trust, missing in bilateral relations for a long time, began to grow in US–India relations after the Cold War. The Indian Americans also played a big role in strengthening bilateral relations. The highly educated and economically well-off Indian Americans constitute the second-highest earning community—after the Japanese Americans—in terms of per capita income in the United States. As successful individuals in different walks of life, the Indian Americans started becoming actively involved in American politics as well. Many of them are now important members of the two leading political parties in the United States. In 1992, the Indian Americans formed the ‘Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans’, popularly known as the ‘India Caucus’, to influence America’s India-policy inside the US Congress. Although the India Caucus has its limitations, it nevertheless was successful in influencing American decision to back India during the Kargil crisis in 1999. It also played an important role in achieving the US–India Civil Nuclear Agreement. Overall, the contribution of the Indian Americans in forging a strong bilateral relationship after the Cold War could hardly be ignored.

President Bill Clinton paid an official visit to India in March 2000. This visit was historic because Clinton was the first American President to visit India in twenty-two years (after President Carter’s visit in 1978). He was the fourth US President in fifty-three years (1947–2000) to pay an official visit to India. This visit was seen as the outcome of a close relationship between the two countries after the Cold War. On 21 March 2000, US President Clinton and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee signed the ‘Vision Statement’ (VS) in New Delhi. This statement became a significant document in bilateral diplomatic history as it provided a detailed outline of the areas of closer cooperation between the two nations in future. The VS announced institutional mechanisms to expedite cooperation in different fields. These are some of the institutional mechanisms created by it: (1) US–India Financial and Economic Forum; (2) US–India Commercial Dialogue; (3) US–India Working Group on Trade; (4) Joint Consultative Group on Clean Energy and Environment and (5) US–India Science and Technology Forum. The statement also declared that the Heads of Government of the two countries would meet regularly—at least once a year—to augment cooperation. Further, Annual Foreign Policy Dialogue at the ministerial levels would take place to ensure close cooperation. The VS also suggested the creation of ‘High Level Coordinating Groups’ to monitor progress in bilateral cooperation. Vajpayee paid a reciprocal visit to the United States in September 2000. This was the first reciprocal visit to the United States—after Morarji Desai’s in 1978—in twenty-two years; it signalled a markedly improved US–India relationship. After these reciprocal visits in 2000, bilateral relations witnessed gradual upswing, and the signing of the Civil Nuclear Agreement between George Bush (Jr) and Manmohan Singh on 2 March 2006 in New Delhi was the outcome of this upsurge in US–India relations after the Cold War. Since 2000, the Heads of Government and other important leaders of the two countries have been meeting regularly and very intense cooperation in different fields have been taking place between the two largest democracies in the world.

There were, however, apprehensions in some quarters about the sustenance of a strong US–India relationship under the Barack Obama administration, due to Obama’s anti-outsourcing policies, affinity for China, and the Af-Pak policy that sought to reinstate Pakistan as central to US strategic and counter-terrorism policies. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s delayed visit to India in July 2009, which ‘finally’ took place several months after she visited other ‘important’ Asian countries, added fuel to such speculations. But during Manmohan Singh’s official visit to the United States in November 2009, President Obama called India ‘indispensable’ for the United States and assured that close links with India in economic and strategic areas would continue. Earlier, the American President had hinted that he was committed to take the Civil Nuclear Agreement to fruition. During the visit, Singh said that US–India relations rested on ‘five Es’ at the concluding stages of the first decade of the twenty-first century. The five Es that Manmohan highlighted were: Economy, Energy, Environment, Education and Empowerment. He believed that these five Es would guide future US–India relations along with defence, security and counter-terrorism. President Obama had expressed considerable admiration for India since he took office in January 2009. His official visit in November 2010 signalled India’s importance to the US administration. During his stay, President Obama reiterated once again America’s commitment towards building an economic and strategic partnership with India. The two nations have overcome many crucial hurdles (like India’s nuclear tests; US sanctions on India, etc.) in the recent past, but their relationship never remained hostage to such obstacles and it moved ahead. Our bilateral relations has attained considerable strength since the year 2000. In that context, President Obama’s visit to India added a fillip to relations between the two nations.

The bonhomie in India–US relations continued after Narendra Modi assumed office as Prime Minister of India in May 2014. Under his leadership, India–US relations continued to develop into a ‘global strategic partnership’, based on convergence of interests and mutual trust. As per a report of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), government of India, ‘Regular exchange of high level political visits has provided sustained momentum to bilateral cooperation, while the wide-ranging and ever-expanding dialogue architecture has established a long-term framework for India–US engagement’.11 The frequency of high-level visits and exchanges between India and the United States has gone up significantly in recent times. Prime Minister Modi visited the United States from 26 to 30 September 2014. During this visit, the Indian Prime Minister held meetings with the American president, members of the US Congress and also members of President Obama’s cabinet. The Indian prime minister also reached out to the American commerce and industry, civil society and think-tanks, and the Indian diaspora in the United States. During this visit, the two sides set up a contact group for advancing the full and timely implementation of the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and to resolve pending issues. This visit also facilitated the creation of an India–US investment initiative, with a special focus on augmenting FDI, portfolio investment, capital market development and financing of infrastructure. According to the MEA, ‘The visit also succeeded in reaffirming India’s strategic priorities in critical spheres of high technology, security, counter-terrorism and defence’.12 During the visit, a VS and a joint statement were issued.

President Barack Obama visited India from 25 to 27 January 2015 as the Chief Guest at India’s Republic Day. During the visit, the two sides issued a Delhi Declaration of Friendship and adopted a Joint Strategic Vision for Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region. Both sides elevated the strategic dialogue between their foreign ministers to Strategic and Commercial Dialogue of Foreign and Commerce Ministers. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi again visited the United States from 23 to 28 September 2015. During this visit, he held a bilateral meeting with President Obama, interacted with leaders of business, media, academia and the provincial leaders in the United States. Economic relations between the two countries have also progressed well in recent years. From a modest US $5.6 billion trade in 1990, India–US bilateral trade reached US $62.11 billion in the FY 2015–16. Several Indian companies are now investing in the United States. These include Tata Group, Wipro, Reliance, Piramal and many others. However, India–US bilateral trade relations need to be augmented further, with a target of US $100.0 billion by the year 2020.

During Narendra Modi’s June 2017 visit to the United States, bilateral relations were evaluated and analysed for further growth by the Indian and American leaders and officials. Modi met the new US President Donald Trump and discussed bilateral and international issues. This meeting was important in the context of changing global power equations where a more assertive China was trying to put forward its policies such as OBOR and CPEC. Prime Minister Modi and the US President Trump agreed to strengthen the strategic partnership between the two nations and cooperation on sensitive global issues. India and the United States have the potential to be natural allies in the future due to changing global power equations, being observed at this point of time.

PART III

Foreign Policy of the People’s Republic of China

Origin and Evolution

Today’s People’s Republic of China (PRC) has a rich political history. One of the most ancient civilizations, China’s political history is nearly seven thousand years old. During this long political history, China was under various rulers and political systems. It had dynastic rulers who ruled the land for long periods. Notable among them were the Shang, the Chou and the Manchu dynasties. The Manchu rulers governed China for a very long period, from 1661 to 1911. They were able to create a large territory that included Tibet, Mongolia and Sinkiang. But at a later stage, the Manchu rulers were unable to govern and protect this large empire. Inefficiency, corruption and extravagance of the later Manchu rulers led to the downfall of the Manchu dynasty. This unstable situation was exploited by different foreign powers to proclaim their dominance in different parts of China. The Russian, German, British and Japanese forces occupied these parts. But it should be remembered at this point that entire China never came under any particular foreign rule; parts of the land were occupied by different foreign rulers at different times. To protest against the presence of foreign rulers, and the corruption in Manchu rule, the Boxur Revolt was led by Sun Yat Sen during 1895–1900. Although this revolution was not totally successful, it nevertheless inspired people to unite against foreign rule and the Manchu dynasty.

After the end of Manchu rule, Sun Yat Sen became the leader of China in 1912. Since then, China experienced a republican system instead of the earlier monarchical system. Before the First World War, Sun Yat Sen relinquished power in favour of Yuan Shi Kai, although Sen and his Kuomintang Party were very influential in China during this period. During the First World War, Yuan Shi Kai declared himself as the Emperor of China reviving possibilities of returning to a monarchical system again. However, after the death of Shi Kai in 1916, the Kuomintang appointed Li Yuan Hang as the President of China, and declared China as a Republic. The tremors of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917 were also felt in China, and the Chinese Communist Party was set up in Shanghai, the largest Chinese city, in 1920. Several members of the Kuomintang joined the Communist Party under the influence of the Bolshevik revolution, and socialism.

After the death of Sun Yat Sen in 1925, Chiang Kai Shek assumed leadership of the Kuomintang party and China. Kuomintang preferred to call itself a nationalist party with the aim to create a unified China, and Chiang Kai Shek became, as the undisputed leader of his party, the harbinger of this aim. But Chiang had problems to realize the dream of a unified China. Among these problems, Japanese aggression, internal political and administrative corruption, and the increasing popularity of the Communist Party under the leadership of Mao Zhe Dong were prominent. Since 1935, Mao was pressurizing the Kuomintang government for rapid land reforms programme in favour of the peasants. Mao and his Communist Party started to concentrate on rural areas working on the welfare of the rural people, mainly peasants. This focus on rural areas yielded tremendous results as the popularity of Mao and his party soared in a largely rural, agro-based China. Before the Second World War, the communists gave issue-based support to the Kuomintang to fight Japanese aggression; but their ideological differences continued.

Gradually the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) emerged as an organized, popular and respectable political outfit, and during the Second World War they became a formidable political force in China. There were several reasons behind the phenomenal growth of the CCP: (1) Mao’s very able leadership; (2) call for land reforms and establishment of rights of the peasants; (3) support from the ‘socialist’ Soviet Union and (4) a corrupt Kuomintang rule. Mao was trying to topple the Kuomintang regime, and training the communists to fight the Kuomintang. In 1946, a civil war started in China between the communists and the Kuomintangs. The United States supported the Kuomintang regime through military and economic assistance. But the communists who were more organized and efficient (in guerilla warfare) won the civil war, and created the modern Peoples’ Republic of China on 1 October 1949. Chiang Kai Shek fled to Formosa (now Taiwan). The modern Chinese state (PRC) was born in 1949 and Mao Zhe Dong became its supreme leader. From 1949 till his death in 1976, Mao Zhe Dong was the undisputed leader of the PRC, and the chief architect of China’s foreign policy.

Foreign Policy of China Under Mao Zhe Dong (1949–76)

Mao’s revolutionary background and faith in socialism influenced his foreign policy agenda. America’s assistance to the Kuomintang regime during the civil war in China, and later in Taiwan, led him to locate the United States as an adversary. He believed that after the Second World War, when European imperialism had taken a backseat, the Americans had assumed the role of a neoimperialist and a neocolonialist. Mao’s PRC was very critical of the American role in Taiwan and in other parts of the world, where the United States was allegedly trying to interfere in the domestic affairs of states through economic and security assistance. American interference in the Korean War in 1950 angered Mao, and China’s relations with the United States plunged to an abysmal low after the Korean War. At various times in his leadership, Mao openly labelled the United States as an imperial and neocolonial power. Understandably, China’s relations with the United States were much strained from the beginning. Mao was also sceptical about other Western European powers like Britain, France, West Germany and Italy for their perceived anti-communist ideological positions. As a committed person to socialist ideologies, Mao was deeply resentful of the West Bloc, and almost turned China away from the Western world. China thus had very little relationship with the West European states, which were viewed as harbingers of capitalism and agents of the United States by Mao and his PRC. So China’s relations with the United States and other Western powers were very cold and distant during the Mao era.

Mao’s PRC went on a bonhomie with the Soviet Union, the first socialist state in the world, a superpower and a supporter of the Chinese communists during China’s civil war and thereafter. Ideological proximity and material support brought the Soviet Union closer to China. Moscow gave huge economic and technological assistance to China after 1949, when the state-building process was going on in full swing. China was creating its industrial and transport infrastructure with Soviet assistance during this time. But the Soviet–China proximity did not last long, as differences emerged from the mid-1950s, overtly on the issue of transfer of poor Soviet technology to China, but covertly over the broader issue of leadership of the Socialist bloc. The Sino-Soviet rift became very pronounced by the early 1960s as both China and the Soviet Union accused each other to be a ‘social imperialist’. China strongly condemned the Soviet role in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The same year, the two countries levelled charges of illegal occupation of territories around their borders against each other. China also severely criticized the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia in 1968 to curb a popular movement against the communist government. From the mid-1960s, China tried to be close to the East Bloc countries, only to arouse further Soviet suspicion. The Soviet Union viewed this Chinese zeal as designs to curb the Soviet influence in the East Bloc countries. However, China was able to develop close relationship with Albania by the mid-1960s. An angry Soviet Union stopped economic and technological assistance to Albania as a retaliatory measure. The Sino-Soviet rift continued throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, as both the socialist countries tried to provide leadership to other socialist states during this period, and viewed the other with suspicion and mistrust. US President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 further fuelled the suspicion. Soviet leaders alleged that China was trying to build an unholy nexus with the United States to marginalize the Soviet Union in international politics. China’s relations with the socialist superpower were thus mostly adversarial in Mao’s time.

Mao’s China provided support to the anti-colonial struggle in the developing states with the desire to become the leader in those states. For this purpose, China supported the NAM and participated in the Bandung Conference in 1955 that formally created the NAM. China also became friendly with India, and the two big countries of Asia went along well for some time. But from the late 1950s, border disputes and the issue of Tibet created serious differences between the two countries which ultimately led to the 1962 Indo-China war. During the initial years after the formation of the NAM in 1955, China was keen on becoming a leading nation in the NAM. But differences with India—and later with Indonesia—and the broader issue of leadership of the Socialist bloc refrained Mao from taking very active interest in the NAM. Instead, China concentrated on building good relations with some other Asian states like Burma (now Myanmar), Nepal, and Pakistan. Foreign policy analysts in India viewed this Chinese move with suspicion, a latent design to isolate India and strengthen anti-India sentiments in these countries. However, China’s efforts to become a leader of the third world failed, as it could not take leadership in the NAM, and as it developed acrimonious relations with many third-world countries.

After 1965, China’s relations with Indonesia and many other countries in Africa and Latin America deteriorated. Indonesian President Suharto alleged that China was instigating the communists in Indonesia with a view to create internal disturbances in the country. Suharto severed diplomatic relations with China. Three African states, Burundi, Ghana and Central African Republic, cut off diplomatic relations with China in 1965–66. Kenya also condemned the aggressive ‘socialist imperialism’ of China during this time. Mao’s China also failed to develop close connections with the developing countries of Latin America. It tried to woo Cuba to come out of Soviet influence by condemning Soviet role in the Cuban Missile Crisis; but Fidel Castro, the supreme leader of Cuba, remained committed to the Soviet Union during and after the crisis. China’s aim to lead the third world against the ‘imperialistic’ policies of the two superpowers was not realized, as Mao’s China got estranged from several third world countries.

Viewed from an objective standpoint, Mao’s foreign policy was not very successful. He isolated both the superpowers and developed adversarial relations with them. With important states of the third world like India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia (all leaders of the NAM), Mao’s China developed very antagonistic relations. China also remained isolated from the industrially developed Western European countries due to Mao’s apathy for these ‘capitalist’, formerly colonial powers. Mao, who was supposed to develop cordial relations with the poor states for his support to the anticolonial freedom struggle in poor countries, also isolated poor countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The Soviet influence over East Europe was a deterrent for Mao to make any significant impact in East Europe, although he tried and succeeded to establish close links with one or two smaller states in the region. But he failed to bring them out of the Soviet ring. The ideological underpinning of Mao’s foreign policy, to avoid the ‘colonial’ and ‘imperial’ powers, did not help China economically or politically, as China got estranged from the industrially developed United States and the West. The confusion in Mao’s foreign policy was manifested further when China got entangled in bitter rivalries with a ‘socialist’ Soviet Union, and ‘nonaligned’ India and Indonesia, and other developing countries of the third world with whom Mao’s ideology should have gone well. Instead, Mao’s China was soon termed as politically ambitious, with an eye to leadership in the socialist bloc, and the third world. This China aroused suspicion in the world, and as a consequence, failed to win friends. During Mao’s tenure, China remained largely estranged in international relations.

China’s Foreign Policy After Mao (1977–91)

China’s foreign policy during the Cold War years could be classified mainly into two parts: first, the Mao era (1949–76); and second, the Deng era (1978–97). This proposition clearly refers to the fact that after the death of Mao Zhe Dong, China’s domestic and foreign policies were controlled by another supreme leader, Deng Xiao Ping. Although Deng officially assumed leadership in 1978, succeeding Hua Guo Feng, who took over leadership for a very short period (1976–78) after Mao’s death, Deng’s rise in Chinese politics could be noticed from 1977. From 1977 till his death in 1997, Deng Xiao Ping remained the most prominent figure in Chinese politics. Consequently, Chinese foreign policy was also controlled by Deng during this period. He made significant departures from Mao’s policies, both in domestic and international spheres. Mao’s foreign policy was loaded with ideological issues like distance from the ‘capitalist’ and ‘imperialist’ states, spreading the message of socialism, supporting ‘revolutionary’ communist and nationalist movements around the world. Deng’s foreign and domestic policies were considered more pragmatic than ideological. Deng was the architect of economic reforms in China which opened hitherto closed Chinese doors to the industrially developed Western world. Chinese economic reforms helped Deng to pursue a more realistic and internationally acceptable foreign policy.

Deng realized that it would not help China much to isolate both the United States and the Soviet Union simultaneously. For China’s economic development, the United States, Western European states and an industrially developed Japan were crucial and more welcome than the socialist rival, the Soviet Union. China could no longer afford to ignore the Western states as ‘capitalist’ and ‘imperialist’ powers. In 1979, Deng’s China established diplomatic relations with the United States. Apart from economic interests, a common adversary (the Soviet Union) also brought China and the United States closer. American President Richard Nixon tried to break the ice in Sino-American relations by visiting China in 1972. But differences between the two nations persisted over Taiwan—which China claimed as its territory but the United States considered as a sovereign independent country—and Mao’s label on the United States as an ‘imperialist’ power. Therefore, Sino-American relations continued to be indifferent during the Mao period. It was Deng who broke real grounds to establish closer links with the United States and other developed states of the West.

Deng used economic diplomacy to attract these states towards China. In 1979, China opened up its economy, allowing private business to proliferate and foreign investment to come. Deng made a very new experiment for China. He retained Communist Party’s control over Chinese politics and the state, but transformed Chinese economy into a liberal market economy. A new Chinese Constitution was introduced in 1982 to facilitate liberal economic developments in China. Deng’s China created Special Economic Zones (SEZ), mainly in the coastal areas, to give special privileges to foreign investors. Now, the industrially advanced states, apathetic to China for long for its ‘closed door’ policies, felt encouraged and got attracted to China. The socialist market economy (SME) that Deng introduced in China was a new model in international politics and economy. It retained one-party control in Chinese politics and society, but allowed deregulation of the economy. Although there were initial schisms about the SME, it gradually proved to be a huge success and made Deng, the conservative pragmatist, the undisputed leader of modern China.

Deng’s foreign policy, must, therefore, be analysed in the context of the SME and his conservative pragmatism. The success of the state-controlled liberal economy in China, manifested through its economic growth rate, made China a very attractive destination for foreign investments. American, Japanese and west European private business started to enter China in a big way from the early 1980s, paving ways for the relegation of political differences to the background. China’s annual average economic growth rate for the decade 1960–70 was 5.2, and for 1970–80 it was 5.5. During the next decade (1980–90), when SME was operating, China’s annual growth rate rose to a staggering 10.3, almost double the average growth rate of the earlier two decades (source: International Monetary Fund). Therefore, Deng’s China was economically stronger than Mao’s China, and it was easier for an economically open and strong China to conduct international relations with more determination, zeal and success. As China shed its ideological bias to invite foreign investments from the ‘capitalist’ and ‘imperialist’ states of the West, these industrially developed nations also changed their views about a ‘rigid’ and ‘closed’ socialist state in Asia. Gradually China’s relations with the Western world improved, as China began to play, from the early 1980s, a significant role in mainstream international economics and politics. Mao’s China also wanted to play a major role in world politics, but could not fulfill its desires due to China’s closed economy and adverse international relations; but Deng’s China, economically open and strong, could play this desired role more easily, as China became more acceptable to the rest of the world.

China’s relations with the Soviet Union also improved after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR in 1985. Border trade between the two socialist giants went up and got strengthened by the late 1980s. Gorbachev paid an official visit to China in May 1989. Before his visit, the Soviet Union announced the withdrawal of 5,00,000 Soviet troops from its borders with China. Chinese leaders welcomed this Soviet gesture. In 1990, Li Peng, Prime Minister of China, visited the Soviet Union. A ten-year vision on close cooperation in trade, economic and technological areas between the two countries was announced during Peng’s visit. With ‘glasnost’ and ‘perestroika’ taking shape, the Soviet Union also opened up and shed its earlier hostility towards China. As a consequence, Sino-Soviet relations began to improve. Deng also reached out to third world countries, including India, to assess possibilities of improved trade and commerce. By the early 1990s, when Cold War was nearing its end, China secured its place in the international order as a rapidly growing economy, a strong military, and a more open state with a realistic view of the world. China’s journey towards a major power status continued after the end of the Cold War.

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